Is determinism truly at play in this scenario?

[craigi]

We always implicitly assume the freedom of the experimentalist... This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science. If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature.

So my question is, do we believe that he's correct?

Do we really believe that a mechanisitic view makes experimentation pointless or is he being over dramatic?

 

[atyy]

I think he is overdramatic. Free will just means we can choose experiment settings randomly and independently at distant locations. So it just means that the rolling dice here are random and independent from the rolling dice at a distant location. Since the rolling dice are classical, we do believe that they are deterministic. It's just that if we needed to explicitly describe their determinism to describe quantum mechanics with a local hidden variables theory, it'd be quite hopeless.

 

[craigi]

I think he is overdramatic. Free will just means we can choose experiment settings randomly and independently at distant locations. So it just means that the rolling dice here are random and independent from the rolling dice at a distant location. Since the rolling dice are classical, we do believe that they are deterministic. It's just that if we needed to explicitly describe their determinism to describe quantum mechanics with a local hidden variables theory, it'd be quite hopeless.

The thing that I find unsettling about it is that regardless of determinism, he's arguing that the mind is something more than the product of its constituent particles.

If the mind is just the product of particles, the expermentalist has no more control over what she chooses to measure or the result of the measurement, under either a deterministic or indeterministic interpretation of quantum physics.

He is arguing that not only is quantum physics inherently indeterministic, but also that consciousness can control this indeterminsm.

Whether or not he finds superdeterminism an appealing feature of an interpretation, this really isn't something that I'd expect to be reading from Zellinger. Surely, if he stands by this statement, he must be holding a controversial, fringe view.

 

[bhobba]

Do we really believe that a mechanisitic view makes experimentation pointless or is he being over dramatic?

For me it, like a lot of philosophical huffing and puffing, is totally pointless.

You can't even know if the universe is deterministic or not, and in principle, its not even possible to do so.

Thanks
Bill

 

[atyy]

The thing that I find unsettling about it is that regardless of determinism, he's arguing that the mind is something more than the product of its constituent particles.

If the mind is just the product of particles, the expermentalist has no more control over what she chooses to measure or the result of the measurement, under either a deterministic or indeterministic interpretation of quantum physics.

He is arguing that not only is quantum physics inherently indeterministic, but also that consciousness can control this indeterminsm.

Whether or not he finds superdeterminism an appealing feature of an interpretation, this really isn't something that I'd expect to be reading from Zellinger. Surely, if he stands by this statement, he must be holding a controversial, fringe view.

I think he's just confused. Gisin (Bell Prize recipient!) made a similar confused argument in http://arxiv.org/abs/0901.4255. BTW, Zellinger is a nobody. I'd be surprised if Zeilinger were that confused:p

 

[craigi]

I think he's just confused. Gisin (Bell Prize recipient!) made a similar confused argument in http://arxiv.org/abs/0901.4255

Wow. I find it astonishing that these guys, at the top of their field, seem to have so little grasp of this. I'm sure that they hold self-consistent views, but seem to lack the ability to talk in terms that each other understand. My tendency was to doubt my own understanding while reading it, but follow up articles on Gisin's article raise the same issues.

BTW, Zellinger is a nobody. I'd be surprised if Zeilinger were that confused:p

Yeah - I should get my eyes checked.

 

[bhobba]

Wow. I find it astonishing that these guys, at the top of their field, seem to have so little grasp of this.

In QM confusion, unfortunately, abounds.

It's not that these guys aren't smart and don't know their shite, its just its a difficult area and even the terms used can confuse.

For example the semantic connection between observation and observer seems a really hard one to shake, despite the more advanced texts like Ballentine making it very clear what the difference is.

Thanks
Bill

 

[Haelfix]

SuperDeterminism is a possible loophole to Bells theorems. Note this is not the same thing as regular determinism or regular mechanicistic laws, and instead is a much stronger statement and sort of gigantic cosmic conspiracy.

Zeilinger is perfectly correct in his statement, and indeed this is basically an assumption of science. In some sense, this is not unlike living in 'the matrix' where every action you do has been predetermined by some computer.

 

[craigi]

SuperDeterminism is a possible loophole to Bells theorems. Note this is not the same thing as regular determinism or regular mechanicistic laws, and instead is a much stronger statement and sort of gigantic cosmic conspiracy.

Zeilinger is perfectly correct in his statement, and indeed this is basically an assumption of science. In some sense, this is not unlike living in 'the matrix' where every action you do has been predetermined by some computer.

Sure, I can understand his reluctance to apply an interpretation which involves superdeterminism but the argument he makes isn't specific to superdeterminism or even determinism. His argument gives freewill an ontological role, which I have no doubt was not his intention.

I know what he's trying to say but I haven't been able to reformulate his argument to one that is compatible with freewill as an emergent concept rather than one with an ontological role. If, as I suspect, this isn't possible then his objection must be either invalid or can be taken that the validity of science relies on a fundamental notion of consciousness.

We should stay clear of fiction, otherwise I'd gladly discuss whether The Matrix concludes that human consciousness is ontological or predetermined.

 

[Haelfix]

That's fair enough, and that sort of issue comes up over and over again in this business. Still it would be very difficult to formulate any sort of notion of free will where one sees a gradual 'emergence' thereof. That essentially runs into the same classical/quantum 'cut' problem that Von Neumann was struggling with in his early works on quantum mechanics.. See related discussions and long argument/counterarguments about the Conway Kochen free will theorem and so forth.

 

[craigi]

That's fair enough, and that sort of issue comes up over and over again in this business. Still it would be very difficult to formulate any sort of notion of free will where one sees a gradual 'emergence' thereof. That essentially runs into the same classical/quantum 'cut' problem that Von Neumann was struggling with in his early works on quantum mechanics.. See related discussions and long argument/counterarguments about the Conway Kochen free will theorem and so forth.

To be clear, by emergent consciousness, I mean consciousness as an arbitrary label we apply to a human-like system with sufficient information processing capacity.

With the exception of Wheeler's Participatory Anthropic Principle, I see all the other consciousness based views as giving consciousness a significant role in the laws of nature.

While I'm sympathetic to these views it seems crazy to be forced down this path when confronted with the concept of superdeterminsm in the context of local realism.

 

[stevendaryl]

Something I'm not sure about is whether superdeterminism and retrocausality are two different loopholes, or whether they are really the same thing. It seems (based on not understanding either that well) that retrocausality gives a natural explanation for superdeterminism; if you make causal influences symmetrical with respect to the past and the future, then that would seem to greatly constrain the set of possibilities, and might result in the sort of superdeterminism needed to explain QM correlations.

 

[atyy]

SuperDeterminism is a possible loophole to Bells theorems. Note this is not the same thing as regular determinism or regular mechanicistic laws, and instead is a much stronger statement and sort of gigantic cosmic conspiracy.

Zeilinger is perfectly correct in his statement, and indeed this is basically an assumption of science. In some sense, this is not unlike living in 'the matrix' where every action you do has been predetermined by some computer.

The reason I think Zeilinger is wrong is that there is no evidence against superdeterminism. So Zeilinger cannot rule out superdeterminism. However there is plenty of evidence that science does work. So if Zeilinger is right, then either superdeterminism has been ruled out or science does not work, neither of which is true.

However, if superdeterminism is true, we cannot know what the true superdeterministic theory is. So it is useless for us to think about it.

 

[stevendaryl]

However, if superdeterminism is true, we cannot know what the true superdeterministic theory is. So it is useless for us to think about it.

Well, we can never KNOW what the real laws of physics are. That doesn't mean it's useless to think about it. I don't see how superdeterminism is any different, in principle.

 

[atyy]

Well, we can never KNOW what the real laws of physics are. That doesn't mean it's useless to think about it. I don't see how superdeterminism is any different, in principle.

I mean think about it in the sense of devising a superdeterministic theory that is scientifically testable and distinguishable from other superdeterministic hypotheses.

 

[craigi]

Something I'm not sure about is whether superdeterminism and retrocausality are two different loopholes, or whether they are really the same thing. It seems (based on not understanding either that well) that retrocausality gives a natural explanation for superdeterminism; if you make causal influences symmetrical with respect to the past and the future, then that would seem to greatly constrain the set of possibilities, and might result in the sort of superdeterminism needed to explain QM correlations.

It was Wheeler again, who proposed the reason that elementary particles of the same type are indistinguishable, is that they are actually the same particle wound round in space and time. Antiparticles being particles traveling backwards in time. Feynman raised the objection that we don't see as many particles as antiparticles and Wheeler offered some hand-wavey argument. As I understand it, this suprisingly, isn't seen as controversial. It just falls out of the equations.

I'm not sure that I see causality, retro or forward in this scanario.

I'm going way off-piste here, but however you wind the paths to solve the matter anti-matter problem, you're going to end up with a particular type of pattern forming. I wonder if the superdeterminstic reconcilliation of local realism is a comparable problem.

 

[stevendaryl]

I mean think about it in the sense of devising a superdeterministic theory that is scientifically testable and distinguishable from other superdeterministic hypotheses.

How is that different from devising any theory? Ultimately, you match what the theory predicts to what you observe. They either agree, or they don't. The point of experiments is to expand the range of observed phenomena, to give a better chance of falsifying the theory. That would still apply to a superdeterministic theory.

 

[craigi]

However, if superdeterminism is true, we cannot know what the true superdeterministic theory is. So it is useless for us to think about it.

Sabine Hossenfelder certainly doesn't think so.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1105.4326

 

[atyy]

Sabine Hossenfelder certainly doesn't think so.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1105.4326

I meant assuming that quantum mechanics does not break down.

Edit: I'll probably have to take that back after reading her paper!

 

[rocket123456]

So my question is, do we believe that he's correct?

Do we really believe that a mechanisitic view makes experimentation pointless or is he being over dramatic?

He does have a point. If the progression of the world is deterministic, including my brain states, then I must hold to beliefs, of which are false, IF that's what the deterministic process entailed. Determinisim and truth is an interesting question to ponder. However, the brain is determined in such a way to distinguish truth from falsehood, leaving no reel possible world of an apparent contradiction.

For me it, like a lot of philosophical huffing and puffing, is totally pointless.

You can't even know if the universe is deterministic or not, and in principle, its not even possible to do so.

Thanks
Bill

The universe is governed by the laws of quantum mechanics. The equations of QM are deterministic, the observations are indeterministic. Guess which one of the two is of physical importance? We, the observer, are "curtained" at full disclosure of the future outcomes, only limited to probabilites, albeit deterministic ones.

It would thus be no more indeterministic than your medical report and prognosis of future cancer development. Deterministic in nature, but indeterministic in observation.

 

[stevendaryl]

He does have a point. If the progression of the world is deterministic, including my brain states, then I must hold to beliefs, of which are false, IF that's what the deterministic process entailed.

Deterministic or not, there is a possibility that you hold beliefs that are false. The best you can do is to try to uncover your incorrect beliefs. I don't see that determinism makes any difference.

 

[rocket123456]

Deterministic or not, there is a possibility that you hold beliefs that are false. The best you can do is to try to uncover your incorrect beliefs. I don't see that determinism makes any difference.

Taking to it's extreme, determinism would seem to require irrationality. Suppose that I live in a deterministic
universe, all events being determined, experiments, brain states, cosmology and so forth. Suppose further that I possesses psychic abilities(perfectly possible in a relativistic-quantum universe) and I precognize an accident involving myself in 5 seconds.

In such a deterministic universe, I would prohibited from intervention, regardless of my true beliefs, and rational justifications for those beliefs. For the simple fact that the precognized event must come about.

I am not sure how indeterminism would solve any of this, but it sure is peculiar fact in a deterministic universe, how rationality MUST (in theory) go out the window, if all determined events are to come about. This would apply to scientific enquiry as well.

I guess that's the main "objection"(it's really no problem, but more a peculiar fact) to superdeterminism, but I could be wrong.

 

[stevendaryl]

Taking to it's extreme, determinism would seem to require irrationality. Suppose that I live in a deterministic
universe, all events being determined, experiments, brain states, cosmology and so forth. Suppose further that I possesses physics abilities(perfectly possible in a relativistic-quantum universe) and I precognize an accident involving myself in 5 seconds.

In such a deterministic universe, I would prohibited from intervention, regardless of my true beliefs, and rational justifications for those beliefs. For the simple fact that the precognized event must come about.

That's true. It would be weird. But the fact that something is predetermined doesn't mean that you can know what's going to happen. To give an illustration from computer science, the halting problem: Some computer programs get into an infinite loop and never halt. That's completely predetermined by the program. But you can show (this was shown by Turing) that there is no way to predict which computer programs halt and which ones don't.

 

[Pythagorean]

Taking to it's extreme, determinism would seem to require irrationality. Suppose that I live in a deterministic
universe, all events being determined, experiments, brain states, cosmology and so forth. Suppose further that I possesses physics abilities(perfectly possible in a relativistic-quantum universe) and I precognize an accident involving myself in 5 seconds.

In such a deterministic universe, I would prohibited from intervention, regardless of my true beliefs, and rational justifications for those beliefs. For the simple fact that the precognized event must come about.

I am not sure how indeterminism would solve any of this, but it sure is peculiar fact in a deterministic universe, how rationality MUST (in theory) go out the window, if all determined events are to come about. This would apply to scientific enquiry as well.

I guess that's the main "objection"(it's really no problem, but more a peculiar fact) to superdeterminism, but I could be wrong.

I think there are a couple misconceptions in your post. I spot two:

First of all, "deterministic universe" is and over-condition. All we're really talking about is human behavior, which, rationally should be deterministic since it seems to be based on brain function that is largely classical and in fact, decision-making can be predicted based on brain activity to good confidence in test situations (Libet was the first to do this, but there have been more experiments since[1]). It's a growing sentiment in neuroscience that our behavior is deterministic.

Secondly, you wouldn't be prohibited from a particular path as if your history had already been written. Your beliefs and decisions are part of that deterministic process. The question isn't whether we make choices, we obviously do. The point is that those choices, feelings, and beliefs are deterministic: they're based on a combination of your biological and environment states and your biological and environmental histories.

Psychologists use a biopsychosocial model[2] nowadays, looking at how all the different influences feed off of and can amplify each other and there's a lot of politics involved in this, too... because it has implication for drug addictions, correlations of crime with education, etc, etc.

So your reaction to determinism, I think, is a fatalistic stance[3]. And fatalism is not determinism. Determinism means that we actually influence things through our actions. We can receive information and change for the better because of it (or the worse... if that's in our nature). If the universe was completely stochastic... nothing you do would seem to matter because causality would be much more fickle then they already are in complex deterministic systems.

[1] http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110831/full/477023a.html
[2] http://www.psyjournal.vdu.lt/wp/
[3] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/

 

[atyy]

I think there are a couple misconceptions in your post. I spot two:

First of all, "deterministic universe" is and over-condition. All we're really talking about is human behavior, which, rationally should be deterministic since it seems to be based on brain function that is largely classical and in fact, decision-making can be predicted based on brain activity to good confidence in test situations (Libet was the first to do this, but there have been more experiments since). It's a growing sentiment in neuroscience that our behavior is deterministic.

Secondly, you wouldn't be prohibited from a particular path as if your history had already been written. Your beliefs and decisions are part of that deterministic process. The question isn't whether we make choices, we obviously do. The point is that those choices, feelings, and beliefs are deterministic: they're based on a combination of your biological and environment states and your biological and environmental histories.

Psychologists use a biopsychosocial model nowadays, looking at how all the different influences feed off of and can amplify each other and there's a lot of politics involved in this, too... because it has implication for drug addictions, correlations of crime with education, etc, etc.

So your reaction to determinism, I think, is a fatalistic stance. And fatalism is not determinism. Determinism means that we actually influence things through our actions. We can receive information and change for the better because of it (or the worse... if that's in our nature). If the universe was completely stochastic... nothing you do would seem to matter because causality would be much more fickle then they already are in complex deterministic systems.

That's irrelevant. rocket123456 is explaining Zeilinger's argument, which as stevendaryl explains is applicable even without superdeterminism.

 

[rocket123456]

I think there are a couple misconceptions in your post. I spot two:

First of all, "deterministic universe" is and over-condition. All we're really talking about is human behavior, which, rationally should be deterministic since it seems to be based on brain function that is largely classical and in fact, decision-making can be predicted based on brain activity to good confidence in test situations (Libet was the first to do this, but there have been more experiments since). It's a growing sentiment in neuroscience that our behavior is deterministic.

Secondly, you wouldn't be prohibited from a particular path as if your history had already been written. Your beliefs and decisions are part of that deterministic process. The question isn't whether we make choices, we obviously do. The point is that those choices, feelings, and beliefs are deterministic: they're based on a combination of your biological and environment states and your biological and environmental histories.

Psychologists use a biopsychosocial model nowadays, looking at how all the different influences feed off of and can amplify each other and there's a lot of politics involved in this, too... because it has implication for drug addictions, correlations of crime with education, etc, etc.

So your reaction to determinism, I think, is a fatalistic stance. And fatalism is not determinism. Determinism means that we actually influence things through our actions. We can receive information and change for the better because of it (or the worse... if that's in our nature). If the universe was completely stochastic... nothing you do would seem to matter because causality would be much more fickle then they already are in complex deterministic systems.

Determinism is, by most definitions fatalistic. The influencing of things is a deterministic process in and of itself. Nothing goes by the physical processes, it's a domino effect.

I hold to the view, similar to Einstein and stephen Hawking, that (at least after) the big bang, all future events were determined with no possible alteration, regardless if you were to rewind the tape.

 

[Pythagorean]

Determinism is, by most definitions fatalistic. The influencing of things is a deterministic process in and of itself. Nothing goes by the physical processes, it's a domino effect.

I hold to the view, similar to Einstein and stephen Hawking, that (at least after) the big bang, all future events were determined with no possible alteration, regardless if you were to rewind the tape.

I agree with your second paragraph. Determinism means one future for each state of the system in the state space; trajectories cannot intersect. This is the mathematical definition.

But still, it is different from fatalism in that fatalism says humans have no influence (that the statespace occurs independent of their feeling and beliefs and desires). But determinism just says any human influence must be deterministic. Humans can still have influence on the state of the universe based on their bleiefs/desires/etc, it's just a deterministic process (thought to evolve in deterministic brain processes!).

 

[rocket123456]

Laplace demon, is for an example, explicitly fatalistic.

 

[Pythagorean]

Laplace demon, is for an example, explicitly fatalistic.

Interesting you say that. Here is a discussion on the separation of determinism and fatalism, which includes some reference to Laplace's demon:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/

 

[atyy]

But we aren't talking about determinism. We are talking about superdeterminism.

Superdeterminism is a theory in which local hidden variables explain correlations between random measurement choices and results even though the choices and results occur at spacelike separation. The "choice" here has nothing to do with human free will. In these experiments, we delegate the "random choice" to an arbitrarily complex device whose detailed workings and initial conditions are unknown to us, eg. whether the number of raindrops that falls in a certain time is even or odd.

Determinism could certainly be true, and Zeilinger's objections just seem to apply to determinism. Superdeterminism could also be true. But can we really construct a local predictive theory ("small" number of parameters) that is deterministic, and makes distant correlations possible depending on whether the number of raindrops or some other absurd parameters like the number of atoms in a ball of earwax at distant locations is even or odd? In discussing this, one has to take into account that the entangled states that show these distant correlations are normally fragile, and have to be protected from the "random environment".

 

[Pythagorean]

But we aren't talking about determinism. We are talking about superdeterminism.

Superdeterminism is a theory in which local hidden variables explain correlations between random measurement choices and results even though the choices and results occur at spacelike separation. The "choice" here has nothing to do with human free will. In these experiments, we delegate the "random choice" to an arbitrarily complex device whose detailed workings and initial conditions are unknown to us, eg. whether the number of raindrops that falls in a certain time is even or odd.

Determinism could certainly be true, and Zeilinger's objections just seem to apply to determinism. Superdeterminism could also be true. But can we really construct a predictive theory (small number of parameters) that is deterministic, and makes distant correlations possible depending on whether the number of raindrops or some other absurd parameters at distant locations is even or odd.

So would you agree that superdeterminism is not "determinism taken to its extreme"?

 

[atyy]

So would you agree that superdeterminism is not "determinism taken to its extreme"?

Basically nothing in neuroscience is related to nonlocal correlations at spacelike separation. So whether one believes neuroscience is deterministic or not is irrelevant.

 

[Pythagorean]

Basically nothing in neuroscience is related to nonlocal correlations at spacelike separation. So whether one believes neuroscience is deterministic or not is irrelevant.

I guess that just means that you and me have different issues with post #22 then.

But Bell does bring free will and human decision making into the discussion. Though, I don't know how appropriate is for him to do so.

"There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already "knows" what that measurement, and its outcome, will be."

 

[atyy]

I guess that just means that you and me have different issues with post #22 then.

But Bell does bring free will and human decision making into the discussion. Though, I don't know how appropriate is for him to do so.

"There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already "knows" what that measurement, and its outcome, will be."

Bell's point is correct, but I dislike his use of the term "free will". I think it is misleading (but it is now standard technical jargon). Here free will is random choice delegated to an arbitrarily complex mechanism that appears random to us. So it can be like the number of atoms in a ball of earwax or some bizarre thing. What is weird is that the entangled state is fragile, and we must take special care to preserve the entanglement to see distant correlations. The randomness of the number of atoms in a ball of earwax is not - that's why we are willing to call it random. So the distant correlations would have to be set up so that although we took no special care over the number of atoms in the ear wax we use to make the choice, that number is still exactly right and robust to produce the distant correlations.

 

[rocket123456]

I guess that just means that you and me have different issues with post #22 then.

But Bell does bring free will and human decision making into the discussion. Though, I don't know how appropriate is for him to do so.

"There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already "knows" what that measurement, and its outcome, will be."

But I don't see why anyone would be a determinist about inanimate nature, but not our own behavior. Superdeterminism appear to follow automatically. The universe is the same for each and every moving subject.

 

[AlephZero]

To give an illustration from computer science, the halting problem: Some computer programs get into an infinite loop and never halt. That's completely predetermined by the program. But you can show (this was shown by Turing) that there is no way to predict which computer programs halt and which ones don't.

That is slightly wrong, but the "slightly" seems important to this discussion.

Of course you can (almost always) predict whether any particular computer program will halt or not, by applying the ordinary rules of logic.

What Turing showed was this: you can't produce just one algorithm (which you could implement as a computer program) that will predict whether all possible computer programs will halt or not.

The proof is very simple: suppose such a "magic debugger" exists. Now write a program that says "If the magic debugger says this program will loop for ever, then halt, otherwise loop for ever".

But how this relates to determinism is not so simple IMO. The proof says nothing about you can prove by some method or other whether all possible programs halt or loop. All it says is that one particular string of symbols in a programming language (i.e. the one in quotes in the previous paragraph) is not actually a computer program, it is only a meaningless string of symbols that looks similar to a program.

 

[craigi]

But we aren't talking about determinism. We are talking about superdeterminism.

Superdeterminism is a theory in which local hidden variables explain correlations between random measurement choices and results even though the choices and results occur at spacelike separation. The "choice" here has nothing to do with human free will. In these experiments, we delegate the "random choice" to an arbitrarily complex device whose detailed workings and initial conditions are unknown to us, eg. whether the number of raindrops that falls in a certain time is even or odd.

Determinism could certainly be true, and Zeilinger's objections just seem to apply to determinism. Superdeterminism could also be true. But can we really construct a predictive theory ("small" number of parameters) that is deterministic, and makes distant correlations possible depending on whether the number of raindrops or some other absurd parameters like the number of atoms in a ball of earwax at distant locations is even or odd?

In one case, we can know that superdeterminsim is viable.

Whatever the true nature of the universe, in principle, we can imagine taking a record of the result of every event. If we can do this, then we know this record could be referenced by a superdeterministic lookup mechanism.

Obviously, this isn't a useful model of the universe because it lacks predictive power. We like to be able to, measure, or at least prepare, the initial state of an isolated system, then use nothing more than rules to predict its future state.

 

[atyy]

In one case, we can know that superdeterminsim is viable.

Whatever the true nature of the universe, in principle, we can imagine taking a record of the result of every event. If we can do this, then we know this record could be referenced by a superdeterministic lookup mechanism.

Obviously, this isn't a useful model of the universe because it lacks predictive power. We like to be able to, measure, or at least prepare, the initial state of an isolated system, then use nothing more than rules to predict its future state.

Yes, I think that's the problem with superdeterminism - it could be true, but for us to know it we'd have to do so many experiments to find out the parameters, that we'd run out of predictive power.

Even with more reasonable theories like dBB, we already seem to have a huge number of possibilities (http://arxiv.org/abs/0706.2522) - none of which are distinguished - unless QM fails. If QM fails we do have a lead. But dBB and its variants are interesting for the moment because they conceptually solve the measurement problem, not because we actually want to use it (ok, it's useful for some calculations), but basically we can believe in dBB for ontology and use QM for predictions. Here's an example showing that a dBB-like theory must be much more complex than its QM counterpart http://arxiv.org/abs/0711.4770.

BUT: I need to understand what Hossenfelder is saying about some class of SDHV theories being testable, to see if there are exceptions.

 

[Pythagorean]

But I don't see why anyone would be a determinist about inanimate nature, but not our own behavior. Superdeterminism appear to follow automatically. The universe is the same for each and every moving subject.

Determinism isn't about animate/inanimate. It's about the nature of the process itself. Some processes are just stochastic, some are just deterministic. And we use these words, really, to describe our modelling approach more than anything. A really complicated deterministic system can also be modeled stochastically, lending to the confusion.

I don't really understand what superdeterminism is so I won't comment on that.

 

[craigi]

I need to understand what Hossenfelder is saying about some class of SDHV theories being testable, to see if there are exceptions.

She's just taking a metric of a correlation time for a particular particle, and proposing testing an upper bound on it.

Short correlation time would map to high complexity, in that the particle would be changing state, for interaction, at a high rate.

 

[stevendaryl]

So would you agree that superdeterminism is not "determinism taken to its extreme"?

As I understand the role of "superdeterminism" as a loophole to Bell's inequality is that it has to do with independent choices.

In a hidden-variables model of the EPR experiment, there are three choices that must be made, by three different "agents":

1. Alice chooses her detector setting.
2. Bob chooses his detector setting.
3. Nature chooses a "hidden variable" shared by the twin pair of particles.

The issue is whether these choices are made independently, or not. If Alice's and Bob's choices were somehow predetermined, then the hidden variable could be chosen taking their choices into account, and you could reproduce the predictions of QM.

The reason this goes beyond ordinary determinism is that you could arrange for the three choices to be independent, even if determinism holds. That is, you can assume that the initial conditions for different parts of the universe could be chosen independently.

 

[atyy]

Sabine Hossenfelder certainly doesn't think so.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1105.4326

Here's a paper that seems related.

http://arxiv.org/abs/1205.0878
Are quantum correlations genuinely quantum?
Antonio Di Lorenzo
Int. J. Mod. Phys. B, 27, 1345016 (2013)

 

[OCR]

It was Wheeler again, who proposed the reason that elementary particles of the same type are indistinguishable, is that they are actually the same particle wound round in space and time. Antiparticles being particles traveling backwards in time. Feynman raised the objection that we don't see as many particles as antiparticles and Wheeler offered some hand-wavey argument.

Feynman actually said... "But, Professor, there aren't as many positrons as electrons."

Wheeler responded with... "Well, maybe they are hidden in the protons or something".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-electron_universe


Carry on...

OCR

 

[bhobba]

The universe is governed by the laws of quantum mechanics. The equations of QM are deterministic, the observations are indeterministic.

That is a matter of interpretation.

We have interpretations such as Nelsons Stochastic's and Partial State Diffusion where QM is not deterministic and interpretations where everything is deterministic eg MW and DBB.

As far as we can tell today there is no physical theory that, if its deterministic can't be derived from some probabilistic basis (eg Classical Mechanics from QM) and conversely (eg QM from a deterministic theory).

This makes such discussions, IMHO useless philosophical waffle, until some way can be found to decide the matter experimentally - which IMHO is highly doubtful - but one never knows what future progress may bring. Just my view - chat away about it as much as you like - its valid intellectual enquiry - just not to my taste.

Thanks
Bill

 

[bhobba]

Determinism isn't about animate/inanimate. It's about the nature of the process itself. Some processes are just stochastic, some are just deterministic. And we use these words, really, to describe our modelling approach more than anything. A really complicated deterministic system can also be modeled stochastically, lending to the confusion.

Exactly - which is why such discussions to me don't really seem to go anywhere, and even as a matter of principle I suspect they cant. Still one never knows.

Thanks
Bill

 

[craigi]

Exactly - which is why such discussions to me don't really seem to go anywhere, and even as a matter of principle I suspect they cant. Still one never knows.

Thanks
Bill

For the largest part, it's all the same physics, just different ways of looking at it. As you suggest, understanding them has its own reward. Amongst many quantum physicists, there still seems to be a feeling that they haven't found a satisfactory view on the subject. Surveys show a suprising disparity between the interpretations that they hold to and it is still an active area of research.

I think many people take in interest in physics because they hope to achieve a deep understanding of nature. I don't find that stopping at the QM formalism or what are referred to as a minimalist interpretations fullfils that. For me, it left me with many more questions that I started with.

QM has proven to provide very reliable predictive power, but there have been minor modifications over the years. Different interpretations can yield, or at least hint at, where new testable predictions might lie, even if they're beyond our means at the moment.

I think the biggest relevant issue is that we've made very little progress in creating a theory of quantum gravity and it seems to me at least, that intrepretational issues present a serious problem for that.

 

[atyy]

Determinism isn't about animate/inanimate. It's about the nature of the process itself. Some processes are just stochastic, some are just deterministic. And we use these words, really, to describe our modelling approach more than anything. A really complicated deterministic system can also be modeled stochastically, lending to the confusion.

I don't really understand what superdeterminism is so I won't comment on that.

That is a matter of interpretation.

We have interpretations such as Nelsons Stochastic's and Partial State Diffusion where QM is not deterministic and interpretations where everything is deterministic eg MW and DBB.

As far as we can tell today there is no physical theory that, if its deterministic can't be derived from some probabilistic basis (eg Classical Mechanics from QM) and conversely (eg QM from a deterministic theory).

This makes such discussions, IMHO useless philosophical waffle, until some way can be found to decide the matter experimentally - which IMHO is highly doubtful - but one never knows what future progress may bring. Just my view - chat away about it as much as you like - its valid intellectual enquiry - just not to my taste.

Thanks
Bill

The point is not determinism/randomness - the point is locality. We are interested in theories with hidden variables because these solve the measurement problem in a straightforward way. Then the question is whether we can have a local hidden variables theory that reproduces the predictions of quantum mechanics. And if one does have such a local hidden variables theory can it also be predictive?

 

[bhobba]

The point is not determinism/randomness - the point is locality. We are interested in theories with hidden variables because these solve the measurement problem in a straightforward way. Then the question is whether we can have a local hidden variables theory that reproduces the predictions of quantum mechanics. And if one does have such a local hidden variables theory can it also be predictive?

All this is valid intellectual enquiry.

For me though until experiment can decide its all a matter of opinion and taste - not science.

Thanks
Bill

 

[bhobba]

I think the biggest relevant issue is that we've made very little progress in creating a theory of quantum gravity and it seems to me at least, that intrepretational issues present a serious problem for that.

Very hard to know what future research will bring. But our best current theory for accomplishing it, String Theory, makes use of bog standard QM.

However I do believe eventually it will have something important to say about the foundations of QM - just a gut feeling though.

Thanks
Bill

 

[Fredrik]

Taking to it's extreme, determinism would seem to require irrationality. Suppose that I live in a deterministic
universe, all events being determined, experiments, brain states, cosmology and so forth. Suppose further that I possesses psychic abilities(perfectly possible in a relativistic-quantum universe) and I precognize an accident involving myself in 5 seconds.

In such a deterministic universe, I would prohibited from intervention, regardless of my true beliefs, and rational justifications for those beliefs. For the simple fact that the precognized event must come about.

I tried to come up with a thought experiment where I can see the problem with deterministic theories that you're talking about. But I wanted to remove the psychic powers, which frankly sound like nonsense to me, so I decided to replace them with computation of future events from measured results. I don't see any problems.

Consider the following thought experiment: Alice and Bob live in a universe that is perfectly described by a deterministic theory. Alice is in her spaceship deep in intergalactic space. Bob (on the outside) measures the state of Alice's ship and everything inside of it. He then uses the theory to compute that Alice's ship is going to explode. He sends a message to inform Alice, and she then pushes the emergency shutdown button, so that the ship doesn't explode. This scenario doesn't contradict determinism, because Bob's calculation only told him what was going to happen if Alice never receives the message.

So let's try to change something in this scenario in order to perhaps reach some kind of absurdity.

Let's say that Bob, immediately after sending the message, calculates how it will change the state of Alice's ship, and then calculates what will happen to the ship. This time he finds that Alice receives the message, pushes the shutdown button, and doesn't explode. Or maybe he finds that Alice's receiver malfunctions, so Alice never gets the message and then explodes. There's nothing absurd about these scenarios. It would be absurd if he finds that Alice receives the message and chooses to let the ship explode, but why would we assume that there are such solutions to the equations of motion?

Now let's remove Bob from the picture altogether, and say that Alice measures the state of her ship herself, and uses her own ship's computers to perform the calculation. This can only lead to an absurdity if the theory says that a physical system can determine its own state. I'm not sure how this would work. The ship's computer is much less complicated than the ship itself, and yet it has to store all the information about the ship. That sounds impossible in principle. But just to make things as messed up as possible, let's assume that we're dealing with such a theory, and that the computer has stored all the information that it needs to begin the calculation. There's only going to be a problem if the ship's computer is able to finish the calculation of what's going to happen 5 minutes from now in less than 5 minutes. This may also be impossible in principle. But let's just say that it's not, and that the computer spits out a description of what's going to happen before it happens. Again, there's no reason to think that the equations of motion have solutions that describe irrational behavior. It's still possible that all solutions are variations of these two: 1. Alice sees the result and pushes the button. No explosion. 2. Alice doesn't see the result and doesn't push the button. Kaboom.

I don't think the stuff in the last paragraph (where Alice is doing the calculation herself) is even worth talking about, because to do so, we have to speculate that physical systems can not only find out what their states are, but also store all the information and use it to compute what's going to happen faster than it's actually happening.