BruceW said:
The collapse happens when the cat died. By definition, a classical object can't be in a superposition.
Why do you assume the cat is "classical" if it's in isolation? Keeping a macroscopic object in complete isolation from its environment would be a very unusual state that we've never observed in reality. If we could build a large quantum computer with as many qubits as there are particles in a "macroscopic" object, would you predict that the quantum computer's state will self-collapse even if it has no interaction with the environment, so it won't work as predicted? Do you agree with Deutsch's claim that the Copenhagen interpretation and the many-worlds interpretation are in principle
experimentally distinguishable in an experiment where we "erase" the memory of a large A.I. with a simulated brain as complex as a cat's (or a person's)?
BruceW said:
It doesn't matter if you can't tell (in principle) which state it collapsed into.
But consider the double-slit experiment. If you assume a "collapse" happened at the slits, but you don't know which state it collapsed into (i.e. you don't know which slit it went through), then you should predict the total probability distribution at the screen will just be a sum of the two single-slit patterns with no interference between them. Now consider the "delayed choice quantum eraser" variant on the double-slit experiment (see the thread
here if you're not familiar with the setup, the link to the actual paper in that thread is outdated but
here is a working link). Since the idler photon is entangled with the signal photon in a way that would in principle allow you to determine which slit the signal photon went through immediately after both photons were created, this does destroy the interference pattern in the
total pattern of signal photons, but if the idler is measured in a state where the which-path information has been "erased" and is unrecoverable (at either the D1 or D2 detectors), then if you do a coincidence count of
only that subset of signal photons whose idlers were detected in this state, then you recover an interference pattern, something that would be impossible if you assume there was a true "collapse" at the slits.
Couldn't something similar be done with the cat, or the A.I. in Deutsch's experiment? Suppose that although the box is nearly completely isolated, it does have a pair of slits which allow a single electron to escape, then shutters on the slits close and nothing else escapes again until the box is opened. Inside the box, there are detectors at each slit, and if the electron is detected going through the left the cat lives, if the electron is detected going through the right the poison is released killing the cat. But instead of opening the box shortly afterwards, we wait billions or trillions of years, when the cat is long dead, the equipment including the poison bottle has long fallen apart, and all the molecules in the box are thoroughly scrambled into a high-entropy state where it's not possible even in principle to determine if the electron went through the right slit or the left slit. Now at the micro level there are going to be a huge number of different possible high-entropy states we could find at the end, call them S
1, S
2, ..., S
10^100, ..., S
N, but suppose we could repeat this experiment an even huger number of times with cats all prepared in identical initial quantum states at the beginning of the experiment. Then I would expect, analogous to the quantum eraser, that if you picked some
particular final state S
X in which the "which-path" information for the electron was unrecoverable, and graphed the positions of the electrons on the screen in the tiny subset of trials where the contents of the box ended up in state S
X, then in this case you
would see an interference pattern in this coincidence count. At least, that's what I'd guess would be predicted by QM
if you assumed no "collapse" inside the box until it was finally opened. Whereas if you do assume there was a "collapse" at the time the electron was detected going through the left or right slit inside the box, and the cat lived or died as a result, then you should predict no interference even in such a coincidence count, right? So this would suggest that at least in principle, no-collapse interpretations like the MWI or Bohmian mechanics could be distinguished from your version of the Copenhagen interpretation (though again I am not sure if
all Copenhagen advocates would agree that an isolated cat should be counted as "classical" and can thus collapse the wavefunction).
BruceW said:
Of course, the question 'what is a classical object?' is a grey area. The definition 'cannot practically be put into superposition' is sturdy, but what objects that includes is vague. For example, Buckyball molecules have been made to interfere. So even though they are molecules, they can still be counted as non-classical objects!
But how does this apply to thought-experiments, then? If for the sake of the thought-experiment we are assuming some super-advanced civilization has the technology to
practically keep a cat completely isolated from the external world (perhaps slightly more realistic if we just assume they can build a giant quantum computer whose qubits are kept isolated from external influences by methods like lowering their temperature to very near absolute zero, and that this giant quantum computer is used to do a detailed
simulation of a cat in a box), then doesn't that mean that
for the purposes of the thought-experiment we must treat the cat as a non-classical object?