Dennett's predecessor brings it all together

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Dennett's materialist philosophy of mind, while unique, is not without historical precedent, particularly from David Hume, whose ideas on consciousness are relevant to contemporary discussions. Hume's concepts of "impressions" and "ideas" illustrate that subjective experiences can be traced back to objective phenomena, challenging the notion of a distinct "self" beyond these experiences. He argues that the comprehension of impressions is moot, as they inherently appear as they do without alternative interpretations. The ongoing debate highlights the complexities of linking neural processes to subjective experiences, with some arguing that the "hard problem" of consciousness may not hold weight if experiences are merely a product of ongoing neural activity. Ultimately, the conversation underscores the need for clarity in understanding both the binding problem and the nature of subjective experiences.
  • #31
Originally posted by Zero
That is still assuming that there is a non-physical element to "subjective experience", which the evidence and logic don't support.

I'm not sure what logic or evidence you're referring to but I'm sure you could list it all out if I asked you to. But instead of doing that, why don't you relate this logic to some of the key issues laid out by hynagogue? Specifically address where the hard problem lies. That would be helpful. Mentat is actually trying to do just that. It just seems he isn't quite able(or willing) to grasp the problem. Perhaps you can help.
 
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  • #32
Originally posted by Zero
That is still assuming that there is a non-physical element to "subjective experience", which the evidence and logic don't support.

The evidence does support it.

Evidence 1: I subjectively experience.
Evidence 2: No one can observe my subjective experiences but me.
Definition: All things physical must be objectively observable.
Conclusion: Subjective experience is not physical.

or

Definition 1: Subjective experience is defined at least partially intrinsically.
Definition 2: Physical phenomena are defined exclusively extrinsically.
Postulate: Intrinsic phenomena cannot be derived from extrinsic phenomena (follows from the definitions of intrinsic and extrinsic).
Conclusion: Subjective experience cannot be derived from physical theory.
 
  • #33
Originally posted by Fliption
Ad-hominem

It's easier to just assume someone is biased and irrational so that you don't have to address the issues than it is to lay out exactly why you hold the opinion you do. Don't worry, you don't have to do anything. I'm just pointing it out in case some reader might be lead astray.

Also I see this thread (once again) dangerously getting into this physical/nonphysical distinction. I think the problems with consciousness can be communicated without having to go into that mess. Be careful with that word Canute. Next you'll find out that Zero thinks Physical means "Everything that exists". So naturally there is nothing non-physical to him. By definition it must be so. The problems of consciousness are real and shouldn't be side-stepped because someone creates a semantic mess by defining things as they see fit without proper inquiry into the philosophical issue being discussed.
Not ad hominem at all...as far as I know, being emotional isn't an insult, and to my way of thinking I can discern no other reason to embrace mysticism over materialism.

Next, I'll tell you that "non-physical" is nonsense, because if it is non-physical, it doesn't interact with the physical world, and therefore cannot be defined. The basic argument for non-physical seems to be "because it has to be there, it just has to!" That sounds more emotional than logical to me. On the other hand, I say that while the non-physical might "exist"(whatever that means for something with no existence), there is no evidence or logical need to assume it.
 
  • #34
Originally posted by hypnagogue
The evidence does support it.

Evidence 1: I subjectively experience.
Evidence 2: No one can observe my subjective experiences but me.
Definition: All things physical must be objectively observable.
Conclusion: Subjective experience is not physical.

or

Definition 1: Subjective experience is defined at least partially intrinsically.
Definition 2: Physical phenomena are defined exclusively extrinsically.
Postulate: Intrinsic phenomena cannot be derived from extrinsic phenomena (follows from the definitions of intrinsic and extrinsic).
Conclusion: Subjective experience cannot be derived from physical theory.
It doesn't follow, except that you WANT it to follow.#1 in both cases assumes your conclusion.
 
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  • #35
Originally posted by Zero
It doesn't follow, except that you WANT it to follow.

It'd be nice if you could back that up. I could just as well say that it does follow, except that you don't want it to follow in order to hold onto your worldview.
 
  • #36
Originally posted by hypnagogue
It'd be nice if you could back that up. I could just as well say that it does follow, except that you don't want it to follow in order to hold onto your worldview.
Read my edit.
 
  • #37
Originally posted by Zero
It doesn't follow, except that you WANT it to follow.#1 in both cases assumes your conclusion.

My conclusion does follow from #1 in each case, yes. However, this is not something I have assumed. This is something I have observed to be the case in nature.
 
  • #38
Originally posted by hypnagogue
My conclusion does follow from #1 in each case, yes. However, this is not something I have assumed. This is something I have observed to be the case in nature.
No, it is absolutely an assumption. Have you every seen a functioning "mind" outside of a brain?
 
  • #39
Originally posted by Zero
Not ad hominem at all...as far as I know, being emotional isn't an insult, and to my way of thinking I can discern no other reason to embrace mysticism over materialism.

I said Ad hominem because you focused on the individual rather than the argument. Focusing on a feature of the individual meant to discredit the argument without evidence is a fallacy for sure. Just deal with the issue.


Next, I'll tell you that "non-physical" is nonsense, because if it is non-physical, it doesn't interact with the physical world, and therefore cannot be defined. The basic argument for non-physical seems to be "because it has to be there, it just has to!" That sounds more emotional than logical to me. On the other hand, I say that while the non-physical might "exist"(whatever that means for something with no existence), there is no evidence or logical need to assume it.

I don't disagree with any of this. When you define these words the way you do then what you are saying must be true. But these silly words/definitions don't have anything to do with the hard problem of consciousness being discussed here.
 
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  • #40
Originally posted by Zero
No, it is absolutely an assumption. Have you every seen a functioning "mind" outside of a brain?

If we take it for granted that a brain's physical properties are necessary for consciousness, we still have not shown them to be sufficient.
 
  • #41
There IS no hard problem. That's the point, the "hard problem" is an illogical pseudo-question based on unfounded assumption.
 
  • #42
Originally posted by hypnagogue
If we take it for granted that a brain's physical properties are necessary for consciousness, we still have not shown them to be sufficient.
You haven't shown them to be insufficient, and that is the claim and assumption you are making, based on circular logic.
 
  • #43
Originally posted by Zero
There IS no hard problem. That's the point, the "hard problem" is an illogical pseudo-question based on unfounded assumption.

Which is? Are you denying that you subjectively experience the world?
 
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  • #44
Originally posted by Zero
There IS no hard problem. That's the point, the "hard problem" is an illogical pseudo-question based on unfounded assumption.

Yes there is, unless you can explain to me how the brain is responsible for consciousness as well as you can explain to me how the properties of H2O molecules are responsible for macroscopic fluidity. That is, unless you can show consciousness to be a logically necessary result of brain processes, you have failed. Just saying "whenever we have brain activity X we have subjective experience Y" is not enough. That is an a postiori account, but to vanquish the hard problem we need an a priori account.
 
  • #45
Originally posted by hypnagogue
Yes there is, unless you can explain to me how the brain is responsible for consciousness as well as you can explain to me how the properties of H2O molecules are responsible for macroscopic fluidity. That is, unless you can show consciousness to be a logically necessary result of brain processes, you have failed. Just saying "whenever we have brain activity X we have subjective experience Y" is not enough. That is an a postiori account, but to vanquish the hard problem we need an a priori account.
Do you accept that the functioning of the brain is tied to the nebulous concept "consciousness? Do you accept that we have solid substantial evidence that the activities of the nervous system is tied in some way to that other pseudo-term "subjective experience".
 
  • #46
Originally posted by Fliption
Which is? Are you denying that you subjectively experience the world?
My brain engages in certain processes that we define as "experience" yes. Since those "experiences" are a function of my individual brain activity, they can be defined as "subjective". What is your point?
 
  • #47
Originally posted by Zero
You haven't shown them to be insufficient, and that is the claim and assumption you are making, based on circular logic.

P: Brain activity X occurs.
Q: Subjective experience Y occurs.

Perhaps we can establish P->Q empirically, that is, a postiori, but the hard problem is not about establishing such a connection. The hard problem is about establishing an a priori connection.

The only way I can logically imagine P ^ ~Q is if I have not been shown a priori that P is sufficient for Q. Given a physical explanation of subjective experience, I can still logically imagine P ^ ~Q-- there is nothing in the logic of the explanation that prevents me from doing so. (Contrast with the logic of the explanation of macroscopic fluidity in terms of H2O molecule properties, which logically forces me to conclude that the macroscopic properties must include fluidity.) This is the same thing as saying that it has not yet been shown that P is a priori sufficient for Q.
 
  • #48
Originally posted by Zero
My brain engages in certain processes that we define as "experience" yes. Since those "experiences" are a function of my individual brain activity, they can be defined as "subjective". What is your point?

Just trying to figure out which assumption you think is wrong. I just went to Hypnagogue's number 1 "I have subjective experience". Thought you claimed it was not a good assumption.
 
  • #49
Originally posted by Zero
Do you accept that the functioning of the brain is tied to the nebulous concept "consciousness? Do you accept that we have solid substantial evidence that the activities of the nervous system is tied in some way to that other pseudo-term "subjective experience".

I do accept this, although I do not accept your disparaging use of the "pseudo" prefix. In any case, you are describing an a postiori account, when the hard problem is about an a priori account.
 
  • #50
Originally posted by hypnagogue
I do accept this, although I do not accept your disparaging use of the "pseudo" prefix. In any case, you are describing an a postiori account, when the hard problem is about an a priori account.
Where's the evidence, equivalent to the evidence for the mind-brain link, that supports something beyond the physical? Come on, show me, I want to see it!
 
  • #51
Originally posted by Zero
Where's the evidence, equivalent to the evidence for the mind-brain link, that supports something beyond the physical? Come on, show me, I want to see it!

I already stated this, several posts back.
 
  • #52
Originally posted by hypnagogue
I already stated this, several posts back.
You showed physical evidence, quoted a study published in a scientific journal? Is there a link that I missed?
 
  • #53
Originally posted by Zero
You showed physical evidence, quoted a study published in a scientific journal? Is there a link that I missed?

What hypnagogue is telling you Zero is that there is no reductive explanation for consciousness. Have you "quoted a study published in a scientific journal that accomplishes this?" Is there a link that I missed?
 
  • #54
Originally posted by Zero
You showed physical evidence, quoted a study published in a scientific journal? Is there a link that I missed?

You want physical evidence for a non-physical phenomenon?

The evidence for its being non-physical is precisely that it cannot be detected objectively. And yet, we know it exists.
 
  • #55
Originally posted by hypnagogue
You want physical evidence for a non-physical phenomenon?

The evidence for its being non-physical is precisely that it cannot be detected objectively. And yet, we know it exists.
Darn it, you had me all excited...:frown:

BTW, I don't want to be rude, gosh no I don't, trust me if I did you would know it...anyhoo! The evidence for something non-physical existing is that it doesn't exist, but it does? Sorry, I just can't contain that level of illogic in my head, not the same week I watched 'Being John Malkovich'. As Mentat has stated repeatedly, if you accept the perfectly logical idea that "subjective experience" is a linguistic shorthand for the incredibly complex interactions between the nervous system, sensory organs, and the world at large, there is no need to add an unproven and unprovable entity.

In other words, experience is a function of brain function, nothing more or less, and there is no reason to assume otherwise.
 
  • #56
Originally posted by Zero
In other words, experience is a function of brain function, nothing more or less, and there is no reason to assume otherwise.

Where are the scientific journals and links that reductively explain how this is the case? I can't wait until they figure out how to explain colors to a blind man.
 
  • #57
Originally posted by Zero
It doesn't follow, except that you WANT it to follow.#1 in both cases assumes your conclusion. . . .

Next, I'll tell you that "non-physical" is nonsense, because if it is non-physical, it doesn't interact with the physical world, and therefore cannot be defined.

Your statement "non-physical is nonsense, because if it is non-physical, it doesn't interact with the physical world" assumes your conclusion. You do not know if that is true or not.

Originally posted by Zero
My brain engages in certain processes that we define as "experience" yes. Since those "experiences" are a function of my individual brain activity, they can be defined as "subjective". What is your point?

Again your conclusion is assumed. You do not know if experiences are solely a function of brain activity. How can you know, using purely physical-detecting research techniques, if brain function might be limited to contributing to some non-physical experiential property of consciousness?

Further, the common argument taht there is "no evidence" is to ignore those who claim they do experience something non-physical. That may not be proof, but it is evidence. In light of such experiential reports, it could be that you and other physicalists lack the consciousness skills needed to experience the non-physical (personally I suspect that is exactly what the problem is; that is, it is physicalists fetish with physical reality that blinds them to the more subtle experience of the non-physical).

In any case, because you do not experience anything non-physical (or recognize the experience) doesn't mean you can assume there is no non-physical. Your statements should accordingly be, "I am not aware of anything non-physical." One cannot extend one's personal lack of experience to be proof of a lack in objective reality.
 
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  • #58
Originally posted by Fliption
Where are the scientific journals and links that reductively explain how this is the case? I can't wait until they figure out how to explain colors to a blind man.
The heck are you talking about? Explaining colors to a blind man is a purely mechanistic problem, again not requiring some magical, mysictal, or emotional explanation to cheapen reality. The reason you can't explain color to the blindman is because of hardware and programming differences. Its the same reason why I can't get a camera to play music, or hook a Mac up to a PC without serious hassles.
 
  • #59
Originally posted by LW Sleeth
Your statement "non-physical is nonsense, because if it is non-physical, it doesn't interact with the physical world" assumes your conclusion. You do not know if that is true or not.



Again your conclusion is assumed. You do not know if experiences are solely a function of brain activity. How can you know, using purely physical-detecting research techniques, if brain function is limited to contributing to some non-physical experiential property of consciousness?

Further, to say there is "no evidence" is to ignore those who claim they do experience something non-physical. That may not be proof, but it is evidence. In light of such experiential reports, it could be that you and other physicalists lack the consciousness skills needed to experience the non-physical. In fact, I suspect that is exactly what the problem is; that is, it is physicalists fetish with physical reality that blinds them to the more subtle experience of the non-physical.

In any case, because you do not experience anything non-physical (or recognize the experience) doesn't mean you can assume there is no non-physical. Your statements would have to be, "I am not aware of anything non-physical." You cannot extend your personal lack of experience to be proof of a lack in objective reality.
Getting deep into the pseudomystical gunk now, aren't we? Anecdote isn't evidence, "special abilities and knowledge' is code word for "you got to get brainwashed to believe it", and you cannot extend your lack of satisfaction with materialism so far as to make unfounded assumptions.
 
  • #60
Originally posted by Zero
The heck are you talking about? Explaining colors to a blind man is a purely mechanistic problem, again not requiring some magical, mysictal, or emotional explanation to cheapen reality. The reason you can't explain color to the blindman is because of hardware and programming differences. Its the same reason why I can't get a camera to play music, or hook a Mac up to a PC without serious hassles.

I'm asking you to show where science has explained consciousness reductively. This was your claim of certainty and I'm asking you to show me where. Where are my articles? I'm so excited!
 

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