Ultimate question: Why anything at all?

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The discussion centers on the philosophical question of why there is something rather than nothing, highlighting the paradox of existence. Weinberg notes that while quantum mechanics provides a framework for understanding reality, it does not answer why these laws govern our universe. The argument suggests that with infinite possibilities, the probability of nothingness existing is effectively zero, implying that existence is more probable than non-existence. Participants express differing views on the implications of this reasoning, with some arguing it leads to nihilism, while others see it as a fundamental inquiry into the nature of reality. Ultimately, the conversation reflects on the complexity and depth of the question, emphasizing that it remains largely unanswerable.
  • #241
alt said:
Ok - let's go with 'intent or lack of intent', and extrapolate your examples.[...]
Both cases are legitimate. Intent from lack of intent. Lack of intent from intent.

If you accept the scientific position, can you really ascribe any special quality to your intentions ? Are they not a result of natural forces - merely an extension of the same principals that govern the raindrop causing the pebble to fall, causing the avalanche ?
You are here mixing causation and intention. (I state what we both understand for clarity).
I see no paradox nor contradiction here. Indeed for intention to manifest and have meaning one's actions need to be able to cause the effect which is the intended goal... at least in so far as it can significantly increase the likelihood of the desired outcome. Indeed for will to exist and have meaning there must be a mechanism of observation, modeling of cause and effect to predict, and power to act.

But there is a part of your examples which I think misses the mark. A spontaneous event may trigger the activity of an intention but the intention may previously exist. The rescue squad were trained and prepared and positions before the avalanche occurred. One may argue that the intention preceded the instigating trigger. Intent needn't invoke omnipotence and must if it is to be actualized account for and react to circumstance.
Is there something special about our intentions ? Intelligence perhaps ? Caused by an unintentional, unintelligent Big Bang (no God) ? Or was it intelligent and intentional (God) ? Or don't we know, are not sure ? Bringing it back to the ultimate question - why anything at all.
Yes intent requires some form of "intelligence" in so far as it must invoke expectations of effects of acts. It is an emergent property of living organisms. Now we can speak loosely of intent on a somewhat lower level and get into a very grey area. We often speak of the purpose of say the shape of a finch's beak or some other genetic characteristic of an organism. Here we are at a level of "quasi-intent" where there is no mind (one may assume for arguments sake) behind the design but there is information processing in the biology of genetic reproduction and evolution. The beak shape is in one sense accidental an in another sense purposeful. We need a distinction in the language to handle this level. Say "quasi-purpose" and "quasi-intent".

It is instructive to look at the thermodynamic environment in which we see life existing. We have Earth sitting with a high temperature sun nearby and a low temperature universe into which to radiate. We thus have a large flux of (Helmholtz) free energy through the system. This allows the emergence of spontaneous self organizing systems. It feeds heat engines which power refrigeration effects (formation of intricate crystalline structures, distillations of fresh water, chemical separation of elements, salt flats and ore deposits, ...)

Self organizing systems have an emergent causal structure. In the presence of free-energy flux they cause replication of their organized structure. No intent here but a different level of description for cause and effect. We see growth of crystals and quasi-crystals, propagation of defects in these, and similar condensed matter phenomena.

It is not so much as a specific organized outcome is caused as that over time and many random accidental effects, those which further the organization, are selected out as more resilient against reversal. (the clump of atoms which accidentally land in alignment with the crystalline structure are less likely to re-dissolve by better transmitting heat into the crystal and down to the cold point where it began to form.)

Within this sea of self organizing systems one presumes organisms emerged able to encode and replicate information about how it behaves physically. Now one has a new level of causation where the genetic structure causes the behavior and the behavior is selected for survival. One has "quasi-purpose" and "quasi-intent" in the form of selection from large numbers of variation for most favorable traits. It is the proverbial billions of monkeys tapping on typewriters except that those who fail to type something sensible get culled.

There are two more points of emergence, the first brings about intentional purposeful behavior. From flatworms to lions, tigers, and bears you have an organ dedicated to perception of the environment and triggering actions base on environmental cues. You have a rudimentary mind which encodes not just behavior but perception. In there somewhere must be a modeling function adapting a predictive mechanism, i.e. learning and changing behavior based on experience. These entities can be said to hold intent. The lion is indeed trying to eat me and the flatworm is in fact intending to move and find food.

At some level, possibly the lion, possibly only bigger brained animals such as primates and some others, possibly only the human mind, there is conscious intention. Instead of only learning cause and effect from our experience in a reactive way, we abstract and hypothesize constructing theories of how the world works and so extrapolating upon experience. I've certainly seen examples of parrots and chimps doing this but not universally, only specific trained examples. I suspect they are at the cusp where such emergent behavior is possible but exceptional among individuals.

(By the same token I've seen humans who seem incapable of anything other than reactive "animal" behavior.)

I personally think that the word 'accidental' and it's fluid use thereof, goes to the heart of the context, and the point (the OP) of this thread.
Hmmm... 'accidental' and also 'spontaneous' with some "accidental" confusion of the two meanings.

Identifying levels we may ask at what levels the meanings of words like "spontaneous" and "accidental" change their definition.

  1. Physics & Thermodynamics
  2. Chemistry & Condensed matter physics
  3. Self-organizing systems (specialized chemistry pre-biology, non-equilibrium thermo.?)
  4. Biology
  5. Behavioral (animal) Psychology
  6. Human Psychology/Philosophy of Thought (including epistemology, logic, etc and the philosophy of science including this list.)
Does that sound about right?
I'd say questions of intent and purpose don't have any meaning below the level of Biology and should be "quasi-" qualified at the level of biology. And then we can distinguish forms of intent at the last two levels e.g. the distinction between first and second degree murder and manslaughter. (conscious intent, reactive intent, no intent but responsibility for causation).

One may ask how 'spontaneous' is defined at the base level vs. 2nd and 3rd levels. In classical physics there is no 'spontaneous' and we have a clockwork determinism between past and future states of reality. Quantum mechanics modifies the issue a bit and there are arguments about interpretation but we can qualify e.g. spontaneous vs. stimulated emission. There is room for invoking the term and giving it meaning. Note however that at the next level spontaneous is quite distinctly meaningful. We can speak, even in the classical domain, of spontaneous reactions, such as condensation or :wink: spontaneous human combustion ;). We understand when speaking of this at the level of chemistry that we are speaking of random external causation and not the type of indeterminate causality invoked when considering quantum physics. It changes further at higher levels. Certain self organization phenomena are "inevitable" with spontaneous time of instigation. That's true even of critical phenomena in chemistry/condensed matter physics where phase changes are the rule and super-critical phases are exceptional.

This is how I see the meanings of the words parsed at different levels. Well I'm talked out and I've got to get ready for school. I apologize for being long winded.
 
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  • #242
jambaugh said:
... I apologize for being long winded.

Not at all. Thank you for your informative and 'to the point' reply. I will read it with much interest and might have some further comments / questions later, if that's OK
 
  • #243
alt said:
Ignorant pedestrian ? Simplistic ? At least you are able to offer your view, and it is readily understood - not wrapped in ever increasing cycles of complexity that gets no one any closer to anything of substance . Oh, and BTW, an admission of ignorance puts you way ahead than some others.

Any intelligent fool can make things bigger, more complex.
It takes a touch of genius - and a lot of courage - to move in the opposite direction.
(Albert Einstein)
Thanks for the pep talk alt. :smile:

Truth be told, the reason I try so hard to simplify things is that I'm not capable of navigating through complexity. I'm a panicky guy. Keep it simple ... please. :smile:

And now I think I should just fade once again into the background and let the more informed members, you included, continue with the discussion.
 
  • #244
jambaugh said:
It is not so much as a specific organized outcome is caused as that over time and many random accidental effects, those which further the organization, are selected out as more resilient against reversal. (the clump of atoms which accidentally land in alignment with the crystalline structure are less likely to re-dissolve by better transmitting heat into the crystal and down to the cold point where it began to form.)

Descriptions of worlds constructed in purely bottom-up fashion are all very well, but they remain vulnerable to the realisation that worlds are fundamentally incomputable.

Here is a recent paper on the incomputability issue and its connection to the "why anything" question -

INCOMPUTABILITY IN NATURE Barry Cooper, Piergiorgio Odifreddiy
To what extent is incomputability relevant to the material Universe? We look
at ways in which this question might be answered, and the extent to which the
theory of computability, which grew out of the work of G¬odel, Church, Kleene
and Turing, can contribute to a clear resolution of the current confusion.
http://www1.maths.leeds.ac.uk/~pmt6sbc/preprints/co.pdf

(A gloss just appeared in Nature - http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v482/n7386/full/482465a.html)

Cooper is talking about how systems self-organise out of vagueness and the need for a new view of mathematics to be able to model that. Maths is based on notions of definability and rigidity - the basis of reductionist computability - and yet we know this is an unreal idealisation (useful, sure enough, but metaphysically untrue).

I think Cooper offers another good way of looking at the question of the self-creation of the universe. We can say it is about the emergence of computability! In the beginning was vagueness - the incomputable. And then by way of a self-organising phase transition, this gave birth to all that was computable.

This is a very "material" or thermodynamic way at looking at maths. The usual approach to maths is immaterial - unconstrained by material limits. Like Bedau arguing for weak emergence, infinite computation is presumed. Big calculations are fine - even if they are so big that they would quickly bust the limits of any material attempts to compute them.

But many are starting now to object to this unrealistic view of computation - the kind that seem happy with non-linear terms that expand faster than the underlying computation that is hoping to keep up with them. If you presume infinite computational resources, then the distinction between polynomial time and exponential time just ceases to be a problem so far as you are concerned.

See these papers questioning such blythe reasoning...

Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity - Scott Aaronson
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1108/1108.1791v3.pdf

The implications of a holographic universe for quantum information science and the nature of physical law - P.C.W. Davies
http://www.ctnsstars.org/conferences/papers/Holographic%20universe%20and%20information.pdf

Some mathematical biologists have been arguing this for a long time of course...

https://www.amazon.com/dp/023110510X/?tag=pfamazon01-20

But Cooper shows how mathematicians are facing up again to the deep issue of incomputability and its implications for how we even conceive reality (and its origination).

On the incomputability of global constraints...

At the same time, new science is often based on situations where the traditional reductions are no longer adequate (chaos theory being particularly relevant here). As one observes a rushing stream, one is aware that the dynamics of the individual units of flow are well understood. But the relationship between this and the continually evolving forms manifest in the streams surface is not just too complex to analyse Ñ it seems to depend on globally emerging relationships not derivable from the local analysis.

On the common trick of simply assuming the incomputability of vagueness to be computable "somehow" - given infinite material resources...

Quantum indeterminacy presents little problem for such an outlook. One either expects an improved scientific description of the Universe in more classical terms, or, more commonly, one takes quantum randomness as a given, and superimposes more traditional certainties on top of that.

The latter perspective is also common to world views that make no assumptions about discreteness. It has the advantage (for the Laplacian in quantum clothing) of incorporating incomputability in the particular form of randomness, without any need for any theory of incomputability. The origins of incomputability in mathematics may be theoretical, but not in the real world, the view is.

On computability acting as a downward constraint on incomputability so as to produce a "well-formed" universe...

Our basic premise, nothing new philosophically, is that existence takes the most general form allowed by considerations of internal consistency. Where that consistency is governed by the mathematics of the universe within which that existence has a meaning.

The mathematics leads to other scientiÞcally appropriate predictions. In particular, there is the question of how the laws of nature immanently arise, how they collapse near the big bang singularity, and what the model says about the occurrence or otherwise of such a singularity.

What we have in the Turing universe are not just invariant individuals, but a rich infrastructure of more general Turing definable relations. These relations grow out of the structure, and constrain it, in much the same sort of organic way that the forms observable in our rushing stream appear to. These relations operate at a universal level.

The similarities of Cooper's arguments with those of Peirce, or the pre-geometry of Wheeler, are obvious. But the computability question, coupled with the emerging information theoretic view of reality that we see both in holographic approaches to cosmology and dissipative structure approaches in material descriptions generally, offer a new paradigm for tackling the "why anything" question.
 
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  • #246
ThomasT said:
" ... the past of an inflationary model is a matter of speculation ..."

...and Vilenkin et al are offering tighter constraints on that speculation.

So if you want to argue that the universe/multiverse is past-eternal, you now have to give arguments against the reasonableness of their averaged expansion condition.
 
  • #247
ThomasT said:
Thanks for the pep talk alt. :smile:

Pep talk ? Was just trying to bring the conversation down to my level :-)

Truth be told, the reason I try so hard to simplify things is that I'm not capable of navigating through complexity. I'm a panicky guy. Keep it simple ... please. :smile:

'bout the same here - except that I wouldn't call myself panicky.

And now I think I should just fade once again into the background and let the more informed members, you included, continue with the discussion.

Me ? Informed ? Lol :-)

I feel like fading into the background all the time, but I'm informed with a propensity to ask the odd question. These couple of lines from Oliver Goldsmith ring in my ears occasionally;

Deign on the passing world to turn your eyes
And pause a while, from letters to be wise ..
 
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  • #248
Oh, and BTW Thomas, earlier on, you said ..

Some behavioral characteristic that's operational on the very largest to the very smallest scale. A dynamic that pervades and permeates the whole of reality.

Can you expand on that at all ?
 
  • #249
apeiron said:
...and Vilenkin et al are offering tighter constraints on that speculation.

So if you want to argue that the universe/multiverse is past-eternal, you now have to give arguments against the reasonableness of their averaged expansion condition.
A good point, imho. Sorting the out the most reasonable constructions wrt extant physical evidence and standard logic is a formidable task ... which supports your point that consideration of the OP should probably facilitate the emergence of more sophisticated answers to the question, even if no definitive ones ... and in the process maybe better ways of thinking about our world, our universe, emerge.
 
  • #250
alt said:
Oh, and BTW Thomas, earlier on, you said ..

Some behavioral characteristic that's operational on the very largest to the very smallest scale. A dynamic that pervades and permeates the whole of reality.

Can you expand on that at all ?
I did that in a couple of previous posts. I don't want to hijack the thread. If you can't find the relevant posts, then PM me and we can hash it out.
 
  • #251
Until science can explain in a non-ambiguous manner the solidity of matter, the question in the OP will remain unanswerable. That would entain a model that's not based on non-existing virtual photons(the mainstream view) as the mediators of the electromagnetic force. This is a crippled model and doesn't give much of a clue what matter is and what anything is. Can anyone provide an adequate or semi-adequate answer to the question what matter is? No.
I guess this concludes the thread, unless some breakthrough can shed more light on what matter is.
 
  • #252
Maui said:
Until science can explain in a non-ambiguous manner the solidity of matter, the question in the OP will remain unanswerable. That would entain a model that's not based on non-existing virtual photons(the mainstream view) as the mediators of the electromagnetic force. This is a crippled model and doesn't give much of a clue what matter is and what anything is. Can anyone provide an adequate or semi-adequate answer to the question what matter is? No.
I guess this concludes the thread, unless some breakthrough can shed more light on what matter is.

Well we have the Pauli exclusion principle, which is in turn based on symmetry arguments. So that is a pretty "solid" and unambiguous explanation.

Maths tells us why there must be both fermions and bosons, at least as potentialities, if there are any material fields at all.

Now why there should be material fields is another matter - it is the "why anything" question again. But material fields are not very "solid" things themselves, are they?

So the solidity of matter is another emergent property arising from symmetries and their breaking. Rather than being a barrier to the discussion, it seems a big clue to our answer.
 
  • #253
apeiron said:
Well we have the Pauli exclusion principle, which is in turn based on symmetry arguments. So that is a pretty "solid" and unambiguous explanation.
Not really. Electromagnetism(the Coulomb repulsion) works at 'large scales' compared to the PEP, if i remember correctly the electromagnetic force begins to act in between 2 'solid' surfaces at distances around 10^-8 m. which is quite big quantum mechanically. I stand by my words, there is NO adequate classical explanation for the solidity of matter at this time. There is a model that generates predictions based on mathematical entities for which existence there is only partial, after-the-fact circumstantial evidence. I think everyone recognizes that whatever causes the repulsion between 'solids' is not the non-real(or not really real) virtual photons but 'something(force?)' that cannot be framed in a classical manner. Hence the question will remain unanswerable.I am not quilified to generalize this, but matter is a special kind of force(one that has a few special features), hence why everything found in reality can(hopefully) be modeled as an interaction between the 4 fundamental forces. If anyone wants to challenge this, i'd be more than happy to learn what else on top of the 4 forces and their intercations exists in nature.
 
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  • #254
Maui said:
I stand by my words, there is NO adequate classical explanation for the solidity of matter at this time. There is a model that generates predictions based on mathematical entities for which existence there is only partial, after-the-fact circumstantial evidence. I think everyone recognizes that whatever causes the repulsion between 'solids' is not the non-real(or not really real) virtual photons but 'something(force?)' that cannot be framed in a classical manner. Hence the question will remain unanswerable.

Err, all knowledge is just models surely? All we are ever going to have is our mental concepts, never the Kantian "thing in itself".

Solidity is a psychological-level concept - a useful idea to organise our impressions at the scale of everyday human life. But it falls apart very quickly as we change our scale of observation.

Virtual particles are an example of a useful concept at a different scale. It is an idea that generates predictions and is confirmed by measurements. Protesting it is "too unreal" is to make the mistake that any concept could ever be real, rather than just a useful mental abstraction used to organise our experience.
 
  • #255
apeiron said:
Virtual particles are an example of a useful concept at a different scale. It is an idea that generates predictions and is confirmed by measurements. Protesting it is "too unreal" is to make the mistake that any concept could ever be real, rather than just a useful mental abstraction used to organise our experience.
I agree with this but if we are supposed to apply the rigor you mention above to the question in the opening post, the question becomes "why 'this useful mental abstraction' at all"? Doesn't it?
 
  • #256
Maui said:
I agree with this but if we are supposed to apply the rigor you mention above to the question in the opening post, the question becomes "why 'this useful mental abstraction' at all"? Doesn't it?

Yes, this is all about examining our concepts more carefully - I think I've said that a lot here. And as an ultimate challenge, it would require us to go the deepest.

So even if we know there can be no final certain answer, this is the reason for taking the question seriously - for what it can reveal about the way we think, the kind of assumptions we have been making without really realising it.

One of the big ones - or so I have argued - is that causation is all bottom-up (I instead argue the systems view on causality).

Another big one is that reality has crisp existence (I instead argue the Peircean view that it self-organises out of vagueness via semiosis).

Vagueness and downward causality are themselves "just concepts". And for the everyday purposes of scientists - scientists who mostly want to build bigger and better machines - they may not even seem very useful concepts.

In the biological and psychological sciences, by contrast, these new concept do appear much more promising. Indeed, they seem essential. And the same has been true for philosophers ever since philosophy began.

I probably agree with you in that I like to have a proper visual or kinesthetic sense of any concept I employ. I want to be able to have a strong impression of vagueness or constraint as some actual "thing" that I can picture vividly, and so play about with, imagine how it works and reacts.

It is just like visualising particles as little balls richochetting about. Strong imagery is useful to actually think. But that says more about our shortcomings as thinking animals (although it is also our advantage, as wouldn't a computer like to be able to do likewise?).

Anyway, the goal of maths and philosophy is to create useful mental abstractions - ideas so generalised that all particular visualisable detail has been washed away. The detail then becomes something the model, based on abstract concepts, predicts and measures. The detail becomes the actual variables we plug back into the general equations.

The great scientists of course have always been good at concretely visualising things - and then throwing all that away to produce the bare mathematical description. Force may be imagined as a bunch of little solid pushes and pulls, tugs and nudges. Then it gets reduced to a capital F in some formula - a symbol standing for something we know how to measure, and relate to other kinds of measurements in a useful fashion.
 
  • #257
Great post Apeiron.

Just to add what you said, what I imagine will happen more in the future (as is happening now) is that mathematics will end up being one of our 'primary' senses in the way that seeing and hearing are senses.

Rather than replacing our natural senses it will strengthen the others and provide a more advanced way to make sense of the world by providing a new kind of intuition about things.

With regards to how we think, a lot of this in my view partially boils down to language and by looking at a dictionary that includes every term created in every language, you basically get a snapshot of how people think and also what they are thinking. By looking at the evolution of language, you can infer what changes have been going on in terms of thinking by looking at what words and terms have been created at what particular time and place.

To mathematics fills a void that regular language can not: it is both very specific and very broad, almost paradoxical in a way. Not only can it provide an exact description of something with relation to some kind of quantity, but it can be used to describe an absolute vastness of possibility with the most compact representation.

I'm going to go out on a limb and say that later it is highly possible that this will be the paradigm for all communication: instead of having a language with words like 'cat', we will have some kind of mathematical representation: maybe a pictorial representation of a geometric object that represents the signal space for what a cat is.

I'm not saying it will happen ten years, a hundred years or even a thousand years from now, but the idea of having a language and method of communication that moves concepts from one person or thing (like a computer) to another in the way that absolute definition certainty is guaranteed with a minimal redundant form of the information is not, at least to me, that far fetched.
 
  • #258
chiro said:
I'm going to go out on a limb and say that later it is highly possible that this will be the paradigm for all communication: instead of having a language with words like 'cat', we will have some kind of mathematical representation: maybe a pictorial representation of a geometric object that represents the signal space for what a cat is.

I know what you mean and I think it is happening already. When I see a cat, especially at the moment when it is nagging to be fed, or scratching a hole in the flower bed, I do think "well, I'm looking at a dissipative structure right there."

The cat can be visualised quite easily as a particular instance of a "geometrical notion" that is extremely general. But also, not part of regular language as yet. :wink:

The difference is traditional geometry is more about the representation of objects than processes. Even a topological vision of a cat would still reduce it to some kind of object (a torus if we just consider the body with its gut as the hole?).

So a big part of what a systems approach says is missing from maths is a representation of pure process. Even the current dynamical models in maths are based on object thinking - one definite state mapping timelessly onto the next definite state. Likewise, the concept of a number is just a something that exists, not something which emerges as some kind of development.

A process-based view may not even be possible, but it is worth investigating.

As an aside, there are people who are trying to rethink maths in a deep way. There is Benioff who is asking what happens when we try to build maths from a quantum foundation. And Davies asks what happens when we limit maths to only what is materially possible.

See - http://www.ctnsstars.org/conferences/papers/Holographic%20universe%20and%20information.pdf

There is no reason the coming century won't produce conceptual revolutions to match the ones of the last. Though personally I think biology, thermodynamics, and the other sciences of complexity, are where the action will be at.
 
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  • #259
apeiron said:
I probably agree with you in that I like to have a proper visual or kinesthetic sense of any concept I employ. I want to be able to have a strong impression of vagueness or constraint as some actual "thing" that I can picture vividly, and so play about with, imagine how it works and reacts. It is just like visualising particles as little balls richochetting about. Strong imagery is useful to actually think. But that says more about our shortcomings as thinking animals (although it is also our advantage, as wouldn't a computer like to be able to do likewise?).
It could be some animal inhereted shortcoming indeed, but delving deeper requires an explanation of the fundamentals -- the pre-existing factors that serve to bring forth the emergence of what you call a crisp reality. Something clearly must pre-exist and pre-date the apparent classical world. Extremely short-lived virtual photons aren't adequate explanations for the world we observe. Referring to matter as a special kind of force or peculiar type of energy does not disspell the confusion about what it is that we mean by something as common and simple-looking as 'matter'. People and scientists in general are left with the only option of referring to 'matter' as that which is observed, touched, handled, etc., but an enquiry into its nature quickly reveals that we are failing as a species to know the ABC of the surrounding world. The only reason why relatively few people discuss this dramatic failure is that few people population-wise are aware of this fact. Getting back to the inital idea - we are not in a particularly good position to claim we adequately know what it is that exists or what pre-existed it. This(and similar scientific or should i say philosophical models) are a castle in the sky and will be so unless people discovered the fundaments of reality, which are now largely missing(i would guess that every BA physicist and above knows this quite well).
Anyway, the goal of maths and philosophy is to create useful mental abstractions - ideas so generalised that all particular visualisable detail has been washed away. The detail then becomes something the model, based on abstract concepts, predicts and measures. The detail becomes the actual variables we plug back into the general equations.
The role of philosophy is to inquire into the nature and validity of the premises and assumptions made by mathematicians. In that regard, philosophy will always disagree with 'shut up and calculate' approaches to understanding reality.
The great scientists of course have always been good at concretely visualising things - and then throwing all that away to produce the bare mathematical description. Force may be imagined as a bunch of little solid pushes and pulls, tugs and nudges. Then it gets reduced to a capital F in some formula - a symbol standing for something we know how to measure, and relate to other kinds of measurements in a useful fashion.
Between the formula and observation, there must be a something that pre-exists and we can define and represent spatially. Do you know how to represent spatially the so called building blocks of the world - the non-spatially extended point 'particles' or the virtual particles that mediate the forces between 'them' which make up this, er... world?
 
  • #260
chiro said:
To mathematics fills a void that regular language can not: it is both very specific and very broad, almost paradoxical in a way.


Sure, mathematics carries no human baggage and doesn't differentiate betweent objects and events, whereas humans are stumped when forced to consider them on equal footing.
 
  • #261
Maui said:
Between the formula and observation, there must be a something that pre-exists and we can define and represent spatially. Do you know how to represent spatially the so called building blocks of the world - the non-spatially extended point 'particles' or the virtual particles that mediate the forces between 'them' which make up this, er... world?

This is trivial if you take a constraints acting downwards on degrees of freedom approach.

What exists at some "location" is infinite possibility. Constraints then limit that freedom so that it has some distinct identity (it is this, and thus not that). So particles exist as the residual degrees of freedom once all other freedoms have been removed from some locale.

The void is then those locales where even more degrees of freedom have been suppressed.

But constraint does have its limits. By observation in our universe, we know that there is a Planck scale uncertainty. You cannot constrain local freedoms better than that. So beyond that limit, you have still a seething mass with its unlimited degrees of freedom.

Virtual particles model that situation. We don't have to think of them as some kind of ontological particles - little scraps of stuff that pre-exist classical existence. They are instead just the degrees of freedom that are unsuppressed because constraint has limits to its reach.

It is kinda like talking about the bubbles of air trapped in swiss cheese. Do the bubbles "spatially pre-exist" or are we just talking about the local limit of a process - the cheese that forms the bubble-shaped boundaries?
 
  • #262
apeiron said:
Though personally I think biology, thermodynamics, and the other sciences of complexity, are where the action will be at.

Interesting view. Why?
 
  • #263
Nano-Passion said:
Interesting view. Why?

Because complexity forces you to face up to the issue of modelling process and development. And the lessons learned there should allow people to see how even the simple is also a result of process and development (rather than merely existing in an uncaused, unexplained, fashion).
 
  • #264
bohm2 said:
“Why is there Something rather than Nothing” is “just the kind of question that we will be stuck with when we have a final theory [of physics]. … We will be left facing the irreducible mystery because whatever our theory is, no matter how mathematically consistent and logically consistent the theory is, there will always be the alternative that, well, perhaps there could have been nothing at all.

A very basic statement is: Something is.

Its denial is self contradictory: Nothing is.

The conclusion is: There could not have been nothing at all.
 
  • #265
sigurdW said:
A very basic statement is: Something is.

Its denial is self contradictory: Nothing is.

The conclusion is: There could not have been nothing at all.

The question is about potentiality rather than actuality. We know something exists of course. But can we rule out the potentiality that nothing could have existed instead?
 
  • #266
apeiron said:
The question is about potentiality rather than actuality. We know something exists of course. But can we rule out the potentiality that nothing could have existed instead?
Look again!

A very basic statement is: Something was.

Its denial is self contradictory: Nothing was.

The conclusion is: There never was nothing.

There is no,there was no, there will be no state of existence corresponding to nothing!

Again: To be is to be a someting, therefore a nothing can't ever be!
 
  • #267
is nothing existing distinguishable from a universe in complete equilibrium?
 
  • #268
sigurdW said:
Look again!

A very basic statement is: Something was.

Its denial is self contradictory: Nothing was.

The conclusion is: There never was nothing.

There is no,there was no, there will be no state of existence corresponding to nothing!

Again: To be is to be a someting, therefore a nothing can't ever be!

How do you know something was?

All we can be certain of is that something is. We can't have the same certainty that there was never a nothingness in the past, nor even that there won't be a nothingness in the future.

So your first premise fails.
 
  • #269
apeiron said:
How do you know something was?

All we can be certain of is that something is. We can't have the same certainty that there was never a nothingness in the past, nor even that there won't be a nothingness in the future.

So your first premise fails.

I can be sure because the negation of the first premise is self contradictory!

Therefore the premise is true.
 
  • #270
Pythagorean said:
is nothing existing distinguishable from a universe in complete equilibrium?

An equilibrium does seem a more fundamental concept than a void. As nothing of note happening would be even less than nothing of note existing.
 

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