Materialism (aka Non-materialists in denial)

[FZ+]

To spare Flipton, LWSleeth, Royce et al from my rather continuous ranting on the other thread, I've set this one up so my ranting may be safely ignored.

What I think materialism is:

My form of materialism is the fundamental denial of a material immaterial distinction. All concepts thought of as immaterial are thus either material in disguise, or non-existent entities. All things that are real are material, and this reality is because it acts in a material way - by having some sort of influence on other things which make it possible to be measured or perceived. (Of course, I think Flipton believes this not to be materialism at all, so I'll be happy for anyone else to come up with a name for it.)

In short:
Material = exerting some sort of influence that renders it detectable
Reality = that which is material
Immaterial reality = contradiction in terms, as to be real, it must become material.

What do you think?

 

[selfAdjoint]

FZ+, I'll buy this:

All concepts thought of as immaterial are thus either material in disguise, or non-existent entities.

provided the definition of material includes things like light, fields and if necesary "virtual" things that exist but cannot in principle be detected as individuals, but only by collective behavior. In other words things whose reality status is somewhat challenged by traditional standards but which are necessitated by contingently successful theories. Their acceptance being at the same level of contigence as the theories that require them.

 

[Yahweh]

I am your typical Evil Materialist.

What is Materialism?
Short definition: Belief that only physical things truly exist.

Complex Definition (from dictionary.com): Philosophical theory stating that physical matter is the only reality and that everything, including thought, feeling, mind, and will, can be explained in terms of matter and physical phenomena. Things that fail to meet to those 2 criteria cannot and do not exist.

My Annotated Definition: All things in the universe that exist or occur can be explained in terms of matter and natural phenomena, all things behave according to "natural law" (for lack of better terminology).

What does "material" mean?

Things which are material are classified as followed:
1. Either made of matter
2. Or a physical property of matter

By Special Relativity, matter and "energy" are equivelant. The computer in front of you is essentially [oversimplified]"congealed energy"[/oversimplified].

Why might people reject materialism?

Before, most people were skeptical of the existence of atoms. In April and May of 1905, Einstein published two papers. In one he invented a new method of counting and determining the size of the atoms or molecules in a given space and in the other he explains the phenomenon of Brownian motion. The net result was a proof that atoms actually exist - still an issue at that time - and the end to a millennia-old debate on the fundamental nature of the chemical elements.(Source).

Now, most Immaterialists reject Materialism because they don't understand how it accounts for consciousness. The reasoning goes like this:
1. Atoms are not conscious
2. You are made of matter (as stated by Materialism)
3. But you are conscious
4. Therefore, Materialism is logically inconsistant

Of course, that would be an example of a logical fallacy of composition, so it has no weight.

Not all Immaterialists reason like that.

However, as I've explained many times before, consciousness is described by Cognitive Neuroscience. Due to that fact, consciousness and Materialism are compatible. Here is some information worth reading:
http://www.neuropsychiatryreviews.com/oct02/npr_oct02_consciousness.html
http://www.sci-con.org/theory/20030401.html

What is reality?

Simple answer: The place where everything exists.

My Annotated Answer: The totality of all things which exist objectively.

What does it mean to "exist"?

Existence means "to be real in objective reality".

Interesting observation: Existence is a qualititive property an object can have, however "existence" itself is not real within objective reality.

A simple test of whether things exist: The Jar test.

The Jar test means that that exist can be put into a jar. "Existence" can't be put into a jar, pencils can. "Beauty" cannot be put into a jar, human beings can. The number 1 cannot be placed into a jar, electromagnetism (as a physical property of matter) can be put into a jar.

Note: Consciousness is a word used to describe an object which is self-aware, "consciousness" itself is in fact an abstract concept. In the same way, words like "alive" and "dead" are also abstract concepts.

Things which do not exist are known as "abstract concepts".

If any of yall are familiar with Lifegazer, I was one of his routine opponents. He was absolutely incapable of grasping how "'existence' doesn't really exist". He's migrated over to the JREF messageboards, lots of fun he is...

What else should I know?

As an extension of what I said above...
There is definite need to differenciate between "Objective Reality" and "Subjective Experience". For the reason, "red", numbers, prepositions, smells, and other abstract concepts do not exist in Objective Reality.

Kittens are adorable.

Materialism does not imply Determinism or Fatalism. The concept of "free-will" is compatible with Materialism.

Materialism states that things don't need to be observed to exist.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I am very sensitive to Beauty, and I have never had any trouble with seeing it as a behavior of my brain. So in your formulation it would be a property of matter, a pattern of material behavior, and a lot less iffy than those virtual particles I mentioned.

To return to those, all quantum field theories have the problem that in the mathematical sense "they do not exist". That is, there is no proof that there is something that behaves like quantum field theory. The (terrific!) results of such theories are gotten by adding up the first few terms of a series that may or may not converge. So these theories do not even pretend (though some of their supporters do) to be THE WORD. And thus the existence-value of the virtual particles, and the ghosts, and the tachyons that are essential parts of such theories has for me to be qualified with the asterisk of contingency. Next week somebody might find a replacemtnt for field theory tht doesn't have them in it.

With that caviat, I'm as fierce a materialist as anybody.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Yahweh
Why might people reject materialism?

Now, most Immaterialists reject Materialism because they don't understand how it accounts for consciousness.
There are other reasons. For instance, the existence of the material world. By a materialst explanation matter is eternal. Not everyone finds this logical. Also it means that the existence of matter is inexplicable. Not everyone likes this.

The reasoning goes like this:
1. Atoms are not conscious
2. You are made of matter (as stated by Materialism)
3. But you are conscious
4. Therefore, Materialism is logically inconsistant

Of course, that would be an example of a logical fallacy of composition, so it has no weight.

You'll need to explain why this has no weight. It certainly isn't obvious. If consciousness is matter then zombies can exist (entities identical to humans but not conscious). However if a zombie is not conscious and a human being is then clearly consciousness is something different to matter.

However, as I've explained many times before, consciousness is described by Cognitive Neuroscience. Due to that fact, consciousness and Materialism are compatible.

Neuroscience has not explained consciousness. It cannot even prove it exists. What you mean is that neuroscience hopes to explain it some time in the future, assuming it can get over the logical obstacles.

b]What is reality?[/b]
Simple answer: The place where everything exists.

Reality is a place?

My Annotated Answer: The totality of all things which exist objectively.

So anger doesn't exist?

What does it mean to "exist"?
Existence means "to be real in objective reality".

So feelings, perceptions, phenomena don't exist?

Interesting observation: Existence is a qualititive property an object can have, however "existence" itself is not real within objective reality.

Objective reality does not exist?

The Jar test means that that exist can be put into a jar. "Existence" can't be put into a jar, pencils can. "Beauty" cannot be put into a jar, human beings can.

What's this 'beauty' thing? I thought you arguing it didn't exist.

The number 1 cannot be placed into a jar, electromagnetism (as a physical property of matter) can be put into a jar.

So mathematics doesn't exist?

Note: Consciousness is a word used to describe an object which is self-aware,

Not by anyone I've ever heard of.

"consciousness" itself is in fact an abstract concept.

Every concept is abstract, including 'atom'. After all concepts only exist in consciousness.

In the same way, words like "alive" and "dead" are also abstract concepts.

Quite right. Unfortunately that doesn't seem to mean that we won't one day be dead.

Things which do not exist are known as "abstract concepts".

Is that your final decision?

If any of yall are familiar with Lifegazer, I was one of his routine opponents. He was absolutely incapable of grasping how "'existence' doesn't really exist". He's migrated over to the JREF messageboards, lots of fun he is...

If you mean that existence is an illusion of some sort then fine. If you mean that the word 'existence' doesn't exist then I'd disagree.

What else should I know?

That's asking for trouble. We all should know more.

As an extension of what I said above...
There is definite need to differenciate between "Objective Reality" and "Subjective Experience". For the reason, "red", numbers, prepositions, smells, and other abstract concepts do not exist in Objective Reality.

True enough. But it does not follow that they don't exist, after all you're talking about them.

Materialism does not imply Determinism or Fatalism. The concept of "free-will" is compatible with Materialism.

Only if you are a substance dualist, and there are so many problems with thus view that few people, not even in science, adopt this view any more. These days physicalists deny freewill. After all the idea that consciousness is causal contradicts science (unless you're a substance dualist).

Materialism states that things don't need to be observed to exist. [/B]

It states that they have to observable in theory, although not necessarily by human beings.

I think that you're using the term 'abstract' to mean 'does not exist'. This is not normal useage.

 

[Royce]

I still fail to see how matter or objective material is primary and the prerequisite for existence when matter is an effect, product or result of the organization of energy. In light of the Big Bang, symmetry, string theory etc how can matter be the cause of anything.
I also have several problems with Yehweh's post. Namely that electromagnetism is a property of matter and thus can be put in a jar.
This just doesn't make sense to me as EM is one of the four forces to which matter is subject to and makes matter possible, not the other way around.
Again it is which way the arrow points. Materialist say it points from matter to everything else. I and others think that it points the other way, from everything else to, finally, matter. We are justified in this as it has never been shown that matter does anything on its own without outside forces acting on it. A rock is a rock is arock forever until and unless something outside of the rock acts on it.

 

[Eh]

A little clarification here. You're defining materialism as the belief that only the physical exists. You then define the physical as things either made of matter or properties of matter. How then, do you define matter? What properties must an object have for it to be considered material??

 

[Fliption]

FZ it seems as if you have maintained this view that materialism cannot be distinguished from anything else with this:

Originally posted by FZ+
What I think materialism is:

My form of materialism is the fundamental denial of a material immaterial distinction. All concepts thought of as immaterial are thus either material in disguise, or non-existent entities.

But then you go on to make a distinction with this:

In short:
Material = exerting some sort of influence that renders it detectable

So a definition of immaterial things would be = something that exerts no influence that renders it detectable. Now that we have this distinction we can determine if all the materialists and non-materialists agree that this is what distinguishes their beliefs. I suspect it isn't but this is only the first attempt. You cannot have a discussion of such things if you do not understand what the other persons view is. I hope this is clear.

The first part of your definition of materialism does not allow for an opposing view. Yet opposing views run rampant here. Clearly, people are using a different definition from you. I say there can be no more debate on the truth of materialism until everyone is on the same page with regard to what it actually means. Already, several people have posted a definition that is not consistent with yours. So much debate over a topic no one can define. If there is a god, I'm sure he finds this entertaining.

 

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Canute
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The reasoning goes like this:
1. Atoms are not conscious
2. You are made of matter (as stated by Materialism)
3. But you are conscious
4. Therefore, Materialism is logically inconsistant

Of course, that would be an example of a logical fallacy of composition, so it has no weight.
--------------------------------------------------

You'll need to explain why this has no weight. It certainly isn't obvious.[/b]

The reason why the argument has no weight is because the reasoning is terrible, so terrible it is known as Logical Fallacy of Composition.

The Fallacy of Composition is to conclude that a property shared by a number of individual items, is also shared by a collection of those items; or that a property of the parts of an object, must also be a property of the whole thing. Examples:

"The bicycle is made entirely of low mass components, and is therefore very lightweight."

"A car uses less petrochemicals and causes less pollution than a bus. Therefore cars are less environmentally damaging than buses."

Do you see why such an argument has no weight?

If consciousness is matter then zombies can exist (entities identical to humans but not conscious). However if a zombie is not conscious and a human being is then clearly consciousness is something different to matter.

Yes, I am very familiar with p_Zombies.

However, I'm afraid your reasoning (a zombie is not conscious and a human being is, then clearly consciousness is something different to matter) is an example of forming a general rule by examining only a few specific cases which aren't representative of all possible cases, this is properly called "Hasty Generalization".

The p_Zombie argument essential boils down to semantics. Personally, I define consciousness as "knowledge of one's own existence, condition, sensations, mental operations, acts, etc; self-awareness" (thats a generalized definition, I know some people who'd like to break that down to a semantics based discussion), I see it as a qualititive property that an object can have. I don't see "consciousness" as something which exists seperately from matter or as an immaterial "entity" (I could name a few people off the top of my head who do).

Here is one reason why the p_Zombie debate is nullified: For what it's worth, I side with Dennett (a philosopher who believed "If it behaves like a person and is indistinguishable from a person, then it is a person"... Note: I've heard people rebuttle this by saying "dreams are indistinguishable from reality, does that make them reality", that's merely a Red Herring argument which means information unrelated to argument is being brought in, it is effectively a logical fallacy) and those who think that the concept of the p-zombie is a logical absurdity. If the "zombie" exhibits all the symptoms of consciousness, then the "zombie" is not a zombie; for to exhibit all the symptoms of consciousness is to have consciousness, which the zombie is denied by definition. And therefore, the entire notion of p_Zombies is a contradiction in terms (such as asking if a light can be both on and off at the same time is contradictory).

Neuroscience has not explained consciousness. It cannot even prove it exists. What you mean is that neuroscience hopes to explain it some time in the future, assuming it can get over the logical obstacles.

I gave a few links regarding Neuroscience and its efforts to explain and describe consciousness.

Most people have a hard time with consciousness. They just don't like the idea of consciousness being reduced down a few materialistic principles (for that reason, they would deny that machine could ever be conscious). Of course, this relates back to consciousness as a qualititive property an object can have as opposed to an immaterial "entity".

Reality is a place?

You're neglecting the second part where I stated "My Annotated Answer: The totality of all things which exist objectively."

I always try to give several definitions. I don't know who might be reading the things I write, I give "simple definitions" for those who might not understand the things I say, then I give much more detailed definitions afterward (see Annotated Definition of Reality).

Its just my effort to compose myself as a good technical speaker. I always tell myself "Its not help to anyone if you try to teach someone by talking over their head".

So anger doesn't exist?

So feelings, perceptions, phenomena don't exist?

(This apply to all but "phenomena") Not in Objective reality.

That is the part that always gets people...

Here, I'll describe why anger, perceptions, and feelings do not exist in terms of farts (it sounds funny but I'm going to make a serious point).

The smell of a fart does not exist. The process of smelling a fart is a physical process occurring in your brain. The memory of what a fart smells like is stored in the structure of your brain. The experience of remembering what a fart smells like is a process in your brain, and so on.

When we talk about the smell of a fart, we are talking about a process as though it were an object. That is just a quirk of language, based on intuitive preconceptions which date back hundreds, and even thousands of years. It is not an indication of what the true nature of reality is.

I think I see where you are going with this. The mistake in the "primary and secondary qualities" idea is not that there is no difference between things like length, and things like color. It is that the color of an object is not a "quality" of that object at all.

The color of an object is a part of the experience you have when you see, or remember seeing, that object. It is a physical process occurring in your brain.

There are qualities of an object which correspond to the experience of color. Namely the wavelengths of light that it emits and/or reflects. Those are standard qualities of the object, fundamentally no different than length or mass.

The idea that scientists claim that color itself is just a wavelength of light, or a property of a wavelength of light, is a misconception. The color of an object is a process occurring in your brain, usually (but not always) as a result of light of a particular wavelength entering your eyes. It is not a property of the object itself. We tend to intuitively think of it that way, but as is often the case, our intuition is simply wrong.

--------------------------------------------------
Interesting observation: Existence is a qualititive property an object can have, however "existence" itself is not real within objective reality.
--------------------------------------------------

Objective reality does not exist?

Two options (and possibly a hidden third option):

1. I reread my statement, I understand it just fine. I'm afraid you misread what I was trying to get across.

2. I have a hard time putting the things I want to get across into intelligible words (its not unusual for me).

I'm leaning towards options #1. I did not imply "Objective reality does not exist".

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[Yahweh]

Continued from last response

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The Jar test means that that exist can be put into a jar. "Existence" can't be put into a jar, pencils can. "Beauty" cannot be put into a jar, human beings can.
--------------------------------------------------

What's this 'beauty' thing? I thought you arguing it didn't exist.

I think you are unintentionally misrepresenting the context of what I said.

I was dumbing down how things can or cannot exist using the "Jar test". Stated that "beauty" cannot be put into a jar because it doesn't exist.

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The number 1 cannot be placed into a jar, electromagnetism (as a physical property of matter) can be put into a jar.
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So mathematics doesn't exist?

Again, you are unintentionally misrepresenting the context of what I said.

And strictly speaking, Mathematics (the study of the measurement, properties, and relationships of quantities and sets, using numbers and symbols) does not exist. "Mathematics" wouldn't be made of matter, its not a physical property of matter, it fails the Jar Test.

And to relate your last 3 or 4 statements, Some people say "exist the mind", but that is a phrase which is used candidly, a bit of a quirk of the English language (possibly other languages as well), I differenciate between things exist in objective reality, and things which are concepts.

--------------------------------------------------
Note: Consciousness is a word used to describe an object which is self-aware,
--------------------------------------------------

Not by anyone I've ever heard of.

I'll admit, it might be difficult to discern the things I write in intelligible ways, but I don't understand your objection.

Every concept is abstract, including 'atom'. After all concepts only exist in consciousness.

Another quirk of language.

The word "atom" is itself conceptual, however its only semantics soup when you forget that the word "atom" references a thing which exists in objective reality. (Again, if this is confusing for any reason, I have a hard time putting the things I like to say in intelligible sentences.)

--------------------------------------------------
Things which do not exist are known as "abstract concepts".
--------------------------------------------------

Is that your final decision?

Well it would be quite a contradiction in terms for something to both exist in reality and remain an abstract concept (again, its like the light being both on and off which I mentioned above).

--------------------------------------------------
If any of yall are familiar with Lifegazer, I was one of his routine opponents. He was absolutely incapable of grasping how "'existence' doesn't really exist". He's migrated over to the JREF messageboards, lots of fun he is...
--------------------------------------------------

If you mean that existence is an illusion of some sort then fine. If you mean that the word 'existence' doesn't exist then I'd disagree.

I'll try to reiterate in simplified terms:

Existence is not a substance (that is the part where Lifegazer disagreed with me... I don't know why, however...).

--------------------------------------------------
As an extension of what I said above...
There is definite need to differenciate between "Objective Reality" and "Subjective Experience". For the reason, "red", numbers, prepositions, smells, and other abstract concepts do not exist in Objective Reality.
--------------------------------------------------

True enough. But it does not follow that they don't exist, after all you're talking about them.

Hopefully, I reiterated clearly enough with my statements above.

--------------------------------------------------
Materialism does not imply Determinism or Fatalism. The concept of "free-will" is compatible with Materialism.
--------------------------------------------------

Only if you are a substance dualist, and there are so many problems with thus view that few people, not even in science, adopt this view any more. These days physicalists deny freewill.

First, it necessary to define "free-will".

I define "free-will" as the ability to consciously choose at one's own accord. (Note: There is a distinct difference between "free-will" and "free-action". Because you "will" to shoot lasers out of your eyes only limits your "free-action", the limitation is entirely unrelated to "free-will"... of course, Hobbes would disagree with me, but only because he had a different definition of "free-will" which too "action" into account).

The antitheses of "free-will" is of course, Fatalism and the general lacking of being able to consciously choose at your own accord (perhaps you don't have the structures to permit it, or maybe you're a rock).

Free-will is not a substance (and it fails the Jar test).

Most of the Physicalists, Naturalists, and Materialists I know do not deny that people have the ability to choose at there own accord.

Free-will is compatible with Materialism in the Philosophy of Compatibilism. From http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism :

Compatibilism, also known as "soft determinism" and most famously championed by Hume, is a theory which holds that free will and determinism are compatible. According to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires. Alternately, Hume maintains that free acts are not uncaused (or mysteriously self-caused as Kant would have it) but caused in the right way, i.e., by our choices as determined by our our beliefs and desires, by our characters. While a decision making process exists in Hume's determinism, this process is governed by the so-called causal chain of events. For example, a person may make the decision to support Wikipedia, but that decision is determined by the conditions that existed prior to the decision being made.[/size]

The bold part describes how Materialism and Free Will are compatible.

After all the idea that consciousness is causal contradicts science (unless you're a substance dualist).

I'm not sure what you mean by this, could you elaborate.

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Materialism states that things don't need to be observed to exist
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It states that they have to observable in theory, although not necessarily by human beings.

I agree.

Interesting anecdote: On the JREF boards is a troll (actually, its hard to tell if he's a troll, or merely someone a bit psychotic who's debate tactics resemble that of a troll). He posts under the name Franko, and occasionally under the name Wraith. He thinks Materialists believe things have to be observed before they exist (because that's what he believes... except he's not a Materialist). So what he did was created his own deity which he named "Logical Goddess" who observes and controls everything in the universe so that they exist. His "Philosophy" is actually much much crazier than that because he's a Fatalist, Solipsist, and Deist. About everything about his "Philosophy" is documented here.

I think that you're using the term 'abstract' to mean 'does not exist'. This is not normal useage.

Again, I sometimes have a hard time expressing the things I'd like to say conherently:

When I say "abstract", I mean "does not exist concretely in objectively reality".

 

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Eh
A little clarification here. You're defining materialism as the belief that only the physical exists. You then define the physical as things either made of matter or properties of matter. How then, do you define matter? What properties must an object have for it to be considered material??

Matter is defined in Physics as: Something which has mass (and usually takes up space).

Keep in mind, matter and energy are equivelant to one another. Solid things are essentially "congealed energy".

 

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Royce
I still fail to see how matter or objective material is primary and the prerequisite for existence when matter is an effect, product or result of the organization of energy. In light of the Big Bang, symmetry, string theory etc how can matter be the cause of anything.
I also have several problems with Yehweh's post. Namely that electromagnetism is a property of matter and thus can be put in a jar.
This just doesn't make sense to me as EM is one of the four forces to which matter is subject to and makes matter possible, not the other way around.

Believe it or not, I also had the same problem (that EM could be put into a jar). I was using the Jar Test example as a very crude dumbed down way to test something's existence.

I'll get a little more technical:

See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Abstract Object:

The abstract/concrete distinction has a curious status in contemporary philosophy. It is widely agreed that the distinction is of fundamental importance. But there is no standard account of how the distinction is to be explained. There is a great deal of agreement about how to classify certain paradigm cases. Thus it is universally acknowledged that numbers and the other objects of pure mathematics are abstract, whereas rocks and trees and human beings are concrete. Indeed the list of paradigms may be extended indefinitely:

ABSTRACTA
Classes
Propositions
Concepts
The letter A
Dante's Inferno

CONCRETA
Stars
Protons
The Electromagnetic Field
Stanford University
James's copy of Dante's Inferno

The challenge remains, however, to say what underlies this alleged dichotomy. In the absence of such an account, the philosophical significance of the contrast remains uncertain. We may know how to classify things as abstract or concrete by appeal to "intuition". But unless we know what makes for abstractness and concreteness, we cannot know what (if anything) hangs on the classification.

The Jar Test is essentially flawed testing for things such as EM. However, EM does happen to exist concretely, nothing surprising about that.

I'll admit, the Jar test, in my opinion, is not the best way I could have described what makes things exist or non-existent.

Again it is which way the arrow points. Materialist say it points from matter to everything else. I and others think that it points the other way, from everything else to, finally, matter. We are justified in this as it has never been shown that matter does anything on its own without outside forces acting on it. A rock is a rock is arock forever until and unless something outside of the rock acts on it.

I understand what you are saying, but I'm missing how does a rock with nothing acting on it implies "everything else to, finally, matter".

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
So a definition of immaterial things would be = something that exerts no influence that renders it detectable. Now that we have this distinction we can determine if all the materialists and non-materialists agree that this is what distinguishes their beliefs. I suspect it isn't but this is only the first attempt. You cannot have a discussion of such things if you do not understand what the other persons view is. I hope this is clear.

The first part of your definition of materialism does not allow for an opposing view. Yet opposing views run rampant here. Clearly, people are using a different definition from you. I say there can be no more debate on the truth of materialism until everyone is on the same page with regard to what it actually means. Already, several people have posted a definition that is not consistent with yours. So much debate over a topic no one can define. If there is a god, I'm sure he finds this entertaining.

It was kind of like Zero's definition from the "bias against materialism" thread, Fliption, and I'm not about to defend that, but I do have a suggestion as to a working definition :

Materialism: The belief that physical reality exists, and that there is nothing else but this physical reality.

Non-materialism: The belief that something other than physical reality exists, whether the physical exists or not (of course, radical skepticism doesn't allow this last part to be a sensical choice, but the fact remains that Solipsists believe that there is no physical or objective reality).


Also, as to the subject of objective reality, Materialism is not the only philosophy that postulates an objective reality, it's simply the only one that postulates that this reality is physical. Subjective experience would also be physical, since everything is physical, to the Materialist.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
It was kind of like Zero's definition from the "bias against materialism" thread, Fliption, and I'm not about to defend that, but I do have a suggestion as to a working definition :

Yes, you're right. It is the exact same definition used by Zero. Talking about Zero's definition is what got FZ and I talking about this to begin with in another thread. He then started this thread to focus on it more. But yes I think he and Zero agree with this non-definition.

Materialism: The belief that physical reality exists, and that there is nothing else but this physical reality.

Non-materialism: The belief that something other than physical reality exists, whether the physical exists or not (of course, radical skepticism doesn't allow this last part to be a sensical choice, but the fact remains that Solipsists believe that there is no physical or objective reality).

Ok, this is a start. But here I am a person trying to reason which view is the correct one; Materialism or something else. After reading this definition, I still cannot reason that because I now have to ask "what does it mean to be physical or non-physical?

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Yahweh
The reason why the argument has no weight is because the reasoning is terrible, so terrible it is known as Logical Fallacy of Composition.

Be careful with the quote marks. You put words in my mouth that I don't agree with.

I don't understand your reasoning on this. You said:

The reasoning goes like this:
1. Atoms are not conscious
2. You are made of matter (as stated by Materialism)
3. But you are conscious
4. Therefore, Materialism is logically inconsistant

Of course, that would be an example of a logical fallacy of composition, so it has no weight.

If atoms are not conscious and we are, which I take it you accept, then consciousness is epiphenomenal on atoms. In this case consciousness is something different to atoms.

This argument is in fact a reduction ad absurdam derived from the first assumption, that atoms are not conscious. If they are conscious then the argument falls down. The point is that if one assumes that atoms are not conscious then one must assume that consciousness is not matter. There's nothing weak about this argument, it's generally accepted.

Yes, I am very familiar with p_Zombies.

However, I'm afraid your reasoning (a zombie is not conscious and a human being is, then clearly consciousness is something different to matter) is an example of forming a general rule by examining only a few specific cases which aren't representative of all possible cases, this is properly called "Hasty Generalization".

I don't think so. If one argues that zombies can exist then it leads to a contradiction with the physicalist thesis. That's one of the main reasons why very few people think zombies can exist.

The p_Zombie argument essential boils down to semantics. Personally, I define consciousness as "knowledge of one's own existence, condition, sensations, mental operations, acts, etc; self-awareness" (thats a generalized definition, I know some people who'd like to break that down to a semantics based discussion), I see it as a qualititive property that an object can have. I don't see "consciousness" as something which exists seperately from matter or as an immaterial "entity" (I could name a few people off the top of my head who do).

In that case you are definitely a substance dualist. Logically this position is inherently problematical, which is why so few people, especially scientists, adopt it these days.

Here is one reason why the p_Zombie debate is nullified: For what it's worth, I side with Dennett (a philosopher who believed "If it behaves like a person and is indistinguishable from a person, then it is a person"... Note: I've heard people rebuttle this by saying "dreams are indistinguishable from reality, does that make them reality", that's merely a Red Herring argument which means information unrelated to argument is being brought in, it is effectively a logical fallacy) and those who think that the concept of the p-zombie is a logical absurdity. If the "zombie" exhibits all the symptoms of consciousness, then the "zombie" is not a zombie; for to exhibit all the symptoms of consciousness is to have consciousness, which the zombie is denied by definition. And therefore, the entire notion of p_Zombies is a contradiction in terms (such as asking if a light can be both on and off at the same time is contradictory).

I probably agree with that. This is why so few people are substance dualists. Mind you, scientifically speaking there are no such things as 'signs of consciousness,' so the whole issue is a bit of a muddle.

I gave a few links regarding Neuroscience and its efforts to explain and describe consciousness.

All neuoroscience links will say the same, that they haven't explained consciousness yet. This is because they haven't. I don't know what you mean by 'describing' it. Any fool can describe it.

Most people have a hard time with consciousness. They just don't like the idea of consciousness being reduced down a few materialistic principles (for that reason, they would deny that machine could ever be conscious). Of course, this relates back to consciousness as a qualititive property an object can have as opposed to an immaterial "entity".

Ok, you're entitled to your opinion. However if you can prove of any of this then you'll become an academic superstar overnight.

You're neglecting the second part where I stated "My Annotated Answer: The totality of all things which exist objectively."

So your first definition is wrong and I should use your second one? This one is a good definition of the phsyical Universe. Whether it's a good defintion of reality is moot.

I always try to give several definitions. I don't know who might be reading the things I write, I give "simple definitions" for those who might not understand the things I say, then I give much more detailed definitions afterward (see Annotated Definition of Reality).

Ok, but please make them agree with each other.

Its just my effort to compose myself as a good technical speaker. I always tell myself "Its not help to anyone if you try to teach someone by talking over their head".

It must be a hard cross to bear, as they say.

That is the part that always gets people...

Here, I'll describe why anger, perceptions, and feelings do not exist in terms of farts (it sounds funny but I'm going to make a serious point).

The smell of a fart does not exist.

HOhohohahaha. Ahem, sorry. You're obviously not a regular user of public transport. You'll certainly make a great partner for someone one day.

The process of smelling a fart is a physical process occurring in your brain. The memory of what a fart smells like is stored in the structure of your brain. The experience of remembering what a fart smells like is a process in your brain, and so on.

When we talk about the smell of a fart, we are talking about a process as though it were an object. That is just a quirk of language, based on intuitive preconceptions which date back hundreds, and even thousands of years. It is not an indication of what the true nature of reality is.

I think I see where you are going with this. The mistake in the "primary and secondary qualities" idea is not that there is no difference between things like length, and things like color. It is that the color of an object is not a "quality" of that object at all.

The color of an object is a part of the experience you have when you see, or remember seeing, that object. It is a physical process occurring in your brain.

What do mean here by 'an experience'? An experience of something that does not exist? The experience of the smell of a fart exists (how did I get into this?) but the smell doesn't? That makes no sense.

These are tricky issues and you've obviously thought about them a lot. But you are letting your death grip on your assumptions lead you into inconsistencies.

There are qualities of an object which correspond to the experience of color.

So experiences of colour exist, but not colour? Hmm.

The idea that scientists claim that color itself is just a wavelength of light, or a property of a wavelength of light, is a misconception. The color of an object is a process occurring in your brain, usually (but not always) as a result of light of a particular wavelength entering your eyes. It is not a property of the object itself. We tend to intuitively think of it that way, but as is often the case, our intuition is simply wrong.

I've never heard even a neuroscientist claim that colour doesn't exist.

2. I have a hard time putting the things I want to get across into intelligible words (its not unusual for me).

It's very difficult by email, I agree. But I know what you're saying.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Ok, this is a start. But here I am a person trying to reason which view is the correct one; Materialism or something else. After reading this definition, I still cannot reason that because I now have to ask "what does it mean to be physical or non-physical?

Ok. Well, what if we said:

Materialism: The belief that physical reality exists, and that there is nothing else but this physical reality. The definition of "physical" may change with scientific discovery, but whatever that definition is, that's all that exists.

Or, to be more serious:

Materialism: The belief that wavicles and spacetime exist, and that nothing else but these exists at all.

That would work along with modern science, wouldn't it? And it would be falisfiable, too.

 

[Eh]

Wouldn't it be simpler to suggest physicalism is the belief that spacetime is ultimately all that exists? We can consider things like waves and energy to be properties of spacetime.

 

[Eh]

Originally posted by Yahweh
Matter is defined in Physics as: Something which has mass (and usually takes up space).

Keep in mind, matter and energy are equivelant to one another. Solid things are essentially "congealed energy".

Hmmm, how about fields?

 

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Eh
Hmmm, how about fields?

Depends on what kind of field...

Electromagnetic Field: Yes, because it exists concretely.

Football Field: Yes, because it exists concretely.

Auric Energy Field: No, because its pseudoscience.

Field of Psychology: No, because that's abstract

You get the idea...

 

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by Canute
Be careful with the quote marks. You put words in my mouth that I don't agree with.

If I put words into your mouth, it was inadvertantly. I would never deliberately misrepresent someones position.

I don't understand your reasoning on this. You said:

If atoms are not conscious and we are, which I take it you accept, then consciousness is epiphenomenal on atoms. In this case consciousness is something different to atoms.

This argument is in fact a reduction ad absurdam derived from the first assumption, that atoms are not conscious. If they are conscious then the argument falls down. The point is that if one assumes that atoms are not conscious then one must assume that consciousness is not matter. There's nothing weak about this argument, it's generally accepted.

Personally, I have problems with Epiphenomenalism.

Epiphenomenalism characterizes consciousness as almost a byproduct of neural process. Its comparable to the way shadows are a byproduct of physical objects, but the shadow can do nothing to influence the physical object. Unless something is wrong with my reasoning, I would say cognitive events do happen to have a definite role in affecting the physical environment (i.e. I am deliberately typing this arent I). I think its obvious our cognitive perceptions do play are in our physical environment, hence the obvious absurdity of Epiphenomenalism (most people today, including most Materialists, reject Epiphenomenalism for that reason). (Of course, any strong-will Epiphenomenalists would respond in kind with a remark regarding Causal applications of consciousness... for instance he can say while consciousness accompanies the physical environment, it does not cause anything, in the same way while increased usage of cars has occurred along side falling literacy rates, the cars don't cause illiteracy... Of course, I always have a response for that one also...)

The reason why the argument is weak is because of the nature of it. It assumes the that a property shared by the indivual items which make up something larger, it must also shared by that something larger (which is a logical fallacy).

Another reason why the argument is weak is due to the fact that atoms and cognition are not equivelent. The systems involved for individual unconscious atoms are not comparable to the systems involved in cognition. I could detail much further, but that is essentially the most fatal flaw of the argument.

In that case you are definitely a substance dualist. Logically this position is inherently problematical, which is why so few people, especially scientists, adopt it these days.

I am most assurredly not a Substance Dualist.

What I think of the mind: I don't believe "mind" is separate from matter, I don't believe consciousness is a substance.

Dualists assert that you are the (indivisible) mind, the (divisible) material part of you is what extends into space. However, dualists can't explain how disease, large heavy objects, drugs, or alcohol affect the mind, they also can't explain the significance of genetics when if comes to the "essence" of who you are.

All neuoroscience links will say the same, that they haven't explained consciousness yet. This is because they haven't. I don't know what you mean by 'describing' it. Any fool can describe it.

The word "describe" is a technical term, it doesn't have the same connotation as it does it casual conversation.

I would posit there are a set of Materialistic functions which are responsible for the arisal of consciousness. Something I don't understand about the Immaterialist position: What makes consciousness any different from other functions of the body (digestion, reproduction, growth)?

It wasnt too long ago when your ancestors asked about where lightning and earthquakes came from, mind you there was an Immaterialist explanation for those ones...

Ok, you're entitled to your opinion. However if you can prove of any of this then you'll become an academic superstar overnight.

I'd probably need to build a machine which is self-aware... of course, that wouldn't stop people from judging the machine is simply responding to pre-programmed algorithms, and that is really isn't conscious...

Of course, I believe it was Descarte who said something similar to that effect:
Animals don't have souls and thus cannot feel pain, they are only programmed to act like it.

While I am a programmer, my expertise is mainly in ASP/ADO, Visual Basic, and I'm teaching myself C++. I don't have the know-how to create many high-level applications, much less robotics.

Why consciousness is so much more special than a heart that pumps blood around the body, I wouldn't know...

So your first definition is wrong and I should use your second one? This one is a good definition of the phsyical Universe. Whether it's a good defintion of reality is moot.

Yes, use the second definition.

Ok, but please make them agree with each other.

I'll try.

What do mean here by 'an experience'? An experience of something that does not exist? The experience of the smell of a fart exists (how did I get into this?) but the smell doesn't? That makes no sense.

Leave it up to the English language to make the word "smell" both a verb and a noun.

The whole smell thing is a little hard to grasp at once, I think you need to read it over a few times.

These are tricky issues and you've obviously thought about them a lot. But you are letting your death grip on your assumptions lead you into inconsistencies.

I've certainly done plenty of thinking, but I haven't found any inconsistencies as of yet.

The one you found, I think you just misread or misunderstood what I had written.

So experiences of colour exist, but not colour? Hmm.

Quite an epiphany, isn't it?

(That should be "experiences/sensations of color occur", not "exist").

The "color" itself does not exist concretely. (Actually, that subject make up one of the most heated debates of Philosophy that still continues today.)

 

[Eh]

Originally posted by Yahweh
Depends on what kind of field...

Well I think the fields we find in nature ought to suffice. Take the gravitational field, for example. The point here is that the field is not considered matter, so another definition of what it means to be "concrete" is needed.

 

[StarThrower]

In order to discuss ontology, you have to have a meaning for 'existence.' Now, a word can have many definitions (equivocality) but meaning is unique. The meaning of existence comes from our experience with material bodies.

To exist means to be in the current moment in time, to be in the present, rather than the past or the future.

You will find this to be correct. Notice that the meaning of existence is temporal, rather than materialistic.

Definitions

X is a particle if and only if (X exists and not (X can cease to exist))

X is a body if and only if (X exists and X can cease to exist)

These definitions lead to the conclusion that

X exists if and only if (X is a particle or X is a body)

And obviously

X is matter if and only if (X is a particle or X is a body)

From which it follows that

X exists if and only if X is matter

Now you might think that the previous statement is a mere tautology, but you would be neglecting the fact that the drawing of the tautology is anything but easy.

A system of logic based upon the meaning of existence given above, is going to be incredibly materialistic. In such a reasoner's logic, time doesn't exist, space doesn't exist, ideas don't exist, etc.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Eh
Wouldn't it be simpler to suggest physicalism is the belief that spacetime is ultimately all that exists? We can consider things like waves and energy to be properties of spacetime.

What about in string theory approaches, that are background-dependent? In this case, there would be wavicles (strings) and there would also be spacetime...I wanted my definition of Materialism to fit all possible circumstances.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by Yahweh
What I think of the mind: I don't believe "mind" is separate from matter, I don't believe consciousness is a substance.

Is it a field? You aren't telling us what you think mind is -- just what it isn't. If it is a field, what sort is it. Electromagnetic? If consciousness is not separate from matter, that means it is the laws of physics which has produced it. Which physical laws are responsible for consciousness?

By your own definition you say consciousness is awareness that is aware of itself. It is not just awareness, which a motion detector, for instance, can be said to be (since it can be aware of motion). The key, the really big deal is that, consciousness knows that it knows, and then learns and understands (and I might add that with humans anyway it can make reflective choices). And that's just the intelligence side of things. What about love, appreciation, compassion, courage, etc. What physical laws have you ever seen that would make you think they could produce those qualities?

So far, all I've ever seen matter and physical processes produce is dry, uncaring mechanical behavior. So far, all we get from matter and physical processes is dumbness. And computers? Awesome computing power, but dumb as a post nonetheless.

So where are we to look in matter and physical processes for this alleged ability to produce consciousness?

Originally posted by Yahweh
. . . dualists can't explain how disease, large heavy objects, drugs, or alcohol affect the mind, they also can't explain the significance of genetics when if comes to the "essence" of who you are.

Nonsense. I can explain it perfectly well. Let's take light as an analogy. If you use a projector to pass light through a moving film, the light takes the shape of the the images on the film and is projected onto a screen. The quality of the projection depends entirely on all the physical apparatus behind the projection even though the projection itself is entirely light!

If your electric current isn't "clean" that affects the image, and the same is true if the bulb is weak, or if the projector runs unsteadily, or if the film is dirty or poorly developed . . . in fact, the light itself has virtually nothing to do with the quality of that projection.

If you destroy the projector, or its power supply, you "kill" the projection, but did you kill the light? True, that light cannot now be part of that projector's projections, but the light contines on. And even though you slowed it down, and gave it characteristics, guess what it does once it gets back in space? It resumes its original nature and returns to light speed.

In that analogy, light has it's own inherent nature, and although you can manipulate it in many ways, you cannot destroy it and you cannot alter its true nature as light. Yet, while part of a physical system, that system has the ability to affect it substantially.

Originally posted by Yahweh
I would posit there are a set of Materialistic functions which are responsible for the arisal of consciousness.

Okay, demonstrate that.

Originally posted by Yahweh
It wasnt too long ago when your ancestors asked about where lightning and earthquakes came from, mind you there was an Immaterialist explanation for those ones...

When someone gives an immaterial explanation for a material process, they err. At the very least they are failing to recognize the distinct properties and behaviors of matter.

When someone gives an material explanation for something that does not behave as matter, they err. At the very least they are in far too big a hurry to attribute every damn thing to materiality.

Originally posted by Yahweh
I'd probably need to build a machine which is self-aware... of course, that wouldn't stop people from judging the machine is simply responding to pre-programmed algorithms, and that is really isn't conscious...

You and I both know that anything you want to label consciousness is going to have rise above its algorithms. I don't think anybody will be fooled long, no matter how intricate the programming, into believing something is conscious when it is not. So if you (or the ever-confident Dennet) can create it, please do. Enough talk, let's see it! But until you or someone does it, you don't really know what causes consciousness do you?

Originally posted by Yahweh
ISomething I don't understand about the Immaterialist position: What makes consciousness any different from other functions of the body (digestion, reproduction, growth)?

Because other functions of the body are stupid, blind mechanics. Can you say that about consciousness?

That analogy using light above isn't so far off from what a lot of people believe happens with humans, and probably animals too. That some undifferentiated pool of consciousness is drawn into the body, and "projected" by it to create the image we call "self." Maybe the body individuates us from the generality of that pool, which means since we are not individuals when we enter into the body, we really are very dependent on it to project us and individuate us.

Whether or not there is a way to escape that dependence is a well-know area of great interest to immaterialists.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by Eh
Wouldn't it be simpler to suggest physicalism is the belief that spacetime is ultimately all that exists? We can consider things like waves and energy to be properties of spacetime.

I don't quite see how spacetime alone covers it.

But aren't we complicating this more than we need too? A definition of materialism I like is one that seems to satisfy every possible variation. It is basically physicalism plus one of physicalism's specific potentals:

Materialism is the belief that all existence is the result of physical processes.

So why would one say he/she is a materialist rather than a physicalist? Because physical processes produced matter which allowed for developments that weren't possible until matter came into being. Because we are entrenched in a material universe, and the understanding of materiality both ensures our survial and material quality of life.

A materialist, then, recognizes the importance of mastering physical processes as they apply to matter (since matter is vitally relevant to our existence). Yet the materialist goes further and says he believes the basis of ALL existence is materiality and physical processes, and doesn't allow for any other sort of being.

 

[Jimmy]

Maybe the question could be put like this:

Does information exist? Is our perception, when you get right down to it, just based on information?

I'm going to define information in a general way by stating that it is the relationships between physical entities. All information depends on physical objects and processes. Some of our descriptions of "physical" objects are pretty abstract in their own right.

Your brain is obviously a physical collection of atoms and molecules. But there is a higher organization that exists. The brain operates on a cellular level as well. There are approximately 10 billion neurons interconnected. The interconnections are, I would say, just as important as the physical neurons themselves. I believe that is where consciousness lies.

All communication depends on physical processes and the information that is represented by the relationships between physical objects.

Two people who are talking to each other depend on physical processes to communicate. The physical process is of course, sound. The original idea is contained in neurons which depend on electro-chemical processes and the relationships between the neurons involved. When the thought is spoken, sound waves trigger electro-chemical processes in the listener's brain. I assume at this point that the information is not quite the same. I bet it's a good guess that something was lost in the translation. But, that's getting off track a bit.

So what is it that extracts the "original" information that is present in the brain of the listener? And what was the original information? Was it physical relationships between things or are those relationships purely abstract?

 

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
Is it a field? You aren't telling us what you think mind is -- just what it isn't. If it is a field, what sort is it. Electromagnetic?

No, its not a field, that's why I say its not a "substance", it does not exist concretely. For that reason, I wouldn't assume "beauty" is a field either.

If consciousness is not separate from matter, that means it is the laws of physics which has produced it. Which physical laws are responsible for consciousness?

I've already addressed this point. I'll copy and paste what I had written:

Another reason why the argument is weak is due to the fact that atoms and cognition are not equivelent. The systems involved for individual unconscious atoms are not comparable to the systems involved in cognition. I could detail much further, but that is essentially the most fatal flaw of the argument.

By asking for "Physical Laws", you are merely creating what are called "Strawman Arguments".

I guess I am obligated to detail further now...

Parts of the brain

Nerve Cells

Your brain is made up of approximately 100 Billion nerve cells, which are called Neurons. Neurons are very special cells in the human body, certainly they are very much like the other cells in the body, except they possesses a capacity that other cells dont: Neurons have the ability to trasmit "messages" from one cell to another, these "messages" are in the form of electrochemical signals.

Neurons are not much more complicated than other cells (for instance, they contain a cell nucleus with DNA, endoplasmic reticulum, RNA, mitochondria), however their physiology is slightly different in that these cells have what are called "Axons" and "Dendrites".

Axons: Axons carry electrochemical signals (or Nerve Impulse) along the length of the cell.

Dendrites: Dendrites connect Neurons to other Neurons. There are a couple different types of Neurons (including sensory and motor), I'm going to talk primarily about "Inteneurons" which are located in the brain and spinal cord.

Divisions of the Brain

The Major Divisions are organized like this:
* Spinal cord (involved in reflex actions)
* Brainstem (also involved in reflex actions, coordinates involuntary muscle behavior such as heartrate, coordinates what are called Visceral movements like urination)
* Cerebellum (coordinates complex voluntary muscle movement, balance)
* Forebrain
- Diencephalon: thalamus (relays sensory input to Cerebral Cortex), hypothalamus (sexual response, peristalsis while eating or drinking, regulates metabolism)
- Cerebral cortex (largely responsible for higher brain functions, including sensation, voluntary muscle movement, thought, reasoning, and memory)

Your Cerbral Cortex is what is important in Higher Brain Functions

Higher Brain Functions

I took you through a generalized description of the brain, now I'm going to get a bit more technical...

The Cerebral Cortex itself is divided into several parts, I'll take a minute to guide through those parts right now...

The Cerebral Cortex is laterally divided into two hemispheres. Each Hemisphere performs a set of unique functions, both Hemispheres work toghether simultaneously.

Parts of the Cerebral Cortex

The Cerebral Cortex is the largest portion of the brain. Its exterior covers about 1500 - 2000 square cm. The Cerebral Cortex is not a single large hunk of brain tissue, it is actually a long strip of tissue which is folded around itself into what are called Gyri (your heart is also a long strip of folded tissue as well), the grooves in the brain are called Sulci.

The parts of the Cerebral Cortex are:

1. Occipital Lobe (composes the back of the Cerebral Cortex)
   
   Your Occipital Lobe is where the brain sends Visual Messages. While this particular part of the brain is rather small in relation to the other lobes, and doesn't perform as many functions as the rest of the lobes, this single lobe is what your sense of sight depends on. When compared to the other lobes, a great deal more work is involved in processing Visual Information than the rest of the senses. (Note: Sensory processing is not related to the actual physical area of a particular section of the Cerebral Cortex, but the number of connections within the corresponding area.)
   
   After the Occipital Lobe processes the Visual Information, it relays the information to the Parietal Lobes (called Wernicke's Area).
   
   
2. Temporal Lobe (composes the sides of the Cerebral Cortex)
   
   The Temporal Lobe processes Auditory Stimuli. Like the Occipital Lobe, it relays the processed information to the Wernicke's Area of the Parietal Lobe.
   
   The Hippocampus is located in the Temporal Lobe, i intimately involved in motivation and emotion as part of the limbic system; has a central role in the formation of memories.
   
   Your Amygdala is also located in the Temporal Lobe, the Amygdala is intimately connected with the hypothalamus and the hippocampus and the cingulate gyrus. As part of the limbic system it plays an important role in motivation, emotional, and sexual behavior
   
   
3. Parietal Lobe (composes the top of the Cerebral Cortex)
   
   Your Parietal Lobe is very important, it processes all somatosensory (sensory/perception) stimuli.
   
   Fiberous nerve cells are distributed throughout your Parietal Lobe which connect to the Thalamus and Spinal Cord. The connections throughout the Parietal Lobe form a "motor map" of the human body, this "motor map" is called a homunculus (you may have seen a homunculus, its the image of the weird shaped person with the very big hands and big lips, large ears...). A homunculus respectively represents the number of fiberous connections (which is related to the amount neural processing) of each of your sensory organs.
   
   Wernicke's Area is a special part of the Parietal Lobe which functions to make sense of auditory and visual information associated with language.
   
   
4. Frontal Lobe (composes the front of the Cerebral Cortex)
   
   Your Frontal Lobe is involved in motor skills, speech (Note: The speech parts of the brain - Frontal, Parietal, and Temporal lobes - is not directly related to the language part of the brain - the Wernicke's Area), and Cognition. I'll get to Cognition after I describe the Frontal Lobe.
   
   Your Frontal Lobe is the largest of the lobes. At the rear of the Frontal Lobe is the Pre-Central Gyrus, it is connected to the somatosensory areas of the Parietal Lobe. And because it is connected to the somatosensory area, it is able to process and coordinate many motor functions.
   
   There is an area in the Frontal Lobe called "Broca's Area" which is responsible for coordinating the movements of the mouth and other parts of the body to produce speech. Broca's Area (produces speech) works in conjunction with Wernicke's Area (processes language) that allows you to understand and communicate with others.
   
   The other parts of the Frontal Lobe perform Cognitive Associative Processes (thought, learning, memory).

Cognition

I've described the functions of the brain and how they work together, now I'm going to get slightly more complicated and describe Cognition.

Corpus Callosum

Your Corpus Callosum is a region of 300 Million Nerve Fibers which allows your the left and right hemispheres of your Cerebral Cortex to "communicate" with each other.

Your Corpus Callosum is particularly important, it is the area where internal monologue occurs (I'll describe the proper chemical processes for that in the next section of this post). Your Internal Monologue is the reason why you are self-aware. While everything else I've said so far would pretty much be accepted at face value, this last sentence is probably where a dualist would be skeptical. In case there is any skepticism, here is an article detailing Internal Monologue and what occurs when you lose it. If you are not able to talk to yourself, you are not aware of your own existence.

A small excerpt from that page I linked:

[excerpt]

Interestingly, a series of studies conducted by Philip McGuire and his collaborators at the Institute of Psychiatry in London, show that specific structures within the left prefrontal lobe are also activated when people are invited to silently articulate sentences or single words. More specifically, inner speech is associated with activation of the left inferior frontal gyrus within the prefrontal cortex. Since a portion of the left prefrontal lobe is associated with inner speech, and that the prefrontal lobes as a whole mediate self-awareness, then it supports the notion that the former participates in self-awareness.


---------------- Continued to Next Post ---------------->

 

[Yahweh]

----------- Continued From Last Post ----------->


It comes as no surprise then that disruption of self-talk following left prefrontal brain injury negatively affects self-awareness, as suggested by Moss’ experience presented earlier. If loss of inner speech decreases self-awareness, we should expect the reverse process to take place with recovery of self-talk after cortical damage. Indeed, George Ojemann, a neurosurgeon at the University of Washington, observed that conscious experience in patients seems to return in parallel with inner speech.

...

A pertinent question at this point is: In what way exactly does inner speech make us self-aware? What is the nature of the relation between self-talk and self-awareness? My proposal is that inner speech can reproduce (i.e., internalize) and expand social sources of self-awareness. Our social milieu is populated by friends, family members, and coworkers who regularly comment on our personal characteristics and behaviors. This social feedback allows us to learn about ourselves. For example, people can claim “You are very strong…” or emotional, good-looking, introverted, lazy, punctual, etc. People may say to you: “I’ve been observing you lately—you seem anxious”... or sad, happy, healthy, impatient, etc. People communicate with us, smile at us, look angry at us, or ignore us; we use this information to develop a self-concept.

Inner speech makes it possible to communicate and develop a relationship with ourselves. We can talk to ourselves as if we were speaking to someone else; in this process we can reproduce for ourselves appraisals we get from others. For example, we can say to ourselves “You’re very strong”, emotional, lazy, etc. “Why did you do this? Because…”, “You take yourself way too seriously!”, “I feel anxious”, and so on. Talking to ourselves that way most certainly makes us self-aware and helps us identify self-information.

...

It would be naïve to believe that inner speech alone produces self-awareness. We just saw that our social environment is important; so are a host of neurological and cognitive processes. Self-awareness represents a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. But I believe that inner speech plays a central role. I like to compare inner speech to a flashlight that we would use to find our way through a dark room. Without the light and by using touch we could still perceive objects and furniture in the room (by analogy: self-information); but perception (self-awareness) would be much more vivid and precise if we would put the flashlight on.

[/excerpt]

Your Corpus Callosum essentially is your "mind". Your Corpus Callosum is where most of your cognitive processess occur, it is responsible for "learning", and self-awareness.

The Left and Right Hemispheres of the brain are not identical. The left hemisphere deals with language and numbers, while the right deals with spatial relationships and aesthetics. The Left side of the brain is where the internal monologue occurs, the right is where images and sounds are processed. Each of these streams through the Corpus Callosum so fast that the two hemispheres individual processes appear unified, and that is what is called the "self".

What happens when the Left and Right Hemispheres cannot communicate with one another?

Split-Brain Patients

Here is an excerpt I took out of a book called "101 Question Your Brain Has Asked, But Could Not Answer". When I describe things, I have a habit of including so much extraneous detail, that my writings are almost tedious to read (although very very thorough... and possibly repetitive). This excerpt sums up the Split-Brain Phenomena more succintly than I could have:

[Excerpt]

When the corpus callosum is cut, either accidentally or intentionally, strange things begin to happen.

In 1961, doctors in California began severing the corpus callosum in patients suffering from epilepsy. In most cases, the patients had fewer or less severe seizures. The treatment appeared successful.

Roger Sperry on a Nobel Prize 20 years later for his studies of these "split-brain" patients after their recovery. The patients could walk, talk, eat, dance, sing, and solve probelms just like normal people do... But Sperry noticed that when asked to raise a hand or knee, a split-brain patient would always raise the right, never the left. The left brain might be understanding the words, but the right brain wasnt answering.

Sperry did some experiments to learn more. In one, he gave the split-brain patients a set of blocks with an arrangement of red and white patterns painted on them. He asked the split-brain patients to match the pattern in another set of blocks. With the left hand, the patients could get the pattern easily, with the right hand they got it wrong.

Sperry though he was seeing the effects of "two minds" or "two spheres of consciousness". The Trouble was, he had no way of knowing whether normal people are also of two minds. Sperry enlisted a graduate student, Micahael Gazzaniga, to help him find out.

"My first quick take... in 1961 was that one side of the brain did something the other side didnt know about". He found that a split-brain patient might button his shirt with his left hand, while his right hand was busy unbuttoning it at the same time.

Gazzaniga and Sperry showed split-brain patients two objects on a screen: A sphere on the left side and a cube on the right. When asked what they saw, they answerd "a cube". Next, subject used their left hands to feel objects they couldn't see, including bot h a cube and a sphere. When asked to match one of the felt object to what they saw, they chose the sphere.

[/Excerpt]

Now I'll describe a bit more...

Remember the part where I mentioned Information streaming through the Corpus Callosum so fast its as if the processes in the two Hemisperes were unified? Well, when the 2 Hemispheres are separated (i.e. when the Corpus Callosum is cut), the Hemispheres operate independently, as if there were more than one Consciousness.

While each Hemisphere has specialized tasks that it can perform, seperating the Hemispheres separates the tasks. However, hardy as the Cerebral Cortex is, each Hemisphere has the ability to learn the tasks of what the other Hemisphere does. The Right Hemisphere, while "silent", can learn to read again, that is how it communicates with itself.

Each Hemisphere, when severed, has a natural tendency to, in a sense, fabricate information that the other Hemisphere is performing.

Even though each hemisphere specializes, they still retain the ability to learn other tasks, and in patients who've undergone this kind of surgery, that's more or less what they do. The right hemisphere can learn to read again, and in a way can start to communicate. Now if you flash the word "WALK" to the left eye (right hemisphere), the patient will get up and walk across the room. But let's say you stop him and ask him why he did this. You're using verbal language skills, and the response is going to come from the left hemisphere which has motor speech skills and "veto power" over the internal monologue. The patient might say quite sincerely "I don't know!" or even "to get a Coke".

When seperating the Corpus Callosum, there are still lower connections which allows for a patient to coordinate walking.

So seperating the Corpus Callosum effectively creates 2 "minds", that is the best demonstration that "mind" is reliant on matter. (And keep in mind, "consciousness" still remains as neither a "substance" nor "field".)


Origins of Consciousness

The final hurdle the Materialist must jump over in an effort to rationalize Cognition is the Materialist nature Consciousness.

I'm going to take Neural Approach first, then I'll get into the chemical nature of Consciousness...

This subject is actually too large to be described in one post, but to keep my response at a realistic length, I'll use excerpts from a couple of sources:

From http://www.neurologyreviews.com/oct02/nr_oct02_consciousness.html

[excerpt]

Consciousness has the distinction of being “the problem” in neurobiology—one even more difficult to understand than sleep, according to Giulio Tononi, MD, PhD. Therefore, he and his colleagues have devised a working definition of consciousness as a starting point for solving its mysteries.

“Consciousness is everything that goes away when we fall into dreamless sleep; everything we hear, see, feel, remember, think—everything that fills our experience,” said Dr. Tononi. It includes the ability to reflect on one’s experiences, recall the past, and anticipate the future. In addition, according to Dr. Tononi, consciousness encompasses not only awareness of the environment but also dreams, which demonstrate the brain’s ability to generate consciousness even during sleep.


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[Yahweh]

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Efforts to understand consciousness have gone beyond mere definitions, however. Researchers are already attempting what had previously seemed impossible—to explain consciousness scientifically: particularly, how it originates and exactly where in the brain it occurs.

...

Early attempts at a scientific explanation of consciousness suggested that portions of the reticular formations are vital for processing life experience and that consciousness is very difficult without them. “But they are not the seat of consciousness,” Dr. Tononi stated. In an effort to determine what is, researchers are studying cortical function both in humans and in other primates whose brains are similar to those of humans. For example, of the 32 cortical areas in the macaque brain (and their related thalamic sections), most seem responsible for some aspect of consciousness, such as perception of motion, shapes, or faces.

However, consciousness does not appear to rely entirely on anyone area of the thalamocortical system, he said. Rather, it “seems to depend on the interaction of many different areas.” Conversely, other large chunks of neural tissue—the cerebellum, for example—have little or nothing to do with consciousness. “We all know that if you take out the cerebellum in an adult human being, consciousness is hardly affected,” Dr. Tononi pointed out.

INTEGRATION AND DIFFERENTIATION

What distinguishes brain areas that are involved in consciousness from those that are not? Integration and differentiation, according to Dr. Tononi. Because of cooperation between the involved brain areas, consciousness occurs as a whole (integration). Yet the interactions among many brain areas are so complex that an enormous repertoire of conscious experiences is possible. Depending on how stimuli are interpreted, individuals experience one particular conscious state while the remaining possibilities are discarded (differentiation). This process is continuous, occurring every fraction of a second.

The normally integrated nature of consciousness can be better appreciated when one observes those individuals who lack it. “Split-brain” patients, for example, exhibit dual consciousness because their brain hemispheres are disconnected, usually as a result of a surgical procedure such as callosotomy. The differentiation of consciousness is evident in that an enormous repertoire of possible conscious states is always available every fraction of a second: One could show any slide, or any frame of a motion picture, and within a fraction of a second we experience a different conscious image. The differentiation of conscious experience is reflected in the constantly changing patterns of neural activity when we are conscious. By contrast, when consciousness is reduced or lost, as in deep, slow wave sleep or during epileptic seizures, all neurons do is either fire or be silent together.

CONSCIOUSNESS, STATISTICALLY SPEAKING

t is impossible to formulate a neural view of consciousness without a more precise understanding of integration and differentiation, Dr. Tononi stressed. Thus, for the past several years, he has been developing a statistical measure called neural complexity. “All this does is measure how much of a [neural] system is integrated and yet has a large repertoire of available [conscious] states,” he explained.

...

The cerebral cortex is an example of a neural system that is highly complex and thus more apt to contribute to consciousness. Studies of the brain in computer simulations have linked the cerebral cortex’s connectivity patterns—a high density of connections, strong local connectivity organizing cells into neuronal groups, patchy connectivity among neuronal groups, and prevalent reciprocal connections—with high neural complexity values.

Dr. Tononi emphasized that his work on neural complexity is still in the early stages and that the validity of this measure is tentative. “But at least it gives us the opportunity to think about ways of testing it,” he concluded.

[/excerpt]


Now, a the chemical nature of Consciousness...

From http://www.sci-con.org/theory/20030401.html

[excerpt]

In a world assumed to be non-dualistic, it is argued that Nagel's view (i.e. that consciousness is what an organism possesses when there is something that it is like to be itself) implies that consciousness is an attribute of some system in the brain that maps patterns of spike train activity.

...

Nagel's well-known (1974) description of consciousness is arguably still the best, as well as one of the most succinct. He in effect defined consciousness as that which exists when, for a particular organism, there is something that it is like to be that thing... Nagel's relative success is surely an indication that he managed to encapsulate an essential aspect of the truth about our conscious experience. There has been much discussion of the implications of *What is it like to be a bat?* for the ontology of consciousness, but might it still carry any useful message for us if we make the prior assumption that the world is non-dualistic (i.e. standard materialism is correct)?

A Nagelian neurology - general principles

In Nagel's brief description of consciousness there are both a 'something that exists' and a condition of 'likeness'. If we assume that the brain is the sole generator of consciousness, then the 'something that exists' must refer to an aspect of its structure or function. The condition of 'likeness' is a more slippery concept, however. In the real world, it is a condition constrained by the nature our conscious experience, which can include all sorts of things; percepts, feelings, cognitions, dreams, hallucinations. There is clearly an implication that the condition must be taken to refer not only self-referentially, to the 'something that exists', but also to the actual content of that something; for example an awareness of seeing a rose, an experience of an emotion, or an hallucination of pink elephants. All such contents, we generally suppose, are encoded in varying patterns of neural activity. Nagel's definition, when viewed in the context of standard materialism, can therefore be taken to imply the existence of an (unknown) aspect of brain function which embodies the 'something that exists' of consciousness, plus neural activity embodying the 'likeness' condition.

One might be tempted to suppose that the two neural conditions are simply two differing aspects of the same neural activity or property, but this is unlikely because we know that consciousness refers to only a small proportion of the brain activity that is going on at any given moment. Moreover, the proven occurrence of unconscious perception (e.g. Kihlstrom, 1996) shows that the type of material on which the 'likeness' condition may be based does not necessarily get into the 'something that exists'. It therefore seems far more probable that (at least) two distinguishable aspects of brain function are involved.

...

It might be thought at first sight that introducing transitivity into Nagelian 'likeness' changes his consciousness definition into something else. 'Being like something' is surely not equivalent to 'being something that it is like', one might reasonably suppose. Indeed, for this reason, there was a good deal of debate at one time over the questions of whether the definition implied dualism and, if so, what sort of dualism. When set within the context of neurological materialism, however, introducing transitivity probably does not pose a problem for the following reason:- Nagel's definition treats consciousness as a 'black box', to use a concept that pervaded psychological thinking at the time, constrained only by the requirement that there be something that it is like to be 'x', where 'x' is an organism in some particular neural state. In a non-dualistic world, since consciousness is a property of the organism, this must surely be taken to mean that 'x' is like itself. While it is true that everything is trivially like itself, the success of Nagel's formulation suggests that trivial likeness is not what is involved. The alternative, non-trivial likeness emerges from the fact that that, if the whole system envisaged here (i.e. pattern of spike activity, plus process that maps it and resultant model) is put back inside the black box, it can once more be envisaged as embodying a self-referential condition of likeness.



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[Yahweh]

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...

The main motivation for pursuing the materialistic interpretation of Nagel described above is that regarding this formulation as valid entails conversion of the so-called 'hard problem' of consciousness into an 'easy' one. It has been argued that Nagel's 'something that it is like' must, from a neurological point of view, refer not only to the neural structure or function that underpins consciousness but also to the informational content of consciousness. The latter is known to be derived from patterns of spike activity that are themselves certainly mainly unconscious, and may be entirely unconscious. A process of 'being like' (i.e. of accurate mapping or modeling) results in Nagelian consciousness. Because the 'something that exists' of consciousness should probably be envisaged as embodied in analog form, the argument suggests a starting point when it comes to looking for what are often called the Neural Correlates of Consciousness. As Revonsuo (2001) has pointed out, however, just about any neural activity can *correlate* with consciousness in one way or another. A different term is needed for neural activity that might be supposed to *generate* consciousness, which is the present focus of enquiry; the term 'neural mechanism of consciousness' (NMC) may suffice.

...

A neural mechanism of consciousness?

Koch (1999, p. 475) has tabulated the various computational mechanisms that appear to exist in, and are possibly used by, single neurons. There are fourteen of these, ranging from routing information via neuromodulators, through differing calcium concentrations in intra-cellular pockets, to molecular flip-flop in dendritic spines. Around half of the mechanisms appear to be analog rather than mainly digital. When looking for a Nagelian NMC, the analog mechanisms must be regarded as the front runners. Among these, varying calcium concentrations hold particularly attractive possibilities. They are dependent on synaptic activity (among other factors) and are therefore able to model preceding spike activity. However, other analog mechanisms are similar in this respect. The principle attraction of varying calcium concentration, when it comes to looking for a Nagelian NMC, can be seen in relation to the question of how the information content of consciousness might be encoded.

...

As Edelman and Tononi (2000) have emphasized, consciousness has two especially striking features that must enter into any adequate account of it. First, it handles information slowly and in small quantities relative to the huge amount that is processed by unconscious brain systems. The visual system for instance can and does transmit millions of bits of information per second, yet we can consciously handle at most only a few hundred of these. An up-to-date estimate by Nolte (2001), for instance, shows that the optic nerves transmit around 7 megabits per sec., while consciously reading, watching sign language, or patterns of illuminated light bulbs in an experimental set-up, typically handles around 25 bits per sec. (ie. 0.00035% of the information potentially available). When reading, of course, consciousness also contains a certain amount of non-verbal information, but not necessarily very much. Second, there exist huge numbers of uniquely distinguishable conscious mental states, many of which can be accessed almost instantaneously through memory. What can be inferred about a Nagelian NMC from these two facts? The limited information handling capacity suggests that the computational or modeling system involved is both slow and extensive so that there is not 'room' in the brain for many sub-components. The alternative, that it might be confined to a tiny area incapable of dealing with large amounts of information, is surely ruled out by the second feature. If the NMC were confined to a microscopic zone, it seems unlikely that it could possesses such enormously varied content as it does.

...

CaMKII, the properties of which have recently been reviewed by Lisman et al. (2002), provides an ideal recording medium for the phase relationships of calcium waves. 'It' is actually a family of related proteins with similar functional capacities, which constitute 1-2% of the total amount of protein in the brain. It is particularly associated with excitatory synapses and is thought to play a vital part in initiating and/or maintaining long term potentiation of the NMDA type of glutamine neurotransmission. There is good evidence that potentiation of this type underlies some forms of memory and learning. The protein may also activate the AMPA type of receptor, thus increasing sensitivity to relatively low frequency synaptic stimulation. The functional properties of the protein are remarkable. Basically, it responds to increasing calcium concentration by switching to an active form. As concentration increases, the time for which CaMKII remains in active form initially increases in a graded manner; eventually, however, a threshold is reached and it remains in active form indefinitely, regardless of the ambient calcium concentration. Of course proteins in the brain tend to have a short half-life and that of CaMKII is around one month. However there is evidence that, when replaced, the replacement adopts the same activation state as its predecessor. Memories of calcium concentration that are recorded in the protein may last indefinitely, though relatively short-lived records also form in relation to lower amplitude calcium waves.

Recall of declarative (i.e. conscious) memory would, according to this picture, involve re-creation of some appropriate subset of the spike activity associated with the original event, enabled by CaMKII-dependent alteration in synaptic weightings. The resurrected spike activity would be mapped into renewed calcium wave patterns, resulting in Nagelian consciousness and reinforcement of the CaMKII record. It is worth noting, however, that resurrecting spike activity can never be a wholly accurate process (because of the stochasticity of spikes), so the holographic record may undergo some alteration as a consequence of each recall.

Doubt and prediction

The picture of a possible Nagelian NMC that has been sketched out shows that varying patterns of calcium concentration analogically map spike activity, thus generating Nagelian consciousness. The patterns are recorded in alterations of activation of CaMKII, which in turn feed back to modulate future spike activity via changes in synaptic sensitivity. Because the altered enzyme activity must retain information about phase relationships between waves of varying calcium concentration, it can be regarded as a holographic record. Nagelian consciousness is thus seen to be intimately involved with memory (on all time scales, ranging from the very short term to the permanent), and to be efficacious in the sense that its structure can profoundly influence future brain activity. It is, in these respects, clearly consciousness as we know it. There is a problem with scale, however, which affects both this specific picture and would probably affect any alternative Nagelian NMC that might be proposed (because the Nagelian 'models' are extensive, holistic entities). The changes in calcium concentration considered hitherto are largely confined to the dendritic spines, on which nearly all excitatory synapses are situated. Consciousness, although it can occasionally appear to be determined by activity in single neurons, generally seems to involve extensive areas of the brain. Because holograms have a fractal-like structure up-scaling might be expected, but its occurrence requires the presence of some suitable physical substrate to support the relevant waves.

Changing calcium concentration is not entirely confined within dendritic spines (Hering and Sheng, 2001). These are highly dynamic structures; the actual calcium concentration and degree of confinement following synaptic activation depend on their shape.

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[Yahweh]

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If a Nagelian candidate for the NMC were to prove capable of passing basic neurological tests, such as MRI based ones, the next step required would be provision of an account of how the NMC might be orchestrated by arousal and attention. If things ever get as far as this, it is likely that global workspace theory (e.g. Baars and McGovern, 1996) will be found to play an essential part in the account. In view of the reciprocality noted earlier between holograms and fractals, Bieberich's (2002) description of how a fractal neural anatomy might provide the basis for a suitably flexible workspace could prove especially relevant. Should it pass this next hurdle, the Nagelian theory would then face the still greater challenge of explaining why conscious contents take the form that they do. Why is red usually experienced as red, for example, and not as the sound of a bell? After all, the phenomenon of synaesthesia shows that colour can occasionally be experienced as sound. The seed of an answer to this question may lie buried within an understanding of what it is to be a hologram, but trying to cultivate the seed at this stage would clearly be premature.
[/excerpt]

(That last source was an especially large document... even selectively choosing the important areas to read makes for large excerpt.)



So there you have it. Consciousness, as explained by Cognitive Neuroscience (believe me, the above is only the tip of the iceberg in understanding Consciouness), is compatible with Materialism. The Split-Brain studies really damage the Philosophy of Dualism.

Again, there isn't much difference between Cognition and digestion, both can be widdled down to a set (a very large set) of Materialistic Functions. Consciousness derives from matter.


That section wore me out a bit, I'll make short response to the rest of the post...

By your own definition you say consciousness is awareness that is aware of itself. It is not just awareness, which a motion detector, for instance, can be said to be (since it can be aware of motion).

You are making an error: There is a distinct differenciation between "awareness" and "perception". The Motion Detector percieves stimuli, but is no consciously aware of them.

The key, the really big deal is that, consciousness knows that it knows, and then learns and understands (and I might add that with humans anyway it can make reflective choices). And that's just the intelligence side of things. What about love, appreciation, compassion, courage, etc. What physical laws have you ever seen that would make you think they could produce those qualities?

Physical laws? I hope you are not talking about Physics. The "Laws" so to speak would be described in Neurobiology.

There is nothing special about functions of love, courage, compassion, etc., all of those are handled in the brain's Limbic System. While the functions themselves are nothing more special than the functions of digestion, its the experience of those functions which are. The experience of those functions creates an illusion that they are so innately "special", that they could not be explained by simple Materialistic principles. However, Materialism describes the nature of Reality, Psychology describes the nature of what is commonly called the "mind". Its important to keep that in mind.

So far, all I've ever seen matter and physical processes produce is dry, uncaring mechanical behavior. So far, all we get from matter and physical processes is dumbness. And computers? Awesome computing power, but dumb as a post nonetheless.

You are exercising a personal judgement in a manner which you create a Strawman Argument, this is specifically called the Fallacy of Personal Incredulity. Its where you make judgements of the likelyhood of events based on personal opinions. Anytime you hear someone say "I find X to be so incredibly unlikely... X couldn't have happened" (you find this a lot in people who's religious beliefs blind them accepting Evolution).

When you deny Materialist Monism because you don't know what "Physical Laws" explain Consciousness, you are exercising the Fallacy of Personal Incredulity. And simply because I can't stress this enough, the systems involved in Consciousness are not comparable to the systems involved on Individual atoms. Its like asking how a bicycle can move side to side if you reduce the bicycle system down to chain and sprockets.

So where are we to look in matter and physical processes for this alleged ability to produce consciousness?

The brain.

Nonsense. I can explain it perfectly well. Let's take light as an analogy. If you use a projector to pass light through a moving film, the light takes the shape of the the images on the film and is projected onto a screen. The quality of the projection depends entirely on all the physical apparatus behind the projection even though the projection itself is entirely light!

If your electric current isn't "clean" that affects the image, and the same is true if the bulb is weak, or if the projector runs unsteadily, or if the film is dirty or poorly developed . . . in fact, the light itself has virtually nothing to do with the quality of that projection.

If you destroy the projector, or its power supply, you "kill" the projection, but did you kill the light? True, that light cannot now be part of that projector's projections, but the light contines on. And even though you slowed it down, and gave it characteristics, guess what it does once it gets back in space? It resumes its original nature and returns to light speed.

In that analogy, light has it's own inherent nature, and although you can manipulate it in many ways, you cannot destroy it and you cannot alter its true nature as light. Yet, while part of a physical system, that system has the ability to affect it substantially.

First, make sure you don't overliteralize your analogy. You were just on the verge of doing so.

However, have you looked into the Split-Brain studies? I have them referenced above. Apparently, their are several "consciousnesses" which all work in unison to form one big complicated machine, but those "consciousnesses" can be isolated. How does Dualism describe that?

When you go to sleep, you cease being conscious. How does Dualism cope with that?

Okay, demonstrate that.

Very well...

Insects have a Cerebral Ganglion, they have what is called a "Neural Net" which stretches across the whole of their body (i.e. They have no - or a very limited - centralized nervous system). Insects have no cognitive ability. That means they cannot think, plan ahead, reason, use logic, or feel pain (dont kill them for pleasure regardless of whether they feel pain, its not nice and I'm very into animal rights). Insects are not self-aware (i.e. They are not "conscious").

Insects lack the proper structures to calibrate Consciousness.

Because insects are not conscious, they function like machines. The behavior of insects is alien in the eyes of a human (the reason for that is due to Personal Incredulity... we are judging the bugs by "human standards").

There are 100s of examples I could cite to demonstrate the machine-like nature of insects, here is possibly my favorite example:


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[Yahweh]

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And excerpt from Richard Dawkin's "River Out of Eden":

[excerpt]

Wasps themselves were the subject of a classic experiment, originally done by the great French naturalist Jean-Henri Fabre and repeatedby various other workers, including members of Tinbergen's school. The female digger wasp returns to her burrow carrying her stung and paralyzed prey. She leaves it outside the burrow while she enters, apparently to check that all is well before she reappears to drag the prey in. While she is in the burrow, the experimenter moves the prey a few inches away from where she left it. When the wasp resurfaces, she notices the loss and quickly relocates the prey. She then drags it back to the burrow entrance. Only a few seconds have passed since she inspected the inside of the burrow. We think that there is really no good reason why she should not proceed to the next stage in her routine, drag the prey in and be done with it. But her program has been reset to an earlier stage. She dutifully leaves the prey outside the burrow again and goes inside for yet another inspection. The experimenter may repeat the charade forty times, until he gets bored. The wasp behaves like a washing machin that has been set back to an early stage in its program and doesn't "know" that it has already washed those clothes forty times without a break. The distinguished computer scientist Douglas Hofstadter has adopted a new adjective, "sphexish," to label such inflexible, mindless automatism. (Sphex is the name of one representitive genus of digger wasp.)

[/excerpt]

When someone gives an immaterial explanation for a material process, they err. At the very least they are failing to recognize the distinct properties and behaviors of matter.

I agree. These explanations are called "supernatural" or "metaphysical" explanations. While they may explain an occurence, they do nothing to explain accurately.

From Skepdic.com - Ad hoc hypotheses:

[excerpt]

Finally, rejecting explanations that require belief in occult, supernatural or paranormal forces in favor of simpler and more plausible explanations is called applying Occam's razor. It is not the same as ad hoc hypothesizing. For example, let's say I catch you stealing a watch from a shop. You say you did not steal it. I ask you to empty your pockets. You agree and pull out a watch. I say, "Aha!, I was right. You stole the watch." You reply that you did not steal the watch, but you admit that it was not in your pocket when we went into the store. I ask you to explain how the watch got into your pocket and you say that you used telekinesis: you used your thoughts to transport the watch out of a glass case into your pocket. I ask you to repeat the act with another watch and you say "ok." Try as you will, however, you cannot make a watch magically appear in your pocket. You say that there is too much pressure on you to perform or that there are too many bad vibes in the air for you to work your powers. You have offered an ad hoc hypothesis to explain away what looks like a good refutation of your claim. My hypothesis that the watch is in your pocket because you stole it, is not an ad hoc hypothesis. I have chosen to believe a plausible explanation rather than an implausible one. Likewise, given the choice between believing that my headache went away of its own accord or that it went away because some nurse waved her hands over my hand while chanting a mantra, I will opt for the former every time.

It is always more reasonable to apply Occam's razor than to offer speculative ad hoc hypotheses just to maintain the possibility of something supernatural or paranormal.

[/excerpt]

Here is another example of an Immaterial explanation failed:

From Skepdic.com - Charle's Tart:

[excerpt]

Tart explains how he first got interested in the paranormal in the following story told at a talk he gave in Casper, Wyoming:

There was a time, years ago, when I was highly skeptical of any paranormal claims of any kind. One of the things that convinced me that there must be something to this is a strange experience that I personally went through. It was wartime. I was at Berkeley, California, and everybody was working overtime...the young lady who was my assistant at the time worked with me until very late this one night. She finally went home; I went home. Then the very next day she came in, all excited...She reported that during this night she had suddenly sat bolt upright in her bed, convinced that something terrible had happened. “I had a terrible sense of foreboding,” she said, but she did not know what had happened. “I immediately swung out of bed and went over to the window and looked outside to see if I could see anything that might have happened like an accident. I was just turning away from the window and suddenly the window shook violently. I couldn’t understand that. I went back to bed, woke up the next morning and listened to the radio.” A munitions ship at Port Chicago had exploded. It literally took Port Chicago off the map. It leveled the entire town and over 300 people were killed...She said she had sensed the moment when all these people were snuffed out in this mighty explosion. How would she have suddenly become terrified, jumped out of bed, gone to the window, and then - from 35 miles away, the shock wave had reached Berkeley and shook the window? (Randi 1992)[/size]

There is no need to perceive this event as paranormal, according to James Randi, who tape-recorded the story. A shock wave travels at different speeds through the ground and through the air. The difference over 35 miles would be about 8 seconds. Most likely the shaking Earth woke up the young lady in a fright and 8 seconds later the window shook. She and Tart assumed that the explosion took place when the window shook, making her experience inexplicable by the known laws of physics. This explanation only makes sense, however, if one ignores the known laws of physics.

[/excerpt]

When someone gives an material explanation for something that does not behave as matter, they err. At the very least they are in far too big a hurry to attribute every damn thing to materiality.

Unfortunately, I know of nothing that exists (and the existence is known and accepted) that cannot be explained in terms of matter and natural phenomena. If you could name an example, I would appreciate that.

You and I both know that anything you want to label consciousness is going to have rise above its algorithms. I don't think anybody will be fooled long, no matter how intricate the programming, into believing something is conscious when it is not. So if you (or the ever-confident Dennet) can create it, please do. Enough talk, let's see it! But until you or someone does it, you don't really know what causes consciousness do you?

The brain "causes" consciousness. Its whatever "causes" radioactive decay that I'm still trying to figure out...

Because other functions of the body are stupid, blind mechanics. Can you say that about consciousness?

Fallacy of Personal Incredulity. You are making an inaccurate judgement of consciousness based on personal convictions.

That analogy using light above isn't so far off from what a lot of people believe happens with humans, and probably animals too. That some undifferentiated pool of consciousness is drawn into the body, and "projected" by it to create the image we call "self." Maybe the body individuates us from the generality of that pool, which means since we are not individuals when we enter into the body, we really are very dependent on it to project us and individuate us.

Whether or not there is a way to escape that dependence is a well-know area of great interest to immaterialists.

Well, I'll put it this way: I have spent a great deal of my life learning as much as I absolutely can fit into the machine inside my skull.

If you wish to come to the JREF messageboards, I invite you to do so. Although I've put in a great deal of time and effort studying things such as this, there are plenty of people there, many of which are brighter than myself.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by Yahweh
Well, I'll put it this way: I have spent a great deal of my life learning as much as I absolutely can fit into the machine inside my skull.

If you wish to come to the JREF messageboards, I invite you to do so. Although I've put in a great deal of time and effort studying things such as this, there are plenty of people there, many of which are brighter than myself. [/B]

What makes you think I need all that elementary neuroscience, lectures about Occams Razor, thoroughly misapplied fallacy accusations, and the refutations of paranormal claims as though I ever suggested they had validity? You know, there are informed people who look at the evidence and come to different opinions than yours.

Although you've changed your handle here again, your debating tactics are exactly the same. Whether you call yourself Yahweh or logical atheist or biologyforums, you can't hide your love for only your own opinions, your false representation of yourself, and your overall lack of integrity in debating. But don't worry, if they let you stay this time I won't be bothering you again.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by Jimmy
Maybe the question could be put like this:

Does information exist? Is our perception, when you get right down to it, just based on information?

I'm going to define information in a general way by stating that it is the relationships between physical entities. All information depends on physical objects and processes. Some of our descriptions of "physical" objects are pretty abstract in their own right.

I don't have a problem with linking sense perception to physicalness, but I don't think sense perception is all there is to my consciousness (I am assuming you used the word "perception" loosely for consciousness). What about my experience of joy sitting here right now that has nothing to do with any external information? I am experiencing an inner part of myself, and it makes me feel good. In fact, if I become too dependent on external information for my sense of well-being, I find myself at the mercy of external conditions for my happiness.

Now, with all sorts of wonderfully complicated stuff to think about and master ("information"), how could someone put self-contained happiness next to it for consideration as crucial to consciousness? Well, this is one of the several reasons why materialists and immaterialists tend to disagree. We debate about what are, and how to prioritize, human potenitals.

Originally posted by Jimmy
So what is it that extracts the "original" information that is present in the brain of the listener? And what was the original information? Was it physical relationships between things or are those relationships purely abstract?

In the situation you set up, that of trading information through the senses, I would have to say you are right to characterize that flow as physical. But there is more than that going on there, and this brings up another reason why materialists and immaterialists tend to disagree.

Let's say you attend a Nutcracker ballet this Christmas. To see and hear it requires that physical information be available for perception, as you say. In your body are sense organs built to capture the information, and then in the brain is a system for experiencing that information. So beyond all doubt, physical information must be utilized for a human to experience a Nutcracker ballet.

But is that all you are going to experience? Do you go there to keep track of variations in wavelengths of sound and light? Do you take an oscilliscope to help you? Do you go there to analyze it all?' Of course you can do that, and there is even practical value in understanding the physical side of how information is exchanged in such a setting (for designing the accoustics of theatres, for instance).

Another whole realm of experience is available too, and that is appreciation. Yes, to perceive the ballet is physical-dependent, but that isn't why you are going there. You are going to appreciate. So if in a discussion you want to boil everything down to the mechanics of how you got the information that gave you an opportunity to apprciate, I would have to say you are so fascinated with mechanics that you rather do that than apprecaite the ballet.

I will take appreciation for myself. And think about it, if we could not enjoy or care about information, we'd never seek it! A computer couldn't care less about whether it has information or not, and doesn't care whether it lives or dies, and it doesn't care if you set it up to repeat 2 + 2 = 4 over and over again until it wears itself out doing it.

That ability to care, to appreciate, to want to learn and grow, to love, to be courageous . . . all this is something different, I believe, from the mechanices of the physical system and universe in which I now find myself. The relevance of the physical side is undeniable, but it isn't all there is to consciousness.

 

[Jimmy]

LW Sleeth,

I was using the term 'perception' loosely. My post did seem to focus mostly on the physical aspects of consciousness and the transfer of information. I was not, however, trying to push the idea of pure materialism. I was trying to convey the idea that information, after you examine the physical processes behind it, is abstract. I don't believe that the physical aspects of our brains alone can explain consciousness/awareness and especially self-awareness. Like I asked before, what is it that extracts the information that is represented by the neurons and how they operate together? We have all this information that is constantly being sampled and integrated by the brain. I think the mind exists because of the complex relationships of its physical parts. The parts are physical. There are definitely physical interactions taking place between the parts. The relationships that exist between those parts are abstract. An analogy is the relationship between hardware and software. The hardware is certainly important but without the software, what good is it? The software or information is abstract. The brain is more than just the sum of its parts. If you have a computer in which the ram is just filled with random data, it's not going to do much. You have the hardware, you have data. but it's dead. On the other hand, if the ram contains actual program software, then you definitely have more than the first case. Physically, both systems are equivalent because you have the hardware and data. The important thing is the relationships that exist in the data itself. I would say that software is more than just the bits that make it up. Our minds as well.

LW Sleeth: Another whole realm of experience is available too, and that is appreciation. Yes, to perceive the ballet is physical-dependent, but that isn't why you are going there. You are going to appreciate. So if in a discussion you want to boil everything down to the mechanics of how you got the information that gave you an opportunity to appreciate, I would have to say you are so fascinated with mechanics that you rather do that than appreciate the ballet.

Your mis-perception of what I believe is my fault. I was in a rush and didn't have the time to focus on the abstract side of consciousness and mind. I do love physics and I do love to model physical reality because I believe it is important. I do not want to boil everything down to mechanics, however. I appreciate beauty as you refer to it. I also appreciate beauty on other levels as well. There is beauty and symmetry in physics.

On a side note: I think about these things frequently but I have not studied neurology or consciousness formally. The things I am saying are no doubt oversimplified and maybe just plain wrong. Forgive me if I use terms loosely. I was intrigued by this discussion and wanted to partake in the discussion. I won't be offended if people point out my mistakes. That's why I'm here discussing this topic. I want to learn.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by Jimmy
I was using the term 'perception' loosely. My post did seem to focus mostly on the physical aspects of consciousness and the transfer of information.

Hmmmmm, I think I must have really misinterpreted your point. I am embarrassed to say I still don't fully understand it. I assumed you were doing a sort of human mind - computer analogy. I might have been thrown off when I saw the word "information."

Originally posted by Jimmy
I was not, however, trying to push the idea of pure materialism.

Although I love to dispute the principles of materialist philosophy, I think there are people who have good reasons for thinking it is true. My biggest objections so far have been people's debating tactics and their objectivity. It's perfectly fine with me if someone wants to be a materialist, an immaterialist, or anything in between as long as they debate fairly and objectively.

Originally posted by Jimmy
Like I asked before, what is it that extracts the information that is represented by the neurons and how they operate together?

I did notice that, and wondered what you were saying there. To me, what/whomever it is that is "extracting" is what makes me most interested in consciousness.

Originally posted by Jimmy
I was trying to convey the idea that information, after you examine the physical processes behind it, is abstract. I don't believe that the physical aspects of our brains alone can explain consciousness/awareness and especially self-awareness.

I think this is where I need more explanation. Do you mean its abstractness suggests it is the interpreting element of consciousness that makes that abstraction something conscious?

Originally posted by Jimmy
On a side note: I think about these things frequently but I have not studied neurology or consciousness formally. The things I am saying are no doubt oversimplified and maybe just plain wrong. Forgive me if I use terms loosely. I was intrigued by this discussion and wanted to partake in the discussion. I won't be offended if people point out my mistakes. That's why I'm here discussing this topic. I want to learn.

You are doing fine as far as I'm concerned. I hope you didn't take my way of debating (which is to rather intensely line up everything I can in support of my postion ) as a criticism of you. I assumed from certain things you said in your post you were arguing in support of the materialist view; and so, in the spirit of debate, I challenged your points (as I understood them).

 

[Jimmy]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
Hmmmmm, I think I must have really misinterpreted your point. I am embarrassed to say I still don't fully understand it. I assumed you were doing a sort of human mind - computer analogy. I might have been thrown off when I saw the word "information."

Like I said earlier, your misinterpretation is my fault. I wasn't exactly clear. No need for embarrassment. :)

As far as "information", I'm just using that as a general term to represent the relationships between physical objects. I know I'm bandying that phrase around quite a bit. Take my earlier example of speech. The physical process that describe sound and the air molecules themselves are important. But when we speak, what's really important are the ideas we are trying to convey. The words we speak set up a complex array of sound waves but the original idea is 'riding' along on those waves in an abstract sense. The sounds would be meaningless to someone who didn't speak the same language.
Does that make any sense?

Although I love to dispute the principles of materialist philosophy, I think there are people who have good reasons for thinking it is true. My biggest objections so far have been people's debating tactics and their objectivity. It's perfectly fine with me if someone wants to be a materialist, an immaterialist, or anything in between as long as they debate fairly and objectively.

I'm not complete materialist in that sense. And I'm not trying to push a theory. I'm just talking. I've always been curious about these things. I'm really not sure where I stand. When you come right down to it, what our senses perceive about the physical world could be completely subjective. Our brains have to filter out an enormous amount of information just to be able to make sense of anything. I often wonder what's lost in the process of just looking at something. Vision is a complicated process. Light comes into the eye, triggers electro-chemical reactions, causes intricate patterns of neurons to fire. After all that, the mind has to interpret all this information. I wonder what's lost in the translation. Hell, we don't even see the thing we are looking at in a sense. We just sense the light that happens to reflect or scatter off of the object. A photon certainly isn't the same thing as the constituent particles that make up a material object. Actually, all of our senses depend on interactions of the outer electrons of atoms. Touch, taste, smell, sight, hearing.

We don't even directly sense everything that exists. Radio waves for example; We know now that they are basically the same as visible light waves at lower energy levels. We don't see them, however. In fact, we see a very narrow band of a much larger spectrum of light. The same with sound waves.

I've often wondered what it would be like to see through the eyes of someone else. Of course my mind would invalidate the experiment because everyone looks at things slightly different but I still wonder. Who can prove that we see physical things in the same way, for instance. I think generally humans are the same and would function much in the same way but how can you be sure? Take the color red, for example. You and I learned that this particular thing we see is called red (unless you're color blind). When we see an object that is red, we are able to agree on that description because we both learned through experience that that is red. You can't possibly know that what I see is the same, however. What if I see the color red like you see the color blue. We would never know. We both learned that this particular color is called red but that doesn't mean we see the 'same' thing. If that really has any meaning at all. I suppose it doesn't but I wonder. I guess it is a little far-fetched. Have I gotten completely off the track? I just enjoy this too much I guess.

I did notice that, and wondered what you were saying there. To me, what/whomever it is that is "extracting" is what makes me most interested in consciousness.

I guess 'extracting' is not a good choice of words. After it's all said and done, after all the physical processes are finished doing what they do, something still has to interpret the information. That's why I'm interested in this as well.

I think this is where I need more explanation. Do you mean its abstractness suggests it is the interpreting element of consciousness that makes that abstraction something conscious?

No, not really. I'm not suggesting that there is some special property of abstractness that lends consciousness. I'm just saying that thoughts, ideas and images we see in our mind are abstract. We need all the neurons and receptors in our brain, obviously, but they are not the thoughts, ideas, and images. Numbers written down on paper are physical representations of abstract ideas. I think what is even more abstract is how quantities in math and physics relate to each other as opposed to just the numbers themselves.

You are doing fine as far as I'm concerned. I hope you didn't take my way of debating (which is to rather intensely line up everything I can in support of my position ) as a criticism of you. I assumed from certain things you said in your post you were arguing in support of the materialist view; and so, in the spirit of debate, I challenged your points (as I understood them).

Thanks for the encouragement. I was never offended in any way by your responses. I am enjoying this too much, in fact.
Anything I say here is just for the sake of discussion. I'm not trying to shove my own view down anyone's throat. I don't really have a too much of a view one way or the other. Catch you later...

 

[Yahweh]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
What makes you think I need all that elementary neuroscience, lectures about Occams Razor, thoroughly misapplied fallacy accusations, and the refutations of paranormal claims as though I ever suggested they had validity? You know, there are informed people who look at the evidence and come to different opinions than yours.

Sorry if I come across as an over-bearing skeptic, its not my intention to come off as intellectually repugnant.

Although you've changed your handle here again, your debating tactics are exactly the same. Whether you call yourself Yahweh or logical atheist or biologyforums, you can't hide your love for only your own opinions, your false representation of yourself, and your overall lack of integrity in debating. But don't worry, if they let you stay this time I won't be bothering you again.

You have me mixed up with somebody else.

I believe Zero can vouch for my validity.

I would be Yahweh, from the JREF forums. Yahweh is the only name I use for the JREF forums, I recently signed up for PhysicsForums under the name "Yahweh". I've only ever actively posted on the JREF boards (I've made a few stray posts on other boards), and I began posting on these boards recently as well. When the name "Yahweh" isn't available, I use the name "Yahweh of Nod". There is a Christian board I post on as well, but I don't use the handle Yahweh for it.

If you realize that you've made a mistake in your judgement in prematurely judging that I am somebody else, just post or PM me with "Oops my bad, sorry 'bout that" and we can move on.

Most people are actually pleasantly surprised when they find out who the person is behind the keyboard typing this post right now...

From Here:

I am impressed by Yahweh. There's a great number of smart, debate-worthy kids in this world, but unlike the rest of them, he holds his tongue and does not bring insults into the fray. The clean-cut style of debating, mixed with a VERY thorough background on his fave subjects, makes him an ace debater. But it's the fact he is very young that makes me so impressed. Behavior and maturity I'd expect from a 40 year old coming from a HS kid? This guy's going to be aces if he doesn't get cranky in his old age (like I feel I may).
---- Keneke

Yahweh; So young and so clever and polite. A valuable member to this forum.
---- PlindBoe

From here also:

I've been a lurker for quite a bit, and decided to register a while back, and haven't made any worthwile posts, and just decided to pop in and post here.

I'm not as brilliant as Yahweh, not as sullen as Lord Kenneth (Although I could identify with his position), but I'm a skeptical hard teen atheist, currently having a status of bum, out of school due to a long streak of depression after a lethargic fall from grace.
---- RabbiSatan

 

[Eh]

Originally posted by Mentat
What about in string theory approaches, that are background-dependent? In this case, there would be wavicles (strings) and there would also be spacetime...I wanted my definition of Materialism to fit all possible circumstances.

It doesn't matter much. If such a thing as background free string theory exists, we can still easily classify a physical object as one that exists in spacetime. A string certainly does, even if the overall relations define spacetime itself. Other things such as a wave function can be considered physical, because they are properties of spacetime.

 

[Eh]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
I don't quite see how spacetime alone covers it.

Why not? Can you think of anything in the physical world that isn't to be found in spacetime?

 

[Fliption]

I guess I should say that my real goal here is not really to define materialism. My real goal is to try to determine what the distinction is between the various views being presented here in this forum among the people using the words materialists and non-materialists. I thought that trying to get a definition of these words would help me understand the distinction. So far, no definition has been able to do that.

Originally posted by Mentat
Materialism: The belief that physical reality exists, and that there is nothing else but this physical reality. The definition of "physical" may change with scientific discovery, but whatever that definition is, that's all that exists.

Obviously, this one does not do that because it simply means everything. There is no opposing view to this. And since we know from the heated discussions in this forum there are different views, then this obviously is not the word that helps me understand the distinction.

Materialism: The belief that wavicles and spacetime exist, and that nothing else but these exists at all.

This is a better attempt but it still begs even more definitions like "wavicles" and "spacetime". So while this in the right direction. More work needs to be done. I'm almost certain that when this process ends that the resulting definition will be exactly what the first definition is. A meaningless one with no opposing view.

I'm beginning to think that the distinction has little resemblance to the old philsophical views of materialism. It would probably be good if that term were dropped completely, since it is obvious that people are using different definitions and then debating as if they are debating on the same concept.

Here is my attempt at the distinction:

I think it is similar to what Royce was saying. I think that it has more to do with what is fundamental in reality. What is the essence of the first cause? Did mindless, accidental processes create intent? Or was it the other way around? This may not be the exact distinction. But I think exploring what the distinction is and then debating it, would be more productive then continuing the silly situation that exists with the word "materialism".

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Eh
It doesn't matter much. If such a thing as background free string theory exists, we can still easily classify a physical object as one that exists in spacetime. A string certainly does, even if the overall relations define spacetime itself. Other things such as a wave function can be considered physical, because they are properties of spacetime.

Wave-functions are properties of spacetime? Also, aren't there supposed to be strings that are wound around some of the curled up dimensions of space? Doesn't this mean that there must both be energy (in the form of strings) and spacetime?

 

[Mentat]

Well, Fliption, what about if we just say that "Whatever science defines as "physical" is physical, and there is nothing else besides these things.

I just checked the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, under "Metaphysics":

Perhaps the most familiar question in metaphysics is whether there are only material entities - materialism - or only mental entities, i.e., minds and their states - idealism - or both - dualism. Here "entity" has its broadest sense: Anything real.

From this, it can be deduced that, if something "mindful" (non-physical) exists at all, then you do not have materialism (you, instead, have dualism). If, however, there is no such phenomenon as a non-physical entity, then you have actual materialism.

I mention this because your suggested distinction (whether "primary reality" is material or "mindful") is based on the assumption that some "mindful" exists at all, in which case you would have no room for actual Materialism.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by FZ+
To spare Flipton, LWSleeth, Royce et al from my rather continuous ranting on the other thread, I've set this one up so my ranting may be safely ignored.

What I think materialism is:

My form of materialism is the fundamental denial of a material immaterial distinction. All concepts thought of as immaterial are thus either material in disguise, or non-existent entities. All things that are real are material, and this reality is because it acts in a material way - by having some sort of influence on other things which make it possible to be measured or perceived. (Of course, I think Flipton believes this not to be materialism at all, so I'll be happy for anyone else to come up with a name for it.)

In short:
Material = exerting some sort of influence that renders it detectable
Reality = that which is material
Immaterial reality = contradiction in terms, as to be real, it must become material.

What do you think?

Not much. Simply because something influences something else, doesn't mean it can be measured or perceived. I'm thinking of (phenomenological) consciousness here. You cannot say it is measurable unless any observer with suitable instruments could detect it. But it cannot be detected unless you either conflate the neurological correlates of consciousness with (phenomenological)consciousness itself, or you suppose that phenomenological consciousness is a causally efficacious reality in its own right. The former presupposes materialism, the latter supposes interactionist dualism (since phenomenological consciousness is only knowable from the 1st person perspective). As a materialist you would presumably opt for the former. But what does it mean to say that phenomenological consciousness is one and the same thing as neurons firing?

Simply because consciousness might be able to affect the physical doesn't entail that consciousness is itself physical. In order to be material/physical it must be able to be discerned from the third person perspective.

Huh?? Why am I only being allowed 10,000 characters??

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
I mention this because your suggested distinction (whether "primary reality" is material or "mindful") is based on the assumption that some "mindful" exists at all, in which case you would have no room for actual Materialism.

We've been into this before. There is a difference between assigning words (semantics) and deciding what is truth. The distinction that I suggested has nothing to do with whether anything actually exist or not. The distinction is about which of the understood "concepts" comes first and caused the other.

There is no sense in claiming that assigning a word to a concept causes it to be true in reality. This view is extreme, unreasonable, and has no place in a philosphy forum. I will not spend another 12 pages debating this one again, as I am confident that enough people will agree to make this discussion productive without having to do that.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
We've been into this before. There is a difference between assigning words (semantics) and deciding what is truth. The distinction that I suggested has nothing to do with whether anything actually exist or not. The distinction is about which of the understood "concepts" comes first and caused the other.

There is no sense in claiming that assigning a word to a concept causes it to be true in reality. This view is extreme, unreasonable, and has no place in a philosphy forum. I will not spend another 12 pages debating this one again, as I am confident that enough people will agree to make this discussion productive without having to do that.

I agree that this should be gotten over as quickly as possible (I don't want to go through another "why the bias against materialism" ), but I do think that, when defining terms that will deal with the very nature of reality, the use of faulty semantics could have profound implications, which is why I mentioned it. If one says that the whole distinction is based on which part of reality ("mindful" or material) is primary, one has already assumed that there is a "mindful" reality, which precludes Materialism right from the start (it would be as useless as you say my definitions are, and for the exact same reasons).

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Canute

Yahwah
The smell of a fart does not exist.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


HOhohohahaha. Ahem, sorry. You're obviously not a regular user of public transport. You'll certainly make a great partner for someone one day.


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The process of smelling a fart is a physical process occurring in your brain. The memory of what a fart smells like is stored in the structure of your brain. The experience of remembering what a fart smells like is a process in your brain, and so on.

When we talk about the smell of a fart, we are talking about a process as though it were an object. That is just a quirk of language, based on intuitive preconceptions which date back hundreds, and even thousands of years. It is not an indication of what the true nature of reality is.

I think I see where you are going with this. The mistake in the "primary and secondary qualities" idea is not that there is no difference between things like length, and things like color. It is that the color of an object is not a "quality" of that object at all.

The color of an object is a part of the experience you have when you see, or remember seeing, that object. It is a physical process occurring in your brain.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


What do mean here by 'an experience'? An experience of something that does not exist? The experience of the smell of a fart exists (how did I get into this?) but the smell doesn't? That makes no sense.

These are tricky issues and you've obviously thought about them a lot. But you are letting your death grip on your assumptions lead you into inconsistencies.

Yahwah just seems to be echoing Stimpson J Cat's arguments on the jref board. Stimpson specifically stated to me the smell of a fart does not exist. Go
http://host.randi.org/vbulletin/showthread.php?s=&threadid=25726&highlight=primary

 

[Eh]

Originally posted by Mentat
Wave-functions are properties of spacetime?

If the wave function is the probabilistic distribution of energy throughout at every point of spacetime, then yes, you can consider it a property.

Also, aren't there supposed to be strings that are wound around some of the curled up dimensions of space? Doesn't this mean that there must both be energy (in the form of strings) and spacetime?

If spacetime is nothing but the relations among strings, then there are no separate "things" here. Consider a single string. It has length as a fundamental property, but it also has energy as a property. So you could consider length and energy to both be properties of the same fundamental thing, with spacetime being the finished product. Locating a string and calling it physical based on it's location in spacetime is no different than slicing up lines on Euclids plane and calling them geometric objects.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Fliption
I guess I should say that my real goal here is not really to define materialism. My real goal is to try to determine what the distinction is between the various views being presented here in this forum among the people using the words materialists and non-materialists. I thought that trying to get a definition of these words would help me understand the distinction. So far, no definition has been able to do that.

I'm not a materialist, but it seems to be that materialism simply means that there is an ontologically self-subsistent reality which is susceptible to a mathematical description by the hard sciences, that this reality is the totality of all that exists, and that this reality, if organised in a particular way, logically entails conscious awareness.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Mentat
Well, Fliption, what about if we just say that "Whatever science defines as "physical" is physical, and there is nothing else besides these things.

Because that's a ridiculous definition. Science cannot define physical because science has nothing to say on the subject of metaphysics. Besides, science is not a conscious entity so how could science define anything? If you mean scientists, then I'm afraid they are failing to understand what the word material or physical means.