Is Everything Really Just One Thing?

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In summary, a sandpile exists as a thing, not just as a collection of grains. The angle of slope of the pile is an emergent quality, that cannot be attributed to any particular combination of grains, but only to the whole. Libertarians tend to say with Mrs. Thatcher, there are no classes, there are just individuals. But this ignores the fact thet mob behavior, for example, is different from individual human behavior. Emergence does exist in human society too.
  • #1
PIT2
897
2
Does plurality exist or is everything 1 'thing'?

(im not sure if plurality is the right word, maybe 'multiplicity'?)

For instance:

6 billion humans - the human race
many grains of sand - a beach

And if u slice a human body into 2 parts, does that make it 2 bodies?
 
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  • #2
Anwsering your question regarding if you slice a body in 2 parts...

If you slice a body in half you do not have two bodies but rather 2 halves of a body.

Lets just say that:

a = b
0.5a does not equeal to b! Simple!
 
  • #3
I am pretty sure a sandpile exists as a thing, not just as a collection of grains. Tha angle of slope of the pile is an emergent quality, that cannot be attributed to any particular combination of grains, but only to the whole. Even one grain extra can cause it to slump.

Philosophers differ though, about human society. Libertarians tend to say with Mrs. Thatcher, there are no classes, there are just individuals.

But this ignores the fact thet mob behavior, for example, is different from individual human behavior. Emergence does exist in human society too.
 
  • #4
derekmohammed said:
Lets just say that:

a = b
0.5a does not equeal to b! Simple!

Thats true
but then
0.5a + 0.5a = b

So it really remains a single thing.
 
  • #5
selfAdjoint said:
I am pretty sure a sandpile exists as a thing, not just as a collection of grains. Tha angle of slope of the pile is an emergent quality, that cannot be attributed to any particular combination of grains, but only to the whole. Even one grain extra can cause it to slump.

Philosophers differ though, about human society. Libertarians tend to say with Mrs. Thatcher, there are no classes, there are just individuals.

But this ignores the fact thet mob behavior, for example, is different from individual human behavior. Emergence does exist in human society too.

Hey, selfAdjoint. Long time :smile:.

I agree with your quote, and add only that it is the realization of such a synergy (if you'll excuse the term) that allows for some of the more important discoveries of the last century (viz. Nash's "Governing Dynamics", Rorty's "Epistemological Behaviorism").

Pit2,
Your question is one of the oldest and (IMHO) most interesting ones of philosophy. Parmenides put forward the idea that all things were "one" and static; change and plurality are mistaken terms. The Eleatics followed suit (Zeno, being the most famous among them).

After David Hume, empiricist Solipsism could be taken as a different form of the same concept, in that all things could be the "impressions" and "ideas" of a singular mind. Kant added the difference between "concept" and "intuition" in order to escape that, but it's still a valid question (that is, if one follows the philosophical paradigm-shift of Descartes and Locke, and thus has a representationalist bias a priori).

As for my own opinion on the matter, I'd say that plurality does exist physically, but not always linguistically. Take your own example: if a human body is sliced in two, is it now two "bodies"? Well, no, but it is two separate entities, physically speaking. In terms of the linguistic puzzle, I think it's better to simply say that there has ceased being a "human body" at all, and, in its place, are now two blobs of flesh that, for reasons of social and linguistic convention, cannot accurately be called "human".
 
  • #6
Mentat said:
As for my own opinion on the matter, I'd say that plurality does exist physically, but not always linguistically. Take your own example: if a human body is sliced in two, is it now two "bodies"? Well, no, but it is two separate entities, physically speaking. In terms of the linguistic puzzle, I think it's better to simply say that there has ceased being a "human body" at all, and, in its place, are now two blobs of flesh that, for reasons of social and linguistic convention, cannot accurately be called "human".

Thanks for the info :)

But about your last bit where you say things can be separate entities, physically speaking:

Suppose you have your own body and you grab an apple. What really is the difference between your hand and the apple? Are they somehow attached to each other(on the smallest level perhaps).

Or even if there is an open space(of air) between you and the apple, is there some kind of connection between your body and the apple?
 
  • #7
First of all Pit2 your logic does make sence. It is true that 0.5a+0.5a = b

BUT AGAIN I WILL SAY THIS

0.5a DOES NOT EQUEAL b. It does not matter whether the two peices make a whole what matters is that half of a whole is not a whole!

In a physical sense there is no attraction between the apple and the hand, only repulsion from the electrons charges from the apple and hand.
 
  • #8
Where you choose to make the dividing lines between objects is a matter of convenience. "Emergent" properties are not added to what was there previously; they are simply the result of smaller properties, and you can look at the "sand heap" as those little particles or as the whole, whichever is more expedient to compute with; if you do it perfectly you get the same answer either way.
 
  • #9
Bartholemew said:
you can look at the "sand heap" as those little particles or as the whole, whichever is more expedient to compute with; if you do it perfectly you get the same answer either way.

In pure theory maybe. In the physicist's dream reductionism works, and everything could be calculated from quarks and leptons. But even at the actual theoretical level the series don't always converge and approximations have to be used (Lattice QCD and such - look up perturbation theory). Emergence turns out to be a good way to look at many systems, or if you prefer a less be-new-aged term, critical phenomena.
 
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  • #10
PIT2 said:
Does plurality exist or is everything 1 'thing'?

(im not sure if plurality is the right word, maybe 'multiplicity'?)

For instance:

6 billion humans - the human race
many grains of sand - a beach

And if u slice a human body into 2 parts, does that make it 2 bodies?


Now, consider the following statements:


(a) 3.5 people are in the room

(b) John is tall

(c) I am an approximation of a real human

(d) Mankind is preserved


These are just a few of very odd statements purporting to be conveying facts about the world. Can you prove that they are right or wrong?
 
  • #11
PIT2 said:
Thanks for the info :)

But about your last bit where you say things can be separate entities, physically speaking:

Suppose you have your own body and you grab an apple. What really is the difference between your hand and the apple? Are they somehow attached to each other(on the smallest level perhaps).

Or even if there is an open space(of air) between you and the apple, is there some kind of connection between your body and the apple?

There are holes in your illustration, if taken directly, but I think I get what you mean: If two bodies are connected by anything (even air or empty (as much as the term "empty" has physical meaning) spacetime), then are they really two bodies? If so, what makes them such? Is that pretty much what you mean?

I guess the only problem with that is whether you consider space a "connection" (and, if it is a plenum, as much classical philosophy would have you think (and as some of modern physical theory would allow), then a case could perhaps be made toward that end) or simply a relation between two points of reference.

If, OTOH, you meant something else by your illustration, then please clarify :smile:.
 
  • #12
selfAdjoint said:
In pure theory maybe. In the physicist's dream reductionism works, and everything could be calculated from quarks and leptons. But even at the actual theoretical level the series don't always converge and approximations have to be used (Lattice QCD and such - look up perturbation theory). Emergence turns out to be a good way to look at many systems, or if you prefer a less be-new-aged term, critical phenomena.
So perhaps quarks and leptons are not a perfect theory. It's all a matter of choosing a theory and using it. Any division between objects is within the theory. The theory, however, is not the physical world.

In the instance of the sand pile, I think it would be harder to make a perfect simulation using the total idea of the pile than it would be using the concept of each grain in the pile. It would be easier to get a first approximation, but harder to do it perfectly.

Simply because it is "more convenient" to calculate using one theory rather than another does not mean that the theoretical objects used to compute the theory are somehow real. All objects are invented by humans to make it easier for them to think.
 
  • #13
Mentat said:
There are holes in your illustration, if taken directly, but I think I get what you mean: If two bodies are connected by anything (even air or empty (as much as the term "empty" has physical meaning) spacetime), then are they really two bodies? If so, what makes them such? Is that pretty much what you mean?

I guess the only problem with that is whether you consider space a "connection" (and, if it is a plenum, as much classical philosophy would have you think (and as some of modern physical theory would allow), then a case could perhaps be made toward that end) or simply a relation between two points of reference.

Yub, that's what i meant.
You said yourself that 'empty' doesn't really have a physical meaning. So if there is no emptyness(or nothingness) then musnt everything be 1 thing?

I wonder what you would see if you zoomed in infinitely far on matter, or empty space. Or better, what would be there without observing it.
 
  • #14
Philocrat said:
Now, consider the following statements:


(a) 3.5 people are in the room

(b) John is tall

(c) I am an approximation of a real human

(d) Mankind is preserved


These are just a few of very odd statements purporting to be conveying facts about the world. Can you prove that they are right or wrong?

I cannot prove if those statements are right of wrong.

But what is your point?
 
  • #15
I do not know what your thoughts are, and vice-versa. Therefore, we are two separate entities.
 
  • #16
You do not even know what your own thoughts are until a moment after you've thought them, and if I told you what I was thinking then you can know what I am thinking.

When information about one system is not present in another system, this is not sufficient to fundamentally separate the two systems.
 
  • #17
PIT2 said:
Yub, that's what i meant.
You said yourself that 'empty' doesn't really have a physical meaning. So if there is no emptyness(or nothingness) then musnt everything be 1 thing?

"Must" is a strong word. It could be considered "one thing", then you'd have to deal with the philosophical puzzle of how it is that two people can disagree about whether it's "one thing" or not.

I wonder what you would see if you zoomed in infinitely far on matter, or empty space. Or better, what would be there without observing it.

Some of the candidates for ToE (Theory of Everything (are you familiar with the term, as used in physics?)) have proposed that space is quantized, so you could only "zoom in" so far, and you'd be looking at "chunks" of spacetime itself. As to matter, one these candidate theories (the superstring theory) posits that you would see one-dimensional "strings" of energy (these being the most fundamental of particles (i.e. electrons and quarks would not be points or ball-shaped particles, but vibrating "strings")).

As to what's there when we're not observing it, philosophies differ greatly on this point. Some would say that nothing's there at all, until you look at it. According to the quantum mechanics, the very nature of particles (and spacetime) is probabilistic, and so what observations you can make when you "zoom in" on a particle are not the only true observations that can be made (IOW, if you observe a particle to be in a certain place, you have observed one of many "probable" locations of the particle).
 
  • #18
Bartholomew said:
You do not even know what your own thoughts are until a moment after you've thought them, and if I told you what I was thinking then you can know what I am thinking.

"A moment after you've thought them"...clarify please. Are you referring to thought as an event (with defined beginnings and ends, and final products)?

When information about one system is not present in another system, this is not sufficient to fundamentally separate the two systems.

But just the reference to them as "one system" and "another system" has semantically separated them (obscure pun intended).
 
  • #19
Mentat said:
"A moment after you've thought them"...clarify please. Are you referring to thought as an event (with defined beginnings and ends, and final products)?

Yes. It is a computational convenience to deal with thought in this manner. Any action of the mind cannot be known by the mind--i.e., placed into the mind's short-term memory--until somewhat after the action happens.

Mentat said:
But just the reference to them as "one system" and "another system" has semantically separated them (obscure pun intended).

Humans may create all the semantic separations they like, for their computational convenience. None of these separations indicate any fundamental difference.


Even if a theory of everything is created and satisfies all experiments that test it, and even if this theory of everything has a smallest theoretical element, the theory is still nothing more than a computational device. These "smallest theoretical elements" are only figments of the device, convenient to compute with but having no greater meaning than that.
 
  • #20
If there is more than one fundamental 'thing' then it becomes very difficult to explain how they both came into existence. After all we can't manage to explain one thing doing it, so to explain the odd coincidence of more than one thing doing it is a tall order. On the other hand it was argued by Leibnitz, and I feel he is correct, that something that is one thing cannot have physical extension.

Take your pick. There's no answer that does not contradict the two-value logic that we normally call reason.
 
  • #21
Bartholomew said:
Yes. It is a computational convenience to deal with thought in this manner. Any action of the mind cannot be known by the mind--i.e., placed into the mind's short-term memory--until somewhat after the action happens.

But what is an "action of mind"? How long does one last? How does one start? How does on end?

Ignorant as it may seem, I'm not really sure what the term means.

Humans may create all the semantic separations they like, for their computational convenience. None of these separations indicate any fundamental difference.

But the whole point of referring to "one thing" and then "another thing" is to distinguish the two. If you wanted to refer to just "one thing" you would have stopped at "one thing".

Even if a theory of everything is created and satisfies all experiments that test it, and even if this theory of everything has a smallest theoretical element, the theory is still nothing more than a computational device. These "smallest theoretical elements" are only figments of the device, convenient to compute with but having no greater meaning than that.

What "greater meaning" could a theory possibly have? For that matter, what does "greater meaning" mean, and to whom?
 
  • #22
Canute said:
If there is more than one fundamental 'thing' then it becomes very difficult to explain how they both came into existence. After all we can't manage to explain one thing doing it, so to explain the odd coincidence of more than one thing doing it is a tall order.

Why? If we get a good explanation of what it means for something to "come into existence" and then explain how it's accomplished...well, we could (in principle) apply that explanation across the board to an infinite number of objects...right?
 
  • #23
Ok maybe I'm a little slow, so forgive me, but essentially what we're talking about is how we view something. Do we view it as a whole, or as an infinitessimal series of objects that make up the whole?

It's like one of those visual acuity questions where you have to pick the jigsaw puzzle piece out of a huge puzzle that is broken down. Your brain wants to see it as a whole, but you have to break it down into the individual pieces in order to pick out the one you want.

I think they are both right. Organizationally life is a whole, and life is quarks and leptons. So are we trying to make the scientific distinction? I think it's a persective situation. you can view the Earth as a whole, or you can view a grain of sand. The grain of sand is part of the long series of things that make the earth.

I Know I'm missing the point, clarify someone...??
 
  • #24
Mentat said:
But what is an "action of mind"? How long does one last? How does one start? How does on end?

Ignorant as it may seem, I'm not really sure what the term means.

For example, a neuron firing would be an action of the mind. An action of the mind is an action of the brain which pertains to the mind; in this case "action of the brain" is all I meant. On the other hand, if you don't believe that the mind parallels the brain, we have no basis for discussion on this particular point.
 
  • #25
Mentat said:
But the whole point of referring to "one thing" and then "another thing" is to distinguish the two. If you wanted to refer to just "one thing" you would have stopped at "one thing".

What "greater meaning" could a theory possibly have?

That's my entire point. A theory is only meaningful to human beings. The idea of a particular "number" of things is a purely human concept, meaningless outside of the human mind.

Mentat said:
For that matter, what does "greater meaning" mean, and to whom?

That's a good question. How do you answer it?
 
  • #26
PIT2 said:
I cannot prove if those statements are right of wrong.

But what is your point?

What I am trying to say is that the best place to start searching for plurality is to ask yourself the following questions and leave your brain to do the rest:

1) Is my leg different from my face ... and do they do the same thing?

2) Am I posting this question to respond to it myself (asking and answering my own question)?

3) In logical space or in the external world, are there things that cannot occupy the same space location?

4) When I am walking, can I make the third step without having made the first and second steps?

5) Am I part of the human race (6 billion people that you mentioned) or am I a solipsist? Or even an indivisible 'it'?


And endlessly more. If you can honestly answer at least one of these questions, then you may have cracked it. Hooorrraaay!
 
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  • #27
Philocrat, those questions demonstrate that different parts of the universe act in different ways. Establishing fundamental separation between parts of the universe is a different matter entirely.

To answer your questions:

1) Is my leg different from my face ... and do they do the same thing?

Precisely where does your leg and face end? Does your leg end at the hip or at the waist? Exactly where at the hip or the waist? At the bone socket? Zoom in. Which atoms to include? Which quarks? Which superstrings? Which parts of superstrings? Your face and leg are parts of a continuum.

2) Am I posting this question to respond to it myself (asking and answering my own question)?

Exactly where is the boundary between you and non-you?

3) In logical space or in the external world, are there things that cannot occupy the same space location?

Most likely there are. But I can conceive of an idealized, single sheet of paper with no constituent parts which you can't fold so that it passes through itself. Only one object exists, yet the exclusion property also exists, so the property of exclusion is not sufficient to establish the existence of multiple objects.

4) When I am walking, can I make the third step without having made the first and second steps?

At exactly what time does each step begin and end? If you can't find a beginning or an ending, then why call them separate entities?

5) Am I part of the human race (6 billion people that you mentioned) or am I a solipsist? Or even an indivisible 'it'?

Imagine God morphing a rabbit slowly and smoothly into a human. Go one atom at a time. In which of those vast trillions of steps does the rabbit stop being a rabbit and start being a human? If you cannot name the point, perhaps you are not a human being at all; perhaps you are a rabbit.
 
  • #28
selfAdjoint said:
I am pretty sure a sandpile exists as a thing, not just as a collection of grains. Tha angle of slope of the pile is an emergent quality, that cannot be attributed to any particular combination of grains, but only to the whole. Even one grain extra can cause it to slump.

A collection is a thing! A sandpile is a thing: it is a collection of sand.
 
  • #29
Zantra said:
Ok maybe I'm a little slow, so forgive me, but essentially what we're talking about is how we view something. Do we view it as a whole, or as an infinitessimal series of objects that make up the whole?

It's like one of those visual acuity questions where you have to pick the jigsaw puzzle piece out of a huge puzzle that is broken down. Your brain wants to see it as a whole, but you have to break it down into the individual pieces in order to pick out the one you want.

I think they are both right. Organizationally life is a whole, and life is quarks and leptons. So are we trying to make the scientific distinction? I think it's a persective situation. you can view the Earth as a whole, or you can view a grain of sand. The grain of sand is part of the long series of things that make the earth.

I Know I'm missing the point, clarify someone...??

I don't think you missed the point at all. This is an old philosophical problem that turns out to be nothing but a semantic puzzle...happens all the time :smile:.
 
  • #30
Alkatran said:
A collection is a thing! A sandpile is a thing: it is a collection of sand.

But is a "collection" a "thing" or "many things"...that's part of the point of the original question.
 
  • #31
Mentat said:
But is a "collection" a "thing" or "many things"...that's part of the point of the original question.

The simple answer is that it is both simultaneously. Think of it this way. A woman can be a wife, mother,daughter, friend, etc all at the same time. It just depends on how you look at it. The same applies.
 
  • #32
Zantra said:
The simple answer is that it is both simultaneously. Think of it this way. A woman can be a wife, mother,daughter, friend, etc all at the same time. It just depends on how you look at it. The same applies.

I agree with you entirely, I was merely countering a dogmatic statement (advocatus diaboli, remember?).
 
  • #33
Mentat said:
Why? If we get a good explanation of what it means for something to "come into existence" and then explain how it's accomplished...well, we could (in principle) apply that explanation across the board to an infinite number of objects...right?
I'm not so sure. If they are all the same thing then maybe you could argue that. But suppose, for instance, that mind and matter are two different substances. In this case each can come into existence independently, and in fact must come into existence independently. We would then need two theories of creation rather than one. If there is a third thing then we would need three theories. It seems to me that we would also need three 'first causes'. At this time even one makes no sense, that there were three would be astonishing.

I think I'm with Bartholomew on this one. Plurality is the appearance of plurality, the 'ten thousand things' that arise from what is fundamental, or perhaps, that are the appearance of what is fundamental as seen from one perspective.
 
  • #34
Just to through this in here...

Are any of you familiar with Putnam's analogy about the square peg into a circular hole...is it a property of any of it's constituents that doesn't allow them to go into the hole? Clearly not. But, as a whole, it is an obvious problem.

Just thought I'd mention that.
 
  • #35
Canute said:
I'm not so sure. If they are all the same thing then maybe you could argue that. But suppose, for instance, that mind and matter are two different substances. In this case each can come into existence independently, and in fact must come into existence independently.

Why? Is there a logical necessity, or is it just improbable?

At this time even one makes no sense, that there were three would be astonishing.

I wouldn't say that one "makes no sense" (sorry, Wuliheron), it's just hard to conceive when you don't consider it an a prori necessity that something exist. Indeed, if nothing existed, then there would be no time or space, so there would be "something" in no time :wink:.
 
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