Tobias Funke said:
Yes, that could be the case. But then again, Galileo wasn't so great at diplomacy! I haven't read enough (or any) Aristotle to know if he would be likely to change his theories when presented with new physical evidence, or if he ever wrote any such thing. That would pretty much make all the difference between him being a scientific thinker (for his time at least) or just some guy who said a bunch of crazy stuff.
When it came to debates with peers he (Galileo) certainly did not try to spare anyone's feelings. On the other hand, he was diplomatic with societal and church superiors. As mathematician he was taught how to cast horoscopes and he often did that for nobles who subscribed to a belief in astrology, for example. The introduction he wrote to "The Starry Messenger" made some disingenuous allusions to astrology for the sake of the noble to whom it was dedicated, and his letters to important demonstrate all the pro forma sucking up required by the customs of the times by anyone in his position relative to them.
I once picked up a book of Aristotle and the chapter I delved into seemed to be a rebuttal to a viewpoint held by someone else. Certainly, therefore, he considered things open to debate, but his whole playing field was abstreuse and impenetrable. Here's a section from the wiki on Aristotle:
"Like his teacher Plato, Aristotle's philosophy aims at the
universal. Aristotle's
ontology, however, finds the universal in
particular things, which he calls the essence of things, while in Plato's ontology, the universal exists apart from particular things, and is related to them as their
prototype or
exemplar. For Aristotle, therefore,
epistemology is based on the study of particular phenomena and rises to the knowledge of essences, while for Plato epistemology begins with knowledge of universal
Forms (or ideas) and descends to knowledge of particular imitations of these. For Aristotle, "form" still refers to the unconditional basis of
phenomena but is "instantiated" in a particular substance (see
Universals and particulars, below)."
So, when you're preoccupied with completely non-practical philosophical issues like whether things contain the essence of universal things or whether particular things merely imitate universal things, you never get any traction on practical mechanics and can reason out some pretty strange explanations of phenomena.