Looks like we'll all have to switch to tablet PCs

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Discussion Overview

The discussion centers around the security vulnerabilities associated with keyboard sniffers and the potential implications for data protection, particularly in the context of using tablet PCs. Participants explore the feasibility of these attacks, historical awareness of such vulnerabilities, and the effectiveness of various protective measures.

Discussion Character

  • Debate/contested
  • Technical explanation
  • Conceptual clarification

Main Points Raised

  • Some participants express concern about keyboard sniffers being able to steal data, suggesting that this vulnerability could impact sales of devices like tablet PCs.
  • Others argue that the effectiveness of keyboard sniffers is limited, noting that detecting individual keystrokes requires typing very slowly and that interference from other devices complicates the process.
  • A participant references historical knowledge of data vulnerabilities, mentioning discussions from the 1970s about protecting data against potential radiation analysis.
  • There are claims that most keyboards use high-impedance contacts, which may emit weak signals, and that data is often encoded during USB transmission, complicating the ability to capture keystrokes.
  • Some participants question the distance from which emissions can be detected, with references to military-grade shielding for monitors and the potential for similar protections for keyboards.
  • Concerns are raised about the adequacy of existing protective measures in high-security environments, suggesting that electronic surveillance has been a consideration for a long time.

Areas of Agreement / Disagreement

Participants do not reach a consensus on the effectiveness of keyboard sniffers or the adequacy of current protective measures. Multiple competing views remain regarding the feasibility of these attacks and the historical context of data security.

Contextual Notes

Some limitations in the discussion include assumptions about the effectiveness of shielding, the specifics of keyboard technology, and the conditions under which data can be intercepted. There is also uncertainty regarding the extent of protection in high-security settings.

jtbell
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Not mine, all my keys have little tinfoil hats.
 
Hmm, my new Mac's keyboard has an aluminum body. Maybe that will help!
 
This is only possible if you are typing the individual keystrokes REALLY slowly.

I've seen it in action, Also the tests were done with just a single keyboard powered by a shut (unplugged) laptop to avoid interference. Basically a battery.

Combine a Keyboard, Mouse, Monitor, Power source and any other electrical device in your system and the noise/interference makes it pretty much impossible to detect individual keystrokes. (for now)
 
A worry for quite a long time! People at the encrypted transmission service told me about that as I visited an embassy in 1975 or 1976. I didn't hear "Tempest" then, but they knew the weakness and tried to protect their data against it.

Which doesn't mean that the radiation could already be analysed then - only that they felt useful to take the possibility into account.

As for the Swiss experiment: most keyboards use contacts with high impedance, either because the contacts themselves are made by carbon-filled elastomers or because load resistors a big to reduce consumption, so I bet the contacts radiate very small (and indistinct!) fields, and the researchers picked data from the USB transmission instead, where keys are already encoded. The cable itself is more or less shielded, but the connectors not so much, and the electronics at both ends even less.

So put your aluminium foil rather there...

As for interferences, many of them can (and must!) be removed before analysing the leak by a keyboard. Though if your screen is a cathode ray tube, the attacker won't waste his time at the keyboard.
 
20 metres? Isn't there a dampening system for these emissions?
 
OAQfirst said:
20 metres? Isn't there a dampening system for these emissions?

Sure there is. Back when CRT monitors where more common you could buy military spec monitors that were shielded to prevent anyone from picking up the signal from them using an antenna (which turns out to be quite easy and can be done at a large distance). I would be suprissed if there aren't shielded keyboard as well.

Electronic surviellance has been around for a long time and most high-security building should already already have some protection in place (metal films on the wall, windows with conducting films etc to create a Faraday's cage and so on).
So I don't think this is anything new.
 

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