JDoolin said:
I think, also, if someone is going to claim that Lorentz Contraction is invisible, then you should be using a "liberal" interpretation of the word "see."
Yes I agree with this, so I think we can find fault in the wording of that conclusion. But I used to think it was a scientifically flawed claim, whereas now I see it as more of a linguistic question. If someone says that "all we ever really see is shapes, all length scales are inferences of some kind", then one can support Terrell's conclusion using his argument. If we instead say "actually, what we mean by seeing involves a host of inferences, even the interpretation of shape requires that", then we can find fault in that wording.
If I tell someone "you cannot see a ghost." I am not saying "you cannot see a ghost if you turn your head away from it, are blindfolded, and are in a different room." The words imply "You cannot see a ghost, even under the best conditions, looking directly at it, with the best possible technology."
Yes, that's a particularly problematic element of the term "invisible." Normally, it means "cannot be seen at all", but Terrell is using it to mean "cannot be inferred from a purely literal analysis of an image." So the image is visible, but the attribute of being length contracted is not visible, but only if you hold that visibility requires no mental processing beyond what it takes to identify shapes! Which is a bit of a stretch, to say the least.
Rather than claim "Lorentz Contraction is Invisible" it would make more sense to seed to define what constitutes a literal interpretation of seeing... What we really mean by seeing in practice, and establishing a general rule for modeling what we see. And I think, unless you are specifically trying to define "seeing" in such a way to salvage Terrell's claim of the invisibility of Lorentz Contraction, you'll find that Terrell's claim is not accurate.
Yes, the conclusion is far better stated "because length contraction does not change the shapes of small things, and images are in some sense a cobbling together of small shapes, seeing it requires the processing of additional information, yet this is usually quite possible to do under practical conditions." In fact, if you think about it, you could use Terrell's argument to say that whether or not you are moving
toward an object is also "invisible", because all that happens is the object appears bigger as you approach it-- none of the shapes change, so an image of the object doesn't tell you that you are approaching it. But we would not say that you cannot tell if you are approaching an object by looking at it, we would be very poor drivers!
When physics says you "can" do something, you can be as explicit as you want about how to do it. But when physics says you "cannot" do something, then as soon as even one way of doing it is figured out, or even one circumstance is found where it can be done, you should redact the "cannot".
Yes, "no-go" theorems need to be held to a high standard. If someone says "length contraction is invisible", this surely sounds like the claim that "you cannot tell if you are in a Galilean or Lorentzian universe just by looking", but in any practical situation that would not be true. If you know you have a rod sliding on a string at high speed, you can predict what that will look like in Galilean vs. Lorentzian universes, and even if the rod is so small that you cannot see the distortion in the tickmarks, the length of the rod at closest approach is still going to look different by the Lorentz factor in the two situations. If that doesn't mean "seeing length contraction", I don't know what does.