ttn said:
This may be true, but even if it is always possible, I think one shouldn't minimize Bohm's achievement in actually creating such a thing. For one thing, people had allegedly (!) proved that this *wasn't* possible for QM, so Bohm deserves credit for (a) trying and (b) showing by construction of counterexample that the proofs were bogus. In addition, even if it is possible in principle always to construct such a theory, it seems unlikely that the theory so constructed would turn out to be so natural. Bohmian mechanics is. My point is just that, as a particular example of a way to fill out a nonlocal stochastic theory with an underlying deterministic nonlocal dynamics, Bohmian mechanics is far more *interesting* than the tone of your comment suggests.
I hope you understood that I am of the opinion that the only viable ways to view QM are:
1) as purely a generator of probabilities, and we shouldn't attach any physical meaning to the formalism (I'm not in favor of that because it brings your physical intuition to a grinding halt, but I have to admit it is a logical possibility)
2) an MWI like view which I favor.
I agree with you that Copenhagen QM is an ugly theory, which is not only ridden with a lot of internal inconsistencies, but is also bluntly non-local in its mechanism, except of course in its probability predictions.
I think in the building of a theory, one should more stick to general principles than to any other criterion. One such principle is information-locality ; it is the essential principle of SR combined with causality. Another one is the superposition principle ; it is the essential principle of QM. No great principle demands for determinism and it turns out that the first two make determinism impossible.
So we have a paradigm which is build upon information-locality and the superposition principle, and which will turn out to be essentially stochastic.
Within that paradigm, we try to set up a specific theory, and we do now what we want, but we do not infringe on the principles of the paradigm we are working in. So no bricolage in the internal mechanism of a theory that infringes on the principles we've set forth, even if we think of extra stuff to protect us from detecting it (such as *hidden* variables).
Copenhagen QM is bricolage of course, _except_ if we do not consider it as a theory in which the formalism corresponds to anything physical, but just as a generator of probabilities, in which case you don't have to take the collapse of the wavefunction seriously: it is just a mathematical trick to generate probability functions. There are so many things wrong with taking Copenhagen QM as a description of any reality that infringing on information locality in its internal workings is only one defect. It also infringes on the superposition principle ! So it does everything wrong if you take the wavefunction description as something "real". But it works just fine if you consider it as a tool that cranks out probability distributions.
Bohm is just as well bricolage because it wants to introduce (hidden ) determinism, but sacrifices one of the great principles, namely information locality, in its internal workings. It doesn't even consider the superposition principle. But it works just fine if you consider it as a tool that cranks out probability distributions.
However, MWI-like QM DO respect information locality and the superposition principle. That's why I think it is the natural view on quantum theory. It contains fundamentally stochastic elements (namely the imposed choices of the branch of the observer), but it sticks to the basic philosophy of the paradigm laid out.
This starts to sound suspiciously like the inconsistency I thought we agreed was bad. Sure, it's nice to know that the QM predictions can't be generated by a deterministic (or stochastic!) local hidden variable theory (w/ "local" = "internal info sense of local"). But to cast the resulting choice as between "respect of the internal info locality or determinism" is to imply that QM itself respects "internal info locality". But as we agreed previously, it doesn't. So (leaving aside MWI) one is forced to accept that viable theories cannot respect "internal info locality". There is no choice of interest there. There is also no choice of interest w.r.t. "signal locality" -- no theory on the table allows superluminal communication.
But why do you leave the only natural option, namely MWI, aside ?
EDIT:
Quantum theory seen as a stochastic theory of which we do not add any reality to the formalism, but just a calculational trick to let us obtain probabilities of outcomes of measurements, respects information locality. That is "external information locality" because there is no internal mechanism postulated so there's nothing to test "internal information locality" against.
Quantum theory, seen in an MWI formulation, where one DOES give a kind of reality to the wavefunction, also respects internal information locality.
The thing that does not, is when one assumes that measurements "collapse the wavefunction" and that this is some kind of physical phenomenon. In _that_ case, this internal mechanism doesn't respect "internal information locality". That's why one shouldn't do it.
There *is* a genuine choice between stochastic and deterministic, e.g., between orthodox QM and Bohmian mechanics. But it is a choice without a price -- that is, it's not like choosing Bohmian mechanics means you have to give anything up.
With Bohmian mechanics you construct a hybrid. You want determinism and then you have to hide it. So, determinism, IS it, or ISN'T it a fundamental principle on which you want to build your theory ? If it is, I don't know why we have to hide it, and if it isn't, I don't know why you try to put it inside.
Only, you HAVE to hide the determinism, because otherwise you CAN do FTL signalling. But what does it mean, hidden determinism ?
I'm not going to comment orthodox QM, I already told you it is just as ugly, EXCEPT as a generator of statistics. It is then on the same level as Bohm, and I don't see why you should even consider Bohm, given that you don't win anything (but I agree with you that you don't loose anything either: you've anyway lost everything else already in Copenhagen QM !). The two are viewed as two calculational procedures to arrive at the only physical quantities of interest: probabilities of measurement outcomes. Maybe some calculations are easier in Bohm's formulation than in the Hilbert state space formulation ; but I doubt that.
So I truly don't understand why you would say that the choice is between "internal info locality" and "determinism".
Well, because I think that information locality is one of the pillars of SR and QM. Determinism isn't. So if there is one thing I would like to stick to, it is information locality, and I can construct a quantum theory that respects that and does have a kind of description of reality (MWI approach) or one that just gives you probabilities (abstract probability calculation, with the calculational technique of your choice: Hilbert or Bohm, whichever leads to the result in the smallest amount of CPU time).
Oh yeah, a couple of comments on why I said above that Bell's Theorem rules out both deterministic *and stochastic* hv theories that obey Bell Locality. (I still can't tell for sure if you disagree with this??)
Sure, I agree with it.
Leaving aside our discussion of whether Bell Locality is the appropriate way to impose "local causality" on a theory, and just taking for granted for the sake of this point that it is, I think it is clear that Bell's inequality applies to Bell-Local-Stochastic theories just as much as it applies to Bell-Local-Deterministic theories. After all, the whole derivation is in terms of probabilities like P(A|a,b,B,L), etc. In a deterministic theory, all these P's would be either zero or one (since we are conditionalizing on "L"). But this assumption is never made in the derivations of the inequality. That is, the inequality still holds even if the P's are just regular old probabilities, i.e., if the theory is genuinely stochastic (but still Bell Local). So there you go. Of course, you have claimed that any genuinely stochastic Bell Local theory can be trivially filled out by an underlying deterministic dynamics. Perhaps; I'm not convinced, but maybe that's true. But any way, regardless, Bell's Theorem as stated does surely apply to Bell-Local stochastic theories. So no such theory is empirically viable, given Aspect et al. So it is terribly misleading to suggest that the choice we face post-Bell is between (a) deterministic nonlocal theories and (b) stochastic local theories. That kind of statement would make Bell roll over in his grave!
I agree with most of what you say, but I consider it not the right criterion, and I reiterate my claim that Bell's theorem is based upon Bell Locality, which is a condition that is INSPIRED by deterministic thinking, namely that in order to have a correlation, you need a direct causal influence, or an indirect "common cause" influence. This by itself comes from the fact that we consider that the ONLY randomness we're willing to accept is lack of knowledge of internal variables.
Part of my proof you already have: a stochastic theory satisfying Bell Locality is replacable by a deterministic theory satisfying Bell Locality.
So you can read this that we only allow for stochastic theories which can be deterministically explained by lack of knowledge of the complete state.
This is a reformulation that Bell Locality is the requirement that the only form of randomness allowed in a theory, is through incomplete knowledge of some parameters in a state description, which, if we would know them, would determine every outcome with certainty.
We've been here before. QM *also* suffers from this kind of "conspiracy" -- it is nonlocal in the Bell or "internal info" sense, but local "on the outside". It is exactly parallel to Bohmian mechanics on both counts. So why talk of "preferring to sacrifice determinism"? Nothing -- literally nothing -- is *saved* by making this sacrifice. That doesn't necessarily prove you ought to choose the deterministic theory, but surely it shows that there's no *reason* for rejecting the deterministic theory. And as I've said about a bajillion times now, that all I really want to argue for here.
That's because you're comparing to Copenhagen QM. But that's indeed a very ugly theory. Try to compare to MWI like QM. You'll be delighted
cheers,
Patrick.