How many believes in Quantum Immortality ?

[confusedashell]

How many believes in the thought experiment on MWI's Quantum Immortality that Max Tegmark put forth?

I think it's bull****, otherwise why hasn't he killed himself to prove it?

 

[xantox]

why hasn't he killed himself to prove it?

Because it is an interesting thought experiment, but a rational being can't choose to perform it. This for two reasons.

First, if MWI is false and he dies, then he dies, and since he doesn't know whether it is true or false, then this is enough to rationally prevent him from performing the experiment.

Second, if MWI is true, by conducting the experiment he would severely pruning off his tree of successors in the multiverse, rationally causing pain to many hims where the experiment would half succeed, and causing sorrow to many families and friends, thus proving his own stupidity in almost all universes.

However, as a thought experiment it is perfectly valid, since it is a purely formal argument and we don't care about the moral consequences in that case.

 

[confusedashell]

so if MWI were to be true, immortaliy comes with it? its like u CANNOT ****n die even if u wish to? ever?

wowwww that is one sad theory put forth... I Doubt this will do any good to humanity

 

[Crosson]

MWI is not true, and just as with Schroedinger's cat, decoherence explains why the cat/suicidant will end up in a macroscopic state, either alive or dead but not both.

 

[confusedashell]

But, isn't that the Copenhagen interpretation?
Doesn't this state consciousness has something to do with anything and goes against objective reality?
here i got to take stand with einstein and doubt that...

Objective reality is obviously primary

 

[Crosson]

But, isn't that the Copenhagen interpretation?
Doesn't this state consciousness has something to do with anything and goes against objective reality?
here i got to take stand with einstein and doubt that...

Objective reality is obviously primary

No, the Copenhagen interpretation was laid out long before decoherence was understood. Now we know that quantum states collapse when they interact with a macroscopic temperature reservoir, nonsense about consciousness is not necessary.

As far as objective reality, I think you mean to stake you claim for determinate reality i.e. the idea that there are particles with simultaneously definite positions and momenta, regardless of what limits QM sets on our knowledge.

I'm glad you agree with Einstein since in 1935 Einstein said he found a paradox that disproved quantum theory. The thought experiment showed that QM predicted the outcome of a certain experiment to be absurd, to deny determinate reality. Einstein's goal was to show that QM was incomplete, but when the experiements were actually done in the 1980s they showed that in fact Einstein was wrong and QM was right.

 

[confusedashell]

So in layman terms you are saying you believe in the Copenhagen interpretation?
What does QM being "right" means? we got like 15 different interpretations , which one is the "right" and most sensible?

 

[setAI]

the implications of parallel universes must be accepted whether or not they challenge the aesthetic sensibilities of a bald ape- causal systems evolve algorithmically- which means they sort through all the possible configurations to generate complex states- they can't magically produce one history- that would be like a factorization program magically guessing the factors of a very large number- if you live in a causal world with consistant rules and structures then you know that there are parallel universes- and in some of them a version of you always survives-

now what the most likely sort of survival states likely to be observed are is another issue

 

[confusedashell]

setAI I've lingered around this forum for awhile and I see you are A STROOONG defender of MWI.
There is no emperical evidence or data for this so, maybe you are the bald ape with a problem with death and hangs onto MWI for immortality wishes like a christian there is life after death?

No trying to start a feud here and start arguement, just saying THERE IS NO EMPERICAL EVIDENCE of it.
So whether you believe it or not, you do not know which is right.
I can doubt it and you be right, you can believe it and I be right.

To put it simple: Are you so convinced of MWI that you'd be willing to try the Quantum Suicide Experiment? (not recommending it) just hypothethically are you that certain?

 

[setAI]

setAI I've lingered around this forum for awhile and I see you are A STROOONG defender of MWI.
There is no emperical evidence or data for this so, maybe you are the bald ape with a problem with death and hangs onto MWI for immortality wishes like a christian there is life after death?

No trying to start a feud here and start arguement, just saying THERE IS NO EMPERICAL EVIDENCE of it.

I have gone on record that I agree with David Deutsch that the MWI is the only legitimate interpretation of QM- and that all empirical evidence for QM is empirical evidence of the MWI- as all other interpretations merely ignore the other outcomes after measurement with no mechanism for 'wavefunction collapse' or description of what happens with those outcomes with decoherence- and I also agree with Deutsch that quantum computers PROOVE parallel universes- and that proof will be widely accepted when a qc performs a calcualtion with more information than is in the observed universe-

also the notion that there is no empirical evidence for parallel universes is I feel a POV error from physicists that has baffled computer scientists and mathematicians where these ideas have been widely accepted for decades- there are very rigorous mathematical proofs which show that casual sets must sort through states algorithmically- and that show all possible states are realized somewhere in the computation- therefore the anthropocentric concept of a conscious observer dying is logically impossible- since the observer IS a configuration of matter- it is endlessly repeated in sections of the causal structure- any disolution of that configuration in a local sub-routine of the algorithm appears elsewhere by definition-

I firmly agree with Deutsch/ Martin Rees/ Max Tegmark/ Nick Bostrom/ Jürgen Schmidhuber/ Marvin Minsky/ and many others who have extensively shown how these are unavoidable realities of living in a world with rules/time/locality/ and causality-

I have said many times that a claim that an observer can 'die' is a claim that the observer is a magical entity made of fairy dust and beyond the laws of physics because it is unique and some godlike demon edits the universe preventing that very discrete configuration of matter from ever being built again anwhere in any universe- but evidence shows that an observer is a discrete ordered configuration of matter- and as such it is repeated throughout the multiverse of the entire casual structure of the universe by definition- quantum immortality is the rational analysis of the logical structure of causality- death is a mystical idea- yet the reverse seems to be the perception of many physicists [at least in America- the UK is rapidly accepting these ideas]

 

[xantox]

MWI is not true, and just as with Schroedinger's cat, decoherence explains why the cat/suicidant will end up in a macroscopic state, either alive or dead but not both.

This is wrong. MWI is not proved true nor untrue. Also, decoherence is the very mechanism used in MWI to explain the emergence of splitting worlds from the Schrödinger evolution.

 

[JesseM]

setAI I've lingered around this forum for awhile and I see you are A STROOONG defender of MWI.
There is no emperical evidence or data for this so, maybe you are the bald ape with a problem with death and hangs onto MWI for immortality wishes like a christian there is life after death?

No trying to start a feud here and start arguement, just saying THERE IS NO EMPERICAL EVIDENCE of it.
So whether you believe it or not, you do not know which is right.
I can doubt it and you be right, you can believe it and I be right.

I doubt there are many people who believe in MWI primarily because they like the idea of quantum immortality. The main reason to favor the MWI is its conceptual simplicity--the Copenhagen interpretation requires you to treat measuring-devices in a fundamentally different manner than the quantum systems they measure, even though the measuring-devices themselves are really just large collections of interacting quantum particles. The MWI allows you to treat all systems on equal footing, giving you an objective picture of the universe in which the interaction of a measuring-device with a quantum system obeys the same fundamental laws as the interaction of individual quantum particles or groups of particles in isolation. As a side benefit, it also allows you to explain the results of experiments involving quantum entanglement without the need for any faster-than-light effects (no need for nonlocality).

As for quantum immortality, this is by no means assured even if you believe the MWI, it really depends on your philosophical views on consciousness and personal identity. For example, leaving aside the MWI, if I step into a Star Trek style teleporter that takes aparts all my atoms in one spot and rebuilds the exact same pattern of atoms in another, would you say that the person who steps out at the other end is the "same person" as the one whose atoms were taken apart, or just a "copy" with false memories, with the "original" having died? Physics can't give you an answer to this sort of question, if there even is any "true" answer. But if you accept in this sort of example that your consciousness can jump along with the pattern of your body, and that your consciousness could even "split" if the teleporter created multiple versions of the same pattern of atoms, then in that case the idea of quantum immortality seems pretty natural.

 

[Crosson]

This is wrong. MWI is not proved true nor untrue. Also, decoherence is the very mechanism used in MWI to explain the emergence of splitting worlds from the Schrödinger evolution.

Who needs an ad hoc collapse of the wave function now that the theory of decoherence has been laid out? Just because Bohr held the view of ad hoc collapse doesn't make it part of the Copanhagen interpretation, or at least it shouldn't if there is to be any continuing debate at all.

When I say that MWI has been disproved, I did not realize that people still held on to the idea of determinate classical states after so many EPR experiments have been done.

 

[xantox]

Who needs an ad hoc collapse of the wave function now that the theory of decoherence has been laid out? Just because Bohr held the view of ad hoc collapse doesn't make it part of the Copanhagen interpretation, or at least it shouldn't if there is to be any continuing debate at all.

When I say that MWI has been disproved, I did not realize that people still held on to the idea of determinate classical states after so many EPR experiments have been done.

Maybe you're talking about the Copenhagen interpretation, and not MWI. MWI has no collapse.

 

[JesseM]

Who needs an ad hoc collapse of the wave function now that the theory of decoherence has been laid out?

I'm pretty sure decoherence doesn't explain why a quantum system would behave classically if there is nothing external interacting with it. The idea behind decoherence as I understand it is that if you have a small system A and its external environment B, and you treat them both using the laws of QM, then as A interacts with B, it becomes entangled and you can no longer see any interference effects in A on its own, they become spread throughout the combined system A+B. This is sort of analogous to the way that if you have 3 photons emitted together and thus entagled with one another, you will see no evidence of entanglement if you look at any pair of photons--the statistics of any pair will look just like that of unentangled photons--but you will see the correlations characteristic of entanglement if you measure all three together. As http://www.ipod.org.uk/reality/reality_decoherence.asp puts it:

Note that the interference components do not actually disappear - because they are out of phase we just don't notice them at the macroscopic level. In fact, they just get dissipated out into the wider environment. I always imagine them as little ripples in the ocean - we only ever notice the big (macroscopic) waves in the ocean. The little ripples get entangled with other little ripples until it is impossible to tell from which big wave each little ripple came.

If you look at the "reduced state" of the smaller subsystem A, apparently interactions with the external system B will cause it to go from a "pure state" to something close to a "mixed state", where you assign different probabilities to different states in a classical way, and you can assume that the probability of getting result X when you make a measurement can be broken down into a weighted sum like P(getting X) = P(getting X if system is in state #1)*P(system in state #1) + P(getting X if system is in state #2)*P(system in state #2) + P(getting X if system in state #3)*P(system in state #3) + ... (in a superposition of states you can't reason this way--that would be like assuming the probability a photon in the double-slit experiment is found at position x can be broken down into the probability it lands at position x if it goes through the left slit + the probability it lands at position x if it goes through the right slit, which would fail to take into account interference effects). However, if the combined system A + B is not modeled as interacting with anything external, then it'll still be in a giant superposition of very different macroscopic states, like Schroedinger's cat, so this doesn't really help with the problem of explaining why macroscopic systems behave classically without introducting some external system to measure or interact with them (which is a big problem in quantum cosmology if you want to treat the entire universe using quantum laws).

See the comment from vanesch on this thread:

One has to be careful. When looking at the combination (system+macroscopic measurement apparatus), a superposition remains a superposition of course, because the hamiltonian is a linear evolution operator. But what decoherence shows you is that *when you restrict your attention to the system*, then what formerly was a superposition, is now best described (best described because you are neglecting part of it, namely the measurement system) by a statistical mixture of eigenstates of the operator that is measured by the measurement apparatus.

Likewise, this comment from sci.physics.research says:

>4) "Collaps by decoherence" relies on the separation of a system from an
>environment. With respect to the supposedly all encompassing character
>of quantum mechanics, which becomes important in quantum cosmology, this
>seperation of the universe in "subject" and "object" is a defect that it
>shares with the Kopenhagen interpretation of "collaps by measuring with
>classical appartus".

Ah, but decoherence does not purport to solve the problem of quantum
cosmology. I don't think you will find any claims in that direction in the
literature.

Greg Egan also has a good set of pages on decoherence starting here.

 

[Nisse]

There's an easy way to test this theory without hurting anyone: replace the gun with a paintball gun and replace the words "not killed" with "not covered in paint".

Unfortunately, even if the experiment worked the only people who would know about it would be the ones in the world that the paint-free experimenter ended up in. Everyone else would see someone with a big dry-cleaning bill to look forward to.

 

[xantox]

It would not work with the paintball, since in that case the probabilities to observe clean clothes would be the same for both theories.

 

[setAI]

we are going to need beefy computers [hypercomputers] before we can ever really start mapping out the Born probability space of macro scale systems- it involves hierarchies of cantor sets and vast algorithmic complexity -

 

[xantox]

Hm, probabilities for the quantum paintball gun's outcomes are rather easy to compute; each shot is clean with 50% probability, and messy with 50% probability.

 

[ganstaman]

What does QM being "right" means? we got like 15 different interpretations , which one is the "right" and most sensible?

Even if we have no explanation for QM, that doesn't mean it can't be right. We know that QM has a great predictive value for experiments, and so an interpretation for why this works isn't necessary for it to explain reality.

Maybe you should just stop caring about why QM is the way it is. It won't change the usefullness of QM in your life (assuming it even plays a role) and then maybe you can stop freaking out over some currently unfalsifiable idea.

 

[Count Iblis]

I don't agree with Tegmark that MWI implies immortality in his suicide experiment. I think that it a fallacy of just focussing on a particular sector of the entire multiverse and then naively defining the subjective time evolution. If you look at the entire multiverse, then all your copies just exist and you have an a priori probability of finding yourself in some particular state. This a priori probability of finding yourself to be that copy who has survived N suicide experiment decays exponentially for N ---> Infinity

 

[xantox]

But since one has a zero probability to find himself in a dead state, so it follows that "one" has a 100% probability to find himself in the surviving copy alive state.

 

[Count Iblis]

But since one has a zero probability to find himself in a dead state, so it follows that "one" has a 100% probability to find himself in the surviving copy alive state.

This is how I think we should analyze the problem.
In the multiverse, all your possible states exist a priori with some a priori probablity. If |s_n> are the states in which you can find yourself in, and |psi> is the wavefunction of the multiverse, then the a priori probablity of finding yourself in |s_n> is
Q_n = <psi|P_n|psi>/<psi|P|psi>

where P_n = |s_n><s_n| I

is the projection on the observer state |s_n>, I is the identity operator acting on the rest of the wavefunction and P is sum over all the P_n. So, what I'm saying is that at any moment you should think of yourself as being randomly sampled from all the possible states that can represent you. These states exist a priori in the multiverse. The definition of what is a bona-fide version of "you" is arbitrary and defined by the |s_n>

This is time independent if the wavefunction of the entire universe is in an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian. We can just as well put the energy eigenvalue equal to zero, so that H|psi> = 0. Any nontrivial time dependency of the wavefunction would make the a priory probabilities depend on some global time coordinate which is unnatural.

Now probabilities are invariant under unitary transformations. Since the operator Exp(-i H t) leaves |psi> invariant, we have:

Q_n = <psi|P_n|psi>/<psi|P|psi>=

<psi|Exp(-i H t)P_nExp(iH t)|psi>/<psi|P|psi>

Note that P_n does not commute with Exp(iH t), otherwise the observer would find himself in a stationary state, so this argument is not like saying that
P_n = Exp(-iH t)Exp(iH t)P_n = Exp(-iH t)P_nExp(iH t)

If we put |s_n(t)> = Exp(-i H t)|s_n>, then

Exp(-iH t)P_nExp(iH t) = |s_n(t)><s_n(t)| I


And this just implies conservation of probability for the observer under time evolution provided |s_n(t)> is still in the linear space spanned by the |s_n>. However, this is not the case in suicide experiments. So, the probability of finding yourself alive after the suicide experiment is less than before.

 

[Nisse]

It would not work with the paintball, since in that case the probabilities to observe clean clothes would be the same for both theories.

Perhaps you could you explain further? The only difference with my suggestion is using a paintball instead of a bullet. How would that change the probabilities?

 

[JesseM]

The reason it doesn't work with a paintball is that the argument for quantum immortality specifically depends on philosophical assumptions about your subjective probabilities of experiencing one branch vs. another--specifically, it is assumed that you are never going to experience a branch where you don't exist. A bullet to the head causes you to stop existing in the branch where it happens, a paintball doesn't.

To see why some might consider this plausible, consider, instead of a branching multiverse, a Star-Trek-style transporter/duplicator in a single universe, which can deconstruct you and reconstruct exact copies atom-by-atom in distant locations (assuming the error introduced by the uncertainty principle is too small to make a difference--if you don't want to grant that, you could also assume this is all happening within a deterministic computer simulation and that you are really an A.I. program). Now suppose this duplicator recreates two identical copies of you, one in Washington and one in Moscow. As you step into the chamber, if you believe it's meaningful to talk about the first-person probabilities of different possible next experiences, it would probably make sense to predict that, from your point of view, you have about a 50% chance of finding yourself in Moscow and a 50% chance of finding yourself in Washington.

On the other hand, suppose only a single reconstruction will be performed in Washington--then by the same logic, you would probably predict the probability of finding yourself in Washington is 100%. OK, so now go back to the scenario where you're supposed to be recreated in both Washington and Moscow, except assume that at the last moment there's a power failure in Moscow and the recreator machine fails to activate. Surely this is no different from the scenario where you were only supposed to be recreated in Washington--the fact that they intended to duplicate you in Moscow shouldn't make any difference, all that matters is that they didn't, so you should have a 100% chance of finding yourself in Washington after the reconstruction. But now look at another variation on the scenario, where the Moscow machine malfunctions and recreates your body missing the head. I don't think it makes sense to say you have a 50% chance of being "killed" in this scenario--your brain is where your consciousness comes from, and since it wasn't duplicated this is really no different from the scenario where the Moscow machine failed to activate entirely. In fact, any malfunction in the Moscow machine which leads to a duplicate that permanently lacks consciousness should be treated the same way as a scenario where I was only supposed to be recreated in Washington, in terms of the subjective probabilities. If we extend this conclusion to the situation of "natural" duplication due to different branches of a splitting multiverse, the subjective probability should always be 100% that my next experience is one of a universe where I have not been killed.

As I said, all this depends on making certain philosophical assumptions about there being some "real" truth about subjective probabilities--it's certainly not a direct consequence of the MWI, someone with different philosophical views about consciousness might accept the MWI but reject quantum immortality.

 

[vanesch]

The reason it doesn't work with a paintball is that the argument for quantum immortality specifically depends on philosophical assumptions about your subjective probabilities of experiencing one branch vs. another ...

very good explanation of the quantum immortality argument!

However, consider the following. Similar to the Star Trek machine, some copies are made, but this time, "the original" is kept. You're put to sleep before the copying procedure is started, and "the original" and the "copies" are then mixed in a kind of big black box mixer, which has several outlets. Each "copy" together with the original is now presented randomly to an outlet, and waken up. From the outside, there's no way to distinguish the "copies" from the original, and all are on the same footing. But of course, you are still "yourself"! There will be strictly no way, however, to tell the outside world that you are the "original".
Behind one outlet, the head is chopped off, and behind the others, life goes on.

Well, if you happen to be behind an outlet where the head is chopped off, you'll die, and your copies will live on, while if it is a copy who's head is chopped off, you'll live on. There's no way you could "live on" just because there's a copy of you surviving.

So you can consider the star trek machine also as the "murder of the original" together with the re-assembly of copies.

Point is: there is strictly no way to find this out on the outside...

 

[xantox]

Well, if you happen to be behind an outlet where the head is chopped off, you'll die, and your copies will live on, while if it is a copy who's head is chopped off, you'll live on. There's no way you could "live on" just because there's a copy of you surviving.

I consider that this use of the word "you" as implicitly equating the physical instance of the "original" brain is incorrect. Even from a subjective point of view, "you" remains an abstract relation of the brain time evolution, so that the mere existence of a perfect copy means that not only for external observers, but also subjectively, there's no way to locate the "original" consciousness on any specific and preferred instance.

Of course, immediately after the copy is created, each instance will start to deviate so that it will be possible to distinguish them. But in appropriate conditions (eg. equal sensory inputs) and within a certain amount of deviation, it will not make any difference, not only for external observers, but also subjectively, whether the original OR the copy is killed.

It is also important for this to work that no instance actually experiences its own death (no painful process, but a sort of annihilation happening in a timeframe much inferior to the consciousness response time).

 

[vanesch]

I consider that this use of the word "you" as implicitly equating the physical instance of the "original" brain is incorrect. Even from a subjective point of view, "you" remains an abstract relation of the brain time evolution, so that the mere existence of a perfect copy means that not only for external observers, but also subjectively, there's no way to locate the "original" consciousness on any specific and preferred instance.

Well, I have a conceptual difficulty with that. Imagine you lying on the bed of the copy-machine, and a perfect copy is created. Assume that in the process, nothing special happens to you, as if you were lying on your sofa. Clearly, there's "the original" you which continues lying on the bed of the copy machine, and if I stick a pin in that body's foot, you will feel it, while if I stick a pin in your copy's foot, you won't feel it. You might not even have noticed a copy being taken, so to say. So for your original subjective world, nothing special happened. You can say that a *new* subjective world has been created together with the copy, but the asymmetry (from your subjective PoV) should be obvious.

*from the outside* (so, objectively) however, there's no way to discriminate between both. But the "you" who came in the room should know it.

Imagine now that the salesman of the copymachine sells an extra option "mind transfer". It costs quite a lot to have this option, and you wonder if it's worth it: instead of making a copy of your body and leaving your "subjective experience" in the body on the sofa, it claims that now, your original subjective experience is "transferred" to the copy.
You wonder whether that device is working correctly, so you want to try it.

So you first use the machine without the option: you go lying on the sofa, the machine hums, and a bit later, in the container next to you, a copy of you gets up. But for you, it is as if you were still lying on the sofa, while the copy is a bit puzzled, because it remembers lying on the sofa and suddenly finding itself in the container. Nevertheless, *you* know that you are still the person on the sofa! But you have no way of convincing others, and your copy is convinced it got transferred.

Next, you use the machine with the option. You go lying on the sofa again... and suddenly you find yourself in the container ! But when you come out of the container, your copy is making some fuzz with the machine salesman, saying that he just went lying there, and didn't get transferred at all, and that his silly option is not working !

You protest, but of course your copy claims that you are the copy. And is really convinced for that to be so. Nevertheless, *YOU* know that this is not the case.

So are both situations equivalent, and is the salesman's option bogus ? Personally, I don't think so. In one case, you remained on the sofa, and in the second case, you got transferred to the container. That makes a whole difference for you ! It is not because there has been created a NEW body with a NEW consciousness that has the complementary experience, that this changes anything for YOU.

But this is objectively impossible to verify.

For instance, imagine you've committed a terrible crime, which will make you however exceedingly rich. But you know you will not have peace of mind until justice has put you on trial. So you use the copymachine to send your copy to court (and hence to jail). You are with a police officer who has to guard you night and day, and you just ask to go on the sofa (of the copy machine). Does it make any difference to you if you switch on the salesman's option or not ? Clearly, it is the body on the sofa that will go in jail.

Personally, I'd switch on the option and remain in the container until the policeman (and the body on the sofa) is gone, and then go and enjoy the fruits of my crime while my copy is convicted to life sentence. In the case of equivalence, there's no reason for you to do this ! Why should you make a copy of yourself enjoying wealth, while you go on miserably in jail ?

 

[xantox]

Well, I have a conceptual difficulty with that. Imagine you lying on the bed of the copy-machine, and a perfect copy is created. Assume that in the process, nothing special happens to you, as if you were lying on your sofa. Clearly, there's "the original" you which continues lying on the bed of the copy machine, and if I stick a pin in that body's foot, you will feel it, while if I stick a pin in your copy's foot, you won't feel it. You might not even have noticed a copy being taken, so to say. So for your original subjective world, nothing special happened. You can say that a *new* subjective world has been created together with the copy, but the asymmetry (from your subjective PoV) should be obvious.

Until the moment you sticked the pin on the first body's foot, both brains were assumed in the same state. So that you can't say that "the original me" is located in body 1 or 2. Only after the pin sensation on body 1 created the asymmetry it will be possible to distinguish the two "me" instances. "The original me" is an invalid expression just like for two identical particles you can't label one as being the "original".

*from the outside* (so, objectively) however, there's no way to discriminate between both. But the "you" who came in the room should know it.

The subjective view is still something objective, since it's the part of the objective state of the brain. If it is impossible to distinguish them for an external observer (which by the way, in principle may know about me even more than I know) then it shall be the same subjectively: that is, I can't say whether I am instance 1 or 2.

Personally, I don't think so. In one case, you remained on the sofa, and in the second case, you got transferred to the container. That makes a whole difference for you !

For a difference to exist for me, I should have some means to decide that there is a difference. If I know for sure that two copies are around (say, because someone I trust said on the loudspeaker: "now there are two copies of you in the room"), even at this point I can't say whether I am in body 1 or in body 2. More interestingly, I cannot even say for sure that I am in body 1 now, and in body 2 after one second!

It is not because there has been created a NEW body with a NEW consciousness that has the complementary experience, that this changes anything for YOU.

The point is, that "you" is an abstract relation of the body. By being abstract, it can not longer be indexed over spacetime like it is possible with the body to distinguish between two instances.

Clearly, it is the body on the sofa that will go in jail. Personally, I'd switch on the option and remain in the container until the policeman (and the body on the sofa) is gone, and then go and enjoy the fruits of my crime while my copy is convicted to life sentence.

This assumption is however false. Also, your copy will say at the trial that he is the real original, and that you're the impostor copy who inverted the workings of the machine.

In the case of equivalence, there's no reason for you to do this ! Why should you make a copy of yourself enjoying wealth, while you go on miserably in jail ?

If there are no multiple universes, then I think there should be still reasons to do this, eg. giving your "other possible future" a chance to exist. Of course this would be not quite perfect, since at least someone could notice that there are two guys around.

 

[vanesch]

The subjective view is still something objective, since it's the part of the objective state of the brain. If it is impossible to distinguish them for an external observer (which by the way, in principle may know about me even more than I know) then it shall be the same subjectively: that is, I can't say whether I am instance 1 or 2.

Ah, that's where we differ then. I think you can, but that by the symmetry of the situation, no *outside observer* can.

For a difference to exist for me, I should have some means to decide that there is a difference. If I know for sure that two copies are around (say, because someone I trust said on the loudspeaker: "now there are two copies of you in the room"), even at this point I can't say whether I am in body 1 or in body 2. More interestingly, I cannot even say for sure that I am in body 1 now, and in body 2 after one second!

That's funny, I wouldn't think so. I would think that I would know very well in which body I am, but that I cannot emit any signal to the outside world which will not be "imitated" symmetrically by the copy, so that an outside observer will observe a symmetrical situation. But I would know - I'd say !

This assumption is however false. Also, your copy will say at the trial that he is the real original, and that you're the impostor copy who inverted the workings of the machine.

Exactly, and that's my goal: my copy will go to jail for my crimes, and will even feel guilty about it, thinking that the machine didn't work!
My example was a bit artificial: I made the assumption that the police and the judges and so on wouldn't think of the existence of any such copy machine. As such, it is the body on the sofa which has continuously been chained to the police officer which will go on trial.

If there are no multiple universes, then I think there should be still reasons to do this, eg. giving your "other possible future" a chance to exist. Of course this would be not quite perfect, since at least someone could notice that there are two guys around.

Yes, right, but I wouldn't personally give a damn about *another guy* (copy of me) enjoying my treasure, not more than I would enjoy my twin doing so! My aim would be to have a copy of me (which is, for me, a totally different person with same memory and so on, but whose wanders in life I don't care about) go to jail instead of myself (= the body I'm living my subjective experiences with).

 

[xantox]

Ah, that's where we differ then. I think you can, but that by the symmetry of the situation, no *outside observer* can. .. I would think that I would know very well in which body I am

That's interesting that we differ here, but then I'd like to understand why you think so, ie which is the basis which would allow me subjectively to know that I am still in body 1?

Exactly, and that's my goal: my copy will go to jail for my crimes, and will even feel guilty about it, thinking that the machine didn't work!

Yes, but you can't call it "my copy" like if you were the original "me". Just "one random instance of me".

Yes, right, but I wouldn't personally give a damn about *another guy* (copy of me) enjoying my treasure, not more than I would enjoy my twin doing so! My aim would be to have a copy of me (which is, for me, a totally different person with same memory and so on, but whose wanders in life I don't care about) go to jail instead of myself (= the body I'm living my subjective experiences with).

In this case, if you look at yourself in a movie made 10 years ago about, say, yourself falling off a banana peel (event which you had forgot in the meantime), you may find that you look pretty much like your (young) twin in that movie. If you didn't know it's a movie of you, then you would also say you don't give a damn about that guy falling.

 

[Mike S.]

The actual solution to the quantum immortality paradox requires the understanding of what "consciousness" is.

People generally accept (without proof, however) that consciousness can change over time - we imagine that we are "the same person" as a minute or an hour or a year ago. This perception of sameness continues even after most of the atoms in the body have been exchanged with new ones - though in truth the elementary particles of these atoms always were one and the same as all others of their kind. If we consider that this is not true, then we would conclude that while we possesses false memories of a "past", that those past consciousnesses never actually became us - they either perished instantly or verged into parallel universes where nothing ever changed in their environment, forever.

I hypothesize that neither that model is true, nor is the model that we are only "the same as" the consciousness in our past and future body. Rather, all consciousness in all places in the cosmos is the manifestation of a single phenomenon, and there is therefore no driving force for the physicist performing the suicide experiment to continue only in a few rare universes. In all the universes his consciousness actually continues in all conscious beings, and so he is just as likely to continue in one as the other. You can visualize that in the suicide-universe, he "jumps into" the memories and body of the person beside him, but this is a mistaken picture. He always was the person beside him.

 

[friend]

How could he continue in some other universe with the knowledge that he killed himself? Either he would continue in a universe where he does not know that he killed himself. Or he would continue in a universe where he could no longer die because he would be alive with the knowledge that he died, and that would not be the same type of reality he has now. Instead it would be some kind of heaven or hell or purgator

 

[Count Iblis]

Well, since the entire multiverse is timeless, the state you find yourself in at any particular "local time" is, in a certain sense, "eternal".

 

[foolishwun]

the cool part is knowing that some day we will know who is right, or we will nothing