Johann said:
Can reason conclude on the existence of anything at all?
I've been following your posts and you seem to think the problem of solipsism cannot be solved. But even if that is the case, then reason must be capable of concluding the existence of at least one thing. But... what should we call that thing?
You're right, I don't think the problem of solipsism can be solved. But only in the sense that the question "Is solipsism true or false?" is undecidable. I don't feel that solpsism is a problem. It is a problem only if one assume that it is either true or false. Then one must try to verify its truth or falsity and this is where problems arise, for it cannot be done.
The problem can be avoided by adopting the 'nondual,' 'mystical,' or 'Middle Way' account of reality. In this account solipsism is neither true nor false, and therefore can never be demonstrated (or known) to be true or false. This is said to be unknowable by reason but the general idea can be undertood by a thought experiment.
Imagine that everything that exists in our multiverse is one thing. Imagine also that all differences and distinctions between the infinity of things that exist within this infinity of individual universes are illusory and thus that all 'things' are illusions of some kind. Imagine that this incudes all material and all mental phenomena.
This may or may not be
the multiverse, the one we seem to be in, but as far as anyone knows it could be. Either way, we can at least imagine such a multiverse.
(Many physicists argue that 'things' are illusory and that only events really exist. This seems to be a case of out of frying pan into the fire to me, for how can events happen between things that are not really things? In this case events are not really events. However, this shows that it is not 'unscientific' to imagine that all things are in some sense illusions which are reducable to some fundamental phenomenon. In Buddhist teachings phenomena (dhamma) are termed 'thing-events' in acknowledgment of their two-sided nature.)
But back to the experiment. This 'one thing' we have imagined as underlying all other things is a fundamental phenomenon from which all other phenomena arise, a fundamental substrate. We need not try to really imagine it for that would be impossible, but we can at least imagine that there is such a thing and then leave it unconceptualised, an undefined term.
Now imagine that you and I are a sentient being living in one of these imagined universes. Is solipsism true or false for us? As individuated beings we would find that solipsism is unfalsifiable. Clearly something that we call 'I' or 'me' would exist but we would be unable to demonstrate to ourselves or to anybody else that anything other than than 'I' or 'me' exists.
But in this imagined multiverse we have assumed that all things are ultimately identical, that all things share the same indentity in an ontological sense. We have imagined all things as being rooted in one thing. You or me, as individuated sentient beings, would be like waves on the ocean, grasstips, emanations of 'God', sparks of Divine Light, little bits of what is fundamental. All things would be epiphenomenal on just one fundamental phenomenon.
In this case we might conclude that even though solipsism is unfalsifiable in our dreamed up world, just as it is in this one, solipsism is in fact true there, for solipsism must be true for a phenomenon that is fundamental. In other words, if we imagine that our essence as individual beings is identical with a fundamental phenomenon then for us solipsism is true, we (in some sense of 'we') really are all that exists.
On the other hand solipsism would also be false. If, when we imagine ourself in this other universe, by a lack of knowledge we mistakenly assume that we are individual and discrete beings, objects separate from other objects, then when we ask "Is solipsism true?" it is false. An infinite number of discrete 'thing-events' exist relative to that discrete 'I' or 'me'.
This multiverse we have imagined is, roughly speaking, our actual reality according to the mystics. Thus a Buddhist, a Taoist, a Sufi or whomever would neither ask the question about solipsism nor give an answer. The answer depends on the underlying assumptions of the person asking it. Just as physicist Lee Smolin writes in 'Three Roads to Quantum Gravity' - "It is not easy to find the right language to use to talk about the world if one really believes that the notion of reality depends on the context of the person doing the talking."
The situation is in fact even more complicated that this, for Buddhists say that this fundamental phenomenon we've imagined to exist does not in fact exist, or rather, that it cannot properly be said either to exist or not-exist. Even this existential distinction is in some way a false one. Thus the Christian mystic Evagrios advises us that what is fundamental must be approached non-conceptually or not at all.
If this is correct, that the existence/non-existence distinction cannot be made for what is fundamental, then it's not entirely clear whether solipsism is true or false even for what is fundamental. In a way it's true and in a way it isn't, depending on how you look at, and even in the final analysis neither answer is quite right. If Buddhists, Christian mystics and the rest are right it is quite simply a fact about reality that determines the unfalsifiability of solipsism. It's unfalsifiable because it isn't false.
As far as I can see every single attempt to give a name to "the thing which absolutely exists" is bound to fail, regardless of the fact that the thing exists and its existence can be asserted by reason. So what exactly is going on here?
Yes, or, as Lao-Tsu puts it, "The Tao that can be named is not the eternal Tao." If the mystical account of reality is true, describes what is the case, then "the thing that absolutely exists" cannot be named, conceived, represented, visualised, imagined or otherwise idolised. What is fundamental, if it were to conceive of itself, would have to divide itself into conceiver and conceived, imaginer and imagined, subject and object and so forth to conceive of or imagine itself, and this is two things, not one. If what is fundamental is not two things then it cannot be known as two things. The mystical literature abounds with warnings of the dangers of dualism.
But again, the situation may be more complex. The distinction between 'exist' and 'not-exist' is said by meditators to be non-fundamental, not applicable to what is fundamental. For this reason, they say, it cannot be truly said that there is anything that absolutely exists, not even whatever it is that is fundamental. Sometimes it is said that this fundamental phenomenon "is," but never that it exists.
If a person decides to give "the thing which absolutely exists" the name "God", would they be doing physics, metaphysics, or something else?
I don't rightly know. I suppose they'd be doing theology. Certainly they'd be making some big assumptions.
If solipsism can't be falsified, can we say for sure that there is no difference between physics and metaphysics?
Good question. Speaking for myself never been able to find a boundary between physics and metaphysics that doesn't seem arbitrary. It appears impossible to do physics without doing metaphysics, since the idea that physical things and the spacetime that contains them really exist is a metaphysical assumption. My impression is that most physicists have no problem with the idea that they cannot avoid metaphysics, but they like to keep the two as distinct as possible, for practical reasons, except maybe on Sundays.
As to the thread's question, my opinion is that there has always been and there will always be one and only one thing to discuss in philosophy, which is how to bring it to its own end. Philosophy is quite curious in that the fulfillment of its goals implies its own destruction. Once a philosophical question is answered, it ceases to be philosophical. Once all philosophical questions are answered, philosophy itself ceases.
This is also pretty much my opinion.
