Metaphorical line between knowledge and belief ?

[myke]

metaphorical line between "knowledge" and "belief"?

where do you draw the metaphorical line between "knowledge" and "belief"? and is there even a difference? Even the best of our scientific knowledge is a series of assumptions based on our observations of our tiny fraction of the universe. these observations are made by the mind of a single species, whose minds have evolved to do little more than survive, and ensure the species continued existence. who are we to judge what is "real"?

 

[zomgwtf]

where do you draw the metaphorical line between "knowledge" and "belief"? and is there even a difference? Even the best of our scientific knowledge is a series of assumptions based on our observations of our tiny fraction of the universe. these observations are made by the mind of a single species, whose minds have evolved to do little more than survive, and ensure the species continued existence. who are we to judge what is "real"?

Well just letting you know, this topic has come to these forums many times before. So don't take it too personally if a couple people tend to be more 'aggressive' towards you then you expect.

It is a good question to think about though.

I'd recommend you set out what your terms mean though, like 'belief' and 'knowledge'. To me it seems like when you talk about 'belief' you actually mean 'faith', I'm not sure though.

EDIT: For instance in my mind this is closer to the definition of belief:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/

In which case whatever the belief is, is a 'form' of knowledge, so to speak, but it's not exactly synonomous with the word knowledge.

 

[Sea Cow]

Even the best of our scientific knowledge is a series of assumptions based on our observations of our tiny fraction of the universe.

No. The best of our scientific knowledge is a series of hypotheses that have provided predictions that could be tested empirically, where the results of those tests prove absolutely 100% in accordance with the predictions.

The last part of your post appears to be a rehashing of the solipsism position regarding knowledge. All this means, however, is that you need to add a proviso to your knowledge: Assuming x is true, we can know that y is also true. You can build a perfectly sensible, secure and complete foundation for knowledge in this way without needing to resort to the idea that it is 'only a belief'.

 

[myke]

the terms themselves are sort of what I'm questioning, to religious people, their faith is "the truth" and therefore belief is treated as knowledge, to others, it is "just a belief". It's possible I'm just thinking in circles, but it is something I think, should be thought about

 

[DaveC426913]

the terms themselves are sort of what I'm questioning, to religious people, their faith is "the truth" and therefore belief is treated as knowledge, to others, it is "just a belief". It's possible I'm just thinking in circles, but it is something I think, should be thought about

One of the components that often separates the two: testability.

It is knowledge if an independent entity can repeat the test and corroborate the results.

 

[zomgwtf]

One of the components that often separates the two: testability.

It is knowledge if an independent entity can repeat the test and corroborate the results.

I understand what you are trying to say but I don't think it's exactly true to what the OP is asking.

Scientific knowledge certainly does have to be tested very vigorously not just by an independent entity but by many such entities. However it is still a belief, it's not faith though (in most cases...) Science never sets out to prove things and all things held true in science are all beliefs. They can definitely change though and there is definitely substantial reasoning behind such beliefs. Faith on the other hand is different and I'm not sure if the OP is asking to distinguish faith or just belief and knowledge.

A belief is just something that is held as true and the 'attitude' that goes along with accepting that it is true. I do believe that the world orbits around the sun, that is a belief... it is also knowledge though.

The reason I said earlier that belief is not synonomous is because you can have knowledge that you hold no beliefs over.

 

[DaveC426913]

I understand what you are trying to say but I don't think it's exactly true to what the OP is asking.

Scientific knowledge certainly does have to be tested very vigorously not just by an independent entity but by many such entities. However it is still a belief, it's not faith though (in most cases...) Science never sets out to prove things and all things held true in science are all beliefs. They can definitely change though and there is definitely substantial reasoning behind such beliefs. Faith on the other hand is different and I'm not sure if the OP is asking to distinguish faith or just belief and knowledge.

A belief is just something that is held as true and the 'attitude' that goes along with accepting that it is true. I do believe that the world orbits around the sun, that is a belief... it is also knowledge though.

The reason I said earlier that belief is not synonomous is because you can have knowledge that you hold no beliefs over.

I don't understand how any of this addresses my point.

All I'm saying is that knowledge is information that can be retested. A belief is something that would an anathema to retest.

 

[Sea Cow]

All I'm saying is that knowledge is information that can be retested. A belief is something that would an anathema to retest.

What about qualia? Are you telling me I don't know how blue looks to me? I do, you know. It may not be public knowledge, but it is knowledge to me, is it not?

 

[DaveC426913]

What about qualia? Are you telling me I don't know how blue looks to me? I do, you know. It may not be public knowledge, but it is knowledge to me, is it not?

How do you get that from what I said? How did I imply you didn't know how blue looks?

 

[Sea Cow]

How do you get that from what I said? How did I imply you didn't know how blue looks?

Qualia are an example of knowledge that cannot be tested, is all. There is public knowledge and there is private knowledge, and private knowledge is not something that can be tested, let alone retested.

It's relevant, I think, because religious people will often assert that their religious beliefs are a kind of private knowledge. It can be hard to disabuse them of this notion because such a thing as private knowledge does exist.

 

[kote]

Beliefs that are accurate or true are said to be knowledge. The problem is, it is impossible to verify anything about the external world to make sure your belief is true. The only type of belief that can be verified is the axiomatic type... we can prove that, given certain rules, 2+2=4. We also may be able to prove certain subjective things, like "I exist."

"Testability" doesn't help us at all. It is impossible to verify any belief through testing. The notion of verification was abandoned for falsification - the idea that we can't prove things right but we can prove them wrong. Even falsification has been abandoned at this point, since it has been shown that no claim of falsification can be conclusive either.

 

[zomgwtf]

All I'm saying is that knowledge is information that can be retested. A belief is something that would an anathema to retest.

Not true, all beliefs regardless of if they can be tested or not are knowledge. People very well do gain knowledge from their religious experiences without testing it one time.

Regardless that's not my point at all, my point is that beliefs ARE knowledge and you are making it out to seem like they are two separate entities. This is just not true, go to the standford page I linked earlier and tell me how you can say that what a person has belief in is not knowledge to that person.

 

[kote]

I recommend Quine's "The Web of Belief" for an answer more in line with what you're asking... how we form beliefs, what we are justified in believing, and also what the difference between belief and knowledge is. It's a good introduction and still 99% relevant.

https://www.amazon.com/dp/0075536099/?tag=pfamazon01-20

 

[myke]

doesn't that mean that the only difference between belief and knowledge is a different point of view?

 

[DaveC426913]

So it really comes down to us agreeing on the definition of knowledge. We all seem to have our own definitions.

 

[Evo]

So it rally comes doen to us agreeing on the definition of knowledge. We all seem to have our own definitions.

Knowledge doesn't mean it's true. False knowledge is knowledge, it's just worthless if you believe it, even worse, it can be harmful. Perhaps that is what you were inferring?

 

[DaveC426913]

Knowledge doesn't mean it's true. False knowledge is knowledge, it's just worthless if you believe it, even worse, it can be harmful. Perhaps that is what you were inferring?

No, I was just saying we don't agree on the definition itself of exactly what constitutes knowledge and what does not. Not much point in proceeding unless we can agree on that.

 

[kote]

So it rally comes doen to us agreeing on the definition of knowledge. We all seem to have our own definitions.

Knowledge has a very specific technical meaning in philosophy. "Knowledge" means "justified true belief" unless otherwise specified.

Edit: So a false belief does not count as knowledge. All knowledge is true.

See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology

 

[kote]

http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/P059

There is a vast array of views about propositional knowledge, but one virtually universal presupposition is that knowledge is true belief, but not mere true belief (see Belief and knowledge). For example, lucky guesses or true beliefs resulting from wishful thinking are not knowledge. Thus, a central question in epistemology is: what must be added to true beliefs to convert them into knowledge?

 

[zomgwtf]

Knowledge has a very specific technical meaning in philosophy. "Knowledge" means "justified true belief" unless otherwise specified.

Edit: So a false belief does not count as knowledge. All knowledge is true.

See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology

Quite true and this is specifically what I was referring to.

However the problem is that all beliefs are true by virtue of them being what is believed in. So something being a belief it is necessary thought to be true to that person. This implies that all knowledge is true but knowledge is not true to everyone. This has been what I've said in all my posts the entire time, lol.

EDIT: Actually I've noticed that they have some counters to what I was thinking about when I had said that it is possible to have knowledge without belief. So maybe I should withdraw that statement

 

[brainstorm]

Knowledge has a very specific technical meaning in philosophy. "Knowledge" means "justified true belief" unless otherwise specified.

Edit: So a false belief does not count as knowledge. All knowledge is true.

See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology

This kind of formalism is confounding in that it renders speakable, sensible claims incorrect at an abstract evaluative level. If it is possible to construct the phrase, "false knowledge," then how can you say that false knowledge can't exist because all knowledge but be true or not be knowledge at all, by definition?

The word "knowledge" is a derivation of the verb, "to know." What does it mean "to know" something? To answer that question, you can do an empirical experiment where you survey various things you know.

You can know, for example, the meaning of the word "God," but also know that God is not empirically observable as such. You can believe in God or believe that God doesn't exist, but that isn't the same thing as knowing whether God exists or not. You can know what you believe without knowing whether your belief is true - and therefore whether it is possible to know (for certain) the truth of what you believe.

From this little exploration, I do think that knowledge contains a certain level of truth constraint. I am apprehensive about using "know" to describe belief of uncertain truth status. On the other hand, though, what is belief except a type of knowledge? Isn't knowledge anything that exists in a mind? If knowledge isn't the general umbrella term for all information and concepts, what is?

Is unknown information still knowledge despite its being yet unknown? If a belief isn't part of an individual's store of knowledge, what is it? What about when something known as true turns out to have been a belief without truth-status? E.g. People "knew" that the world was flat or that Pluto was the ninth planet, and then some people convinced them that their "knowledge" were untrue beliefs. Does this mean that those people didn't "know" what they knew when they knew it?

In general I think there's some confounding between objective existence of knowledge and its evaluation in terms of truth-value/status. Outside of whether something can be deemed true or not, it must be known to even be considered for evaluation. You can't establish something as true or false without knowing it as a claim prior to evaluation, so that would seem to make the fact of whether something is knowledge or not independent of any evaluation of whether it is true.

 

[kote]

If it is possible to construct the phrase, "false knowledge," then how can you say that false knowledge can't exist because all knowledge but be true or not be knowledge at all, by definition?

It's the same reason that even though I can construct the phrase "married bachelor," there's still no such thing, by definition.

Isn't knowledge anything that exists in a mind? If knowledge isn't the general umbrella term for all information and concepts, what is?

Our knowledge is a subset of our beliefs - in particular, justified and true beliefs are called knowledge. If you want to expand further to consider further "information and concepts," you might call it mental content or something similar. I'm not aware of any other technical term here. Idea could also work depending on whether or not you want to consider perceptions too.

Is unknown information still knowledge despite its being yet unknown?

Knowledge must be known. If information is unknown, it isn't knowledge.

If a belief isn't part of an individual's store of knowledge, what is it? What about when something known as true turns out to have been a belief without truth-status? E.g. People "knew" that the world was flat or that Pluto was the ninth planet, and then some people convinced them that their "knowledge" were untrue beliefs. Does this mean that those people didn't "know" what they knew when they knew it?

They believed that they knew, but they were wrong. They may even have been justified in believing that the world was flat. They were missing the third criteria though. A justified false belief is not knowledge.

In general I think there's some confounding between objective existence of knowledge and its evaluation in terms of truth-value/status. Outside of whether something can be deemed true or not, it must be known to even be considered for evaluation. You can't establish something as true or false without knowing it as a claim prior to evaluation, so that would seem to make the fact of whether something is knowledge or not independent of any evaluation of whether it is true.

Ideas can't be believed without being conceived. They can't be known without being believed. There is no condition that they must be known to be considered though. They must only be conceived to be considered. An idea can't be known until it is first conceived and then believed. It is in those stages that the evaluation is done.

 

[kote]

Note that I never claimed we can know whether or not we know anything . Actually, it seems pretty clear that the opposite is true. We can never be certain of what we know. This becomes a big epistemological issue. You can argue that knowledge, by this definition, is meaningless, since we can never make any justified claims about knowledge - we can only make claims about beliefs.

This is true. We can never tell the difference between belief and knowledge. It may be more useful, then, to redefine knowledge in terms of the strength and justification of our beliefs, leaving out the truth criterion. This leads to the strange situation where two people can have knowledge of conflicting ideas. I can know that God exists, and you can know that God doesn't exist. That doesn't seem to do us much good either though. One of us is wrong. One of us must only think we know, right?

Neither way of going about it is perfect, but the choice you make has huge implications across how you will consider any philosophical arguments. For the sake of consistency and communication, philosophers stick with the requirement that knowledge must be true. Unless they don't. But then they tell you they aren't .

 

[brainstorm]

For the sake of consistency and communication, philosophers stick with the requirement that knowledge must be true. Unless they don't. But then they tell you they aren't .

Even though you may want to initiate the process of philosophizing with the criteria of only counting true knowledge as knowledge, that is an empirically confounding approach considering that information has to be known before it can be known as true or false.

So when you try to retro-actively deny knowledge-status to a known piece of information once you establish it as being false, you end up with an anti-empirical approach to knowledge.

I think you got it right when you said that information becomes knowledge only once it becomes known. It is then logical to say that ALL information becomes knowledge once it becomes known.

So if I come inside and tell you that the temperature is 70, that information becomes known to you as is therefore "knowledge" in the sense that "knowledge" is the noun form of the verb "to know." If the actual temperature turns out to have been 80 and your perception, or a miscalibrated thermometer, caused you to have false-knowledge of the temperature, it doesn't mean that you didn't know the information "70 degrees outside."

I think the distinction we're debating here is knowing verses Knowing, in the same sense that people talk about truth/Truth or reason/Reason. If you say "I know that," the implication is that what is known is true; i.e. it is a truth claim." If you say, "My knowledge is that," then the claim becomes one of relative knowledge, which is bracketed for truth value. The distinction is based on connotation and inflection due to nuances in usage, not the denotative meaning of the word generally.

A married-bachelor is an oxymoron because "bachelor" directly refers to the marital status of the person. "Knowledge" does not directly refer to the truth status of a claim, only whether it is known by the knower. If "know" only referred to true information, people could not be "known" since they are not true or false.

Granted there is some tension with claiming to know something false, but I think that is just due to an implicit truth-orientation built into the act of knowing. As Foucault says, people have a compulsion to tell the truth. Maybe it is through this implicit inflection embedded into the work "know" through common usage that this compulsion is communicated and socialized.

To the extent that truth can only be established in critical evaluation of knowledge, it is not really possible to simply "know" something as true without first subjecting the knowledge to critical reflection. To the extent that all knowledge is subjective prior to its being established as objective or factual, simply asserting "I know X" as a statement of truth seems to be inherently deceptive. Therefore it seems more honest to say, "To my knowledge," followed by a statement of fact.

That's not to say that you can't assert truth-power by stating "I know X," but that to do so is more an assertion than a true statement. "I know it is sunny outside" invites critical investigation whereas "to my knowledge, it is sunny outside" is verified by the fact that the speaker is acknowledging the source of their claim, i.e. their own knowledge.

 

[kote]

...information has to be known before it can be known as true or false.

This is not right. An idea must be conceived before it can be evaluated as true or false. It's only known after that evaluation is performed and the idea is deemed to be justified. It must also actually represent the truth. Information can't be known until it is first deemed to be true.

A married-bachelor is an oxymoron because "bachelor" directly refers to the marital status of the person. "Knowledge" does not directly refer to the truth status of a claim, only whether it is known by the knower. If "know" only referred to true information, people could not be "known" since they are not true or false.

Actually, knowledge does directly refer to truth status. See the standard definition of knowledge as justified true belief. Obviously words can have more than one meaning. Pointing out that "to know" can also mean "to be familiar with" doesn't help with the definition of knowledge, as distinct from belief, that we are dealing with.

That's not to say that you can't assert truth-power by stating "I know X," but that to do so is more an assertion than a true statement. "I know it is sunny outside" invites critical investigation whereas "to my knowledge, it is sunny outside" is verified by the fact that the speaker is acknowledging the source of their claim, i.e. their own knowledge.

"To my knowledge" means "according to what I do know," or, in other words "I don't know." Also, there is a very large difference between knowing and claiming to know. Any time anyone claims to know something, there is always room for critical investigation. I haven't mentioned anything about claims of knowledge.

Actual knowledge, while it may be limited in scope, is absolute. The only problem is we can never tell if we have actual knowledge or not.

You can argue with the merits of the standard definition of knowledge, but there is a clear standard definition. Any other definition should be qualified as such or should be labeled by a different word.

 

[brainstorm]

You can argue with the merits of the standard definition of knowledge, but there is a clear standard definition. Any other definition should be qualified as such or should be labeled by a different word.

We're establishing a knowledge conflict here. My knowledge of the word "knowledge" conflicts with your knowledge of the word "knowledge."

How do we establish who is right? You are making reference to standard definitions that you claim are valid, but what is your source of authority? I haven't seen any reasoning on your behalf, only claims-making.

You keep citing some philosophical elite, but what gives you the power to cite some sub-branch of philosophy to define the meaning of a word in general usage?

To use your own language, how do you know that your knowledge of the word "knowledge" is valid?

 

[zomgwtf]

We're establishing a knowledge conflict here. My knowledge of the word "knowledge" conflicts with your knowledge of the word "knowledge."

How do we establish who is right? You are making reference to standard definitions that you claim are valid, but what is your source of authority? I haven't seen any reasoning on your behalf, only claims-making.

You keep citing some philosophical elite, but what gives you the power to cite some sub-branch of philosophy to define the meaning of a word in general usage?

To use your own language, how do you know that your knowledge of the word "knowledge" is valid?

Ugh, back to people claiming they can make variations on fundamental definitions of words. He doesn't NEED to make any sort of argument for his definition of the word. Why, you might ask? It's ALREADY BEEN DONE. Read the literature before you hate on it.

 

[kote]

You keep citing some philosophical elite, but what gives you the power to cite some sub-branch of philosophy to define the meaning of a word in general usage?

To use your own language, how do you know that your knowledge of the word "knowledge" is valid?

I've cited several academic philosophy sources, and this is a philosophy forum.

You could also try using the common definitions of speed or weight or heat on the physics sections of the forums, but that won't get you too far either. Try telling a physicist that he's wrong about what weight means because it's commonly used to refer to what scientists call mass. There are accepted, technical, academic definitions that we have to agree on for any progress to be made. Common ambiguous definitions are not useful for anything except imprecise informal conversation.

 

[brainstorm]

I've cited several academic philosophy sources, and this is a philosophy forum.

You could also try using the common definitions of speed or weight or heat on the physics sections of the forums, but that won't get you too far either. Try telling a physicist that he's wrong about what weight means because it's commonly used to refer to what scientists call mass. There are accepted, technical, academic definitions that we have to agree on for any progress to be made. Common ambiguous definitions are not useful for anything except imprecise informal conversation.

The words "speed," "weight," and "heat" are not used correctly or incorrectly based on the social status of the physicists who define them. They are subject to empirical testing, and if empirical testing demonstrates that a particular definition doesn't hold water, it doesn't matter what any physicists opinion is, because if their opinion doesn't agree with empirical testing, it's wrong.

That leaves us philosophers in a precarious position because linguistic empiricism is not exactly empiricism, is it. Still, we do have reason and argumentation to validate some knowledge and definitions over others. I don't believe you have presented sufficiently valid reason or argumentation to defend the meaning of "knowledge" you've asserted.

You have only cited other philosophers who supposedly agree with you. How is it reasonable to accept something wrong being right just because a number of people with some social status agree about it? Is truth relative?

I provided the reasoning and argumentation that once information is known by a knower, it must necessarily be "knowledge," regardless of whether it is true or not. This is defensible according to the reasoning that the information is "known" prior to evaluation as true or false.

How can something be known and not be knowledge? Knowledge is the noun form of the verb "to know."

I also provided a clear explanation of the connotative use of the phrase, "I know X" verses "To my knowledge, X is." Without some meaning of knowledge that includes the possibility of false knowledge, there becomes no way to evaluate whether knowledge is in fact true or false. Therefore your definition of knowledge is fundamentally flawed in that it denies the very possibility that knowledge can be contested.

You can cite whoever you want, but if your claim isn't reasonable, it can't be true.

 

[zomgwtf]

The words "speed," "weight," and "heat" are not used correctly or incorrectly based on the social status of the physicists who define them. They are subject to empirical testing, and if empirical testing demonstrates that a particular definition doesn't hold water, it doesn't matter what any physicists opinion is, because if their opinion doesn't agree with empirical testing, it's wrong.

His point went completely over your head did it?

Regardless I think you either missed my post, or you just decided not to respond. He doesn't have to prove anything to you about the definition he is using, it's already been done. As I said you should familiarize yourself with the literature before you think your cutting it up because you like to think of the word in a different sense.

This was pretty much the same problem that occurred in that thread over the issue of the soul.

 

[brainstorm]

His point went completely over your head did it?

No, I KNEW what he was saying. I just BELIEVED it was faulty logic and I provided defensible REASON, which your post does not respond to.

Regardless I think you either missed my post, or you just decided not to respond. He doesn't have to prove anything to you about the definition he is using, it's already been done. As I said you should familiarize yourself with the literature before you think your cutting it up because you like to think of the word in a different sense.

If he doesn't prove or reason his claim, I need a specific citation to evaluate the reasoning of the source. The mere fact that there is a citation for something doesn't automatically validate it. Validation is based on reasoning. Notably, you said nothing about the reasoning I provided in my post.

This was pretty much the same problem that occurred in that thread over the issue of the soul.

I don't view that thread as a rigorous truth-oriented discussion. It is more of an exploration of an immaterial concept.

This discussion of the meaning of the word "knowledge" has higher stakes, though. If you would have read the post you responded to, you would see that by denying the possibility that "knowledge" can refer to yet-unvalidated or invalidated knowledge, you deny the very fact that knowledge can be disputed in its truth-value.

Are you also willing to claim that knowledge is indisputably true?

 

[kote]

The words "speed," "weight," and "heat" are not used correctly or incorrectly based on the social status of the physicists who define them. They are subject to empirical testing, and if empirical testing demonstrates that a particular definition doesn't hold water, it doesn't matter what any physicists opinion is, because if their opinion doesn't agree with empirical testing, it's wrong.

Actually, the definitions do depend on the social statuses of the defining physicists. When enough social pressure builds to change the standard definitions, then they are replaced and are no longer standard. If you mean anything other than (mv^2)/2 when you say "kinetic energy," you are wrong. This is because physicists decided that "kinetic energy" is the label that they would give to the potential described by that certain formula. There is nothing called "kinetic energy" that exists out there that we are trying to map with our formula.

Energy doesn't have such a thing as existence. It's simply a useful convention for modeling experiments. This is true even if you believe that particles do exist and have real momentum etc. If a more useful convention comes along that is similar in scope and replaces our current model of kinetic energy, social pressure from physicists will cause a redefinition in the term. That is how a paradigm shift works. Until that happens, the definition of kinetic energy isn't up for debate. You'll fail any physics class you take if you don't use the established definition.

This is even a bit of an out of date example. The definition of kinetic energy already has been redefined - in relativistic terms. In a classical physics class, or in the paradigm of Newtonian physics, kinetic energy only means one very specific thing. In relativistic physics it means another. Which one is right absolutely depends on sociology. Clearly the relativistic version is a better model. Because of this, although there is some overlap in the definitions now, when you get down to the really technical level, only the relativistic version can be considered correct in today's paradigm. Still, back before relativity, if you had claimed that kinetic energy were anything but (mv^2)/2, you would have been laughed at and told to go look up the definition in an intro physics textbook.

Even today we know that our current models in physics are not perfect. They are approximations, or, very technically, they are just wrong as true representations of reality. Does that mean that force isn't actually equivalent to mass times acceleration? No. Force, by the definition given to it by high status textbook-writing physicists, is mass times acceleration. At some point in time we may replace this definition with something that generates more precise models, but for the time being, force necessarily is mass times acceleration, by definition. This is not up for debate or empirical testing.

You could make the claim that all of our definitions and concepts in physics are wrong because they do not lead to a unified theory. If you are willing to do this, I'll grant that you can question the definition of "knowledge" in philosophy. There isn't anything special about physics though. Who gets to write the textbooks is absolutely sociological. If you hold that force just is mass times acceleration, by definition, then the same logic should lead you to accept the definition of knowledge as stated. It's the definition that the top academics writing the textbooks decided to give it, and it's what the field acknowledges and works with. You'll fail an epistemology course if, without explicitly explaining your dissent, you use the word to mean anything else.

That leaves us philosophers in a precarious position because linguistic empiricism is not exactly empiricism, is it. Still, we do have reason and argumentation to validate some knowledge and definitions over others. I don't believe you have presented sufficiently valid reason or argumentation to defend the meaning of "knowledge" you've asserted.

You have only cited other philosophers who supposedly agree with you. How is it reasonable to accept something wrong being right just because a number of people with some social status agree about it? Is truth relative?

I provided the reasoning and argumentation that once information is known by a knower, it must necessarily be "knowledge," regardless of whether it is true or not. This is defensible according to the reasoning that the information is "known" prior to evaluation as true or false.

How can something be known and not be knowledge? Knowledge is the noun form of the verb "to know."

I also provided a clear explanation of the connotative use of the phrase, "I know X" verses "To my knowledge, X is." Without some meaning of knowledge that includes the possibility of false knowledge, there becomes no way to evaluate whether knowledge is in fact true or false. Therefore your definition of knowledge is fundamentally flawed in that it denies the very possibility that knowledge can be contested.

You can cite whoever you want, but if your claim isn't reasonable, it can't be true.

This has all been addressed. We evaluate ideas and beliefs before they ever have a chance of being called knowledge. You can have all the ideas and beliefs you want without knowing a single thing.

You're free to cite philosophers who disagree. That would probably be much more constructive. They are out there, and I've already shared some of their arguments.

 

[zomgwtf]

brainstorm, I haven't seen you lay out any 'reasoning' of why false knowledge is possible. I've only seen you claim that knowledge in everyday language can be used to convey an opinion, or educated guess.
This is not knowledge as Epistemology deals with it; which is what is being discussed here in this thread. Most languages actually have different words to distinguish clearly between these phrases, English is not one of them unfortunately.

I would like for you to give me a specific example of 'false knowledge' or 'unknown knowledge' or whatever other claim you can possibly make. Substantiate your claim with an example.

I'll lay out the standard definition for you:
knowledge is a justified TRUE belief.

What does this mean? Very simple. We all hold beliefs, the term in epistemology implies that you actually believe it to be true, not that you have 'beliefs IN such and such' but you actually believe the proposition is true. If this belief is justified and the proposition is actually true then you have KNOW it, it can not be any other way.

Example:
I believe my car is blue. It's a belief of a proposition that I think is true, I think it's a justified belief.
I see my car and I recognize that it is blue, the proposition is true, I know my car is blue now.

However:
I believe rain is methane. This is still a belief of a proposition I believe to be true, I could be justified in my belief (just an example). However when I see it raining and take samples and find out rain on Earth is water I do not know that rain is methane. I could change my beliefs and gain knowledge of rain but I can not know that rain is methane.

 

[brainstorm]

Actually, the definitions do depend on the social statuses of the defining physicists. When enough social pressure builds to change the standard definitions, then they are replaced and are no longer standard. If you mean anything other than (mv^2)/2 when you say "kinetic energy," you are wrong. This is because physicists decided that "kinetic energy" is the label that they would give to the potential described by that certain formula. There is nothing called "kinetic energy" that exists out there that we are trying to map with our formula.

Your assumption is that these terms are purely axiomatic and scientific discourse is paradigm-based, a la Kuhn. I had to trade my faith in Kuhnian paradigms in when I realized that were contested by Foucaultian truth-power. Or maybe it would be more accurate to say that the paradigm of empiricism makes it impossible to insist on truth that is not subject to empirical verification.

Kinetic energy does not "exist" the way matter exists. It exists as interdynamics of matter. If you claimed that kinetic energy only referred to solid objects and not to liquids, the fact that a river flows downstream would provide evidence that you are wrong. Then you would have to provide some reason why the downstream motion of water is qualitatively distinct from the acceleration of falling objects. Or you could provide reasoning why the distinction between potential and kinetic energy isn't rigorous. You can't just say, "all these people recognize it and therefore it's valid." If that was possible, Galileo would have been wrong and the pope right.

Energy doesn't have such a thing as existence. It's simply a useful convention for modeling experiments. This is true even if you believe that particles do exist and have real momentum etc. If a more useful convention comes along that is similar in scope and replaces our current model of kinetic energy, social pressure from physicists will cause a redefinition in the term. That is how a paradigm shift works. Until that happens, the definition of kinetic energy isn't up for debate. You'll fail any physics class you take if you don't use the established definition.

How would a paradigm shift ever occur if there could be no debate without one?

Actually, this is a bit of an out of date example. The definition of kinetic energy already has been redefined - in relativistic terms. In a classical physics class, or in the paradigm of Newtonian physics, kinetic energy only means one very specific thing. In relativistic physics it means another. Which one is right absolutely depends on sociology. Clearly the relativistic version is a better model. Because of this, although there is some overlap in the definitions now, when you get down to the really technical level, only the relativistic version can be considered correct in today's paradigm. Still, back before relativity, if you had claimed that kinetic energy were anything but (mv^2)/2, you would have been laughed at and told to go look up the definition in an intro physics textbook.

Laughter isn't a reasonable refute for anything, even if it works socially among sub-rigorous peer-interactions among certain 'scientists.' Two different models or theories can operationalize distinct definitions/meanings of a term, but it's not like there is any boundary conditions for critically contesting the usage of a term within the axiomatic/paradigmatic assumptions of the theory. If you tell me that either Newtonian or relativity physics do not maintain empirical testing or critical reason as part of their paradigm, then you may have some basis for insisting that their axioms may not be contested. However, since both do - either definition is up for discussion in terms of the theory. Actually, I don't see how the kinetic energy would be distinct in those two theories, but maybe you can start another thread on that one.

Even today we know that our current models in physics are not perfect. They are approximations, or, very technically, they are just wrong as true representations of reality. Does that mean that force isn't actually equivalent to mass times acceleration? No. Force, by the definition given to it by high status textbook-writing physicists, is mass times acceleration. At some point in time we may replace this definition with something that generates more precise models, but for the time being, force necessarily is mass times acceleration, by definition. This is not up for debate or empirical testing.

What if I find out that F only = MA for certain ranges of masses and acceleration in certain gravity situations? Would physicist maintain that formula as universally applicable to all masses and accelerations? No, they would qualify the range for which the formula applies. You underestimate the critical-responsiveness of good science. Critique and refinement isn't about perfection, it's about improvement and rigor.

You could make the claim that all of our definitions and concepts in physics are wrong because they do not lead to a unified theory.

No, you're mixing up empirical correspondence with theoretical coherence. A theory doesn't have to explain everything to be valid in what it does explain.

If you are willing to do this, I'll grant that you can question the definition of "knowledge" in philosophy.

First, you didn't even cite any specific explanation of logic of defining knowledge. Second, I provided specific defensible reasoning that you fail to debunk or even address. You seem to prefer the route of overwhelming me with a preponderance of unreasoned reasons why discoursive-sociality prevents me from even disputing your asserted truths. In your world, truth seems to be established by avoiding critical discourse.

There isn't anything special about physics though. Who gets to write the textbooks is absolutely sociological. If you hold that force just is mass times acceleration, by definition, then the same logic should lead you to accept the definition of knowledge as stated. It's the definition that the top academics writing the textbooks decided to give it, and it's what the field acknowledges and works with.

You are trying to elevate the social-power of academics above the truth-power of reasonable argumentation and empirical evidencing. You may get away with that among some people, but it will never make you truly right about anything - although you may be more interested in hearing yes than being right.

You'll fail an epistemology course if, without explicitly explaining your dissent, you use the word to mean anything else.

Dissent is irrelevant. Epistemology is either responsive to critical reason and empiricism or it isn't. Your epistemology seems not to be, but if it's not, then its dogmatic and has little value beyond social hegemony.

This has all been addressed. We evaluate ideas and beliefs before they ever have a chance of being called knowledge. You can have all the ideas and beliefs you want without knowing a single thing.

How can knowledge ever be disputed if it's not knowledge until it's indisputable? Most of the knowledge you are expressing in this post is problematic in its validity, but it is still all you know. I see your point with your argument, but you can't seem to see how problematic it is to retroactively withdraw the label of knowledge at the moment a dispute gets validated.

 

[kote]

What if I find out that F only = MA for certain ranges of masses and acceleration in certain gravity situations? Would physicist maintain that formula as universally applicable to all masses and accelerations?

Impossible. F=ma by definition, like 2+2=4. Not every concept has a strict definition - far from it. But when we're dealing with specific fields of study there are certain rules that need to be followed for any progress to be made. There are certain technical terms of art that are axiomatic within their fields. When enough debate gets stirred up around certain terms then they are no longer standard terms of art. Definitions are abandoned and often eventually replaced.

No, you're mixing up empirical correspondence with theoretical coherence. A theory doesn't have to explain everything to be valid in what it does explain.

Modern physics isn't valid. It is inconsistent. That's why we are looking for a way to unify and bring consistency.

You are trying to elevate the social-power of academics above the truth-power of reasonable argumentation and empirical evidencing. You may get away with that among some people, but it will never make you truly right about anything - although you may be more interested in hearing yes than being right.

I don't even claim to be absolutely right on this. But if you accept that any words can have strict definitions, "knowledge" as a philosophical term of art should be one of them. It is on the same level as any terms in physics or math. It has a clear standard definition represented in textbooks and tested in philosophy classes.

How can knowledge ever be disputed if it's not knowledge until it's indisputable? Most of the knowledge you are expressing in this post is problematic in its validity, but it is still all you know. I see your point with your argument, but you can't seem to see how problematic it is to retroactively withdraw the label of knowledge at the moment a dispute gets validated.

Knowledge is indisputable. What is disputable is whether or not anyone belief actually is knowledge or if it's just a belief. As I've said many times, it's impossible to know whether or not you have knowledge. That's where the dispute is.

I'm not sure what point you're trying to make. Are you saying that no terms are allowed to be axiomatic and well defined? If so - fine, but that makes it awfully hard to have a meaningful conversation, doesn't it? If you refuse to accept general terms of art, you aren't speaking the same language. I don't see how that helps anyone make any progress.

If you think terms of art need revising or replacing, fine. Make that argument. But until you prove your case and get the textbooks changed, please do us the favor of acknowledging the standard definition and speaking the same language that we are all using.

 

[zomgwtf]

Knowledge is indisputable. What is disputable is whether or not anyone belief actually is knowledge or if it's just a belief. As I've said many times, it's impossible to know whether or not you have knowledge. That's where the dispute is.

This is the major take home part in my opinion. There are things you can definitively know though, because they are concepts made my humans, with no applications outside that realm. Would you not agree kote? For instance knowing that we can not know a married bachelor is something we have knowledge over and we can be certain of.

 

[kote]

If it helps clarify at all, I don't claim to have much knowledge. I have very little knowledge. I have plenty of beliefs, but practically no knowledge.

I think I can safely say "I exist" and maybe a few other things. That's about the extent of it though.

 

[brainstorm]

Impossible. F=ma by definition, like 2+2=4. Not every concept has a strict definition - far from it. But when we're dealing with specific fields of study there are certain rules that need to be followed for any progress to be made. There are certain technical terms of art that are axiomatic within their fields. When enough debate gets stirred up around certain terms then they are no longer standard terms of art. Definitions are abandoned and often eventually replaced.

I know that F=MA is universal. I gave an example of how it would have to be revised if it was demonstrated not to be universally applicable. My point was that only a fool would insist on maintaining a definition that doesn't work in practice, such as yours of "knowledge."

Modern physics isn't valid. It is inconsistent. That's why we are looking for a way to unify and bring consistency.

You are assuming that isolated inconsistencies undermine all knowledge identified as "modern physics." Even though a general name is used to refer to multiple knowledges, that doesn't mean that they are all conditional on each other in such a way that bringing one into question automatically causes a chain reaction where all fall like a house of cards. Any given idea in physics has its own empirical and discursive validity independently of the rest, unless it is shown that the inefficacy of one idea undermines that of another, in which case there is interdependency, but you can't assume it beyond the level of specifics.

I don't even claim to be absolutely right on this. But if you accept that any words can have strict definitions, "knowledge" as a philosophical term of art should be one of them. It is on the same level as any terms in physics or math. It has a clear standard definition represented in textbooks and tested in philosophy classes.

I'm not arguing that "knowledge" or any other word should or shouldn't have a strict definition. I am arguing that your definition was flawed in that it lacked the ability to describe knowledge as knowledge when its validity is in dispute. Such a definition as you want to use would conflate substantive discussion about the validity of knowledge with debate about whether the thing your discussing is in fact what you're discussing or something else.

It would be like saying a computer monitor is only a computer-monitor when it's off and once it's on it ceases to be a computer monitor and becomes a virtual desktop. Then if someone says, "your monitor is on, do you want to turn it off," you ignore them because they didn't say anything about your "virtual desktop."

Think about the whole basis of science in skepticism and tentative belief. If scientific knowledge is always subject to falsification and therefore can never produce more than tentative knowledge, you could never even recognize that such a thing as "scientific knowledge" exists in the first place, because it's never absolutely true.

That is preposterous. Scientific is knowledge that is accepted tentatively with the assumption that critical discourse and alternative theories will eventually come along and call it into question. In fact, I don't think that science recognizes any knowledge as more than tentatively true, so according to you science has to scrap the word knowledge from its vocabulary completely. Nonsense.

Knowledge is indisputable. What is disputable is whether or not anyone belief actually is knowledge or if it's just a belief. As I've said many times, it's impossible to know whether or not you have knowledge. That's where the dispute is.

Ok, so knowledge is impossible according to you. So why do you bother discussing what it is?

I'm not sure what point you're trying to make. Are you saying that no terms are allowed to be axiomatic and well defined? If so - fine, but that makes it awfully hard to have a meaningful conversation, doesn't it? If you refuse to accept general terms of art, you aren't speaking the same language. I don't see how that helps anyone make any progress.

Axioms are fine, but they have to be established through consent. You can't assert that an axiom is valid in and of itself. I guess you know that, which is why you keep insisting on social efficacy of institutionalized paradigms as a basis for demanding acceptance of axiomatic language.

Let me ask you this: how do you regard critical reasoning and truth-power vis-a-vis this art of cooperative axiom? Do you eschew it completely to allow increasingly nonsensical superstructure to be predicated on initially nonsensical axioms? Or do you think that dissent and critical reason have the capacity to refine knowledge to greater levels of truth and efficacy?

If you think terms of art need revising or replacing, fine. Make that argument. But until you prove your case and get the textbooks changed, please do us the favor of acknowledging the standard definition and speaking the same language that we are all using.

First, could you please cite such a textbook or, preferably, a website that explains this definition of knowledge of yours? Actually, I just googled it and I see where you're getting this definition now - so at least I can't fault you for have valid knowledge of the claims being made about knowledge by various philosophers.

The problem is that the language is inherently inconsistent in that it fails to connect the noun "knowledge" directly to the verb "knowing." The only way I guess this could be reconciled would be to take the three criteria, justified/true/believed, and relativize these to the particular thinker or "regime of truth" in Foucaultian language.

In that case, knowledge would only be "knowledge" if it was sincerely believed to be true according to the sincere justification of the individual or regime in question. Still, how can you call a known lie something other than knowledge? I suppose it would only be knowledge to the extent it is known to be a lie. Yet, even if it's not known to be a lie, it has the same status as knowledge to the knower - because he believes it to be true and justifies his belief with reference to plausibility, trust of the liar, etc.

Oh, goodness, I'm starting to realize that there's an interesting set of issues here to analyze. Still, I find it wonderfully simple to study knowledge from the empirical approach that all that is known is knowledge and that evaluation is a subsequent layer of knowledge generated on top of the initial unevaluated knowledge. I think I can justify this according to your criteria by recognizing that an unevaluated piece of knowledge is reflexively considered true without being actively evaluate as such.

Sincerity is inflected in everyday knowledge, unless it is insincere, ironic, sarcastic, etc. in which case it is presumably not experienced as knowledge but as dramatic verbage.

Well, I guess I got to reconciling once I googled your definition by the end of this post. Do you believe we're on the same page at this point or do you still think my definition of knowledge is in conflict with yours?

I guess the better question is are you still arguing for denying the knowledge-status of knowledge if it is only believed, justified,and true according to a particular thinker/regime? Or are you automatically assuming all knowledge not to be knowledge because it's truth value may yet be contested by a critic?

 

[apeiron]

If it helps clarify at all, I don't claim to have much knowledge. I have very little knowledge. I have plenty of beliefs, but practically no knowledge.

I think I can safely say "I exist" and maybe a few other things. That's about the extent of it though.

So what are the few other things? That would be interesting.

Do you just mean axiomatic facts like 1+1=2 or actual facts about reality, the thing in itself?

I completely agree with your general position of course.

 

[brainstorm]

Sorry to borrow your excerpt for a different purpose, but it made me think. I'm not trying to eclipse your post. Those are great questions and I'm looking forward to reading kote's response.

Originally Posted by kote
If it helps clarify at all, I don't claim to have much knowledge. I have very little knowledge. I have plenty of beliefs, but practically no knowledge.

I think I can safely say "I exist" and maybe a few other things. That's about the extent of it though.

This reminds me of a persistent problem I have when reading statements about relativism. If you do not regard your beliefs as knowledge, how can you know that you have no knowledge. In fact, how can you know that the axiomatic definition of knowledge you're using is valid or useful?

You seem to deny the truth value of anything you think/believe, but axiomatically accept the knowledge of others on the basis that it is socially established.

Are you just confused about your own social status vis-a-vis people you recognize as legitimate philosophers? Will your beliefs/thoughts suddenly become "knowledge" to you when you attain a PhD or whatever social-status validates axiomatic knowledge of a knower to you?

If you have faith in paradigms, what threshold of agreement in "a field" do you require to recognize a paradigm shift? If 100% of physicists achieve consensus, I assume you would call this a paradigm shift. What if 50% break away from the paradigm of the other 50%? What if it's a minority? An individual? What are your criteria? reasoning?

 

[zomgwtf]

Sorry to borrow your excerpt for a different purpose, but it made me think. I'm not trying to eclipse your post. Those are great questions and I'm looking forward to reading kote's response.


This reminds me of a persistent problem I have when reading statements about relativism. If you do not regard your beliefs as knowledge, how can you know that you have no knowledge. In fact, how can you know that the axiomatic definition of knowledge you're using is valid or useful?

You seem to deny the truth value of anything you think/believe, but axiomatically accept the knowledge of others on the basis that it is socially established.

Are you just confused about your own social status vis-a-vis people you recognize as legitimate philosophers? Will your beliefs/thoughts suddenly become "knowledge" to you when you attain a PhD or whatever social-status validates axiomatic knowledge of a knower to you?

If you have faith in paradigms, what threshold of agreement in "a field" do you require to recognize a paradigm shift? If 100% of physicists achieve consensus, I assume you would call this a paradigm shift. What if 50% break away from the paradigm of the other 50%? What if it's a minority? An individual? What are your criteria? reasoning?

Can you give me an example like I asked earlier of knowing something which was not true?

 

[kote]

I guess the better question is are you still arguing for denying the knowledge-status of knowledge if it is only believed, justified,and true according to a particular thinker/regime? Or are you automatically assuming all knowledge not to be knowledge because it's truth value may yet be contested by a critic?

I'm not quite claiming that knowledge of external things is impossible. I don't know the answer. I say that I don't have much knowledge, because I have yet to find a solid way to absolutely justify the truth of empirical claims. This causes a lack of absolute conviction for me in my beliefs. If I only think that my beliefs are probably true, then it's arguable whether or not I really believe them, and I certainly have not justified them well. I'm missing the justification piece, and possibly even the belief piece for many of my ideas.

There are others who have found a method of justification that causes them to truly believe. If their justification is in fact valid, then they would have more knowledge of things than I do. It's arguable what this justification would be and if it's even possible. The justification piece is where much of the philosophical work is being done. Since we've decided to agree on what knowledge is, the questions still remain, but they are focused on different details.

It sounds like we're about on the same page, except that typically your "unevaluated knowledge" is just called an idea, conception, or whatever else, and the word "knowledge" is reserved.

As far as paradigms and terms of art... I don't think there are any particular laws that you can go by. As with all real language, it's fuzzy. That's why I only say that the strength of the standard definition of knowledge is only as strong as the strength of terms of art in other fields like physics. They are just accepted conventions that are extremely helpful for communication when you are getting down to the technical details, as is done in academic research. Academia is sociological, not rational. There's no way around the fact that the rational study of philosophy (and physics etc) is performed in and by society. However, on the same note, if you want to do physics or philosophy within our society, you have to play by the rules.

 

[kote]

So what are the few other things? That would be interesting.

Do you just mean axiomatic facts like 1+1=2 or actual facts about reality, the thing in itself?

I completely agree with your general position of course.

I do mean axiomatic things. I also buy Descartes' argument for subjective knowledge... I know that I exist, and I know the content of my perceptions.

Setting aside the question of whether or not I know what knowledge means to others, I can still define the word axiomatically for my own purposes. Accepting the justified true belief version, I know that I don't know a lot of things, simply because I lack justification or conviction. Justification is a "content of my perception" type thing. I don't believe that I'm justified in believing the absolute external reality of particles. Therefore, I know that I don't have knowledge of particles existing out there. Etc.

Once I can justify a materialist ontology and perfect methods for making empirical measurements, I'll get back to you with all of the things I learn and know about the existence out there .

 

[kote]

While we're on it, there are some conventions in philosophy that I don't agree with. I think we could get more done if we did things in a different framework. For example, I don't like the language of "possible worlds." Assuming there is such a thing as deterministic causation, there are no possible worlds that are identical at one point in time and not at a later point. I'd prefer if we weren't so loose with possibility and contingency.

In free will, philosophers will talk about replaying scenarios in identical worlds and seeing if a person will make the same decision every time, or if the decision will change based on random factors or the strength of the person's conviction or whatever. This is supposed to give insight on whether or not we have real choice in different scenarios or if we are determined.

I don't like this language. If a person makes a different decision in an identical scenario, I'd contend that that's proof it's not actually the same person making the decision. I'd call it a different person.

Am I disagreeing on anything substantial with the possible worlds folks? Not really. It's semantics. We all have the same picture of what's happening. We all accept it's a different decision being made. I'd call that a different "possible person," while convention would just call the whole situation a different possible world.

I could try to argue my case and change the convention. I could also just clarify my own language before presenting my arguments in that different framework. If I don't want to do that, though, I just have to accept the conventions that are being used. If I don't play by the rules, no one else will make sense of anything I'm saying.

I don't agree with the idea of possible worlds, but I'm perfectly fine framing arguments in terms of possible worlds. It's just how we approach problems for consistency. There is no right or wrong in this case, there is only useful and not useful. And if everyone else is using "possible worlds," it's probably a useful concept for me to communicate with.

It's similar in that there is a certain technical thing that is meant by "possible worlds." I don't agree that it's defined in the most useful way, but regardless of how I think it should be defined, it means what it means to philosophers.

As for knowledge, I don't think using the standard definition masks any problems or makes it difficult to talk about anything important, so I'm indifferent to how it's defined. I could be persuaded though. I haven't thought about that too terribly much. That's a different issue though, since it is defined, and that's what we've been discussing.

 

[brainstorm]

Can you give me an example like I asked earlier of knowing something which was not true?

A good everyday example would be racial classification. Race has been debunked as having a biological basis, yet it is commonly recognized and employed in everyday social life as if it were a fact of nature. So, people "know" what races there are and how to identify individuals according to the logic of 'race,' even though from a biological standpoint sub-species is an empty distinction.

 

[brainstorm]

I'm not quite claiming that knowledge of external things is impossible. I don't know the answer. I say that I don't have much knowledge, because I have yet to find a solid way to absolutely justify the truth of empirical claims. This causes a lack of absolute conviction for me in my beliefs. If I only think that my beliefs are probably true, then it's arguable whether or not I really believe them, and I certainly have not justified them well. I'm missing the justification piece, and possibly even the belief piece for many of my ideas.

There are others who have found a method of justification that causes them to truly believe. If their justification is in fact valid, then they would have more knowledge of things than I do. It's arguable what this justification would be and if it's even possible. The justification piece is where much of the philosophical work is being done. Since we've decided to agree on what knowledge is, the questions still remain, but they are focused on different details.

Have you ever thought that the way so many people are able to justify their belief in the truth of their knowledge is by tentatively accepting knowledge as the best they have to go by at a particular moment?

If "absolute" is an unachievable ideal, then in order to accept the practical truth-inflection of any expressed knowledge, it helps to take an in-progress approach to truth. I.e. Absolute truth is never achieved, but people are sincerely and legitimately engaged in process and progress in that direction. It will never be reached, but the point isn't to reach the destination, it's to move in that direction, the same way you climb a stair-climber machine not to reach a higher altitude, but to get exercise and achieve a level of fitness that let's you climb stairs and inclines well when it is practically useful to.

It sounds like we're about on the same page, except that typically your "unevaluated knowledge" is just called an idea, conception, or whatever else, and the word "knowledge" is reserved.

Well, now I'm wondering if it's possible to generate unevaluated knowledge without even the inflection of truth-as-sincerity. If you hear an unrecognizable loud noise and say, "wow, what was that?!?" the word "that" refers to something you sincerely heard and believe to be true even though you have yet to evaluate what caused the noise.

Academia is sociological, not rational. There's no way around the fact that the rational study of philosophy (and physics etc) is performed in and by society. However, on the same note, if you want to do physics or philosophy within our society, you have to play by the rules.

This is a disturbingly cynical statement. I realize that it is popular to decry rationality among many academics, but do you/they understand the consequences of asserting a non-rational approach to knowledge-power. You are basically denying the academic freedom to practice rationality. I tend to think of academics or anyone else as essentially and inalienably free and not determined by any container-structure/ideology. Individuals exercise power vis-a-vis one another using the imagery of such container-structure-ideologies, but they are independently responsible for the deployment of such imagery and/or submission to it. You can't just claim that academia is not rational, and then justify eschewing rationality by reference to the fact that you are part of academia. You are individually accountable to reason. Granted academics try to bond together in ways to shield themselves from accountability, but those are social structuring activities that have the long term effect of making them susceptible to delegitimation. Do you really want to spend your entire tenured life avoiding concern for rationality and reason? How would doing so benefit anyone, including yourself?

 

[kote]

This is a disturbingly cynical statement. I realize that it is popular to decry rationality among many academics, but do you/they understand the consequences of asserting a non-rational approach to knowledge-power. You are basically denying the academic freedom to practice rationality. I tend to think of academics or anyone else as essentially and inalienably free and not determined by any container-structure/ideology. Individuals exercise power vis-a-vis one another using the imagery of such container-structure-ideologies, but they are independently responsible for the deployment of such imagery and/or submission to it. You can't just claim that academia is not rational, and then justify eschewing rationality by reference to the fact that you are part of academia. You are individually accountable to reason. Granted academics try to bond together in ways to shield themselves from accountability, but those are social structuring activities that have the long term effect of making them susceptible to delegitimation. Do you really want to spend your entire tenured life avoiding concern for rationality and reason? How would doing so benefit anyone, including yourself?

Huh? It's simply a fact that academic research is performed by societies of people. How close or far from perfect rationality the system is is totally beyond the point. I haven't said a single negative thing about academic research. The only thing I've said is that when doing research in a particular field, the terms of art and methods used by that field should be respected if not necessarily adhered to. If you want to have a discussion with yourself then use whatever definitions you want. Once you involve others, sociology is involved at least as far as your methods of communication. And that's okay, because it's necessary.

 

[zomgwtf]

A good everyday example would be racial classification. Race has been debunked as having a biological basis, yet it is commonly recognized and employed in everyday social life as if it were a fact of nature. So, people "know" what races there are and how to identify individuals according to the logic of 'race,' even though from a biological standpoint sub-species is an empty distinction.

Well firstly racial classification needs to be broken down. Two different meanings, one generally accepted in society and one strictly biological.

People believe there are people that have different skin colour than they do. They could be justified in this belief. People do have different skin colour, therefore they know that people have different skin colour.

People believe that people with different skin colour are a different sub-species from their skin colour. They could feel justified in this belief. People with different skin colours are not sub-species from other skin colours, therefore the people with those beliefs do not KNOW that people of different skin colour are a sub-species.

They CAN'T know it because it's not true, they can only believe it. One of two possibilities, they don't know the science (which necessarily means they don't know... THINK ABOUT IT. 'They don't KNOW the science'. They just believe in non-sense) or they do know the science and just believe based on faith, (they still do not know anything and their beliefs are questionable now).

Now why is this important? Because you are using two different definitions of race in your description here. The general population does not use race in the biological sense of 'sub-species' to my knowledge at least, and if they do they you can see from above they have no knowledge of the science, they can't because it's not true. Then you talk about a specific biological word race and apply it to the social word race, two different meanings. You have to be more specific with your words if your going to use examples like this friend.

This also questions accepting science as well. Are all the answers that science gives true? Nope. Hence kote has told you that he doesn't know a whole lot of different things about reality.

 

[brainstorm]

I do mean axiomatic things. I also buy Descartes' argument for subjective knowledge... I know that I exist, and I know the content of my perceptions.

Good, so you do know what you do know. That is also the first step, imo. Now the question is how can you know that anything exists separately from your own existence? You seem to assume that the content of your perceptions is a subset of the universe. What other universe can possibly exists than the sum total of all of what you perceive and imagine to be perceivable/knowable beyond your knowledge? If you think about it, you know everything in either active or potential form. If you can't imagine its existence, then you can't presume it is there to know, can you? So everything you know, know you can know, or can imagine knowing, are all part of your subjective knowledge or perceptions, no?

Setting aside the question of whether or not I know what knowledge means to others, I can still define the word axiomatically for my own purposes. Accepting the justified true belief version, I know that I don't know a lot of things, simply because I lack justification or conviction. Justification is a "content of my perception" type thing. I don't believe that I'm justified in believing the absolute external reality of particles. Therefore, I know that I don't have knowledge of particles existing out there. Etc.

How could you create justification or convinction? What would it take for you to do that? Are you not impaired by your assumption of externality? Why do you assume that things exist externally to you if you doubt your ability to know everything except your cartesian subjective knowledge? Are you capable of recognizing the fact that you know externality only as part of that subjective knowledge too?

Once I can justify a materialist ontology and perfect methods for making empirical measurements, I'll get back to you with all of the things I learn and know about the existence out there .

Why can't you just engage it without justifying it? Even if it only exists as part of your subjective knowledge, you can still interact with it. It is no less real to you because you doubt the ontology and perfection of your methods. Whatever you interact with, you know is there in some form to interact with it. Otherwise you would have nothing to interact with. Even if you were catatonic in dialogue with your psychoses, you could axiomatically treat them as material realities, externalize them, etc. - whatever you want.

It sounds like you just want to refrain from acting on your perceptions until you have some proof that they are more than perceptions. Do you see how placing this kind of conditionality on taking action would have put desCartes and everyone else who ever knew "cogito ergo sum" into paralysis? If you can't justify external reality, you still have to feed and care for your body and get whatever else done that is rationally necessary for you to survive, provided you still have faith that you exist within a living body.

 

[brainstorm]

While we're on it, there are some conventions in philosophy that I don't agree with. I think we could get more done if we did things in a different framework. For example, I don't like the language of "possible worlds." Assuming there is such a thing as deterministic causation, there are no possible worlds that are identical at one point in time and not at a later point. I'd prefer if we weren't so loose with possibility and contingency.

In free will, philosophers will talk about replaying scenarios in identical worlds and seeing if a person will make the same decision every time, or if the decision will change based on random factors or the strength of the person's conviction or whatever. This is supposed to give insight on whether or not we have real choice in different scenarios or if we are determined.

I'm interested in the epistemology of lumping together multiple elements in sets and then talking in terms of the sets without acknowledging the micro-interactions that cause a set to have an effect attributed to it. The set could be a group, society, or "possible world" in your case. When "world" is mobilized as an agent vis-a-vis its inhabitants, a deterministic relationship is usually assumed. The underlying logic is the same as an adversary being surrounded with no choice but to submit to domination. I question whether this kind of logic is much more than a means of psychologically coercing people into accepting certain things as inevitable.

If you assume that individuals have free will, which I do, then it is logical why such ideological instruments are necessary to effect surrender/submission/docility in individuals. Without a reason, they would be free to choose whether or not to submit to authority on their own reason/rationality. That would require a free-market exchange of authority and liberate people from non-consensual domination. A very risky prospect for people whose economic welfare and sense of stability has become dependent on coerced cooperation.

My recommendation is to resist even contemplating these "possible worlds" scenarios, instead shifting the analysis to interacting agents where no agent is attributed container status or necessary-condition status. Both logics promote cognitive-complicity with logics of domination.

I don't like this language. If a person makes a different decision in an identical scenario, I'd contend that that's proof it's not actually the same person making the decision. I'd call it a different person.

Is a person the person, or the personality of the person? It sounds like you're saying if a person's personality changes, it becomes a different person.

Am I disagreeing on anything substantial with the possible worlds folks? Not really. It's semantics. We all have the same picture of what's happening. We all accept it's a different decision being made. I'd call that a different "possible person," while convention would just call the whole situation a different possible world.

To the extent that "world" is a synonym for externality, then the only difference between "possible world" and "possible person" would indeed be whether you externalize the person's perceptions or recognize them as a projection of the person. Either way, I don't see how it matters to you either way if you see it as nothing more than semantics.

I could try to argue my case and change the convention. I could also just clarify my own language before presenting my arguments in that different framework. If I don't want to do that, though, I just have to accept the conventions that are being used. If I don't play by the rules, no one else will make sense of anything I'm saying.

Here's more collectivist logic. I have been in countless situations where an individual defended their knowledge by reference to convention. It doesn't matter if I tell them they are responsible individually for submitting to the authority of convention as they recognize it, they resist and insist that they have no choice or power BUT to accept the convention they externalize.

The question is if no one would ever resist convention, how would convention ever change? Likewise, if no one ever broke rules, how would legitimated violence ever take place? The issue what you think you will gain in the long run by avoiding conflict and questioning conventions when you know there's something wrong with them. There's a biblical expression about fearing God more than worldly authority. I think this means that when you ignore your conscience too much out of convenience, it catches up to you in one way or another.

It would be like if you keep going along with what your boss tells you, and then one day the company gets audited for corruption and you end up being held accountable for what you did, even though you were just going along with your boss. You benefited from the corruption, and benefited from avoiding conflict with your boss, but in the end it all comes back to haunt you.

That's the reason I always feel an obligation to at least warn people of the consequences of going along with social trends without sufficient evaluation of the possible consequences. Unfortunately, there are so many forms of cleverly manufactured consent that happen constantly that you're not even aware of how many ways you have already made yourself vulnerable, but I still think it's worth listening to your conscience and exercising free will as best you can. I think it's a long uphill struggle, but the positive effects on your own conscience and life begin almost immediately.

As for knowledge, I don't think using the standard definition masks any problems or makes it difficult to talk about anything important, so I'm indifferent to how it's defined. I could be persuaded though. I haven't thought about that too terribly much. That's a different issue though, since it is defined, and that's what we've been discussing.

It sounds like you just don't care that much except as a means to gaining some tangential reward. Some people actually reason out consequences to knowledge that increases the stakes beyond strictly aesthetic ones. Personally, I am an idealist who believes (dare I say, "knows") that the way people think influences the way they act and interact with themselves and others. So when I see certain ideological patterns that would make people prone to abuse themselves and others, I feel a desire to intervene - because I think it could come back to me - either by me ending up as an object of a chain of action-reactions OR as ideology multiplies into increasingly diverse permutations that become increasingly difficult to gain consciousness of because they have been fragmented into seemingly contradictory forms of propaganda.

If you're a Marxist/materialist, then it's easy to throw your hands up in the air and believe that humans have practically no power over their ideologies anyway. The best materialist-determinists can hope to do is be comfortable for the ride. This seems comfortable enough until you imagine yourself with a smoking gun in your hand and sirens coming closer, and what are you going to tell the police when they arrive, that you're a social-determinist who was just going along for the ride?

Anyway, just be careful with indifference because it can have negative consequences for yourself and others, imo. If you care enough to argue otherwise, I would consider that quite positive.