Many-Worlds Theory: Existence of Multiple Universes

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The discussion centers on skepticism regarding Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics, with participants questioning its validity and implications. Key points include the idea that if infinite universes exist, their interactions remain unexplained, leading to concerns about infinite regress. Critics argue that MWI may serve as a philosophical cop-out rather than a robust scientific theory, as it lacks distinct predictions from the Copenhagen interpretation. The conversation also touches on the nature of observations in quantum mechanics and the challenges of verifying MWI experimentally. Overall, the debate highlights the tension between philosophical interpretations and empirical science in understanding the universe.
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I'm not a huge fan of many-worlds theory, but I do think that multiple Universes can exist. My only problem is that if there's an infinite number of Universes, why hasn't a Universe collided with our own yet? Are there other Universes somehow keeping that Universe from colliding with ours? And does it go on like that ad infinitum?
 
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The "worlds" in the MWI aren't flying around like the molecules of the air. :smile: They don't occupy locations in some kind of space, and it isn't possible to make sense of such ideas as the ones you have in mind ("a world's position in space", "the distance between two worlds", etc).
 
As Fredrik points out, the universes in WMI aren't out there, they're right here - overlapping. They just don't interact with us (because of some as-yet unexplained reason).
 
DaveC426913 said:
As Fredrik points out, the universes in WMI aren't out there, they're right here - overlapping. They just don't interact with us (because of some as-yet unexplained reason).

Regardless of the infinite possibilities in an infinite multiverse where the "overlapping" doesn't matter? Sorry if I seem hostile, I just have this nagging intuition that Many-Worlds does not work. :)
 
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Emanresu56 said:
Regardless of the infinite possibilities in an infinite multiverse where the "overlapping" doesn't matter?
This isn't a sentence; it is missing a verb. I don't understand what you are asking. Can you rephrase?

Emanresu56 said:
I just have this nagging intuition that Many-Worlds does not work. :)
Intuition and its brother "common sense" are as useful as teats on a snake when it comes to the mathematical nature of the universe. Don't use them.
 
DaveC426913 said:
This isn't a sentence; it is missing a verb. I don't understand what you are asking. Can you rephrase?

Basically, I've been having this nagging idea that an infinite multiverse leads to an infinite regress - and, while there might not be any problems with an infinite regress existing, there's still the feeling that Many-Worlds is simply a cop-out. I use "feeling" in the intuitive sense, not the personal sense.
 
What would it even mean for a universe to "collide" with another?

What would it matter if there were infinitely many universes versus a finite number?

From what I've seen, MWI is just a complicated way physicists use to explain how randomness appears. That instead of requiring a "choice" to ever be made, the universe simply permutes through all possible choices.
 
DaveC426913 said:
As Fredrik points out, the universes in WMI aren't out there, they're right here - overlapping.

Sidney Coleman used to say "In Many-Worlds, there are not many worlds. There is only one world." His point was that in MWI, the wave function does not collapse, but in all measurements it appears as if it does.

It may also be worth pointing out that MWI is an interpretation, not a theory. It makes exactly the same predictions as Copenhagen: there is no test possible, even in theory, that distinguishes them.
 
Emanresu56 said:
Basically, I've been having this nagging idea that an infinite multiverse leads to an infinite regress - and, while there might not be any problems with an infinite regress existing, there's still the feeling that Many-Worlds is simply a cop-out. I use "feeling" in the intuitive sense, not the personal sense.

Cop outs are all the rage atm, it reflects some rather annoying limitations in physics, mind you cop out \neq worthless.

Me I object to MWI on the basic principle I object to anything in science, and that is the show me the money factor. It's arbitrary and no one gets out of it for long.

Intuition isn't useless in physics, physics just doesn't care what you think should happen or should be, only what does in fact happen and is and that is a fish that is hard to catch.
 
  • #10
Emanresu56 said:
Basically, I've been having this nagging idea that an infinite multiverse leads to an infinite regress - and, while there might not be any problems with an infinite regress existing, there's still the feeling that Many-Worlds is simply a cop-out. I use "feeling" in the intuitive sense, not the personal sense.
There are intuitive as well as mathematical physics bases for multiverse. And, it seems that there's always going to be room for something beyond any description that mankind will be able to produce.
 
  • #11
I believe in Many-Worlds Theory because I am the center of all of them!
 
  • #12
I am happy that more and more people abandon Copenhagen I. and accept MWI
 
  • #13
The Copenhagen interpretation is also flawed because it treats the observer as an outside 'God' when in fact, we the observers should also be treated within the same quantum mechanical framework.
 
  • #14
What is the principle of MWT?
 
  • #15
Phrak said:
What is the principle of MWT?

The wave function resolves itself in every possible form in other realities/worlds, the measurement is discernibly identical to CI, thus it's indistinguishible from CI, and probably always will be, which has lead some people to cry *cough cop out*. This theory is deterministic.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation

* There is circularity in Everett's measurement theory. Under the assumptions made by Everett, there are no 'good observations' as defined by him, and since his analysis of the observational process depends on the latter, it is void of any meaning. The concept of a 'good observation' is the projection postulate in disguise and Everett's analysis simply derives this postulate by having assumed it, without any discussion.[23] Talk of probability in Everett presumes the existence of a preferred basis to identify measurement outcomes for the probabilities to range over. But the existence of a preferred basis can only be established by the process of decoherence, which is itself probabilistic.[24]

MWI response: Everett's treatment of observations / measurements covers both idealised good measurements and the more general bad or approximate cases.[25] Thus it is legitimate to analyse probability in terms of measurement; no circularity is present.

What I might call the magic bullet that kills it and others might hand wave away. Even the answer here does not rid us of a priori assumptions that cannot ever be verified, and in fact it's high order hand waving/philosophy in its purest sense. Which leads a lot of people to say, so what's the point? There are 1001 possible alternatives to CI already, why do we have to invent ones that can potentially never be verified; my answer is to ask the String Theorists, they've been getting away with it for years quite successfully. :smile::-p

Undeniably MWI is interesting but is it anything like what really happens or just more wishful thinking to explain away our doubts?

By the way this isn't exactly my position but it certainly has a good point.
 
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  • #17
Dmitry67 said:
I don't know what is a concept of 'good observations' [25], 1956 (!)
But now all problems are solved:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_decoherence

They are? How exactly? Have you visited these many worlds to in act verify the results of their experiments? Good observation just means being able to measure something you haven't just assumed before you started the experiment. In that sense MWI is axiomatic.
 
  • #18
The Dagda said:
1. They are? How exactly?
2. Have you visited these many worlds to in act verify the results of their experiments? Good observation just means being able to measure something you haven't just assumed before you started the experiment. In that sense MWI is axiomatic.

1. Name the problems first :)
2. Have you even visited the interior of the black holes to speculate about the Schwarzschild/Kerr solution? You just believe that if GR works outside there are no reasons to believe that it does not work inside!
 
  • #19
MWI is very logical.

1. We take QM in its purest form, without all weird and magic 'observers', 'measurements', 'our knowledge' etc.
2. We make an experiment with a Schodienger cat, and based on the calculations there are 2 cats, dead and alive!
3. But we make another calculations (described in the Quantum decoherence article) and we find out these these 2 cats do not interact with each other, and it explains why we see only one of them
4. However, we need to conclude that the symmetry is preserved, and all other outcomes do exist.

Very often people try to eliminate MWI using Occams razor. But it is a logical mistake: you percieve only one world, so you think that MWI suggests something EXTRA: another worlds. Then you try to cut these extra worlds using Occams razor or falifiability blah blah blah.

But in fact, it is CI (and other interpretations) which adds something extra: it adds a symmetry-breaking mechanism (called 'randomness') to explain why some cats are real and why some are not.

Imagine that we talk about an infinite flat space. The claim that it is infiniteis simpler then a claim that 'it ends somewhere'. because if it ends somewhere then there is a strange object called 'end of space', it has shape etc. So the claim 'all outcome exist' is simpler, then 'only one outcome exists'
 
  • #20
Dmitry67 said:
1. Name the problems first :)
2. Have you even visited the interior of the black holes to speculate about the Schwarzschild/Kerr solution? You just believe that if GR works outside there are no reasons to believe that it does not work inside!

What does visiting an inferred phenomena we really know nothing directly about have to do with the interpretation of QM? You seem to be avoiding the issues, they are laid out in a previous post.

Occam's razor in this case makes the two the same, which means MWI gets eliminated by the laws of theory.

A theory must distinguish itself from any preceding theory. If its just to all observable purposes just the same as CI then it is CI with extra philosophical nugat to make philosophers all hot.

There aren't two cats in this case there is every probable decay in a radioactive isotope, which may lead to the cat being dead or alive.

You can't appeal to randomness as a deal breaker just because you don't like the implications, this is physics not philosophy, if you want to make a claim it has to be experimentally verifiable or distinguishable, or it is just arm waving away things you personally think should be wrong in your own particular world. If we can do that then we might as well just become String Theorists and abandon experiment altogether.
 
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  • #21
The Dagda said:
1
What does visiting an inferred phenomena we really know nothing directly about have to do with the interpretation of QM? You seem to be avoiding the issues, they are laid out in a previous post.

2
Occam's razor in this case makes the two the same, which means MWI gets eliminated by the laws of theory.

3
A theory must distinguish itself from any preceding theory. If its just to all observable purposes just the same as CI then it is CI with extra philosophical nugat to make philosophers all hot.

1
I showed that the falciability is applicable to MWI to the same extent as to the interior of the BH. Modern physics uses a weaker version of the falsiability, so MWI has no problems with it.

2
See my post above.
Occams razor is cutting away an extra symmetry-breaking mechanism called 'randomness' because it is not needed to explain what we observe.

3
So far the status of MWI is an 'interpretation', but I think some tricky experiments can be done to distinguish if from the CI
 
  • #22
Dmitry67 said:
1
I showed that the falciability is applicable to MWI to the same extent as to the interior of the BH. Modern physics uses a weaker version of the falsiability, so MWI has no problems with it.

No you didn't, how can you falsify something that is completely indistinguishable from CI?

2
See my post above.
Occams razor is cutting away an extra symmetry-breaking mechanism called 'randomness' because it is not needed to explain what we observe.

This is just arm waving. Since when has occam's razor been a law of science?

3
So far the status of MWI is an 'interpretation', but I think some tricky experiments can be done to distinguish if from the CI

Like what? That's the whole point, until there are any it remains a purely philosophical interpretation. I honestly think these days that Karl Popper should come back from the dead and beat most so called scientists over the head until they start behaving like theorists not philosophers. Not that there isn't immense value in speculation, but let's not keep putting the cart before the horse, you'd of think we'd of learned something from ST, the phrase is not shut up and speculate.

Now in the future I would be delighted to eat my words, when I see a practical application of MWI that distinguishes it from CI, until then I remain firmly convinced it's nothing more than arm waving. Now CI may not be the most complete theory either, but the onus is firmly upon any interpretation to distinguish itself, until it does that appealing to non sequiturs is worthless.
 
  • #23
The Dagda said:
1
No you didn't, how can you falsify something that is completely indistinguishable from CI?

2
This is just arm waving. Since when has occam's razor been a law of science?

3
Like what? That's the whole point, until there are any it remains a purely philosophical interpretation.

4
I honestly think these days that Karl Popper should come back from the dead and beat most so called scientists over the head until they start behaving like theorists not philosophers.

5
Now CI may not be the most complete theory either, but the onus is firmly upon any interpretation to distinguish itself, until it does that appealing to non sequiturs is worthless.

1
I was replying to "if you can not visit alternative worlds, then it is not scientific'

2
good, then should you not mentioned that 'occams razor had erased something' in MWI

3
My ideas are too raw to post them here.
Also, I don't want to share my nobel prize with you :)

4
Hi actually did it. In some worlds :)

5
Wait, wait, you call CI a 'theory'? Wait a minute, it can not be distinguished from the Transactional interpretation, for example. How can you call it a theory?
 
  • #24
Dmitry67 said:
1
I was replying to "if you can not visit alternative worlds, then it is not scientific'

So if I can't visit the planet of the Zoobian smarfarts and converse in the universal language of farts, it means it is scientific. I revise that statement, Karl Popper should come back with a shot gun and some strong language. :-p

2
good, then should you not mentioned that 'occams razor had erased something' in MWI

3
My ideas are too raw to post them here.
Also, I don't want to share my nobel prize with you :)

4
Hi actually did it. In some worlds :)

5
Wait, wait, you call CI a 'theory'? Wait a minute, it can not be distinguished from the Transactional interpretation, for example. How can you call it a theory?

Because of the two slit experiment, and because of Bell's. And because it came first. It is a tentative theory in that sense, although I wouldn't go so far as to say it is firmly theoretical. That said compared to the others it craps on them by virtue of being 90 years or so old. That I'm afraid is science, if it wasn't we'd still be using Newtonian mechanics in astronomy.

I said under Occam's razor they are equal, and that that is no reason to dismiss a concern anyway, you are right. Neither is it a reason to favour MWI over CI, even if all things were equal and they are not, CI has more going for it atm by virtue of itself.

I've actually always like MWI, but as an interested party I'm not a put the cart in front of the horse person.
 
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  • #25
As usual, nobody had changed his mind :)
I hope other reading will find our discussion useful.

I just wanted to comment on this:

The Dagda said:
And because it came first

...

A theory must distinguish itself from any preceding theory.

In fact, CI was the very first, but it does not give it a "right of the first night" with science.
A theory must distinguish itself from *any* theory.

The order of pulications is important to the authors, nobel prized etc, but not for the scientific truth.
 
  • #26
Dmitry67 said:
The order of pulications is important to the authors, nobel prized etc, but not for the scientific truth.
To go further, chronology is counterproductive pedagogically. It's surely much better to learn and understand QM based upon the results of a century of study, rather than based upon the intuition and biases of the people who first worked on it.
 
  • #27
Hurkyl said:
To go further, chronology is counterproductive pedagogically. It's surely much better to learn and understand QM based upon the results of a century of study, rather than based upon the intuition and biases of the people who first worked on it.

Put your cards on the table, do you think after 90 years of study and revision CI has less than MWI? And if so why? I think personally its still there, but amongst a crowd of young pretenders, but I feel unsure of throwing myself behind anything that relies purely on arm waving, that to me is not science. Not that I am in any position to say what science is, but there you go. I just feel its better to er on the side of caution than flash in the pan fads, like String Theory and MWI. At least CI has experimental evidence albeit inferred. QM is not currently a deterministic theory, and wishing it so will not make it so by dint of magic. Any resorts to speculation, opinion, popularity, authority, need to have something other than a name and a reputation, some evidence would be nice.

Just because you don't think an interpretation has much theoretical worth doesn't mean you don't think it might, as well. It would be just as ignorant to dismiss MWI arbitrarily.
 
  • #28
I thought the scientific method was supposed to begin with something that is observed, and a question about it: "why did this happen?" I find it sad that some "scientific" activities now begin only with the feeling "it would be so cool if this were true", and then they go on to make a big deal of the fact that no mathematical contradictions have been found in it, as if that made it true.
 
  • #29
Dmitry67 said:
MWI is very logical.
1. We take QM in its purest form, without all weird and magic 'observers', 'measurements', 'our knowledge' etc.
What's weird about observers, measurements, and our knowledge. All of these have objective physical referents. On the other hand the parallel, but unobservable outcomes of MWI refer only to mathematical creations.

MWI is logical, but it's based on the faulty premise that quantum wavefunctions refer to real propagations in some quantum underworld. There's no reason to assume that. What we do know is that they describe the 'evolution' of probabilities in mathematical spaces, and the probabilities are associated with the behavior of instruments in real 3D space and time.

Dmitry67 said:
2. We make an experiment with a Schodienger cat, and based on the calculations there are 2 cats, dead and alive!
Standard QM says there's one cat, and assigns probabilities to the two possible, mutually exclusive, results, dead cat or alive cat. This fits with what's observed. No problem.

Dmitry67 said:
3. But we make another calculations (described in the Quantum decoherence article) and we find out these these 2 cats do not interact with each other, and it explains why we see only one of them.
The more parsimonious explanation for why we only see one of them is that the 'other' one doesn't exist except as a mathematical fiction.

Dmitry67 said:
4. However, we need to conclude that the symmetry is preserved, and all other outcomes do exist.

Very often people try to eliminate MWI using Occams razor. But it is a logical mistake: you percieve only one world, so you think that MWI suggests something EXTRA: another worlds. Then you try to cut these extra worlds using Occams razor or falifiability blah blah blah.

But in fact, it is CI (and other interpretations) which adds something extra: it adds a symmetry-breaking mechanism (called 'randomness') to explain why some cats are real and why some are not.
Randomness isn't something added by the theory or CI. It refers to the observed unpredictability of individual quantum experimental phenomena. Recorded data define reality. Metaphysical speculations don't.

Aggregated correlations reveal nonrandom data trends. This suggests a deterministic world.

The problems that the MWI approach purports to solve are pseudoproblems that can be satisfactorily dealt with by simply interpreting quantum theory in terms of what all can agree that it does refer to, rather than what some say it might refer to.

By the way, I don't mean to disparage metaphysical speculation in general. It's an important part of the development of ever deeper and more encompassing physical theories.
 
  • #30
Hurkyl said:
To go further, chronology is counterproductive pedagogically. It's surely much better to learn and understand QM based upon the results of a century of study, rather than based upon the intuition and biases of the people who first worked on it.
Maybe so. It's certainly faster, but I think maybe not so fulfilling. If one has the time, then approaching the subject of the quantum theory as a historical study can be fascinating.

From John Bell's, How to Teach Special Relativity

"I have for long thought that if I had the opportunity to teach
this subject, I would emphasize the continuity with earlier ideas.
Usually it is the discontinuity which is stressed, the radical break
with more primitive notions of space and time. Often the result
is to destroy completely the confidence of the student in perfectly
sound and useful concepts already acquired."
 
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  • #31
Re: "What is the principle of MWT?"

The Dagda said:
The wave function resolves itself in every possible form in other realities/worlds, the measurement is discernibly identical to CI, thus it's indistinguishible from CI, and probably always will be, which has lead some people to cry *cough cop out*. This theory is deterministic.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation

That sound's fairly odd for a principle. Alot of words seem to exchanged over something roughly understood.
 
  • #32
Re: "What is the principle of MWT?"

The Dagda said:
The wave function resolves itself in every possible form in other realities/worlds, the measurement is discernibly identical to CI, thus it's indistinguishible from CI, and probably always will be, which has lead some people to cry *cough cop out*. This theory is deterministic.

That sound's fairly odd for a principle. Alot of words seem to exchanged over something roughly understood.
 
  • #33
The Dagda said:
Put your cards on the table, do you think after 90 years of study and revision CI has less than MWI? And if so why?
You've lost sight of the question; the point is how best to understand quantum physics. At the time, CI was pretty much the only option, because the ramifications of relative states hadn't been discovered, indefiniteness hadn't really been treated seriously in a scientific context, and nobody had yet worked out any hidden-variable variations on the theory. But now that we have 90 years of experience, we can make a more informed decisions.

As a mathematician, I look at QT and see two parts: unitary evolution that happens most of the time, and collapse which happens occasionally. It's often a good idea to study things one piece at a time, so it's very natural to study the effects of unitary evolution (in other words, MWI). That's just a good way to learn and study things; it would apply to any theory, and it baffles me how vehemently people seem to reject that notion.

Anyways, while I may have been expecting to then add collapse into the picture1, you run into decoherence -- the interesting phenomenon that the observational effects of collapse can be described as a by-product of unitary evolution. So again, just looking at the theory tells you that it's very natural to consider decoherence-based viewpoint. I'm baffled how many people won't even consider such a thing!

Sure, one can complain about all the non-observable things, but that's not a feature unique to MWI -- we've been doing it with physical theories for centuries. At its core, it's nothing more than the acknowledgment that many different mathematical states can represent indistinguishable physical realities. Again, I'm baffled that people would take such a stance to reject interpretations like MWI.

1: Yes: the CI posits that between collapses, the quantum world behaves exactly as described by MWI.



ThomasT said:
What's weird about observers, measurements, and our knowledge. All of these have objective physical referents.
But, as the quote said, they're "magic". CI excludes, a priori, the possibility that such things can be described by quantum mechanics.

MWI is logical, but it's based on the faulty premise that quantum wavefunctions refer to real propagations in some quantum underworld.
If all predictions of quantum mechanics can be computed (in principle) from the wavefunction, then that means the quantum wavefunctions really do refer to "real propagations in some quantum underworld".

So, I ask you, what predictions of quantum mechanics are not determined (even in principle) by a wave function?
 
  • #34
ThomasT said:
1
What's weird about observers, measurements, and our knowledge. All of these have objective physical referents. On the other hand the parallel, but unobservable outcomes of MWI refer only to mathematical creations.

2
MWI is logical, but it's based on the faulty premise that quantum wavefunctions refer to real propagations in some quantum underworld. There's no reason to assume that. What we do know is that they describe the 'evolution' of probabilities in mathematical spaces, and the probabilities are associated with the behavior of instruments in real 3D space and time.

3
Standard QM says there's one cat, and assigns probabilities to the two possible, mutually exclusive, results, dead cat or alive cat. This fits with what's observed. No problem.

1 At first, "our knowledge" is subjective, not objective.
But the main problem is that CI defines the behavior of the quantum particles based on 'measurement devices', while the measurement devices are themselves huge collections of particles. Such definition is deadly recursive and makes futile any potential attempt to axiomatize the QM (known as 6th Hilberts problem)

2,3
You had so got used to CI that now you can not distinguish QM and CI at all!
In 2 you just describe what CI says
in 3: there is only one cat in CI (and some other I) but *NOT* in MWI. It is a main point of the whole MWI: there are BOTH cats!
 
  • #35
Hurkyl said:
Anyways, while I may have been expecting to then add collapse into the picture1, you run into decoherence -- the interesting phenomenon that the observational effects of collapse can be described as a by-product of unitary evolution. So again, just looking at the theory tells you that it's very natural to consider decoherence-based viewpoint. I'm baffled how many people won't even consider such a thing!

BTW I am curious how Quantum Decoherence (QD) is interpreted in CI.
QD belongs to QM, it is independent of any interpretation

Before, CI had 'wavefunction collapse' in its foundation. But after the discovery of QD it appears that there are two similar things serving the same purpuse :)
 
  • #36
Hurkyl said:
You've lost sight of the question; the point is how best to understand quantum physics. At the time, CI was pretty much the only option, because the ramifications of relative states hadn't been discovered, indefiniteness hadn't really been treated seriously in a scientific context, and nobody had yet worked out any hidden-variable variations on the theory. But now that we have 90 years of experience, we can make a more informed decisions.

As a mathematician, I look at QT and see two parts: unitary evolution that happens most of the time, and collapse which happens occasionally. It's often a good idea to study things one piece at a time, so it's very natural to study the effects of unitary evolution (in other words, MWI). That's just a good way to learn and study things; it would apply to any theory, and it baffles me how vehemently people seem to reject that notion.

Anyways, while I may have been expecting to then add collapse into the picture1, you run into decoherence -- the interesting phenomenon that the observational effects of collapse can be described as a by-product of unitary evolution. So again, just looking at the theory tells you that it's very natural to consider decoherence-based viewpoint. I'm baffled how many people won't even consider such a thing!

Sure, one can complain about all the non-observable things, but that's not a feature unique to MWI -- we've been doing it with physical theories for centuries. At its core, it's nothing more than the acknowledgment that many different mathematical states can represent indistinguishable physical realities. Again, I'm baffled that people would take such a stance to reject interpretations like MWI.

1: Yes: the CI posits that between collapses, the quantum world behaves exactly as described by MWI.

No I have not lost sight of the question, MWI just isn't science its arm waving away problems in a what if scenario. Tell me what exactly is the point of making something up that in all likelihood will and could never be tested. If its just to illustrate CI then fine, but it's still philosophy. I consider such a thing and I do not reject it, I fear though people as usual give too much weight to what is essential pure philosophy.

But, as the quote said, they're "magic". CI excludes, a priori, the possibility that such things can be described by quantum mechanics.

And so therefore it cannot possibly be correct? Is that your assumption and if so how do you reconcile it with the fact that experimentally it is true, by resorting to magic?

If all predictions of quantum mechanics can be computed (in principle) from the wavefunction, then that means the quantum wavefunctions really do refer to "real propagations in some quantum underworld".

So, I ask you, what predictions of quantum mechanics are not determined (even in principle) by a wave function?

The question is meaningless, since you have no idea what really happens, all it does is model what happens in experiment without knowing intrinsically anything about the wave. I agree with Bohr, there is nothing real about the wave function in as much as we know, and how people have the nerve to suggest such without actually knowing anything about it is beyond me and science. Claiming the wave function is real is all very well in principal but is it? Show me the money?

If QM is deterministic then how do you resolve the Bell inequalities, which show that it is not? This again is magical thinking, if I say it is, it must be because I say so.

If you ask me many worlds is just a neat way of avoiding hidden variables without actually tackling the issue at all or addressing gaps in our knowledge. In that sense it is no better than a God of the gaps theory, where CI is not, there I am by will of my imagination. Now as I say I have no problem with it as a hypothetical concern, but people take it as far, far more than that, and personally I don't think they have any reason to that is scientific at least.

Let's define what we mean by determinism, which is after all the same in science as it is in any other field.

Causal Determinism

Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature. The idea is ancient, but first became subject to clarification and mathematical analysis in the eighteenth century.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/

This article discusses the issues from classical to quantum mechanics without being too maths heavy.

4.4 Quantum mechanics

As indicated above, QM is widely thought to be a strongly non-deterministic theory. Popular belief (even among most physicists) holds that phenomena such as radioactive decay, photon emission and absorption, and many others are such that only a probabilistic description of them can be given. The theory does not say what happens in a given case, but only says what the probabilities of various results are. So, for example, according to QM the fullest description possible of a radium atom (or a chunk of radium, for that matter), does not suffice to determine when a given atom will decay, nor how many atoms in the chunk will have decayed at any given time. The theory gives only the probabilities for a decay (or a number of decays) to happen within a given span of time. Einstein and others perhaps thought that this was a defect of the theory that should eventually be removed, by a supplemental hidden variable theory[6] that restores determinism; but subsequent work showed that no such hidden variables account could exist. At the microscopic level the world is ultimately mysterious and chancy.

So goes the story; but like much popular wisdom, it is partly mistaken and/or misleading. Ironically, quantum mechanics is one of the best prospects for a genuinely deterministic theory in modern times! Even more than in the case of GTR and the hole argument, everything hinges on what interpretational and philosophical decisions one adopts. The fundamental law at the heart of non-relativistic QM is the Schrödinger equation. The evolution of a wavefunction describing a physical system under this equation is normally taken to be perfectly deterministic.[7] If one adopts an interpretation of QM according to which that's it — i.e., nothing ever interrupts Schrödinger evolution, and the wavefunctions governed by the equation tell the complete physical story — then quantum mechanics is a perfectly deterministic theory. There are several interpretations that physicists and philosophers have given of QM which go this way. (See the entry on quantum mechanics.)

More commonly — and this is part of the basis for the popular wisdom — physicists have resolved the quantum measurement problem by postulating that some process of “collapse of the wavefunction” occurs from time to time (particularly during measurements and observations) that interrupts Schrödinger evolution. The collapse process is usually postulated to be indeterministic, with probabilities for various outcomes, via Born's rule, calculable on the basis of a system's wavefunction. The once-standard, Copenhagen interpretation of QM posits such a collapse. It has the virtue of solving certain paradoxes such as the infamous Schrödinger's cat paradox, but few philosophers or physicists can take it very seriously unless they are either idealists or instrumentalists. The reason is simple: the collapse process is not physically well-defined, and feels too ad hoc to be a fundamental part of nature's laws.[8]

In 1952 David Bohm created an alternative interpretation of QM — perhaps better thought of as an alternative theory — that realizes Einstein's dream of a hidden variable theory, restoring determinism and definiteness to micro-reality. In Bohmian quantum mechanics, unlike other interpretations, it is postulated that all particles have, at all times, a definite position and velocity. In addition to the Schrödinger equation, Bohm posited a guidance equation that determines, on the basis of the system's wavefunction and particles' initial positions and velocities, what their future positions and velocities should be. As much as any classical theory of point particles moving under force fields, then, Bohm's theory is deterministic. Amazingly, he was also able to show that, as long as the statistical distribution of initial positions and velocities of particles are chosen so as to meet a “quantum equilibrium” condition, his theory is empirically equivalent to standard Copenhagen QM. In one sense this is a philosopher's nightmare: with genuine empirical equivalence as strong as Bohm obtained, it seems experimental evidence can never tell us which description of reality is correct. (Fortunately, we can safely assume that neither is perfectly correct, and hope that our Final Theory has no such empirically equivalent rivals.) In other senses, the Bohm theory is a philosopher's dream come true, eliminating much (but not all) of the weirdness of standard QM and restoring determinism to the physics of atoms and photons. The interested reader can find out more from the link above, and references therein.

This small survey of determinism's status in some prominent physical theories, as indicated above, does not really tell us anything about whether determinism is true of our world. Instead, it raises a couple of further disturbing possibilities for the time when we do have the Final Theory before us (if such time ever comes): first, we may have difficulty establishing whether the Final Theory is deterministic or not — depending on whether the theory comes loaded with unsolved interpretational or mathematical puzzles. Second, we may have reason to worry that the Final Theory, if indeterministic, has an empirically equivalent yet deterministic rival (as illustrated by Bohmian quantum mechanics.)

I know what you are saying when you say it is deterministic in the sense we can equate the maths to fit the facts by using abstract tricks like renormalisation and i, all I say is that is it reflective of the facts or are we just postulating an outcome and retrofitting the maths to that? If so how do we know it is fundamentally deterministic? And isn't the Schrödinger equation underivable?
 
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  • #37
hurkyl said:
... the point is how best to understand quantum physics.
Yes
hurkyl said:
At its core, it's (MWI) nothing more than the acknowledgment that many different mathematical states can represent indistinguishable physical realities.
Is MWI necessary for this?
hurkyl said:
... the CI posits that between collapses, the quantum world behaves exactly as described by MWI.
Does it? I've always thought of the CI as an instrumentalist view.

This is from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy discussion of the CI:

...
Bohr's more mature view, i.e., his view after the EPR paper, on complementarity and the interpretation of quantum mechanics may be summarized in the following points:

1. The interpretation of a physical theory has to rely on an experimental practice.
2. The experimental practice presupposes a certain pre-scientific practice of description, which establishes the norm for experimental measurement apparatus, and consequently what counts as scientific experience.
3. Our pre-scientific practice of understanding our environment is an adaptation to the sense experience of separation, orientation, identification and reidentification over time of physical objects.
4. This pre-scientific experience is grasped in terms of common categories like a thing's position and change of position, duration and change of duration, and the relation of cause and effect, terms and principles that are now parts of our common language.
5. These common categories yield the preconditions for objective knowledge, and any description of nature has to use these concepts to be objective.
6. The concepts of classical physics are merely exact specifications of the above categories.
7. The classical concepts—and not classical physics itself—are therefore necessary in any description of physical experience in order to understand what we are doing and to be able to communicate our results to others, in particular in the description of quantum phenomena as they present themselves in experiments;
8. Planck's empirical discovery of the quantization of action requires a revision of the foundation for the use of classical concepts, because they are not all applicable at the same time. Their use is well defined only if they apply to experimental interactions in which the quantization of action can be regarded as negligible.
9. In experimental cases where the quantization of action plays a significant role, the application of a classical concept does not refer to independent properties of the object; rather the ascription of either kinematic or dynamic properties to the object as it exists independently of a specific experimental interaction is ill-defined.
10. The quantization of action demands a limitation of the use of classical concepts so that these concepts apply only to a phenomenon, which Bohr understood as the macroscopic manifestation of a measurement on the object, i.e. the uncontrollable interaction between the object and the apparatus.
11. The quantum mechanical description of the object differs from the classical description of the measuring apparatus, and this requires that the object and the measuring device should be separated in the description, but the line of separation is not the one between macroscopic instruments and microscopic objects. It has been argued in detail (Howard 1994) that Bohr pointed out that parts of the measuring device may sometimes be treated as parts of the object in the quantum mechanical description.
12. The quantum mechanical formalism does not provide physicists with a ‘pictorial’ representation: the ψ-function does not, as Schrödinger had hoped, represent a new kind of reality. Instead, as Born suggested, the square of the absolute value of the ψ-function expresses a probability amplitude for the outcome of a measurement. Due to the fact that the wave equation involves an imaginary quantity this equation can have only a symbolic character, but the formalism may be used to predict the outcome of a measurement that establishes the conditions under which concepts like position, momentum, time and energy apply to the phenomena.
13. The ascription of these classical concepts to the phenomena of measurements rely on the experimental context of the phenomena, so that the entire setup provides us with the defining conditions for the application of kinematic and dynamic concepts in the domain of quantum physics.
Such phenomena are complementary in the sense that their manifestations depend on mutually exclusive measurements, but that the information gained through these various experiments exhausts all possible objective knowledge of the object.

Bohr thought of the atom as real. Atoms are neither heuristic nor logical constructions. A couple of times he emphasized this directly using arguments from experiments in a very similar way to Ian Hacking and Nancy Cartwright much later. What he did not believe was that the quantum mechanical formalism was true in the sense that it gave us a literal (‘pictorial’) rather than a symbolic representation of the quantum world. It makes much sense to characterize Bohr in modern terms as an entity realist who opposes theory realism (Folse 1987). It is because of the imaginary quantities in quantum mechanics (where the commutation rule for canonically conjugate variable, p and q, introduces Planck's constant into the formalism by pq − qp = ih/2π) that quantum mechanics does not give us a ‘pictorial’ representation of the world. Neither does the theory of relativity, Bohr argued, provide us with a literal representation, since the velocity of light is introduced with a factor of i in the definition of the fourth coordinate in a four-dimensional manifold (CC, p. 86 and p. 105). Instead these theories can only be used symbolically to predict observations under well-defined conditions. Thus Bohr was an antirealist or an instrumentalist when it comes to theories.
...

This is from the Wikepedia article on the CI:
...
The Copenhagen interpretation consists of attempts to explain the experiments and their mathematical formulations in ways that do not go beyond the evidence to suggest more (or less) than is actually there.

The Copenhagen interpretation was a composite statement about what could and could not be legitimately stated in common language to complement the statements and predictions that could be made in the language of instrument readings and mathematical operations. In other words, it attempted to answer the question, "What do these amazing experimental results really mean?"
...

I like the ensemble, or statistical, or probability interpretation.
From the Wikipedia article:
...
The Ensemble Interpretation, or Statistical Interpretation of quantum mechanics, is an interpretation that can be viewed as a minimalist interpretation; it is a quantum mechanical interpretation that claims to make the fewest assumptions associated with the standard mathematical formalization. At its heart, it takes the statistical interpretation of Max Born to the fullest extent. The interpretation states that the wave function does not apply to an individual system – or for example, a single particle – but is an abstract mathematical, statistical quantity that only applies to an ensemble of similar prepared systems or particles. Probably the most notable supporter of such an interpretation was Albert Einstein:

The attempt to conceive the quantum-theoretical description as the complete description of the individual systems leads to unnatural theoretical interpretations, which become immediately unnecessary if one accepts the interpretation that the description refers to ensembles of systems and not to individual systems.
—Albert Einstein
...

ThomasT said:
What's weird about observers, measurements, and our knowledge. All of these have objective physical referents.
Hurkyl said:
But, as the quote said, they're "magic". CI excludes, a priori, the possibility that such things can be described by quantum mechanics.
Where does it say that? There's a quantum theory of measurement, isn't there? Is it necessarily at odds with the basic concerns of an instrumentalist approach?
Hurkyl said:
If all predictions of quantum mechanics can be computed (in principle) from the wavefunction, then that means the quantum wavefunctions really do refer to "real propagations in some quantum underworld".
Yes, in some sense, because quantum correlations are, to a certain extent, predictable. But there's no way to know if it's revealing exactly what's happening in that underlying reality. The randomness of individual quantum phenomena suggest that it isn't. Wavefunctions, and various models of subatomic processes, are a synthesis of metaphysical heuristics and the record of objective instrumental behavior. MWI just goes too far in assuming that wavefunctions are in one-to-one correspondence with the 'quantum underworld' and so generates some physical absurdities. Assuming that wavefunctions describe the actual physical state of the underlying reality is an unwarranted stretch.
 
  • #38
Dmitry67 said:
BTW I am curious how Quantum Decoherence (QD) is interpreted in CI.
QD belongs to QM, it is independent of any interpretation

Quantum decoherence isn't explicitly referenced in CI, as it wasn't known about at the time of its formulation. However, its most salient charecteristic, that of the effective quantum- classical divide at a certain scale of largeness, is included in the copenhagen description. Effectively, this answers the same paradoxes as decoherence, as the copenhagen authors understood that macroscopic systems are normally classical. Schrodinger's cat couldn't be in a superposition according to the original formulation, because it has reached a certain level of complexity and obeyed classical mechanics. Decoherence offers the mechanism of environmental interaction as the explanation of this emergent classicality. I think decoherence, because of the effective similarites, is easily accommodated by Copenhagen. Consistent Histories really conceptually clarifies the role of decoherence and updates the copenhagen framework to incorporate it.
 
  • #39
I agree with you, there are no reasons why QD should not fit in the CI. CI must adopt it as QD is interpretation-independent.

But my question is what CI should do with the old, original wavefunction collapse? Before the discovery of QD measurements were explained by the collapse. But now...

Does CI use both QD and collapse, or collapse is replaced by QD in the modern CI, or something else?

(Personally I think CI is dead because of the discovery of QD as at the moment of discovery of QD Occams razor erased the wavefunction collapse)
 
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  • #40
Dmitry67 said:
... "our knowledge" is subjective, not objective.
Our collective or public knowledge is objective. This is the sort of knowledge that the CI is talking about. Materials, instruments, observational data -- that sort of thing.
Dmitry67 said:
But the main problem is that CI defines the behavior of the quantum particles based on 'measurement devices', while the measurement devices are themselves huge collections of particles. Such definition is deadly recursive and makes futile any potential attempt to axiomatize the QM (known as 6th Hilberts problem)
Axiomization would be nice. But it should be based on physical facts, shouldn't it? Shouldn't the historical and physical bases of the superposition principle, the projection postulate, and the Born rule be taken into account?
Dmitry67 said:
... there is only one cat in CI (and some other I) but *NOT* in MWI. It is a main point of the whole MWI: there are BOTH cats!
I see that as a problem with MWI.

Doesn't the MWI take the Schroedinger wave equation as the fundamental physical dynamic? If so, that seems to me to be on the right track -- because the fundamental dynamic governing the behavior of all physical systems in our universe would seem to be some sort of fundamental wave dynamic. But there is a problem with saying that quantum superpositions represent real physical states (eg., independent of observation, the cat is both dead and alive). Doesn't it make more sense to say that quantum superpositions represent no more and no less than the (probability weighted) possible experimental results?

I don't think that taking the Schroedinger wave equation or any wave behavior as the fundamental physical dynamic requires thinking of quantum states as real physical states. This goes back to the physical basis for quantum mechanics, which is the behavior of instruments, not of some 'reality' underlying that behavior.

Wasn't the motivation for Heisenberg's matrix mechanical representation to take the instrumental behavior as the point of departure for a theory of quantum phenomena? Isn't this more or less equivalent to the Schroedinger representation? If so, then what is the basic mathematical structure of quantum theory about? Is it (1) describing the actual physical behavior of a quantum underworld, or is it (2) relating the variety of our observations of instrumental behavior so as to produce the most accurate probabilistic predictions regarding future instrumental behavior? Certainly (2), but also, it seems, a bit of (1) insofar as it incorporates analogies from classical physics and our experience of macroscopic phenomena. But whereas (2) is complete in that everything that can be taken into account is taken into account, (1) has to be considered incomplete as long as the theory is unable to predict the behavior of individual quantum phenomena.

If the completeness of (1) is obviated by the quantum theory itself, then the MWI is obviated.
 
  • #41
ThomasT, I understand that it might be confusing as in MWI there are 2 realities. Max Tegmark had explicitlycalled them 'birds view' and 'frogs view'. Frogs view is an observer's view, in it reality is random. In the bird's view (God who observes all the realities at once) QM is deterministic and wavefunction is real.

The bird's view is used in GR, for example, when we talk about the 'baloon' analogy - looking at our world from the 'outside' or the universe.

So when you say 'is it real' you just need to specify if you are referring frog's or bird's view. In frog's view there is 'randomly' one cat, in bird's view there are (deterministically) both.

While in the birds view we talk about 'what had actually happened' (and on that level QM is not only deterministic, but also realistic. On the contrary, Frog's view, in the best Einstein traditions deals with only the observables, which are derived from the QM equations (Bird's view), but appear very different from them to the observers.
 
  • #42
There's some room for argument (as I find myself in a philosopy room, there's plenty more), but MWT is not quantum mechanics. It's missing a postulate.
 
  • #43
on a purely philosophical note, in addition to its problems with probability, I still can't fully appreciate the determinism offered by MWI. The branch *you* wind up in is entirely random, and impossible in principle to determine because there is no singular you, just many descendents on equal footing. From an individual perspective, that indeterminism is preserved and there is no escaping it- it seems forced to try to salvage determinism by extravagantly expanding reality and saying that the direct verification of deterministic phenomena is in principle beyond measurement, while maintaining the loathed indeterminism from any given single perspective.
 
  • #44
jms5631 said:
on a purely philosophical note, in addition to its problems with probability, I still can't fully appreciate the determinism offered by MWI. The branch *you* wind up in is entirely random, and impossible in principle to determine ...

Did you think science was the end-all, be-all of reason? Or is it limited in scope by the pivotal dependency on experimental evidence? Quantum mechanics already stresses the scientific formula. Qunatum mechanics is non-repeatable.

As the previously perceived requirement of experimental repeatability has reasonably undergone a metamorphosis to accommodate the statistical nature of quantum mechanical observation, how /or should unobservables, in principle, be reasonably accommodated?

If you figure it out, let me know :smile:
 
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  • #45
Dmitry67 said:
I agree with you, there are no reasons why QD should not fit in the CI. CI must adopt it as QD is interpretation-independent.

But my question is what CI should do with the old, original wavefunction collapse? Before the discovery of QD measurements were explained by the collapse. But now...

Does CI use both QD and collapse, or collapse is replaced by QD in the modern CI, or something else?

(Personally I think CI is dead because of the discovery of QD as at the moment of discovery of QD Occams razor erased the wavefunction collapse)

If its dead why then is it still the weapon of choice for the discerning physicist. Also what other interpretation has anything but the most tenuous evidence for its existence? None. This is still a money where your mouth is situation, and I hope you're right, sincerely, but hopes and dreams and what ifs are not science.

How anyone can use an axiom like Occam's razor to be the source of their conviction alone - and erroneously at that - All things not being equal, is beyond me.
 
  • #46
jms5631 said:
I still can't fully appreciate the determinism offered by MWI. The branch *you* wind up in is entirely random, and impossible in principle to determine because there is no singular you, just many descendents on equal footing.

I was also thinking about it when I read about MWI the very first time.
But there is no paradox: there are many *you*'s, so, in case of a cat, both *you* are saying: but look, why the cat is dead(alive), not vice versa? For *me* it is random! Why *my* consciousness has chosen that particular branch of reality?

And while for both *you* it is a total surprise, when you look at it from the bird's view, seeing all branches, the whole picture looks deterministic and perfectly symmetric
 
  • #47
The Dagda said:
If its dead why ...

You are answering my psycological comment, not my question itself.
And I know why. Because it is a BIG problem for CI.
Forget what I said about 'CI is dead'
Could you answer my question above?
 
  • #48
Dmitry67 said:
So when you say 'is it real' you just need to specify if you are referring frog's or bird's view. In frog's view there is 'randomly' one cat, in bird's view there are (deterministically) both.
I often use the bird's eye view when speculating about things. The bird's eye view of MWI isn't supported by objective reality. The interpretation of the wavefunction that's the basic premise of MWI isn't supported by objective reality. It's a fiction which is obviated not only by our observations and by the quantum theory itself, but also by at least one interpretation which does basically the same thing as MWI, afaik, without all the fluff.

MWI might be an interesting exercise for some, but, imho, it's not very good natural philosophy.
 
  • #49
ThomasT said:
I often use the bird's eye view when speculating about things. The bird's eye view of MWI isn't supported by objective reality. The interpretation of the wavefunction that's the basic premise of MWI isn't supported by objective reality. It's a fiction which is obviated not only by our observations and by the quantum theory itself, but also by at least one interpretation which does basically the same thing as MWI, afaik, without all the fluff.

MWI might be an interesting exercise for some, but, imho, it's not very good natural philosophy.

Again, what objective reality?
Objective in frog's view or bird's view?
Note, we can not 'observe' the bird's view from insideof our world.

However, if you still insist, please provide additional details for:

The bird's eye view of MWI isn't supported by objective reality. The interpretation of the wavefunction that's the basic premise of MWI isn't supported by objective reality.

What contradictions do you see?
 
  • #50
Dmitry67 said:
Again, what objective reality?
Objective in frog's view or bird's view?
Note, we can not 'observe' the bird's view from insideof our world.

However, if you still insist, please provide additional details for:

The bird's eye view of MWI isn't supported by objective reality. The interpretation of the wavefunction that's the basic premise of MWI isn't supported by objective reality.

What contradictions do you see?
Some bird's eye views are supported by objective reality. Some aren't. MWI's bird's eye view is one of those that isn't.

One reason that MWI isn't a good choice as a physical interpretation of quantum theory is because it leads to nonphysical results. But the main reason to reject it is because it starts from a premise that's contradicted by the theory itself.

Yes, CI says what quantum theory is -- essentially a theory of instrumental behavior. That's what an interpretation of the physical meaning of a theory is supposed to do. It's supposed to tell you what the theory is, not what it might be if it's fundamental dynamical equation were in one-to-one correspondence with the behavior of a reality underlying our objective apprehensions.
 
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