decs said:
is anything in our beautiful univerese 'purely' random?
This is, still, one of those open questions for which no compelling answer can be offered currently. Determinism or indeterminism? The reality is that the old debate is still raging even today...Are the probabilistico-statistical regularities observed in the experiments with quantum particles a sign of determinism or of indeterminism? Here the stances vary widely.
The orthodox wisdom, following the fathers of the Copenhagen interpretation, say that 'god does play dice' meaning that the quantum world (at least) is truly random at the 'core', being intrinsically indeterministic + we deal with truly uncaused events at the quantum level as the rule.
Other thinkers however (among them Bohm, De Broglie, Vigier, Popper, Einstein, Bell, Ian Stewart and so on) say that we have to be much more cautious when interpreting QM, the observed probabilistic regularities deserve at least a further special attention (probabilistic approaches are fully compatible with deterministic processes), there is no compelling evidence that our universe cannot be deterministic or that the standard formalism of QM is complete (for example Bell's inequalities violations are fully compatible with classical locality if a certain form of determinism hold at quantum level).
There are subltle differences amonst these thinkers but essentially all sustain at least a 'weak' form of determinism. The notion of 'weak' determinism has a long tradition at least from Hume onward. Defined in few words: Hume says that all events have causes but things could have been otherwise (e.g after making a choice we can still say that counterfactuals were possible).
I have always had a very difficult time to accept Hume's definition for I do not see how could we avoid some form of indeterminism or that consciousness (a certain part of it at least) is a fundamental feature of the universe, being outside causation (not all things are caused then). Under the acception that consciousness is not fundamental the only rational solution I see is to accept at least a very weak form of indeterminism (at least some events are not predetermined, this irrespective whether prediction is possible or not).
Popper seems to confirm me. In his book 'The open universe: An Argument for Indeterminism' Popper advocates a form of 'weak' indeterminism / 'weak' determinism absolutely necessary in his view for the existence of real free will. Frankly speaking I do not find his arguments there very strong (that there are events that are not predetermined) but the point of interest is that he defines his 'weak' form of determinism very clearly, by rejecting the claims of completitude and intrinsic indeterminism defended by copenhagenists.
For him the quantum world is not intrinsically acausal and random, he does not reject the possibility of some 'deeper', fully deterministic, quantum laws. However predictability (in the classical deterministic sense) at quantum level is not possible and moreover there are events which are not predetermined this leaving the door open to real free will and for human responsability. This is exactly one of the interpretations of the Humean concept of 'weak' determinism I've always had in mind (being in the same time a form of 'weak' indeterminism).
[some clarifications about Popper's view: his type of 'weak' determinism is a form of indeterminism (also 'weak'), he does not deny the existence of causality or the existence of clear laws at the quantum level he only denies strong determinism. That is, it is conceivable for example that the behaviour of quantum particles in the two slits experiment is fully deterministic in the strong sense (irrespective whether we will ever find AND justify those laws) but there must be some truly acausal events at least in the processes involved in human decision making at the quantum level or even at 'deeper' levels.]
However neither stronger forms of determinism can be ruled out, the logical exercise of Bohm prevent us at least now to claim that there must be acausal events or that quantum entities cannot be particles (close to the situation in the classical physics) having definite trajectories, positions and momenta (irrespective whether we can know them or not).
So, under the current circumstances at least, it is fairer to say that we do not know whether the universe is deterministic or not, implicitly we do not know whether the quantum world is truly random as copenhagenists and related views hold (still genuine underdetermination at quantum level, there are no sufficient reasons yet, upon the actual standard of rationality, to make a compelling difference between the different interpretations of QM).