DaleSpam said:
I already addressed this in post 50, but that is exactly what you were doing in claiming that the red guy's time was going backwards. If you talk about a sequence of inertial frames then his clock goes forwards at all times and in all frames. If you talk about a sequence of "3D worlds" then you are talking about a 4D non-inertial frame, and mathematically that frame cannot cover the red guy's worldline.
You are still not getting it. I am not saying the red guy's clock goes backward for the red guy sitting at rest in his own frame of reference (see sketch at the bottom of my post #32). The red guy always sees his clock moving forward as he moves along his world line in his positive X4 (time) direction.
But if you were to make a list of the RED clock readings in the order they are presented in the blue guy's frame each time he (blue--referring to my earlier sketch at the bottom of post #32) boosts to his next inertial frame, then you would see those clock readings getting smaller and smaller as blue advances along his worldline (with blue's own clock readings moving forward in time). So, each time blue is coasting in a new inertial frame you note the clock reading on the red worldline at the intersection of the blue X1 axis with the red worldline (you can of course calculate this using the Lorentz transformation between red and blue coordinates, where red's frame is the same as black's except displaced along the black X2 axis). And of course you will perform a new Lorentz transformation for each new period of blue coasting in a new inertial frame.
So, we are not trying to manufacture some single coordinate transformation for a curvalinear non-inertial frame at all. We could talk about using something like Rindler coordinates, etc., but that's not at all what I've been trying to convey.
DaleSpam said:
Here are a couple of Einstein quotes on solipsism from The Library of Living Philosophers Volume VII – Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, Paul Arthur Schillp,Editor
I've included comments with a sketch to clarify the way the problem of solipsism comes into special relativity and hyperplanes of simultaneity.
Page 673 …A few more remarks of a general nature concerning concepts and [also] concerning the insinuation that a concept - for example that of the real - is something metaphysical (and therefore to be rejected). A basic conceptual distinction, which is a necessary prerequisite of scientific and pre-scientific thinking, is the distinction between "sense-impressions" (and the recollection of such) on the one hand and mere ideas on the other...one needs this distinction in order to be able to overcome solipsism… we shall make use of this distinction unconcerned with the reproach that, in doing so, we are guilty of the metaphysical "original sin."
Page 673 (further down the page) …We represent the sense-impressions as conditioned by an "objective" and by a "subjective" factor. For this conceptual distinction there also is no logical-philosophical justification. But if we reject it, we cannot escape solipsism.
Also from Schillp, Page 81: "Physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp reality as it is thought independently of its being observed. In this sense one speaks of 'physical reality'."
"Belief in an external world independent of the perceiving subject is the basis of all natural science."
Einstein, "Maxwell's Influence on the Evolution of the Idea of Physical Reality," 1931, in Einstein, Albert, Ideas and Opinions, New York: Random House, 266.
“I am not a positivist. Positivism states that what cannot be observed does not exist. This conception is scientifically indefensible, for it is impossible to make valid affirmations of what people 'can' or 'cannot' observe. One would have to say 'only what we observe exists', which is obviously false.
Autobiographical Notes, 1949, in Schilpp 1949 p.81
The sketch depicts the problem with denying the real external world does not exist for observers if they cannot observe it. A common objection to the external world existing for an observer at a particular moment in time is that he cannot know anything about such a world “out there” until light signals arrive to inform the observer—by then the external world he is informed of is in the distant past (such as observation of stars, etc.).
So, the problem as depicted below is that under such objections the observer cannot know of anything but himself, for he is continually advancing forward along his worldline at the speed of light at the apex of his backward light cone. At that apex point he has no knowledge of the world of his hyperplane of simultaneity, and by the positivist’s claim he must consider himself to be a solipsist—the only known existing entity.