I The Sleeping Beauty Problem: Any halfers here?

[PeroK]

For a bit of fun, I imagined @Marana in the role of experimenter and me in the role of sleeping beauty:

Me: You woke me up!
Marana: Yes, I need to ask you what is your credence that the coin is heads.

Me: What day is it?
Marana: I can't tell you that.

Me: Is it Monday?
Marana: I can't tell you that.

Me: Did you give me that drug already?
Marana: I can't tell you that either.

Me: I believe there is likelihood of 1/3 that it's heads.
Marana: That's wrong!

Me: Why is it wrong?
Marana: How did you get 1/3?

Me: I imagined that we did this experiment many times and ... therefore, by using relative frequencies I got 1/3.
Marana: But, your not allowed to think like that.

Me: How can you stop me thinking?
Marana: Okay, I can't stop you thinking, but it's wrong for you to think like that.

Me: Why is it wrong?
Marana: Because relative frequencies are invalid for you.

Me: Would you be allowed to use relative frequencies. Perhaps to explain this experiment to an observer?
Marana: Yes, of course.

Me: So, it's right for you to think like that but it's wrong for me to think like that?
Marana: Yes.

Me: But, I'm quite good at probabilities. Why can't I use my natural abilities here and now?
Marana: Because you can't.

Me: So, basically, I'm expected to give the dumb answer of 1/2 (because, hey, nothing can change a coin after it's been tossed) and not the clever answer of 1/3?
Morana: I'm afraid so.

Me: That's not fair!
Marana: That's the way it is.

 

[forcefield]

The coin flip creates two equally likely scenarios. Hence the probability is 1/2.

I was only a part-time halfer: I should add that she has information about the relative probabilities of her being awake in the two scenarios. Hence 1/3.

I was only part-time thirder: That relative probability is actually 1:1. The fact that SB is awake twice in case of tail and only once in case of head does not increase belief in tail. So I finally voted for 1/2.

 

[stevendaryl]

Sleeping beauty can consider herself to be randomly selected from all such sleeping beauties. That would give a probability of 1/2. The question is whether, from that starting point of 1/2, there is any way to update to 1/3. That's what I haven't seen so far.

I went through the numbers, and it's 2/3. If you do the experiment over and over, with different starting times, then of the "active" Sleeping Beauties (the ones in day 1 or day 2 of the experiment), 1/3 are on day 1 after a coin flip of heads, 1/3 are on day 2 after a coin flip of heads, and 1/3 are on day 1 after a coin flip of tails. If the actual Sleeping Beauty thinks of herself as a random choice among those, then she would come up with 2/3 heads.

It's sort of similar to the situation where there is some country where people have a 50% chance of producing one offspring, and 50% chance of producing two offspring. If you take a random adult and ask the probability that it will have two offspring, the answer is 50%. If you take a random child and ask what is the probability that their parent had two children, it's 2/3.

Equivalently, she can consider her experiment (the coin toss followed by either M or MT) to be randomly selected from all such experiments, and use the relative frequency of 1/2. This is justified because the experiment is an experiment. Again, the question is whether she can change from that 1/2.

Yeah, in the repeated sleeping beauty experiment, there are two different relative frequencies to compute:

• Let's call a coin flip "active" if it's being used in a sleeping beauty experiment, and it was flipped less than two days ago (regardless of the result).
• Let's call a sleeping beauty "active" if she is experiencing day 1 or day 2.

Then:

• 2/3 of active sleeping beauties have an associated coin toss result of heads
• 1/2 of all active coin flips are heads

So, if you point to a random coin flip result (recorded on a piece of paper) and ask a Sleeping Beauty what are the odds that it is heads, she should answer 1/2. But if you tell her that it's her result, she should say 2/3.

Relative frequency can be used, but not haphazardly. It needs to be justified... and we all agree on that! Because clearly using relative frequency of heads awakenings is the wrong way to compute the subjective probability of a heads coin toss without the drug. That is a misuse. And I'm arguing that, even with the drug, it is still a misuse to use relative frequency of heads awakenings as the subjective probability of a heads coin toss. But it is a proper use to use relative frequency with experiments, since they are experiments.

To call it a misuse, you need to say what reason is there not to. What harm comes from it?

To me, the best example of a counter-intuitive result coming from the thirder position is to change it to a lottery. A person has a one in a million chance of winning. But you can make it subjectively 50/50 by waking the winner a million days in a row. That's strange.

It is at issue in the most popular argument for 1/3. The argument goes: after conditioning on "it is monday", we must get 1/2.
That is, P(monday and heads)/P(monday) = P(monday and tails)/P(monday) = 1/2. Therefore P(monday and heads) = P(monday and tails).

I assume we all agree that you wouldn't use regular conditioning on "it is now 2:00" and "it is now 2:01" in my example.

That's not the same thing. You can eliminate that problem by making statements about connections between events. "The first time I looked at the clock, it was 2:00." "The second time I looked at the clock, it was 2:01". No contradiction.

I argue that the same holds here. You can't use regular conditioning on "it is monday", and the argument for 1/3 doesn't work.

I think that's barking up the wrong tree. Instead of Monday, think about Tuesday. You ask Sleeping Beauty what the probability of getting heads was. Now you tell her that today is Tuesday. Then she knows that she got heads. Of course, telling her "Today is Tuesday" gave her new information, and it allowed her to update her likelihood estimates. So if you have a theory of subjective probability that can't accommodate such an update, then I would say something is wrong with that theory.

This isn't really a new thing: none of us condition on the flow of time and immediately throw out every probability computation. It's unspoken, but we avoid it intuitively. Until the sleeping beauty problem, a bizarre setup that makes us want to use it.

I don't think that there is anything wrong with conditioning on the flow of time. If it's possible to forget what day it is, then knowing what day it is is additional information, and it can change your subjective likelihood estimates. It's a language problem for how to deal with words like "now" in a consistent way, not a problem with the applicability of probability.

Rather than using conditioning, what we usually do (correctly) is to know that, by itself, the passage of time doesn't change things that don't change with time.

But that just doesn't seem true. If today is Tuesday, she knows that the coin toss result was heads. So knowing it's Tuesday changes the odds from whatever to 1.

Now, if you did really want to condition on the time, you could treat the time as if it was randomly selected. That's fine. Then you would be conditioning on "it is time X and time X was randomly selected". Using this method you would get P(heads) = 1/2 and P(heads|monday) = 2/3.

How do you get that? That's truly nonsensical, for the following reason (pointed out by @PeroK): If the memory wipe happens on the morning of the awakening, right before sleeping beauty wakes up, then there is no need to even toss the coin until Tuesday morning. So on Monday, the coin hasn't even been tossed (under this variant). How could the knowledge that today is Monday tell you about a coin that has not yet been tossed?

It makes a lot more sense to say that knowing it's Monday doesn't tell you anything about the likelihood of a coin toss in the future. So P(H | Monday) = 1/2. Knowing that it's Tuesday tells you exactly what the coin toss result was: P(H | Tuesday) = 1. If you don't know whether it's a Monday or a Tuesday, then the probability of heads would be: P(H) = P(H|Monday) P(Monday) + P(H|Tuesday) P(Tuesday) > 1/2

But thirders are trying to have it both ways. They do not want to treat time as randomly selected or static, yet they want to condition on it.

If you want to randomly select a time, as well as randomly select heads or tails, then there are 4 possibilities, equally likely:

1. Heads and Monday
2. Heads and Tuesday
3. Tails and Monday
4. Tails and Tuesday

Then you rule out 4 on the basis that the rules say no memory wipe in that case. (So if Sleeping Beauty doesn't know whether it's Monday or Tuesday, then she can't be in situation 4). Eliminating situation 4 still leaves the other three equally likely.

 

[stevendaryl]

A reasonable person don't wager.
Look, for once, I'll try to be dead serious. This problem is in the "positive trolling" category, exactly like the chicken and eggs. Those problems have perfectly fine and simple answer, until you add some "hidden" confusion based on tricky language where everyone feels untitled to plug their own meaning.
In sleeping beauty, the trolling start when you speak about days name. This is irrelevant because of the drug and the closed room.

So if the coin is fair, and the experiment is fair, Beauty does not even have to be put to sleep to answer the question. Actually the coins does not even have to be flipped before Tuesday. So asking the question on Monday is definitely some sort of lying if the experimenter choose to do so.I agree, but then it is irrelevant to the question "What is your credence now for the proposition that the coin landed heads?".I have no idea how Beauty or anyone else could do that calculation. "Waking up" have never changed anything to how you process the world, except maybe on the February 2 (arghh I lied, I am not serious anymore)If the question was "how many time do you wake up", I would agree Beauty should answer 3/2.
But that is not the question, isn't it ?

Well, what is your calculation for this modified Sleeping Beauty problem?

1. She gets a memory wipe in either case (heads or tails).
2. But if the coin result was tails, then on Tuesday she is given a note saying that it is, in fact, Tuesday.

Then before she checks whether there is a note, then do you agree that there are 4 possibilities, equally likely?

1. Result was heads, and today is Monday?
2. Result was heads, and today is Tuesday?
3. Result was tails, and today is Monday?
4. Result was tails, and today is Tuesday?

Just from symmetry, wouldn't you give all 4 possibilities equal likelihood?

Now, she checks for a note. If there is no note, then she knows she is in situation 1-3. The lack of a note eliminates situation 4, but it shouldn't affect the likelihood of the other 3 possibilities.

 

[PeterDonis]

for me, relative frequency is equivalent to probability

If you are dealing with a large enough sample space for the law of large numbers to be relevant, then this makes sense. So if Beauty were told that the experiment would be run, say, 1000 times, and after each run ended she would be given the amnesia drug so she would never know, when awakened, which run it was, then using the relative frequency to conclude that P(Monday|Awakened) = 2/3 and P(Tuesday|Awakened) = 1/3 (using my notation from previous posts) would make sense. And that would give P(Heads) = 1/3.

But the original statement of the problem doesn't say that; it says the experiment gets run once and that's it. And I don't think it is a slam dunk that relative frequencies are equal to probabilities if we just have a single sample. The frequentists say it is, but not everyone is a frequentist.

From a Bayesian point of view, if we're only making a single run of the experiment, then the only basis we have for assigning any value at all to P(Monday|Awakened) and P(Tuesday|Awakened) is prior probabilities. If we say that, given only a single run of the experiment, we have no useful information about the distribution of awakenings, then the obvious prior to use is the maximum entropy prior, which is P(Monday|Awakened) = P(Tuesday|Awakened) = 1/2. And if we use those values, then, by my previous posts, we get P(Heads) = 1/4! So this argument is an argument against both the thirder and the halfer. (And we would need to add another option to the poll. )

 

[PeroK]

If you are dealing with a large enough sample space for the law of large numbers to be relevant, then this makes sense. So if Beauty were told that the experiment would be run, say, 1000 times, and after each run ended she would be given the amnesia drug so she would never know, when awakened, which run it was, then using the relative frequency to conclude that P(Monday|Awakened) = 2/3 and P(Tuesday|Awakened) = 1/3 (using my notation from previous posts) would make sense. And that would give P(Heads) = 1/3.

But the original statement of the problem doesn't say that; it says the experiment gets run once and that's it. And I don't think it is a slam dunk that relative frequencies are equal to probabilities if we just have a single sample. The frequentists say it is, but not everyone is a frequentist.

From a Bayesian point of view, if we're only making a single run of the experiment, then the only basis we have for assigning any value at all to P(Monday|Awakened) and P(Tuesday|Awakened) is prior probabilities. If we say that, given only a single run of the experiment, we have no useful information about the distribution of awakenings, then the obvious prior to use is the maximum entropy prior, which is P(Monday|Awakened) = P(Tuesday|Awakened) = 1/2. And if we use those values, then, by my previous posts, we get P(Heads) = 1/4! So this argument is an argument against both the thirder and the halfer. (And we would need to add another option to the poll. )

That analysis doesn't essentially depend on the peculiarities of this experiment. So, that is a critique of probability theory more generally, and specifically in the case where there is only one experiment.

 

[PeterDonis]

that is a critique of probability theory more generally, and specifically in the case where there is only one experiment.

Yes, that's true.

 

[Boing3000]

If you know how to write a computer programme, you could do a computer simulation of the problem and you would, to your surprise, see the answer 1/3 appear rather than 1/2.

I have encoded your logic (if I get it right, your toss 5 & 6 does not follow the same rule)
This is javascript push F12 and cut and paste it into your console

(function BeautyThirders(run) {
    var counts = { H: 0, T: 0 }
    var experiments = [
        function Head(counts) {
            counts.H++;
        },
        function Tail(counts) {
            counts.T++;
            counts.T++;
        }
    ];
    while (--run >= 0) {
        experiments[Math.floor(Math.random() * experiments.length)](counts);
    }
    alert("H/T = " + (counts.H / counts.T).toFixed(2));
})(10000);

So, in that little simulation, we ended up with 3 Heads and 3 Tails for the coin. Beauty was woken 9 times (6 times on a Monday and 3 on a Tuesday). When she was woken, it was as a result of Heads 3 times and Tails 6 times.

Of course, but I am afraid you miss my point about this debate/poll. (I voted for the third option)
Beauty cannot count. She is drugged especially to avoid her to do so.
Given the procedure described into the Wikipedia article the situation is simple and straightforward. The credence that a coin lands Head (or tail for that matter) does not change if Beauty goes to sleep or not.

Therefore, if she counted each time she was woken whether it had been a Head or a Tail, she would have got 6-3 tails. And, that is what's called a relative frequency and is the basis of what a probability is.

She cannot count, so unless some modification is done to the definition of the problem, I reject this arguments.

So, halfers don't allow two bets on the same coin, but thirders do.

That's also how I interpret the difference and why I vote for the latest possibility.
When people whose bread and butter is probability cannot even agree on a simple problem, then my credence that this problem is badly defined is above 99.9%

Finally, the thirders position is: if you don't allow the Tuesday bets to stand, why have them in the first place? Isn't that then a different problem?

Precisely, why indeed have question mark in the definition ? Why speak about bet when there is none ? The credence is 1/2. Now indeed, choosing Head instead of Tail may make you loose twice (an hypothetical bet), and that's why the thirder's view exist.

And that's how the problem should be fixed. The credence that the coin is Head(or Tail) has nothing to do with the credence of loosing one or two bets.
Here is a modified version of the code, which is bet oriented, and don't drug Beauty.
The frequency Beauty bets on Head is the second parameter (1 (always),2(half), 3 ..., > tries == never). So obviously, if you want to win, better never bet heads

(function BeautyBets(run, frequency) {
    var counts = { WakeUps : 0, Wins : 0 }
    var experiments = [
        function Head(counts) {
           //Monday
            if (++counts.WakeUps % frequency == 0)
                counts.Wins++;
            else
                counts.Wins--;
        },
        function Tail(counts) {
           //Monday
            if (++counts.WakeUps % frequency != 0)
                counts.Wins++;
            else
                counts.Wins--;
           //Tuesday
            if (++counts.WakeUps % frequency != 0)
                counts.Wins++;
            else
                counts.Wins--;
        }
    ];
    while (--run >= 0) {
        experiments[Math.floor(Math.random() * experiments.length)](counts);
    }
    alert(counts.Wins.toString() + "wins for " + counts.WakeUps + " bets (" + (counts.Wins / counts.WakeUps).toFixed(2) +")");
})(10000, 3);

 

[PeroK]

Given the procedure described into the Wikipedia article the situation is simple and straightforward. The credence that a coin lands Head (or tail for that matter) does not change if Beauty goes to sleep or not.

Perhaps not, but it does change when the experimenter looks at it. It changes from 1/2 to either 0 or 1.

When Beauty is wakened the coin is not 50-50 heads or tails. It is either definitely Heads or definitely Tails.

Her credence is now definitely wrong, and she knows that. So she must, if she can, look for clues to help her guess what the coin really is.

 

[stevendaryl]

Given the procedure described into the Wikipedia article the situation is simple and straightforward. The credence that a coin lands Head (or tail for that matter) does not change if Beauty goes to sleep or not.

Once again, if instead of wiping her memory in the case of heads, suppose they wipe her memory on Monday regardless, but if the coin flip was tails, her memory is restored 10 minutes after wakening.

Then before the 10 minutes is up, do you agree that Sleeping Beauty has to consider all four of the following possibilities equally likely?

1. It's Monday, and the result was heads.
2. It's Monday, and the result was tails.
3. It's Tuesday, and the result was heads.
4. It's Tuesday, and the result was tails.

After the 10 minutes is up, she knows whether she is in case 4 or not. If case 4 is ruled out, then what are the updated probabilities for 1-3?

 

[Boing3000]

Her credence is now definitely wrong, and she knows that.

Wrong how ? What happens that could make her change her mind about how coins works ?

So she must, if she can, look for clues to help her guess what the coin really is.

No she does not. But if the problem definition is changed, not just to include vaguely some asymmetrical bet, but to attach some new credence to how she must bet to win. This is not equivalent to what the coin is.
Drugged or not, she knows the bet is asymmetrical, she knows that even though coins works 1/2, that she will not be asked about that, but asked about "being awake in the context of this asymmetrical setup" what do you bet ?

So one last time. The thirder are not reading a problem about "what the coin really is". They are reading a problem about what to say about a coin to win some bet
I have trivially modified the code so you can change the amount bet in each case. And non surprisingly if Head bet value is more than twice Tail bet, then it became more "interesting" to always bet on Head. Yet still nothing have happened to the coins, frequencies of days and what not.
It is also not surprising that the only invariant of this algorithm is when frequency is 2 (1/2). Meaning 0 gain or loss. Meaning the only "physical" thing is a fair coin have two side.

(function BeautyBets(run, frequency, headAmount, tailAmount) {
    var counts = { Bets: 0, Wins: 0, Flips: 0 }
    var experiments = [
        function Head(counts) {
            counts.Flips++;

            if (++counts.Bets % frequency == 0)
                counts.Wins += headAmount;
            else
                counts.Wins -= headAmount;
        },
        function Tail(counts) {
            counts.Flips++;

            if (++counts.Bets % frequency != 0)
                counts.Wins += tailAmount;
            else
                counts.Wins -= tailAmount;

            if (++counts.Bets % frequency != 0)
                counts.Wins += tailAmount;
            else
                counts.Wins -= tailAmount;
        }
    ];
    while (--run >= 0) {
        experiments[Math.floor(Math.random() * experiments.length)](counts);
    }
    alert("Money " + counts.Wins);
})(10000, 2, 2.1, 1);

 

[stevendaryl]

Wrong how ? What happens that could make her change her mind about how coins works ?

No she does not. But if the problem definition is changed, not just to include vaguely some asymmetrical bet, but to attach some new credence to how she must bet to win. This is not equivalent to what the coin is.

I don't understand what you mean. Surely, if the walls of Sleeping Beauty's room are painted red if the coin flip is heads and blue otherwise (and she knows this), then she wouldn't stick to her 50% likelihood of heads and tails after seeing the wall color. When someone is asked what the likelihood is that something is true, they typically use whatever information that is available.

The real issue is whether she has any information to change her likelihood estimate. I say she does---the fact that she doesn't know whether it is Monday or Tuesday tells her something---it tells her that either:

1. The result was heads, and today is Monday.
2. The result was heads, and today is Tuesday.
3. The result was tails, and today is Monday.

The fourth possibility---that today is Tuesday and the coin flip was tails---is eliminated by the information that she doesn't know whether it's Monday or Tuesday. (She would know in the fourth case).

 

[PeroK]

Wrong how ? What happens that could make her change her mind about how coins works ?

If I say to you that I am going to toss a coin, you will say the probability of heads is 1/2. That's fine.

Then, I toss the coin and look at it but don't tell you. Then I ask you again. You will still say 1/2.

That's the best you can do, but your information is now out of date. I know what the coin is and, to me, your answer of 1/2 is no longer valid. Or, at least no longer up to date.

Now, I could tell you or show you what the coin is and you would be forced to change your credence from 1/2 to 0 or 1.

Alternatively, I could give you some clues about what the coin is. And, using my clues you might change your credence from 1/2 to something else, based on how big a clue I give you.

This is perhaps easier to see with a die than a coin. I could tell you it's an even number and you would change your credence that it is a 6, say, from 1/6 to 1/3 etc.

The real point of this puzzle is to work out whether there are any clues in the experiment for Beauty to pick up on.

The halfers say there are no clues, so they stick with 1/2.

The thirders, however, are much better at spotting clues, so we find these clues and change our credence to 1/3.

 

[Boing3000]

Once again, if instead of wiping her memory in the case of heads, suppose they wipe her memory on Monday regardless, but if the coin flip was tails, her memory is restored 10 minutes after wakening.

Then before the 10 minutes is up, do you agree that Sleeping Beauty has to consider all four of the following possibilities equally likely?

1. It's Monday, and the result was heads.
2. It's Monday, and the result was tails.
3. It's Tuesday, and the result was heads.
4. It's Tuesday, and the result was tails.

No. Case 3 never enter the possibilities.

After the 10 minutes is up, she knows whether she is in case 4 or not. If case 4 is ruled out, then what are the updated probabilities for 1-3?

Probabilities of coins flipping does not update with knowledge. If she have to bet, she will not change her bet anyway. There is a specific wining strategy in all cases.
I think the halfers are aware that "being awake AND be Tails" is twice that of "being awake AND Heads".
Just change the question so it exclude the confusion with: "being awake AND be the SAME tail as yesterday"

 

[stevendaryl]

No. Case 3 never enter the possibilities.

What do you mean? Are you saying that case 3 never happens, or that it has no associated likelihood?

Probabilities of coins flipping does not update with knowledge.

That is just wrong. When you acquire new information, you update the likelihood of what is true.

If heads versus tails affects what Sleeping Beauty sees, then she can update her estimate of the likelihood based on what she sees. That's the way probabilities work. If someone flips a coin, and they win a prize for heads, and they see the coin but you don't, you can update the likelihood that it is heads by whether they smile or frown. If you know that your uncle just bought a $100,000 sports car, then your estimate of the likelihood that he won the lottery would go up.

The subjective likelihood of an event in the past changes depending on what you know. Are you disagreeing with that? You think that since winning the lottery has a 1 in a million chance, that even if your uncle tells you "I just won the lottery", you won't believe him?

 

[stevendaryl]

Why can't you answer the question:

In the case where the memory restoration happens 10 minutes after Sleeping Beauty wakes up on Tuesday if the result was tails, do you agree that before the 10 minutes is up, that Sleeping Beauty would consider all 4 of the following to be possible?

1. It's Monday, and the result was heads.
2. It's Monday, and the result was tails.
3. It's Tuesday, and the result was heads.
4. It's Tuesday, and the result was tails.

 

[Boing3000]

Now, I could tell you or show you what the coin is and you would be forced to change your credence from 1/2 to 0 or 1.

No. Only me looking at the coins (both side to be sure it is fair) will turn my credence into event/certitude.

Alternatively, I could give you some clues about what the coin is. And, using my clues you might change your credence from 1/2 to something else, based on how big a clue I give you.

I understand that perfectly. And that have nothing to do with coins flipping. It as everything to do with coins "flipping AND more...."

The real point of this puzzle is to work out whether there are any clues in the experiment for Beauty to pick up on.

And yet the very layout of the experiment goes out of his way to drug Beauty so has to be sure "there is no clues" to be gained in the experiment. I make it clear in my first post that there is not even the need to run it. Unless I misunderstood the usage of drug. Was it suppose to make here forget only about the day, or about the whole setup explanation ?

The halfers say there are no clues, so they stick with 1/2.

Indeed, the halfers says that, as well as the very definition of the problem. And they are dam right about 1/2 of Head actual counts.

The thirders, however, are much better at spotting clues, so we find these clues and change our credence to 1/3.

There are not clues to spot. All data are present before hand, and there is 2/3 chances to be awake on tail.

I say: both group don't answer the same question.

 

[stevendaryl]

Probabilities of coins flipping does not update with knowledge. If she have to bet, she will not change her bet anyway.

That doesn't make any sense. In the revised experiment (on Tuesday, if the result was tails, her memory is restored 10 minutes after she wakes), she wakes up knowing that she's in one of 4 situations:

1. Heads and Monday
2. Heads and Tuesday
3. Tails and Monday
4. Tails and Tuesday

If you asked her to bet on which situation is true, what odds would she take? I can't see any reason for her not to give all four possibilities equal likelihood.

Now, in case #4, she finds out that she is in case #4. In cases 1-3, she finds out only that she is not in case #4. Now, what likelihood would she give to each of the possibilites 1-3? How much would she be willing to bet on each?

 

[stevendaryl]

And yet the very layout of the experiment goes out of his way to drug Beauty so has to be sure "there is no clues" to be gained in the experiment.

But that's not true. When she wakes up, she finds out that she is not in situation #4 (it's Tuesday, and the result was tails). (edit: I originally said "heads")

 

[Boing3000]

Why can't you answer the question:

In the case where the memory restoration happens 10 minutes after Sleeping Beauty wakes up on Tuesday if the result was tails, do you agree that before the 10 minutes is up, that Sleeping Beauty would consider all 4 of the following to be possible?

1. It's Monday, and the result was heads.
2. It's Monday, and the result was tails.
3. It's Tuesday, and the result was heads.
4. It's Tuesday, and the result was tails.

Beauty has been explained all the possibilities and 3 is not one of them.
From wikipedia: " if the coin comes up heads, Beauty will be awakened and interviewed on Monday only"

That is just wrong. When you acquire new information, you update the likelihood of what is true.

I am told that a fair coins is 1/2 chance to be head. And frankly, I tend to believe it, because it matches my experiences so far.
Then I am told that same coins have just run 1 millions head in a row. Now, I know it is unlikely, but that newly acquired information change nothing. If that coin is fair then it is still 1/2.

 

[Boing3000]

But that's not true. When she wakes up, she finds out that she is not in situation #4 (it's Tuesday, and the result was tails). (edit: I originally said "heads")

Maybe we haven't read the same setup. Mine if from wikipedia, and she cannot finds anything by construction of the experiment:
wiki: "Any time Sleeping Beauty is awakened and interviewed she will not be able to tell which day it is or whether she has been awakened before. During the interview Beauty is asked: "What is your credence now for the proposition that the coin landed heads?".

 

[stevendaryl]

Beauty has been explained all the possibilities and 3 is not one of them.
From wikipedia: " if the coin comes up heads, Beauty will be awakened and interviewed on Monday only"

Hmm, I think I may have gotten heads and tails confused, in that case. The way I have been assuming is that

• If it's heads, she is woken up on Monday and Tuesday
• If it's tails, she is woken up on Monday
• And the twist: If it's tails, of course she will wake up on Tuesday, but she will wake up knowing that it is in fact Tuesday.

I am told that a fair coins is 1/2 chance to be head. And frankly, I tend to believe it, because it matches my experiences so far.

Yes, but if I further tell you that when it lands heads, I dance a jig, and I don't dance a jig, then your likelihood changes. Likelihood of the truth of something changes based on new information. That's what probability is good for---taking into account new information.

 

[stevendaryl]

Maybe we haven't read the same setup. Mine if from wikipedia, and she cannot finds anything by construction of the experiment:

But if she doesn't know what day it is, then that is itself information, because she would know what day it was if it were Tuesday and the coin toss had been a particular result (whichever result causes her memory not to be wiped).

 

[PeroK]

No. Only me looking at the coins (both side to be sure it is fair) will turn my credence into event/certitude.

.

You are misunderstanding the point of the problem. We are not discussing here the situation with conjurers, liars or unfair coins. That is a completely different problem altogether.

In that case, none of the answers or analyses given here are valid.

If a stage magician tossed a fair coin there is a finite probability that it would come up as a playing card showing the ace of spades.

 

[Boing3000]

Hmm, I think I may have gotten heads and tails confused, in that case. The way I have been assuming is that

• If it's heads, she is woken up on Monday and Tuesday
• If it's tails, she is woken up on Monday
• And the twist: If it's tails, of course she will wake up on Tuesday, but she will wake up knowing that it is in fact Tuesday.

OK, but I suppose we'd better stick to the actual Beauty "problem" which is not what you describe. And btw the "twist/drug" is precisely that beauty will NOT be able to tell what day it is (or if it is the millionth time she is woken (well if there is no mirror in the room at least ))

Yes, but if I further tell you that when it lands heads, I dance a jig, and I don't dance a jig, then your likelihood changes.

Not at all. Only the likely hood that you dance a jig increase (even though I am quite sure you are a happy guy on average ). And the information don't concerns coins tossing, but you dancing. You make "a promise" to me (that I would assign some probability you would respect)

Likelihood of the truth of something changes based on new information.

That's a agreeable statement but it is unlikely to be true. The precise exact (mathematical) correlation between information is what truth means for me.

That's what probability is good for---taking into account new information.

In my book, probability is the tool to manage absence of information. Everybody knows there is no randomness in coins tossing (the lower bound of that ignorance is chaos) and only our absence of knowledge of the "exact" way the coin is tossed, force us to use probability tool to manage the truths about the situation.

New information (like dancing, or wakening) added linearly to the consequences of that original "fuzziness" don't change that original "fuzziness"

 

[Boing3000]

You are misunderstanding the point of the problem. We are not discussing here the situation with conjurers, liars or unfair coins. That is a completely different problem altogether.

I am not trying to be facetious here. I am the once trying to stick with the exact definition of the "dilema".

Now, I could tell you or show you what the coin is and you would be forced to change your credence from 1/2 to 0 or 1.

I don't understand the purpose of such sentences. Telling me that a coins not tossed is 1/2 is identical to telling me the once tossed is is A or B. Observing it is some state A or B does no change credence, it deletes credence, it remove the very notion that I must use probability anymore.

I am going to op-out of this thread, because I cannot even get you to acknowledge that this problem contains the very hard assertion that Beauty cannot know what days it is (by usage of a drug).

I understand both halfers and thirders point of view. They disagree because they can't even recognize that they use different frame of reference (the lab vs Beauty)

 

[stevendaryl]

OK, but I suppose we'd better stick to the actual Beauty "problem" which is not what you describe. And btw the "twist/drug" is precisely that beauty will NOT be able to tell what day it is (or if it is the millionth time she is woken (well if there is no mirror in the room at least ))

But that's not true. She knows that the combination: It is Tuesday and the coin toss was (whatever result does not result in a memory wipe) did not occur. So the fact that she doesn't know the day is itself information, which the halfers are not taking into account.

Not at all. Only the likely hood that you dance a jig increase (even though I am quite sure you are a happy guy on average ). And the information don't concerns coins tossing, but you dancing. You make "a promise" to me (that I would assign some probability you would respect)

That's just wrong, but it's a confusion about the use of probability having nothing specifically to do with Sleeping Beauty.

If events are correlated, then knowing about one event gives you information about the other event. If a coin was flipped, you don't know the result, so you assign it a likelihood of 50/50. But looking at clues, you can find out more information about the result. More information means less uncertainty about the result. In the extreme case, you actually look at the coin. After that, your uncertainty about the result is zero, and you know either that it is heads or that it is tails.

There is no point in discussing Sleeping Beauty probabilities if you don't understand (or don't accept) the basics of probability theory and probabilistic inference.

 

[Boing3000]

But that's not true. She knows that the combination: It is Tuesday and the coin toss was (whatever result does not result in a memory wipe) did not occur. So the fact that she doesn't know the day is itself information, which the halfers are not taking into account.

Now you lost me. Yes, she knows the combination, and I already point out that going true the experiment change nothing about that knowledge.
So why bother with that memory wipe ? (which I hope you don't deny, because it is part of the problem definition)
The only reason is to project Beauty in a universe only made of Monday, while the universe of the lab is made of Monday and Tuesday.
If not, there is no reason to specify that criteria in that problem. You cannot just wave that fact away. Halfers have every rights to use that criteria to compute her probability.

If events are correlated, then knowing about one event gives you information about the other event.

I cannot seem to be able to explain to you that 's not what I disagree with. I don't deny correlation, and I feel I am the one taking them seriously. You dancing does not change the original event probability. Establishing correlation downstream of events does not trickle up. That's all I am saying.
I don't even understand why you would bring up such bizarre correlation and passing them for information gathering. Is there not many other probabilities you start dancing ? Why "complicate" things in such a way ?
I say that seeing you dancing is an information about "coins flipped AND promise". You cannot leave out the correlation in both math and natural language, that's too many shortcuts.

In sleeping Beauty's problem the asymmetrical correlation happens BEFORE she is even put to sleep. In that lab-frame 1/3 is the probability to wake up on Monday.
The confusion in that problem is then to proceed the wipe. If you take this element as meaningful/seriously then Beauty always wake up with only Sundays memory. So it is always Monday for her.

If a coin was flipped, you don't know the result, so you assign it a likelihood of 50/50. But looking at clues, you can find out more information about the result.

I agree 100%. But waking up isn't a clue for Beauty. She has strictly no more information to gather AFTER waking up.

There is no point in discussing Sleeping Beauty probabilities if you don't understand (or don't accept) the basics of probability theory and probabilistic inference.

I don't accept that I don't understand them. I am one of the 3 peoples that actually agree with both answers. So we are finished here.

 

[stevendaryl]

Now you lost me. Yes, she knows the combination, and I already point out that going true the experiment change nothing about that knowledge.

When she wakes up in the morning, the fact that she doesn't know whether it's Monday or Tuesday tells her something. It tells her that either it's Monday, or that the coin toss was (whichever one results in a memory wipe).

I agree 100%. But waking up isn't a clue for Beauty. She has strictly no more information to gather AFTER waking up.

But that's not true. She doesn't cease to exist on Tuesday in either case. It's just that if it's Tuesday, and the coin toss was (whichever result does not result in a memory wipe), then she will know what day it is. Therefore, if she doesn't know what day it is, then she learns either that it's Monday, or that it's Tuesday and her memory has been wiped.

 

[stevendaryl]

It certainly doesn't do the halfers any good to justify their answer by rejecting the whole concept of probabilistic reasoning.

The way that probabilistic inference works is this:

If A is some random event (a coin toss, a lottery result, etc.), and B is an event whose likelihood is affected by A, then probabilistic inference works out this way:

1. Let P(A) be the a priori likelihood of A (1/2 in the case of a coin, maybe 1 in a million for the case of winning the lottery).
2. Let P(B|A) be the likelihood of B when A is true.
3. Let P(B| \neg A) be the likelihood of B when A is false.
4. Then if you see that B is true, you can compute a probability P(A|B) for the probability that A is true given that B is true. P(A|B) = \frac{P(B|A) P(A)}{P(B|A) + P(B|\neg A)}

So for example, A might be "Your uncle wins the lottery". B might be "Your uncle buys a $100,000 sports car". Suppose:

• P(A) = \frac{1}{10^6}
• P(B|A) = \frac{1}{2}
• P(B|\neg A) = \frac{1}{10^6}

So it's very unlikely that your uncle would ever buy a sports car if he doesn't win the lottery, but if he does win the lottery, he has a much greater probability.

Then if you see your uncle driving in a newly purchased sports car, you can figure that there is a signification likelihood that he won the lottery:

P(A|B) = \frac{\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{10^6}}{\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{10^6} + \frac{1}{10^6} \cdot (1 - \frac{1}{10^6})} \approx 0.33

So the likelihood that your uncle won the lottery is updated from 1 in 10^6 to 1 in 3

 

[Boing3000]

When she wakes up in the morning, the fact that she doesn't know whether it's Monday or Tuesday tells her something. It tells her that either it's Monday, or that the coin toss was (whichever one results in a memory wipe).

It tells here NOTHING more that she knew already. You cannot understand the problem of that problem until you acknowledge that.

But that's not true. She doesn't cease to exist on Tuesday in either case. It's just that if it's Tuesday, and the coin toss was (whichever result does not result in a memory wipe), then she will know what day it is.

1) Fact : the coins can be tossed Monday night. Apparently you don't get that.
2) Fact : She factually cease to exist; From wiki "Beauty will be awakened, interviewed, and put back to sleep with an amnesia-inducing drug that makes her forget that awakening".
Thus I beg to disagree with the underlined part, because it is simply wrong.

Therefore, if she doesn't know what day it is, then she learns either that it's Monday, or that it's Tuesday and her memory has been wiped.

So she learned nothing. She knew that already. And she have definitely no way two distinguish between those "OR".

It certainly doesn't do the halfers any good to justify their answer by rejecting the whole concept of probabilistic reasoning.

I have not seen any halfers do that. Nor does I. It certainly does not do you any good to pretend that.

Thanks for the "probabilistic inference" reminder. But you need to understand halfers use the same rule, with a different inference (void for Beauty).

 

[stevendaryl]

So she learned nothing. She knew that already.

No, she didn't. If she has memories of Monday, then she learns something (namely, that her memory wasn't wiped, and the experiment is over). If she doesn't have memories of Monday, then she also learns something (namely, that the experiment is not yet over).

 

[stevendaryl]

I have not seen any halfers do that. Nor does I. It certainly does not do you any good to pretend that.

You said yourself that the probability of heads can never be updated in light of new information. Or at least, you seemed to be denying that. You said:

Probabilities of coins flipping does not update with knowledge.

That's contrary to standard probabilistic reasoning.

 

[Boing3000]

No, she didn't. If she has memories of Monday, then she learns something (namely, that her memory wasn't wiped, and the experiment is over). If she doesn't have memories of Monday, then she also learns something (namely, that the experiment is not yet over).

She never have memories of Monday, per definition of that problem. She never forget Sunday, per definition of that problem. Hence she is forever on Monday.
If you cannot understand that from the problem definition, I cannot help you.

You said yourself that the probability of heads can never be updated in light of new information. Or at least, you seemed to be denying that

Nope I never said that. I explicitly said new information AND new correlation is needed.
You keep projecting your way of thinking into mine. I don't use implicit inferences. I am an explicit kind of guy.

Probabilities of coins flipping does not update with knowledge.

See ? There is no new correlation here. Observing coins being flipped will never change that probability.
Knowledge meant data-collection, not purposely asserting new correlation connection. Those are two different things.
And Beauty has no way to access to new information past Sunday.

 

[stevendaryl]

She never have memories of Monday, per definition of that problem.

No, we don't kill her based on the coin flip. It's just that if the coin flip is a certain result, then her memory of Monday is erased. If the coin flip is something else, her memory of Monday is not erased. So she learns something from the fact that her memory is or is not erased.

 

[stevendaryl]

Nope I never said that. I explicitly said

Well, what you said and what you denied saying sound the same to me. I can't make any sense of your claim:

Probabilities of coins flipping does not update with knowledge.

The only kind of updating that is being discussed is revising the probability that a coin flip was heads based on new information. Your quote seems to be saying that that's impossible, which is contrary to probabilistic reasoning.

 

[stevendaryl]

I'm beginning to think that the Sleeping Beauty problem as stated is misleading halfers. The statement of the problem suggests that there are only three possibilities:

1. Heads and it's Monday
2. Tails and it's Monday
3. Tails and it's Tuesday

That's not true. We don't kill Sleeping Beauty depending on the coin toss. She'll wake up Tuesday morning, regardless of the coin flip. The difference is that if the coin flip was "heads", then on Tuesday, she'll know that it is Tuesday, and that the experiment is over. So really, she wakes up every morning. It's just that only under certain circumstances is she uncertain about what day it is. So the fact that she is uncertain about the day tells her something. She does learn something upon awakening.

 

[PeterDonis]

I'm beginning to think that the Sleeping Beauty problem as stated is misleading halfers.

The problem as stated is not what you are stating.

We don't kill Sleeping Beauty depending on the coin toss. She'll wake up Tuesday morning, regardless of the coin flip.

That's not the way the problem is stated. (It's the way you have altered it in your posts, but it's not the way the original problem is stated.) As the original problem is stated, Beauty is only awakened on Tuesday if the coin flip turns up tails. Otherwise she is left asleep on Tuesday. That's how it is described in the Wikipedia article linked to in the OP.

So really, she wakes up every morning.

Only in your altered version of the experiment. Which, once again, illustrates the point I made when I first entered this thread, that the fact that everyone seems to need to alter the definition of the experiment in order to derive a clear answer indicates that the original experiment is not defined precisely enough for there to be a clear answer.

 

[stevendaryl]

The problem as stated is not what you are stating.
That's not the way the problem is stated. (It's the way you have altered it in your posts, but it's not the way the original problem is stated.) As the original problem is stated, Beauty is only awakened on Tuesday if the coin flip turns up tails. Otherwise she is left asleep on Tuesday. That's how it is described in the Wikipedia article linked to in the OP.

So your interpretation is that she sleeps for the rest of eternity in that case? I just interpreted that in that case, the experiment ends and she wakes normally (with an alarm clock, or whatever).

 

[PeterDonis]

So your interpretation is that she sleeps for the rest of eternity in that case?

No, she is awakened on Wednesday and the experiment ends. Read the Wikipedia article linked to in the OP.

 

[Charles Link]

Which, once again, illustrates the point I made when I first entered this thread, that the fact that everyone seems to need to alter the definition of the experiment in order to derive a clear answer indicates that the original experiment is not defined precisely enough for there to be a clear answer.

In many physics problems, (such as problems involving masses and springs and pulleys, etc.), it is useful to test the limiting cases to help solidify that you have the correct answer. In this particular problem, most of the checks on the answer using limiting cases (such as using a biased coin) gave results that brought into question the correctness of the answer that was computed. Although I voted for 1/2, (because the 1/3 result didn't pass the test of the biased coin), I'm not particularly pleased with the 1/2 answer either. Perhaps the 3rd choice is the best of the three, but the problem statement itself seems to be reasonably clear. On first reading of it, I would have expected it to give an answer that passed all the tests.

 

[stevendaryl]

No, she is awakened on Wednesday and the experiment ends. Read the Wikipedia article linked to in the OP.

Yes, I screwed up in stating the problem. I apologize. I was using a different variation of the problem that was not the one from Wikipedia.

I don't think that the answer changes, though. In the Wikipedia article, if the coin toss is heads, then Sleeping Beauty is only awakened once. If we changed that to "if the coin toss is heads, she is not awakened at all", then surely the odds of the coin toss being tails given that she is awake must rise to 1. So the argument that she learns nothing from the fact that she is awake isn't true, as a general principle.

 

[PeroK]

In many physics problems, (such as problems involving masses and springs and pulleys, etc.), it is useful to test the limiting cases to help solidify that you have the correct answer. In this particular problem, most of the checks on the answer using limiting cases (such as using a biased coin) gave results that brought into question the correctness of the answer that was computed. Although I voted for 1/2, (because the 1/3 result didn't pass the test of the biased coin), I'm not particularly pleased with the 1/2 answer either. Perhaps the 3rd choice is the best of the three, but the problem statement itself seems to be reasonably clear. On first reading of it, I would have expected it to give an answer that passed all the tests.

I have to say that your result with the biased coin must have been due to a calculation error.

 

[Boing3000]

The only kind of updating that is being discussed is revising the probability that a coin flip was heads based on new information

And I am telling you that new information does NOT change anything (learning that "my tailor is rich" is irrelevant, and it IS new information).
You need new correlation, and then new data concerning this new sets of possible facts. You need to be specific.

If we changed that to "if the coin toss is heads, she is not awakened at all"

You don't get to change the correlation between events mid-way analyzing a problem.

then surely the odds of the coin toss being tails given that she is awake must rise to 1. So the argument that she learns nothing from the fact that she is awake isn't true, as a general principle.

You cannot use fallacies to derive general principle. That she cannot learn anything is a basis for that "dilemma".
It is easy to spot, you just cannot come to term that this problem is badly defined (but convincingly enough apparently) so that physicists/mathematicians start trolling themselves to oblivion.

 

[Charles Link]

I have to say that your result with the biased coin must have been due to a calculation error.

With the biased coin, where the coin is 99% biased for heads, but also where the tails result is changed to waking her for 1000 consecutive days gives a mathematical result that defies logic. There is only one coin flip, and not an ensemble...

 

[PeroK]

With the biased coin, where the coin is 99% biased for heads, but also where the tails result is changed to waking her for 1000 consecutive days gives a mathematical result that defies logic. There is only one coin flip, and not an ensemble...

Sorry, that just makes no sense.

 

[PeterDonis]

I don't think that the answer changes, though.

Basically, this type of claim (of which a number of different individual examples have been made in this thread) amounts to saying that the answer to the original problem is the same as the answer to some different problem that is more precisely specified. Which amounts to saying that the original problem can only be interpreted such that it is equivalent to the more precisely specified problem. But this thread discussion clearly falsifies that claim, since different people are interpreting the original problem specification differently.

 

[PeroK]

Only in your altered version of the experiment. Which, once again, illustrates the point I made when I first entered this thread, that the fact that everyone seems to need to alter the definition of the experiment in order to derive a clear answer indicates that the original experiment is not defined precisely enough for there to be a clear answer.

In my summary post, a few pages back now, I stuck to the problem,as stated. In fact, early on in this thread the claim was made that all thirder arguments involve changing the problem in some way. Since then I have stuck to the core problem as stated.

My only embellishment is to consider an additional random observer, but that it simply to corroborate Beauty's calculations, which could be left to stand without corroboration.

I have done this despite the fact that I believe increasing the number of days involved blows the 1/2 argument apart. The halfers rely on the fact that both 1/2 and 1/3 are plausible answers.

With, say, 99 days, the options would be 1/2 or 1/100. The 1/2 answer becomes very difficult to justify in this case. It becomes increasingly implausible.

In fact, the other difficulty with the 1/2 answer is that it becomes the general answer for a wide range of data; whereas, the 1/3 answer changes with the numerical data involved, which is more what you would expect.

The exception to this is your argument that the problem might imply simply a repeat of the calculation with the original data. In that case it makes perfect sense that 1/2 is the only answer no matter what has happened or may yet happen.

That, however, renders the problem rather pointless, implying as is does simply a repeat of the same calculation in all circumstances.

It's interesting that some of the wilder defences of the 1/2 position seem to have taken this to the extreme that even if you look at the coin and see a head, say, then the question over the probability that it is heads remains 1/2. And that the certainty now that it is a head is not actually a probability.

This also leads to the extreme position that the probability of a coin being heads is absolutely 1/2 and can never change, even to 0 or 1, under any circumstances.

These reveal fundamental disagreements over the nature of probability and credence that wouldn't be removed even if the problem were stated more precisely, as you suggest.

 

[PeterDonis]

In my summary post, a few pages back now, I stuck to the problem,as stated...

My only embellishment is...

In other words, you stuck to the problem as stated, except for embellishments. Which just concedes my point.

that it simply to corroborate Beauty's calculations, which could be left to stand without corroboration

Only if those calculations are the ones that correspond to the vague ordinary language in the original problem statement. Which you argue for by adding embellishments. Which again concedes my point.

These reveal fundamental disagreements over the nature of probability and credence that wouldn't be removed even if the problem were stated more precisely, as you suggest.

Yes, that's true. In other words, the original problem statement is vague, and making it precise requires picking one set of assumptions about the nature of probability and credence, out of multiple mutually incompatible possibilities of which different people will pick different ones.

 

[stevendaryl]

Basically, this type of claim (of which a number of different individual examples have been made in this thread) amounts to saying that the answer to the original problem is the same as the answer to some different problem that is more precisely specified.

The whole challenge of thought experiments such as this one is to figure out how to cast the problem into a form where mathematics can be applied. There are two issues in reformulating it: (1) Resolving ambiguities in the problem that don't show up until you try to formalize it. (2) Figuring out what is the correct way to formalize it, in the first place.

I don't think those are the same thing. The fact that people can formalize it two (or more) different ways does not mean that the problem was ambiguous. It might mean that some of the ways of translating an informal problem into a mathematical one are just wrong.

Which amounts to saying that the original problem can only be interpreted such that it is equivalent to the more precisely specified problem.

That's what I think.

But this thread discussion clearly falsifies that claim, since different people are interpreting the original problem specification differently.

It could be a matter of interpreting it differently, or it could be a matter of some people making a conceptual mistake. If you have a problem, such as the Bell Spaceship paradox, and people come up with different answers, that doesn't mean that the problem was ambigous. It sometimes means that somebody made a mistake in formalizing. You can't use the fact that people get different answers as an argument that the problem was ambiguous. (By that criterion, every answer is always right, because the fact that someone got a different answer is proof that they interpreted the problem differently.)