Hi Lars
Lars Laborious said:
MF, simply saying that qualia are virtual constructs within the information processing system that we call consciousness, doesn't explain how qualia originate.
The question “how do virtual constructs originate?” is answered by “they originate within a particular form of information processing”. Asking for a deeper explanation than this is meaningless.
If I ask “how do electrons originate?” or “how does gravity originate?”, how would you answer?
(If you answer that electrons are not fundamental but are supposed to be composed of entities called strings, I could ask the question again – how do strings originate?).
The point is that nobody has the faintest idea of “how things originate” at a fundamental level, or even “what things really are”, except insofar as we can try to explain some concepts in terms of
other concepts, or we can try to approximate by analogy.
There is no fundamental answer to “how things originate” except by explaining in terms of analogies or other concepts.
What we need is not an answer to “how things originate” (because this question is ultimately unanswerable), but instead “how can some things be rationally, coherently and consistently explained in terms of other things”. This is ALL we can ultimately achieve.
And the explanation of how qualia originate is that they are virtual representations constructed within (emergent from) particular systems of information processing. That’s it. Asking for more is like asking for “where do electrons come from?”
Lars Laborious said:
Yes, it might arise within such a process, but you cannot explain how that can be by comparing it to virtual entities. "Virtual" is a potential state that is imagined to be, and you can't have (phenomenal) imagining without qualia. It's a circular problem.
Not circular at all. You seem to be stuck in the notion that “if it’s virtual, then there must be an external human mind which is imagining it”. This is not the case. Virtual does not entail human imagination. Virtual entails only that an entity is interpreted by an agent as directly representing some form of physical reality when it does not. Such interpretation can take place within an information processing system which represents virtual entities internally “to itself” by creating (also internally) the notion of a virtual “self”. There need be no external observer nor external mind nor human imagination involved.
Lars Laborious said:
Again, "virtual" is a potential state that is imagined to be. Take away this (phenomenal) imagining, and the "virtual entities" or qualia cannot arise.
I agree – but again please try to set aside the notion that virtual entities can exist only in a human mind (via imagination). Virtual entities (I am suggesting) can be created within any suitably complex information processing system which conforms to Metzinger’s conditions. The “phenomenal imagining” as you call it is then a part of the total creation, the system creates virtual self, virtual qualia, and when combined the virtual self experiences the qualia by “imagining” that the self is real and the qualia are real. No human mind is required.
Lars Laborious said:
So, by starting with non-experiencing equipment, it's not logical to say that qualia arise as "virtual entities" - the computer cannot imagine (Note: I'm not saying that it's impossible to make an imagining computer).
You are not suggesting that it’s impossible to make an imagining computer – good!
Then simply take this to the next level – within this imagining computer, the program constructs a virtual self and virtual qualia such that the computer imagines that it is a real “self” which is experiencing real “qualia” within it’s “mind”. There is no human observer, there is no real self, and there are no real qualia (these are constructs of the program), but the computer “imagines” (ie interprets the information) that these things do really exist as somehow physical entities.
Lars Laborious said:
There is absolutely no reason to believe that the program can “see” the “virtual buildings” the way you and I see the “virtual buildings”.
Within existing computer programs - I agree completely.
I perhaps was taking the analogy too far by suggesting that a program such as SIM city constructs virtual buildings – because there is no “phenomenal self” or “virtual self” within the program to interpret those virtual buildings. I apologise for this misleading notion.
My point is that there is no reason in principle why a computer could not be developed which represents internally to itself by creating virtual buildings and a virtual self which “interprets” those buildings. Such a computer could “imagine to itself” that it was viewing real physical objects within the information processing of the program, when in fact no real physical objects exist (its just information).
All I’m saying is that I believe this is the same way that the human brain does it.
Lars Laborious said:
The program just is. Doing it's job. It has no perspective; nothing appears to it. Of course it doesn't need an external mind in order for the program to run, but for virtual entities to exist, it does.
Yes, I agree it does. Thus the program needs to construct a “virtual self” within itself, as well as the “virtual buildings”, such that it can “think to itself” that it is seeing buildings. In just the same way, I believe the human brain “tells itself” that it is an agent which is seeing/hearing/feeling/smelling some kind of “real physical qualia” when in fact those qualia are virtual.
Best Regards
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