Evo said:
Abortion was legalized in the US because of the high incidence of death, sterility and other serious side affects of illegal abortions. But this mostly only happened to the poor, the rich could "arrange" medical abortions for their daughters, either through a friend or relative or by flying their daughter to a country where abortion was legal. But I guess none of you bothered to research why abortion was legalized here?
Did you bother to research why abortion is legal here?
This page contains the full text of the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.
- This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
The original district court ruling stated that the Ninth Amendent to the US Constitution guaranteed a right of privacy that included the decision to terminate a pregnancy without state interference. The Supreme Court disagreed, but ruled that, in fact, the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed that right.
- On the basis of elements such as these, appellant and some amici argue that the woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do not agree. Appellant's arguments that Texas either has no valid interest at all in regulating the abortion decision, or no interest strong enough to support any limitation upon the woman's sole determination, are unpersuasive. The Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate. As noted above, a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past.
Contrary to what many people believe, the Supreme Court did not interpret the constitution in such a way that the right to terminate a pregnancy was absolute. The state is said to have a legitimate interest
at some point during pregnancy in protecting both the health of the mother and in protecting potential life. When this point occurs is never stated.
- We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
The above statement seems to indicate that
some level of state regulation, in the aforementioned interests of protecting maternal health and unborn life, is constitutional. Again, how much regulation and what form it is allowed to take is never stated.
- The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a "person" within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at length and in detail the well-known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. The appellant conceded as much on reargument. On the other hand, the appellee conceded on reargument that no case could be cited that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
. . .
All this, together with our observation, supra, that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.
The above statement by the Court is the basis of contemporary pro-life arguments that, if it can be established that the unborn should be granted the status of personhood based on moral concerns, then Roe v. Wade becomes moot, and indeed guarantees that these unborn have the right not to be killed.
Note that the court never ruled on the matter of whether or not the unborn should be considered persons. In fact, the court took no stand on the issue of when life began or what the moral status of a fetus was. They ruled only that the constitution and subsequent rulings have never recognized the unborn as having full personhood (similar to the Dred Scott decision). They did, however, say this:
- In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth. For example, the traditional rule of tort law denied recovery for prenatal injuries even though the child was born alive. That rule has been changed in almost every jurisdiction. In most States, recovery is said to be permitted only if the fetus was viable, or at least quick, when the injuries were sustained, though few courts have squarely so held. In a recent development, generally opposed by the commentators, some States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. Such an action, however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life. Similarly, unborn children have been recognized as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or other devolution of property, and have been represented by guardians ad litem. Perfection of the interests involved, again, has generally been contingent upon live birth. In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.
This was true at the time of the ruling. Although limited personhood was granted to the unborn by some laws and rulings, each of these granted personhood contingent on the fact that the unborn should eventually become born. Should they die before birth, whatever rights they had been granted were thus taken away. Ignoring the illogic of this stance, we have the further problem that, as of today, the legal status of personhood is not just bestowed upon the unborn contingent on their birth. California at least, and perhaps other states (though I am not certain of this) now allows that anyone other than the mother or physician of the mother be charged with murder for the killing of an unborn child. This is discussed by myself in the Scott Peterson thread. The Roe v. Wade decision was made contingent upon the fact that no prior ruling had ever recognized full personhood for the unborn, unless they eventually were born. Now we have laws and rulings in which full personhood is granted to unborn children who never are born. With a significant part of the Supreme Court's rationale taken away, what are we now to do?
The Court also stated this:
- As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.
I urge you to consider all of this, and ask yourself whether the legal basis of abortion is really as strong as you previously believed.
I thought you ment this topic makes you sick. I'm sorry, I completely misinterpreted your meaning. My fault, I'm sorry. Truce? 
