Is Free Will Governed by Quantum Mechanics?

[Loren Booda]

How must we overcome the laws of physics as independent actors? Can there be a science that explains this personal divergence from mechanical description? Is free will the rule of the universe rather than the exception?

 

[christianjb]

Who knows?

Perhaps mathematician John Conway.

http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~jas/one/freewill-theorem.html

 

[Loren Booda]

What I get from Conway is that if a free agent can interact with neutral matter, then all mechanics is susceptable to free will.

 

[Loren Booda]

Much of the quantum logic he describes can be found previously in Jeffrey Bub's "Interpreting the Quantum World."

 

[mosassam]

How must we overcome the laws of physics as independent actors? Can there be a science that explains this personal divergence from mechanical description? Is free will the rule of the universe rather than the exception?

In what ways do we act independently of the laws of physics? The choices we make seem to be reflections of who we are, does this allow for freedom? When you say free will, do you mean freedom from our personal constraints - our simian heritage, our imprinting, conditioning, programming - do you mean freedom from the "I", the Self. For any decisions or choices made within the Self surely cannot be free. And even if we do reach that kind of level of personal freedom, surely the laws of physics will dictate the kinds of choices we make as they reflect the kind of universe we exist in. By which I mean the laws of physics will determine the range of options we have to choose from.
Conversely, freedom means to be without external constraint, which can certainly be said about the universe. The universe is free and if we consider its "components" in a holographic sense rather than a mechanical sense we see that everything contains this freedom rather than being a "slave component" of the Great Machine. Reality is free, existence is free. It may be that we are only enslaved by the concept of freedom.
Can a choice, free from external constraint, be expressed in a mathematical way?

 

[christianjb]

What I get from Conway is that if a free agent can interact with neutral matter, then all mechanics is susceptable to free will.

Well, Conway makes the statement that IF humans can be said to possesses free will- then particles must also have some degree of free will, because in a sense they are making decisions according to the interpretation of some experiments.

Of course- that doesn't prove that humans have free will.

I'm not an expert on his 'Free Will Theorem paper', but it is worth reading- just for fun if nothing else.

 

[christianjb]

In what ways do we act independently of the laws of physics? The choices we make seem to be reflections of who we are, does this allow for freedom? When you say free will, do you mean freedom from our personal constraints - our simian heritage, our imprinting, conditioning, programming - do you mean freedom from the "I", the Self. For any decisions or choices made within the Self surely cannot be free. And even if we do reach that kind of level of personal freedom, surely the laws of physics will dictate the kinds of choices we make as they reflect the kind of universe we exist in. By which I mean the laws of physics will determine the range of options we have to choose from.
Conversely, freedom means to be without external constraint, which can certainly be said about the universe. The universe is free and if we consider its "components" in a holographic sense rather than a mechanical sense we see that everything contains this freedom rather than being a "slave component" of the Great Machine. Reality is free, existence is free. It may be that we are only enslaved by the concept of freedom.
Can a choice, free from external constraint, be expressed in a mathematical way?

I heard one physicist say that we don't have the free-will to disobey the law of gravity.

Beyond that- consciousness only emerges in vastly complex systems (i.e. our brains). It must be pretty complicated.

Don't forget that airplanes obey the same laws of physics as rocks. However one flies and the other drops to the ground.

 

[mosassam]

I heard one physicist say that we don't have the free-will to disobey the law of gravity.

Beyond that- consciousness only emerges in vastly complex systems (i.e. our brains). It must be pretty complicated.

Don't forget that airplanes obey the same laws of physics as rocks. However one flies and the other drops to the ground

Your replies have a zen koan quality about them. They seem to contain deep information but I'm kind of missing how they relate to my own post. More contemplation on my behalf may be required.
There is a good outline of freewill on the Freewill thread, post # 4, Anssih.
What is meant by the "seat" of freewill?

 

[christianjb]

OK.

BTW, it's not so much the laws of physics- it's more basic than that. Many suspect that consciousness can be built into any 'Turing machine'. In other words- if you had the right program- then you could effectively code all the consciousness and decision making of the human brain into your PS3 (or any other computer), such that your PS3 acts like a brain emulator.

For an example of massively complex behavior in a 'universe' with much simpler laws of physics than our own- Google/Wikipediate 'Conway's Game of Life'. Effectively the entire universe on an infinite checkerboard.

 

[MeJennifer]

How must we overcome the laws of physics as independent actors? Can there be a science that explains this personal divergence from mechanical description? Is free will the rule of the universe rather than the exception?

I do not believe there is a free will.

Free will implies that the universe is not completely governed by physical laws but also up to a certain extend by the imagination of the mind.

 

[christianjb]

I do not believe there is a free will.

Free will implies that the universe is not completely governed by physical laws but also up to a certain extend by the imagination of the mind.

We certainly have the illusion of free will.

Let me invent the term 'meta-free will' to describe the illusion of free will.

You must then admit that 'meta-free will' does exist and is governed by the laws of the universe.

If you don't accept that- then I'll just ask you to explain meta-meta free will.

Here's the question...

What's the difference between 'free-will' and 'meta-free will'? I don't think there is any practical difference. I'd be quite happy to settle for my brain having 'meta-free will' if you disproved the first.

Of course, you could disprove all of the meta^n free-wills, but then I'd resort to using Cantor's notation for different levels of infinity. You don't want me to do that do you?

 

[MeJennifer]

We certainly have the illusion of free will.

Let me invent the term 'meta-free will' to describe the illusion of free will.

You must then admit that 'meta-free will' does exist and is governed by the laws of the universe.

That does not logically follow at all.

If you don't accept that- then I'll just ask you to explain meta-meta free will.

It is a term you just invented.

Of course, you could disprove all of the meta^n free-wills, but then I'd resort to using Cantor's notation for different levels of infinity. You don't want me to do that do you?

It most certainly won't impress me, and logically speaking, it does not make any sense whatsoever.

 

[christianjb]

I do not believe there is a free will.

Free will implies that the universe is not completely governed by physical laws but also up to a certain extend by the imagination of the mind.

That does not logically follow at all.


It is a term you just invented.


It most certainly won't impress me, and logically speaking, it does not make any sense whatsoever.

Uh... you could be a little less sarcastic.

I think you can admit that we at least have the illusion of free-will. If you don't admit that- then I will claim that we have the illusion of the illusion of free will... and so on.

Just telling me that 'it does not follow logically' isn't much help.

 

[MeJennifer]

If you don't admit that- then I will claim that we have the illusion of the illusion of free will... and so on.

You can claim whatever you want but what is the relevance of such claims?

So what that someone has the illusion of free will? How does that prove anything relating to free will? There are people who have the illusion they are Napoleon, how in any way does such an illusion relate to the real thing?

See what I mean?


By the way:

Who knows?

Perhaps mathematician John Conway.

http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~jas/one/freewill-theorem.html

Conway's theorem does not pertain to the existence of free will but to a consequence of free will.

The theorem could be paraphrased by: "experiments are not coincidences!"

In this regard, I agree with the notion that humans are not free (as in free will) to perform scientific experiments.

 

[christianjb]

You can claim whatever you want but what is the relevance of such claims?

So what that someone has the illusion of free will? How does that prove anything relating to free will? There are people who have the illusion they are Napoleon, how in any way does such an illusion relate to the real thing?

See what I mean?


By the way:


Conway's theorem does not pertain to the existence of free will but to a consequence of free will.

The theorem could be paraphrased by: "experiments are not coincidences!"

In this regard, I agree with the notion that humans are not free (as in free will) to perform scientific experiments.

OK, so you agree that we have at least the illusion of free will- we possesses 'meta-free will' as I called it.

My stance is that 'meta-free will' is pretty much a good enough substitute for actual free will in most instances. I can't think of anything I can do with free will that I can't do with meta-free will.

It pretty much comes down to Turing's argument for AI from thereon. If my meta-free will is indistinguishable from actual free-will to the outside observer- then you probably should grant me free-will, or at least reserve judgment.

If someone thinks they are Napoleon in a wide variety of ways and manners- then to some extent they are Napoleon. That extent is determined by how easily they can fool other people.

'We are who we pretend to be, so we must be careful who we pretend to be' (Kurt Vonnegut)

I'm not saying that all of reality is a social construct. There is an external reality- but only so far that we can devise tests to probe it. If there's no test to distinguish 'true' from 'meta' free will- then I don't think it's meaningful to call free will an illusion at all.

 

[MeJennifer]

It pretty much comes down to Turing's argument for AI from thereon. If my meta-free will is indistinguishable from actual free-will to the outside observer- then you probably should grant me free-will, or at least reserve judgment.

"I imagine I am Napoleon therefore I am Napoleon".
Completely false reasoning.

If someone thinks they are Napoleon in a wide variety of ways and manners- then to some extent they are Napoleon. That extent is determined by how easily they can fool other people.

Yes but we are talking about facts right? Whether free will is a fact or not, not if we can "fool" people to believe it right?

 

[christianjb]

"I imagine I am Napoleon therefore I am Napoleon".
Completely false reasoning.



Yes but we are talking about facts right? Whether free will is a fact or not, not if we can "fool" people to believe it right?

Maybe Napoleon was too extreme an example. However, imagine that someone goes to such extremes - learns all about the life of Napoleon- pictures himself as Napoleon in every way. Eventually it makes a certain amount of sense to treat him as if he were Napoleon.

In the case of Napoleon- the emulation can never be perfect- because for one thing- we know that Napoleon is dead! However, in the case of free-will- emulation can become extremely precise. Precise enough that people can have detailed arguments about whether a person has free-will or not.

Again- you didn't really explain why you think my reasoning is false- you just proclaimed it to be false. You may be right- but you do need to explain yourself if you want to be involved in a discussion.

If you think I'm crazy- then Google/Wikipediate 'the Turing test'. It may be self evidently wrong to you- but Alan Turing didn't think so.

 

[mosassam]

I do not believe there is a free will.

Free will exists in so far as we do have the ability to make choices and decisions. However, whether these choices are free from external constraints (constraints external to the choices themselves) is another matter. Choices are made by the Self, the Self seems to be an amalgum of various processess such as imprinting, conditioning, programming etc. directed by various environmental factors such as family, society and a multitude of life experiences. In this light the Self cannot be seen as being free from external constraints, so it is difficult to see how the choices it makes can be free. The Self can certainly imagine free will exists (the illusion of free will) and can construct a logical framework to demonstrate its existence, but as long as these things are generated by the Self I cannot see how they can be deemed to be free.

 

[Loren Booda]

Is the physical universe like Western religion's God in that one is allowed "free will" as long as (s)he respects certain constraints, or is free will absolute in these situations?

 

[christianjb]

Is the physical universe like Western religion's God in that one is allowed "free will" as long as (s)he respects certain constraints, or is free will absolute in these situations?

Try to exercise free will to overcome gravity if you fall out of a window. You can't- you've always got to obey the laws of physics.

However, it's not obvious to me that obeying the laws of physics at all times imposes any severe constraints on what we normally think of as free will.

Chess for example is played according to fixed rules- but the outcome is still determined by choices people (or machines) make. Those choices are unpredictable (even in the case of a computer).

 

[Rade]

How must we overcome the laws of physics as independent actors? Can there be a science that explains this personal divergence from mechanical description? Is free will the rule of the universe rather than the exception?

To answer the title of the OP,--what is the seat of free will ?--for me the answer goes--"the seat of free will is the human mind" (at least for life on earth). Therefore, free will is very much the exception in the universe as now known by humans. By free will I mean the fact that the human animal is a material being with volitional consciousness--e.g., each individual human has free will choice to "think or not to think". The science that explains divergence from the mechanical is called "reason". Humans with free will to think or not to think via reason can overcome at least one of the laws of physics--gravity--the only one that operates at the macroscopic scale of the human body as a material being. Thus we overcome laws of physics by using free will choice to think or not on the question of how to overcome. Now we read that quarks have property of absymtopic freedom--but this is not a type of free will since quarks do not gain this property by volition.

 

[christianjb]

To answer the title of the OP,--what is the seat of free will ?--for me the answer goes--"the seat of free will is the human mind" (at least for life on earth). Therefore, free will is very much the exception in the universe as now known by humans. By free will I mean the fact that the human animal is a material being with volitional consciousness--e.g., each individual human has free will choice to "think or not to think". The science that explains divergence from the mechanical is called "reason". Humans with free will to think or not to think via reason can overcome at least one of the laws of physics--gravity--the only one that operates at the macroscopic scale of the human body as a material being. Thus we overcome laws of physics by using free will choice to think or not on the question of how to overcome. Now we read that quarks have property of absymtopic freedom--but this is not a type of free will since quarks do not gain this property by volition.

Be careful. We can't overcome gravity by free-will. We can build a plane or a rocket that appears to defy gravity- but of course a more careful analysis shows that they obey all laws of physics (including gravity) at all times.

 

[mosassam]

Is the physical universe like Western religion's God in that one is allowed "free will" as long as (s)he respects certain constraints, or is free will absolute in these situations?

Don't the constraints you mention go against the idea of freedom (that which is without constraints)? Free will must be free (ie: without constraint). The complexity of the mind allows for the illusion of free will (by which I mean we are free to choose, but the choices themselves are constrained).
For Christianjb - free will implies the freedom to make a choice. Making a choice does not rely on gravity and in that way it defies the law of gravity. Free will does not imply superhuman feats.
For Rade - how are we free to "not think"? I can see how we are free to apply thought to whatever we choose to, but to choose not to think seems, to me at least, unlikely.

 

[Loren Booda]

From what I understand, many Christians believe that God allows us self-determination until Judgment Day: the promise of heaven or threat of damnation.

 

[mosassam]

From what I understand, many Christians believe that God allows us self-determination until Judgment Day: the promise of heaven or threat of damnation.

Is self-determination the same as free-will? Does the physical universe "allow" us anything? If so, in what way? How does 'belief' affect the existence (or not) of free-will? What about the Jewish, Moslem or Hindu religions?
Surely any religion provides its own constraints on the way an individual chooses, as does science, as does philosophy, as do family, society, culture and tradition.

 

[christianjb]

This thread is taking a wrong turn.

Let's leave religion out of the free-will debate.

 

[Loren Booda]

Agreed.

This thread has me thinking that "will" is by definition free, if future physics projects an independent self (an extension of uncertainty?).

 

[mosassam]

If we just look at the 'parts', then nothing has freedom, everything is interconnected and, thus, interdependent. But if reality is a unified whole then there must be 'pure' freedom - everything is everything, therefore no interdependence. However, the rational mind (the seat of free-will) must fragment, divide, categorise and classify. When we think we separate, and so the unified whole becomes separated.
It may be that uncertainty only occurs when we think about things.

 

[Loren Booda]

As mankind acquires leisure time and procrastinates survival at this moment in history, we have at least for now the ability to acknowledge free-will.

Interdependence and independence are both dual edged swords, freeing or confining in complementary manners. I would not have lived as long as I have without the altruism of human society, which may however also contribute to my violent death eventually.

Parts are not always bordered by impasse, as the infinite universe may be foreign to the free-will of material, finite beings. I admit that I am limited, and that reasonably defines my free-will. Is this my rationality speaking?

Complete physical uncertainty eliminates the concept of a knowable self, but allows experience unbounded, much like a mind without a brain. Feel free!

How is free-will related to consciousness?

 

[Rade]

...For Rade - how are we free to "not think"?...

Does it not hold true that there is a continuum of awareness for the human mind, from unconsciousness (or nearly so) to what can be called "focused awareness" ? And do we not find different states of focused awareness, from meditation, relaxation, daydreaming,...etc...to the most "focused" state...that with clarity of focus, with abstract property, what is called thinking ? And are we not "free" to initiate and sustain each process volitionally ? I have no idea "why" folks choose to focus in different ways at different times at different places--why some choose to mediate while others choose to focus their minds to "think". But what does seem clear to me is that we are all "free" to focus in such a such way or not to focus, thus we are free to "not think", to not ask such a question as asked by Einstein at age 14--"what would the world look like if I rode on a beam of light". You see, Einstein was "free" to "not think" this thought, or any thought, on that day many years ago, when he informs us that he did so think. Clearly no human (outside one unconscious in hospital) has free will to "never think"--but this is not what I was trying to explain when I stated that humans have free will to think or not think--I hope this clarifies my comment.

 

[moving finger]

How is free-will related to consciousness?

Free will is related to consciousness insofar as free will is an illusion (a mistaken interpretation of reality) possessed by some conscious minds. Apart from that, they have little in common.

MF

 

[christianjb]

Free will is related to consciousness insofar as free will is an illusion (a mistaken interpretation of reality) possessed by some conscious minds. Apart from that, they have little in common.

MF

How can you test the concept that free will is an illusion? What if I claim that free-will is not an illusion? Prove me wrong.

 

[christianjb]

And- what is the brain doing- if not making decisions? Is not making decisions the basis of free will?

 

[moving finger]

How can you test the concept that free will is an illusion? What if I claim that free-will is not an illusion? Prove me wrong.

I can show that your concept of free will is flawed only if you are prepared to explain to me (in detail) your concept of free will, and show how this free will is supposed to work (ie how it produces outcomes which are neither determined nor random, but "something else").

Are you willing to do that?

MF

 

[moving finger]

And- what is the brain doing- if not making decisions? Is not making decisions the basis of free will?

Why should this follow?

Decision-making is an algorithmic process, a process of deterministically evaluating the values of alternative possible courses of action, and then deterministically selecting that course of action with the highest value. A computer can do this. Why should such a process necessarily involve free will (whatever that might be)?

MF

 

[christianjb]

Why should this follow?

Decision-making is an algorithmic process, a process of deterministically evaluating the values of alternative possible courses of action, and then deterministically selecting that course of action with the highest value. A computer can do this. Why should such a process necessarily involve free will (whatever that might be)?

MF

I accept that the brain is almost certainly following an algorithmic process. That doesn't mean it doesn't have free will. It's still making decisions- choices between considered alternatives.

In that sense- computers almost certainly can have free will. Maybe they already do. They make decisions don't they?

Determinism is a tricky subject. Not even computers are deterministic if they're hooked up to a rapidly changing external stimulus- i.e. the outside world. The system as a whole is definitely not deterministic- and thus neither are its parts- if they're in connection to the system and making decisions.

As to the defn. of free will. You tell me. It doesn't matter that much to me precisely how it's defined, but it does need to be a testable concept, especially if you want to claim it doesn't exist.

 

[moving finger]

I accept that the brain is almost certainly following an algorithmic process. That doesn't mean it doesn't have free will. It's still making decisions- choices between considered alternatives.

In that sense- computers almost certainly can have free will. Maybe they already do. They make decisions don't they?

Depends on how you define "choice", and on how you define "free will". I've been in debates with libertarians who insist that determinism is incompatible with genuine choice (ie only an agent with libertarian free will can genuinely choose). On the other hand, a compatibilist would define free will along the lines of the ability to act unconstrained by external forces at the time of the act (in which case determinism is compatible with free will).

Determinism is a tricky subject. Not even computers are deterministic if they're hooked up to a rapidly changing external stimulus- i.e. the outside world. The system as a whole is definitely not deterministic- and thus neither are its parts- if they're in connection to the system and making decisions.

Is it? How do you know it is not deterministic? (as opposed to being unpredictable - predictability and determinism are not synonymous)

As to the defn. of free will. You tell me. It doesn't matter that much to me precisely how it's defined, but it does need to be a testable concept, especially if you want to claim it doesn't exist.

It is the libertarian concept of free will that I claim is incoherent (hence cannot exist in a natural world). Basically, a libertarian believes in the notion of ultimate responsibility (UR), where UR is the premise that an agent is able to act autonomously of all external circumstances (past and future) and yet still be in control of its actions. UR entails that an agent’s actions be ultimately uncaused, and yet at the same time remain under the control of that agent. Self-determination is another way of saying that to be free we must be ultimately responsible for what we do.

 

[Royce]

It is the libertarian concept of free will that I claim is incoherent (hence cannot exist in a natural world). Basically, a libertarian believes in the notion of ultimate responsibility (UR), where UR is the premise that an agent is able to act autonomously of all external circumstances (past and future) and yet still be in control of its actions. UR entails that an agent’s actions be ultimately uncaused, and yet at the same time remain under the control of that agent. Self-determination is another way of saying that to be free we must be ultimately responsible for what we do.

This is a gross mis-statement of the libertarian position as I understand it. No wonder you believe that freewill doesn't exist.

No person or agent of freewill is free of external nor internal circumstances nor influences. Nor is any decision uncaused. The operative words are "compelled" and
"predetermined."

An agent's of freewill decisions are not compelled nor predetermined by cause and effect but real choices between real alternatives. The influences, both external and internal, the may influence his decision one way or the other are also real but are influences only not compelled nor predetermined. The are not free of all influences nor are they uncaused.

It is also the libertarian's position that with personal freedom comes personal responsibility. The greater the freedom the greater the responsibility. If we have and exercise freewill then we are also responsible for our decisions and the consequences of the choices, good or bad.

There is no such thing, IMO, as absolute freewill as you defined it, absolutely free of influences, circumstances or cause.


While doing a Google search on free will, I came across this article.

free will

"Free will is probably located in the pre-frontal cortex, and we may even be able to narrow it down to the ventromedial pre-frontal cortex."
--Stephen Pinker, How the Mind Works


Free will is a concept in traditional philosophy used to refer to the belief that human behavior is not absolutely determined by external causes, but is the result of choices made by an act of will by the agent. Such choices are themselves not determined by external causes, but are determined by the motives and intentions of the agent, which themselves are not absolutely determined by external causes...

http://skepdic.com/freewill.html" [

 

[christianjb]

Well- the libertarianism thing seemed to come out of left-field. No ideas about that.

As I understand it, the consensus view is that the universe is not deterministic, because of 'pure' randomness from quantum fluctuations. It's also inherently unpredictable, because of chaos on many levels.

It may even be tricky to speak of some quantum events having a cause. If a decay is perfectly random- then the precise time of the decay is not caused by anything.

Even a thermostat is hooked up in a feed-back loop with the environment. The system as a whole is inherently unpredictable and indeterminable. It doesn't seem obvious to me that we can't say that a thermostatted room isn't making a (very basic) choice to be at a certain temperature.

 

[moving finger]

No person or agent of freewill is free of external nor internal circumstances nor influences. Nor is any decision uncaused.

I never claimed that any agent is free of external or internal circumstances - what I claimed is that libertarian free will assumes that a free will agent is ABLE TO ACT AUTONOMOUSLY of all external circumstances - in other words, the agent is ultimately responsible for it's decision (the chain of responsibility terminates in the agent, and does not extend to preceding causes). Libertarian fee will indeed assumes that a free will agent's actions must be ultimately uncaused, in the sense that there is no chain of cause and effect preceding the point of the agent's alleged free will decision (hence causing that decision).

The libertarian believes in the notion of ultimate responsibility, in the sense that we can claim "the buck stops here" with the free will agent (ie the free will agent can claim to be ultimately responsible for its actions), in effect the libertarian believes she CAN, in certain circumstances, choose independently of all external influences IF SHE SO WISHES - and it is this notion of ultimate responsibility which I argue is incoherent.

In this sense of UR, the libertarian is in effect saying, for a given action X for which she claims she is responsible, "I and only I am responsible for that act X - although there were external influences acting on me, none of those influences CAUSED me to act in any particular way, I was able to deliberate independently of those external influences and act X happened because, and only because, I wanted it to happen". It is in this sense that a libertarian believes she is able to act independently of external factors.

There is no such thing, IMO, as absolute freewill as you defined it, absolutely free of influences, circumstances or cause.

Then we agree - because this is precisely what the libertarian is claiming - that she CAN (if she chooses) make decisions which are NOT caused by preceding influences but at the same time are not random - that the chain of cause and effect for a free will decision terminates in the agent - that she is ultimately responsible.

Your quote brings us to the crux of the free will problem, because as defined :

Free will is a concept in traditional philosophy used to refer to the belief that human behavior is not absolutely determined by external causes, but is the result of choices made by an act of will by the agent. Such choices are themselves not determined by external causes, but are determined by the motives and intentions of the agent, which themselves are not absolutely determined by external causes...

I could model such a "free will" decision-making machine by simply installing a genuinely indeterministic random-number generator as a source of choices/motives/intentions within the agent - such a model would do exactly as described above - but would we claim the model has free will?

I think not - hence clearly the definition advanced is inadequate, since it does not allow us to distinguish between genuine free will choice and random selection.

 

[moving finger]

Well- the libertarianism thing seemed to come out of left-field. No ideas about that.

As I understand it, the consensus view is that the universe is not deterministic, because of 'pure' randomness from quantum fluctuations. It's also inherently unpredictable, because of chaos on many levels.

It may even be tricky to speak of some quantum events having a cause. If a decay is perfectly random- then the precise time of the decay is not caused by anything.

Even a thermostat is hooked up in a feed-back loop with the environment. The system as a whole is inherently unpredictable and indeterminable. It doesn't seem obvious to me that we can't say that a thermostatted room isn't making a (very basic) choice to be at a certain temperature.

The jury is out on whether the world is fundamentally deterministic or indeterministic. The only safe conclusion we can draw from QM is that the world is epistemically indeterminable - but this is not the same as ontically indeterministic.

But even if the world were ontically indeterministic - how does this generate free will? (It allows for the libertarian holy grail of alternate possibilities, but alternate possibilities are not sufficient for free will - we also need ultimate responsibility)

 

[christianjb]

The jury is out on whether the world is fundamentally deterministic or indeterministic. The only safe conclusion we can draw from QM is that the world is epistemically indeterminable - but this is not the same as ontically indeterministic.

But even if the world were ontically indeterministic - how does this generate free will? (It allows for the libertarian holy grail of alternate possibilities, but alternate possibilities are not sufficient for free will - we also need ultimate responsibility)

Rephrase the above in terms that a physicist can understand.

Do you mean libertarianism as a political philosophy?

 

[moving finger]

Rephrase the above in terms that a physicist can understand.

The following paper may help : http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000939/00/determ.pdf

I'm a physicist myself, so this may be a case of the blind leading the blind, but basically :

epistemically indeterminable = we are unable to determine (measure) the world to an arbitrary precision (even though it may be fixed to an arbitrary precision) - basically here we are saying we are limited in what we can know about the world

ontically indeterministic = the world is fundamentally indeterministic, over and above any limitations we may have in our measurement of the world

Do you mean libertarianism as a political philosophy?

No, I mean philosophical or metaphysical libertarianism, see :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarianism_(metaphysics)

It is generally claimed that libertarian philosophy requires the principle of alternate possibilities or PAP (ie the future is not "fixed" and there are genuine alternate future possibilities), but PAP alone is not sufficient to generate free will (after all, ontic indeterminism also gives us PAP). The real essential ingredient for libertarian free will is ultimate responsibility, which many including myself claim is an incoherent concept (unless one appeals to supernatural forces)

 

[christianjb]

Quantum processes are truly random- so that makes it 'ontically' indeterministic, to use that strange phrase.

 

[moving finger]

Quantum processes are truly random- so that makes it 'ontically' indeterministic, to use that strange phrase.

Not necessarily - check the Bohmian interpretation (and before you claim that hidden variable theories do not work, that's not correct - LOCAL hidden variable theories don't work, in fact NO local real theory works - whatever the world is, it is non-local if it is real) (by works I mean fits the empirical data)

 

[christianjb]

Not necessarily - check the Bohmian interpretation (and before you claim that hidden variable theories do not work, that's not correct - LOCAL hidden variable theories don't work, in fact NO local real theory works - whatever the world is, it is non-local if it is real) (by works I mean fits the empirical data)

The Bohmian interpretation is highly controversial at best. That doesn't mean it's wrong- but it is very much disputed.

The majority view is that true randomness lies at the heart of quantum mechanics. Not very many physicists like hidden variable theories.

Personally- I doubt it matters to the free-will debate, which view you take of quantum mechanics. The brain's mechanism probably isn't dependent on such effects.

 

[moving finger]

The Bohmian interpretation is highly controversial at best. That doesn't mean it's wrong- but it is very much disputed.

I certainly agree with that - just as I dispute the assumption that the world is necessarily ontically indeterministic

The majority view is that true randomness lies at the heart of quantum mechanics. Not very many physicists like hidden variable theories.

Perhaps so - but at one time the majority view was that the sun circled the Earth and not vice versa - Galileo & Copernicus were the underdogs of their time, and I have an affinity for the underdog - truth is not decided by popular vote thank goodness

Perhaps most physicists "don't like" hidden variable theories because as far as physics is concerned, Copenhagen and Shut Up And Calculate are good enough - not many physicists venture into metaphysics. Physics is after all about epistemology, ontology is not very relevant for most physicists.

Personally- I doubt it matters to the free-will debate, which view you take of quantum mechanics. The brain's mechanism probably isn't dependent on such effects.

I agree - I don't see how indeterminism engenders free will (the libertarian needs indeterminism, because she needs the PAP, but indeterminism alone is not enough)

 

[christianjb]

The fact that Galileo was in conflict with religious teachings says nothing about the truth of the Bohmian picture.

Physicists have had decades to evaluate Bohm's works in a fair and free manner. In that time- they have found no convincing evidence that Bohm's approach is in any way superior to more standard quantum theories.

 

[moving finger]

The fact that Galileo was in conflict with religious teachings says nothing about the truth of the Bohmian picture.

Physicists have had decades to evaluate Bohm's works in a fair and free manner. In that time- they have found no convincing evidence that Bohm's approach is in any way superior to more standard quantum theories.

Perhaps because physicists are fundamentally concerned only with epistemology - what they can measure. That was certainly Bohr's view. If the world is deterministic, but it appears indeterministic in all of our experiments, then a physicist can safely assume indeterminism. That doesn't mean the physicist is right, it's just a good working assumption. That's not good enough for a philosopher however.

 

[Mahler765]

I'm not exactly sure why people try to use mathematics and physics to try to prove free will...

Human beings obey different laws than math and science. One of the very first posts on this thread talked about humans not having free will because we can not choose to disobey the laws of gravity.

We live in a physical world and we have to obey the laws of that world. Free will has to do strictly with making decisions. While you can't decided to disobey the law of gravity, you can decide to test the laws of gravity...

When standing on the edge of a cliff, there are an infinite number of possible options(as there are with any decision that has to be made). The law of gravity is a law only because every time something is dropped, it falls to the ground.

One of the first things you learn in any philosophy class is that the scientific laws are based on precedence only. Just because the pencil fell to the floor when you dropped it the first thousand times you let it fall out of your hand, doesn't mean that it won't fly towards the ceiling the thousand and first time you "drop" it.

When you decide to "disobey" the law of gravity, you are putting it to the test. Every time a 3rd grader does an experiment dropping a sheet of paper, that same law is put to a test.

In fact, every time an experiment is done to determine whether a hypothesis is a law, you are trying to "disobey" that law.



Also, there was mention of computers being able to make decisions...I'm an electrical engineering student and I spend most of my time writing code for computers to follow.

Whenever you see a computer doing something "clever", it's because a clever programmer told it to do that.

Computers are becoming increasingly "independent", but that's only because human beings are able to make them so.

When a computer has to make a decision, it has a conditional structure programmed into it for it to follow...if x = 3, then do this; if x <0, then do this, etc.

When a human makes a decision, there's an infinite amount influences to take into consideration. A computer would have to be obeying an infinite number of conditional structures, which is impossible because it would have to actively generate it's own programming.

Also, "Decision-making is an algorithmic process, a process of deterministically evaluating the values of alternative possible courses of action, and then deterministically selecting that course of action with the highest value." was mentioned on page three by moving finger...

You can't describe a decision making process as deterministic because if it's deterministic, there can't be any decision...your course of action has already been "determined" for you.

One good analogy that helped me understand free will was that we are all characters in a story...

The book's already been written, but we are within the story and we have to live it in a linear fashion.

This can go hand in hand with the idea that the only way to make objective judgements about a system is to be completely removed from the system.

Because of the flow of time, we have to make decisions to move on. Even the band Rush understood the concept. Even if you choose not to decide, you've still made a choice...

In the second Matrix movie, Neo knows he has to make a certain decision. The oracle tells him that he's already made that decision, he just has to understand it.

As a character in the book, you're locked in a certain position in time, just riding the flow, and your character has to make a decision at the end of chapter 2.

The only way for you to get to chapter 3 is to make a choice, and because time doesn't stop to wait for you, if you don't make an active decision(choose not to decide), then you move on to chapter three anyway.

That's the strongest argument for free will...that you can choose to influence what's going to happen in the future.

Sort of abstract, but it makes sense to me...

Also, say there is a God-like character...by definition He would be outside the system. He is the only objective observer. He might know what's going to happen, what you're going to do, but you still DON'T know what you're going to do, so it doesn't matter.

If there is a God that is all knowing, and He does know what's going to happen...so what? That doesn't affect your position at all...because you still don't know what you're going do. God's not making the decision, you're still the one who does that.

If Bob knows that you're going to choose blueberry pie for dessert, but you still haven't made up your mind yet, what Bob knows is irrelevant because Bob's not making the decision.

Back to my opening line...what electrons and rocks do is irrelevant because you aren't an electron or a rock. To prove that humans have free will or whether their actions are determined, look are what humans do.