DevilsAvocado said:
The de Broglie–Bohm theory is explicitly nonlocal (as are all ontic QM interpretations), to be compatible with empirical data.
I am more than aware of this, which is exactly
why I had said
locality in configuration space, because that's what I meant. So I don't see the relevance of your objection?
Also, saying "to be compatible" is a bit of a disingenuous representation, as if to say that it's necessarily some sort of epicyclic fudge.
DevilsAvocado said:
More fundamental?? To me, this is when things go wrong. Science is about understanding and constructing explanatory
models (approximations) of this world – not to build a "Mathematical Heaven" that's stands above everyone and everything, representing the Ultimate Platonic Truth.
This is not science – science has to be refutable by
experiments.
I know there are guys like Max Tegmark who propose the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis. Question: How do you test the validity of MUH? With a calculator? What has Gödel to say about that?
For this portion I have little idea how this relates to what I originally said. I don't recall at any point saying that "the universe is fundamentally maths, and doesn't actually exist"...?
DevilsAvocado said:
Do you for real mean that an "explanation" that state a mathematical configuration space to be more fundamental than the world we live in (
which is degraded as "emergent") – as natural, intuitive and conceptual??
Saying things like "than the world we live in" is just affirming the consequent (normal space is fundamental, therefore normal space is fundamental, kinda thing). Compared to a Gallilean geometry, Minkowski space is a
seemingly more abstract space. It seems like youir point could be directly applied to people (either now or in the past) who would want to
insist that only "normal 3-space-plus-time" exists and that anything is "just maths, but not
reeeally there".
Also, "natural, intuitive, and conceptual" are notoriously difficult to agree on, and surely shouldn't in-and-of-themselves presume to be deciding factors in discussions of what is fundamental (a point which I get the impression
you would have made in response to me if I had happened to mention the same).
DevilsAvocado said:
This is exactly what I'm talking about; in order to preserve the good ol' Local Realism, we're introduced to a "magical world" of buzzwords and "stuff" that just "pops out" to make everything right again. If I have to choose between "spooky action at a distance" and "emergent disasters" – I choose the spooky stuff, no doubt, it seems less spooky...
EDIT: I appreciate that we have differing opinions about whether or not it makes sense for spatial nonlocality to be explicable by taking the configuration-space representation as more fundamental, but I'd at least reiterate that we are in fact talking about the same thing (quantitatively, and empirically, if not conceptually), and point out that despite what you might have mistakenly thought while reading my post, that I am
not a proponent of Local Realism. You've probably been thrown off by my making a distinction between spatial-locality and configuration-space locality.
I'll omit the part about Bell's theorem, since we do actually agree, I'm just not sure how your reply related to what I said.
DevilsAvocado said:
Observing the violation of Bell's inequality tells us something about
all possible future theories; they must all comply with the options above, in the same way as Newton's apple will always fall in same direction at same speed, no matter what scientific theory may come in the future.
Do you conceive the possibility of someone ever measuring Newton's apple going in opposite direction, at twice the speed? (
Disclaimer: excluding fleeting local Micro Black Holes 
)
It should have been obvious that my point was just an elaboration on the fact that, eventually, we have tended to find scenarios which
look as if they ought to be described by our current laws, but then aren't - and need something new. Older theories usually remain valuable approximations within some limited domain.
DevilsAvocado said:
If you mean that science cannot and should not represent "The Ultimate Final Truth", then yes.
It certainly shouldn't represent itself as
having it, but it should definitely constantly try to get closer. Deciding either way on whether such a Truth does or does not actually exist seems premature, though I'll happily admit for the record's sake that I am inclined to think that one does.
DevilsAvocado said:
This is not what I am saying. A scientific theory must be
refutable (
in contrast to mysticism/religion), and the only way to refute a theory is by
experiments.
Do you know any other way??
All I was saying was that "we haven't done an experiment to demonstrate the limitedness of X theory" doesn't automatically imply that "such an experiment is impossible in principle". Demonstrating the latter, if true, takes a fair amount of effort; and is still only valid if the physical theory you use to derive it is also
fully true.
---
I kind of get the feeling that your responses have been trying to imply things about what I said/meant which weren't there at all; as if I'm supporting some sort of anti-scientific spiritualistic "knowledge"-gaining process, or some other trivially-deconstructible naive viewpoint.