Is Free Will Possible in a Deterministic Universe?

[alt]

You can't really divide the world into people who are interested in true reality and those that aren't. It's more like anyone can have the experience of wanting to cut through obfuscation to really know something beyond what other people want them to know about it or what is convenient for themselves to know. Who hasn't had the experience of wanting to know the real truth, even when they suspect it would disrupt their reality or otherwise hurt them. What kid doesn't eventually want to know the truth about Santa Claus, even if they know it's going to ruin the magic of Christmas if it turns out he doesn't really exist?

Yes, lol, and the Easter Bunny ..

But earlier you said;

Only the truest scientists are interested in reality as it actually exists - and everyone else just uses knowledge to play social games and vie for power (not that scientists never do this - that's why I say "true" scientists).

That sounds a lot more than a generalisation. Who ARE these true / truest scientists ?

 

[nismaratwork]

Probably Nietzche through Foucault, yes, but don't you think the genealogical citations distract from the substantive discussion of content? Positioning and posturing really gets on my nerves in academic discourse. What's worse is how often it is taken as a substitute for any substantive argumentation AT ALL. It's just flag-waving.

I think you are taking a playful observation and reading into it, what was not there. I don't posture, I prefer direct and brutal honesty. Was I in any way indirect in our earlier argument a few pages ago? Where someone comes by their ideas and knowledge can be insightful, that's all, just as my comment about monkey curiosity comes from Larry Niven (the sci-fi author) and was also playful. When I'm being direct, you'll know it, I don't attack from the flanks.

 

[brainstorm]

Counting the number of ants in an anthill is pursuing truth, about an anthill, but its a waste of time(for most people) unless you are someone who gets off on counting things.

Philosophy isn't just about navel gazing, its about how we choose to live.

Fine, that's a good example of an irrelevant truth. But I hope you realize that people rarely target irrelevant truths for obfuscation. They pick the ones that they know or suspect may have some influence in their lives. Philosophy may be about choosing how to live, but when someone's ethic is to obfuscate or otherwise lie or mislead to achieve a certain way of living, it's a problem ethically. And let's face it, there are many unsustainable and unreasonable lifestyle choices that people pursue in the name of freedom and by the power of privilege that are susceptible to scrutiny, hence the term "inconvenient truth." When awareness of inconvenient truths is immanent, claiming that certain questions or truths are irrelevant is one tactic for obfuscating and averting the conclusion that something has to change, despite it being inconvenient to do so. No offense, and I am certainly open to the possibility that I am wrong, but this is the way it came across to me so I said what I saw.

Only the truest scientists are interested in reality as it actually exists - and everyone else just uses knowledge to play social games and vie for power (not that scientists never do this - that's why I say "true" scientists).

That sounds a lot more than a generalisation. Who ARE these true / truest scientists ?

The Santa Claus example was meant to show that anyone could have a true interest in truth despite the inconvenience or social consequences of true knowledge. A truly honest person can reflect on why they want to discover or believe certain things. I knew, for example, when global warming was being debated that I wanted there to be limits on fossil fuel consumption because I think excessive fossil-fuel burning creates a way of life that I dislike. However, because I knew I had an interest in the outcome, I could decide that I was more interested in whether global warming is valid science or not instead of just rallying for the outcome that suited my political interest. Now, how many people who don't want to curb their fuel consumption or pay higher gas tax do you think are open to the possibility that global warming IS a true reality? Probably not many. Political interests affect people's will to know, even many scientists.

I think you are taking a playful observation and reading into it, what was not there. I don't posture, I prefer direct and brutal honesty. Was I in any way indirect in our earlier argument a few pages ago? Where someone comes by their ideas and knowledge can be insightful, that's all, just as my comment about monkey curiosity comes from Larry Niven (the sci-fi author) and was also playful. When I'm being direct, you'll know it, I don't attack from the flanks.

Glad to hear you don't attack from the flanks. When I was accusing you of posturing, it was because you were primarily focussing on source-citations. While it can be relevant in certain discussions what source something comes from, e.g. when there is disagreement over interpretation or meaning of earlier usages of a concept, it does not automatically lend credibility to an argument. Information, whether grounded in citation or not, has to make a reasonable argument.

Too many scholars publish writing in which source-citation and posturing are subtly substituted for reason and argumentation. The point of their articles is basically to say, "I have great expertise in this subject and I have read many other things other people have written on similar topics, therefore when I make a claim it is substantiated by my position in my field." In your earlier posts, I didn't see any explicit argumentation or reasoning so I assumed you were just plotting multiple points of citation and trying to imply that your claims were defensible without defending them. That's what I call posturing.

 

[nismaratwork]

Fine, that's a good example of an irrelevant truth. But I hope you realize that people rarely target irrelevant truths for obfuscation. They pick the ones that they know or suspect may have some influence in their lives. Philosophy may be about choosing how to live, but when someone's ethic is to obfuscate or otherwise lie or mislead to achieve a certain way of living, it's a problem ethically. And let's face it, there are many unsustainable and unreasonable lifestyle choices that people pursue in the name of freedom and by the power of privilege that are susceptible to scrutiny, hence the term "inconvenient truth." When awareness of inconvenient truths is immanent, claiming that certain questions or truths are irrelevant is one tactic for obfuscating and averting the conclusion that something has to change, despite it being inconvenient to do so. No offense, and I am certainly open to the possibility that I am wrong, but this is the way it came across to me so I said what I saw.





The Santa Claus example was meant to show that anyone could have a true interest in truth despite the inconvenience or social consequences of true knowledge. A truly honest person can reflect on why they want to discover or believe certain things. I knew, for example, when global warming was being debated that I wanted there to be limits on fossil fuel consumption because I think excessive fossil-fuel burning creates a way of life that I dislike. However, because I knew I had an interest in the outcome, I could decide that I was more interested in whether global warming is valid science or not instead of just rallying for the outcome that suited my political interest. Now, how many people who don't want to curb their fuel consumption or pay higher gas tax do you think are open to the possibility that global warming IS a true reality? Probably not many. Political interests affect people's will to know, even many scientists.


Glad to hear you don't attack from the flanks. When I was accusing you of posturing, it was because you were primarily focussing on source-citations. While it can be relevant in certain discussions what source something comes from, e.g. when there is disagreement over interpretation or meaning of earlier usages of a concept, it does not automatically lend credibility to an argument. Information, whether grounded in citation or not, has to make a reasonable argument.

Too many scholars publish writing in which source-citation and posturing are subtly substituted for reason and argumentation. The point of their articles is basically to say, "I have great expertise in this subject and I have read many other things other people have written on similar topics, therefore when I make a claim it is substantiated by my position in my field." In your earlier posts, I didn't see any explicit argumentation or reasoning so I assumed you were just plotting multiple points of citation and trying to imply that your claims were defensible without defending them. That's what I call posturing.

Ahhhh, no no, we've moved past the source issues, I abandoned that a while ago. I can see why you'd still be defensive on the point however, but I'm not completely monolithic.

 

[brainstorm]

Ahhhh, no no, we've moved past the source issues, I abandoned that a while ago. I can see why you'd still be defensive on the point however, but I'm not completely monolithic.

I really didn't bring it up to be defensive or aggressive. It was just the example of posturing that came to mind because that was the context in which it came up last for me. I have no problem or grudge against you. I'm not even sure you share my view of source-citing as posturing, but I would be willing to discuss it further if there was something to be learned by the exchange. Honestly, I've heard people talk a lot about posturing in the past but I never gave much thought to what it was, so there's probably a lot I haven't even thought about yet. Probably a topic for another thread though.

 

[apeiron]

I'm not even sure you share my view of source-citing as posturing, but I would be willing to discuss it further if there was something to be learned by the exchange.

The deep issue here is how to achieve scholarly discussion on the internet. In the early days of the net, it seemed very easy. For a start, no-one under the age of 20 probably had a computer and modem , and the majority on the net were academics or professionals in some form. So they imported their scholarly standards from everyday life.

It really was one of those Woodstock things for about five years.

Then the unscholarly herd arrived and things changed. One response was blogging. Another was wiki. You either set yourself up as an expert voice (which is rather restricting as you have to narrowcast rather than broady discuss) or became part of the wisdom of the crowd (a powerful, but homogenising, device).

Anyway, the internet has become a generic platform and so suffers the pull of the lowest common denominator. To combat that tendency, it seems quite right that anonymous voices on the internet demonstrate their connections back to a framework of wider scholarship. This is a safeguard to counter posturing - though I can see how it could be used as an aid to posturing too.

The test becomes whether the voices demonstrate an understanding of their references. Goggling makes it easy to find references. But the bluff of bluffers can still be called with further questions.

 

[JoeDawg]

Fine, that's a good example of an irrelevant truth. But I hope you realize that people rarely target irrelevant truths for obfuscation.

Are you kidding?

Apart from the fact 'relevant' is highly subjective, there is a whole industry devoted to obfuscation of what most people consider irrelevant truths... its called advertising.

So, how does one determine 'relevant' truth? Because I guarrantee, how a car works is irrelevant to most people... until it stops working, at which point the only relevant fact is how much it will cost to fix it.

 

[Pythagorean]

Science isn't interested in what exists, its interested in what can be consistently observed.

He said scientists, not science. Scientists are definitely interested in reality. What can consistently be observed is an important part of determining aspects of reality. Also, provide for me an example of a credible alternative. Every argument you make will have been rooted in observations. Inconsistent observations won't make your argument any stronger. It seems consistent observations are our strongest evidence.

And everyday reality is quite different from the highly structured reality of math/science.

Definitely for people who don't regularly practice math/science. I'd be careful about speaking for everyone, though. A statement about reality is a statement about perspective, and I can only assume this is your perspective. A perspective I was familiar with prior to being familiar with math/science, but that I've lost touch with now.

When people say they want simple, they mean straight-forward and useful. Pursuing the details, for their own sake, is just autism.

Ad hominem.

And too extreme of a counter-argument. Sometimes miscommunication arises from simplification. Just because a degree of complexity is required to understand a concept doesn't mean that the details are being pursued for their own sake.

 

[brainstorm]

The deep issue here is how to achieve scholarly discussion on the internet. In the early days of the net, it seemed very easy. For a start, no-one under the age of 20 probably had a computer and modem , and the majority on the net were academics or professionals in some form. So they imported their scholarly standards from everyday life.

It really was one of those Woodstock things for about five years.

Then the unscholarly herd arrived and things changed. One response was blogging. Another was wiki. You either set yourself up as an expert voice (which is rather restricting as you have to narrowcast rather than broady discuss) or became part of the wisdom of the crowd (a powerful, but homogenising, device).

Anyway, the internet has become a generic platform and so suffers the pull of the lowest common denominator. To combat that tendency, it seems quite right that anonymous voices on the internet demonstrate their connections back to a framework of wider scholarship. This is a safeguard to counter posturing - though I can see how it could be used as an aid to posturing too.

The test becomes whether the voices demonstrate an understanding of their references. Goggling makes it easy to find references. But the bluff of bluffers can still be called with further questions.

It shouldn't be necessary to establish any identity status in order to engage in discussion. The very fact that you distinguish between two broad categories of internet-users suggests that you are likely to accept some claims as valid just because you perceive them as scholarly, while you will reject other uncritically, just because the tone doesn't "sound" scholarly to you or sources aren't cited, etc. Imo, it should not be that difficult to interact with information in a critically open way such that it is neither necessary to reject it completely or accept it blindly or on the basis of citations or credentials of the writer. You should be able to read content for content, with only whatever context you as a reader are able to apply to engage it with sufficient critical reason.

 

[alt]

Sometimes miscommunication arises from simplification. Just because a degree of complexity is required to understand a concept doesn't mean that the details are being pursued for their own sake.

And othertimes, complexity is the culprit.

The whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday thinking.
Albert Einstein

If you're unable to bring your concepts back to the realm of everyday thinking, you're merely doing bussiness with yourself(ves).

Spelling edit - realm.

 

[ThorX89]

I think if universe were deterministic (and I'm not saying it is or that it is not) it would have no impact on your free will what so ever.
In such a universe, you'd simply arrive at a particular time at a particular place with a particular thought in your head. Now that place might as well be this forum and the thought might as well be the doubt over the existence of your free will. Now you might want to prove you have free will indeed by acting differently than you normally would if this thought didn't cross your mind. But this wanting would simply be the result of the current state of your brain interacting with the new input.
Of course, you might say that that state of your brain might have been different had you shaped it differently by different actions in the past. But such actions would only have been the product of your previous wants, and those were not in your control either, by the same reasoning.
Ergo at the beginning of that chain you'd have deterministic influence again.

So by all accounts, in a deterministic universe, you could say you have a free will, but in fact that will would be determined and what you would have is only free reign over acting on that will.
Nevertheless the illusion that you have free will would be so perfect that you might simply want to act like you do have one.

Simply because acting on your free will makes you feel like you have control. And us people so like to have control. And if it would be an illusion or not, it wouldn't matter.

That's what I think.

 

[brainstorm]

And othertimes, complexity is the culprit.

The whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday thinking.
Albert Einstein

If you're unable to bring your concepts back to the realm of everyday thinking, you're merely doing bussiness with yourself(ves).

Spelling edit - realm.

Why do people so often assume that "everyday thinking" is a homogenous culture? One person's everyday thinking is another person's obfuscation.

 

[alt]

The Santa Claus example was meant to show that anyone could have a true interest in truth despite the inconvenience or social consequences of true knowledge. A truly honest person can reflect on why they want to discover or believe certain things. I knew, for example, when global warming was being debated that I wanted there to be limits on fossil fuel consumption because I think excessive fossil-fuel burning creates a way of life that I dislike. However, because I knew I had an interest in the outcome, I could decide that I was more interested in whether global warming is valid science or not instead of just rallying for the outcome that suited my political interest. Now, how many people who don't want to curb their fuel consumption or pay higher gas tax do you think are open to the possibility that global warming IS a true reality? Probably not many. Political interests affect people's will to know, even many scientists.

OK - I know instances where the global warming aurgument has made enemies of the best of friends. I really don't want to go there, and your point is lost on me anyway.

First you gave me Santa Claus and then you gave me global warming. MAy I refer you to your earlier statement that has piqued my interest;

Only the truest scientists are interested in reality as it actually exists ..

I was wondering if you meant that literally, ie, can you point to one or two that are only the truest scientists, and that are exclusively (as your sentence suggests) interested in reality as it actually exists ?

Or were you generalising ? And if you were, is that at the exclusion of lesser scientists ? Your sentence seems to exclude lesser scientists from any ability or intention to be interested in reality as it actually exists.

Heck ! Where does it leave non scientists ?

With the greatest of respect, I should say I've read your posts here with much interest and admiration, eager to see some development of your ideas about these greatest of truths, and actual realities.

Spelling edit

 

[brainstorm]

I think if universe were deterministic (and I'm not saying it is or that it is not) it would have no impact on your free will what so ever.
In such a universe, you'd simply arrive at a particular time at a particular place with a particular thought in your head. Now that place might as well be this forum and the thought might as well be the doubt over the existence of your free will. Now you might want to prove you have free will indeed by acting differently than you normally would if this thought didn't cross your mind. But this wanting would simply be the result of the current state of your brain interacting with the new input.
Of course, you might say that that state of your brain might have been different had you shaped it differently by different actions in the past. But such actions would only have been the product of your previous wants, and those were not in your control either, by the same reasoning.
Ergo at the beginning of that chain you'd have deterministic influence again.

So by all accounts, in a deterministic universe, you could say you have a free will, but in fact that will would be determined and what you would have is only free reign over acting on that will.
Nevertheless the illusion that you have free will would be so perfect that you might simply want to act like you do have one.

Simply because acting on your free will makes you feel like you have control. And us people so like to have control. And if it would be an illusion or not, it wouldn't matter.

That's what I think.

If free-will was just an illusion that was needed to be sufficiently determined by the universe, then what effect could it possibly have to deny or question it? What would be the purpose of even considering whether it had any real power or not? Are your reflections on free-will simply yet another determined part of your determined life? How do you decide whether to embrace or resist consciousness and active self-determination?

 

[imiyakawa]

If free-will was just an illusion that was needed to be sufficiently determined by the universe, then what effect could it possibly have to deny or question it?

None. If you are questioning it, you were "going to" question it no matter what.

What would be the purpose of even considering whether it had any real power or not?

The human conception of purpose would be a mind model.

Are your reflections on free-will simply yet another determined part of your determined life?

They would be if that person was in a determined universe.

How do you decide whether to embrace or resist consciousness and active self-determination?

You can't resist determinism. Although you can know that for practical purposes only you have free will.

So by all accounts, in a deterministic universe, you could say you have a free will, but in fact that will would be determined...
Nevertheless the illusion that you have free will would be so perfect that you might simply want to act like you do have one.

Correct. FAPP, free will exists. But really, everything you do/think "has" to be that way.

 

[alt]

Why do people so often assume that "everyday thinking" is a homogenous culture? One person's everyday thinking is another person's obfuscation.

Sure. If there's an intent to obfuscate, one can do so at any level. But I think the Einstein quote I referenced earlier, was just what he said in another;

Most of the fundamental ideas of science are essentially simple, and may, as a rule, be expressed in a language comprehensible to everyone.

I am simply saying that you (anyone), if you think you know something, should be able make it known to anyone who is interested in knowing it.

 

[nismaratwork]

Sure. If there's an intent to obfuscate, one can do so at any level. But I think the Einstein quote I referenced earlier, was just what he said in another;

Most of the fundamental ideas of science are essentially simple, and may, as a rule, be expressed in a language comprehensible to everyone.

I am simply saying that you (anyone), if you think you know something, should be able make it known to anyone who is interested in knowing it.

Well, Dirac believed that the rules were simple, but that they were generally incomprehensible to anyone who didn't speak the language of mathematics required to understand the relevant equations. The belief in fundamental simplicity can go hand in hand with nearly impenetrable (at the time) symbols.

 

[alt]

Well, Dirac believed that the rules were simple, but that they were generally incomprehensible to anyone who didn't speak the language of mathematics required to understand the relevant equations. The belief in fundamental simplicity can go hand in hand with nearly impenetrable (at the time) symbols.

(at the time)

And at this time too, surely, for the vast majority of people on this Earth I would suggest, would find the language of mathematics incomprehensible - unless trained thereof for many years.

Does that however, leave everyone other than mathematicians out in the cold, so far as the deeper meanings, higher truths, ultimate realities are concerned ?

Surely not !

 

[ThorX89]

To brainstorm: My reply to that would be approximately the same as what imiyakawa wrote. :-)

 

[brainstorm]

You can't resist determinism. Although you can know that for practical purposes only you have free will.

The only reason I think your perspective here is problematic is that ideologies of social determinism actually have the effect of discouraging people from exercising their free will more than necessary to comply with forces and structures they believe to be deterministic. When structural-determination is deconstructed and replaced with a radically constructive view of social life, people can not only no longer orient toward imagined structures in their actions, they become the responsible agents, i.e. co-authors, of the structures they believe to be determining their actions.

If this was not a powerful re-imaging tool, why would so many people react to it with so much irritation and frustration? Tell almost anyone that they are the authors of their own structural-determination as they perceive it and they will argue insistently that determining forces are real, that they are beyond their control, and that they are relatively powerless to resist them. If these people truly believed their determination was beyond their control, why would they feel so strongly compelled to argue against perspectives that say otherwise?

Correct. FAPP, free will exists. But really, everything you do/think "has" to be that way.

Maybe. And if so, I HAVE to convince as many people as possible to embrace their free-will and reject ideologies of structural-determinism. Since it is something I can't choose not to do, why would anyone argue against me for doing it? Because they have no choice but to do so? But what if they do? And what if I do too?

Sure. If there's an intent to obfuscate, one can do so at any level. But I think the Einstein quote I referenced earlier, was just what he said in another;

Most of the fundamental ideas of science are essentially simple, and may, as a rule, be expressed in a language comprehensible to everyone.

I am simply saying that you (anyone), if you think you know something, should be able make it known to anyone who is interested in knowing it.

I agree completely and I always explain intellectual ideas in comprehensible language. The problem is that the reason many people are arguing against complex language isn't because they can't deal with the complexity. If that was the case, no one would ever accuse me of being overly complex, because there's no encrypted expert language in the way I write. Instead, they criticize anything that doesn't confirm their established worldview. In other words, it's not that they resist complexity - it's that they resist cognitive dissonance and ideological conflicts. The same people will embrace a highly complex and jargon-encrypted version of any idea that resonates with what they want to believe.

Someone criticizing global warming science for political reasons will claim that the language is too complex and that science should be simpler, as you say, and then they will support an equally complex and jargon-filled theory about why global climate is not affected by CO2 emissions. Complaining about intellectual complexity is nothing more than a tactic for attacking views they don't like for whatever reason.

 

[ThorX89]

Maybe. And if so, I HAVE to convince as many people as possible to embrace their free-will and reject ideologies of structural-determinism. Since it is something I can't choose not to do, why would anyone argue against me for doing it? Because they have no choice but to do so? But what if they do? And what if I do too?

You have misunderstood the concept of pseudo-free will in a deterministic universe.
It's about that that you DO have a choice. You DON'T HAVE to convince as many people as possible about anything. You CAN decide what to do on your OWN. But whatever you do, in a deterministic universe, you WERE GOING TO DO IT ANYWAY.

Since you still can do whatever you want, you might as well be in an nondeterministic universe.
You wouldn't be able to tell the difference.
You can still make a difference in the world. But if you do, you were going to do it anyway.

The only reason I think your perspective here is problematic is that ideologies of social determinism actually have the effect of discouraging people from exercising their free will more than necessary to comply with forces and structures they believe to be deterministic.

The perspective is problematic if not fully understood.
If people understood that as far as their everyday life goes, they don't lose their free will in a deterministic universe, they wouldn't be discouraged.
Unfortunately, the concept is not easy to grasp, so it's often the best just to say that for all intents and purposes free will does exist, no matter if the universe is deterministic or not.
It's all just the simple fact that (in a det. universe) "whatever you do, you were going to do it anyway".
And since you can't do anything about this, it's best just not to care and live your life the best way you can. :-)

P.S. It still quite important for you to care about this if you're a physicist.

 

[imiyakawa]

It's about that that you DO have a choice. You DON'T HAVE to convince as many people as possible about anything. You CAN decide what to do on your OWN. But whatever you do, in a deterministic universe, you WERE GOING TO DO IT ANYWAY.

Since you still can do whatever you want, you might as well be in an nondeterministic universe.
You wouldn't be able to tell the difference.
You can still make a difference in the world. But if you do, you were going to do it anyway.

This is correct to an orgasmic extent. This is the distinction that everyone should be making when discussing free will, and one that hasn't been acknowledged yet as far as I can tell. A) For practical purposes & B) From the perspective of physics. Free will from a practical, emergence perspective, exists. It almost certainly cannot exist (the ability to actually choose) from a physicist's perspective unless you posit a "soul", or some biasing mechanism.

In a deterministic universe, you will act and think a certain way at time x and there's nothing that can change that (assuming causal closure, of course). In an inherently probabilistic universe, your future probability distribution of possibilities are determined (a physicist told me this statement was correct, so that isn't crackpottery) - there's no "I" that chooses at the fundamental level. Sorry.

This isn't about deluded atomists trying to deny you your ability to choose. The same consequence applies to random/determined AND determined universes.

But, I emphasize, for practical purposes you can choose. But really, you can't. <<-- This statement can be argued against only if you tweak the definition of the agent that chooses away from what I intended.

 

[brainstorm]

It's about that that you DO have a choice. You DON'T HAVE to convince as many people as possible about anything. You CAN decide what to do on your OWN. But whatever you do, in a deterministic universe, you WERE GOING TO DO IT ANYWAY.

But according you you, whatever I choose, that was to have been my choice. Now the question is what happens to my psyche if I start believing everything that I'm doing will have been determined in whatever choices I make. Does that affect the free exercise of free-will? I think it would. Therefore it is probably best to deny the possibility that free-will is determined, even if it is the truth. If it is the truth, btw, then there is no ethical problem with denying it because truth has no value in a deterministic social world - all information would just be instrumental to moving the plot along, no? Besides, no unplanned truth-discoveries or denials would be possible, therefore denying a discovered truth would be inevitable. Does any of this start to smell like bottomless BS to you after a while?

Since you still can do whatever you want, you might as well be in an nondeterministic universe.
You wouldn't be able to tell the difference.
You can still make a difference in the world. But if you do, you were going to do it anyway.

But how could one make a difference in the world without operating with faith in free-will. Anyone believing their actions to be determined would only be making a difference insofar as they are an instrument of someone else's will (but whose?). So a person has to believe in free will to perceive themselves as making a difference in anything. Otherwise, how could anything that happens be attributed to anyone?

And since you can't do anything about this, it's best just not to care and live your life the best way you can. :-)

So why do you mention it? Because you were determined to do so?

P.S. It still quite important for you to care about this if you're a physicist.

Why physicists and not others?

 

[imiyakawa]

Sorry, I felt compelled to respond.

Does any of this start to smell like bottomless BS to you after a while?

No. However, "inescapable consequence" comes to mind.

But how could one make a difference in the world without operating with faith in free-will.

Me and ThorX have agreed that in this determined universe (and even in a random universe, in my opinion), true agent causation can't exist, but for practical purposes free will exists. None of this automatically precludes moral decision making and the validity of the coherent illusion of free will. (Or the actuality of free will, depending on perspective).

Anyone believing their actions to be determined would only be making a difference insofar as they are an instrument of someone else's will (but whose?).

?

So a person has to believe in free will to perceive themselves as making a difference in anything. Otherwise, how could anything that happens be attributed to anyone?

Free will (for practical purposes) VS. actual agent-causation free will/an introduced bias into the evolution of law in the brain (some kind of self causation stripped of total constraint).

Both are perspectives.

So why do you mention it? Because you were determined to do so?

That depends on how you define "why".

Why physicists and not others?

Not necessarily physicists, but others seem to have a chronically hard time of understanding this ... They know they have agent causation (in the physicist's sense - just ask a guy on the street) - they experience it. If you surveyed the population I wouldn't be surprised at a response of 99.95% in the affirmative of consciousness being self causal in some way. (By the way, self causation is not synonymous with the concept of self perpetuity/self organization).

Also, because it's not a practically useful chain of thought for ordinary people.

 

[apeiron]

You have misunderstood the concept of pseudo-free will in a deterministic universe.

Did I miss the bit where you demonstrated that reality is determined to the extent where brain processes and a wider world of social interactions can all be completely determined in a strict micro-causal fashion? That there is zero error in the propagation of causes and effects all the way upwards in scale? That this determinism survives despite QM intedeterminancy, initial condition issues of chaos modelling, the thermal jostle of noisy brains, etc?

I don't feel convinced that determinism could operate flawlessly all the way from the micro to the macro scale. It seems to conflict with other scientific models. So tell us how you are vaulting this gap?

 

[imiyakawa]

apeiron, what do you think of posit that when speculating on free will through the explanatory prism of physics, even in a truly random (at the quantum level) universe you cannot have agent self-causation. The posit that the probability distributions of a particular brain state at some future time is actually determined. This is not to deny self organization or self perpetuation of complex adaptive systems. This is to deny a third type of causality until it is demonstrated why such a causality should arise. I don't see dynamical interactive hierarchies as affording this special type of causality divorced from either determinism or randomness, either - although of course I appreciate that chaos eventuates naturally in such systems. I can appreciate the structuring of communicative hierarchies as you explain so well, however I cannot begin to picture an escape hatch from either randomness or determinism (without violating the assumption of causal closure). Can you envisage such an escape route that will provide a mechanism(sic?) for agent self-causation?

This is the view that I was attempting to discuss in the other thread, but it got sorely misunderstood (probably a fault in my attempt at exposition, and the confusion between prediction in principle to actual prediction).

Further, I understand the way that "agent self-causation" seems to be designed to beg the question, and is not useful when looking at the free will issue from a practical perspective. Nevertheless, I find this definition and subsequent formulation of the free will problem an entertaining one to discuss.

Did I miss the bit where you demonstrated that reality is determined to the extent where brain processes and a wider world of social interactions can all be completely determined in a strict micro-causal fashion?

Are you saying that IF the universe was a deterministic reality, there is the potential for 'slip ups' as the order of complexity increases? I'm not talking about predictability here. (Also, ThorX specifically said he was assuming determinism, he wasn't saying he thought the universe was determined.) I comprehend your systems view, but I was under the guise that this view agrees that if the universe is in all ways determined then so are the systems, no matter the complexity.
Actually, reading back on your comment it seems you had contention with what you thought was a lack of a disclaimer from ThorX about whether he meant what he was modeling as a hypothetical.

 

[brainstorm]

Free will (for practical purposes) VS. actual agent-causation free will/an introduced bias into the evolution of law in the brain (some kind of self causation stripped of total constraint).

Both are perspectives.

Ok, I'm starting to get that you see everything as beyond your control and all perspectives as equally relative. I used to think this way until I discovered truth-power as yet another relative perspective. What that means is that if you can say all perspectives are equally valid, then you can also have the perspective that one perspective is better than others and argue for it. I think an agential-constructive approach to, at least, human interaction is better than a perspective that says everything humans experience is determined, including their consciousness and sense of free will. Free-will is simply more directly observable than involuntary determination of action combined with parallel experience of free will, which does not actual influence any outcomes.

If you can empirically observe yourself wondering whether to use the word "word" instead of "term" in a particular sentence, and then you freely choose to use the term "term" even though you could have used "word" instead, you have directly empirically observed your free-will at work. Then, to move to a more synthetic/abstract level to theorize that your experience of free-will was actually an illusion obscuring a more fundamental but unobserved deterministic cause of your choice makes little sense inductively. Why would you hypothesize something that blatantly contradicts your direct observations?

Now, if you would argue that it is useful to theorize how free-will would fit into a deterministic model of human consciousness and behavior, I think you've succeeded. But I think you've also proved that it's not really possible to test whether free-will or determination is ultimately true beyond inductive empiricism. Can you think of some deductive test that could PROVE that free-will is actually determined and has no real influence on any outcome? I don't think you can, so all you're really doing is theorizing to suit some political or other preference you have for believing determinism over agency.

Also, because it's not a practically useful chain of thought for ordinary people.

For what people in which extraordinary context is it then useful and why/how?

 

[apeiron]

Actually, reading back on your comment it seems you had contention with what you thought was a lack of a disclaimer from ThorX about whether he meant what he was modeling as a hypothetical.

I am pointing out that the "if" part of "if reality is absolutely deterministic" needs justification. The argument itself may go through, but the underpinning axioms are not believable.

And it is not as though better stories are not already available. As I have said often enough, if everyone would just talk about the existence of intelligent choice rather than this strawman of freewill, then there is not much of any real import to argue about (Oh, I see the problem ).

Instead, an 18th century debate between Newtonian science and Catholic theology just runs around in its little circles endlessly.

 

[imiyakawa]

I think an agential-constructive approach to, at least, human interaction is better than a perspective that says everything humans experience is determined, including their consciousness and sense of free will.

I agree that this is a "better" position to have, is correct for all practical purposes, and has more potential for a dialogue with an actual outcome rather than providing a set of premises that begs the question.

Then, to move to a more synthetic/abstract level to theorize that your experience of free-will was actually an illusion obscuring a more fundamental but unobserved deterministic cause of your choice makes little sense inductively.

But it does make sense from an inductive and abductive point of view.. even verging on the deductive. You may not see any practical consequences as a result of that specific definition, but there is no blunder being made in reasoning towards it.

Just view it as any other complex system. The first axiom you assume is what? Physical law guides the evolution of this system. That is the base. The brain is no exception until those stating such an axiom is not possible lay out their mechanism for a third type of causality, dislocated from randomness and determinism, yet at the same time layered on top of randomness and determinism.

Why would you hypothesize something that blatantly contradicts your direct observations?

It doesn't contradict the feeling of choice, though. One can easily envisage how this feeling comes about despite completely lawful (random or determined) relations governing the brain.

Can you think of some deductive test that could PROVE that free-will is actually determined and has no real influence on any outcome?

I probably couldn't imagine such a test*. This is no reason not to suppose anything other than laws, random or determined, strictly guiding the evolution of the brain. It is this lack of reason that precludes the need for such a test. The claim of self-evidence of the ability to choose is no argument whatsoever. One can easily see how such an illusion would arise from the way the brain is constructed.

*Well, there is an fMRI experiment I remember seeing on TV. Two remotes in either hand, instructed: "press one randomly". Neuroscientist interviewed purported that you could predict the decision up to 6 seconds prior to the button press (and hence prior to conscious awareness). This has interesting implications for viewpoints that entertain a cartesian theatre setup (global workspace theory, Ramachandran's views, also some interesting implications for theories centered around particular functional organization types and strong emergence), and it may fit the criteria of this test you're after (although it wouldn't prove anything conclusively, of course!).

For what people in which extraordinary context is it then useful and why/how?

I stated the opposite - that it wasn't useful. I enjoy thinking about it, but that's just me.

 

[imiyakawa]

I am pointing out that the "if" part of "if reality is absolutely deterministic" needs justification. The argument itself may go through, but the underpinning axioms are not believable.

Yes, I agree.

And it is not as though better stories are not already available. As I have said often enough, if everyone would just talk about the existence of intelligent choice rather than this strawman of freewill.

I agree with everything you say here. The definition I'm bringing up is certainly a straw man, and the conclusion is buried in the premises which makes it horrendously circular. However, I see it to be a very interesting discussion and one that captures my imagination (which is why I keep bringing it up, much to your dismay!). Although, you're correct in that there is nothing to argue about and so I agree that this thread should take a detour.

 

[jgm340]

I feel a bit guilty for not reading this thread in its entirety, but it is getting a bit late, so you'll have to forgive me for inconsiderately throwing in my two cents without knowing fully whether my ideas have been considered already.

Idea 1, "Necessity of Structure to Determinism":

Suppose for a moment that the universe is entirely determined from a set of "initial conditions". Suppose also that you have no free will (in a moment we are going to try to contradict this claim). Now, imagine what it would look like to see the universe played out from start to end: a sculpture in four dimensions, with your life being a stroke of color in the middle of it all.

Because of causality, we know that the structure of this sculpture would have very specific qualities. Any slice in time could be reconstructed entirely by some slice before (or after) it. To capture the entire universe, it would suffice to take only a single, 3d slice of the sculpture, along with the rules to go from one slice to the next (or previous). Now, while each slice is determined by every other, we must accept that some slice S₀ is non-determined (since we are talking about the entire universe here!). Since we assume causality to be symmetric^[1] in time, there is no privileged point in time that you can say: "THIS, not any other slice, is the non-determined slice".

This means we may as well set S₀ to be the present time. Thus, you, as you are right now, and your choices (which depend on who you are at this moment) are non-determined. Hooray, free will!

Idea 2, "Distributed Causation":

If two pool balls strike a third at exactly the same time, at exactly the same speed, which of the first two is responsible for the subsequent motion of the third ball? Wouldn't you say they were equally responsible? What if they had been traveling at different speeds? What if one ball had hit before the other?

It's not so cut and dry that "one things leads to another". A large part of the idea of determinism is that we ought to attribute the determination of an event to the earliest set of past events (a.k.a. causes) which affected said event. This is a very strange way to do it, though! This means that immediate causes are said to be LESS of a determinant of an event than distant causes. In most peoples' experience, your "choice" to pick up a phone seems to have a lot more to do with the fact that it is ringing than it does with a sperm and an egg uniting many years ago. Indeed, if we think of "causation density", the phone ringing certainly carries most of the weight in causing you to pick it up. It has, after all, only one inevitable outcome. The more distant causes, such as you being born, deciding to go around that corner one day, etc. are all well and good, but there are seemingly an infinite number of them! Each distant cause on its own has a 0.00000000% chance of causing you to pick up the phone at some pre-prescribed time (even though combined, it works out to be a sure thing).

So, when talking about a determination of an event, perhaps it is better to imagine it to be a process which takes place over time, getting more and more focused the closer we are to the event. We can define the determination of an event by forming a tree of causation: start with the event of concern at the base of the tree, then draw branches to each primary cause, then to each secondary cause of each primary cause, etc. Note that the n-th causes could happen at different times. (For example, a man could have set up a detour on the sidewalk 10 days prior, while another man could have accidentally dropped a banana peel only yesterday. Both would be primary causes of a hilarious incident.) If we allow equal weight to each cause (distant or close), then we get a much better picture of what caused an event, without any bias for or against more immediate causes.

In most instances, we get exactly what we expect: the past has FAR more weight than present in determining the future. If we ask: "Why did the moon pass between the Earth and the Sun just now?" we can say, without a doubt, that the recent happenings in the past 100 years hold no weight against the billions of years of happenings before that. So, all I have done is ever-so-slightly weaken determinism, be allowing weight to be distributed across time, instead of limiting all the determination to some initial frame.

But that's all I need! See the thing is, most events are transitory. Most events are caused by seemingly unrelated events, and cause seemingly unrelated events. One rock might hit another in space, but chances are it'll never see that same rock again. Life, however, is different. Almost any event that happens in a life form is due to events that ALSO HAPPENED IN THE LIFE FORM. In other words, the longer a living thing is alive, the more it has determined itself.

And, this fits in nicely with most normal people's views already. As a baby, you haven't been around long enough (as a self-contained causation machine) to have any weight against all the external factors which contributed to you being there. However, by the time you are 20 years old, events happening inside your own body become the primary contributors to your behavior. Again, Hooray, free will!


^[1] By "causality symmetric in time", I mean that a future state can be used to completely reconstruct a past state (in addition to the other way around). My argument does not depend on this. If a past state cannot be completely reconstructed, then we simply restrict the universe to anyone of the possible past states.

 

[brainstorm]

I agree that this is a "better" position to have, is correct for all practical purposes, and has more potential for a dialogue with an actual outcome rather than providing a set of premises that begs the question.

This is spineless pseudodeference, as far as I can tell. If you actually believed it was a better position to have, you would take it. Still, you don't but you avoid confronting the ideological conflict. You're trying to establish a theoretical means of having cake and eating it too because you're desperately afraid that having to choose will mean losing in some way. That's my impression, anyway. It's hard to tell because you're also somewhat vague in terms of your logic and purpose.

But it does make sense from an inductive and abductive point of view.. even verging on the deductive. You may not see any practical consequences as a result of that specific definition, but there is no blunder being made in reasoning towards it.

The blunder lies in blindly transposing the logic of deterministic physicalities to the operation of subjectivity. You have no basis for doing so except default, with the assumption that the physical is a norm to which anything else must conform.

Just view it as any other complex system. The first axiom you assume is what? Physical law guides the evolution of this system. That is the base. The brain is no exception until those stating such an axiom is not possible lay out their mechanism for a third type of causality, dislocated from randomness and determinism, yet at the same time layered on top of randomness and determinism.

Why is it difficult for you to imagine that free-will could emerge from determinism or vice versa? You're trying to proceed from abstract logical assumptions while ignoring the empiricism of observation. Why would you assume subjectivity would behave "as any other complex system" just because it's complex? Climate and microchips are both complex systems but do they behave the same? Sure, there might be commonalities to be found and generalities to be extrapolated, but you can't take something inherent in one and apply it to the other in contrast to empirical observation. E.g. you wouldn't say that because climate is a complex system the same as a microchip and they both transmit electricity, that rebooting the system is a way to cure climate freezing up. You also wouldn't assume that some form of logic circuitry within clouds causes them to initiate rain. Instead, you would look at the specific phenomena empirically and extrapolate hypotheses about how it functions that explain how it works without completely undermining the observed facts. So, like I said before, if you have some reason or proof why empirically apparent free-will would have no effect on events, explain, and otherwise you have to provide some basis for explaining away the empirical observation that when you are confronted with options, you are free to choose anyone of them. This can even be contrasted with situations in which your choice is relatively more weighted by contingent factors. There's simply no reasonable empirical basis for thinking that free-choice and all the strategies for influencing it are a cover-up for an inherently determined human reality.

It doesn't contradict the feeling of choice, though. One can easily envisage how this feeling comes about despite completely lawful (random or determined) relations governing the brain.

Next you'll be saying that the absence of light doesn't preclude the feeling that you can see things when the sun is out.

I probably couldn't imagine such a test*. This is no reason not to suppose anything other than laws, random or determined, strictly guiding the evolution of the brain. It is this lack of reason that precludes the need for such a test. The claim of self-evidence of the ability to choose is no argument whatsoever. One can easily see how such an illusion would arise from the way the brain is constructed.

I can't imagine a test that could prove that lightning isn't caused by an command-control algorithm programmed into clouds through patterns in their ionization, but is that any reason to assume that they don't have self-programming emergent operating systems that determine how big they grow before beginning condensation?

*Well, there is an fMRI experiment I remember seeing on TV. Two remotes in either hand, instructed: "press one randomly". Neuroscientist interviewed purported that you could predict the decision up to 6 seconds prior to the button press (and hence prior to conscious awareness). This has interesting implications for viewpoints that entertain a cartesian theatre setup (global workspace theory, Ramachandran's views, also some interesting implications for theories centered around particular functional organization types and strong emergence), and it may fit the criteria of this test you're after (although it wouldn't prove anything conclusively, of course!).

This is an interesting experiment. Could the six seconds have been the time between decision was made and when it was finally executed?

I stated the opposite - that it wasn't useful. I enjoy thinking about it, but that's just me.

Don't be so apologist. If you have good reason to ground your belief, you should be able to pursue it to reasonability. Yes, you will encounter stubborn people who refuse to entertain any claims or argumentation that risk contradicting their pet beliefs. And, certainly, there are good ethical reasons to avert deterministic ideology, considering that it can lead to compulsive fascist behavior in compliant humans. Nevertheless, science trumps peace-politics, imo, because politics always has the means to make choices to promote peace even when the science demonstrates the opposite to be the default. Better to have truth and the choice of peace than to have the will to peace manipulating the truth into benevolent lies. That's my opinion anyway, but maybe I just made it up to promote peace:)

 

[imiyakawa]

You are incorrect. We can conclude that a materialistic consciousness does not create/introduce/take advantage of a third type of undiscovered causality until you demonstrate how such a causality can arise on top of determined &/or random processes.

This is spineless pseudodeference

Wow you're incredible.
So if I agree on a point with the person I am in discussion with, I am committing "spineless pseudo deference"?

Please provide me with the logical pathway from mutual agreement --> spineless pseudo deference!

If you actually believed it was a better position to have, you would take it.

Better doesn't necessarily mean more correct. I was talking strictly from a utility perspective. If you define better as more correct, then I don't think that is better, and I take the opposite position to you.

Still, you don't but you avoid confronting the ideological conflict.

Please introduce me to the physicist that thinks there's a third type of causality without the existence of a soul.

You're trying to establish a theoretical means of having cake and eating it too because you're desperately afraid that having to choose will mean losing in some way.

Baseless speculation.
Are you me? Then you cannot state my intentions.

The blunder lies in blindly transposing the logic of deterministic physicalities to the operation of subjectivity. You have no basis for doing so except default, with the assumption that the physical is a norm to which anything else must conform.

I'm pretty sure I stated the assumption of causal closure (i.e. no soul, etc).

OF COURSE under this framework the subjective is strapped to determinism, IF the universe is deterministic. And if the universe is random, then the subjective is strapped to both randomness and determinism!

Please demonstrate your new type of causality and calling me desperate! (Oh, and after you've done this, claim all your prizes for revolutionizing physics.)

Why is it difficult for you to imagine that free-will could emerge from determinism or vice versa? You're trying to proceed from abstract logical assumptions while ignoring the empiricism of observation.

Oh my... Please demonstrate your third type of causality.

The illusion is easy to imagine, and is no problem under materialism unless you demonstrate exactly why it is a problem.

Why would you assume subjectivity would behave "as any other complex system" just because it's complex?

Please demonstrate your third type of causality that is caused by random/determined processes but is not random or determined.

Instead, you would look at the specific phenomena empirically and extrapolate hypotheses about how it functions that explain how it works without completely undermining the observed facts.

You believe your ability for self-causation is "observed fact". I'm sorry, unless you can provide a coherent framework for a new type of causality, this is a ridiculous position to have. As I've said, depending on perspective, free will either exists or it doesn't. From the physicist's perspective, I'm still waiting for you to provide me with one reason as to why it does.

So, like I said before, if you have some reason or proof why empirically apparent free-will would have no effect on events,

Do you know the definition of free will that I was talking about?

I can't imagine a test that could prove that lightning isn't caused by an command-control algorithm programmed into clouds through patterns in their ionization, but is that any reason to assume that they don't have self-programming emergent operating systems that determine how big they grow before beginning condensation?

Self-programmed algorithms/systems (let's just say self organization and perpetuation) is not a port for self-causation. Do you know what precedes that self-programming? Complete determinism or randomness. That creates that self-program. Not only that, but you have to identify the new type of causality that exists for this self program. You still have to demonstrate how that self-program defeats either randomness or determinism.

Could the six seconds have been the time between decision was made and when it was finally executed?

It could have been it was only a 5 minute segment on the TV.
---
apeiron, you were incorrect in your last post, people DO argue for pure agent self-causation that supersedes randomness and determinism!

 

[Evo]

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