Many-Worlds Theory: Existence of Multiple Universes

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The discussion centers on skepticism regarding Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics, with participants questioning its validity and implications. Key points include the idea that if infinite universes exist, their interactions remain unexplained, leading to concerns about infinite regress. Critics argue that MWI may serve as a philosophical cop-out rather than a robust scientific theory, as it lacks distinct predictions from the Copenhagen interpretation. The conversation also touches on the nature of observations in quantum mechanics and the challenges of verifying MWI experimentally. Overall, the debate highlights the tension between philosophical interpretations and empirical science in understanding the universe.
  • #51
Dmitry67 said:
You are answering my psycological comment, not my question itself.
And I know why. Because it is a BIG problem for CI.
Forget what I said about 'CI is dead'
Could you answer my question above?

Yeah I can answer your question why is CI dead, when all there is to replace it is philosophy? Show me the money, or is just arm waving what you call science these days. Occam's razor is not a law of science, I've said that before and I'll say it again, nor is it applicable as no other interpretation has anything like the evidence CI has, it's not the mainstream because someone just thought they'd put up all the interpretations on a dart board and toss a dart over their shoulder. And making claims that CI is dead based on pure conjecture is an extraordinary leap of logic, or should I say non sequitur. I think the onus is on you to prove just how you came to that wildly speculative idea, n'est pas?

Amazing now your resorting to psychology, now you really have lost me, what makes you think your conceptions according to the planet you live on have anything to do with the way the Universe works at all, let alone make you an authority enough to judge what is correct on that basis?

Dmitry67 said:
Again, what objective reality?
Objective in frog's view or bird's view?
Note, we can not 'observe' the bird's view from insideof our world.

However, if you still insist, please provide additional details for:

The bird's eye view of MWI isn't supported by objective reality. The interpretation of the wavefunction that's the basic premise of MWI isn't supported by objective reality.

What contradictions do you see?

None, fancy talk doesn't pass for evidence and it never has. I'd say that's pretty much spot on. MWI has nothing but a philosophical basis.

And considering what it would take to prove it or even distinguish it from CI it probably always will.
 
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  • #52
CI doesn't say objective reality does not exist(at the quantum level, remember its existence is not contested in the classical limit), its statement is rather :the nature of reality between measurements is unknowable and the only things that can be meaningfully discussed are the outcomes of measurements.
 
  • #53
ThomasT said:
Some bird's eye views are supported by objective reality. Some aren't. MWI's bird's eye view is one of those that isn't.

One reason that MWI isn't a good choice as a physical interpretation of quantum theory is because it leads to nonphysical results. But the main reason to reject it is because it starts from a premise that's contradicted by the theory itself.

You say, *some*, *nonphysical results* etc.
ANY EXAMPLES?
Please?
 
  • #54
The Dagda said:
Amazing now your resorting to psychology, now you really have lost me, what makes you think your conceptions according to the planet you live on have anything to do with the way the Universe works at all, let alone make you an authority enough to judge what is correct on that basis?

Listen, "CI is dead" was just a side note.
You use it to ignore my question.

The question was, now, after QD is discovered, how CI deals with it?
Do you have both old-style collapse plus QD in the modern edition of CI, or what?
You say, you don't like armwaving, this is good, answer a real question.
 
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  • #55
Dmitry67 said:
Listen, "CI is dead" was just a side note.
You use it to ignore my question.

The question was, now, after QD is discovered, how CI deals with it?
Do you have both old-style collapse plus QD in the modern edition of CI, or what?
You say, you don't like armwaving, this is good, answer a real question.

Decoherence, as you know given that you use it in the context of an MWI framework, is not yet sufficient to solve the measurement problem on its own-with a few notable active areas of research that are the exceptions, namely Zurek's approaches. Decoherence provides the mechanism by which quantum interference effects are suppressed, but does not say why a pointer state is selected, nor what happens to the other elements of the wavefunction. There is no reason why collapse can't coexist with decoherence, and some versions of copenhagen have been revised to include it specifically. Personally, as I have said before, look to the consistent histories interpretation to provide a complete account of decoherence within a copenhagen style framework.
 
  • #56
Dmitry67 said:
Listen, "CI is dead" was just a side note.
You use it to ignore my question.

The question was, now, after QD is discovered, how CI deals with it?
Do you have both old-style collapse plus QD in the modern edition of CI, or what?
You say, you don't like armwaving, this is good, answer a real question.

As was said above which I agree with. And also of course the standard explanation is the explanation that we find evidence for in both the double slit and Bell's inequalities. It may be a pain in the arse, and I hope something like the Bohmian model or MWI is in fact the correct model, but as yet it's too premature to throw the baby out with the bath water.

I've personally read a few papers of how say the Schrödinger Equation can be resolved from first principles or mathematically it is apt to consider the wave function real, but the problem is they rely on a priori assumptions, which as of yet have yet to be established; such as mentioned, if the wave function is indeed pictorially accurate, or there are indeed hidden variables or the wave function is resolved in other "worlds".
 
  • #57
jms5631 said:
1
Decoherence, as you know given that you use it in the context of an MWI framework, is not yet sufficient to solve the measurement problem on its own-with a few notable active areas of research that are the exceptions, namely Zurek's approaches. Decoherence provides the mechanism by which quantum interference effects are suppressed, but does not say why a pointer state is selected, nor what happens to the other elements of the wavefunction.

2
There is no reason why collapse can't coexist with decoherence, and some versions of copenhagen have been revised to include it specifically.

1 Correct, but do we need 2 things to fix 1 problem?
2 any links to the 'revised CI'?
I am really curious.

2 Dadga:
Ah, looks like I had misinterpreted your words.
 
  • #58
Dmitry67 said:
1 Correct, but do we need 2 things to fix 1 problem?
2 any links to the 'revised CI'?
I am really curious.

2 Dadga:
Ah, looks like I had misinterpreted your words.

Having looked at the way I said it that is understandable, it's not an easy subject to clarify. I do like most, hope we are not hamstrung by CI, but I am not certain of anything and nor do I have any right to be being as I do not have the education to make overarching prepositions. :smile:
 
  • #59
Dmitry67 said:
You say, *some*, *nonphysical results* etc.
ANY EXAMPLES?
Please?
What's all that branching stuff? :smile:
Hey, if anything I'm saying is wrong then let me know. I appreciate the discussions. They motivate me to look things up.

Are you a fan of MWI? If so, what questions do you think it answers? What problems do you think it solves?

I'm not against metaphysics, just metaphysics that seems unnecessary or not grounded in objective records.

For example, I think that there are some reasons to believe in multiverse ideas. But not the sort of multiverse produced by quantum wavefunction branching a la the MWI.
 
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  • #60
ThomasT said:
1
What's all that branching stuff? :smile:

2
Are you a fan of MWI? If so, what questions do you think it answers? What problems do you think it solves?

3
For example, I think that there are some reasons to believe in multiverse ideas. But not the sort of multiverse produced by quantum wavefunction branching a la the MWI.

1
Let me repeat myself. MWI does not ADD anything new. It does not even postulate that these worlds exist. It doesnot posulate that ther world splits! MWI only DENIES the wavefunction collapse and (modern) MWI uses QD to show that QM without collapse is consistent with what we see.

So MWI does not need to justify the existence of alternative worlds and branching is a result of QD (which is interpretation-independent).

2
Yes, I am fan of MWI
MWI is very good for the axiomatization of physics
CI is in principle non-axiomatizable

3
Again, branching is not a part of MWI.
It is defined by QD and it is part of a standard, interpretation-independent QM
 
  • #61
Dmitry67 said:
1
Let me repeat myself. MWI does not ADD anything new. It does not even postulate that these worlds exist. It doesnot posulate that ther world splits! MWI only DENIES the wavefunction collapse and (modern) MWI uses QD to show that QM without collapse is consistent with what we see.

So MWI does not need to justify the existence of alternative worlds and branching is a result of QD (which is interpretation-independent).

Can you clarify your views on MWI somewhat further, I'm interested. I've never heard MWI without the definite positive statement that the other worlds need exist. I think without that postulate, you'd essentially have a Quantum Darwinistic, strict decoherence type approach.
 
  • #62
jms5631 said:
Can you clarify your views on MWI somewhat further, I'm interested. I've never heard MWI without the definite positive statement that the other worlds need exist. I think without that postulate, you'd essentially have a Quantum Darwinistic, strict decoherence type approach.

ok, so
1. We take a 'pure' QM, with deterministic evolution of a wavefunction (in terms of CI, 'between collapses)
2. Then we takeinto account Quantum Decoherence: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_decoherence

So far it is interpretation-independent.
now the tricky part:

However, decoherence by itself may not give a complete solution of the measurement problem, since all components of the wave function still exist in a global superposition, which is explicitly acknowledged in the many-worlds interpretation. All decoherence explains, in this view, is why these coherences are no longer available for inspection by local observers. To present a solution to the measurement problem in most interpretations of quantum mechanics, decoherence must be supplied with some nontrivial interpretational considerations (as for example Wojciech Zurek tends to do in his Existential interpretation). However, according to Everett and DeWitt the many-worlds interpretation can be derived from the formalism alone, in which case no extra interpretational layer is required.

3. So, both cats exist (mathematically), they just can not interact. MWI just accepts it AS IS without adding any additional axioms. In that sense, it is 'shut up and calculate'.

CI claims that somehow (randomly) one cat becomes 'real' and another 'non-physical', claiming that nature had somehow made a choice between 2 paths. Another reality is nonphysical (and Stephen King's Langolieres have to eat all these 'abandoned' realities :) )

So in MWI alternative worlds exist not because MWI claims they exist, but because it does not contain an world-elimination axiom (collapse)! Oversimplifying, CI is MWI + 'langolieres' :)
 
  • #63
Dmitry67 said:
(1)Let me repeat myself. MWI does not ADD anything new. It does not even postulate that these worlds exist. It doesnot posulate that ther world splits! MWI only DENIES the wavefunction collapse and (modern) MWI uses QD to show that QM without collapse is consistent with what we see.

So MWI does not need to justify the existence of alternative worlds and branching is a result of QD (which is interpretation-independent).

(2)Yes, I am fan of MWI
MWI is very good for the axiomatization of physics
CI is in principle non-axiomatizable

(3)Again, branching is not a part of MWI.
It is defined by QD and it is part of a standard, interpretation-independent QM
(1)Ok, then it comes down to the physical meaning of 'wavefunction collapse'. If wavefunction collapse objectively refers to the qualitative behavior of instruments, then there's no denying that of the various probability weighted, mutually exclusive possibilities described by the wavefunction, only one will correspond to the instrumental configuration for any single trial in an experimental run -- and that's the physical meaning of wavefunction collapse.
(The fact that only one possible result per trial is recorded is how we know that the possibilities represented in the formalism are, physically, mutually exclusive -- ie., that the mathematical representation doesn't mean that they all physically 'exist' simultaneously.)

The results of individual trials can't be predicted because the quantum theory of measurement is an incomplete description of the physical processes underlying the instrumental behavior. Is a complete description of the underlying processes even possible? The CI says no because the basic quantum hypothesis, the existence of a fundamental quantum of action, defines a relationship between canonically conjugate observables which limits what can be objectively demonstrated (ie., what can be known via instrumental behavior).

The MWI, however, starts by assuming that quantum wavefunctions and quantum superpositions are complete descriptions of the underlying processes (that quantum states are real physical states), even though we know that those wavefunctions and superpositions predict random results wrt individual trials. The result of this is that the MWI (even if, as you say, it doesn't generate a metaphysical picture that seems nonsensical) leaves us no better off, objectively, than simply not extending the minimalist interpretation of the formalism in the first place. This is why I think that the MWI is, and must be, an unproductive approach toward a better understanding of the interactions, etc., involved in quantum measurement processes.

(2)Are there any other approaches to axiomatization of quantum theory, besides MWI, that seem promising?

(3)A completely interpretation-independent qm (ie., if quantum wavefunctions were taken to be devoid of any physical meaning) wouldn't be of much use, would it?
 
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  • #64
ThomasT said:
(The fact that only one possible result per trial is recorded is how we know that the possibilities represented in the formalism are, physically, mutually exclusive)
We can agree that "only one possible result per trial is recorded", but your next statement doesn't follow. For a 'realistic' measuring device governed by the Schrödinger equation, you would be left with a measuring device in a superposition of states, each one recording only one possible result.
 
  • #65
what does 'physical' mean, or 'physically' in this case?

I wouldn't call the many world theories valid physical theories, in the sense in which the word physical has commonly been used, anymore than quantum mechanics is a valid theory of physics verified by repeatable results --before this idea of repeatability was extended to include statistical repeatability of a new kind.

Hurkyl, I'm trying to think of a few examples, by comparison, of things that are taken as physical, but are canonically unmeasurable. I was thinking virtual particles would do, but there's the Cramer(sp?) force.
 
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  • #66
ThomasT said:
(1)Ok, then it comes down to the physical meaning of 'wavefunction collapse'. If wavefunction collapse objectively refers to the qualitative behavior of instruments, then there's no denying that of the various probability weighted, mutually exclusive possibilities described by the wavefunction, only one will correspond to the instrumental configuration for any single trial in an experimental run -- and that's the physical meaning of wavefunction collapse.
(The fact that only one possible result per trial is recorded is how we know that the possibilities represented in the formalism are, physically, mutually exclusive -- ie., that the mathematical representation doesn't mean that they all physically 'exist' simultaneously.)

The results of individual trials can't be predicted because the quantum theory of measurement is an incomplete description of the physical processes underlying the instrumental behavior. Is a complete description of the underlying processes even possible? The CI says no because the basic quantum hypothesis, the existence of a fundamental quantum of action, defines a relationship between canonically conjugate observables which limits what can be objectively demonstrated (ie., what can be known via instrumental behavior).

The MWI, however, starts by assuming that quantum wavefunctions and quantum superpositions are complete descriptions of the underlying processes (that quantum states are real physical states), even though we know that those wavefunctions and superpositions predict random results wrt individual trials. The result of this is that the MWI (even if, as you say, it doesn't generate a metaphysical picture that seems nonsensical) leaves us no better off, objectively, than simply not extending the minimalist interpretation of the formalism in the first place. This is why I think that the MWI is, and must be, an unproductive approach toward a better understanding of the interactions, etc., involved in quantum measurement processes.

(2)Are there any other approaches to axiomatization of quantum theory, besides MWI, that seem promising?

(3)A completely interpretation-independent qm (ie., if quantum wavefunctions were taken to be devoid of any physical meaning) wouldn't be of much use, would it?

2. I don't know
personally I am am very conviced by the Max Tegmark's approach
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Tegmark
http://arxiv.org/abs/0704.0646

3. I agree

1. Form the Bird's view wavefunctions is a complete description of a system
But it does not give us a chance to predict the results of individual measurements, from our frog's perspective.
 
  • #67
Phrak said:
Hurkyl, I'm trying to think of a few examples, by comparison, of things that are taken as physical, but are canonically unmeasurable. I was thinking virtual particles would do, but there's the Cramer(sp?) force.

Besides the interior of the balack holes, I am thinking about the statement that (if Omega is low enough or there is a repulsive gravity, but we are almost sure about it) spacetime of our Universe is 'open' and space in infinite.

While any statements about the local curvature are physical (falsifiable in the classical sense) the claim 'our universe in infinite' is non-falsifiable because you can not fly to the infinity to prove, that there is no 'edge of the universe', even in principle.

I think this is a very good example.

You can not prove experimantally that 'our universe is infinite'
But an opposite claim, that it is finite, is also inverifiable, but it is also weird and it introduces a strange object, 'an edge of the space'

In MWI, you can notprove experimentally, that other worlds exist.
However, an opposite claim, that they don't exist, is also unverifiable, but it introduces the strange process called wavefunction collapse (other-worlds-elimination)
 
  • #68
Phrak said:
what does 'physical' mean, or 'physically' in this case?
Oh! I had completely glossed over that, just assuming ThomasT was referring to a definite outcome.

I feel silly, because I missed a chance to deliver one of my favorite arguments! It's clear that we can construct a 'real', 'physical' experiment to detect whether or not our measuring devices record only one result per trial... but what sort of experiment can detect whether or not the outcome is definite or indefinite?


If you're looking for analogies, in my mind it's very much like the notion of position (or velocity, or charge, or whatever): things that aren't preserved by physical symmetries, so they're not really 'physical' notions, but yet we keep them around because they make everything simpler, and simply deal with the ambiguity. (e.g. by measuring charge as a multiple of a fixed reference charge)

I find CI very much akin to doing Newtoniam mechanics with the restriction that the only coordinate charts you're ever allowed to use are ones where you're at the origin, and the x, y, and z axes are all forward, left, and up, respectively. You can do it, it eliminates some non-physicality, and it more closely resembles what you actually observe... but yet it's a silly restriction to adhere to.


(P.S. I am of the opinion that things like a CNOT gate are perfectly good toy models of a measuring device. And with a CNOT gate, you can experimentally demonstrate that you don't get definite outcomes)
 
  • #69
Hurkyl said:
Oh! I had completely glossed over that, just assuming ThomasT was referring to a definite outcome.
I thought I was referring to a definite outcome.

Hurkyl said:
I feel silly, because I missed a chance to deliver one of my favorite arguments! It's clear that we can construct a 'real', 'physical' experiment to detect whether or not our measuring devices record only one result per trial... but what sort of experiment can detect whether or not the outcome is definite or indefinite?
Aren't all recorded results definite outcomes? Or is there a difference between results and outcomes?

Hurkyl said:
(P.S. I am of the opinion that things like a CNOT gate are perfectly good toy models of a measuring device. And with a CNOT gate, you can experimentally demonstrate that you don't get definite outcomes)
What do you mean by 'definite outcomes'?
 
  • #70
Dmitry67 said:
You can not prove experimantally that 'our universe is infinite'
But an opposite claim, that it is finite, is also inverifiable, but it is also weird and it introduces a strange object, 'an edge of the space'.
The boundary of a finite universe doesn't seem so strange if you think of that boundary as a wavefront expanding in a medium. Observations suggest that our universe is expanding, which suggests that it had a beginning, which implies that it's finite -- even if fapp it's infinite.

Dmitry67 said:
In MWI, you can not prove experimentally, that other worlds exist.
However, an opposite claim, that they don't exist, is also unverifiable, but it introduces the strange process called wavefunction collapse (other-worlds-elimination)
'Wavefunction collapse' refers to the registration of a detection, the appearance of a bit of data, the end of an interval that might define a trial where no detection is recorded, or the end of an experimental run. The term wasn't invented to eliminate "other worlds", at least afaik it wasn't.

"Other-worlds-elimination" isn't a problem for interpretations that don't produce them. The "other worlds" never appear. The simplest explanation for this is that they're interpretational fictions.
 
  • #71
ThomasT said:
What do you mean by 'definite outcomes'?
We have a definite outcome if the wavefunction of the ________1 is not in a combination2 of states corresponding to different outcomes.

1: Fill the blank in with "universe" or "system" or whatever would be appropriate.
2: Either mixed or pure


e.g. if we have a qubit with basis states |0> and |1>, and we decide to call those states 'outcomes', then |0> and |1> are definite, whereas |0> + |1> is indefinite, as is a mixture 50% |0> and 50% |1>.


For a more elaborate example, suppose we had four qubits, three initialized to zero, and the other one an input to our experiment. We use a CNOT gate to add the input state to the first and second qubits (a toy 'measurement'), and then we used two more CNOT gates to add the first and second qubits to the third (a 'compare' 'measurement' -- set the third qubit to 1 if and only if the first and second qubits are different)

If the input qubit is |0> + |1>, then the end result if passing it through the device is the state: (the input qubit is on the fourth line)

A: Start with: |000>(|0> + |1>)
B: After first 'measurement' CNOT gate: |0000> + |1001>
C: After second 'measurement' CNOT gate: |0000> + |1101>
D: After the first 'compare' CNOT gate: |0000> + |1111>
E: After the second 'compare' CNOT gate: |0000> + |1101>

If we look at the (relative) state of the input qubit, it starts off in the pure state |0>+|1>, and after B, it decoheres into the mixture 50% |0> and 50% |1>, and stays there. The 'outcome' of the input qubit is indefinte.

If we look at the first qubit, it starts in the pure state |0>, and after B, it transisitions into the mixture 50% |0> and 50% |1>, and stays there. (It 'splits' into two 'copies': one 'measuring' a 0, and one 'measuring' a 1)

The third qubit, on the other hand, started in |0>, after D split into the mixture, and then at E it recombined into the pure state |0> -- we have the definite outcome that the first two qubits are measured to have the same value. (Despite the fact their actual value is indefinite!)
 
  • #72
Hurkyl said:
... what sort of experiment can detect whether or not the outcome is definite or indefinite? ...

... with a CNOT gate, you can experimentally demonstrate that you don't get definite outcomes ...
What I meant by definite outcome or definite result was a data bit or the physical state of a detector at a particular time. This is how the words, result, outcome, and definite are conventionally used, afaik.

Our discussion is about the physical meaning of quantum states. The physical meaning of the pure quantum bit state is that it will correspond to either 0 or 1, with 0 and 1 referring to, eg., two different voltage levels, two different polarizations, two different locations, etc. The data bits, 0 and 1, that the qubit superposition represents are mutually exclusive, definite outcomes.

CNOT gate demonstrations don't tell us that qubits refer to two, mutually exclusive, physical states simultaneously any more than any quantum superposition refers to the simultaneous existence of any number of mutually exclusive physical states.
 
  • #73
ThomasT said:
What I meant by definite outcome or definite result was a data bit or the physical state of a detector at a particular time. This is how the words, result, outcome, and definite are conventionally used, afaik.

Our discussion is about the physical meaning of quantum states. The physical meaning of the pure quantum bit state is that it will correspond to either 0 or 1, with 0 and 1 referring to, eg., two different voltage levels, two different polarizations, two different locations, etc. The data bits, 0 and 1, that the qubit superposition represents are mutually exclusive, definite outcomes.

Classical logic levels are a recoding of qbits, in this case to two level saturable states. It doesn't have to be-one-to one does it? The process has physical meaning, as you've called it, within the constraints of the recoding mechanism.
 
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  • #74
Hurkyl said:
(P.S. I am of the opinion that things like a CNOT gate are perfectly good toy models of a measuring device. And with a CNOT gate, you can experimentally demonstrate that you don't get definite outcomes)

I tried to make some headway on this some time ago when this came up, as you may recall. I didn't get very far. It seemed, apriori unreasonable that two qbits would interact, with |C> effecting a change in |A>, without |A> effecting a change in |C>.

The best I obtained for an answer was an oblique hint that the phase of the control bit, |C> was effected by the state of |A>.

Is this correct?
 
  • #75
Phrak said:
I tried to make some headway on this some time ago when this came up, as you may recall. I didn't get very far. It seemed, apriori unreasonable that two qbits would interact, with |C> effecting a change in |A>, without |A> effecting a change in |C>.

The best I obtained for an answer was an oblique hint that the phase of the control bit, |C> was effected by the state of |A>.

Is this correct?
Alas, it has completely fallen out of my brain. :frown: Anyways, I don't follow your train of thought, but I can give my own. :smile:

If we focus (relative) state of the control bit, then the typical result is that the CNOT gate forces decoherence: after passing through the CNOT gate, an initial pure state p|0> + q|1> would be transformed into a mixed state of |0> and |1> with probabilities |p|^2 and |q|^2 respectively. The same would happen with any input mixture. The only exception is if the control and target lines were entangled in a way that would cause interference.

So, as we would expect from a toy measurement, the object being 'measured' has decohered into a statistical mixture of the two outcomes.

And as long as there's not entanglement involved, the actual state of the target line is completely irrelevant. (At least, if I've done the calculation correctly)
 
  • #76
Hurkyl said:
Alas, it has completely fallen out of my brain. :frown:

No problem, Hurkyl. Some 1000 threads back for both of us, you were explaining MWT and decoherence. The notion of a toy observer came up—I think for the first time—as a possible means to model decoherence in quantum mechanical observers.

---------------------------------

Maybe I should start over.

To make sense of MWT we need to understand an observer as a quantum mechanical system. To understand this, we could construct a toy observer. To do this we need to model the nature of human or machine information processing. To do this we need:

1) An underlying principle of classical information processing. We need this because it will tell us that classical information processing requires that information is discarded. The so-called reversible classical gates are reversible only in principle. Even a not gate discards information. This will invoke decoherence as a sufficient, though not necessary, element of classical information processing. (more on this later.)

and 2) A schema for building classical logic gates or neurons out of multiple quantum gates.


Now, if we are to model gates, or neurons, or the neurons of neuronetworks out of quantum gates, we had better darned well understand quantum gates.

I cannot believe that two quantum bits can interact, where qbit C changes qbit T, without qbit T changing qbit C. Say we have a c-not and C=1. What has happened to the information of the fomer state of T? If we are questioning the validity in the operation of a c-not gate, it’s not enough to say the value of T can be reacquired by acting a second c-not gate on T'. I think something has been left out of the popular description of a c-not gate.

I will have to go out on a limb in the following, because the fact of the matter is, I don’t know if the following is true or not. Let me know.

a) A quantum gate is reversible.
b)There is a relative phase between two qbits.
c) If the phase information is not preserved, the gate cannot be reversed.

For simplicity, assume the inputs to a c-not are both pure states; either |1> or |0>. Just as in boolean logic, there are 4 possible outcomes. If not, reversibility is violated; quantum mechanics would not obey time reverse symmetry.

d) I'm going to make a wild stab at the truth table of a c-not as follows.

(c,t) \rightarrow (c',t')
---------------------
(0,0) e^{\delta} \rightarrow (0,0) e^{\delta}
(0,1) e^{\delta} \rightarrow (0,1) e^{\delta}

(1,0) e^{\delta} \rightarrow (1,1) e^{\delta + \phi}
(1,1) e^{\delta} \rightarrow (1,0) e^{\delta + \phi}

\delta is the relative phase of two qbits. \delta is an unphysical gauge, that we could just as well set to zero. \phi is the change in the relative phase of c and t. We should be free to attach the phase to either output bit, as long as we are consistant.

A second c-not gate acting on the primed qubits would have the truth table:

(c',t') \rightarrow (c'',t'')
---------------------
(0,0) e^{\delta} \rightarrow (0,0) e^{\delta}
(0,1) e^{\delta} \rightarrow (0,1) e^{\delta}

(1,0) e^{\delta + \phi} \rightarrow (1,1) e^{\delta + 2\phi}
(1,1) e^{\delta + \phi} \rightarrow (1,0) e^{\delta + 2\phi}

If \phi = i \pi, two c-not gates in series will restore the primed states to their original unprimed states.

So, have I told any fibs yet?

The above contention is testable with two electrons (C,T), entangled in a c-not, sent on separate paths encompasing a solenoid, then reentangled with a second c-not. Varying the strength of the solenoid field should cause the resultant spin states (C'',T'') to vary. Sending both electrons around the same side of the solenoid should obtain (C'',T'')=(C,T), independent of the strength of the solenoid field.
 
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  • #77
Phrak said:
\delta is the relative phase of two qbits.
What exactly do you mean by this? I understand what it would mean to talk about the overall phase of their joint state, but it's not clear how to make sense of the idea of a relative phase between the two qubits.

Symbolically, the joint state, expressed as a vector in Hilbert space in the 0-1 basis, is of the form
a |00> + b |01> + c |10> + d |11>​
If b=c=d=0, for example, then we can interpret a as being the (unphysical) overall phase of the state vector, but there is nothing here expressing the idea of a relative phase between the two bits.

We could use the partial trace to extract the single particle states out of this joint state -- but the calculation for that I know involves using density matrices, and thus completely obliterates all information about the overall phase. (as well as destroying information about entanglement)
 
  • #78
Hurkyl said:
What exactly do you mean by this? I understand what it would mean to talk about the overall phase of their joint state, but it's not clear how to make sense of the idea of a relative phase between the two qubits.

Symbolically, the joint state, expressed as a vector in Hilbert space in the 0-1 basis, is of the form
a |00> + b |01> + c |10> + d |11>​
If b=c=d=0, for example, then we can interpret a as being the (unphysical) overall phase of the state vector, but there is nothing here expressing the idea of a relative phase between the two bits.

We could use the partial trace to extract the single particle states out of this joint state -- but the calculation for that I know involves using density matrices, and thus completely obliterates all information about the overall phase. (as well as destroying information about entanglement)

But you do understand the problem, don't you? If we can't properly account for quantum mechanical information, it's problematic that a translation to classical information will be correct.

Two particles of the same species have a relative phase. Either that, or I've misunderstood something. I'm referencing Mark P. Silverman, on the correlations of two electron interferometry, if that helps.

But things are worse than I though. The quantum gates described in most web sites, including Wikipedia, ignore the gate apparatus. The unitary operations are so schematical that entanglement with the apparatus enabling the operation is ignored. I have managed to discover that in an NMR (Nuc. Mag. Resonance) Hadamard gate, for instance, the qubit is entangled with a radio frequency source. Nowhere does this show up in the truth-table.
 
  • #79
Phrak said:
But you do understand the problem, don't you? If we can't properly account for quantum mechanical information, it's problematic that a translation to classical information will be correct.
It's not clear what exact question you're asking here. If you're referring to the loss of information when decomposing a 2-particle state into two 1-particle states, then yes, that would be a problem if we insisted that the two 1-particle states told us everything about the 2-particle state. Fortunately, we know better than to insist such a thing!

If you're referring to the fact I don't know what you mean by 'relative phase' here, then basically, one of the following is true:
A. You are talking about something that isn't a 2-qubit system
B. There is relative phase in the state I described, and I simply don't know what you mean by the term​

I guess I should point out that the place I am familiar seeing 'relative phase' is when talking about the components of a quantum state relative to some basis. e.g. for the single qubit state a|0>+b|1>, both the magnitude and the phase of the value (b/a) are physically significant.


The unitary operations are so schematical that entanglement with the apparatus enabling the operation is ignored. I have managed to discover that in an NMR (Nuc. Mag. Resonance) Hadamard gate, for instance, the qubit is entangled with a radio frequency source. Nowhere does this show up in the truth-table.
If the action of the gate apparatus on the qubits is not completely described by the truth table, then it's not a quantum gate. :smile:

I'm somewhat skeptical of your description though: I don't think the action of the gate on the qubit state can be unitary if it results in an entanglement with the gate apparatus. However, there is no problem introducing a temporary entanglement while the apparatus is operating, as long as it gets wiped out by the end of the operation.

I confess, however, I don't really know anything about the engineering of quantum gates.
 
  • #80
Re: engineering of quantum gates.

This is what it comes down to. I really won't be convinced of many things without a description of the experiental apparatus that manages a universal gate set.
 
  • #81
Many Worlds, like any other interpretation is not forced on us like, e.g. the Schroedinger equation is. In fact none of the (carefully thought out) interpretations is. Consider the following experiment. A fat coin is tossed. (It's fat so that the probability of it landing on its edge is not very small.) Spinning in the air, it is in a superposition of three states: heads, tails and edge. (There are hidden variables here of course, namely the initial conditions of the flip.) In a universe the coin lands on its edge. The people in this universe have never seen such a thing before. In the same universe the coin is flipped again. In another universe the coin lands on its edge and the people in this universe have the memory of two edges in a row. This goes on through many universes and the people in the "edge" universes begin to suspect that the laws of classical physics are just not applicable to this experiment for them. As time goes on and many flips have happened, in the "edge" universes the results of the flips are seen as just plain miraculous. If you extend this reasoning, you get an infinite number of universes where the laws of physics are wantonly broken. To me, this is unacceptable and a definite bye-bye to MWI. Comments?
 
  • #82
ccrummer said:
If you extend this reasoning, you get an infinite number of universes where the laws of physics are wantonly broken. To me, this is unacceptable and a definite bye-bye to MWI. Comments?
Classical physics permits the laws of physics to be "wantonly broken" too, y'know.
 
  • #83
Hurkyl How does "Classical physics permit the laws of physics to be 'wantonly broken'[?]"
 
  • #84
ccrummer said:
Hurkyl How does "Classical physics permit the laws of physics to be 'wantonly broken'[?]"


There's nothing in classical physics that forbids a flipped coin from landing on edge a million times in a row, for example. And if you treated the situation statistically, such events are definitely part of the set of outcomes, and with nonzero weight too.
 
  • #85
Emanresu56 said:
I'm not a huge fan of many-worlds theory, but I do think that multiple Universes can exist. My only problem is that if there's an infinite number of Universes, why hasn't a Universe collided with our own yet? Are there other Universes somehow keeping that Universe from colliding with ours? And does it go on like that ad infinitum?
The 'worlds' of MWI shouldn't be taken literally. MWI has no particular physical meaning. Just as standard quantum theory has no particular physical meaning.

So, with that in mind we can explore your question regarding, if there's an infinite number of universes, then why hasn't at least one of these universes collided with our universe? Well, maybe one has, and we just haven't noticed the effects of it in our sector of our universe yet.

Do you see how silly this sort of speculation can get?

Forget it. Don't be a fan. Just study physics.
 
  • #86
Hurkyl said:
There's nothing in classical physics that forbids a flipped coin from landing on edge a million times in a row, for example. And if you treated the situation statistically, such events are definitely part of the set of outcomes, and with nonzero weight too.

I'm a little confused by your statement. How are outcomes with a nonzero expectation breaking the laws of classical physics?
 
  • #87
ccrummer said:
--- snip long post --- To me, this is unacceptable and a definite bye-bye to MWI. Comments?
To me usual (many worlds) interpretation of relative states is unacceptable. But basic idea is worth considering. Take Schroedinger equation seriously because is, apparently even obviously to some, telling something about underlying reality. What? Big question. Nobody knows. You decide.
 
  • #88
You're right, of course. A disturbing thing about MWI, though, is that these improbable outcomes occur in some universe every time the experiment is done, i.e. for Classical physics these improbable events *could* occur where for MWI they *do* occur. I don't see how the equivalent of the Born rule can exist for MWI, or maybe what it would even mean. An outside observer would see that the pathological universes are of measure zero. The problem is that first of all, for Everett there is no such observer and second of all how can a measure be defined over the universes so that one could make statements about zero measure? Insights?
 
  • #89
Ivan Seeking said:
I'm a little confused by your statement. How are outcomes with a nonzero expectation breaking the laws of classical physics?
They're not.

However, that was the phrase ccrummer described the outcome of repeated edge landings.
 
  • #90
ccrummer said:
for MWI they *do* occur.
Only an "outside observer" would observe that. Inside observers are limited to "could".

how can a measure be defined over the universes so that one could make statements about zero measure? Insights?
That mixed (relative) states can be described as a statistical distribution over pure states is basic QM.
 
  • #91
ccrummer said:
You're right, of course. A disturbing thing about MWI, though, is that these improbable outcomes occur in some universe every time the experiment is done, i.e. for Classical physics these improbable events *could* occur where for MWI they *do* occur. I don't see how the equivalent of the Born rule can exist for MWI, or maybe what it would even mean. An outside observer would see that the pathological universes are of measure zero. The problem is that first of all, for Everett there is no such observer and second of all how can a measure be defined over the universes so that one could make statements about zero measure? Insights?
Well, I'm not expert on this. I think Hurkyl is expert. Maybe Ivan. Anyway, my understanding of relative states is not so alarming. Invoke Born rule ad hoc whenever. Why does Born rule work? This is just wave mechanics. You want to know outcome at particular place and particular time, then invoke Born rule. Intensity. Wave amplitude at particular place and particular time. Resulting probabilities generally hold. Schroedinger equation therefore must in some way correspond to deeper reality. But how, why? This is what I'm asking you, Hurkyl, Ivan, etc. Why? How?

Anyway, this is just some layman consideration of physics. No need to think of 'other worlds' etc. relative state interpretation is not so silly. It's about taking the wave equation seriously, and quite possibly corresponding to salient features of the underlying reality. After all, it does predict a rather wide range of phenomena. So, question is, what is it about the SE that is most important? What is it that corresponds to the deeper reality? It isn't a question about whether it does or doesn't. Obviously, 'something' about it does. So, what is it?
 
  • #92
Hurkyl said:
Only an "outside observer" would observe that. Inside observers are limited to "could".

No, inside observers whose worlds behave generally according to the laws of physics would observe these improbable events and in universes where there were strings of such events, the people would see them as miracles, things that defy the laws.

That mixed (relative) states can be described as a statistical distribution over pure states is basic QM.

Of course, you are right but that doesn't answer the problem of defining a "measure" over the set of universes. Such a measure would allow derivation of the Born rule and calculation of the Born probabilities.
 
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