Is There a Clear Explanation for A-Consciousness?

[RAD4921]

The universe is self aware because WE are self aware. If anyone argues this then I would then question as to how self ware THEY are.

 

[quantumdude]

I'd like to point out that this does not meet the quality standards for our Philosophy section. Please see the Guidelines and try to flesh out your argument.

Thank you,

 

[Drayakir]

I think what he is trying to say is that the Universe is self-aware because some components of the Universe are self-aware. True. Though I think the Universe is far too large in order to be self-aware, or be capable of any type of thought. At most it could be like an organism reacting to stimuli; and that is debatable as well. The Brothers Strugatsky have mentioned something like this in their book about the World Homeostasis, where the Universe would retaliate against things/ideas/people that might bring about the end of the world by tampering with laws of nature (i.e. changing them instead of accepting them).

 

[quantumdude]

I think what he is trying to say is that the Universe is self-aware because some components of the Universe are self-aware.

Your guess is as good as mine. But if that is what he meant, then it can only lead to one of 2 dead ends.

First, he could argue the position that since physical objects and processes give rise to beings that are "self aware", that means that the universe must have been self aware to begin with. But this is just an argument from the fallacy of composition.

Second, he could simply define a composite structure as "self aware" as long as some part of it is self aware, in which case there's no room for discussion.

 

[Kerrie]

RAD, instead of making these claims, why don't you state why you believe this to be true, and please provide some solid arguments.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

I still think the point is missed. We are of the universe and we are self aware, so the universe is self aware. Not the entire universe, and not necessarily in any sense beyond our awareness, but at the least it is aware "as" us. This does not imply that the universe was self aware before we came to be.

 

[quantumdude]

it is aware "as" us.

That would be the second of the two possibilities I mentioned. It still leaves me wondering: How does one establish such a notion, apart from simply defining it to be the case?

 

[Ivan Seeking]

How can we be considered separate from the universe?

We are star stuff and all of that...

 

[loseyourname]

That would be the second of the two possibilities I mentioned. It still leaves me wondering: How does one establish such a notion, apart from simply defining it to be the case?

I don't see how it does. You can say part of the universe is self-aware, but it is fallacious to assign an attribute to an entity simply because some of its constituent parts possesses that attribute. The form of the argument: X is p. X is a part of Y. Therefore, Y is p. Clearly this is not valid, as demonstrated by the ridiculous analogy: Sperm are single-celled flagellated organisms. Sperm are a part of human males. Therefore, human males are single-celled flagellated organisms.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

I guess the only objection is that the statement did not require that the universe was conscious before we came to be. It is not proof of eternal consciousness, but at least as long as we exist it does.

 

[loseyourname]

How can we be considered separate from the universe?

We are star stuff and all of that...

If self-awareness is an attribute of star stuff, then Moses conclusion would be true. If, however, self-awareness is an emergent property of star-stuff that only exists when star-stuff is organized into human brains, then his conclusion is not true. I've seen decent arguments for panexperientialism, but panpsychism is another story entirely. For one thing, what kind of a "self" would star stuff be aware of?

 

[Ivan Seeking]

...sounds anthropocentric to me. We are just complicated star stuff.

 

[quantumdude]

I don't see how it does. You can say part of the universe is self-aware, but it is fallacious to assign an attribute to an entity simply because some of its constituent parts possesses that attribute.

Bingo. That's precisely the fallacy of composition, which I mentioned earlier in this thread. The only other way I can think of to say that "the universe is self aware" is to define self-awareness to be an attribute possessed by a whole if it is possessed by one of its parts. But in that case, you trade in a logical fallacy for an empty tautology.

How can we be considered separate from the universe?

We can't. That's why the definition of self awareness I stated above works. The problem is that it only works in a way that is trivially true.

 

[Moses]

Mmmm...even it will sound odd, i will say it:

First, i agree with loseyourname about his statement about, i have another example to strenghten the arguement: Four balls, three yellow and one black, if one is black, never means the other three yellows are black! We are the balck ball, and the universe is the four balls in this example...

I do think that the universe is sel-awarse, stopens, trees, all of the atoms and waves, since they "apply" some laws. I do believe in a Universe-Master, by logic of course, if he created the universe and "programmed" the laws there, so his creatures should be aware of these laws in order to apply, from chemical to biological to physical laws, from trees to stones to stars. We are, the human being, in a very high level of awareness, this is why may be The Universe Master may send a religion to us...[actually i do believe He sent one already, which it is not out topic here...]

 

[Canute]

I suppose then we are committing a fallacy to say that human beings are self-aware. After all, our toes aren't conscious. Instead we must say that human brains are self-aware. But then, we don't know if consciousness emerges from brains, so to be accurate we must say that some part of the universe is self-aware, but we don't yet know which part.

 

[quantumdude]

I suppose then we are committing a fallacy to say that human beings are self-aware. After all, our toes aren't conscious.

Well that's true, but there's a difference. My toes aren't conscious, but I am conscious of my toes. That is, I receive what you philosophers call "qualia" through them (right now I can feel my shoes pressing against them). Surely then we can attach a meaningful difference between my toes and a cloud of interstellar dust, no?

 

[Bartholomew]

Why would you assume your toes are not conscious? I assume my toes are conscious.

 

[RAD4921]

Guidelines

I'd like to point out that this does not meet the quality standards for our Philosophy section. Please see the Guidelines and try to flesh out your argument.

Thank you,

I will go over the guidelines as you suggested. I hope I didn't breach any type of forum etiquette. I do apologize.
I didn’t mean to make it sound like “put up your dukes and let's go at it”
It is VERY interesting to see the path this thread is starting to take. It makes me see the different facets of how people perceive this statement and opens up my mind to other possibilities.

 

[Kerrie]

thank you for clarifying your stand RAD4921...this forum has had it's share of crackpots, thus our reason for making guidelines...sometimes the context or tone isn't conveyed accurately through our posts too.

 

[RAD4921]

I agree

Why would you assume your toes are not conscious? I assume my toes are conscious.

How do we know what is conscious and what isn't? How do we know what is self aware and what isn't? How do I know if an atom in the belly of a star is aware of itself? It may sound absurd to some but it is certainly a possible. Of course all of this is making assumptions. I see what Tom and Loseyour name are saying. Maybe the "self awareness" I am speaking of is not as self aware as I thought. Maybe there is greater self awareness or what the self wareness I speak of is an illusion of some type and the universe is not self aware at all. I don't think going to a dictionary and looking up "self awareness" is going to solve these questions I have.

 

[RAD4921]

Editting

thank you for clarifying your stand RAD4921...this forum has had it's share of crackpots, thus our reason for making guidelines...sometimes the context or tone isn't conveyed accurately through our posts too.

Is there a way I can omit the last sentence of my initial thread posting so that it does not sound so offenseive? I didn't realize how confrontation it sounds. Thanks
Robert

 

[hypnagogue]

It's dangerous to equate "self-awareness" with "consciousness." It's difficult to capture exactly what we mean by self-awareness, but minimially, our concept of self-awareness will probably include some sort of functional or informational concepts-- e.g., if a system is self-aware, it will have access to information about itself via some causal/functional mechanism. Thus, self-awareness seems to be primarily an objective phenomena evaluable by 3rd person investigation.

"Consciousness" is a 'mongrel' concept that has come to mean many things, including self-awareness. But the really unique, interesting, and problematic aspect of consciousness is what is varyingly called qualia, subjective experience, phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness), raw feels, etc. These terms all refer to the visceral, experiential aspect of consciousness; the emotional feeling of sadness, the redness of red, the smell of fresh pancakes, etc. P-consciousness presents significant epistemological problems, because for instance I have access to my own qualia but not to those of others; I cannot jump into another person's head and experience what he experiences. Thus, P-consciousness seems to be primarily a subjective phenomenon evaluable only by 1st person investigation.

Depending on which of these terms we're working with, our arguments will take different courses. For instance, I can say with confidence that my toes are not self-aware; to do this, I just need to observe their physical structure and ascertain that there are no higher level, self-referential information structures present there. However, the question of whether my toes have subjective experience is a much trickier one, and no matter my route of reasoning I must have less confidence on my conclusion, due to the problems of epistemological access for qualia (roughly the problem of other minds).

 

[loseyourname]

I suppose then we are committing a fallacy to say that human beings are self-aware. After all, our toes aren't conscious. Instead we must say that human brains are self-aware. But then, we don't know if consciousness emerges from brains, so to be accurate we must say that some part of the universe is self-aware, but we don't yet know which part.

This depends on two things. First, there is the possibility of non-conscious panexperientialism that could include every irreducible component of the human body. When I say non-conscious, I mean simply that this form of experience would not be the form of experience involving active computational processes that are commonly associated with human consciousness. In this way, our toes may very well be capable of some form of visceral experience unrecognizable to the human imagination, but this would not rise to the computational level of the human mind.

In addition, we have the question of exactly what constitutes a "self" to be aware of? In the case of the human mind, it seems to be the fact that the mind can see itself as the continuing subject of coherent experience, a phenomenon contingent on both memory and the ability to project oneself into the future. On this level, a toe cannot be considered self-aware, being unable to conceive of its existence as the existence of a "self," simply because it does not possesses the computational capacity to conceive, period.

To address your question of whether or not it is fallacious to call a human being self-aware, we must first consider what it meant by "human being." Do we mean simply "the human body." In that case, it would be fallacious, because under the restrictions established above, the body cannot conceive of itself as a continuing subject of experience. The mind may be able to conceive of the body as a continuing subject of experience (although this experience would likely not be the same kind of qualitative experience engaged in by the mind), but the mind is not the body. Even equating mind with brain and thus saying "the brain is self-aware" might be fallacious in this respect, because there are plenty of components in the brain that do not perform any computational function that can be considered "conceiving of itself as a continuing subject of experience." It is suggested, and I would say likely true, that there are components in the brain that are capable of conceiving of such a self, and it is strictly these components (that either partially make up or entirely constitute the "mind") that can be called self-aware under the above restrictions.

So the question of fallacy becomes a question of whether by "human being" we mean "human body" or we simply mean that part of the human body - also a part of the human brain - that is capable of conceiving of itself as a continuing subject of experience. It also becomes a question of whether we will allow the entire body to be considered self-aware, given that the conceptually capable part of it conceives of the entire body as a continuing subject of experience. If we answer the second question in the affirmative, then we have some pretty interesting implications pertaining to the self-awareness of larger entities of which the bodies themselves are a part (in principle, up to and including the entire universe), and for that reason, I am inclined to answer the second question in the negative.

 

[3mpathy]

can we say that? that there is a self aware part of the universe, but we don't know where is it? that sounds odd to me.

 

[loseyourname]

can we say that? that there is a self aware part of the universe, but we don't know where is it? that sounds odd to me.

I wouldn't say that. I would say that there is at least one self-aware element to the universe, and it resides in my brain. There are likely approximately 6 billion other self-aware parts of the universe, and they reside in the brains of every other living human being. There exists the possibility that there are other self-aware parts as well, but as of now, I have no evidence to suggest the realization of this possibility.

 

[3mpathy]

"Wait! I might be confused? Errr...maybe I'm not..."

wow, lol quick responce. took like 30 seconds. i was about to edit my post and say apologize becuz i was trying to post on the first page(didnt see the #2) and therefore i didnt read anything on this page before i posted. sry for saying anything stupid that has already been asked above.



im a little bit confused by your post.are u saying that u think that you are selfaware and u can't prove it, or that all 6million ppl are self-aware and u can't prove it? or are u saying that there might be other self aware parts of this universe and u can't prove it? what can't u prove?

 

[loseyourname]

I cannot prove my own self-awareness if by "prove" you mean prove it to you or to someone else. But I can be certain of my own self-awareness, even if I cannot make anyone else certain of it. By extension, I cannot prove that anyone else is self-aware, but all of the relevant evidence suggests that they are, all 6 billion of them, and I have no reason to suspect otherwise. By "there exists the possibility that there are other self-aware parts as well," I meant that there might be non-human life forms, either on this planet, or elsewhere in the universe, that are self-aware, but I cannot at this time point to much evidence either in favor of or against this possibility.

 

[3mpathy]

ok thank you for clarifying.i was thinking that you were trying to say that the other self-aware things were ghost or God or something of that nature. I understand it now.

btw cool quote thingie. could you say that the variations of wave pressure are the symphony but just not really understandable to humans? so it would make sense...just not to humans :P

 

[TENYEARS]

What would any of you consider proof that conciousness is a quality not of the brain. For example thing I can and have done is left my body with my dream body and physically connected with others. What proof would one consider that this occured. For example I once entered the dream of another and the individual was extremely frightened. The next day in a round about way I asked the individual how they slept. They said they had a horrible dream and was very shaken. The individual percienved my presence but did not know it was me. When I witnessed them they saw me in a state of absolute horror. I never before asked this individual how they slept and this individual has never relayed any type of horrible dream. The mind creates an overlay on this greater reality but is partly aware. This happens all the time. And listening to some of these posts it apparently happens during the day for many. LoL

Note: I have never met a cetain actress and yet I was drawn into a dream of hers one night and instructed her certain things. If you were to consult this individual you would find that on January 3rd of 2003 she had a particular dream which I could describe and she would remember. LoL You may not believe but it is true. I do not do this by will usually, it seems to come for the most by the need of the individual and is very infrequent unless I am doing experienmentation like I was over 16 years ago. I could do it with continaual effort which took 1.5 years to achieve. This may push some of you over the edge and into experience. I remember the day I was able to do it for the first time. It was caused by my reading something where it hit me in a way that I recognized that it was indeed possible. Some will question your mind makes it possible. Maybe, maybe the mind connects with other minds via the fact that they are already connected but there is no external body outside this one. Maybe again and maybe not. Time will tell but I have also witnessed the dead. Good night.

 

[Kerrie]

TENYEARS, please explain what your above post has to do with the topic? I am really trying to hold back on the delete button...

 

[Bartholomew]

Self-awareness is so commonly confused with consciousness that it is a pet peeve of mine.

The way you determine whether something is conscious or not is you determine a general principle that seems to lie behind your own consciousness, and generalize. Many people have not gotten past the "humanlike thought" stage of this process. I have advanced so far that I can recognize my toes as the thinking, feeling persons that they really are.

(I'm kidding... a little...)

 

[loseyourname]

The way you determine whether something is conscious or not is you determine a general principle that seems to lie behind your own consciousness, and generalize. Many people have not gotten past the "humanlike thought" stage of this process. I have advanced so far that I can recognize my toes as the thinking, feeling persons that they really are.

(I'm kidding... a little...)

You're going to have to state this a little clearer, because, given my understanding of the relevant terminology, it is impossible to generalize from a generalization unless you hop categories. The best I can tell, what you're doing is taking the general principle (consciousness is defined by x) and then applying it to specific instances; i.e. my toes have x, therefore they are conscious.

It also isn't clear what you mean by "general principle" that seems to lie behind your own consciousness. For one thing, what seems to lie behind our own consciousness might only be that, what seems and not what is. Second, not everyone will accept that consciousness is a divisable entity that can be reduced to a lowest common denominator. They will say that consciousness only occurs when x, y, and z are present, rather than when only x is present; that, in fact, the existence of consciousness is dependent on many interwoven entities that are not themselves consciousness. What steps do you take to counter their arguments?

 

[TENYEARS]

Kerrie, I will describe this only because I know you are intersted in the subject matter so I will give you the only logical deduction one can make if any connection with another human is a possibility. The brain and the more subtle functions which are yet to be acknowlged by science but do indeed exist. The question is is this connection a recpetion and translation of waves from another human being and translatable or does the human being exist also in a more subltle energy form which which also maintains conciousness outside of the "physical"(lol) body one more option which is a conbination of the two would be the energy field of a human extends beyond themselves for some distance. It may be that this big body is capable of interacting with others while still part of the physical.

If the second option is true then it still does not admit to the existence of a signle conciousness but extends the realm of human conciousness. That is indeed a begining. There is the possibility that the perceived option 2 is created by option one and is not real with the exception of the communication itself. BUT, if the human brain is capable of 1 then one would have to also admit the possiblity of the human system to not only interpret the wave funtion of brain energy but of possible physical objects and other living things which could in effect create a similated relm of experience which is actually based on the manifestation of the original. All just thoughts my experience leads me toward a particular end but I will present the possibilities.

If the energy state of the human exists is there another level which is finer than that? Pure thought without energy? I know for a fact that humans are more that they percieve. Would it not be an awsome venture to prove to the world that yes virgina there is a Santa Claus. How incredible would that experience be to the world to know there is more!

If one is lost one must start small and solidly and build a foundation of proof. This is a good place to start in terms of conciousness. The big picture would be like god and relativity because they are one and the same. That is unfortuante and fortunate. Fortunate because it is real unfortunate because most humans would not understand it but would acknowlge it. Humans need to connect in experience and that is the only way to truth, to connect with the environment. In that the expansion of conciousness begins.

 

[Kerrie]

TENYEARS, i was trying to give you a chance to shine, but i think you are tarnishing your reputation even more.

 

[TENYEARS]

Kerrie, what is to tarnish? I have seen and accomplished the things I say. If you hypothetically believed the things I said I have accomplished and done would you think such an individual would worry of what others thought of their words. It would seem that such an individual would be concerned with understanding and potentially help others if the moment and time presented itself in need. I came to this forum to figure out what to do with the very experiences you all so intensely debate.

In one vision I had of a terrible disaster of which I was part, one so many facets of the vision were so beyond statistical probability and all occurring within a 24 hour period. All were spoken before hand bla bla bla. The important point of this is logically if one extended themselves in the are of precogniction one could say humans have inate processes which all indepth pattern matching which is a projection of potential possibilites. The problem is if one were to know the events of the vision which were the "keys" one would recognize this would be far beyond pattern matching and only be attributed to the ability of the mind to completely connect to the singularity which is all of infinity. A logical person cannot let precognition be a reality unless this is the case or else it becomes illogical. I have been a witness to this one, but that is my experience and may or may not be redily provable. What can be done is prove the events of the vision and I can prove that scientifically to some degree with an idea that has not been done before.

 

[Bartholomew]

Loseyourname:
Consciousness is defined, in the strict sense of "defined," intuitively, and this definition is not available by default to the human mind. This is the "p-consciousness" that somebody was talking about earlier (Edit: it was Hypnagogue) and it is not questionable or debatable. If someone claims reasoning power is necessary for consciousness, they must support this; they can't define consciousness that way, because consciousness--meaning "p-consciousness" (which is a new term I like and I think I'll use in the future)--is already unquestionably defined.

The "generalization" is not an actual definition--it's an explanation. What is the general principle that unites perceiving the blueness of blue and the feeling of the texture of sand? And as with any explanation of the real world--especially since it can deal with only a single stream of experiences, varied though they might be--it is not going to be absolutely certain. But there are degrees of intuition that you can use with respect to consciousness explanations which you can't use for most other things; consciousness is so fundamentally different from everything else that any complicated explanation for it that involves specifying a lot of conditions is not going to ring true. Like, if you say thought is necessary, thought is just a mostly arbitrary set of neuronal patterns, which is just an arrangement of particles in such and such a way. Why should that particular arrangement produce anything as fundamentally removed from everything else as consciousness seems to be? It does not make sense. The true explanation must be relatively simple and... intuitive.

So in summary, the phenomenon of consciousness already exists and is not redefinable; it is not a math concept or a theory in physics. It can only be explained, and there are two tools to do this: examining the properties of your unquestionable p-consciousness, and using intuition to weed out bad explanations to a greater degree than is usual.

By the way, you have a cute picture, if that's you.

 

[loseyourname]

Consciousness is defined, in the strict sense of "defined," intuitively, and this definition is not available by default to the human mind. This is the "p-consciousness" that somebody was talking about earlier (Edit: it was Hypnagogue) and it is not questionable or debatable. If someone claims reasoning power is necessary for consciousness, they must support this; they can't define consciousness that way, because consciousness--meaning "p-consciousness" (which is a new term I like and I think I'll use in the future)--is already unquestionably defined.

As I said, there are people that will tell you that phenomenal experience is all there is to consciousness. I'm not so quick to agree just by considering the historical usage of the word. Especially if you look at the usage of the word "consciousness" in psychology texts as well as anthropological texts, we can see there is more to it, something that is unique to a brain organized, both by genetics and by memetics, the way the human brain is organized, something above and beyond the bare experiential character.

What is the general principle that unites perceiving the blueness of blue and the feeling of the texture of sand? And as with any explanation of the real world--especially since it can deal with only a single stream of experiences, varied though they might be--it is not going to be absolutely certain. But there are degrees of intuition that you can use with respect to consciousness explanations which you can't use for most other things; consciousness is so fundamentally different from everything else that any complicated explanation for it that involves specifying a lot of conditions is not going to ring true.

Again, I'm not so sure about that. It might not ring true to you, but to me, it doesn't ring true to say that your toes are conscious. If you say they are imbued with a raw experiential capacity, then I can see that. But when I read accounts of consciousness in various fields, there is clearly more to what is being talked about than raw experiential capacity. There is something that seems to be exclusively the capacity of higher mammals and maybe some birds.

Like, if you say thought is necessary, thought is just a mostly arbitrary set of neuronal patterns, which is just an arrangement of particles in such and such a way. Why should that particular arrangement produce anything as fundamentally removed from everything else as consciousness seems to be? It does not make sense. The true explanation must be relatively simple and... intuitive.

Well, I'm not sure how you can call thought an arbitrary set of neuronal patterns. Maybe some thoughts are arbitrary, but not all. Some thoughts are directed, some thoughts are intentional. It is this difference between raw thought and intentional thought that I think is the key to the rest of what consciousness is, aside from the raw experiential capacity. It isn't that intentional thought produces consciousness, but it is nonetheless an important element, without which you do not have consciousness. It takes intentional thought and experiential capacity.

By the way, you have a cute picture, if that's you.

Ha! I'm not a female and that picture is of Scarlett Johansson. I do agree that she's cute, though.

 

[Bartholomew]

Those other meanings of consciousness are not really fundamental. They are more on the order of "how does a car work" than "what is this special thing called consciousness which is somehow different from everything else." They are not the big question. The only important question--important meaning, "very, very important"--is the origin of p-consciousness.

Every thought is predetermined and not arbitrary by the meaning of "arbitrary" that you use, but what I meant by "arbitrary" is "having no clear physical characteristic to differentiate it from every other arrangement of particles."

Ha! I'm not a female and that picture is of Scarlett Johansson.

Dangit!

 

[loseyourname]

Those other meanings of consciousness are not really fundamental. They are more on the order of "how does a car work" than "what is this special thing called consciousness which is somehow different from everything else." They are not the big question. The only important question--important meaning, "very, very important"--is the origin of p-consciousness.

Not really. If conscious thought is indeed intentional, then there is something fundamental to the concept of intention that is not itself functional. Assuming panexperientialism, if it is this intentional capacity that makes our experience different from the experience of a rock, then I think it's important to consciousness.

Every thought is predetermined and not arbitrary by the meaning of "arbitrary" that you use, but what I meant by "arbitrary" is "having no clear physical characteristic to differentiate it from every other arrangement of particles."

Well, that's the question, isn't it? We don't know if every thought is predetermined. In fact, if we use your intuitive approach, then we can conclude that there are thoughts that aren't determined! If every thought is predetermined, maybe you're right, but that will require a huge overhaul of the word "consciousness." A lot of textbooks will need to be edited and common speech patterns will need to be changed.

 

[Bartholomew]

Every thought is predetermined because it comes from the brain, which is a part of the physical world. Welll, okay, because of uncertainty, all thoughts may have some element of randomness, but I don't think that makes any difference.

My "intuitive" approach is not the same as "accepting whatever concept you would have had before thinking about it." Intuition must be learned.

 

[hypnagogue]

As I said, there are people that will tell you that phenomenal experience is all there is to consciousness. I'm not so quick to agree just by considering the historical usage of the word. Especially if you look at the usage of the word "consciousness" in psychology texts as well as anthropological texts, we can see there is more to it, something that is unique to a brain organized, both by genetics and by memetics, the way the human brain is organized, something above and beyond the bare experiential character.

You're referring to what is called "access consciousness" or just "a-consciousness" in the literature. Whereas "p-consciousness" refers to the experiential nature of consciousness, "a-consciousness" refers to the cognitive/functional mechanisms that are normally attributed to the word. A mental object is said to be a-conscious if it is poised to be under direct control of reasoning, reporting, and action. As such, a-consciousness is roughly equivalent to what we mean by "awareness."

If you're familiar with Chalmers' work, he would probably say that understanding a-consciousness falls under the 'easy' problems of consciousness, whereas understanding p-consciousness is the hard problem. It also might be helpful to note that while a zombie is not p-conscious, it is nonetheless a-conscious.

 

[Bartholomew]

It also might be helpful to note that while a zombie is not p-conscious, it is nonetheless a-conscious.

You cannot determine definitely whether anything except yourself has p-consciousness. That's the point, and the reason you need a theory.

By the way, am I right in assuming that what you mean by p-consciousness includes things like memory and other kinds of awareness not covered under the conventional meaning of "sense"? Because those things are essentially the same as conventional senses and fall under the same "hard problem," as you call it.

 

[hypnagogue]

You cannot determine definitely whether anything except yourself has p-consciousness.

That's true, but the philosophical construct of the 'zombie' has no p-consciousness by definition. It's a hypothetical being that we use to help us reason about consciousness.

By the way, am I right in assuming that what you mean by p-consciousness includes things like memory and other kinds of awareness not covered under the conventional meaning of "sense"? Because those things are essentially the same as conventional senses and fall under the same "hard problem," as you call it.

The hard problem isn't about the senses, per se. It's just about subjective experience. Insofar as memory has an experiential aspect (it is 'like something' to experience a memory), it is part of the hard problem. But the cognitive mechanisms that make memory possible fall under the 'easy' problems. Understanding how sensory information is stored in the brain is in principle something that we should be able to figure out using standard scientific approaches (hence, an 'easy' problem) whereas understanding how/why that process of memory storage and retrieval is accompanied by subjective experience seems beyond standard scientific approaches (hence, a hard problem).

You might want to read a couple of Chalmers' papers to familiarize yourself a bit with the terminology and concepts. http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html are good places to start.

 

[loseyourname]

You're referring to what is called "access consciousness" or just "a-consciousness" in the literature. Whereas "p-consciousness" refers to the experiential nature of consciousness, "a-consciousness" refers to the cognitive/functional mechanisms that are normally attributed to the word. A mental object is said to be a-conscious if it is poised to be under direct control of reasoning, reporting, and action. As such, a-consciousness is roughly equivalent to what we mean by "awareness."

Well, I'm really referring to both, as I think it takes both to get what the common man would refer to as "consciousness."

If you're familiar with Chalmers' work, he would probably say that understanding a-consciousness falls under the 'easy' problems of consciousness, whereas understanding p-consciousness is the hard problem. It also might be helpful to note that while a zombie is not p-conscious, it is nonetheless a-conscious.

I'm familiar from second-hand sources, but I've never actually read anything written by Chalmers. I'll get around to it. I'd actually go a little further than Chalmers and say that I think a-consciousness is all but explained, or at least that I think the existing framework is enough with only a slight tweaking of competing models.