selfAdjoint said:
Patrick, is it correct to say that QM is unitary evolution plus Born, and does not include projection at all?
I wouldn't say that, it depends on one's viewpoint. QM is for sure unitary evolution. Some think (hardline MWIers) that that is sufficient ; I think that in one way or another, the Born rule is needed in order to calculate probabilities. To the entity for which these probabilities make sense (the "observer"), the projection ALSO makes sense. Indeed, if the global wavefunction is:
|psi> = a |O1> |sys1> |env1> + b |O2> |sys2> |env2> + c |O3> |sys3> |env3>
in a strict unitary view, then in one way or another, observer O can be in states O1, O2 or O3, and (that's the hokus-pokus that gives problems) is only aware of ONE of these states, with probabilities |a|^2, |b|^2 and |c|^2 respectively.
In a von Neumann view, the above state is the result of the "pre-measurement interaction" and the "measurement" gives then rise to a projection: in the case O is in state O2, (which could happen with probability |b|^2), the STATE is now just |O2> |sys2> |env2>. Projection "ontologically" happened.
In an MWI view, the state |psi> remains what it is, but you happen to be observer number 702340 which is associated with the state O2.
However, FOR THAT PARTICULAR OBSERVER, everything happens AS IF the state is now |O2> |sys2> |env2> (on the condition that env2 remains for ever essentially orthogonal to all other |envx> states). So in this case, the projection doesn't really ontologically happen, but it does happen for all practical purposes FROM THE STANDPOINT OF OBSERVER O2, in that this is the only part of the wavefunction he will still have to care about ; he can, if he likes, continue to calculate what happens to his twin observers in other branches but it won't make a difference to him.
There is in fact only a difference between the von Neumann and the MWI view if some ontological status is given to the wavefunction. In both, the projection plays a role, but in the von Neumann view, something "happened" to the wavefunction, while in the MWI view, it is a "trick to only work with the relevant part of the wavefunction from the point of view of an observer".
In a true Copenhagen view (which is often confused with a von Neumann view), things are less clear. In a Copenhagen view, it somehow doesn't make sense to talk about the quantum state of the observer which lives in a classical world. So you cannot talk about a premeasurement evolution in this language, because there is no quantum mechanical description of the observer, or even the macroscopic measurement system. There, the projection somehow happens directly to the microscopic system and it is impossible to analyse deeper the interaction between the measurement apparatus and the system (at least this is how I understand it).
In the viewpoint that the wavefunction does not have any ontological status, then there is no difference between von Neumann and MWI ; however, I think that there is a difference between Copenhagen on one side (which gives ontological status to all "classical" objects, and denies it to all quantum objects) and MWI/von Neumann on the other hand, in which or the wavefunction has an ontological status, or nothing has.
Given that Copenhagen (if I understand it well) doesn't give any ontological status to the wavefunction, I guess that the projection also doesn't mean much: it is just calculational machinery that somehow makes classical measurement apparatus give results.
EDIT: I might try to add the strong points and weaknesses of each viewpoint:
- in von Neumann and MWI, not giving an ontological status of the wavefunction (in which case there is no difference between both) deprives physics in fact of all forms of ontology. We only have observers which know results of measurements, but nothing is really there, because everything is in fact described by a wavefunction. So that's strange: we know results of measurements about nothing.
- in von Neumann and MWI, giving an ontological status to the wavefunction (which I think is the only sensible thing to do), I think that von Neumann has the advantage of an ontology which corresponds to our observations (measured things really happened), but has the problem of the fact that a measurement by a single individual (what is that ?) changes the objective state of the entire universe, moreover in a non-local way.
MWI has the advantage of implying that a measurement only affects the observer and also that locality is respected, but has two other problems: the first one is that the measurement doesn't correspond to "what is really there" and the second one is that one needs to make a difference between the physical construction of the observer (the body) and his "mind"/"consciousness" which is associated with it ; it being the last one which is in fact the "true observer".
- Copenhagen as such, to me, cries out for a more general theory, in which quantum theory is the limiting case for "microscopic" systems, and classical physics a limiting case for "macroscopic systems". But EPR situations make it damn hard to define what is microscopic and what is macroscopic. it might very well be that Copenhagen is the crude version of what is to come. However, as it is, today, it has the disadvantage of not defining where is this famous boundary between quantum and classical behaviour.
cheers,
Patrick.