How Do Mind and Body Interact in Dualism?

[seeker03]

Dualism.

I was wondering if anyone could help me with this. If our mind and our body can interact, and our mind is mental and our bodies are physical, then there should be some sort of integration. Yet this integration cannot touch at a mental level and a physical level, because this is what dualism states. Then, how does our body and mind interact according to dualism?

 

[selfAdjoint]

Lots of answers to this one. Here's one to try, epiphenomenalism. It means the mind is just a byproduct that the body, especially the brain makes, like the noise a machine makes when it's working. The classic objection to this is that the sound doen't affect the machine but the mind can affect the body. But that's pretty silly; the meachine noise was only a simplified model, you shouldn't push it too far.

Combine epiphenomenalism with evolution, you get an epiphenomenon that happened to evolve, turned out to have survival advantages, and flourished. So that's what it could be. Just an accidental byproduct of cellular working that's been enhanced by evolution.

 

[seeker03]

thanks! that's a pretty good analogy. but how can the mind exist without the body? in your analogy, the body is an extension of the mind. but from our senses, it would seem that the mind is an extension of the body.

 

[Mentat]

seeker, your problem started when you differentiated "mental" from "physical". If mental events are not physical, then they cannot interact with the physical body (which they obviously do); therefore they must be physical. For an explanation of why non-physical things cannot interact with physical ones, see the ninth post down on the third page of this thread.

 

[hypnagogue]

Or, for an ongoing explanation of how phsyical/non-physical interactions could in fact be a conceivable, coherent framework, check out this thread.

 

[seeker03]

thanks guys, both of those threads contain very relevant information. :)

 

[full-time-climb]

One explanation is an intelligence at the cellular level. Each cell carries it’s own intelligence. Just watch a cut heal without you having to instruct it.
We think our mind is in our brain because that’s where the most cells are.

John

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by full-time-climb
One explanation is an intelligence at the cellular level. Each cell carries it’s own intelligence. Just watch a cut heal without you having to instruct it.
We think our mind is in our brain because that’s where the most cells are.

John

This cannot be correct.

First off, if cells were conscious of pain, then there would be no need of a nervous system that relayed such information (of being cut) to the spinal cord and brain.

Secondly, if a cell was conscious, then why would anything have every developed a brain, when any collection of cells would suffice?

Lastly, if pain was felt by a cell, then why does the cell (along its neighboring cells) not respond before any electrical stimulus reaches the spinal cord?

 

[full-time-climb]

Cells do act without control coming from the brain. Let's just think back to before we had a brain. When we were just a single cell. Every cell new exactly what to do and when to do it. Even after we had developed a brain we still have systems of cells that do not require instruction from our brain.

Interesting don't you think.


John

 

[Iacchus32]

Yes, that is pretty amazing!

The intelligence factor is definitely encoded within the cell. At which point it becomes a matter of where the cell "takes up residence" and specializes in.

And it's a good indication that consciousness even occurs at the cellular level.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by full-time-climb
Cells do act without control coming from the brain. Let's just think back to before we had a brain. When we were just a single cell. Every cell new exactly what to do and when to do it. Even after we had developed a brain we still have systems of cells that do not require instruction from our brain.

Interesting don't you think.


John

Actually, a cell never knew "what to do" or "when to do it", until a CNS evolved. Think about it, a plant doesn't know what to do or when to do it, and it's a whole collection of cells. No, a cell may have interacted with its surroundings, but it never knew it was doing this.

 

[Iacchus32]

And yet who's to say that human society isn't altogether different than a collection of cells? And here, while we may be speaking of something occurring on a higher level, we're basically speaking of something which is fundamenatlly the same.

 

[full-time-climb]

Great points Mentat. Do you know if the nerve cells of the brain are radically different than the nerve cells in the body?


John

 

[Canute]

Some arguments on dualism.

Dualism can be explained by assuming that God keeps the physical and the experiential perpetually in sync, as I believe Liebnitz proposed. I don't buy this. However dualism is definitely a problematic position.

Epiphenominalism (supervenience) is sometime used to get around the problem, but it doesn't work. Ryle and others suggest that consciousness is no more than the steam from a train whistle, on the basis that the steam has no effect on the train. The problem with this view is that it's complete nonsense. Of course the steam has an effect on the train. There is no known scientific case of an epiphenomenon having no effect on the structure from which it arises, so claiming that consciousness is an exception is a pretty thin argument.

Also it has been well argued on logical grounds (Dupree) that 'supervenience' (an epiphenomenon 'supervenes' on what it is epiphenomenal on) must be symmetrical (will find ref. if required). If causation works one way it must work the other way as well. Epiphenominalism is therefore not a very plausible idea.

I think that few current thinkers go for 'substance dualism'. Most prefer 'property dualism', one substance but two aspects.

Substance dualism only makes sense if mind and matter reduce to one substance, as Buddhism asserts. Property dualism has nothing to say about the ontology of mind and matter.

Some property dualists assert that mind and matter are both material. This is counterintuitive at best and outright insanity at worst. Still, if someone chooses to believe that exerientia are physical objects it's hard to argue with them. It's like arguing with people who believe they're Napoleon, logic doesn't seem to apply.

As for the idea that consciousness has evolved it contradicts science. As currently defined science must assume that consciousness has no function. In this case consciousness bestows no advantage on an organism and cannot be selected for.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
And yet who's to say that human society isn't altogether different than a collection of cells? And here, while we may be speaking of something occurring on a higher level, we're basically speaking of something which is fundamenatlly the same.

That's rather a "straw-man" argument, don't you think? I mean, yes, if all of us humans produce some higher consciousness through our own minute processes, then your conclusion makes sense, but it is an added assumption that we produce such a gestalt, right?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by full-time-climb
Great points Mentat. Do you know if the nerve cells of the brain are radically different than the nerve cells in the body?


John

No, I don't think there's much difference in structure between interneurons (in the neocortex of the brain) and motor or sensory neurons (which are also in the rest of the body).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Some arguments on dualism.

Dualism can be explained by assuming that God keeps the physical and the experiential perpetually in sync, as I believe Liebnitz proposed. I don't buy this. However dualism is definitely a problematic position.

Just to be clear, this "God" idea couldn't work either since the "god" of this concept would have to be neither physical nor non-physical.

Epiphenominalism (supervenience) is sometime used to get around the problem, but it doesn't work. Ryle and others suggest that consciousness is no more than the steam from a train whistle, on the basis that the steam has no effect on the train. The problem with this view is that it's complete nonsense. Of course the steam has an effect on the train. There is no known scientific case of an epiphenomenon having no effect on the structure from which it arises, so claiming that consciousness is an exception is a pretty thin argument.

Also it has been well argued on logical grounds (Dupree) that 'supervenience' (an epiphenomenon 'supervenes' on what it is epiphenomenal on) must be symmetrical (will find ref. if required). If causation works one way it must work the other way as well. Epiphenominalism is therefore not a very plausible idea.

I think that few current thinkers go for 'substance dualism'. Most prefer 'property dualism', one substance but two aspects.

Substance dualism only makes sense if mind and matter reduce to one substance, as Buddhism asserts. Property dualism has nothing to say about the ontology of mind and matter.

Well, when you think about it, this is no dualism at all. In fact, Materialists would assume that mind and matter are of one substance too: matter!

Some property dualists assert that mind and matter are both material. This is counterintuitive at best and outright insanity at worst. Still, if someone chooses to believe that exerientia are physical objects it's hard to argue with them. It's like arguing with people who believe they're Napoleon, logic doesn't seem to apply.

Well, of course I'm not saying that those supposed phenomenological entities are physical, I'm saying that they don't exist at all, and that the process of "mind" and "thought" can be explained completely in terms of matter.

As for the idea that consciousness has evolved it contradicts science. As currently defined science must assume that consciousness has no function. In this case consciousness bestows no advantage on an organism and cannot be selected for.

This part is just wrong, as there are many books (including Consciousness Explained) which explain why consciousness would evolve.

First off, the australopithecines (sp?) and subsequent primitive Homo species could have used superior intellects to outwit larger predators and to remain socially inact.

There is also the matter of coordinating attack, but this too is part of being a social animal, and being social does indeed have evolutionary advantages to it.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
Well, when you think about it, this is no dualism at all. In fact, Materialists would assume that mind and matter are of one substance too: matter!

Materialists are generally property dualists, since most people find that it is logically difficult to say that 'love' is material. But I agree that they are not dualists as to substance.

Well, of course I'm not saying that those supposed phenomenological entities are physical, I'm saying that they don't exist at all, and that the process of "mind" and "thought" can be explained completely in terms of matter.

So a feeling of 'anger' is a physical object and any associated phenomenolgy doesn't exist? Hmm.

This part is just wrong, as there are many books (including Consciousness Explained) which explain why consciousness would evolve.

The most innapropriate and arrogant book title ever. Dennett had a good try but hardly anyone agrees with him. His view doesn't stand up to analysis.

I don't remember him talking about consciousness evolving. However if consciousness is non-causal then it didn't evolve, end of story. You can argue that the brain-states underlying some states of consciousness evolved, but unless consciousness is causal and freewill exists then consciousness has never had anything to do with evolution. It's impossible in principle that it did.

Your view escapes this problem by the only possible route, by saying that consciousness is physical. But if it is physical how do explain the 'explanatory gap', and why are neuroscientists looking for its correlates, rather than the thing itself?

(Btw - I'm not trying to be confrontational, just up front. )

First off, the australopithecines (sp?) and subsequent primitive Homo species could have used superior intellects to outwit larger predators and to remain socially inact.

Yes, but this is physical computation. Whether these entities were conscious of that computation or not could have made no difference to their behaviour in your view.

I can see that there is some logic to the idea that consciousness is physically caused. But to say it is physical seems very illogical, since how can matter self-reference? Maybe I haven't understood the argument for it, but I have tried.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
So a feeling of 'anger' is a physical object and any associated phenomenolgy doesn't exist? Hmm.

Indeed. Anger is a release of certain hormones, coupled with the firing of a few interneurons...nothing non-physical required.

It's not a physical object, but it is a physical process.

The most innapropriate and arrogant book title ever. Dennett had a good try but hardly anyone agrees with him. His view doesn't stand up to analysis.

Interestingly enough, though, while you're right that very few people say they agree with him, every Materialist theory of consciousness (usually written by neurologists or cognitive scientists) can be shown to be another way of saying exactly what Dennett said (even if unintentionally).

A couple of examples are the selectionist theories of William Calvin and Gerald Edelman.

I don't remember him talking about consciousness evolving. However if consciousness is non-causal then it didn't evolve, end of story. You can argue that the brain-states underlying some states of consciousness evolved, but unless consciousness is causal and freewill exists then consciousness has never had anything to do with evolution. It's impossible in principle that it did.

Your view escapes this problem by the only possible route, by saying that consciousness is physical. But if it is physical how do explain the 'explanatory gap', and why are neuroscientists looking for its correlates, rather than the thing itself?

(Btw - I'm not trying to be confrontational, just up front. )

And I appreciate this. However, some neuroscientists do indeed believe that "gap" can be crossed (this usually being stated in terms of a discovery that the "gap" didn't really exist in the first place).

The examples I mentioned above, along with Joseph LeDoux (in his book, Synaptic Self) are just a few.

Yes, but this is physical computation. Whether these entities were conscious of that computation or not could have made no difference to their behaviour in your view.

Indeed, but now you are referring to self-consciousness. Minor consciousness can evolve into self-consciousness, but not because it is beneficial to the species, simply because it is not deterimental...and it has helped us ascend to the "top of the food chain" in more recent times (the past 6,000 or so years).

I can see that there is some logic to the idea that consciousness is physically caused. But to say it is physical seems very illogical, since how can matter self-reference?

Hebbian cell-assemblies firing in synchronous self-stimulation, thus relating one "thought" to another by the adding of new synchronicities in a "darwinian machine" we call the neocortex? That's William Calvin's take. Consciousness would not be matter, but a process that matter does.

 

[Canute]

Hmm. I have a feeling we aren't ever going to agree about this. Still...

Originally posted by Mentat
Indeed. Anger is a release of certain hormones, coupled with the firing of a few interneurons...nothing non-physical required.

It's not a physical object, but it is a physical process.

So why do neoruscientists, when they search for the neural correlates of anger, bother to ask their subjects whether they feel angry or not? It can't be because feeling angry is not the same thing as a bunch of neurons. It reminds me of the old behaviourist joke of two cognitive scientists of the Watson/Skinner school meeting. "You're very well today, how am I?"

Interestingly enough, though, while you're right that very few people say they agree with him, every Materialist theory of consciousness (usually written by neurologists or cognitive scientists) can be shown to be another way of saying exactly what Dennett said (even if unintentionally).

'Every' is much too strong, and few of these theories are as well thought out as Dennett's. But you're partly right. In fact Velmans (I think it was) practically accused him of stealing 'hetero-phenomenology' from a paper of his (can't remember what Velmans called it). The fact is, however, that very few people think that Dennett explained consciousness. My personal view is that Dennett is very clever and writes well, but he is patronising, dishonest in his thinking, and has a view derived from temperament rather than logic. That goes for 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea' as well. Thank God he isn't here to sue me.

And I appreciate this. However, some neuroscientists do indeed believe that "gap" can be crossed (this usually being stated in terms of a discovery that the "gap" didn't really exist in the first place).

True, many of them believe that (wouldn't you if you were a neuroscientist?). But the issue is open.

Excuse the long quote but it seems relevant. From a recent conference report:

“It would seem reasonable to expect any conprehensive account of consciousness to accommodate two of its most fundamental attributes: that we have a self-centred sense of experience and that this sense is somehow linked to the conditioning of our physiology. Yet those conversant with post-Cartesian philosophy will know that time and again significant doubts have been raised about any apparently obvious link between mind and body. So of all of the questions implicated the scientific study of consciousness perhaps the most pressing is to what extent, if at all, does our mental life correlate with bio chemical activity at the neuronal level? Until this is resolved we will be unable to reconcile the data gathered from phenomenological analysis of introspective experience with tha derived from neuroscientific analysis of brain behaviour. The infamous gap will persist.”
Robert Peperell ‘Between phenomenology and neuroscience’ A report of the ‘Towards a Science of Consciousness’ Conference, Prague, July 2003) From JCS Vol 10 No 11, 2004 p 85

It includes notes on a presentation given by neurophysiologist
Karl Pribram,

‘One can no more hope to find consciousness by digging into the brain than one can find gravity by digging into the earth’s centre’. His solution to the mind/brain problem is, much like Thompson, to reject the assumption of an inherent division and instead to regard the brain as but part of a larger web of causations impinging upon each instantiation of consciousness, including social systems and culture. We concluded by invoking a spiritual dimension to the quest for human understanding; not the kind of spiritualism one suspects Honderich had in mind, but rather a kind of ‘pervading consciousness’ which partakes of patterns that seem to be an intrinsic part of nature and human experience, including ‘quantum mechanics, organic chemistry, history, interpersonal interactions, or religious beliefs’ – all touched on to some extent in this wide-ranging presentation.”

Robert Peperell ibid.

Indeed, but now you are referring to self-consciousness. Minor consciousness can evolve into self-consciousness, but not because it is beneficial to the species, simply because it is not deterimental...and it has helped us ascend to the "top of the food chain" in more recent times (the past 6,000 or so years).

Is 'minor' consciousness the same as the now debunked 'proto-consciousness?

This having it both ways. If consciousness is no more than non-detrimental then how did it help us ascend the food chain?

Hebbian cell-assemblies firing in synchronous self-stimulation, thus relating one "thought" to another by the adding of new synchronicities in a "darwinian machine" we call the neocortex? That's William Calvin's take. Consciousness would not be matter, but a process that matter does. [/B]

Sounds impressive but boils down to 'consciousness is brain' and doesn't address the difficult questions.

I wonder if our disagreement is down to you discussing 'phenomenal consciousness' and me discussing 'what it is like to be'? What do you think?

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Canute
I wonder if our disagreement is down to you discussing 'phenomenal consciousness' and me discussing 'what it is like to be'? What do you think?

In truth, 'phenomenal consciousness' and 'what is it like to be' are the same thing. The materialist position on consciousness bolsters itself either by deluding itself into believing that phenomenal consciousness "doesn't exist," or by assuming that correlation between brain processes and subjective experiences implies causation. I agree with you, Canute; despite some claims to the contrary, consciousness by and large remains very much unexplained.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
In truth, 'phenomenal consciousness' and 'what is it like to be' are the same thing. The materialist position on consciousness bolsters itself either by deluding itself into believing that phenomenal consciousness "doesn't exist," or by assuming that correlation between brain processes and subjective experiences implies causation. I agree with you, Canute; despite some claims to the contrary, consciousness by and large remains very much unexplained.

I hate to disgree when you've just agreed with me but...

Phenomenal consciousness implies consciousness of phenomena, but consciousness at its simplest, as 'what it is like' does not imply this, or at least not necessarily. I'd say that this distinction, or the failure to make it clear, is a major source of misunderstanding between people arguing that consciousness is fundamental (like me) and those arguing that it consists entirely of sensory data and thus must be emergent from brains.

I'd also argue that the correlation between brain processes and subjective experiences does imply causation. It's the nature of that causation that is the issue.

The one view that really is wrong is, as you say, thinking that we've made any progress on solving these problems scientifically yet. Perhaps we will in future, and perhaps we won't. Perhaps the answer lies in science, and perhaps it doesn't. So far we don't have the scientific evidence required to make up our minds.

From the scientific perspective it's a matter of opinion whether physicalism is true or not, since it's a metaphysical theory. If I ran the education system (God help us) this is the first fact that all children would learn at school, followed by a list of all the other things we don't know but make assumptions about.

Oops. Slipped into rant mode.

 

[UltraPi1]

Building a bridge between physical and conceptual existence. How is this done?

By eliminating the physical - No bridge is necessary.

Thats right - There is no physical world to speak of. Your reality is entirely conceptual.

Your mind, your body, the world we live in is not physical. I repeat - There is no physical reality.

I thought I'd toss out something not discussed. That a concept acts in accordance with our understanding of the physical. A concept quacks like a duck. Therefor it is. Conceptual reality mimics that of the physical, and we think in the physical sense.

Does that make us physical?

Well - Yes - But not really.

No bridge is necessary.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
So why do neoruscientists, when they search for the neural correlates of anger, bother to ask their subjects whether they feel angry or not? It can't be because feeling angry is not the same thing as a bunch of neurons. It reminds me of the old behaviourist joke of two cognitive scientists of the Watson/Skinner school meeting. "You're very well today, how am I?"

LOL! Yeah, I know that we still rely on the utterly heterophenomenological, third-party approach in our study of psychology, but that could just be because we don't yet have a full enough understanding of the physics behind whatever emotion we're discussing.

'Every' is much too strong, and few of these theories are as well thought out as Dennett's. But you're partly right. In fact Velmans (I think it was) practically accused him of stealing 'hetero-phenomenology' from a paper of his (can't remember what Velmans called it). The fact is, however, that very few people think that Dennett explained consciousness. My personal view is that Dennett is very clever and writes well, but he is patronising, dishonest in his thinking, and has a view derived from temperament rather than logic. That goes for 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea' as well. Thank God he isn't here to sue me.

Wow. I've never seen a Dennett-hater before. I guess we're all entitled to our opinions, but I've never noticed any of these attributes in Dennett.

True, many of them believe that (wouldn't you if you were a neuroscientist?). But the issue is open.

Indeed it is. However, in much of Consciousness Explained, Dennett wasn't so much proving his own theory as disproving the theories of others (which required Dualism). So, if Dennett can show that Dualism is ridiculous (and that too is still open for debate, but I think he nailed it pretty hard), then neuroscientists have basis for their hope of explaining consciousness.

Is 'minor' consciousness the same as the now debunked 'proto-consciousness?

Well, I wouldn't call it "proto-consciousness" so much as a development of the primitive linguistic abilities (through which memes are propogated in social structures) and comprehensive abilities of hominoids.

This having it both ways. If consciousness is no more than non-detrimental then how did it help us ascend the food chain?

Well, it's helped us in progressing technologically, right?

Sounds impressive but boils down to 'consciousness is brain' and doesn't address the difficult questions.

I wonder if our disagreement is down to you discussing 'phenomenal consciousness' and me discussing 'what it is like to be'? What do you think?

I'm not sure. "What is it like to be" is subjective experience, but I have no problem with belief in subjective experience (as I myself have had subjective experiences, and so I know they exist), obviously, I just have a problem with the belief that these experiences have a phenomenal existence (seperate from the workings of the neocortex).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by UltraPi1
Building a bridge between physical and conceptual existence. How is this done?

By eliminating the physical - No bridge is necessary.

Thats right - There is no physical world to speak of. Your reality is entirely conceptual.

Then it stands to reason that you yourself are not physical, right?

Your mind, your body, the world we live in is not physical. I repeat - There is no physical reality.

I thought I'd toss out something not discussed. That a concept acts in accordance with our understanding of the physical. A concept quacks like a duck. Therefor it is. Conceptual reality mimics that of the physical, and we think in the physical sense.

Does that make us physical?

Well - Yes - But not really.

Why not really?

Indeed, I agree that no bridge is necessary, but am much more apt to get rid of the conceptual than the physical.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Indeed, I agree that no bridge is necessary, but am much more apt to get rid of the conceptual than the physical.

Just to play some devil's advocate (assuming 'conceptual' as used here refers to the ontological nature of 'consciousness'): the conceptual is that which you experience firsthand, and it is the medium through which you observe 'the world' and infer the existence of the physical. So
1) our notions of the physical are entirely contingent on our experience of the conceptual;
2) the conceptual has an axiomatic claim to existence, whereas the physical has only an assumed/inferred one.

I conclude that if any of these two notions is to be discarded, it should be the physical.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Canute
I hate to disgree when you've just agreed with me but...

Phenomenal consciousness implies consciousness of phenomena, but consciousness at its simplest, as 'what it is like' does not imply this, or at least not necessarily. I'd say that this distinction, or the failure to make it clear, is a major source of misunderstanding between people arguing that consciousness is fundamental (like me) and those arguing that it consists entirely of sensory data and thus must be emergent from brains.

What does it mean to be conscious of a phenomenon if it is not like something to experience that phenomenon? There is perhaps a sense in which a thermometer is 'aware' of the phenomenon of temperature, but this is clearly (I hope) not what we mean by 'consciousness.'

I'd also argue that the correlation between brain processes and subjective experiences does imply causation. It's the nature of that causation that is the issue.

Certainly a reasonable assumption, and one that we probably need to make in scientific investigation of consciousness, but still an assumption nonetheless. Correlation in and of itself does not imply causation.

 

[UltraPi1]

Then it stands to reason that you yourself are not physical, right?

That's exactly what I'm saying, along with everything else in the universe - No exceptions.

Why not really?

Not really because the universe is not physical as stated.
I initially said yes it is physical because everything points to that conclusion. We all believe it to be so. Why question it when it acts flawlessly. Few if any would ever consider our existence as non-physical.



To play the other side of the coin.

Think of every entity in the universe as a concept (thought). Each concept acts in accordance with what we term physical laws. In short - the universe is physical, but not really. I contend that if you could examine the fundamental - You would find ... Not a damn thing. A thought has no size, but for the size of the thought. The fundamental is not a thing except for the thought of a thing. Physicality is a conceptual illusion.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
LOL! Yeah, I know that we still rely on the utterly heterophenomenological, third-party approach in our study of psychology, but that could just be because we don't yet have a full enough understanding of the physics behind whatever emotion we're discussing.

I know what you mean about relying on third-person evidence. But if you think about it consiousness is completely invisible to third-persons, and in fact we rely entirely on first person evidence. What we see from a third-person perspective is behaviour, not consciousness. Alos, however much science we do we will never prove that emotions exist in a scientific sense. How is physics going to explain something it can't prove exists?

Wow. I've never seen a Dennett-hater before. I guess we're all entitled to our opinions, but I've never noticed any of these attributes in Dennett.

Ah, but you agree with him.

Indeed it is. However, in much of Consciousness Explained, Dennett wasn't so much proving his own theory as disproving the theories of others (which required Dualism).

He did a pretty good job as well, but dualism lives to fight again. His book had little impact on the debate as far as I can tell from what emerges in the literature.

So, if Dennett can show that Dualism is ridiculous (and that too is still open for debate, but I think he nailed it pretty hard), then neuroscientists have basis for their hope of explaining consciousness.

Ho showed some forms of dualism to be illogical, but failed (imo) to deal with the more logical forms of it. (I also think that (ultimately) dualism is false, but only at the limit).

Well, I wouldn't call it "proto-consciousness" so much as a development of the primitive linguistic abilities (through which memes are propogated in social structures) and comprehensive abilities of hominoids.

Are you saying that consciousness depends on language? You wouldn't be alone in that (Wittgenstein agreed I think) but it's speculation with little evidence to support it, and plenty against.

Well, it's helped us in progressing technologically, right?

Do you think that consciousness (our ability to know we are experiencing) is causal? It's not the scientific view. According to science consciousness had (and has) no effect on our technological progress.

I'm not sure. "What is it like to be" is subjective experience, but I have no problem with belief in subjective experience (as I myself have had subjective experiences, and so I know they exist), obviously, I just have a problem with the belief that these experiences have a phenomenal existence (seperate from the workings of the neocortex). [/B]

If you KNOW that subjective experience exists, but science cannot observe subjective experience, then how can subjective experience be the the same thing as a brain state. How do you know subjective experiences exist?

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
What does it mean to be conscious of a phenomenon if it is not like something to experience that phenomenon? There is perhaps a sense in which a thermometer is 'aware' of the phenomenon of temperature, but this is clearly (I hope) not what we mean by 'consciousness.'

That's not what I meant. I was saying that phenomenal consciousness is 'intentional', it is consciousness of something. 'What it is like to be' is a more fundamental definition, and a more fundamental state.

It's very hard to argue that phenomenal consciousness is not physically caused (the momentary nature of it anyway), but that isn;t the case for 'what it is like'.

Certainly a reasonable assumption, and one that we probably need to make in scientific investigation of consciousness, but still an assumption nonetheless. Correlation in and of itself does not imply causation. [/B]

It's very difficult to see how the correlation can hold if there is not interaction between brain and experience. Leibnitz argues God maintains the link, but the idea never caught on. How do you think they are correlated if they don't interact? (Btw I'm not assuming anything about which direction the causation works).

(I agree with your last post. Good point about the conceptual being prior to the physical).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Just to play some devil's advocate (assuming 'conceptual' as used here refers to the ontological nature of 'consciousness'): the conceptual is that which you experience firsthand, and it is the medium through which you observe 'the world' and infer the existence of the physical. So
1) our notions of the physical are entirely contingent on our experience of the conceptual;
2) the conceptual has an axiomatic claim to existence, whereas the physical has only an assumed/inferred one.

I conclude that if any of these two notions is to be discarded, it should be the physical.

It's funny that you mention that, since I'd just been considering it. However, I think this reasoning is wrong. Introspection comes quite a bit after perception of objectivity, in the development of an infant, doesn't it?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
What does it mean to be conscious of a phenomenon if it is not like something to experience that phenomenon? There is perhaps a sense in which a thermometer is 'aware' of the phenomenon of temperature, but this is clearly (I hope) not what we mean by 'consciousness.'

What of the consciousness of a dog, that he has been approached? It can be said that it isn't really like anything to be a dog, since the dog never conducts introspection (note: I chose "dog" randomly, I could have used any non-sentient (not even semi-sentient) mammal), and yet he is conscious of objective phenomena, right?

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
It's funny that you mention that, since I'd just been considering it. However, I think this reasoning is wrong. Introspection comes quite a bit after perception of objectivity, in the development of an infant, doesn't it?

Perception is a subjective experience, and so still belongs under the 'conceptual' category (again-- assuming by 'conceptual' we refer to the ontological nature of consciousness rather than the more literal definition).

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
What of the consciousness of a dog, that he has been approached? It can be said that it isn't really like anything to be a dog, since the dog never conducts introspection (note: I chose "dog" randomly, I could have used any non-sentient (not even semi-sentient) mammal), and yet he is conscious of objective phenomena, right?

I don't think we know enough about the mental activity of dogs to say that they don't conduct some sort of introspection. Regardless of this, your argument relies on the notion that it can only be like something to be a certain creature if that creature introspects, which can't be taken as a given.

In what sense can a dog be said to be conscious of phenomena if it is not like something for that dog to experience those phenemona? If it is not like something to be this dog, it follows that the dog has no subjective experience; if the dog has no subjective experience, it follows that it is not conscious.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
I know what you mean about relying on third-person evidence. But if you think about it consiousness is completely invisible to third-persons, and in fact we rely entirely on first person evidence. What we see from a third-person perspective is behaviour, not consciousness. Alos, however much science we do we will never prove that emotions exist in a scientific sense. How is physics going to explain something it can't prove exists?

Actually, Psychology is considered a science (I think), and rightly so. It may only be able to interpret "behavior", but that just means that a full understanding of emotion will not come until a physical link to each instance of this "behavior" is found. Right?

Ah, but you agree with him.

Because I haven't noticed any of these faults that you point out. My "agreement" is different than most, in that it is merely a current assumption that I cannot yet disprove.

He did a pretty good job as well, but dualism lives to fight again. His book had little impact on the debate as far as I can tell from what emerges in the literature.

You are correct. That is sad, in my own opinion, since the new scientific theories of consciousness do seem to follow very near to exactly the model that he predicted.

He showed some forms of dualism to be illogical, but failed (imo) to deal with the more logical forms of it. (I also think that (ultimately) dualism is false, but only at the limit).

What "more logical forms of it" are you referring to? Examples?

Are you saying that consciousness depends on language? You wouldn't be alone in that (Wittgenstein agreed I think) but it's speculation with little evidence to support it, and plenty against.

Well, I say that the propogation of memes in complicated social structure is indeed dependent on language, and that the passing and personal propogation of memes is very important to consciousness...what's wrong with that?

Do you think that consciousness (our ability to know we are experiencing) is causal? It's not the scientific view. According to science consciousness had (and has) no effect on our technological progress.

Hmm...but no non-sentient being could ever invent the tools that primitive man must have used to outwit his predators and his prey (since we're not much, physically, compared to some of the beasts that existed 2 million years ago).

If you KNOW that subjective experience exists, but science cannot observe subjective experience, then how can subjective experience be the the same thing as a brain state. How do you know subjective experiences exist?

I told you, I know that they exist because I've experience them. You have too, otherwise you wouldn't have experienced whatever emotion it is you are experiencing at the time of reading this (hopefully only good thoughts ).

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Canute
That's not what I meant. I was saying that phenomenal consciousness is 'intentional', it is consciousness of something. 'What it is like to be' is a more fundamental definition, and a more fundamental state.

It's very hard to argue that phenomenal consciousness is not physically caused (the momentary nature of it anyway), but that isn;t the case for 'what it is like'.

I agree. If that is how you're defining phenomenal consciousness, then the problem of phenomenal conscious is just the 'easy' problem of consciousness-- it can be explained entirely by recourse to functional analysis of cognitive capacities.

However, the reason there is so much debate about consciousness is because there is a 'hard' problem of consciousness-- explaining how it can be that it can be 'like something' to be a certain physical system, just as you stated. I believe what we are interested with here is the 'hard' problem of consciousness. To try to solve the hard problem with recourse to solutions to the easy problem, as is sometimes a tactic for the materialist, is at bottom just a straw man argument.

It's very difficult to see how the correlation can hold if there is not interaction between brain and experience. Leibnitz argues God maintains the link, but the idea never caught on. How do you think they are correlated if they don't interact? (Btw I'm not assuming anything about which direction the causation works).

As I said, I do believe the most reasonable assumption to make is that there is a causal interaction underlying the correlation. I just wanted to point out that this is still an assumption and could be a potential flaw in our understanding (I doubt it-- but it could be the case).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Perception is a subjective experience, and so still belongs under the 'conceptual' category (again-- assuming by 'conceptual' we refer to the ontological nature of consciousness rather than the more literal definition).

Perception is indeed a subjective experience, but the perception of this fact is an introspective one, is it not?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I don't think we know enough about the mental activity of dogs to say that they don't conduct some sort of introspection. Regardless of this, your argument relies on the notion that it can only be like something to be a certain creature if that creature introspects, which can't be taken as a given.

Why not? If it is like something to be me, then it stands to reason that I know what it is like, since I am me. And if I know what it is like, then I have conducted introspection. Right?

In what sense can a dog be said to be conscious of phenomena if it is not like something for that dog to experience those phenemona?

Simple, the dog becomes aware of the phenomenon, but never aware of what it is like to be aware of the phenomenon. Seriously, if a dog runs into a tree, and then feels pain, the dog is probably conscious of the pain, but not that this is what it is like to hit a tree, nor that this pain is different from that which is felt when running into any other hard surface.

If it is not like something to be this dog, it follows that the dog has no subjective experience;

No, it follows that the dog doesn't know it has subjective experience. Knowing about subjective experience just isn't one of its subjective experiences.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Perception is indeed a subjective experience, but the perception of this fact is an introspective one, is it not?

You don't need to perceive that you perceive in order to be conscious. This is almost akin to the homunculan problem-- why should we stop at perception of perception? Why shouldn't we have to perceive that we perceive that we perceive in order to be conscious? Alternatively, why should perception of perception entail consciousness (subjective experience), but not perception alone?

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Why not? If it is like something to be me, then it stands to reason that I know what it is like, since I am me. And if I know what it is like, then I have conducted introspection. Right?

Define introspection.

Simple, the dog becomes aware of the phenomenon, but never aware of what it is like to be aware of the phenomenon. Seriously, if a dog runs into a tree, and then feels pain, the dog is probably conscious of the pain, but not that this is what it is like to hit a tree, nor that this pain is different from that which is felt when running into any other hard surface.

If the dog feels pain, then there is something it is like for this dog to feel this pain. Otherwise, the dog cannot be said to feel pain in the first place.

No, it follows that the dog doesn't know it has subjective experience. Knowing about subjective experience just isn't one of its subjective experiences.

If the dog does not experience its own subjective experience, then by definition there is no subjective experience to speak of.

It is logically inconsistent to hold that the dog is conscious of (say) pain and also that there is nothing it is like to be the dog. If the dog has subjective experience of pain, it must follow that this pain feels like something to the dog; therefore it is 'like something' to be this dog.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
You don't need to perceive that you perceive in order to be conscious.

I know. That's not what I said. You need to perceive that you perceive in order for it to be "like something" to be you. You can be conscious without this introspection.

This is almost akin to the homunculan problem-- why should we stop at perception of perception? Why shouldn't we have to perceive that we perceive that we perceive in order to be conscious? Alternatively, why should perception of perception entail consciousness (subjective experience), but not perception alone?

Again (just to make sure I'm clear), it is not necessary for consciousness, but for it to be "like something" to be you.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Define introspection.

Perceiving that you perceive (and any conclusions drawn from this perception).

If the dog feels pain, then there is something it is like for this dog to feel this pain. Otherwise, the dog cannot be said to feel pain in the first place.

Yes, it is like something to feel pain, for a dog. What I said is that it is not like something to be a dog, since the dog doesn't even know it's a dog.

If the dog does not experience its own subjective experience, then by definition there is no subjective experience to speak of.

But the dog does experience its experience. It just doesn't know that it's doing that.

It is logically inconsistent to hold that the dog is conscious of (say) pain and also that there is nothing it is like to be the dog. If the dog has subjective experience of pain, it must follow that this pain feels like something to the dog; therefore it is 'like something' to be this dog. [

No, therefore it is like something for this dog to feel pain.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
I know. That's not what I said. You need to perceive that you perceive in order for it to be "like something" to be you.

Again (just to make sure I'm clear), it is not necessary for consciousness, but for it to be "like something" to be you. [/B]

It is consistently agreed by philosophers that consciousness is 'something that it is like'. This is how it is usually defined. What you say here is therefore self-contradictory.

There is no a priori reason why 'perceiving that we percieve' is necessary to consciousness, and Buddhists would strongly disgree with the idea.

However perceiver and perceived are both probably necessary to 'phenomenal consciousness', i.e. consciousness of phenomena, since these phenomena are contents of consciousness, and therefore require the existence of something that contains them.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
No, therefore it is like something for this dog to feel pain.

I think you have been making the assumption that "it is like something to be creature X" means that it is like something to experience creature X's sense of self. From this it would follow that if creature X has no sense of self, there is nothing it is like to be creature X.

However, this is not how the terminology in general is used. When we say "it is like something to be creature X," we mean that, if you put yourself in creature X's shoes (so to speak), you would have some sort of subjective experience. From your own admission that it is like something for a dog to feel pain, it follows that "if we 'put ourselves in a dog's shoes,' it would be like something for us to feel this dog's pain." This argument works just as well if we substitute any arbitrary conscious perception in for 'pain.' So, as long as the dog is conscious of something, we say it is like something to be this dog.

 

[Canute]

Oh yes, that's a much better way of explaining it.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
It is consistently agreed by philosophers that consciousness is 'something that it is like'. This is how it is usually defined. What you say here is therefore self-contradictory.

Oh. Consciousness was defined rather differently in the books I've read...but, I could be completely wrong (as usual ).

There is no a priori reason why 'perceiving that we percieve' is necessary to consciousness, and Buddhists would strongly disgree with the idea.

But I didn't say it was necessary to consciousness, I said it was necessary to knowing what it is like to be you...and knowing what it is like to be you is necessary for it to be "like something" to be you, since if you don't know what it's like to be you, who does?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I think you have been making the assumption that "it is like something to be creature X" means that it is like something to experience creature X's sense of self. From this it would follow that if creature X has no sense of self, there is nothing it is like to be creature X.

However, this is not how the terminology in general is used.

Then I apologize for my misconception. You are exactly right as to how I was taking that term.

When we say "it is like something to be creature X," we mean that, if you put yourself in creature X's shoes (so to speak), you would have some sort of subjective experience. From your own admission that it is like something for a dog to feel pain, it follows that "if we 'put ourselves in a dog's shoes,' it would be like something for us to feel this dog's pain." This argument works just as well if we substitute any arbitrary conscious perception in for 'pain.' So, as long as the dog is conscious of something, we say it is like something to be this dog.

But (and please forgive me if this is a stupid question) doesn't this just prove that it is like something for a dog to do X? I've never disputed this, it's whether it's like something for the dog to just be a dog that I've disputed. I don't quite see how you can separate having conscious self-perception from it being "like something" to be you.

A little more help please .

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
But (and please forgive me if this is a stupid question) doesn't this just prove that it is like something for a dog to do X? I've never disputed this, it's whether it's like something for the dog to just be a dog that I've disputed. I don't quite see how you can separate having conscious self-perception from it being "like something" to be you.

A little more help please .

You could indeed equally well phrase it, "it is like something for a dog to do X," eg "it is like something for a dog to smell a tree." The phrasing "it is like something to be a dog" just highlights the first-person view of this 'like-ness.' That is, when we say "it is like something to be a dog," we mean something roughly like

1) A dog has a conscious perception associated with e.g. its behavior of smelling a tree-- it is 'like something' for the dog to smell the tree.
2) The dog's experience of smelling the tree is only accessible to the dog itself.
3) Therefore, if you were the dog, it would be like something for you to smell the tree.
4) Therefore, it is like something to be the dog (eg to be the dog smelling the tree, or to be the dog experiencing any other arbitrary conscious perception).

I think you get the substance of the idea; it's just a matter of phrasing.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
Oh. Consciousness was defined rather differently in the books I've read...but, I could be completely wrong (as usual ).

You're not exactly wrong. Scentists usually argue that we cannot define consciousness, and then proceed to define it as they see fit. So lots of definitions turn up. However philosophers, with less at stake, usually define it as 'what it is like'. This comes from Nagel, who in a famous paper wondered what it is like to be a bat.

But I didn't say it was necessary to consciousness, I said it was necessary to knowing what it is like to be you...and knowing what it is like to be you is necessary for it to be "like something" to be you, since if you don't know what it's like to be you, who does? [/B]

Ok. But the word 'know' can be tricky here. It implies an experience and also a self-aware 'experiencer' who is separate to the experience. This leads to complications. Consciousness, at the limit, may not need a 'self'. Theoretically it can be just the experience. (It's hard to get your head around that but that's the thinking). Philosophers tend to play safe on this and stick to the simplest definition, the very minimum required for consciousness.

 

[Sikz]

seeker, your problem started when you differentiated "mental" from "physical". If mental events are not physical, then they cannot interact with the physical body (which they obviously do); therefore they must be physical.QUOTE]

What about the uncertainty principle? Couldn't the "mind" or "soul" or whatever you want to call it interact with the universe that way? Einstein is quoted as saying "I cannot believe that God plays dice!" but who says GOD is playing dice? What if the randomness of quantum physics provides a way for the non-physical to affect the physical?