Hurkyl said:
The unitary part of quantum mechanics predicts:
(1) Classical apparatuses cannot exist
(2) Quantum apparatuses can simulate classical ones
(3) Thermodynamics can make the simulation's flaws essentially undetectable
I would say that this argument inverts the process of how science is done. Science is not done by asserting axioms and seeing how their ramifications connect to reality, monkeying with our understanding of reality as necessary. Instead, it starts with real phenomena, like the way we interact with our measuring devices and how we rely on those devices to behave when we formulate the meaning of "objective observation". Then we take that interaction as the fundamental reality that we wish to understand, and we form axiomatic structures to attempt to simulate it. So prediction (1) is ascientific, and prediction (2) is the purpose of quantum mechanics, so it is not a prediction of quantum mechanics. You will need to cite an experiment done with a "quantum apparatus" to show the logic in the direction you are applying it (the main problem being, the human mind has built science around classical behavior). I don't know what you mean by prediction (3), perhaps elucidating that would help.
The Copenhagen interpretation postulates that the actual, physical state of the universe undergoes an effectively undetectable 'collapse', which violates both the unitary and relativistic parts of quantum mechanics.
I would call that the "Heisenberg skew" to the Copenhagen interpretation, but Heisenberg was engaging in philosophy-- I much prefer the approach Bohr finally settled on, which to me is that we were never talking about the "physical state of the universe", for all we have access to is science. The scientific approach is to engage in behaviors that intentionally accomplish the "collapses" you refer to, but these are not collapses in the "state of the universe", they are simply collapses in the information that we have chosen to track. The fingerprints of the physicist is all over the result, as is always the case in science-- treating it like an abstract event happening to the "state of the universe" is to turn science into philosophical baggage, forgetting along the way what defines science in the first place (i.e., Galileo not Plato).
As for "nonunitariness", the unitarity applies only to the complete system, which includes us, as you yourself pointed out. As we have no way to step
outside that system to test its unitariness, we find that unitariness is actually only an
effective concept-- a concept that applies imperfectly to subsets only to the extent that they are treatable as closed systems. Measurement violates that closure requirement, so we do not expect measurement to be unitary, when projected onto the state of the system being measured (which is what science does). That holds unless we subsume our apparatus into a larger one that includes us-- betraying the entire point of
objective science as something to be distinguished from untestable philosophy.
To the best of my knowledge, the CI does not give any hints about the mechanism of collapse, nor any theoretical indication about where and when a collapse should occur. If there has been progress in these respects, please share.
It is nothing new in science to note that we cannot access the details of a process that we are treating statistically. It is no less true in classical physics than quantum mechanics-- we never had any idea that wasn't purely statistical about how to predict the weather next January. So I don't see why we should be bothered that quantum mechanics yields inherently statistical results when we project our predictions onto real or hypothetical observations in the future. No one ever promised we could predict everything-- I find it much more amazing that we do so well, than am I bothered by our need to resort to statistical predictions in quantum mechanics. Who said reality was deterministic? Even in classical mechanics, that was always just a philosophical pretense-- it never came from science, again because that would be inverting the proper logic of how we choose axioms to describe reality, not interpreting reality to fit our axioms.
In my opinion, the primary mistake in the CI is the insistence upon using unconditional probabilities. Consider the classical setup where Alice and Bob each have half of an entangled pair of qubits. If Bob measures his qubit and gets a |1>, then it is impossible, even in principle, for the experiment to give any information about
P(Alice gets a |0>, given that Bob gets a |0>),
from which it follows that it is impossible for this experiment to give any empirical evidence regarding
P(Alice gets a |0>).
I don't understand your point here-- the CI allows for joint wave functions, and joint wave functions successfully pass every experimental test you can name in regard to Alice and Bob--
even ones where Alice and Bob are using different wave functions to reflect different information. The desire to make the wave function "something real" that has a unique existence outside of how Alice or Bob is using theirs is pure philosophical baggage, quantum mechanics works fine without that.
However, this is precisely the probability that the CI insists is being tested when it concludes that wavefunction collapse must occur! This is based upon an assumption of statistical independence, which the CI prefers to retain, even at the cost of sacrificing the best tested laws of nature in the history of mankind.
The CI does not make any incorrect predictions in any known experiments, I think you are misinterpreting what a wave function collapse is. It is a reflection of the change in information in some physicists head-- that's what it is, anything more is something you may choose to add if you have a philosopical bent, but the science doesn't care, in regard to testing predictions. I'm saying that if you look at what science is, rather than philosophize about what reality is, the problems vanish and the CI works swimmingly (the minimal Bohr version).