Does Omniscience Negate Free Will?

[x-ray vision]

I have read the following argument as proof that if an omiscient being can see the future, free will does not exist.

1. An infallible, omniscient, being exists. [Assumption]
2. This being has foreknowledge that event 'A' will occur. [Definition of omniscience]
3. 'A' must occur. [Definition of infallible]
4. I cannot choose to do any action which would make it so that 'A' does not occur. [Points, 1, 2, 3]
5. I lack free will. [Point 4]

Does this argument hold water?

For the sake of the above argument, please forget what quantum mechanics may or may not prove, etc. Before given the information above, if we assume that free will can exist, do the points above alone prove that it can not. Thanks.

 

[Danger]

It's pretty much a moot point since there is no supreme being, but this actually belongs in the Philosophy section.

 

[NickJ]

Although you cannot choose to do an action that makes 'A' not occur, I don't see how it follows that you do not choose for 'A' to occur. Perhaps the omniscient being's foreknowledge that 'A' will occur is the result of the being knowing that you will choose to do 'A'. If so, then if you had chosen to do something other than 'A', the omniscient being would have had foreknowledge that this other thing would occur.

So there's a decision to be made: does the being's knowledge determine what will happen, or does what will happen determine the being's knowledge. If the former, no free will. If the latter, then there can be free will even if there is an omniscient being, because free choices determine, in part, the content of that being's knowledge.

And here's a second, more radical reply, that is independent of the first: if the future does not exist yet, then an omniscient being does not know what will happen in the future (because omniscience only requires knowing everything about what there is). In this case, the omniscient being will know that A occurs when A actually occurs. And even if the omniscient being is smart enough to be able to predict very reliably that A occurs, still this prediction does not amount to the being's making it the case that A occurs.

 

[DaveC426913]

You don't need a supreme being to invoke this logic.

As soon as you allow for the ability to see future events - through any means, you run into a contradiction with free will.

 

[Simon 6]

X-Ray: assuming there is free will and assuming there is an omniscient being, then I would say yes, the omnisient being - who is presumably outside of time - can have complete knowledge of someone's free choice. I see no contradiction there at all. What for us would seem like foreknowledge is to an omniscient being just knowledge.

The difficulty arises when you try to reconcile omniscience, not with the choices that are made but with those that aren't!

First, to define some concepts.

Omniscience – all knowing. By extension this would, in my view, have to mean the totality of all knowledge. Such knowledge covers everything that is, everything that has been, everything that will be, everything that could be and everything that might have been.

An omniscient being - a mind that knows, in effect, every conceivable experience of reality, both possible and actual.

To say, as NickJ did, that only the present might exist is an interesting notion - but it seems to place an ad hoc limitation on knowledge - one that would have to apply to the past too. Historians and weather forcasters would soon be out of a job.

The key to this is not the distinction between past and future, but the distinction between the actual and the possible.

In terms of omniscience, does it make sense to distinguish between actual and possible experiences?

The excercise of free will means that some experiences are had, while others get avoided. Now, if a possible experience is avoided, can it be known as clearly as an actual one?

If an omniscient being does know possible experiences as vividly as actual ones, what is the knowledge based on? Or to flip that argument: if possible experiences are known fully, in what sense have they been avoided?

In human terms, free will means choosing one experience over another. To use a biblical analogy, if Eve had chosen not to bite into the apple, she could never have known what it tasted like. By choosing as she did she experienced biting into the apple.

An omniscient being would have to know, in full, the experience of biting into the apple and leaving Eden. The same being would also have to know the experience of not biting into the apple and staying in Eden. Both sets of experiences would be included in the totality of knowledge. By necessity therefore, free will does not increase knowledge but has to deny it.

Conclusions: omniscience must, by necessity, include all possible experiences. For free will to exist, some experiences must be denied. If any possible experience is denied, there can be no omniscience. However, if omniscience exists, all possible experiences are fully known because they have been had and free will must be redundant.

If there is an omniscient being, then all possible experiences must be known to it. For any experience to be known in full, it must in fact be had by someone. Free will, however, requires that some experiences are denied. If no experiences are being denied, then free will cannot exist. Therefore free will and omniscience cannot be compatible.

Free will is only viable if some experiences are in fact avoided and are not known by anyone. Omniscience is only viable if all possible experiences actually occur.

The most powerful being can know in full all past, present and future experiences - but only those that are actually had. To know in full of a possible experience that is never experienced is a contradiction.

It seems that you can have free will or an omniscient being, but not both.

If I had to make a choice, I would plum for the omniscient being.
Whether that is a free choice is another matter... :)

 

[Rade]

It seems that you can have free will or an omniscient being, but not both.

Cannot the omniscient being freely will not to know "all" actual experiences of another free will entity, yet maintain potential of such knowledge, thus allowing both to exist ?

 

[moving finger]

You don't need a supreme being to invoke this logic.

As soon as you allow for the ability to see future events - through any means, you run into a contradiction with free will.

This conclusion is unfortunately based on faulty logic (but admittedly many people including myself do make this mistake, since the correct logical argument is not obvious unless one studies it carefully and rigorously - it was a long time before I understood my error). As long ago as the 6th century, Boethius realized that an atemporal being could logically know everything about the temporal world without there being any necessary contradiction with the notion of free will.

The important thing to understand is that event A happening is the "cause" of the omniscient being "knowing" that A, not the other way around (ie the fact that the omniscient being "knows" that A does not "cause" A to happen), hence there is not necessarily any inconsistency between omniscience and free will.

The logical error in the OP argument is known as the "transfer of necessity" in step 3 - just because an entity knows that A "will" occur does not entail that A "must" occur (ie is logically necessary).

In other words, A can be logically contingent (ie dependent on free will), and the entity can logically still "know that A" in advance.

For a full discussion see

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/

and for an excellent explanation of the logical argument involved see

http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/freewill1.htm#ldeterminism

Best Regards

 

[DaveC426913]

You don't need a supreme being to invoke this logic.

As soon as you allow for the ability to see future events - through any means, you run into a contradiction with free will.

This conclusion is unfortunately based on faulty logic (but admittedly many people including myself do make this mistake,

I don't see how this invalidates my claim (though it's possible you didn't mean to pick on my statement specifically). You don't need to postulate an omniscient being, all you need to postulate is the ability to see the future - and you have the conditions required to generate the apparent paradox. Granted, it is an apparent paradox, which you go on to show:

since the correct logical argument is not obvious unless one studies it carefully and rigorously - it was a long time before I understood my error). As long ago as the 6th century, Boethius realized that an atemporal being could logically know everything about the temporal world without there being any necessary contradiction with the notion of free will.

The important thing to understand is that event A happening is the "cause" of the omniscient being "knowing" that A, not the other way around (ie the fact that the omniscient being "knows" that A does not "cause" A to happen), hence there is not necessarily any inconsistency between omniscience and free will.

The logical error in the OP argument is known as the "transfer of necessity" in step 3 - just because an entity knows that A "will" occur does not entail that A "must" occur (ie is logically necessary).

In other words, A can be logically contingent (ie dependent on free will), and the entity can logically still "know that A" in advance.

I was thinking like this too, but I couldn't articulate it.

If I may paraphrase:
An omniscient being "knowing an event" does not force that event to come to pass. There is no cause-effect relationship - at least, not in the direction that interferes with free will.

 

[moving finger]

I don't see how this invalidates my claim (though it's possible you didn't mean to pick on my statement specifically). You don't need to postulate an omniscient being, all you need to postulate is the ability to see the future - and you have the conditions required to generate the apparent paradox. Granted, it is an apparent paradox, which you go on to show

I think you have answered your own question. Your claim was that ability to see future events leads to a contradiction with free will, which is in fact not necessarily the case.

(I agree, I didn’t mean to pick on your statement specifically – quite a few posts within this thread seem to make the same logical error)

If I may paraphrase:
An omniscient being "knowing an event" does not force that event to come to pass. There is no cause-effect relationship - at least, not in the direction that interferes with free will.

Exactly.

Best Regards

 

[DaveC426913]

I think you have answered your own question. Your claim was that ability to see future events leads to a contradiction with free will, which is in fact not necessarily the case.

Well, my claim was actually that, regardless of the apparent paradox, invokation of an omniscient being is unnecessary, and serves simply to confuse/derail the issue. I was simply trying to clarify the initial claim.

 

[Simon 6]

Cannot the omniscient being freely will not to know "all" actual experiences of another free will entity, yet maintain potential of such knowledge, thus allowing both to exist ?

I don't think so. That's sort of redefining onmiscience by putting God's knowledge in storage. The complete knowledge of all possible choices and experiences is there - if God wants it.

If this complete knowledge is potentially available, the knowledge itself must be based on potential experiences. The moment God accesses this knowledge, all these potential experiences have to be real experiences - otherwise ominscience falls into question. If God's knowledge of the possible is to be as complete as God's knowledge of the actual, then the difference between a possible experience and an actual one falls into question.

If, in the entire history of the universe, certain experiences were denied because free will was excercised, then no being has had these experiences. If they have not been had, they can't be known with the same vividity as if they were had.

I stand by the following assessment:

Omniscience requires all experiences to known in full - exit free will.
Free will requires some experiences to be denied - exit omnisicence.

Simon

 

[moving finger]

Omniscience requires all experiences to known in full - exit free will.

Doesn't logically follow.

"necessarily, God knows that I do X" does not equate to "I do X necessarily" (the logical transfer of necessity fails)

(full explanation here http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/freewill1.htm#ldeterminism)

I understand why you think that God's foreknowledge somehow "fixes" the future, because that is the commonly held intuitive response (and I thought the same once). But by using a strictly logical argument we can show that this is in fact not the case.

In order to correctly claim logical transfer of necessity in the form you require, you would need to assume at least a couple of additional premises, namely (1) that God exists temporally and not atemporally and (2) some principle akin to "the principle of the necessity of the past" (see the Stanford link here http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/)

Theologians and others might claim that either or both of these premises is false (Boethius claimed (1) is false; Alvin Plantinga claims (2) is false).

(Of course, none of this implies that free will is a coherent notion anyway - which it's not!)

Best Regards

 

[Pythagorean]

one of my problems with an omniscient being is that I believe everything that exists, exists physically. I think, to be omniscient, something would have to be larger than the universe, because it has to be able to compute (from stored knowledge) or (even more ludicrous) already have the knowledge stored of what's going to happen.

If we look at the universe, it's like a big supercomputer, processing. It would take an even bigger supercomputer to compute the outcome of the universe, since it couldn't possibly contain all the information without at least containing a 'model' of every atom in the universe with its initial conditions.

This is why all of our models of the universe will be generalizations or very specific cases, and not include all the cases of every possible outcome, because the one thing that can 'compute' physical reality (the universe) already requires a lot of complicated 'bits' called atoms.

 

[Simon 6]

"necessarily, God knows that I do X" does not equate to "I do X necessarily" (the logical transfer of necessity fails).

Agreed. For me there are no diffuculties with time. Pre-cognition does not equal pre-destination. Either a pre-cognitive or ex-temporal being can allow us free will, without any contradiction.

My argument is different and can be summarised as follows:

1) Experiences that are actually had are known in full.

2) Experiences that are never had cannot be known in full.

3) God knows that I do X and that I do not do Y.

4) God knows in full all the experiences that followed from X, but cannot know in full the non-existent experiences that would have followed from Y.

Conclusion: omniscience of both experiences requires both X and Y to happen. Free choice of X requires that Y cannot be known by any being to the same degree as X. Therefore free will and omniscience are mutually exclusive.

Simon

 

[moving finger]

one of my problems with an omniscient being is that I believe everything that exists, exists physically. I think, to be omniscient, something would have to be larger than the universe, because it has to be able to compute (from stored knowledge) or (even more ludicrous) already have the knowledge stored of what's going to happen.

If we look at the universe, it's like a big supercomputer, processing. It would take an even bigger supercomputer to compute the outcome of the universe, since it couldn't possibly contain all the information without at least containing a 'model' of every atom in the universe with its initial conditions.

This is why all of our models of the universe will be generalizations or very specific cases, and not include all the cases of every possible outcome, because the one thing that can 'compute' physical reality (the universe) already requires a lot of complicated 'bits' called atoms.

Why could an omniscient god not exist in some higher dimension, such that he/she is able to observe the entirety of our 4D spacetime as a single "unity" (a single observation from that god's perspective)? Such a god would correspond to Boethius's idea of an atemporal god, able to know the entire past and future of our 4D world, but entailing no contradiction with our notion of free will.

Best Regards

 

[moving finger]

Agreed. For me there are no diffuculties with time. Pre-cognition does not equal pre-destination. Either a pre-cognitive or ex-temporal being can allow us free will, without any contradiction.

My argument is different and can be summarised as follows:

1) Experiences that are actually had are known in full.

2) Experiences that are never had cannot be known in full.

3) God knows that I do X and that I do not do Y.

4) God knows in full all the experiences that followed from X, but cannot know in full the non-existent experiences that would have followed from Y.

Conclusion: omniscience of both experiences requires both X and Y to happen. Free choice of X requires that Y cannot be known by any being to the same degree as X. Therefore free will and omniscience are mutually exclusive.

Simon

I would challenge premise (2) (and hence also (4) and your conclusion) - By some definitions of omniscience, an omniscient being knows everything (hence not only what physically happens, but also what might have happened, what is logically possible), therefore an omniscient being knows not only the experiences you have, but also the ones you do not have but could have had (if you had chosen differently).

Best Regards

 

[Simon 6]

I completely concur with your definition of omnisicience - which includes everything that might have happened as well as everything that actually happens.

Indeed, if omniscience referred only to what happens, then there is no contradiction with free will.

The question now becomes: is it logically possible for any being to have full knowledge of experiences that have never been had?

If God is everywhere and can share our consciousness, all our experiences can be fully known to God. What about those experiences we avoided by free will? Since they never got experienced, God cannot share them or know them in the same way that he knows the experiences we did have.

To say that a being knows absolutely every detail of an experience with nothing left out amounts to saying the experience happened. If some experiences are denied through free will, then they are not experienced at all. The full details of those experiences with nothing left out must remain unknowable unless they are experienced.

I would conlude that full omniscience - as you've defined it - can exist if, and only if, every experience that is possible is actually experienced. Exit free will.

Since free will automatically requires some experiences never to be had, the full detail and knowledge of those experiences - with nothing left out - is simply not there. Exit omniscience.

Omniscience and Free Will - it seems one of them has to go for the other to be logically possible.

 

[moving finger]

If God is everywhere and can share our consciousness, all our experiences can be fully known to God. What about those experiences we avoided by free will? Since they never got experienced, God cannot share them or know them in the same way that he knows the experiences we did have.

How do you know that an omniscient being cannot know the experiences that we do not have, in the same way that they would know the experiences that we do have? That such a thing is not possible would seem to be an assumption on your part, but is not necessarily true (indeed such an assumption would seem to put epistemological "limits" on omniscience, which is not what omniscience is all about).

To say that a being knows absolutely every detail of an experience with nothing left out amounts to saying the experience happened. If some experiences are denied through free will, then they are not experienced at all. The full details of those experiences with nothing left out must remain unknowable unless they are experienced.

To say that a possible experience is not actually experienced by the agent making the choice is not the same as saying that the same experience cannot be known logically by the omniscient being. The omniscient being could logically know what that experience would have been like had the agent made the choice, even though the agent did not in fact make the choice.

I would conlude that full omniscience - as you've defined it - can exist if, and only if, every experience that is possible is actually experienced. Exit free will.

And I would conclude that omniscience does not require that every possible experience is "actually experienced" by an agent, only that the omniscient being has the ability to know what that experience would have been like had it actually happened.

Since free will automatically requires some experiences never to be had, the full detail and knowledge of those experiences - with nothing left out - is simply not there. Exit omniscience.

I see no reason why an omniscient being could not in principle know the full details of all logically possible experiences, regardless of whether those possible experience are actually "had" by some agent or not.

Omniscience and Free Will - it seems one of them has to go for the other to be logically possible.

I don't think so.

What your argument essentially boils down to is a simple argument against the logical possibility of omniscience :

(1) Definition : Omniscience entails that an omniscient being knows all details of experiences, both experiences that "have been experienced", and experiences that "have not been experienced"
(2) Premise : (according to you) experiences which "have not been experienced" cannot be known by any being in the same detail that experiences which "have been experienced" can be known.
(3) Hence (from 1 and 2), no being is omniscient.

But I would challenge the logical necessity of the premise that experiences which "have not been experienced" cannot be known by any being in the same detail that experiences which "have been experienced" can be known.

Best Regards

 

[DaveC426913]

What if your omniscient being is simply capable of observing all states of QM's many worlds?

You take an action, you do not take an action. OB sees a split in the universe. He still observes both actions, yet your free will is not violated. All that's happening by your action or inaction is that you are determining which "you" - in which universe - is the you that is asking the question.

 

[Severian]

I would put the logic the other way around:

The non-existence of the supernatural would imply that you have no free-will, since free-will is by definition supernatural.

(By supernatural, I am meaning anything which cannot in principle be explained by physics.)

 

[Simon 6]

Moving Finger and Dave, this is interesting because I'm being challenged from two opposing perspectives.

Dave you're proposing a scenario where all experiences do occur but can still be chosen. Moving Finger, you're propsing a scenario where some experiences are denied but can still be known.

I am forced to challenge both propositions. I'll start with Dave.

What if your omniscient being is simply capable of observing all states of QM's many worlds?

You take an action, you do not take an action. OB sees a split in the universe. He still observes both actions, yet your free will is not violated. All that's happening by your action or inaction is that you are determining which "you" - in which universe - is the you that is asking the question.

I would submit the following:

If there is a multiverse of realities, where everything that can happen does happen, free will cannot exist. Omniscience can.

If there is a single reality, where some things definitely never happen, omniscience cannot exist. Free will can.

I suspect Moving Finger completely agrees with the first statement but not the second. Whereas Dave probably agrees with the second but not the first.

Dave: if there is indeed a multiverse, then up to a given decision point you are the same person. After that you have two different experiences in different realities, according to the decision made. An omniscient being can of course share both these experiences. But since both choices were definitely made, in what sense has free will not been violated?

If it is certain that both paths are going to be taken, but until then you are the same person, then free will can only be an illusion. Afterwards there will be two versions of yourself, with the same history up to that decision, each claiming that they chose their particular path. Can both be right? You might try to justify your free will by saying "I take full responsibility for my decision. It reflects who I am. That's why I made this choice, not the other". But if it was the same person who also made the other choice, your justification collapses. You might want to try again: "At the crucial decision point, I became two different people who freely made both choices.". In that case, it was a matter of inevitability, beyond your control, that you were going to become two different people. You face the same paradox. Can you claim responsibility for becoming two different people? Or was it the paths taken that made you different?

The multiverse has much to commend it, and certainly allows for an omniscient being. But I'm not the first to suggest that it is the ultimate deterministic model of reality. If everything that can happen does happen, then free will has to be abandoned.

Moving Finger: I would maintain that a single universe does allow free will, but omniscience has to be abandoned. In this scenario, only some things happen. If so, I submit that some experiences are necessarilly denied and therefore remain unknown.

I would argue: even the most powerful being cannot make 1 + 1 = 3. This is no criticism of God, simply a statement that if God exists, mathematical truth is a part of his domain. So I'm going to assume that you accept mathematical statements as being immutable.

I would claim the following:

1) Either something exists or it does not exist - but not both.

2) Either an experience has been had or it has not been had - but not both.

3) If an experience has been had, it does exist.

4) If an experience has not been had, it does not exist.

5) God can share all experiences that have been had by others.

6) God can have independent experiences that have never been had by others.

7) God cannot have an experience that is neither his own or someone else's.

8) If any of God's experiences are absolutely indentical in every last detail to experiences that others could have had, then these same experiences that could have been had by others are in fact real experiences.

9) If someone's possible experience is also a real experience, then it is an experience that belongs to that person - and must be had from that person's point view, even if shared by God.

10) Free will requires that some experiences are never had.

11) If there are some experiences that are never had, through the excercise of free will, then God does not have them either - for God can only have those experiences that are had.

Conclusion: Free will puts a logical limit on experience and knowledge. If there is free will, then omniscience must either be abandoned or re-defined to include total knowledge of what is but exclude total knowledge of what might have been.

My conclusion is based on a crucial premise: that if any being knows what might have been with the same vividity and detail that he knows what is, then the distinction between what might have been and what is becomes so blurred as to be non-existent.

If there is no distinction between the possible and the actual, then everything that is possible can be fully known because it happens. Enter omniscience, exit free will.

If there is such a distinction, then the possible cannot known to the same degree as the actual. Enter free will, exit omniscience.

Simon

 

[Pythagorean]

Why could an omniscient god not exist in some higher dimension, such that he/she is able to observe the entirety of our 4D spacetime as a single "unity" (a single observation from that god's perspective)? Such a god would correspond to Boethius's idea of an atemporal god, able to know the entire past and future of our 4D world, but entailing no contradiction with our notion of free will.

Best Regards

It sounds like a religion described with physics terms. I can't say it's impossible, but it's a convenient place to use Occam's razor until something substantial comes up.

 

[neophysique]

If the being closes its eyes then there wouldn't be a problem.

 

[Doc Al]

The important thing to understand is that event A happening is the "cause" of the omniscient being "knowing" that A, not the other way around (ie the fact that the omniscient being "knows" that A does not "cause" A to happen), hence there is not necessarily any inconsistency between omniscience and free will.

The logical error in the OP argument is known as the "transfer of necessity" in step 3 - just because an entity knows that A "will" occur does not entail that A "must" occur (ie is logically necessary).

In other words, A can be logically contingent (ie dependent on free will), and the entity can logically still "know that A" in advance.

For a full discussion see

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/

and for an excellent explanation of the logical argument involved see

http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/freewill1.htm#ldeterminism

Best Regards

Sorry to intrude on this discussion, but I have a question. I've looked at Prof Swartz's page (re logical determinism), but I guess I'm missing the point.

Of course someone (omniscient or not) "knowing" that A will happen does not "cause" A to happen. But how can one say they know something unless it has already happened or they are sure that it will happen? (Guessing doesn't count!) In which case, is it possible for A not to happen?

Can you point out the logical error?

 

[arildno]

As far as I can see, the only half-viable philosophical solution of this is Spinoza's "sub specie aeternitate" (?), in which, essentially the eternity axis is orthogonal on the time axis, so that from God's perspective from eternity, he basically sees what people are going to choose, or what becomes the same, what they already have chosen to do.
Thus, it does not violate the principle of free will, which has it work "along" the temporal axis

Or something like that.

 

[DaveC426913]

Moving Finger and Dave, this is interesting because I'm being challenged from two opposing perspectives.
Simon

That's a lot to chew. I'll cut to the chase in the counterargument to put to me.

I don't see how splitting into two universes at a given point eradicates free will. True, in the larger picture, both events happened, but so what? Nothing forced me down one path.

Consider: a logical definition of free will only requires the condition that I can choose an action without forces beyond my control stopping me. Thus, BOTH things happening has not violated my ability to choose of my own free will. (And in this sense, a multiverse bears me out: it can be shown to the omniscient being that I was in fact, able to choose BOTH paths and NEITHER were denied me by external forces.)

 

[octelcogopod]

Free will seems to be an emergent property.

The logical error with the free will discussion seems to be that people seem to think choice has to be fundamental in that the particles themselves have to be guided by an external force called the mind/free will.

There can still be free will in a completely deterministic universe, only not fundamental.

That is if we define free will as such;

The ability for any living thing to perform an action based on external stimuli or internal processes processed by the brain.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Free will seems to be an emergent property.

The logical error with the free will discussion seems to be that people seem to think choice has to be fundamental in that the particles themselves have to be guided by an external force called the mind/free will.

There can still be free will in a completely deterministic universe, only not fundamental.

That is if we define free will as such;

The ability for any living thing to perform an action based on external stimuli or internal processes processed by the brain.

Did you mean to include a "not" in the last sentence? Because otherwise it seems to just say that determinism (actions are always caused by prior physical events) applies to living things. I don't see what emerges.

 

[octelcogopod]

No, I didn't mean to put a 'not' there.
What emerges in my opinion is what we do daily, make decisions based on a dilemma..

The fundamental entity is deterministic, but when you collect large amounts of it, they form chaotic patterns that we are unable to see, since we are in effect one of those patterns, or rather consciousness is.

That's my idea anyway and it will take a lot of actual nitty gritty to actually work out the details on how a consciousness pattern works deterministically, but the only other option I see is that consciousness is outside or supervenes the physical, which to me makes it seem "unsolvable."

 

[Simon 6]

Thanks for your reply Dave.

Ok, I’ll try expressing it another way.

The multiverse requires you to be one person until the paths split. It is then that all possible outcomes get played out.

Let’s say at a given moment you face two choices. You are one person. As that one person, you make your decision. The result every time is the same: both possible choices get enacted in separate realities.

This means two different choices were made, but they originated from one person. After the split, there are now two versions of you saying: “I was completely responsible for the action I took. The choice was free, independent and uniquely mine”.

Can both claims be true? Consider the implications. If you were indeed one person at the time you made the choice, there are now two opposing choices that are being owned as unique to you when you were just one person.

Do you see the contradiction?

Regards
Simon

 

[DaveC426913]

Do you see the contradiction?

No.

Or more precisely: the contradiction exists inherently in the supposition of multiple universes in the first place. If you can get your head around that, then nothing else is illogical - including two 'me's.


I stand by my working definition of free will: I can take an action or not take an action without an external force preventing me. (If I manage to do this by splitting into two of me, well, bully for me.)

 

[Simon 6]

the contradiction exists inherently in the supposition of multiple universes in the first place. If you can get your head around that, then nothing else is illogical - including two 'me's.

I stand by my working definition of free will: I can take an action or not take an action without an external force preventing me. (If I manage to do this by splitting into two of me, well, bully for me.)

The multiverse itself has no logical contradictions, and may well be an accurate discription of reality. But I would have to say it is a deterministic model of existence - even though everything that is possible happens.

Your working definition of free will allows you to take an action or not take an action. The multiverse, however, forbids any possible action from not being taken.

In the multiverse - all your decisions get played out but have one single point of origin - you. At a given point in time, you are faced with a choice of possible actions - but the truth is that you are about to take all of them. If so, this is beyond your control and responsiblity, however it may seem to you subjectively after the fact.

You can claim absolute free will take and personal responsibility for one action you are about to take - providing you are not about to take all the alternative actions as well. If it is certain that you are going to take every action - then something other than your own free will is required to explain why.

I support your working definition of free will. In the multiverse, the force acting on you that you haven't mentioned is the basis for quantum theory - uncertainty. If everything that is possible happens, random chance is the influence beyond your control which logically must deny you free will.

Free will, by almost anyone's description, requires decisions to be made in terms of who you are and for which you can claim genuine responsiblity. I'm saying that this can only be accommodated by a single universe in which some possibilities are realized and others aren't.

If you re-defined free will as random chance, that would be a different story. Then I would definitely accept it as compatible with both the multiverse and omniscience.

Simon

 

[ValenceE]

Hello to all,

First off, let me say that I’m a newcomer in PF. I read many posts in different parts of PF and I find it all very interesting and informative. Now for my first post…

I agree with points 1, 2, 3 but not 4 and certainly not 5…

In my opinion, even if an omniscient being already knows that in some future situation, I will opt for action A, it does in no way make my (so called) free will disappear.

From this present moment on, I’m entirely free to make any choice I want, in all situations that I will face, until the foreknown situation arises in which I will opt for action A. The same goes for the rest of my life after I chose A.

As I see it, argument 4 and 5 don’t necessarily apply because, exercising my free will, pondering on the possible ways to act on the given situation, I am still ‘able’ to make another choice than A until I do choose A, as already known by the omniscient being even before I was born.

VE

 

[DaveC426913]

From this present moment on, I’m entirely free to make any choice I want, in all situations that I will face, until the foreknown situation arises in which I will opt for action A. The same goes for the rest of my life after I chose A.

As I see it, argument 4 and 5 don’t necessarily apply because, exercising my free will, pondering on the possible ways to act on the given situation, I am still ‘able’ to make another choice than A until I do choose A, as already known by the omniscient being even before I was born.

VE

I foresaw that you were going to make this decision. It was inevitable.

 

[Brother Jerry]

Sorry a little late to the discussion...

To Simon6

The dissertation you had early on about the experiences being defined into two categories, actual and possible was great. And your definition of omniscience was right on. To be omniscient one would have to know all that actually happened and all possibilities of what could happen.

The one thing that does have to be clarified in this discussion is that foreknowledge of an event is not predestination or pre determined outcome of events. God may know what we are to do but it is not God who is imposing His will upon us to do that. There is a difference.

However Simon one thing that you fail to recognize in the argument you stated is that the omniscient being would have experienced/known/had all possible experiences. You were correct in that for free will to exist, some experiences must be denied the individual. That does not mean the experience was denied the omniscient being. Only the individual.

We have two separate situations here in that you will have an omniscient being that has knowledge of all experiences, actual and possible. And then you have the one who is not omniscient and gains knowledge only through experiences. Just because the omniscient being has all experiences does not in any way alter the non-omniscient being's choice or possible choices in the particular experience that person is going through. If you and I were to be standing on a bridge and I was thinking of jumping off. I do not know all of the possible experiences that could happen. However you do. You know of the infinite possibilities that could happen from that second on. And from the next second on. And from the second after that. However your knowledge of every possible event is doing nothing to the nature of my choice to jump or not. To fall backwards or forwards, to dive headfirst or feet first. It is still all my choice.

Now take it a step further and this being knows all the possible outcomes but also the actual outcome that is to be. If there is but one possibility then all others are non-existant. It is not that they are denied they just do not exist. And back on the bridge you know that I am going to jump by just leaping off feet first. Your knowledge of that has not altered the possible choices I had. You just knew what choice I was going to make.

There are some basic facts. 1) We all have choices. Thus choices are available. 2) We decide what choice we are going to make (unless your married with children...then it is the wife and kids ;) ). We make these choices by evaluating our experiences and apply that to the current model. 3) Because we have choices there must be other possibilites. This does not mean that they ever truly existed just that there other possibilities.

Now because we have choices we must have an ability to evaluate the options and choose a path. Since we even have choices in anything we do we know we are not being controlled by outside forces. Since we are not being controlled by outside forces we must then also presume that we have free will. So that even with an omniscient being in the picture we still have free will so thus it shows that foreknowledge is not imposing of will, nor does it alter the options or decisions we may have.

Later on you made this statement

If God is everywhere and can share our consciousness, all our experiences can be fully known to God. What about those experiences we avoided by free will? Since they never got experienced, God cannot share them or know them in the same way that he knows the experiences we did have.

Now you are limiting Omniscience to only that which we have experienced. You have earlier defined it as everything that could be experienced. All that is and all that possibly could be. If the omnicient being can only know experiences by sharing sharing in our experience then it is not omniscient. The omniscient being has knowledge of everything not through experiences but just because it is an omniscient being. We as non-omniscient beings GAIN knowledge only through experiences. An omniscient being cannot GAIN knowledge because if there is any to gain then the being was not omniscient to begin with...just really really knowledgeable. The type of being you describe does not have say an infinite knowledge but an infinite -1 knowledge.

Then you have your list...

1) Either something exists or it does not exist - but not both.
- Correct physically. But not in the realm of knowledge. I can conceive of a wonderous invention that could save the world. But decided to not follow through with it...did it exist? no not physically. I still had the idea and thus it did exist only in a limited capacity...my head.

2) Either an experience has been had or it has not been had - but not both.
- Correct again physically. However that does not mean that a being with knowledge of everything could not have seen the outcome of that experience in many different ways, based on your free will actions.

3) If an experience has been had, it does exist.
- Now this is somewhat incorrect. Remember experiences are not physical items to exist or not exist...they are events that either happen or do not happen.

4) If an experience has not been had, it does not exist.
- See #3 above. And to expand upon that just because an experience has not happened does not mean that a being that is all knowing does not know the outcome of a different decision.

5) God can share all experiences that have been had by others.
- God does not "share" our experiences. He is with us through the experiences and they are not dependent upon Him having knowledge of that experience and all of it's possibilities.

6) God can have independent experiences that have never been had by others.
- No. It is not "can" but does. Creation being one :) However the experiences that God has had, is having, or will have are not adding to His knowledge. He already knows of those experiences.

7) God cannot have an experience that is neither his own or someone else's.
- Wrong. To say that God cannot know anything is go against the definition of omniscience. And since we are now talking about God who is more than omniscient, He is also omnipotent. We can explain how it is that God would have knowledge of all possible experiences. He created it all and thus knows all there is about everything. He knew it before He created it and has counted the hairs on your head. The Creator of all there is will obviously have knowledge of all there is to know of His creation.

8) If any of God's experiences are absolutely indentical in every last detail to experiences that others could have had, then these same experiences that could have been had by others are in fact real experiences.
- And again an experience had and in the past has no bearing on the knowledge or possible experiences to be had in the future.

9) If someone's possible experience is also a real experience, then it is an experience that belongs to that person - and must be had from that person's point view, even if shared by God.
- This goes against what your previous statement said. However it shines a light on exactly what it is you must realize. experiences are unique and individual to each and every person. Two different people placed into the same set of decisions will percieve things completely different based on their past experiences. Thus if every person is unique, and every possible choice in life of each unique individual is unique to that individual then you have nothing but one great big unique. Thus if every decision is unique and no two in the history of man are perceived alike then in order for there to be omniscient being it must be able to see all possible outcomes of each unique decision based upon each unique individuals perception. And that is God.
Prior to this you continued to place finite amounts of knowledge into omniscience. Omniscience is not a matter of knowing that which has been experienced. That would be a finite amount of knowledge. But it also must entail all that can be experienced.

10) Free will requires that some experiences are never had.
- By the individual this is true. However the individual never experiencing them does not mean that they have never been known by an omniscient being.

11) If there are some experiences that are never had, through the excercise of free will, then God does not have them either - for God can only have those experiences that are had.
- And at what point do you think that God is limited to the knowledge of man? Again you attempt to limit the omniscient to that which has already happened.

And your conclusional crucial premise. "that if any being knows what might have been with the same vividity and detail that he knows what is, then the distinction between what might have been and what is becomes so blurred as to be non-existant"
This is a conlcusion and premise based on your own mental limits. And the second portion of this where "if there is no distinction between the possible and the actual, then everything that is possible can be fully known because it happens." This is not true because to the omniscient being that knows all there is to know is still not imparting his will upon the events. So the individual non-omni being still has to make the decisions.

There is a lot there and it may seem to jump around. Jump starting into this thread and a few pages behind.

Sincerely
Brother Jerry

 

[Simon 6]

Apologies Brother Jerry, I've been away from this thread for a couple of weeks.

You've come up with plenty of intriguing propositions to analyse, though some of what you said appears to involve one or two leaps of faith.

Before I respond, I should say that when it comes to omniscience, I haven't been arguing either for or against the notion of any being that possesses it. I view the existence of such a being as something that in itself entails no contradiction. In other words I think omniscience is logically self-sustaining as a concept. I'm not so sure the same can be said of free will - but that is another subject. I do maintain that the two are imcompatible.

I'll begin with two descriptions of existence, only one of which can be true. (I define existence as the totality of everything and everyone, past and future. This includes the possible existence of an omniscient being, if applicable.)

1) In the whole of existence, everything that can be known and experienced is known and experienced.

2) In the whole of existence, not everything that can be known and experienced is known and experienced.

The first description of reality allows omniscience, the second does not.

More contraversially, I would say the first description denies free will, while the second allows it.

I will focus on your most challenging paragraph:

Simon one thing that you fail to recognize in the argument you stated is that the omniscient being would have experienced/known/had all possible experiences. You were correct in that for free will to exist, some experiences must be denied the individual. That does not mean the experience was denied the omniscient being. Only the individual.

Clearly you favour the first description, but with a sub-category that allows the second. In other words, you would say that my first description applies to God, whereas my second description applies to us. Since we all belong to the whole of existence, we can all fit into my first description - but qualified.

You would say: "In the whole of existence, everything that can be known and experienced is known and experienced by God, but not by us."

Now we're into those deeper waters. What you're describing is a being that has/knows, in every last detail, individual experiences that we could have had but didn't. These possible experiences, known in full to God, would have been had from our individual points of view. Every thought we would have had, every blade of grass we would have interacted with, every intimate emotion and every sensation - God would know them all in their entirety. In other words: on our behalf, God has all those individual experiences we never had. It follows that our unique identities, such as they would have been, are also assumed by God.

What you're describing is a multiverse of realities, with alternative versions of ourselves, contained within God - so complete and so detailed that the quality of reality in what God knows and experiences is no less than the qualtiy of reality in what we experience. I am perfectly at ease with that description. But since all these unique, detailed and personal experiences are real and known in their entirety, what distinguishes some as having the stamp of our identity, while others do not? To know an individual experience in full is to possesses the identity of the individual that has it. To know a possible individual experience to the same degree as an actual one is to possesses the identity of the individual that could have it. If so: there is, albeit through God, all our possible experiences and all possible versions of ourselves that experience them. These individuals contained within God must be as real as we are - for if there was even the slighest detail of reality lacking in them, something would be missing from God's knowledge/experience.

As I've previously argued: in a multiverse where everything that can happen does happen, and everything that can be known and experienced is known and experienced - then every permutation of reality must in fact occur. If you like, you could describe God as the multiverse in it's entirety. In my view, a multiverse is the only condition of existence that can make omniscience logically possible.

I would also argue, the multiverse is a condition of existence that makes free will logically impossible. The only possible rescue for free will is to take away the one condition required for omniscience.

So now I return to those two mutually exclusive descriptions of existence with the same position.

1) In the whole of existence, everything that can be known and experienced is known and experienced.

2) In the whole of existence, not everything that can be known and experienced is known and experienced.

The first does allow omniscience. The second may allow free will. Neither allows both.

That's all for now.

Regards
Simon

 

[z3hr]

I have read the following argument as proof that if an omiscient being can see the future, free will does not exist.

1. An infallible, omniscient, being exists. [Assumption]
2. This being has foreknowledge that event 'A' will occur. [Definition of omniscience]
3. 'A' must occur. [Definition of infallible]
4. I cannot choose to do any action which would make it so that 'A' does not occur. [Points, 1, 2, 3]
5. I lack free will. [Point 4]

Does this argument hold water?

For the sake of the above argument, please forget what quantum mechanics may or may not prove, etc. Before given the information above, if we assume that free will can exist, do the points above alone prove that it can not. Thanks.

An omniscient being does not disprove free will. It exists in the sense that we can never know what event 'A' will be; therefore, we cannot change it. We can choose whatever we want, the omniscient being would determine event 'A' based on what we choose. The omniscient being would have to remain separate from the non-omniscient being. It is not ever possible to know event 'A' because if anyone ever found out what event 'A' was, it would no longer exist. By this you can determine that only a completely arbitrary being could know what event 'A' is, because their knowledge of it would not falsify its existence.

 

[JoeDawg]

1. An infallible, omniscient, being exists.

Is this being also omnipotent? This is important, because if the being simply knows all, but has no power to affect anything, then they are basically just watching a recording. Their knowledge is unchangeable, but the events would not be constrained.

3. 'A' must occur.

In a sense this is no different than someone who has post-knowledge of the event. An omniscient being is just in the position of 'remembering' the future.

5. I lack free will.

Freewill and determinism are not mutually exclusive.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

The real problem with freewill would occur if the being in question had both omniscience and omnipotence. It would then know all that occurred and is essentially responsible for everything that occurs... either by its action or lack of action.

 

[octelcogopod]

Freewill and determinism are not mutually exclusive.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

A big point in this is that we as humans cannot directly control our brain or our inner workings.
We are indirectly controlling the functions of our brain with our mind.
Free will is always going to be one layer behind reality, in that even the mind of an omnipotent being would still need its own world that it would not have control over.
A mind will forever be a slave to the workings it cannot see or control.
The moment you create a mind, you separate it from the fundamental reality it is built upon. How or why this happens seems impossible to prove physically, but mentally it makes complete sense.

 

[WaveJumper]

I would argue that Proconsul did not have a free will, but homo sapiens had acquired it. The moment those ape-like animals started to make drawings in the caves(70 000 years ago??), something really tremendous had happened(the arrival of art and language and of awareness). I call that emergent free will.

 

[JoeDawg]

We are indirectly controlling the functions of our brain with our mind.

Is there really a difference between brain and mind?

 

[DaveC426913]

Is there really a difference between brain and mind?

Absolutely. That's his point.

You can control your thoughts (mind). You cannot control your neurons/blood flow (brain).

 

[kote]

Absolutely. That's his point.

You can control your thoughts (mind). You cannot control your neurons/blood flow (brain).

That's definitely arguable. Most philosophers believe that we have free will and that our brains are determined. Many separate mind and brain, but not all, and I don't know of anyone who would say we control our minds but not our brains.

If we control our mind but not our brain then our mind does not have a one-to-one causal (or identifying) relationship with our brain. Beyond that, it means that there is no causal link between our mind and our brain. It also would mean that our thoughts are not determined by our brain processes.

Surely there is some causal link between our mind and our brain, in which case either both are free or both are determined. If my free mind has any effect on my brain, my brain is not determined. If my free mind has no control over my determined actions, in what way can it be said to be free?

 

[Duquin]

Hmm...for the comments that we don't control our brain in my opinion that is not true. With years of training one can use the mind to influence the brain to command our body to do many things such as slow the heart rate and enter a temporary self induced coma of sorts.

As for free will and an all-knowing being, just because it knows everything that will happen does not mean we do not have free will. While it is possible everything was set and chosen by this being, it's also possible it was not and we can still have free will and it is the fact that we have free will that the being knows event A will happen.

I would assume this being would be in tune with all life and non-life in the universe and would therefore know every thought and action being taken and upon that can come up with precise predictions of the future. Free will is a tricky thing some speak of destiny and preordained futures however is it not the fact that we have free will that allows these futures to be so solidly in place? This makes me think of a classic see into the future archetype where a person see's their future and does much to try and change it, when it turns out their resulting actions are what cause said future in the first place. It was because they made the choice to act on their vision of what had yet to happen that it did indeed happen, where if they had been content with their future it never would have happened. Could it be that free will itself is a tool to ensure the future this being knows of?

I believe I read that free will was something we evolved into having although I personally think it's something all life is born with. While thinking functions may be different for animals of various species, if you get a pet and over the course of a week expose it to 2 new treats and then hold both up and ask it which it likes, at first it may simply jump to try and get a treat but sooner or later it realizes it's being given a choice and chooses it's favorite...at least that is what my dog did about 3 months ago, is that not free will? Heck since I've done that she's learned to pick right away but doesn't always go for the same thing and seems to like to switch it up now and again. I find that sort of whimsical "Lets try something new today" rather free will-like if that makes any sense.

Humans, animals, I think even plants have their own form of free will to an extent albiet not to the level a human might consider to be free will. But that delves more into beliefs and I won't stray off into that, my point I guess would be that an omnicient being can still know everything that is going to happen while humans retaining free will.

 

[WaveJumper]

Hmm...for the comments that we don't control our brain in my opinion that is not true. With years of training one can use the mind to influence the brain to command our body to do many things such as slow the heart rate and enter a temporary self induced coma of sorts

I was going to say the same thing. There seems to be a contradiction - if we can control our heart-beat by forcing our brain to send a modified signal to the heart muscles, what exactly is the 'entity' that forces the brain to send modulated signals? It's clear an Australopithecus or a Proconsul wouldn't be able to do that.

It's not unreasonable to think that in a few thousand years, we'd be even much more in control of ourselves. I highly doubt an Australopithecus could restrain himself as much as present day human can. We can fight and resist urges, instincts and all sorts of bio-chemical drives to an extent unthinkable for an animal-like creature. This doesn't seem like a typical deterministic process(in the regular use of the word 'deterministic').

 

[OB 50]

There are so many problems with the concept of an omniscient being:

1. In order to "know" something, the being in question has to have an accurate mental model of the object of knowledge. In order to know literally everything, the being would have to possesses an accurate model of the entire universe, down the the Planck scale. The problem here is that a completely accurate model of the universe at this level of detail basically is the universe. There would be no way to distinguish between the "real" universe and the model.

2. This doesn't even take into account the mechanism by which this being would observe the universe. How does it gain knowledge of the universe without affecting it through the act of observation? If this being is able to observe the entire universe at the Planck scale, then it is also able to affect it at this level as well, which is effectively omnipotence. It doesn't seem logically possible to have one without the other.

3. In order to know literally everything, the being would also have to know and understand itself at the same level of detail. This presents a major recursive problem. Assuming this being possesses a mind capable of modeling the entire universe, it would then need to model its own mind, which already contains an entire universe, within itself. This is an obvious paradox, yet an essential requirement of a truly omniscient being.

In short, the basic assumption of an omniscient being is logically impossible due to the fact that the being could never possesses full knowledge of itself. If the premise is logically impossible, then the debate about its implications on free will is inconsequential.

 

[WaveJumper]

3. In order to know literally everything, the being would also have to know and understand itself at the same level of detail. This presents a major recursive problem. Assuming this being possesses a mind capable of modeling the entire universe, it would then need to model its own mind, which already contains an entire universe, within itself. This is an obvious paradox, yet an essential requirement of a truly omniscient being.

In short, the basic assumption of an omniscient being is logically impossible due to the fact that the being could never possesses full knowledge of itself. If the premise is logically impossible, then the debate about its implications on free will is inconsequential.

The human mind is as much capable of modeling and understanding an omniscient and omnipowerful god, as it is capable of comprehending infinity. I wonder if there are still people who treat the human mind as something all-powerful, because that would be a new form of religion. I'd say that the fundamental limitations of the human mind are far greater than most people are comfortable to acknowledge(though what many may claim).

 

[OB 50]

The human mind is as much capable of modeling and understanding an omniscient and omnipowerful god, as it is capable of comprehending infinity. I wonder if there are still people who treat the human mind as something all-powerful, because that would be a new form of religion. I'd say that the fundamental limitations of the human mind are far greater than most people are comfortable to acknowledge(though what many may claim).

I'm not sure if you're agreeing with me or not, but those are generally good points. However, if you're saying that an omniscient being is inherently "unknowable", and therefore exempted from any requirements of logic, then I respectfully disagree.

One thing to note is that we are only obliged to "understand" those things that actually exist. If omniscience, omnipotence and infinity are merely concepts created by the human mind, then there is nothing objective to understand. They are what we say they are.

 

[WaveJumper]

One thing to note is that we are only obliged to "understand" those things that actually exist. If omniscience, omnipotence and infinity are merely concepts created by the human mind, then there is nothing objective to understand. They are what we say they are.

Space, time, free will, emergent properties, singularities, entanglement, uncaused quantum events, just to name a few, are all concepts that exist, yet we don't understand them. We may feel obliged as you say, but neither reality nor the structure of the human mind would feel obliged to bow down to our human wishes. We are not gods, we are lucky to even have made it that far, as far as progress and knowledge is concerned. It's so amazing that you get to wonder if there is some deeper connection between the human mind and reality. Then you think about those few examples above and get a cold shower.

 

[JoeDawg]

Absolutely. That's his point.

Its a point.

You can control your thoughts (mind). You cannot control your neurons/blood flow (brain).

What is this 'you' thing you speak of, if not the brain/mind.

Unless you believe in some sort of supernatural soul, I'd say separating the two doesn't make much sense. Neuroscience, although it is in its infancy, shows quite a correlation between brain and mind.
The mind is what the brain does.