Thomas Kuhn's Critics: Evaluating Views on Scientific Revolution

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Thomas Kuhn's concept of the "invisibility of revolutions" suggests that scientific paradigm shifts are often perceived as mere additions to knowledge rather than true revolutions, primarily due to how textbooks represent scientific history. Textbooks tend to rewrite the narrative of science, obscuring the significance and existence of these revolutions, which leads to a linear and cumulative view of scientific progress. Critics argue that Kuhn's portrayal oversimplifies the scientific process, focusing on sociological and psychological factors rather than the objective merits of competing theories. This perspective has sparked debates among philosophers of science, including notable figures like Popper, Lakatos, and Feyerabend, who have challenged Kuhn's framework. Ultimately, Kuhn's work raises important questions about how scientific history is constructed and understood.
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Thomas Kuhn's "critics"

hello...

I have read this chapter XI of Kuhn's Structures of Scientific Revolutions...

Are there such philsophers who were for/against Kuhn's invisibility of revolutions? I am interested to know what are their sides to Kuhn's invisibility of revolution...
 
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irony of truth said:
hello...

I have read this chapter XI of Kuhn's Structures of Scientific Revolutions...

Are there such philsophers who were for/against Kuhn's invisibility of revolutions? I am interested to know what are their sides to Kuhn's invisibility of revolution...

http://wc0.worldcrossing.com/WebX?14@165.8dWZcIAWHbe.9@.1dde5f07


I would have to look specifically and will. But I would first draw your attention to self Adjoint's assessment.

Self adjoint said:
Kuhn's two examples of paradigm shift that he produced professional histories of are Copernicus' revolution and Planck's introduction of quantized emission and absorption of radiation. In both cases they justified their new ways with traditional math. Copernicus showed that the diameters of the planetary deferents always passed through the sun, in terms of the epicycle theory. And Planck showed that the quantum followed form 19th century mathematical idealizations of the black body

https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=281651&postcount=66

In my time spend with this other poster I approached this subject from a different angle, and incorporated questions and insights of this gentlemen. I was then able to catelogue his insights(distilled questions from reading Kuhn) with pespective views in my research.

Of course these had to incorporate some of the views of today. New roads to describing this quantum geometry of quantum gravity. Certainly a revolution in my books. We find that this struggle was not limited to the views share for us by Einstein's insights, but his resistance meet in Bohr's view in the issues of Solvay.

Paradigmal change, even when new insight is developed in regards to these anomalies, is not a bad thing, if taken seriously. Because it forces people to go to their books, much as Bohr did when thought expeirments were placed in front of him and Schrodinger. As a result the world of quantum mechanics we also went through with it's own revolution. :smile:

So this squaring off if I may, has certain advantages all around. Einstein was very comfortable I believe with the model he had created, so the world presented by Bohr of quantum mechanics although unsettling has a issue it had to contend with. Everything worked fine in a cosmological setting, but did not work very well down below. :smile:

People are working on this today.



Chapter XI - The Invisibility of Revolutions.

Because paradigm shifts are generally viewed not as revolutions but as additions to scientific knowledge, and because the history of the field is represented in the new textbooks that accompany a new paradigm, a scientific revolution seems invisible.

An increasing reliance on textbooks is an invariable concomitant of the emergence of a first paradigm in any field of science (136).

The image of creative scientific activity is largely created by a field's textbooks.

Textbooks are the pedagogic vehicles for the perpetuation of normal science.

These texts become the authoritative source of the history of science.

Both the layman's and the practitioner's knowledge of science is based on textbooks.

A field's texts must be rewritten in the aftermath of a scientific revolution.

Once rewritten, they inevitably disguise no only the role but the existence and significance of the revolutions that produced them.

The resulting textbooks truncate the scientist's sense of his discipline's history and supply a substitute for what they eliminate.

More often than not, they contain very little history at all (Whitehead: "A science that hesitates to forget its founders is lost.")

In the rewrite, earlier scientists are represented as having worked on the same set of fixed problems and in accordance with the same set of fixed canons that the most recent revolution and method has made seem scientific.

Why dignify what science's best and most persistent efforts have made it possible to discard?

The historical reconstruction of previous paradigms and theorists in scientific textbooks make the history of science look linear or cumulative, a tendency that even affects scientists looking back at their own research (139).
These misconstructions render revolutions invisible.

They also work to deny revolutions as a function.

Science textbooks present the inaccurate view that science has reached its present state by a series of individual discoveries and inventions that, when gathered together, constitute the modern body of technical knowledge—the addition of bricks to a building.

This piecemeal-discovered facts approach of a textbook presentation illustrates the pattern of historical mistakes that misleads both students and laymen about the nature of the scientific enterprise.

More than any other single aspect of science, that pedagogic form [the textbook] has determined our image of the nature of science and of the role of discovery and invention in its advance.

http://www.emory.edu/EDUCATION/mfp/Kuhn.html
 
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Thanks.. but can I ask some questions.. I want to know more deeper but simply about Kuhn's invisibility of revolutions...

- What does invisibility means in "Invisibility of Revolution"? Is it literally not seen by our naked eye?

- Also... why is it that the revolution, Accdg. to Kuhn, is invisible..? "Because paradigm shifts are generally viewed not as revolutions but as additions to scientific knowledge, and because the history of the field is represented in the new textbooks that accompany a new paradigm, a scientific revolution seems invisible." This is the reason, right? I want to fully understand this in layman's term...

- Are there some practical examples that could explain this invisibility of revolutions?

- Also, I want to know what constitutes the invisibility of revolutions...what are those?

And, what are the factors that would constitute the invisibility of revolutions?

Because of the "existence" of invisibility of revolutions, what could be the effect?
 
irony of truth said:
Thanks.. but can I ask some questions.. I want to know more deeper but simply about Kuhn's invisibility of revolutions...

- What does invisibility means in "Invisibility of Revolution"? Is it literally not seen by our naked eye?
Welcome to Physics Forums, irony of truth!

No, it's not literally 'seen'.

AFAICS, it refers to the perception of how science changes ... for almost all people (other than at a superficial level, as presented by popular media, for example), change in science can be 'seen' only through textbooks (according to Kuhn). So, if the textbooks - whose content changes over time - do not reflect what the part of science was like before 'the revolution', then no one (other than a few historians of science and curious readers; oh, and a handful of active scientists in the particular field ... until they die) will have any significant insight into what actually happened during the revolution.

In this sense, Kuhn is making it clear that science is most definitely not history!

For your other questions, I'll have to go dig up my copy and re-read it to be able to answer ... l8ter.
 
irony of truth said:
Thanks.. but can I ask some questions.. I want to know more deeper but simply about Kuhn's invisibility of revolutions...

- What does invisibility means in "Invisibility of Revolution"? Is it literally not seen by our naked eye?

- Also... why is it that the revolution, Accdg. to Kuhn, is invisible..? "Because paradigm shifts are generally viewed not as revolutions but as additions to scientific knowledge, and because the history of the field is represented in the new textbooks that accompany a new paradigm, a scientific revolution seems invisible." This is the reason, right? I want to fully understand this in layman's term...

- Are there some practical examples that could explain this invisibility of revolutions?

- Also, I want to know what constitutes the invisibility of revolutions...what are those?

And, what are the factors that would constitute the invisibility of revolutions?

Because of the "existence" of invisibility of revolutions, what could be the effect?

Yes, Nereid spells it out in regards to the textbooks.

The quiet revolution and what is invisible is leading researchers, and here I could have referred to Smolin or a Witten, and find that these might be the professors, crossing the room kind of people( that's a Higg's joke) and how such thinking could have been formalized, as it spreads through communications like these forums.

On the outer most extreme civilization(the outer rim and the gravity associated measured in the professors original idea, and inverse square length tells us much about these views from there origination) is being warmed to the views of Kip thorne and Wheeler, although we would have not recognized the tangible of their association in LIGO.

Most people in society do not know the origins of this world cosmologically, yet it has physically manifested itself here on earth. Voila :smile:

You had to know where this thinking emerged, to my way of thnking, and this is tracible(call it history[ the books are not showing this becuase they are frozen views in time], No!? :smile: ) although not easily perceptible.
Something triggers in the mind( a anomalie) and further insightual development occurs, the revolution is manifestng itself today, and the war of the worlds(words) is continuing. Somehtng will come out of it as both arose out of Einstein and Bohr's relative positions, as it wil arise out of strings and LQG. They are driving each other?
 
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Nereid said:
AFAICS, ...

In this sense, Kuhn is making it clear that science is most definitely not history!

What is 'AFAICS'? It's my first time to encounter that word...

What made Kuhn think that science is not history? Also, If Kuhn said that science is not history, what is science accdg. to him? =)
 
By the way, who were the philosophers who generally criticized (whether in favor of or against) Kuhn's structure of scientific revolutions?
 
irony of truth said:
What is 'AFAICS'? It's my first time to encounter that word...

What made Kuhn think that science is not history? Also, If Kuhn said that science is not history, what is science accdg. to him? =)
As far as I can see :wink:

Kuhn followed Popper (a philosopher), in time, in his study of what science actually IS.

The main successors to Kuhn - in this field - were Lakatos and Feyerabend, with a large cast of other characters.

The main criticisms of Kuhn (IIRC) were that his 'paradigm shift' didn't really happen the way Kuhn described them, when you got down to examining things in detail. Further, most of most scientists' working lives aren't spent in taking part in revolutions or paradigm shifts; Kuhn was largely silent on this (so he could only address a small part of what science actually IS).
 
I recall reading a refutation of Kuhn's ideas in David Deutsch's The Fabric of Reality. Here are a few relevant excerpts:

...[C]onsidered as a description or analysis of the scientific process, Kuhn's theory suffers from a fatal flaw. It explains the succession from one paradigm to another in sociological or psychological terms, rather than having primarily to do with the objective merit of the rival explanations. Yet unless one understands science as a quest for explanations, the fact that it does find successive explanations, each objectively better than the last, is inexplicable.

Hence Kuhn is forced flatly to deny that there has been objective improvement in successive scientific explanations, or that such improvement is possible, even in principle:

there is [a step] which many philosophers of science wish to take and which I refuse. They wish, that is, to compare theories as representations of nature, as statements about 'what is really out there.' Granted that neither theory of a historical pair is true, they nonetheless seek a sense in which the later is a better approximation to the truth. I believe that nothing of the sort can be found. (in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, p. 265)

So the growth of objective scientific knowledge cannot be explained in the Kuhnian picture. It is no good trying to pretend that successive explanations are better only in terms of their own paradigm. There are objective differences. We can fly, whereas for most of human history people could only dream of this. The ancients would not have been blind to the efficacy of our flying machines just because, within their paradigm, they could not conceive of how they work. The reason why we can fly is that we understand 'what is out there' well enough to build flying machines. The reason why the ancients could not is that their understanding was objectively inferior to ours. (Deutsch p. 323-324)

If one does graft the reality of objective scientific progress onto Kuhn's theory, it then implies that the entire burden of fundamental innovation is carried by a handful of iconoclastic geniuses. The rest of the scientific community have their uses, but in significant matters they only hinder the growth of knowledge. This romantic view (which is often advanced independently of Kuhnian ideas) does not correspond with reality either. There have indeed been geniuses who have single-handedly revolutionized entires sciences; several have been mentioned in this book-- Galileo, Newton, Faraday, Darwin, Einstein, Godel, Turing. But on the whole, these people managed to work, publish and gain recognition despite the inevitable opposition of stick-in-the-muds and time-servers. (Galileo was brought down, but not by rival scientists.) And though most of them did encounter irrational opposition, none of their careers followed the iconoclast-versus-scientific-establishment stereotype. Most of them derived benefit and support from their interactions with scientists of the previous paradigm. (Deustch p. 324- 325)

I have sometimes found myself on the minority side of fundamental scientific controversies. But I have never come across anything like a Kuhnian situation. Of course, as I have said, the majority of the scientific community is not always quite as open to criticism as it ideally should be. Nevertheless, the extent to which it adheres to 'proper scientific practice' in the conduct of scientific research is nothing short of remarkable. You need only attend a research seminar in any fundamental field in the 'hard' sciences to see how strongly people's behaviour as researchers differs from human behaviour in general. Here we see a learned professor, acknowledged as the leading expert in the entire field, delivering a seminar. The seminar room is filled with people from every rank in the hierarchy of academic research, from graduate students who were introduced to the field only weeks ago, to other professors whose prestige rivals that of the speaker. The academic hierarchy is an intricate power structure in which people's careers, influence and reputation are continuously at stake, as much as in any cabinet room or boardroom-- or more so. Yet so long as the seminar is in progress it may be quite hard for an observer to distinguish the participants' ranks. The most junior graduate student asks a questions: 'Does your third equation really follow from the second one? Surely that term you omitted is not negligible.' The professor is sure that the term is negligible, and that the student is making an error of judgement that someone more experienced would not have made. So what happens next?

In an analogous situation, a powerful chief executive whose business judgement was being contradicted by a brash new recruit might say, 'Look, I've made more of these judgements than you've had hot dinners. If I tell you it works, then it works.' A senior politician might say in response to criticism from an obscure but ambitious party worker, 'Whose side are you on, anyway?' Even our professor, away from the research context (while delivering an undergraduate lecture, say) might well reply dismissively, 'You'd better learn to walk before you can run. Read the textbook, and meanwhile don't waste your time and ours.' But in the research seminar any such response to criticism would cause a wave of embarrassment to pass through the seminar room. People would avert their eyes and pretend to be diligently studying their notes. There would be smirks and sidelong glances. Everyone would be shocked by the sheer impropriety of such an attitude. In this situation, appeals to authority (at least, overt ones) are simply not acceptable, even when the most senior person in the entire field is addressing the most junior.

So the professor takes the student's point seriously and responds with a concise but adequate argument in defence of the disputed equation. The professor tries hard to show no sign of being irritated by criticism from so lowly a source. Most of the questions from the floor will have the form of criticisms which, if valid, would diminish or destroy the value of the professor's life's work. But bringing vigorous and diverse criticism to bear on accepted truths is one of the very purposes of the seminar. Everyone takes it for granted that the truth is not obvious, and that the obvious need not be true; that ideas are to be accepted or rejected according to their content and not their origin; that the greatest minds can easily make mistakes; and that the most trivial-seeming objection may be the key to a great new discovery. (Deustch p. 325-326)
 
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  • #10
hypnagogue said:
I recall reading a refutation of Kuhn's ideas in David Deutsch's The Fabric of Reality. Here are a few relevant excerpts:

Does it talk about Kuhn's invisibility of revolution? =)
 
  • #11
Hello ^_^

I don't like to be off-topic, but it seems 'irony of truth' and I have the same problem - Studying Kuhn.

Only this time I'm faced with a different chapter - V. The Priority of Paradigm.

(Makes you wonder if I know the guy)

Irony: Now, when you mean critics of Kuhn, do you mean those in favor of Kuhn or those against Kuhn? Or maybe both?

If this helps - Lakatos could be one critic, since he started his critique of science right after Kuhn. ^_^

To all: I wouldn't like to be a pain, but I have some questions too, but to be more general for the sake of "irony of truth"'s questions as well, my questions are:

1.) Are there any book(s) that criticize Kuhn? The Fabric of Reality appears to be a book, and it seems helpful enough, but I'd like to know if there are other sources.

2.) Are there any online articles out there that give their own criticisms of Kuhn? Because after 2 exhausting days of searching every search engine out there, I still have little criticisms of Kuhn.

And also, does the Fabric of Reality have anything to say (mainly, if they agree or disagree) particularly about paradigms preceeding any set of rules for science?

Hope I didn't ask for too much. Thanks for any help. ^_^
 
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  • #12
I don't mean to get off track either.

I would have liked to use the foundation of mathematics as a case in point about successive changes?
 
  • #13
The ebla forum's History and Philosophy of Science section might be a good place to start; Hugo - who is an admin there - is also a PF member. IMHO, there are lots of good resources on that site too.
 
  • #14
apologies for side stepping here for a moment


Nereid,

Did you not like my comment on the Cat's Eye in response to your astronomy today?

There is a new picture of the Cat's eye that's out, do you have access?

Regards
 
  • #15
The irony of truth is that it has to be self evident.

If Kuhn's world is assigned mathematical interpretation as a basis( and one does not forget another posters quote here), then if the views proposed by Kuhn are considered in these steps mathematically, they are successive.

This reminds me of the question as to whether mathematics was discovered or created?

We have been given some mighty puzzles by notable persons who have stupified people for a long time. Poincare? Euclid and his Fifth Postulate? Add some yourself.

Again reference to the foundation of mathematics and the philsophical views open the topic quite largely. How would anomalies present themselves and how would quiet revolutions take place if not theoretcially, and consistently?

Such astractions set up society for prospective views to be validated, and all the time it developed itself consistently along prospectves view of a physics that many had not considered?

Could it have been done without a comsological view? Could it have been done without a quantum view? To me this is the esence of the quiet revolution that is taking place, and there are no books for it(the mathematics is being developed). That comes later, and in time revision to those books becomes important yet would all new mathematics reflect itself in the history? It has too :smile: or it had no where to begin from?
 
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  • #16
hello

Nereid said:
For your other questions, I'll have to go dig up my copy and re-read it to be able to answer ... l8ter.

Sir, have you got them?

I got some few questions...
How come normal science and the nature of scientific education and popularization is the reason for scientific revolution?

What has made Kuhn think that textbooks disguise the role of revolutions and the existence of revolutions?

What made Kuhn think that science is cumulative?
 
  • #17
Thanks for the help.. now I got to sum them up.
 
  • #18
Hello... did Kuhn ever suggested something, from the fact that textbooks are not reliable? What is it?
 
  • #19
irony of truth said:
hello...

I have read this chapter XI of Kuhn's Structures of Scientific Revolutions...

Are there such philsophers who were for/against Kuhn's invisibility of revolutions? I am interested to know what are their sides to Kuhn's invisibility of revolution...

The fundamental question is whether there is such thing as 'Paradigm shift' in the first place. When one paradigm swiftly overthrows the another, does it make any reference to that overthrown? If it does, then the movement from one paradigm to the next is a mere revisional exercise that does not leave the entire science community intellectually dazed or sleepwalking. Kuhn should have concentrated in showing clear but systematic scientific progress via plying logically consistent revisional pathways. I am more with the notion that one paradigm or theory revises another but does so coherently, and not with the one that teleports intelligent beings from one oblovion to the next in miraculously disconnected fashion.
 
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