Dualism & Consciousness: Exploring a New Perspective

[Paul Martin]

I seem to be among a small number of people who still believe in dualism. At least to the extent that I understand what other people mean by 'dualism', my beliefs seem to qualify. In particular, I believe that consciousness does not reside or take place in the brain, or even in the physical world. I believe that consciousness takes place outside the 4D space-time continuum of our familiar physical world. As for whether or not this should be classified as "dualism" is not of much interest to me. More important to me is that anyone who might be interested in my ideas would try to understand them and refute them rather than simply categorize and dismiss them.

In this thread I will try to present and defend some of my ideas that might be considered dualistic. I'll start with some conversations from other threads which have been left dangling.

Although these ideas might seem to some to be a "religion", that is another classification which I find to be nearly useless. My mind is open to change, so if anyone presents a rebuttal to any of my beliefs which I think makes more sense, I will eagerly abandon my old idea and adopt the new one.

My definition of a 'belief of mine', is a proposition that in my judgment has a specific probability of being true. To accurately express my beliefs, then, I should give you the probability numbers to distinguish, for example, between something that I believe might be true but I doubt it (say at 35%), and something I believe is highly likely to be true (say at 90%). On this scale, absolute truth would be 100% and a proposition that is utterly false with no possibility of being true would be at 0%. To make sure this scale from doubt to certainty is understood, I will try to remember to give you, in parentheses, my judgment of the probability number each time I mention a belief of mine. These numbers are not scientific but instead are based on nothing but my judgment.

At this point in my thinking, tautologies aside, there is only one proposition which I believe (90%) is absolutely true, and that is that "thought happens". Even though I can't clearly define 'thought', nor 'happens', I nevertheless believe (100%) with certainty that something is going on. I call "something", "thought", and in my judgment, 'happens' is an adequate word to refer to the "goings on". "Thought happens", to me, is just another way of saying that "there is something and not nothing" except that I have labeled the something as "thought". I know that there is thought and that it goes on. Everything else falls somewhere exclusively within the 0 to 100% range in my beliefs.

Now, let me proceed with some of those dangling threads.

...where is the law of nature which says that all forms of consciousness must be as you experience it?

If there is such law, which I doubt (5%), I don't know where it is. I only know that thought happens. I experience thought and I use the term 'consciousness' to mean that experience that I have. In my opinion (88%), consciousness is not present unless something similar to the conscious experiences that I have is present also. My own conscious experiences are variable, in that sometimes I am more alert, attentive, receptive, or cognizant than I am at other times, so I believe (99%) that there is a range of degrees of consciousness possible. This raises a host of questions about whether or not certain entities are conscious, such as, atoms, bacteria, spiders, dogs, and other humans.

How do you know that consciousness as I experience it is the same as consciousness as you experience it?

I don't.

Presumably you believe that other humans apart from yourself can also be conscious?

Yes, I believe they can be (99%).

Is there a rational source for this belief?

'Rational' to you might be different from 'rational' to me, but my source for my belief is my own thoughts and my own reasoning ability.

Could you perhaps tell us what is the reason for believing that other humans are conscious?

It seems illogical to me that I would be all that different from the other six billion humans, when in all other respects I am quite ordinary. I believe (84%) that that is a rational reason.

There is in fact a very credible explanation for consciousness – consciousness is simply a particular form of information processing (by an agent) which produces (as part of that processing) the entities of virtual “qualia” and virtual “self”. This (imho) is all that consciousness is, and thus is an explanation for consciousness. The details are in Metzinger’s paper.

Here we have a fundamental disagreement, MF. That may seem to be a very credible explanation to you, but I am incredulous. IMHO, consciousness cannot arise from the processing of information (99.8%). This opinion comes from my judgment of the difference between the subjective experience of consciousness that I have and my knowledge of information processing. I am well aware of the possibilities for manipulating information in myriad ways, but I am convinced (99.8) that consciousness cannot arise from the rearranging of bits. The fact that you think otherwise, makes me wonder about how different your conscious experience is from my own. It seems possible to me (32%) that people like yourself, Dennett, and Metzinger might not experience conscious as Lars Laborious, I, and others do. Could that be true?? ... Naaah.

But let's take a closer look at your claim. You parenthetically remark that the information processing must be done by "an agent". Hmmm. Lars and I also claim that there must be an "agent" which has the experience of consciousness. I.e., consciousness can't exist without something being conscious. We each seem to need an agent in order for our respective worlds to make sense.

You claim that the agent is simply the physical machine and its running program. I claim that the agent exists and experiences consciousness outside the physical world and that it interacts with information in the physical world. (Chalmers would classify me as an 'Interactionist dualist', which is OK with me.)

This leaves us with four fundamental problems -- two for each of us: How did that agent come to be? and How does consciousness arise in association with brains?

What we need is not an answer to “how things originate” (because this question is ultimately unanswerable), but instead “how can some things be rationally, coherently and consistently explained in terms of other things”. This is ALL we can ultimately achieve.

I agree that we don't need an answer to "how things originate". And it might be true that the question is ultimately unanswerable. If we take that position, then it let's us both off the hook for the problem of how our respective "agents" came to be. I don't have to explain how the primordial consciousness came to be and you don't have to explain how the physical world came to be.

But that is not satisfying to many of us. We would like to know what was the nature of that first "thing" or "entity" which existed? And if there is some one ontologically fundamental essence underlying everything else, what is it? and what is its nature?

After all, “how can some things be rationally, coherently and consistently explained in terms of other things” unless those "other things" are identified?

So unless you want to skip this challenge and call it a draw, let me pursue it a little by reiterating a question I posed to you a while ago.

In order for X to exist, something -- call it X' -- must be primordial and ontologically fundamental in order to account for the existence of X. (I don't know what you might consider X' to be, but regardless of whether it is a false vacuum, a "true" vacuum, a Higg's Field, a set of laws, a set of principles, an endless stack of turtles, or what, it doesn't matter for the purposes of this argument.)

I have said that my X' is a primordial consciousness. You have not told me what your X' is. When you tell me, we can judge whether or not it makes more sense than the primordial existence of consciousness. (To prepare you, I'll sketch out my argument: If you have consciousness you can get concepts. It makes no sense for concepts to exist in the absence of a mind (a conscious agent).) If your X' is not some sort of concept, what is it?

Moving on to the next problem, of how consciousness arises in living brains, we may be at an impasse. You claim that there is no Hard Problem and that Metzinger has explained how consciousness can arise in certain systems of information processing. I claim that both Chalmers and Penrose have presented convincing arguments showing why that explanation does not work. Metzinger leaves me unconvinced, and apparently Chalmers and Penrose have left you unconvinced. I doubt that either of us, especially I, can go beyond those respective arguments and convince the other to change views. We can certainly talk about it if you want. I would be delighted to do so but I think we should keep our expectations low.

Don’t fool yourself into thinking that you have a coherent and rational theory which would rival the physicalist account unless and until you work these things out rigorously.

Well, if the rivalry is to be decided by popularity, then I certainly won't fool myself. I am an unarmed peasant outside the physicalist castle walls with hordes of credentialed physicalists on the ramparts ready to shoot me down. But, if I may be so bold, I would suggest that the physicalists have no more "rigorous" explanations for either fundamental origins or for the appearance of consciousness in brains than I do.

What evidence do you have for your assertion that “consciousness is outside the physical universe”?

1.If there is only a single consciousness, then it can obviously not be seated in only a single brain (unless it is in mine and the rest of you are all zombies). (98% for the premise, 90% for the conclusion, .05% for the solipsism)
2. The single consciousness must be in a fairly close real-time communication with all living brains. (90%)
3. This proximity can be more easily achieved in multiple, large, extra spatial dimensions, than by being confined to the 4D physical universe. (95%)
4. We know from GR that the 4D space-time continuum is bent, or curved. (90%)
5. We know that at least one extra dimension is required in order to bend or curve a space in the way our space is curved. (You can't bend a string without at least a plane to do it in. You can't bend a sheet of paper without a 3D space in which to do it. (It gets a little more technical, but I won't go into it unless you want to.)) (99%)
6. We know mathematically that a space can be embedded in a space of higher dimensions and still retain all of its properties. (E.g. figures on a sheet of paper may be distorted by bending the paper, but all the 2D relationships within the figures remain unchanged. (Flatlanders residing on the paper couldn't necessarily tell that you bent their paper unless you bent it in a certain way.)) (99%)
7. The extra dimensions provide plenty of space-time, outside our physical 4D space-time for structures and processes that would account for the seat of consciousness. (99%)

Having never observed it myself (at least that I can clearly remember) I can't tell you much of anything about these structures or processes, but I am convinced (98%) that we can mathematically deduce many things about them if we decided to work at it.

[Y]ou ... need to construct a plausible and rational mechanism which shows how consciousness gives rise to and explains everything we know empirically about the physical world. Can you do this? If not, your notion is explanatorily very weak.

Yes, I believe (80%) that I can do this. I'll paraphrase a summary which I have posted before:

Starting with consciousness, one can get mathematics. And with mathematics, one can get Dick's theorem. And with Dick's theorem one can get the laws of physics. And with the laws of physics, some initial numbers, and some sort of processor (like a conscious mind) one can get phenomena that appear every bit as real as the rock Boswell kicked trying to refute Berkeley. It all seems to hang together and make sense to me.

One of those occasions, of beginning processing of some initial numbers according to the laws of physics, was our Big Bang. I believe (90%) that the physicalists have good explanations for everything that has happened in our 4D world ever since with a few exceptions: They don't have an explanation for consciousness, sleep, the Cambrian explosion, or the origin of life. My views don't contradict the physicalist views but instead they extend and augment them.

With respect, I think you should not be surprised that few people take your ideas seriously, unless and until such time as you can work out a rational, coherent and “explanatorily adequate” model based on these ideas. It seems that you’re a long way from this.

I am not surprised. I am interested to know what part of my explanation is not rational or coherent. I admit that I have only offered a sketch of an idea which hardly qualifies as a theory. If you would tell me where the explanation is inadequate, maybe I can fill in the missing pieces, or maybe you could show me why I should abandon some of the ideas and replace them with something better. That would be wonderful.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[moving finger]

Hi Paul

In my opinion (88%), consciousness is not present unless something similar to the conscious experiences that I have is present also.

Question : Why need all consciousness be “similar” to the conscious experience that you have?
What rational reason could one have for saying that something does not qualify as consciousness simply on the basis that it is radically different to one’s own conscious experience?

IMHO, consciousness cannot arise from the processing of information (99.8%). This opinion comes from my judgment of the difference between the subjective experience of consciousness that I have and my knowledge of information processing. I am well aware of the possibilities for manipulating information in myriad ways, but I am convinced (99.8) that consciousness cannot arise from the rearranging of bits.

I understand that you say you are “convinced” that consciousness cannot arise from information processing, but I do not understand why you think this.

The rational reason for rejecting an hypothesis would normally be either because it does not fit with empirical facts, or because it posits some mystical or metaphysical fundamental entity for which there is no empirical evidence (eg the hypothesis that angels push the planets around the sky). Could you perhaps explain what it is exactly about the “information processing explanation of consciousness” hypothesis which you think is inadequate?

You claim that the agent is simply the physical machine and its running program. I claim that the agent exists and experiences consciousness outside the physical world and that it interacts with information in the physical world.

Correct. In my case the “agent doing the information processing” is a real physical entity; but it is not identical with “the sense of conscious self that arises as a consequence of the information processing”, which is a “virtual entity” created through the information processing.
In your case, I guess that the “agent” and “the sense of conscious self” are somehow identical, and neither is a real physical entity? Would this be correct?

This leaves us with four fundamental problems -- two for each of us: How did that agent come to be? and How does consciousness arise in association with brains?

The "agent" problem
In my explanation, the agent is simply the physical entity which carries out the information processing. The agent is your physical body. No need to invoke any additional mystical or metaphysical concepts or ideas. No problem.
In your explanation, the agent is supposed to be something non-physical which nevertheless somehow interacts with the physical world, a la cartesian dualism, but for which we have no empirical evidence that it exists? Problem.

The “consciousness” problem
In my explanation, consciousness is simply a particular form of information processing in an agent, which processing creates within itself “virtual objects” in relation to a “virtual subject”, such that the agent spins an internally consistent story that it is “experiencing” or “perceiving”. We call the virtual objects qualia, and we call the virtual subject “my conscious self”. In respect of consciousness - the brain provides the suitable physical substrate on which this information processing can take place (although in theory such consciousness could arise within any suitably configured artificial intelligence – organic brains are not essential). No need to invoke any additional mystical or metaphysical concepts or ideas. No problem.
In your explanation, it would seem that consciousness is somehow closely associated with the non-physical agent, and like the agent it would still need to interact somehow with the physical world, a la cartesian dualism? Problem.

We would like to know what was the nature of that first "thing" or "entity" which existed? And if there is some one ontologically fundamental essence underlying everything else, what is it? and what is its nature?

All logic is based on assumed premises. All explanations are based on some fundamental assumptions. The premises underlying logic, and the fundamental assumptions underlying explanations, cannot be “proven” true (except in terms of other assumptions). If this is something that one finds that one cannot accept, if one needs to find some “absolute truth in absence of premises” then one is going to be very frustrated.

Even in your own “theory”, you need a fundamental assumption that “consciousness is primordial”. You cannot “show” that this is the case, you need simply to assume this is the case in order to build the rest of your theory.

After all, “how can some things be rationally, coherently and consistently explained in terms of other things” unless those "other things" are identified?

Do you literally mean identified here, or do you mean explained?
To explain X in terms of Y does not entail that I explain Y in terms of anything else.
I can explain electromagnetic emission and absorption of energy in terms of entities I call photons, but such an explanation does not require me to explain “what a photon is”. Nobody has the faintest idea of what a photon “is” or how to explain it, but this does not prevent us from using the concept of photons to explain electromagnetic effects.

All explanation is in terms of concepts and models. We “explain” one concept by invoking other “concepts”, but ultimately we have no fundamental explanation for any of these concepts except in terms of other concepts.

In order for X to exist, something -- call it X' -- must be primordial and ontologically fundamental in order to account for the existence of X.

I disagree. You are assuming there is necessarily something “ontologically fundamental”. This need not be the case.

I have said that my X' is a primordial consciousness.

It is very easy to posit such a thing, it is quite another to construct a rational, consistent and coherent theory which explains how everything else arises from this X’.

(Presumably your “primordial consciousness” has always and always will exist, and is all-pervasive, being everywhere at once and at all times?)

I could (for the sake of argument) say that my X’ is a turtle. But in absence of a worked-out and consistent theory of how a primordial turtle generates everything we see about us, I would not expect anyone to take such an idea seriously.

You have not told me what your X' is.

(a) there need not necessarily be an X’ and (b) even if there is an X’, I do not believe we can ever know what that X’ is.

When you tell me, we can judge whether or not it makes more sense than the primordial existence of consciousness.

With respect, what needs to be “judged” is not the sense or nonsense of a particular notion of primordial existence, but whether this notion leads to a rational, consistent and coherent theory which explains how everything else arises.

If your X' is not some sort of concept, what is it?

(a) there need not necessarily be an X’ and (b) even if there is an X’, I do not believe we can ever know what that X’ is.

You claim that there is no Hard Problem and that Metzinger has explained how consciousness can arise in certain systems of information processing. I claim that both Chalmers and Penrose have presented convincing arguments showing why that explanation does not work. Metzinger leaves me unconvinced, and apparently Chalmers and Penrose have left you unconvinced. I doubt that either of us, especially I, can go beyond those respective arguments and convince the other to change views. We can certainly talk about it if you want. I would be delighted to do so but I think we should keep our expectations low.

I would love for someone to tell me just what they think the Hard Problem is.
I’m a great believer in the scientific method. One proposes an hypothesis to fit the facts, runs it up the flagpole, and others then try to shoot it down by showing how it does not fit the facts. This is a great tried-and-tested approach.

Metzinger has proposed an hypothesis to explain how consciousness arises. You have suggested that there are “convincing arguments” showing why the hypothesis is incorrect. Perhaps we should start there. What are these “convincing arguments”?.

I would suggest that the physicalists have no more "rigorous" explanations for either fundamental origins or for the appearance of consciousness in brains than I do.

I don’t think many physicalists would claim to have any explanations for “fundamental origins” (see above). As to explanations for the appearance of consciousness, that’s why we’re discussing the Metzinger account isn’t it?

1.If there is only a single consciousness, then it can obviously not be seated in only a single brain (unless it is in mine and the rest of you are all zombies). (98% for the premise, 90% for the conclusion, .05% for the solipsism)
2. The single consciousness must be in a fairly close real-time communication with all living brains. (90%)
3. This proximity can be more easily achieved in multiple, large, extra spatial dimensions, than by being confined to the 4D physical universe. (95%)
4. We know from GR that the 4D space-time continuum is bent, or curved. (90%)
5. We know that at least one extra dimension is required in order to bend or curve a space in the way our space is curved. (You can't bend a string without at least a plane to do it in. You can't bend a sheet of paper without a 3D space in which to do it. (It gets a little more technical, but I won't go into it unless you want to.)) (99%)
6. We know mathematically that a space can be embedded in a space of higher dimensions and still retain all of its properties. (E.g. figures on a sheet of paper may be distorted by bending the paper, but all the 2D relationships within the figures remain unchanged. (Flatlanders residing on the paper couldn't necessarily tell that you bent their paper unless you bent it in a certain way.)) (99%)
7. The extra dimensions provide plenty of space-time, outside our physical 4D space-time for structures and processes that would account for the seat of consciousness. (99%)

Thus, your assertion that “consciousness is outside the physical universe” rests purely on your premise that there is only a single consciousness, which premise is disputed. With respect, this hardly qualifies as “evidence” that “consciousness is outside the physical universe”.

Starting with consciousness, one can get mathematics.

How? What are the necessary properties of your “primordial consciousness”, how does it manifest itself in absence of an organic brain (if it can manifest itself at all), and does it produce mathematics in the absence of a brain?

And with mathematics, one can get Dick's theorem. And with Dick's theorem one can get the laws of physics. And with the laws of physics, some initial numbers, and some sort of processor (like a conscious mind) one can get phenomena that appear every bit as real as the rock Boswell kicked trying to refute Berkeley. It all seems to hang together and make sense to me.

Are you suggesting that under your theory the physical world is not “real”, that the physical world is all just an illusion within primordial consciousness? (your comment “one can get phenomena that appear every bit as real as the rock”)?

They don't have an explanation for consciousness, sleep, the Cambrian explosion, or the origin of life. My views don't contradict the physicalist views but instead they extend and augment them.

I disagree. I think you will find that there are physicalist explanations for these things (it’s just that you don’t accept them).

See, for example : http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio.NC/0512026

Best Regards

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

Why need all consciousness be “similar” to the conscious experience that you have?

I am interested in understanding the consciousness that I experience. To the extent that others experience something "similar" to my own experience, I am interested in their experiences as well -- their reports might contribute to my understanding. If they experience something completely different from my own, that might be interesting to me as well, but it wouldn't help me understand my own experience. Thus, for the purpose of understanding my own consciousness I only consider conscious experiences that are similar to my own.

What rational reason could one have for saying that something does not qualify as consciousness simply on the basis that it is radically different to one’s own conscious experience?

As is the custom in mathematics, I feel completely free to define any terms I use in any way I like. I realize that if I define them differently than other people typically do, it will tend to confuse my readers, so I try not do that. But in cases where vernacular usage is typically ambiguous or ill-defined, then I think it helps communication if I am careful about my definitions. Thus, I think it is completely rational for me to define 'consciousness', for the purposes of my exposition, to be an experience similar to the one that I have. If you want to discuss some other type of consciousness, please feel free to define what you mean and we can talk about that too.

Could you perhaps explain what it is exactly about the “information processing explanation of consciousness” hypothesis which you think is inadequate?

I'll try. (It's the "exactly" part of your request that will make it difficult.)
1. I have been fascinated by my own conscious experience since my early childhood. I have done a lot of thinking since then about the nature of that experience. When I was a teen-ager, I read a book titled "Mechanical Man" by Dean Wooldridge (of Bunker-Ramo-Wooldridge, later TRW). The thesis of the book was that the trend of scientific discoveries concerning life was converging on a final explanation of life that would be completely physical. I remember feeling challenged by this thesis as I read the book and in my mind I was convinced that science would be able to explain everything except consciousness. Sure enough, he delayed any discussion of consciousness until the very end of the book, where he admitted that science couldn't yet explain consciousness, but the trend shows that it is only a matter of time before they will. I was unconvinced reading that prediction, and I remain unconvinced to this day. (I still remember the last sentence of that book: "A man who knows he is a machine should be able to bring more objectivity to bear on his problems than a machine that thinks it is a man." I disagree with both the premise and the conclusion of this statement. I would say, "A man who knows he is driven by some higher transcendent consciousness should be able to bring more meaningful solutions to bear on his problems than a man who acts as if he were a mere machine.")

Later, as I completed a long career working with large-scale computers, and having a project in mind, and partially underway for most of that time, of building a robot (actually an android that looks like me) which would be able to pass the Turing test, I gave the question of machine intelligence considerable thought. With that background, in my judgment, I am convinced that it is not possible for a machine (computer or brain) to achieve conscious experience by itself.

In my opinion, the only way to achieve it is vicariously. That is, if the machine is coupled to a truly conscious entity through some communication link which allows the conscious entity to perceive information originating in the machine, and which also allows intentional command information from the conscious entity to control the actions of the machine, then, and only then, the machine could appear to be conscious. Thus a backhoe might look conscious to a Martian, and human bodies seem to be conscious to each other, but in reality, they are both "driven" by a real conscious agent that is not part of the machine or body. That is, more or less, the explanation from my own personal experience and analysis related to the question.

2. I think Roger Penrose presented a logical and compelling case against the possibility of machine consciousness in "The Emperor's New Mind". I have not heard a convincing argument against it. I am surprised that you seem to hold Penrose in disdain. He is one of my heroes. I devoured his "The Road to Reality". (You can read the notes I made while reading it at http://paulandellen.com/ideas/notes/bn036.htm )

3. I think David Chalmers presented a different logical and compelling case in "The Conscious Mind". I know you were not convinced by his case, but I was. I remained convinced after buying ($$$!) and reading Jonathan Shear's "Explaining Consciousness -- The Hard Problem" which consisted of challenges by a couple dozen detractors of Chalmers. These included Dennett, Churchland, McGinn, and many others -- but unfortunately not Metzinger. (You can read the notes I made while reading "The Conscious Mind". at http://paulandellen.com/ideas/notes/bn026.htm )

The rational reason for rejecting an hypothesis would normally be either because it does not fit with empirical facts, or because it posits some mystical or metaphysical fundamental entity for which there is no empirical evidence (eg the hypothesis that angels push the planets around the sky).

I believe (98%) that my hypothesis fits with all empirical facts. Can you tell me one which doesn't fit? I also believe that the transcendental entity it posits, the primordial consciousness, exhibits plenty of empirical evidence. It appears as the driver and "knower" of all animals.

In your case, I guess that the “agent” and “the sense of conscious self” are somehow identical, and neither is a real physical entity? Would this be correct?

No, not quite. Yes, the "agent" is not a physical entity. But "the sense of conscious self" makes no sense to me as an entity. You will have to define it for me so that it makes sense before I could comment on what it is or how it relates to my "agent". In my view, the "agent" has, or is, the ability to know. Thus, the agent can know that it knows, for example, in which case you might say that it "has a sense of knowing". That might be what you mean, but I am not sure. You'll have to clarify for me.

In my explanation, the agent is simply the physical entity which carries out the information processing. The agent is your physical body. No need to invoke any additional mystical or metaphysical concepts or ideas. No problem.

No problem if you take that body, or that physical universe as a given. Sounds very "Creationist" to me. I'm saying that if you trace the evolution of the body backward, you eventually arrive at a few femtoseconds after the Big Bang. That's where I want you to begin answering questions. How did that happen!? for heaven's sake. That is where I believe my hypothesis gives a reasonable answer and the physicalists are left with nothing but a mystery they would rather dodge.

In your explanation, the agent is supposed to be something non-physical which nevertheless somehow interacts with the physical world, a la cartesian dualism, but for which we have no empirical evidence that it exists? Problem.

Problem? What problem? The agent is "the ability to know", which we (at least I) know very well to exist by the most direct of experiences. I have explained how being non-physical is perfectly understandable as long as we define 'physical' to mean of our 4D space-time continuum. Of course if you extend the definition of physicality (which I recommend that scientists do, but they won't) to include hyperdimensions of space and time, then, of course everything would be physical.

As for interaction, I have sketched what I think is an adequate explanation in the absence of experimental evidence which would firm up the details. In principle, there should be no problem accepting the possibility of the same sort of mechanism as EM radiation except that instead of being confined to our 4D manifold, it would operate in higher dimensions with some of its effects manifesting in the 4D manifold. If this is too sketchy, let me know and I will elaborate. As for empirical evidence, I claim that the behavior of every animal on Earth is evidence.

The “consciousness” problem No need to invoke any additional mystical or metaphysical concepts or ideas. No problem.

Yes, Virginia, there is a problem. It is The Hard Problem. I think that in this discussion we can't go beyond the work of Metzinger, Chalmers, and Penrose, to name three. We disagree on the veracity of their respective conclusions and unless you can think of some other way out, I think we will have to leave it in that disagreeable state.

In your explanation, it would seem that consciousness is somehow closely associated with the non-physical agent, and like the agent it would still need to interact somehow with the physical world, a la cartesian dualism? Problem.

Yes. That's a fair summary of my position. But except for the dreaded and scorned "dualism" label, what problem remains that I haven't addressed?

Even in your own “theory”, you need a fundamental assumption that “consciousness is primordial”. You cannot “show” that this is the case, you need simply to assume this is the case in order to build the rest of your theory.

Yes, I make that assumption. And, yes, I cannot "show" that this is the case, but I am in no different situation than you are. "Even in your own “theory”, you need a fundamental assumption that “[something] is primordial”. You cannot “show” that this is the case, [and you haven't yet even had the temerity to tell me what that "something" is,] you need simply to assume this is the case in order to build the rest of your theory. I have told you what I think is the primordial essence of reality and you attack my position. Please tell me what you think the primordial essence of reality is so that I might see if it needs attacking, or whether I could replace my idea with yours.

Do you literally mean identified here, or do you mean explained?

Yes, I literally meant 'identified'. First things first. What is your X' (or your Y in your example)?

To explain X in terms of Y does not entail that I explain Y in terms of anything else.

Agreed. You merely need to identify, or at least name, Y.

I can explain electromagnetic emission and absorption of energy in terms of entities I call photons, but such an explanation does not require me to explain “what a photon is”. Nobody has the faintest idea of what a photon “is” or how to explain it, but this does not prevent us from using the concept of photons to explain electromagnetic effects.

You are very close to making my point here. Nobody has much of an idea what consciousness is or how to explain it, but that should not prevent us from using the concept of consciousness to explain all other physical effects, which I have sketched out how to do. You might say the details are incomplete, but I don't see how you can argue that the approach is not sound in principle.

All explanation is in terms of concepts and models. We “explain” one concept by invoking other “concepts”, but ultimately we have no fundamental explanation for any of these concepts except in terms of other concepts.

AHA! Now you are really getting close to proving my case. I agree completely with what you said here. But step back one step and notice that everything you said here depends on concepts. And what are concepts?? The are artifacts (or artefacts, or products) of some mind or some kind of mental capability. Without having any fundamental explanation for this "mind" or "mental capability", except to relate it to familiar mental phenomena which we humans seem to experience, we should be at liberty to use some symbol, say 'primordial consciousness', or 'the ability to know', or 'Y', to refer to this mind or mental capability which is a necessary precursor to having any concepts at all. Without such an entity, you can't have any explanations, concepts, or models at all. And, in my opinion, you can't have any "things" either. The obvious logical conclusion is that some kind of mind or consciousness must be primordial and ontologically fundamental.

I disagree. You are assuming there is necessarily something “ontologically fundamental”. This need not be the case.

OK. You got me there. You have successfully helped me argue and conclude that something like a mind must be primordial. But you are right that this does not entail that it must also be ontologically fundamental. I withdraw that assertion. That does not change the thrust of the argument so far because it was the "first cause" type of entity that we are talking about. What exactly the substrate is made of is a different -- and in my view a much more complex -- problem.

(more to follow)
Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

Why need all consciousness be “similar” to the conscious experience that you have?

I am interested in understanding the consciousness that I experience. To the extent that others experience something "similar" to my own experience, I am interested in their experiences as well -- their reports might contribute to my understanding. If they experience something completely different from my own, that might be interesting to me as well, but it wouldn't help me understand my own experience. Thus, for the purpose of understanding my own consciousness I only consider conscious experiences that are similar to my own.

What rational reason could one have for saying that something does not qualify as consciousness simply on the basis that it is radically different to one’s own conscious experience?

As is the custom in mathematics, I feel completely free to define any terms I use in any way I like. I realize that if I define them differently than other people typically do, it will tend to confuse my readers, so I try not do that. But in cases where vernacular usage is typically ambiguous or ill-defined, then I think it helps communication if I am careful about my definitions. Thus, I think it is completely rational for me to define 'consciousness', for the purposes of my exposition, to be an experience similar to the one that I have. If you want to discuss some other type of consciousness, please feel free to define what you mean and we can talk about that too.

Could you perhaps explain what it is exactly about the “information processing explanation of consciousness” hypothesis which you think is inadequate?

I'll try. (It's the "exactly" part of your request that will make it difficult.)
1. I have been fascinated by my own conscious experience since my early childhood. I have done a lot of thinking since then about the nature of that experience. When I was a teen-ager, I read a book titled "Mechanical Man" by Dean Wooldridge (of Bunker-Ramo-Wooldridge, later TRW). The thesis of the book was that the trend of scientific discoveries concerning life was converging on a final explanation of life that would be completely physical. I remember feeling challenged by this thesis as I read the book and in my mind I was convinced that science would be able to explain everything except consciousness. Sure enough, he delayed any discussion of consciousness until the very end of the book, where he admitted that science couldn't yet explain consciousness, but the trend shows that it is only a matter of time before they will. I was unconvinced reading that prediction, and I remain unconvinced to this day. (I still remember the last sentence of that book: "A man who knows he is a machine should be able to bring more objectivity to bear on his problems than a machine that thinks it is a man." I disagree with both the premise and the conclusion of this statement. I would say, "A man who knows he is driven by some higher transcendent consciousness should be able to bring more meaningful solutions to bear on his problems than a man who acts as if he were a mere machine.")

Later, as I completed a long career working with large-scale computers, and having a project in mind, and partially underway for most of that time, of building a robot (actually an android that looks like me) which would be able to pass the Turing test, I gave the question of machine intelligence considerable thought. With that background, in my judgment, I am convinced that it is not possible for a machine (computer or brain) to achieve conscious experience by itself.

In my opinion, the only way to achieve it is vicariously. That is, if the machine is coupled to a truly conscious entity through some communication link which allows the conscious entity to perceive information originating in the machine, and which also allows intentional command information from the conscious entity to control the actions of the machine, then, and only then, the machine could appear to be conscious. Thus a backhoe might look conscious to a Martian, and human bodies seem to be conscious to each other, but in reality, they are both "driven" by a real conscious agent that is not part of the machine or body. That is, more or less, the explanation from my own personal experience and analysis related to the question.

2. I think Roger Penrose presented a logical and compelling case against the possibility of machine consciousness in "The Emperor's New Mind". I have not heard a convincing argument against it. I am surprised that you seem to hold Penrose in disdain. He is one of my heroes. I devoured his "The Road to Reality". (You can read the notes I made while reading it at http://paulandellen.com/ideas/notes/bn036.htm )

3. I think David Chalmers presented a different logical and compelling case in "The Conscious Mind". I know you were not convinced by his case, but I was. I remained convinced after buying ($$$!) and reading Jonathan Shear's "Explaining Consciousness -- The Hard Problem" which consisted of challenges by a couple dozen detractors of Chalmers. These included Dennett, Churchland, McGinn, and many others -- but unfortunately not Metzinger. (You can read the notes I made while reading "The Conscious Mind". at http://paulandellen.com/ideas/notes/bn026.htm )

The rational reason for rejecting an hypothesis would normally be either because it does not fit with empirical facts, or because it posits some mystical or metaphysical fundamental entity for which there is no empirical evidence (eg the hypothesis that angels push the planets around the sky).

I believe (98%) that my hypothesis fits with all empirical facts. Can you tell me one which doesn't fit? I also believe that the transcendental entity it posits, the primordial consciousness, exhibits plenty of empirical evidence. It appears as the driver and "knower" of all animals.

In your case, I guess that the “agent” and “the sense of conscious self” are somehow identical, and neither is a real physical entity? Would this be correct?

No, not quite. Yes, the "agent" is not a physical entity. But "the sense of conscious self" makes no sense to me as an entity. You will have to define it for me so that it makes sense before I could comment on what it is or how it relates to my "agent". In my view, the "agent" has, or is, the ability to know. Thus, the agent can know that it knows, for example, in which case you might say that it "has a sense of knowing". That might be what you mean, but I am not sure. You'll have to clarify for me.

In my explanation, the agent is simply the physical entity which carries out the information processing. The agent is your physical body. No need to invoke any additional mystical or metaphysical concepts or ideas. No problem.

No problem if you take that body, or that physical universe as a given. Sounds very "Creationist" to me. I'm saying that if you trace the evolution of the body backward, you eventually arrive at a few femtoseconds after the Big Bang. That's where I want you to begin answering questions. How did that happen!? for heaven's sake. That is where I believe my hypothesis gives a reasonable answer and the physicalists are left with nothing but a mystery they would rather dodge.

In your explanation, the agent is supposed to be something non-physical which nevertheless somehow interacts with the physical world, a la cartesian dualism, but for which we have no empirical evidence that it exists? Problem.

Problem? What problem? The agent is "the ability to know", which we (at least I) know very well to exist by the most direct of experiences. I have explained how being non-physical is perfectly understandable as long as we define 'physical' to mean of our 4D space-time continuum. Of course if you extend the definition of physicality (which I recommend that scientists do, but they won't) to include hyperdimensions of space and time, then, of course everything would be physical.

As for interaction, I have sketched what I think is an adequate explanation in the absence of experimental evidence which would firm up the details. In principle, there should be no problem accepting the possibility of the same sort of mechanism as EM radiation except that instead of being confined to our 4D manifold, it would operate in higher dimensions with some of its effects manifesting in the 4D manifold. If this is too sketchy, let me know and I will elaborate. As for empirical evidence, I claim that the behavior of every animal on Earth is evidence.

The “consciousness” problem No need to invoke any additional mystical or metaphysical concepts or ideas. No problem.

Yes, Virginia, there is a problem. It is The Hard Problem. I think that in this discussion we can't go beyond the work of Metzinger, Chalmers, and Penrose, to name three. We disagree on the veracity of their respective conclusions and unless you can think of some other way out, I think we will have to leave it in that disagreeable state.

In your explanation, it would seem that consciousness is somehow closely associated with the non-physical agent, and like the agent it would still need to interact somehow with the physical world, a la cartesian dualism? Problem.

Yes. That's a fair summary of my position. But except for the dreaded and scorned "dualism" label, what problem remains that I haven't addressed?

Even in your own “theory”, you need a fundamental assumption that “consciousness is primordial”. You cannot “show” that this is the case, you need simply to assume this is the case in order to build the rest of your theory.

Yes, I make that assumption. And, yes, I cannot "show" that this is the case, but I am in no different situation than you are. "Even in your own “theory”, you need a fundamental assumption that “[something] is primordial”. You cannot “show” that this is the case, [and you haven't yet even had the temerity to tell me what that "something" is,] you need simply to assume this is the case in order to build the rest of your theory."

I have told you what I think is the primordial essence of reality and you attack my position. Please tell me what you think the primordial essence of reality is so that I might see if it needs attacking, or whether I could replace my idea with yours.

Do you literally mean identified here, or do you mean explained?

Yes, I literally meant 'identified'. First things first. What is your X' (or your Y in your example)?

To explain X in terms of Y does not entail that I explain Y in terms of anything else.

Agreed. You merely need to identify, or at least name, Y.

I can explain electromagnetic emission and absorption of energy in terms of entities I call photons, but such an explanation does not require me to explain “what a photon is”. Nobody has the faintest idea of what a photon “is” or how to explain it, but this does not prevent us from using the concept of photons to explain electromagnetic effects.

You are very close to making my point here. Nobody has much of an idea what consciousness is or how to explain it, but that should not prevent us from using the concept of consciousness to explain all other physical effects, which I have sketched out how to do. You might say the details are incomplete, but I don't see how you can argue that the approach is not sound in principle.

All explanation is in terms of concepts and models. We “explain” one concept by invoking other “concepts”, but ultimately we have no fundamental explanation for any of these concepts except in terms of other concepts.

AHA! Now you are really getting close to proving my case. I agree completely with what you said here. But step back one step and notice that everything you said here depends on concepts. And what are concepts?? The are artifacts (or artefacts, or products) of some mind or some kind of mental capability. Without having any fundamental explanation for this "mind" or "mental capability", except to relate it to familiar mental phenomena which we humans seem to experience, we should be at liberty to use some symbol, say 'primordial consciousness', or 'the ability to know', or 'Y', to refer to this mind or mental capability which is a necessary precursor to having any concepts at all. Without such an entity, you can't have any explanations, concepts, or models at all. And, in my opinion, you can't have any "things" either. The obvious logical conclusion is that some kind of mind or consciousness must be primordial and ontologically fundamental.

I disagree. You are assuming there is necessarily something “ontologically fundamental”. This need not be the case.

OK. You got me there. You have successfully helped me argue and conclude that something like a mind must be primordial. But you are right that this does not entail that it must also be ontologically fundamental. I withdraw that assertion. That does not change the thrust of the argument so far because it was the "first cause" type of entity that we are talking about. What exactly the substrate is made of is a different -- and in my view a much more complex -- problem.

(More to follow)

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

It is very easy to posit such a thing, it is quite another to construct a rational, consistent and coherent theory which explains how everything else arises from this X’.

Indeed it is, and indeed it is. I don't claim to have constructed a theory at all. I have only sketched out a plan which I think is a rational, consistent, and coherent explanation for how all physicality can be constructed from a primordial consciousness. I hope that some bright young graduate students will work out the details of exactly how it works. In the meantime, what part of my sketch do you consider irrational? inconsistent? or incoherent?

(Presumably your “primordial consciousness” has always and always will exist, and is all-pervasive, being everywhere at once and at all times?)

Here I think we need to be careful. The question of whether it always existed or simply sprang into existence from nothing is the same mystery facing each and every and all and any other theories, explanations, or stories about how reality got started. It gives me and my hypothesis no more trouble than it does to all other competing hypotheses.

As for "all-pervasive", "being everywhere", and "at all times", I insist that we don't jump to the conclusion that the primordial consciousness is complete, perfect, infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, or omnibenevolent. I believe (99%) that none of those apply. This means that except as the first cause of everything and its transcendence, the primordial conscioiusness, and what it has evolved to so far, is nothing whatsoever like the God of any religion on Earth and it should not be construed, interpreted, or represented as such. (Depending on the definition, I will grant omnipresence, however.)

Going down a notch in the details, I see the relationship between the primordial (by now evolved to "cosmic") consciousness and the physical world to be something like this: The relationship to inanimate material structures (galaxies, cars, marbles) to be as Newton described the mechanical universe: no direct interaction, the behavior of the physical entities to be determined by the pure unitary evolution of QM. The relationship to animals, however is interactionist, as I have described previously, but in a bigger picture, which includes the higher dimensions, which I also described previously, the relationship is along the lines of the hierarchy of Natural Individuals as described by Gregg Rosenberg in his "A Place for Consciousness". Each typical (i.e. except for the very top and the very bottom) individual in the hierarchy is driven as a remote controlled device by a Natural Individual at the next higher level in the hierarchy, and it in turn can drive remote controlled devices at the next lower level of the hierarchy. In this way, it is only the One Natural Individual at the very top of the hierarchy that actually is conscious. The rest are only vicariously conscious as I tried to explain with my JPL rover analogy.

So in this complex picture, you can make what you will of the question of whether the primordial consciousness "is all-pervasive, being everywhere at once and at all times". That's probably more than you wanted to hear, but let me know if it is not and you want more.

I could (for the sake of argument) say that my X’ is a turtle. But in absence of a worked-out and consistent theory of how a primordial turtle generates everything we see about us, I would not expect anyone to take such an idea seriously.

Neither would I. There are myriad examples of dependencies on physical structures for the existence of a turtle. The existence of a turtle in the absence of physicality seems unimaginable, unless it resided in some reality apart from our physical 4D continuum, in which case it probably wouldn't resemble any turtle you or I know. Even at that, it doesn't seem that a hyperdimensional turtle would be a believable candidate for the designer of our 4D physicality, although I suppose it could happen.

By contrast, no one can show any proof that consciousness can't exist outside of the brain. Moreover, some NDE and OBE reports indicate that indeed it can. As for how a consciousness can generate everything we see about us, I have been through that enough times already. I am awaiting your response telling me where it doesn't make sense.

(a) there need not necessarily be an X’

Then give me at least a sketch of the bootstrap process generating something from nothing.

even if there is an X’, I do not believe we can ever know what that X’ is.

I understand your belief. But would you allow us to guess at what it might be and from that guess, try to deduce a possible explanation for everything else? That's all I'm trying to do.

Metzinger has proposed an hypothesis to explain how consciousness arises. You have suggested that there are “convincing arguments” showing why the hypothesis is incorrect. Perhaps we should start there. What are these “convincing arguments”?.

I hope the three I listed near the beginning of this post will answer your question. Number 1 is convincing to me. Numbers 2 and 3 supported my prior conviction and they may be what you are looking for. I am sure that my personal experience will not convince you, but I think a careful reading of Penrose or Chalmers might. If they don't, I'm afraid we will have to remain in disagreement.

Thus, your assertion that “consciousness is outside the physical universe” rests purely on your premise that there is only a single consciousness, which premise is disputed. With respect, this hardly qualifies as “evidence” that “consciousness is outside the physical universe”.

No. You have changed the context. My list of 7 pieces of evidence was in response to your question, "What evidence do you have for your assertion that “consciousness is outside the physical universe”?" It is true that the first two depend on the premise of a single consciousness, but the other five are independent of that premise. Once before, in another thread, you asked me for my reasons for accepting the premise of a single consciousness. I told you my reasons then, and I think I referred you to a lengthy thread I started titled "Implications of a Single Consciousness" in which I solicited counter arguments for my premise and received none which I considered substantial.

We can revisit that premise again, but in answering your question here, I thought you already understood my position. Here I was only addressing the question of consciousness residing outside the 4D physical universe.

How [can one get mathematics from consciousness]?

Indeed, how else?? Think of Stephen Hawking. What does he use besides his consciousness? Consciousness produces mathematics by thinking about primitives, axioms, and logical consequences. More is required to record and communicate mathematical results, but this is apart from, and after, the mathematics has been produced. As for whether or not consciousness requires a body and brain to support it is a contentious issue on which you and I disagree. That too, is separate from the fact that consciousness can and does produce mathematics.

What are the necessary properties of your “primordial consciousness”

Good question. I don't know the answer, but I think it is within our reach to figure it out. My initial guess, as you know, is that the ability to know might be both necessary and sufficient.

how does it manifest itself in absence of an organic brain (if it can manifest itself at all)

Here you are dragging me into pure speculation -- but you asked. I think it can, and does, manifest itself in many different Natural Individuals at all levels of the hierarchy I outlined above. Human brains are at a bottom level of that hierarchy except for things like Mars rovers, backhoes, and virtual reality games which could be considered to make up a new level below than humans. That is if you want to imbue consciousness in those lower-level entities, which they seem to exhibit.

Are you suggesting that under your theory the physical world is not “real”, that the physical world is all just an illusion within primordial consciousness?

Yes, that's exactly what I am suggesting. Of course, it is practical to define the word 'real' to include structures in the physical world so it becomes a semantic question. Incidentally, I think this same thing comes into play when we try to label ideas as "dualistic". We can, using Robert Persig's image of Phaedrus' Knife, categorize ideas in many different ways. In examining my ideas to determine if they are "dualistic" or not, I could say that, no, I am a monadist and the only thing that exists is that consciousness. But then, you might say, what about the thoughts of that consciousness? Aren't they different from the consciousness itself? OK, I would say, I guess I am a dualist after all. Then Penrose would interrupt and say, wait a minute, what about the Ideal World containing the complete Mandelbrot Set and Platos other ideals? Do you deny that they at least have some sort of existence? Well, OK Roger, I guess I am a treblist after all. Unless...maybe those Ideals only exist in one or both of those other worlds. Maybe Ideals only exist in minds and in coded physical symbols. If these coded symbols included algorithms, then the complete M'set could exist only in the mental and physical worlds. But then, to continue this line of reasoning, if the physical world is nothing but ideas in the mental world, as Berkeley said, then I am back to being a monist after all. 'Real' is whatever you define it to be for your purposes. Just let me know what you mean when you talk to me about it.

I just don't know what the value of such categorization is except to form membership criteria for exclusive clubs. I am content to express my ideas as best as I can and let others decide how to categorize me -- unless, of course, those others have the power to burn me at the stake.

I disagree. I think you will find that there are physicalist explanations for these things[, consciousness, sleep, the Cambrian explosion, or the origin of life,] (it’s just that you don’t accept them).

I don't accept them because I don't find them convincing.

See, for example : http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio.NC/0512026

I'm already late getting ready to leave town so I won't have time to check this out until I get back. Thanks in advance. I'll take a look.

As always, it has been great talking with you, MF. I'm looking forward to more.

Warm regards to all, especially those who have read this far.

Paul

 

[moving finger]

good grief, Paul, you must have been burning the midnight oil!

It will take me some time to read and digest all of the above, I'll try to fit it in with all the other demands on my time but please accept my apology in advance if it takes me a while to get back to you on this!

Best Regards

 

[octelcogopod]

Paul if I may, I have a couple of questions about this primordial consciousness..

First off, what IS this fundamental consciousness?
Is it made of anything?
Can we empirically measure and predict it in any way?
Is it the direct opposite of the physical world? (Or at least, something that contrasts it sort of)

It seems to me that both of your theories end in the same fundamental problem; "what is existence made of."
For lack of a better word at this time, please excuse me.
Like I said earlier, and I hope people don't hate me for it, but it seems to me that all discussion on anything ends up in one problem; the problem of what is the original, most fundamental and non infinite regressive piece of building block.

Pauls arguments make sense, but they don't really explain much because we haven't really defined consciousness, nor have we any kind of idea on how to grasp what this primordial consciousness is.

Same with moving-finger, he has his x', which we are unable to explain at this time.

I just don't know, but it seems like no matter how you attack this problem, we end up realizing that what is missing is that piece of knowledge, that knowledge progresses philosophy, not vice versa.

 

[moving finger]

Hello Paul

Hope you are well. Let me just say that I enjoy exchanging ideas with you. You make me think, which is always good, and your arguments tend to be rational and unemotional (for the most part). I appreciate that. Thank you.

Since your previous posts were rather long, I need to split my reply into two posts.

Here is part 1.

for the purpose of understanding my own consciousness I only consider conscious experiences that are similar to my own.

This seems a rather “blinkered” way to try and understand fundamental truth?

Isn’t it rather like the old joke of the policeman who sees a drunk stumbling about under a lamp-post at night? The policeman approaches the drunk and asks him what he is doing. The drunk says that he dropped his keys, and he is looking for them. “Did you drop your keys around here?” asks the policeman, pointing towards the lamp-post. “No” answers the drunk, “but the light is better here”.

I think it is completely rational for me to define 'consciousness', for the purposes of my exposition, to be an experience similar to the one that I have. If you want to discuss some other type of consciousness, please feel free to define what you mean and we can talk about that too.

Defining consciousness simply as “an experience similar to what I have” I suggest is inadequate as either a good philosophical or a good scientific operational definition (but it would fit well with Penrose-type notions of consciousness – see below). If we use such a definition there is no way that you and I, for example, can enter into a meaningful objective dialogue on the issue because I have no idea what your experience is actually like.

I would define consciousness as the ability of an agent to form a consistent and coherent internal representational model based on information from the external world, which model is temporally connected with the external world, and through which model the agent creates a centre of narrative gravity (an idea of “self”), to which it relates information from the external world. Would you agree?
If not, why not?
Would you care to present an alternative (objective) operational definition?

Could you perhaps explain what it is exactly about the “information processing explanation of consciousness” hypothesis which you think is inadequate?

I'll try. (It's the "exactly" part of your request that will make it difficult.)
1. I have been fascinated by my own conscious experience since my early childhood. I have done a lot of thinking since then about the nature of that experience.

As I think many of us do. But with respect this is not an explanation of why you think the hypothesis inadequate.

2. When I was a teen-ager, I read a book titled "Mechanical Man" ……I was unconvinced reading that prediction, and I remain unconvinced to this day.

OK, but still you don’t say why you are unconvinced. This is not an explanation of why you think the hypothesis inadequate.

Later, as I completed a long career working with large-scale computers, ……..I am convinced that it is not possible for a machine (computer or brain) to achieve conscious experience by itself.

I understand that you are convinced that this is not possible, but still you do not say why you are convinced. This is not an explanation of why you think the hypothesis inadequate.

Paul - If we are to make any progress in this discussion, it is not enough for you to say simply “I do not believe it” or “I am not convinced” in response to an hypothesis (such as Metzinger’s explanation of consciousness). You need to say why you don’t believe it, why you are not convinced. There need to be rational and coherent reasons provided for rejecting an hypothesis if we are to have a meaningful discussion.

In my opinion, the only way to achieve it is vicariously……. That is, more or less, the explanation from my own personal experience and analysis related to the question.

Opinion is fine, but it doesn’t count for much in a rational debate unless it is supported by logical argument or empirical evidence.
Thus, you believe that even human brains alone cannot “generate” consciousness? There is this primordial consciousness already in existence, which for some reason seems to like to infest otherwise unconscious objects such as human brains? Is this correct?
Do we have any empirical evidence for the existence of such primordial consciousness except in the form of human brain infestations?
If not, why not?

2. I think Roger Penrose presented a logical and compelling case against the possibility of machine consciousness in "The Emperor's New Mind". I have not heard a convincing argument against it. I am surprised that you seem to hold Penrose in disdain. He is one of my heroes. I devoured his "The Road to Reality". (You can read the notes I made while reading it at http://paulandellen.com/ideas/notes/bn036.htm )

Don’t start me on Penrose!

I have most of Penrose’s popular science books, including the ones you refer to. He is a great mathematician, but imho a very poor philosopher. He seems to be subjectively but irrationally biased against the notion that machines can be conscious. His “Turing machine” or “Godel” arguments (if these are the arguments you are referring to) are not arguments which show that machines cannot be conscious (though he seems to think they are). Just to give you one example of his naive philosophical thinking : In one of his books he confuses a simple 2-dimensional image with a self-referential model, and asks (in all sincerity it seems) ‘why is a camera not conscious?’.

In the Emperor’s New Mind (ENM), Penrose is unwilling to define consciousness. He is vague, he uses phrases such as ‘it is hard to be precise’, ‘I do not think it wise…..to propose a precise definition of consciousness’, ‘I more or less know when I am conscious….’. He relates consciousness to non-algorithmic judgments, and gets tangled up in ascribing consciousness to a non-algorithmic process, which is nevertheless (he contends) not just a lucky guess. In ENM, Penrose seems to get stuck in the naïve “cartesian theatre” illusion, claiming things such as “perhaps consciousness is merely a spectator who experiences an action replay”.

Penrose relies on ambiguity and confusion in meanings. He uses terms like “understanding”, “intelligence”, “awareness” throughout his book “Shadows of the Mind”, but point-blank refuses to define these concepts, on the basis that ‘to attempt to define the term…..would put us in danger of allowing to slip away the very concept that we wish to ensnare’. IMHO the only ‘danger’ for Penrose is that the proper definition of these terms will show that there is nothing mystical about them after all. He says ‘we must rely upon our intuitive comprehension of its meaning’ – and this from a mathematician. This kind of philosophy sounds more mystical than rational. If you wish to read a good, rational and unemotional counter-argument (one which demolishes Penrose’s ideas) then I recommend Moravec’s “Robot : Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind”.

If you believe that Penrose does present a single rational and coherent argument which shows that machines cannot possesses consciousness then I would be happy to discuss it. Could you present such an argument?

(please don’t just refer me to other websites etc; I would like to actually discuss the issue in this thread).

3. I think David Chalmers presented a different logical and compelling case in "The Conscious Mind". I know you were not convinced by his case, but I was. I remained convinced after buying ($$$!) and reading Jonathan Shear's "Explaining Consciousness -- The Hard Problem" which consisted of challenges by a couple dozen detractors of Chalmers. These included Dennett, Churchland, McGinn, and many others -- but unfortunately not Metzinger. (You can read the notes I made while reading "The Conscious Mind". at http://paulandellen.com/ideas/notes/bn026.htm )

I would love someone to tell me just what they think the so-called “Hard Problem” really is, and why it is that Metzinger’s account does not do away with the problem altogether. (ie rational and coherent reasons, not simple subjective emotions like “it doesn’t feel right” or “it’s not convincing”).

The rational reason for rejecting an hypothesis would normally be either because it does not fit with empirical facts, or because it posits some mystical or metaphysical fundamental entity for which there is no empirical evidence (eg the hypothesis that angels push the planets around the sky).

I believe (98%) that my hypothesis fits with all empirical facts. Can you tell me one which doesn't fit? I also believe that the transcendental entity it posits, the primordial consciousness, exhibits plenty of empirical evidence. It appears as the driver and "knower" of all animals.

I have yet to see all the details of your hypothesis, which is the subject of this thread. Until then, I cannot say whether it fits the facts. However, I do know already that it posits some metaphysical fundamental entities for which there is no empirical evidence.

The reason I made the above comment “The rational reason for rejecting an hypothesis would normally be……” was in reaction to your own rejection of Metzinger’s hypothesis. This hypothesis, unlike yours, contains plenty of detail which makes it both comprehensive and coherent, and it does not posit any new metaphysical concepts. I have so far not seen any rational reason for rejecting Metzinger’s account of consciousness.

Yes, the "agent" is not a physical entity. But "the sense of conscious self" makes no sense to me as an entity. You will have to define it for me so that it makes sense before I could comment on what it is or how it relates to my "agent".

When I am conscious, I have a “conscious sense” that there is something similar to a “logical centre of my experience”, and this centre seems to be located within my head, but it does not necessarily have a well-defined location in space. It is the logical centre at which all of my perception and thinking seems to take place, it seems to be the logical centre where my knowledge resides. But this logical centre of course disappears when I lose consciousness. This is what I refer to as “the sense of conscious self”. Do you not also have a similar sense of “self”?

In my view, the "agent" has, or is, the ability to know. Thus, the agent can know that it knows, for example, in which case you might say that it "has a sense of knowing". That might be what you mean, but I am not sure. You'll have to clarify for me.

Hopefully I have clarified what I mean by “the sense of conscious self” above. I suspect that this is synonymous with “the agent” in your case, but only you can confirm that.

In my explanation, the agent is simply the physical entity which carries out the information processing. The agent is your physical body. No need to invoke any additional mystical or metaphysical concepts or ideas. No problem.

No problem if you take that body, or that physical universe as a given. Sounds very "Creationist" to me.

I have not said that I take the physical universe (if by this you mean the existing laws of physics) as a “given”. There may be something more fundamental than the physical universe, which generates the physical universe, but if we have no way of knowing what this might be then it seems pointless (to me) to simply speculate on what it might be. Given this, the epistemic buck must stop somewhere.

In your philosophy, it seems to be primordial consciousness that is “given” (this is where your epistemic buck stops). What makes you think the notion of a “given physics” is necessarily “Creationist”, whereas the notion of a “given primordial consciousness” is not?

I'm saying that if you trace the evolution of the body backward, you eventually arrive at a few femtoseconds after the Big Bang. That's where I want you to begin answering questions. How did that happen!? for heaven's sake. That is where I believe my hypothesis gives a reasonable answer and the physicalists are left with nothing but a mystery they would rather dodge.

There are a number of different hypotheses, including the notion that the Big Bang is the result of a quantum fluctuation. Your hypothesis posits a metaphysical “primordial consciousness”, but I have yet to see how this leads to the Big Bang, what mechanism you propose which shows how the Big Bang is a result of primordial consciousness.

As regards mystery – I believe the fundamental origin of the universe will always remain a mystery. The only way we can verify hypotheses is by testing them with experiment or observation. How is anyone going to test an hypothesis about the origin of the Big Bang?

In your explanation, the agent is supposed to be something non-physical which nevertheless somehow interacts with the physical world, a la cartesian dualism, but for which we have no empirical evidence that it exists? Problem.

Problem? What problem?

The problems associated with the notion of dualism. For example, the problem of explaining the mechanism whereby something both interacts with the physical world, and yet remains undetectable from the physical world. The problem of explaining just where this interaction takes place (is there a special place in the brain, as Descartes suggested, where the brain interfaces with the Res Cogitans?). The problem of explaining why and how this interface seems to be restricted, constrained, to the human brain. And many more besides. In short, what is missing is a comprehensive, rational and coherent explanatory model which shows how this all works and hangs together, which allows us to predict the properties and behaviour of such Res Cogitans, so that we might be able to do some empirical tests to verify the model.

As for interaction, I have sketched what I think is an adequate explanation in the absence of experimental evidence which would firm up the details. In principle, there should be no problem accepting the possibility of the same sort of mechanism as EM radiation except that instead of being confined to our 4D manifold, it would operate in higher dimensions with some of its effects manifesting in the 4D manifold. If this is too sketchy, let me know and I will elaborate. As for empirical evidence, I claim that the behavior of every animal on Earth is evidence.

Thus we have more multiplying metaphysical entities. Not only does your explanation need to posit some mysterious primordial consciousness (for which we have no empirical evidence), but also you need to posit some mysterious interaction via higher dimensions (for which interaction we also have no empirical evidence) whereby this mystical entity interfaces to the human brain?
Once again, Metzinger’s hypothesis requires no such metaphysical assumptions.

The whole point is that we have a rational and coherent explanation for such behaviour without the need to posit such weird and wonderful metaphysics. If you can come up with rational reasons as to why we should reject the rational explanation then I will agree that we might need to posit some new entities, but right now I see no need to multiply entities needlessly.

Yes, Virginia, there is a problem. It is The Hard Problem. I think that in this discussion we can't go beyond the work of Metzinger, Chalmers, and Penrose, to name three. We disagree on the veracity of their respective conclusions and unless you can think of some other way out, I think we will have to leave it in that disagreeable state.

I have asked before and I ask again. Please tell me just what you think the “Hard Problem” is, and I will then show you why it is not a problem after all.

Yes. That's a fair summary of my position. But except for the dreaded and scorned "dualism" label, what problem remains that I haven't addressed?

The problems associated with the notion of dualism, see above.

Even in your own “theory”, you need a fundamental assumption that “consciousness is primordial”. You cannot “show” that this is the case, you need simply to assume this is the case in order to build the rest of your theory.

Yes, I make that assumption. And, yes, I cannot "show" that this is the case, but I am in no different situation than you are. "Even in your own “theory”, you need a fundamental assumption that “[something] is primordial”. You cannot “show” that this is the case, [and you haven't yet even had the temerity to tell me what that "something" is,]

I have suggested already :

(a) there need not necessarily be an X’ and (b) even if there is an X’, I do not believe we can ever know what that X’ is.

In other words, there may be something more fundamental than the physical universe, which generates the physical universe, but if we have no way of knowing what this might be then it seems pointless (to me) to simply speculate on what it might be.

Does this perhaps explain why I do not have the “temerity” to tell you what that X’ is?

I have told you what I think is the primordial essence of reality and you attack my position.

What I am attacking is the notion that one can “know” what the fundamental source of everything is. The most any of us can do is to adopt a premise that “the source of everything may be XYZ, and everything follows from that”. Where you and I differ is that you are saying categorically that XYZ is something called “primordial consciousness”, whereas I am saying that since I can explain consciousness as an emergent phenomenon of the physical world I see no reason to posit consciousness as being primordial.

Please tell me what you think the primordial essence of reality is so that I might see if it needs attacking, or whether I could replace my idea with yours.

Paul, I have already told you, but you seem to ignore it :

(a) there need not necessarily be an X’ and (b) even if there is an X’, I do not believe we can ever know what that X’ is.

In other words, there may be something more fundamental than the physical universe, which generates the physical universe, but if we have no way of knowing what this might be then it seems pointless (to me) to simply speculate on what it might be.

Undoubtedly this will not satisfy you, because you seem to think that you can know what this “primordial essence” really is.

First things first. What is your X' (or your Y in your example)?

See above. I do not agree that there is necessarily a “primordial essence”, and even if there was I do not agree that we can know what it is. The best we can do is to “speculate” that it is something in particular, without evidence or rational justification. I recognise that we cannot know the unknowable, hence I do not resort to speculation to posit that there is necessarily anything in particular which is fundamental.

 

[moving finger]

Part 2 :

To explain X in terms of Y does not entail that I explain Y in terms of anything else.

Agreed. You merely need to identify, or at least name, Y.

But I am not saying that Y is fundamental. Just because I cannot explain Y in terms of anything else, it does not follow that Y is fundamental. It only follows that we do not know.

Nobody has much of an idea what consciousness is or how to explain it,

This is simply incorrect. Metzinger’s hypothesis is a very good explanation, without positing mystical or metaphysical entities. You choose to ignore this however.

but that should not prevent us from using the concept of consciousness to explain all other physical effects, which I have sketched out how to do. You might say the details are incomplete, but I don't see how you can argue that the approach is not sound in principle.

Your suggested approach to understanding consciousness rests on unnecessary metaphysical premises, and it’s not clear to me how your complete mechanism is supposed to work. Why adopt such strange premises when we have a perfectly good rational explanation which does not need such metaphysics?

All explanation is in terms of concepts and models. We “explain” one concept by invoking other “concepts”, but ultimately we have no fundamental explanation for any of these concepts except in terms of other concepts.

AHA! Now you are really getting close to proving my case. I agree completely with what you said here. But step back one step and notice that everything you said here depends on concepts. And what are concepts?? The are artifacts (or artefacts, or products) of some mind or some kind of mental capability.

For some reason you seem to believe that a concept necessarily requires a mind. It is easy to understand why – all of the concepts you are familiar with are the product of minds (an example of what I call anthropomorphic thinking). But it does not follow from this that a concept necessarily requires a mind.

Without having any fundamental explanation for this "mind" or "mental capability", except to relate it to familiar mental phenomena which we humans seem to experience, we should be at liberty to use some symbol, say 'primordial consciousness', or 'the ability to know', or 'Y', to refer to this mind or mental capability which is a necessary precursor to having any concepts at all. Without such an entity, you can't have any explanations, concepts, or models at all.

Are you suggesting that explanations exist only within conscious minds?

What happened to the Platonic realm? Every concept that every mind has ever conceived already exists somewhere in the Platonic realm, just as every mathematical equation that any mind has conceived already exists in the same realm. The Platonic realm (to me) is simply the realm of “whatever is logically possible”. We do not invent mathematics, we discover it. Similarly, we do not invent concepts, we discover them. Concepts exist, in a logical sense, independently of any conscious experience of those concepts.

And, in my opinion, you can't have any "things" either.

Sorry, but how do you define “thing”?

The obvious logical conclusion is that some kind of mind or consciousness must be primordial and ontologically fundamental.

Absolutely not. This again is an example of anthropomorphic thinking. The concept of a circle exists within the Platonic/mathematical realm, it does not need any kind of primordial consciousness to make it possible, to bring it into existence from “nothingness”.

You are assuming there is necessarily something “ontologically fundamental”. This need not be the case.

You have successfully helped me argue and conclude that something like a mind must be primordial.

Really? I disagree. Minds are emergent, not primordial.

It is very easy to posit such a thing, it is quite another to construct a rational, consistent and coherent theory which explains how everything else arises from this X’.

Indeed it is, and indeed it is. I don't claim to have constructed a theory at all. I have only sketched out a plan which I think is a rational, consistent, and coherent explanation for how all physicality can be constructed from a primordial consciousness. I hope that some bright young graduate students will work out the details of exactly how it works. In the meantime, what part of my sketch do you consider irrational? inconsistent? or incoherent?

I believe it best serves the interests of other participants in this forum if we present all of the arguments on this thread.

There are many questions that spring to mind, some examples are :
 What exactly is this primordial consciousness (PC), how does it work?
 Why would, and how does, the PC create the Big Bang and the rest of the universe?
 Why and how does the PC bring everything else into existence?
 What relationship is there between this PC and the rest of reality?
 Was there any consciousness in the universe before conscious organic organisms evolved, if so how was it manifest?
 Does PC infect otherwise unconscious organic beings and cause them to be conscious?
 What is the mechanism by which PC interacts with the physical world?
 What would happen if a human being was not infected with this PC, would it be a zombie?
(there are many more questions, but let’s start with these)

(Presumably your “primordial consciousness” has always and always will exist, and is all-pervasive, being everywhere at once and at all times?)

Here I think we need to be careful. The question of whether it always existed or simply sprang into existence from nothing is the same mystery facing each and every and all and any other theories, explanations, or stories about how reality got started. It gives me and my hypothesis no more trouble than it does to all other competing hypotheses.

It seems you are equivocating here. Something “primordial” would seem to be something which exists in absence of everything else, no?

As for "all-pervasive", "being everywhere", and "at all times", I insist that we don't jump to the conclusion that the primordial consciousness is complete, perfect, infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, or omnibenevolent.

What does this mean? Are you saying the PC is everywhere, or not? Is the PC at all times, or not? Your “primordial” theory is not much of a theory if it cannot address these very basic questions.

I believe (99%) that none of those apply. This means that except as the first cause of everything and its transcendence, the primordial conscioiusness, and what it has evolved to so far, is nothing whatsoever like the God of any religion on Earth and it should not be construed, interpreted, or represented as such. (Depending on the definition, I will grant omnipresence, however.)

Whoah! Where did the concept of “God” get dragged into this?

Going down a notch in the details…….. The rest are only vicariously conscious as I tried to explain with my JPL rover analogy.

Thus there is only one consciousness driving everything, and all the rest of us are….what? Having illusions of consciousness?
Sorry, but I can’t see that this is either rational or coherent.
Why is the “One Natural Individual” (ONI) doing all this, what is the purpose?
Can the ONI choose which other beings are conscious, and which not?
How does the ONI choose which other beings shall have feelings of consciousness, and why?
Is there any empirical evidence for any of this, if so, what?

So in this complex picture, you can make what you will of the question of whether the primordial consciousness "is all-pervasive, being everywhere at once and at all times". That's probably more than you wanted to hear, but let me know if it is not and you want more.

Just answers to the above questions would be a good start.

I could (for the sake of argument) say that my X’ is a turtle. But in absence of a worked-out and consistent theory of how a primordial turtle generates everything we see about us, I would not expect anyone to take such an idea seriously.

Neither would I. There are myriad examples of dependencies on physical structures for the existence of a turtle. The existence of a turtle in the absence of physicality seems unimaginable, unless it resided in some reality apart from our physical 4D continuum, in which case it probably wouldn't resemble any turtle you or I know. Even at that, it doesn't seem that a hyperdimensional turtle would be a believable candidate for the designer of our 4D physicality, although I suppose it could happen.

Why not? Why couldn’t a turtle generate consciousness in just the same way that your ONI generates consciousness? So far, you have not presented any mechanism by which the ONI could generate consciousness within other agents.

By contrast, no one can show any proof that consciousness can't exist outside of the brain. Moreover, some NDE and OBE reports indicate that indeed it can.

Do you really want to move this discussion on to so-called near death and out of body experiences? Such experiences can be explained as simple illusions and hallucinations. Please provide any credible scientific accounts of such phenomena which shows they provide evidence that consciousness can exist outside of the brain.

As for how a consciousness can generate everything we see about us, I have been through that enough times already.

I’m sorry but you have not (at least not in this thread).

(a) there need not necessarily be an X’

Then give me at least a sketch of the bootstrap process generating something from nothing.

I have never suggested that something can be generated from nothing. It could be turtles all the way down, or it could be a cyclic relationship. There is simply no way that we can know, and idle speculation is not philosophy.

even if there is an X’, I do not believe we can ever know what that X’ is.

I understand your belief. But would you allow us to guess at what it might be and from that guess, try to deduce a possible explanation for everything else? That's all I'm trying to do.

To me, idle speculation is not philosophy. A belief has absolutely no philosophical merit if there is simply no way to validate that belief. The universe exists, this much we know, but I know not why it exists, neither do I believe that we can know why it exists. However, given the premise that “the universe exists” is true, I can then try to explain everything I observe based on the minimum of additional premises.

Metzinger has proposed an hypothesis to explain how consciousness arises. You have suggested that there are “convincing arguments” showing why the hypothesis is incorrect. Perhaps we should start there. What are these “convincing arguments”?.

I hope the three I listed near the beginning of this post will answer your question. Number 1 is convincing to me. Numbers 2 and 3 supported my prior conviction and they may be what you are looking for. I am sure that my personal experience will not convince you, but I think a careful reading of Penrose or Chalmers might. If they don't, I'm afraid we will have to remain in disagreement.

Your arguments above (if they are the ones that you refer to) do indeed seem to be based on subjective feelings rather than rational argument. I am afraid I cannot accept an argument based purely on subjective feelings. If however you believe there is anything in here which is based on rational objective argument then please let me know.

As for Penrose & Chalmers, I have responded in some detail on this above.

Thus, your assertion that “consciousness is outside the physical universe” rests purely on your premise that there is only a single consciousness, which premise is disputed. With respect, this hardly qualifies as “evidence” that “consciousness is outside the physical universe”.

No. You have changed the context. My list of 7 pieces of evidence was in response to your question, "What evidence do you have for your assertion that “consciousness is outside the physical universe”?" It is true that the first two depend on the premise of a single consciousness, but the other five are independent of that premise.

Incorrect. Each “piece of evidence” builds upon the preceding.
Number 3 : Refers to “proximity” which is a reference to number (2)
Number 4 : What relevance does 4D spacetime have, unless it is based on (3)?
Number 5 : Refers to extra dimensions, why is this needed except as an extension of (4)?
Number 6 : Refers to higher dimensional space, what relevance does this have except as an extension of (5)?
Number 7 : Is another variation on (6)

How [can one get mathematics from consciousness]?

Indeed, how else?? Think of Stephen Hawking. What does he use besides his consciousness? Consciousness produces mathematics by thinking about primitives, axioms, and logical consequences. More is required to record and communicate mathematical results, but this is apart from, and after, the mathematics has been produced. As for whether or not consciousness requires a body and brain to support it is a contentious issue on which you and I disagree. That too, is separate from the fact that consciousness can and does produce mathematics.

Do you believe that consciousness actually creates mathematics, or that mathematics exists independently of consciousness? Recall the Platonic realm.

What are the necessary properties of your “primordial consciousness”

Good question. I don't know the answer, but I think it is within our reach to figure it out. My initial guess, as you know, is that the ability to know might be both necessary and sufficient.

It seems to me that this “primordial consciousness” is fundamentally a complex entity without a simple or rational explanation. A better answer imho would be a fundamentally simple entity which generates complexity via a simple, rational and explainable mechanism.

how does it manifest itself in absence of an organic brain (if it can manifest itself at all)

Here you are dragging me into pure speculation -- but you asked. I think it can, and does, manifest itself in many different Natural Individuals at all levels of the hierarchy I outlined above. Human brains are at a bottom level of that hierarchy except for things like Mars rovers, backhoes, and virtual reality games which could be considered to make up a new level below than humans. That is if you want to imbue consciousness in those lower-level entities, which they seem to exhibit.

I’m glad that you acknowledge all of this is based on pure speculation.
And if there are no humans around? What does this primordial consciousness actually “do” for the first 13 billion years of the existence of the universe when there are no humans?

Does this primordial consciousness invade and infect a human brain like a virus?

Are you suggesting that under your theory the physical world is not “real”, that the physical world is all just an illusion within primordial consciousness?

Yes, that's exactly what I am suggesting. Of course, it is practical to define the word 'real' to include structures in the physical world so it becomes a semantic question.

Whoahhhhh!
This changes everything. You’re saying that there is no reality except for the primordial consciousness (PC), that everything we “think” we experience is actually an artificial construct of the PC?

This begs the question – if the PC is the source of everything., why does the PC construct reality in “this” way, and not “another” way?

Incidentally, I think this same thing comes into play when we try to label ideas as "dualistic". We can, using Robert Persig's image of Phaedrus' Knife, categorize ideas in many different ways. In examining my ideas to determine if they are "dualistic" or not, I could say that, no, I am a monadist and the only thing that exists is that consciousness.

That was a great book, wasn’t it!

Sure you can say this, and indeed that seems to be what you are saying.

You seem to be saying that PC exists, physical reality is an illusion, and everything we observe is a construct of the PC.

My philosophy is just the opposite, that physical reality exists, the self is an illusion, and consciousness is a construct of physical reality.

To me, the basic question is : Each of these explanations rests upon certain fundamental assumptions. Which one is more fundamental than the other? In other words, which one makes the minimum of assumptions of primordial complexity?

But then, you might say, what about the thoughts of that consciousness? Aren't they different from the consciousness itself? OK, I would say, I guess I am a dualist after all. Then Penrose would interrupt and say, wait a minute, what about the Ideal World containing the complete Mandelbrot Set and Platos other ideals? Do you deny that they at least have some sort of existence? Well, OK Roger, I guess I am a treblist after all. Unless...maybe those Ideals only exist in one or both of those other worlds. Maybe Ideals only exist in minds and in coded physical symbols. If these coded symbols included algorithms, then the complete M'set could exist only in the mental and physical worlds. But then, to continue this line of reasoning, if the physical world is nothing but ideas in the mental world, as Berkeley said, then I am back to being a monist after all. 'Real' is whatever you define it to be for your purposes. Just let me know what you mean when you talk to me about it.

It’s very simple. The objective world is real. The conscious world is an emergent but virtual construct of the real world. The Platonic world is an idealistic world, independent of the real world. That’s it, Simple, isn’t it? Why make it more complex than it needs to be?

I think you will find that there are physicalist explanations for these things[, consciousness, sleep, the Cambrian explosion, or the origin of life,] (it’s just that you don’t accept them).

I don't accept them because I don't find them convincing.

Understood. What I keep asking is why don’t you find them convincing? As I said near the beginning of this post :

If we are to make any progress in this discussion, it is not enough for you to say “I do not believe it” in response to an hypothesis. You need to say why you don’t believe it. There need to be rational and coherent reasons provided for rejecting an hypothesis if we are to have a meaningful discussion.

Best Regards

(PS : The phoenix is a myth – perhaps not a good symbol to associate with the notion of primordial consciousness?)

 

[Lars Laborious]

I think the difference between dualists and monists derives from contradictory ideas on what the physical or rather not-qualia are like.

All though I’ve never experienced nothing but qualia, since experience is qualia, I find it rational to compare not-qualia with something not visible, since it’s not experienced. And qualia with something visble. Note: This is just an analogy. Now, if you take something not visible and combine it with something else not visible, it’s harder to explain how you can make something visible out of it than if you instead applied something already visible. (One could also compare not-qualia with “black" and qualia with for example “blue”.)

The law of conservation of energy says that nothing can come of nothing, but then again QM suggests that this law is somehow violated on microscopic scales. But then, if something can in fact come of nothing, that doesn’t make them any more equal.

But if they are in fact equal, then qualia are inherent properties of the fundamental, physical substance. Which brings up new questions regarding physics, since raw consciousness then can be said to be fundamental. For instance “do quarks or strings have consciousness?”, and “what would that consciousness be like, compared to ours?”.

And, MF, what concept does not necessarily require a mind? It’s hard to see how Plato's forms fit into the physical. To me, a concept existing as an original model outside a mind sounds pretty metaphysical, whether it happens through sense-perception or not. Platonic realism is more mysterious than enlightening. Wouldn’t you categorize the belief that concepts exists in a special realm of the universe as dualism? If not, how come?

 

[moving finger]

Which brings up new questions regarding physics, since raw consciousness then can be said to be fundamental. For instance “do quarks or strings have consciousness?”, and “what would that consciousness be like, compared to ours?”.

It is pointless (imho) to attempt any answer to such a question until one has a definition of consciousness. And I mean an objective operational definition, I don't just mean the Searle-Penrose-type wishy-washy definition of "consciousness is what I experience when I am awake".

I suggested above :

I would define consciousness as the ability of an agent to form a consistent and coherent internal representational model based on information from the external world, which model is temporally connected with the external world, and through which model the agent creates a centre of narrative gravity (an idea of “self”), to which it relates information from the external world.

Any comments?

According to such a definition of consciousness, I do not see how quarks or strings can possesses consciousness (unless one is prepared to believe that they form consistent and coherent internal representational models based on information from the external world etc...

And, MF, what concept does not necessarily require a mind?

A circle is an example of a concept.
Why is it necessary to posit a mind in order for a circle to exist as a logical concept?
Why is it in fact necessary to posit any material world in order for the concept of a circle to exist as a logical concept?

It’s hard to see how Plato's forms fit into the physical.

The whole idea is that Plato's forms do not literally fit into, or interact with, the physical. To me, Plato's world of forms is simply a logical world which contains everything that is logically possible. All geometric figures, all mathematical equations, and all concepts, already "exist" in a logical sense in this world. All a mathematician does when he comes up with a new equation is that he "discovers" this equation (I think Paul and Penrose would concur with this idea). All I'm saying is that the same is true of concepts.

To me, a concept existing as an original model outside a mind sounds pretty metaphysical, whether it happens through sense-perception or not.

Does the notion of a circle existing as a logical entity independent of any mind also seem metaphysical to you?

Do you believe that mathematicians literally "create" new mathematics, or do they simply discover pre-existing mathematical relationships?

Platonic realism is more mysterious than enlightening. Wouldn’t you categorize the belief that concepts exists in a special realm of the universe as dualism? If not, how come?

I am not postulating that Plato's world of forms actually exists except in a logical sense, and it certainly does not interact with or have any causal relation with the physical world. If you wish to call this dualism then that's your prerogative, but don't confuse it with the interaction-type dualism which is at the root of most dualistic explanations of consciousness. The two are quite different.

Best Regards

 

[Lars Laborious]

I would define consciousness as the ability of an agent to form a consistent and coherent internal representational model based on information from the external world, which model is temporally connected with the external world, and through which model the agent creates a centre of narrative gravity (an idea of “self”), to which it relates information from the external world.

Any comments?

I find it difficult to understand what you actually mean by "agent". Earlier you've referred to virtual agents, which Paul and I have argued that belong to imagining. You've suggested that "virtual entails only that an entity is interpreted by an agent as directly representing some form of physical reality when it does not", but that doesn't explain what your agent is. You've also said that a robot could develope a "sense of 'conscious self' within it’s processing routines, so that it thinks it is an agent which is actually 'looking' at images via it’s visual colour receptors", but you haven't explained how the robot could think and believe - which are usually considered to be properties of a mind.

Why is it necessary to posit a mind in order for a circle to exist as a logical concept?

Without minds there wouldn't be any logical thinking of circles. Physical entities could form a circle, but there would not be a concept of it. If a computer, in a world without minds, were doing calculations on a circle's diameter, it would still not exist a concept of a circle. - It would only exist the casual doing of calculations.

Why is it in fact necessary to posit any material world in order for the concept of a circle to exist as a logical concept?

If you do believe that concepts are not a part of a material world, isn't it logical to assume that they exist only in minds? Or do you believe in several worlds outside the material world?

To me, Plato's world of forms is simply a logical world which contains everything that is logically possible.

A "logical world" are an imagined world. Logic is thought or reason.

Does the notion of a circle existing as a logical entity independent of any mind also seem metaphysical to you?

A notion of a circle could not exist without the notion which is a feeling, and feelings belong to minds.

Do you believe that mathematicians literally "create" new mathematics, or do they simply discover pre-existing mathematical relationships?

Mathematics is a study of concepts, and concepts are imagined to be. For example, whitout a mind, two physical entites wouldn't be two, they would only be. Numbers are concepts imagined to be; to help us understand our surroundings better.

[...]If you wish to call this dualism then that's your prerogative, but don't confuse it with the interaction-type dualism which is at the root of most dualistic explanations of consciousness.

Why would you not believe that two worlds could interact with each other? Or at least by one-way interactions?

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

It's great talking to you. No apologies are necessary for a tardy response. I am short of time myself and must apologize to you for getting this started and then not being available to do justice to the follow ups. Please be patient with me. I sincerely appreciate the thought and energy you are devoting to this thread.

Defining consciousness simply as “an experience similar to what I have” I suggest is inadequate as either a good philosophical or a good scientific operational definition (but it would fit well with Penrose-type notions of consciousness – see below). If we use such a definition there is no way that you and I, for example, can enter into a meaningful objective dialogue on the issue because I have no idea what your experience is actually like.

I agree it's bad science. I suppose it's also bad philosophy, although I don't really know what the official rules of philosophy are. But, to me, the nature of my own existence is of extreme interest. After thinking about it most of my life, it seems to me that the way for me to approach learning about my existence is to start with my own innermost experiences. And, I would expect that the best way for you to start would be with your own innermost experiences.

The alternative is to start with some other concept which I (we) have acquired somehow. The acquisition of that concept would have had a very complex history involving learning English and a substantial vocabulary, receiving information couched in language about the concept, and forming the concept in our respective minds. All of this can possibly introduce error and misunderstanding. Even choosing mathematics as the starting concept, like Dick did, we would have to assume that the concepts are understood by other people the same way as we understand them. And, in my case, I don't agree with the standard, or traditional, set of mathematical concepts. (I think it was a mistake to accept the Axiom of Choice, which has been done for the past hundred years.) Any concept other than mathematics would be even more fuzzy and more prone to introduce error.

So here we have another disagreement. I say start by investigating my own conscious experience. You say that's like looking where the light is best. Instead, you suggest starting with the concepts of models, information, an external world, a "centre of narrative gravity", etc.:

I would define consciousness as the ability of an agent to form a consistent and coherent internal representational model based on information from the external world, which model is temporally connected with the external world, and through which model the agent creates a centre of narrative gravity (an idea of “self”), to which it relates information from the external world. Would you agree?
If not, why not?

I don't agree. I don't agree because there are too many words in that definition in which I have no confidence that I understand the meaning of them in the same way as you do. If the two of us were to sit through a course of study in which these concepts were all developed from first principles so that we could gain some confidence that we each knew what the other was talking about, then it might work.

If we use such a definition [as yours] there is no way that you and I, for example, can enter into a meaningful objective dialogue on the issue because I have no idea what your experience is actually like.

Way.

Using my starting point, I think we can skip the "course of study" I mentioned and proceed in just this dialog, developing the concepts as we go. Here's a sketch of how it could work:

I start by introspecting and examining my own conscious experience.
I try to describe it in language and tell you.
You introspect and examine your conscious experience.
You try to describe it to me.
We compare descriptions.
We try to confirm similarities by elaborating on the descriptions to see if they still are the same.
We try to resolve dissimilarities by asking each other to describe them in other words.
If we reach the conclusion that our experiences are nowhere near the same, we will have learned something which I think would be important.
If we reach the conclusion that our experiences are about the same, then we include a third person and go through the same sort of exercise.
If we discover that three or more of us have conscious experiences similar to mine, then each of us has two or more objective sources and one subjective source of information regarding the conscious experience. You and I, for example, would have a common objective source.
If you are intent on studying the question strictly objectively, then you may study the others' reports once you have convinced yourself that they indeed experience the same sort of conscious experience.

If we don't take that sort of approach, then I can never be quite sure you even know what I am talking about wrt consciousness. (The fact that you think that an information processing machine can experience pain makes me wonder if you feel pain the same as I do.) And for your part, you must consider any opinion or belief of mine as being of no value in contributing to understanding, which you seem to do.

Now, as for your definition:

I would define consciousness as the ability of an agent to form a consistent and coherent internal representational model based on information from the external world, which model is temporally connected with the external world, and through which model the agent creates a centre of narrative gravity (an idea of “self”), to which it relates information from the external world.

As I explained in the Metzinger thread, I am confident that I could write a computer program which would do exactly and all the things you mention in your definition, and while it was running, I would know that it was not conscious. I would know in the same way you would know that a tape recorder was not conscious even if it were playing a recording of me saying "Hey! I just realized that I am a tape recorder and I am experiencing consciousness! Really. I am really conscious! This is amazing!".

How I know the computer is not conscious, or how you know the tape recorder is not conscious, I really don't know. But if either of those machines is conscious, then consciousness is a lot more mysterious than it appears.

Would you care to present an alternative (objective) operational definition?

Yes, I'll present the same one I have suggested several times. I would say that consciousness is the ability to know. 'Ability' is used here in the same sense in which it is used in the definition of energy: the ability to do work. That definition of 'energy' served quite well to allow the concept to be quantified, measured, and identified with many physical phenomena. I think the same could be true for the ability to know. Of course it will take a new, young Boltzmann to work out the quantitative relationships among the related concepts to put it on a firm theoretical footing.

Paul - If we are to make any progress in this discussion, it is not enough for you to say simply “I do not believe it” or “I am not convinced” in response to an hypothesis (such as Metzinger’s explanation of consciousness). You need to say why you don’t believe it, why you are not convinced. There need to be rational and coherent reasons provided for rejecting an hypothesis if we are to have a meaningful discussion.

I agree. On the other hand, I did not simply say "I do not believe it". What I gave you was a rambling account of some of my background, which you seemed to read with impatience, so that you could understand my reason. I stated that reason as, "With that background, in my judgment, I am convinced that it is not possible for a machine (computer or brain) to achieve conscious experience by itself."

Yes, that reason is terse and by itself doesn't sound like much more than a statement of belief. But the reason is the result of my judgment after a long background in learning about information systems and in thinking about the problem of consciousness.

For example, I know what blue looks like to me. I also know that the phenomenon of perceiving blue can be accounted for by certain wavelengths of light hitting my retinas, but that explanation does not explain the experience of blueness. I also know that machines can detect and discriminate certain wavelengths of light even better than my eyes can and that they can easily be programmed to report "seeing blue" and they can use character strings like 'blueness' in their reports. Yet, with my experience of machines, I know that they do not experience blueness like I do.

Now, from what I read in Metzinger, he claims that if the program has accumulated and organized certain information about its current and past states, and has a function which operates in near-real time which could be taken to be an "awareness" function, and (and this is what he claims is the key component to conscious experience) that some of the accumulated experience is hidden from, or made unavailable to, the "awareness" function, then consciousness will arise in the running machine/program.

In my judgment, based on my experience with programmable machines, and my experience of seeing blue and feeling pain, the emergence of consciousness in the machine will not happen under those circumstances.

Furthermore, in my judgment, the only way the machine could experience consciousness is if it were constructed in such a way as to operate as a functioning communication system allowing a remote (i.e. outside and separate from the machine) conscious agent to achieve two-way communication with the machine, the two ways being perception in one direction and willful action in the other direction. In this case, the experience would not occur in the machine but in the conscious agent. However, if the communication link were sufficiently robust, the conscious agent could have a vicarious experience which would make it seem to the agent as if it were actually the machine itself and that the machine was having the experience. I think we humans are getting close to building such machines with our remote controlled devices, virtual reality systems, and system simulators. It shouldn't be hard to imagine how such a conscious agent-machine setup would work.

But, after all that, it boils down to the fact that my opinion is based on my judgment. I can't give you any airtight logical or physical proof. Of course, if you can give me airtight logical or physical proof that my opinion is wrong, I will gladly change my opinion. And Metzinger's argument is not an airtight logical or physical proof.

Opinion is fine, but it doesn’t count for much in a rational debate unless it is supported by logical argument or empirical evidence.
Thus, you believe that even human brains alone cannot “generate” consciousness?

I am well aware of the value of my opinions: not much. But to answer your question, Yes, I believe that even human brains alone cannot "generate" or experience consciousness.

There is this primordial consciousness already in existence, which for some reason seems to like to infest otherwise unconscious objects such as human brains? Is this correct?

Yes, except that I would choose a different word than 'infest'. I usually use the word 'drive' or 'operate' to describe the "infestation". I drive my car, but I suppose from my car's viewpoint, I might be infesting it.

Do we have any empirical evidence for the existence of such primordial consciousness except in the form of human brain infestations?

Yes. I'd say that all other animals are also such evidence. There may be more subtle evidence yet to be discovered such as the mechanisms behind the choice of the Big Bang's initial conditions and some of the trickier developments in biological evolution.

If you believe that Penrose does present a single rational and coherent argument which shows that machines cannot possesses consciousness then I would be happy to discuss it. Could you present such an argument?

Sorry, but no. If Penrose couldn't convince you, I'm sure I could not either.

I would love someone to tell me just what they think the so-called “Hard Problem” really is, and why it is that Metzinger’s account does not do away with the problem altogether.

If Chalmers couldn't adequately explain it to you, I'm sure I could not either.

When I am conscious, I have a “conscious sense” that there is something similar to a “logical centre of my experience”, and this centre seems to be located within my head, but it does not necessarily have a well-defined location in space. It is the logical centre at which all of my perception and thinking seems to take place, it seems to be the logical centre where my knowledge resides. But this logical centre of course disappears when I lose consciousness. This is what I refer to as “the sense of conscious self”. Do you not also have a similar sense of “self”?

No. I do have a "sense of conscious self", but only when I willfully attend to that aspect of my conscious experience. I don't do that very often. I also don't experience the sense of centrality which you seem to consider pretty important. At certain times, particularly when I am attending to visual perceptions, it seems that my consciousness is centered between and behind my eyes. But if the perceptions are of the night sky, or of a beautiful vista or sunset, my consciousness can sometimes seem to be located way out in the scene I am contemplating. If I am listening to music, my consciousness seems to fill the hall along with the music. If I am feeling pain, it seems as if I can push the actual location of the pain around simply by strongly attending to it. (I learned about this technique from accounts of POWs who reported that it is an effective way to tolerate torture). At first, it seems as if the pain is in the affected body part, e.g. a finger. But when concentrating attention on the pain itself, it seems to move, leave the body, and disappear altogether.

If by a "logical centre" you mean a central process, then yes, I do experience that. It is as if there is some process identified with attention which I can willfully move around, not only in space to body parts and scenes of my environment, but also in time as I ponder the past and future, and also in the space of competing sources of information from various senses, imagination, and deliberate logical processing.

I have gone into this detail in the hopes that you will agree to begin (or continue) our conversation along the lines I suggested earlier of each of us trying to understand the conscious experience of the other. That way, if one of us is nothing but a machine, we might be able to figure that out.

Hopefully I have clarified what I mean by “the sense of conscious self” above. I suspect that this is synonymous with “the agent” in your case, but only you can confirm that.

No, it is not synonymous. Maybe this can be a key to unlock a barrier between us. The sense of conscious self is an experience, which is like a process. The agent, by contrast, is the thing having the experience, which is like a processor. The sense of self is a thought; the agent is the thinker.

The problems associated with the notion of dualism. For example, the problem of explaining the mechanism whereby something both interacts with the physical world, and yet remains undetectable from the physical world. The problem of explaining just where this interaction takes place (is there a special place in the brain, as Descartes suggested, where the brain interfaces with the Res Cogitans?). The problem of explaining why and how this interface seems to be restricted, constrained, to the human brain. And many more besides. In short, what is missing is a comprehensive, rational and coherent explanatory model which shows how this all works and hangs together, which allows us to predict the properties and behaviour of such Res Cogitans, so that we might be able to do some empirical tests to verify the model.

I think my well-worn radio analogy explains and answers all these questions. Yes, it's not rigorous, but it is easily understandable.

To give the analogical answers to what you wrote, the mechanism explaining the interaction of the radio station and the radio is via encoded EM radiation signals. The radio station remains undetectable from the radio. There is no special place within the radio in which the interaction between the radio station and the radio (unless you identify the antenna circuits with the Res Cogitans). The capability of reproducing transmitted radio programs is restricted and constrained to radios simply because you need such a device to discriminate, detect, amplify, and convert to sound, the transmitted signals. There are many more details about radio operation, but they are mere details. In short, in order to really understand radio operation and how it all hangs together, there are many details of electrical and electronic engineering that must be comprehended. Once they are understood, there are many empirical tests to verify that the radio really operates according to theory.

I'll have to stop here because I am already late for my next commitment. But you can think about this much before I get to the rest. Take your time responding because I probably won't be back here until Monday.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[moving finger]

I find it difficult to understand what you actually mean by "agent".

In very broad and general terms, an agent is something which is capable of acting within an environment.
An agent may also possesses consciousness, or intelligence, but need not.
Humans are agents, animals are agents, machines are agents.

You've also said that a robot could develope a "sense of 'conscious self' within it’s processing routines, so that it thinks it is an agent which is actually 'looking' at images via it’s visual colour receptors", but you haven't explained how the robot could think and believe - which are usually considered to be properties of a mind.

How would you define a “mind”, and what makes you think that a robot (suitably equipped) necessarily could not possesses a “mind”?

Without minds there wouldn't be any logical thinking of circles.

Why is it necessary to posit “thinking of circles” in order for a circle to exist as a logical possibility?

I think you are assuming “all logical possibilities must be manifest as mental concepts embodied in minds”, whereas I am not. Everything that is logically possible, including all logically possible concepts, already “exists” in a logical (but not physical) sense, as a logical possibility.

If you do believe that concepts are not a part of a material world, isn't it logical to assume that they exist only in minds? Or do you believe in several worlds outside the material world?

I have already clearly stated in previous posts that I believe in the notion of Plato’s world of forms as a world of logical possibilities, need I repeat that again?

A "logical world" are an imagined world. Logic is thought or reason.

Something that is logically possible does not require a mind to “imagine it” in order to make it logically possible.
Do not confuse ontology with epistemology.
If it is “logically possible that it rain in Boston tomorrow”, then this logical possibility exists (ontically) as a logical possibility, quite independently of any “mind imagining the possibility”.

Does the notion of a circle existing as a logical entity independent of any mind also seem metaphysical to you?

A notion of a circle could not exist without the notion which is a feeling, and feelings belong to minds.

A notion, like a concept, is fundamentally a logical possibility (I’m not interested in comparing simple textbook definitions from general-purpose dictionaries, because the everyday definitions of words is predicated on the everyday usage of words – and once one starts exploring the world outside of everyday use one cannot assume simplistic definitions. Common usage of words such as “feeling”, “notion”, “consciousness”, “understanding” make the naïve assumption that all of these things are uniquely associated with human minds).

But if it makes you feel happier, simply replace the word “notion” with the phrase “logical possibility”.

Do you believe that mathematicians literally "create" new mathematics, or do they simply discover pre-existing mathematical relationships?

Mathematics is a study of concepts, and concepts are imagined to be. For example, whitout a mind, two physical entites wouldn't be two, they would only be. Numbers are concepts imagined to be; to help us understand our surroundings better.

With respect, Lars, this doesn’t answer the question.

Why would you not believe that two worlds could interact with each other? Or at least by one-way interactions?

One could assume such mystical one-way interaction, but why invoke additional metaphysical assumptions if they are unnecessary?

Such an assumption would be not only an additional metaphysical premise, it would also require an explanatory theoretical framework. In my philosophy, such a premise of interactionist dualism is simply redundant. As Laplace said, I have no need of that hypothesis.

Best Regards

 

[moving finger]

After thinking about it most of my life, it seems to me that the way for me to approach learning about my existence is to start with my own innermost experiences. And, I would expect that the best way for you to start would be with your own innermost experiences.

My philosophy is quite different. As a scientist originally, my approach is to objectify everything wherever possible. If it is impossible to arrive at an agreed objective definition of a term like “consciousness” then (imho) it’s a waste of time for two people to attempt to have any meaningful or rational discussion about what consciousness actually is (apart from “consciousness is a subjective feeling”, which is not very enlightening); all we can do is to swap stories.

The alternative is to start with some other concept which I (we) have acquired somehow. The acquisition of that concept would have had a very complex history involving learning English and a substantial vocabulary, receiving information couched in language about the concept, and forming the concept in our respective minds. All of this can possibly introduce error and misunderstanding.

I agree that trying to relate concepts between two individuals can lead to misunderstanding. That’s a fundamental problem of communication. This is precisely why it is important to agree objective definitions of terms before we start.

So here we have another disagreement. I say start by investigating my own conscious experience.

How can I participate in your investigation of your own conscious experience? That’s not a question of discussion or a debate, it’s a question of you going away and doing some personal introspection. I suggest that when you have finished introspecting, come back and let me know how you have decided to objectively define this thing you call “consciousness”.

I don't agree. I don't agree because there are too many words in that definition in which I have no confidence that I understand the meaning of them in the same way as you do. If the two of us were to sit through a course of study in which these concepts were all developed from first principles so that we could gain some confidence that we each knew what the other was talking about, then it might work.

Understood.
Do you perhaps have a suggested alternative definition of “consciousness” that you would be happy with?
If we cannot agree on the definition of this “consciousness” thing, it seems to me that we cannot usefully proceed much further in the debate on what this thing is and how it arises.

I start by introspecting and examining my own conscious experience.
I try to describe it in language and tell you.
You introspect and examine your conscious experience.
You try to describe it to me.
We compare descriptions.

I can do that right now.
My conscious experience is this : When I am “conscious” I seem to form a consistent and coherent internal representational model based on information from the external world, which model is temporally connected with the external world, and through which model I create a centre of narrative gravity (an idea of “self”), to which I can relate information from the external world.

Now you tell me yours. (Objectively if you can, rather than subjectively)

The fact that you think that an information processing machine can experience pain makes me wonder if you feel pain the same as I do.

I have no idea whether I experience pain the same way you do. How could we find out?

As I explained in the Metzinger thread, I am confident that I could write a computer program which would do exactly and all the things you mention in your definition, and while it was running, I would know that it was not conscious.

How would you know it was not conscious?
(If you answer “I do not know how I would know”, then you have not satisfied the conditions for knowledge – to claim knowledge requires a justified belief, and admitting that you “do not know how you would know” clearly shows your belief is not justified).

I would know in the same way you would know that a tape recorder was not conscious even if it were playing a recording of me saying "Hey! I just realized that I am a tape recorder and I am experiencing consciousness! Really. I am really conscious! This is amazing!".

This is the same error that Penrose commits when he asks “why is a camera not conscious?”.
Are you seriously suggesting that the tape recorder in your example is forming a consistent and coherent internal representational model which is temporally connected to the external world and through which model the tape recorder creates a centre of narrative gravity (an idea of “self”), to which it relates information from the external world? I think it is not.

I would say that consciousness is the ability to know.

Knowledge = justified true belief. For any agent to possesses knowledge (= able to know) it simply needs to be able to form beliefs about the world which it can justify, some of which beliefs may happen to be true. Is this really all that you think consciousness is? Why would this require some metaphysical “primordial consciousness” to bring it about?

Yes, that reason is terse and by itself doesn't sound like much more than a statement of belief. But the reason is the result of my judgment after a long background in learning about information systems and in thinking about the problem of consciousness.

With respect Paul, as far as I can tell, you have provided neither rational, objective argument, nor emprical evidence, which would allow us to reject Metzinger’s account. All you have provided (it seems to me) is a detailed account of the history of your subjective feeling that it “cannot be right”. I’m sorry, but I cannot accept your feelings as a valid reason for rejecting Metzinger’s account.

For example, I know what blue looks like to me. I also know that the phenomenon of perceiving blue can be accounted for by certain wavelengths of light hitting my retinas, but that explanation does not explain the experience of blueness. I also know that machines can detect and discriminate certain wavelengths of light even better than my eyes can and that they can easily be programmed to report "seeing blue" and they can use character strings like 'blueness' in their reports. Yet, with my experience of machines, I know that they do not experience blueness like I do.

What relevance does the notion “they do not experience blueness like I do” have to the question of whether they are conscious or not? That another agent “does not experience blueness like you do” is NOT evidence that the agent is not conscious. Perhaps you can reasonably assume that I experience blue like you do. But what about other creatures? Would you agree that a dog is conscious? If yes, when a dog looks at a blue object, do you think the dog is then necessarily “experiencing” the same thing that you claim to experience when you look at a blue object? (you might want to check up on the details of canine vision before you answer).

In my judgment, based on my experience with programmable machines, and my experience of seeing blue and feeling pain, the emergence of consciousness in the machine will not happen under those circumstances.

Have you ever worked with a machine which you would claim satisfies Metzinger’s conditions for consciousness, as detailed in his paper?

But, after all that, it boils down to the fact that my opinion is based on my judgment. I can't give you any airtight logical or physical proof. Of course, if you can give me airtight logical or physical proof that my opinion is wrong, I will gladly change my opinion. And Metzinger's argument is not an airtight logical or physical proof.

No hypothesis constitutes a “proof”. That’s not how science works. An hypothesis is an attempt to provide a rational and coherent explanation of a phenomenon.

That planetary motion is “explained” by Newton’s “laws” is simply an hypothesis.
An alternative hypothesis is that the planets are pushed around the sky by angels (this was indeed accepted as a credible hypothesis at one time).
I cannot “prove” that the Newton’s “law” hypothesis is correct and the angel hypothesis is incorrect, since both fit the experimental data. I can only point to the fact that the Newton “law” hypothesis is based on a rational and coherent argument with minimal metaphysical premises, whereas the angel hypothesis is basically just one very big metaphysical premise and not much else.
If someone were to say “in my opinion, based on my judgment, the Newton’s laws hypothesis is wrong”, what could I say? Just the same as I am saying to you now : Where is your rational argument for claiming this hypothesis wrong, where is the evidence?

I'd say that all other animals are also such evidence.

All? You believe that all animal species are conscious?
Does this include insects? Fish? How about plants? Amoeba? Viruses?
Do you have any evidence that any of these other species are conscious? How would one tell? Since you define consciousness as “something similar to what I experience”, how do you know that other species experience the world similarly to the way you do?

If Penrose couldn't convince you, I'm sure I could not either.

Penrose could not convince me simply because his arguments were either based on false premises or invalid inferences. I can find no argument of his, purporting to show that machines cannot possesses consciousness, which is sound. I am very happy to be corrected on that score if anyone can present a sound argument.

If Chalmers couldn't adequately explain it to you, I'm sure I could not either.

With respect, Paul, it’s hardly valid to claim that Metzinger’s explanation does not solve the “Hard Problem”, if you are then unable or unwilling to backup such a claim?

I do have a "sense of conscious self", but only when I willfully attend to that aspect of my conscious experience. I don't do that very often. I also don't experience the sense of centrality which you seem to consider pretty important. At certain times, particularly when I am attending to visual perceptions, it seems that my consciousness is centered between and behind my eyes. But if the perceptions are of the night sky, or of a beautiful vista or sunset, my consciousness can sometimes seem to be located way out in the scene I am contemplating. If I am listening to music, my consciousness seems to fill the hall along with the music. If I am feeling pain, it seems as if I can push the actual location of the pain around simply by strongly attending to it. (I learned about this technique from accounts of POWs who reported that it is an effective way to tolerate torture). At first, it seems as if the pain is in the affected body part, e.g. a finger. But when concentrating attention on the pain itself, it seems to move, leave the body, and disappear altogether.

This, to me, seems perfectly compatible with my own explanation.
I can explain your feeling that you only sometimes have a sense of conscious self on the basis of variations in your level of introspective awareness. Just because you do not continuously introspectively examine the existence of your conscious self does not mean that it does not continuously exist.

If by a "logical centre" you mean a central process, then yes, I do experience that. It is as if there is some process identified with attention which I can willfully move around, not only in space to body parts and scenes of my environment, but also in time as I ponder the past and future, and also in the space of competing sources of information from various senses, imagination, and deliberate logical processing.

I deliberately referred to “logical centre” to distinguish it from “physical centre”. A logical centre of experience can be located anywhere, and can also be physically distributed in space.

At least from the above it would seem that we both have a “sense of conscious self”, even though we may differ in some of the detailed descriptions of the properties of this self.

I have gone into this detail in the hopes that you will agree to begin (or continue) our conversation along the lines I suggested earlier of each of us trying to understand the conscious experience of the other. That way, if one of us is nothing but a machine, we might be able to figure that out.

Why do you think this would be the case?

To give the analogical answers to what you wrote, the mechanism explaining the interaction of the radio station and the radio is via encoded EM radiation signals. The radio station remains undetectable from the radio. There is no special place within the radio in which the interaction between the radio station and the radio (unless you identify the antenna circuits with the Res Cogitans). The capability of reproducing transmitted radio programs is restricted and constrained to radios simply because you need such a device to discriminate, detect, amplify, and convert to sound, the transmitted signals. There are many more details about radio operation, but they are mere details. In short, in order to really understand radio operation and how it all hangs together, there are many details of electrical and electronic engineering that must be comprehended. Once they are understood, there are many empirical tests to verify that the radio really operates according to theory.

What you present here is pure speculation based on analogy. In the case of radio, there is a way that we (as observers) can identify the fact that there is a radio station involved, but in the case of consciousness you are presumably saying that it is impossible to detect either the presence of primordial consciousness (PC), or the transmissions between PC and the brain. You are not suggesting that the radio analogy is the actual mechanism, only that this is a mechanism which has some kinds of similarities. You are not presenting a rational and coherent explanatory hypothesis based on anything known about the human mind. You are not suggesting that any of this can be confirmed experimentally or empirically. In short, all you have is one big metaphysical speculation, with no basis in rational theory or emprical data. (The notion that angels push the planets around the sky falls into exactly the same category).

How does this PC speculation then lead to a rational account and explanation for the rest of reality?

Best Regards

 

[Lars Laborious]

I have already clearly stated in previous posts that I believe in the notion of Plato’s world of forms as a world of logical possibilities, need I repeat that again?

The problem, Moving Finger, is that since you don’t believe that concepts or virtual objects exist exept in a logical sense, and you also compare qualia with virtual objects, you’re saying that the experience of blueness are not real except in a logical sense. Yet, there is a big difference between a logical possibility and a quale: Possibility is just a word to describe that something real can change; a property of something already existing, (the happening of a singel possibility can be observed, but the possibility is still nothing). While a quale is so real that it’s observable.

 

[octelcogopod]

But Lars, doesn't it seem odd to you then, that it seems so far that a quale, or consciousness, cannot control the physical world.
If you dig up layer after layer, all you get are physical ones, why? Because there is no such thing as a quale.
We are trying to explain this consciousness, this.. Qualia, but nobody has ever been able to observe it anywhere.
Why? I think it is because qualia IS the physical world.
There is no difference between them.

See if we look at emergence, take, a human being.
Now if we separate everwy individual particle that makes up a human, we will see that all we get is a big mass of nothing.
A particle porridge so to speak.
But if we put it together in a meaningful sense, we get a human.
That's basically what emergence is.

So, the problem is that we do not have a complete blueprint of a human being on all emergent layers.
If we define an emergent layer as any meaningful composition of any number of particles, then we see that any bounding particles become an emergent layer.

So, a human being can be literally composed of thousands of layers.
And the only way to comprehend how consciousness is built, is to understand all these layers.

Bear in mind, all these layers are completely physical and empirically provable in nature.

A virtual qualia, to me, is simply, as software is to hardware, an emergent layer in existence.
Researching the function of a car engine on the quantum level may work, with a lot of research and resources, but that doesn't mean it's efficient.
Likewise, researching how consciousness works with the physical world is futile, at least now, there's plenty of evidence for it.

 

[Lars Laborious]

[...]We are trying to explain this consciousness, this.. Qualia, but nobody has ever been able to observe it anywhere.
Why? I think it is because qualia IS the physical world.
There is no difference between them.

Actually, qualia are all we observe. But you might be right, the physical and qualia might very well be the same. But that doesn't make qualia real only in a logical sense. If qualia and the physical are the same then raw consciousness are fundamental properties in the physical world.

 

[moving finger]

you don’t believe that concepts or virtual objects exist exept in a logical sense

Absolutely not. Where have I said this? I said that concepts and virtual objects can exist in a logical sense quite independently of any "mind" thinking about them, just as a circle can exist in a logical sense independently of any mind thinking about it. But it certainly does not follow from this (as you seem to think) that concepts, virtual objects and circles exist ONLY in a logical sense.

and you also compare qualia with virtual objects, you’re saying that the experience of blueness are not real except in a logical sense.

Not at all. To say "X can exist in a logical sense" is not saying "X exists only in a logical sense".

a quale is so real that it’s observable.

A quale is not observable in the scientific sense. Nobody else can "observe" your qualia, only you can, and then only internally within your conscious experience. This fits precisely with a quale being a virtual object that exists only in relation to your consciousness, and not as a physically objective entity.

Best Regards

 

[Lars Laborious]

A quale is not observable in the scientific sense. Nobody else can "observe" your qualia, only you can, and then only internally within your conscious experience.

Well, nobody can observe anything but their qualia, so nothing is observable in an objectively way. Science relies on qualia. Spite the irreliability and irreproducebility of human senses and qualia, we have to use them. All though we prefer using various devices and tools to increase objectively accuracy, quality and value of the information obtained, we have to rely on logic through thinking which is qualia.

 

[moving finger]

nobody can observe anything but their qualia, so nothing is observable in an objectively way. Science relies on qualia. Spite the irreliability and irreproducebility of human senses and qualia, we have to use them. All though we prefer using various devices and tools to increase objectively accuracy, quality and value of the information obtained, we have to rely on logic through thinking which is qualia.

And qualia are themselves nothing other than virtual entities constructed within the information processing which is consciousness.

Seems perfectly reasonable to me.

Best Regards

 

[Lars Laborious]

And qualia are themselves nothing other than virtual entities constructed within the information processing which is consciousness.

Maybe this time I get you right: You think qualia are virtual entities, which are real - not only in a logical sense, and exist outside the physical world, but do not interact with the physical all though they are constructed within an information processing that are generated by physical entites. No?

 

[moving finger]

Maybe this time I get you right: You think qualia are virtual entities, which are real - not only in a logical sense, and exist outside the physical world, but do not interact with the physical all though they are constructed within an information processing that are generated by physical entites. No?

If one dons a virtual reality headset which is plugged into a flight simulator, and via the sensory inputs from that headset one imagines that one is piloting a plane, then is the “plane” which one is piloting “real”? The plane exists as a virtual construct, it can be traced back to the real world only in terms of information flow from the simulator via the headset to your brain. There is no “real plane”, and since there is no real plane there is no plane to interact with the physical world, even though the plane is constructed (as a virtual entity) within the information processing that is going on in the “system” (in this case the “system” is simulator+headset+your brain).

Best Regards

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

Once again I apologize for being so intermittent in my responses. I feel badly that I have opened up this discussion and then not been able to find the time to respond to each of your arguments and questions. I will try to catch up with you by picking and choosing some of your responses that I think are key to our disagreements and misunderstandings. If I have missed some that you think still need addressing, please forgive me and then let me know that you think I need to address them. I'll try to go back and respond to them. Thank you for your patience.

Thus we have more multiplying metaphysical entities. Not only does your explanation need to posit some mysterious primordial consciousness (for which we have no empirical evidence), but also you need to posit some mysterious interaction via higher dimensions (for which interaction we also have no empirical evidence) whereby this mystical entity interfaces to the human brain?
Once again, Metzinger’s hypothesis requires no such metaphysical assumptions.

If I agreed with you, that Metzinger has provided a satisfactory explanation of consciousness, then I would also agree that we would have no need for my "multiplying metaphysical entities". But, as I have explained, I don't. Occam's Razor is a good guideline as long as you have competing explanations which adequately explain the phenomena in question. But if you don't have a satisfactory explanation, then you might have to accept something more complicated. The history of science is rife with such extensions and expansions, so we should not rule them out out of hand. In fact, my proposal of extending the notion of reality to some small finite number of extra dimensions of space and time, each of which is finite in extent, seems much less extravagant then some currently proposed ideas by real scientists of p-branes colliding in 11-dimensional space-time, some of which dimensions are infinite in extent. Even the MWI interpretation of QM with its infinities seems much more complex to me than my proposal.

In other words, there may be something more fundamental than the physical universe, which generates the physical universe, but if we have no way of knowing what this might be then it seems pointless (to me) to simply speculate on what it might be.

Does this perhaps explain why I do not have the “temerity” to tell you what that X’ is?

Of course it does. But I already knew that. I deliberately chose the word 'temerity' as a compliment to you on your method of thinking. I am the foolhardy speculative one in this conversation, not you. I have come up with some pretty outlandish ideas which I would like to have tested by intelligent, articulate people who have the patience to have a logical discussion with me. You are among the few with whom I consider it a valuable privilege to talk about these issues.

Now, I agree with you that "if we have no way of knowing what [the fundamental generator of the universe] might be then it seems pointless (to me) to simply speculate on what it might be". But I don't agree with the premise. I don't know for sure whether we have a way, but I suspect that we might have one or more ways of knowing. Here are two in particular:

1. The mathematical approach (this should be acceptable to science): We may posit some primordial, or essential, entity and then see if by logical deduction we can't derive an explanation for the phenomena we experience. (That is the approach I am trying to take here).

2. The "direct access" approach (this is undoubtedly not acceptable to science): We may have direct access somehow to information or knowledge revealing something of the nature of the primordial or essential entity responsible for the existence of the universe. This is the religious approach and to date it has produced a lot of erroneous and confusing explanations. It could be that it is the inadequacy of language which is responsible for the errors and confusion and that if we investigated the revelations in other ways than by scripting and preaching, we might get closer to the truth. (I am not taking that approach myself, but I leave the possibility open.)

What I am attacking is the notion that one can “know” what the fundamental source of everything is.

I do not claim to "know" what the fundamental source of everything is.

The most any of us can do is to adopt a premise that “the source of everything may be XYZ, and everything follows from that”.

That is all and exactly what I am trying to do.

Where you and I differ is that you are saying categorically that XYZ is something called “primordial consciousness”,

You have evidently misunderstood me. I don't make such a categorical claim. Instead, I say two things: (1) I take the primordial consciousness as an hypothesis in the same sense as one adopts an axiom in mathematics. There is no claim of truth. There is only a commitment to consider the hypothesis to be "true" during the process of deriving inferences from that hypothesis. And, (2) I say that I "believe" that hypothesis to be true. I have explained at the beginning of this thread what I mean when I say that "I believe something". I mean that I have judged that "something" against all mutually exclusive ideas I am aware of, and assigned numbers to each representing the probability of it being true in my judgment. If and only if the "something" gets a number greater than 50%, then I say "I believe it". The number indicates how strongly I believe it.

Of course I don't actually come up with these numbers in most cases (the beginning of this thread is exceptional) and if I do, the method is not very rigorous. But the point is not the numbers or their accuracy; the point is that I don't consider any of my beliefs to be categorical truths. Just as I don't consider any mathematical axioms to be categorical truth.

whereas I am saying that since I can explain consciousness as an emergent phenomenon of the physical world I see no reason to posit consciousness as being primordial.

I understand and agree with your position completely. If Metzinger's explanation were satisfactory to me I would immediately drop and lose interest in the idea of a primordial consciousness. But his explanation is not satisfactory to me and the PC idea and its implications offers what seem to me to be the most reasonable explanations for all the great mysteries. Name a mystery and I'll tell you how I think the PC idea can explain it.

For some reason you seem to believe that a concept necessarily requires a mind. It is easy to understand why – all of the concepts you are familiar with are the product of minds (an example of what I call anthropomorphic thinking). But it does not follow from this that a concept necessarily requires a mind.

There are a few reasons I believe a concept necessarily requires a mind. What you call "anthropomorphic thinking" is one of them. That is, all concepts I am familiar with are the product of minds. And you are right; this in itself does not imply the necessity of a mind.

Another reason is simply the definition of the word as I have come to understand it during my lifetime. A concept is an idea or a notion or a thought. These are all products of mental processes and a mind is a mental processor. It would be a distortion of language to try to separate these ideas in such a way that concepts could exist independently of mind.

A third reason is considerably more esoteric and rigorous. (Pauses...contemplates...decides to proceed) I'm glad you asked. Here goes:

According to Chomsky, we are born with certain innate language capabilities. According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of the various language elements develops in each of our minds in conjunction with the usage of the language by all the other people with whom we come into linguistic contact. The meanings of the various language elements are therefore individual and distinct. Any attempt to be precise about the meaning of any language element will result in the discovery that the meaning is different in some respect for any two individuals if the precision is carried out far enough. The precision of meaning of language elements is plenty adequate, however, to be useful in conducting most human affairs, although we still have ubiquitous arguments, disputes, wars, and other consequences of misunderstandings.

The subject and purpose of mathematics is to try to bring as much precision to the meaning of language statements as possible. In the opinion of some philosophers, and in my own opinion, mathematics is an attempt to answer the question, "What can we say with certainty?". I think that at this stage, in the 21st century, most mathematicians would say that the answer has been found, and it is "Nothing. We can say nothing with certainty". Nevertheless, there has been an enormous byproduct of mathematics answering the question, "What can we say that is useful?" The scientists and the engineers have taken those useful answers and applied them to provide us with the marvelous technology we all enjoy.

But back to the question of certainty. We can't say anything with certainty because we have no place to start. So the mathematical approach is to start with some primitive concepts without definition, name them (identify them with unique symbols), and declare some relationships among them. Then definitions of new concepts are made based on these primitive concepts, the relationships, and previous definitions. Next, propositions (coherent statements using the primitive and defined terms) are investigated to see if they are consistent with all previously accepted propositions and axioms. If they are, they are added to the body of accepted mathematics. So mathematics can't say a proposition is certain or true, but it can say that within a particular mathematical system, a proposition is consistent with that system.

Now we are in a position to entertain the question of whether concepts must inhere in a mind, or whether they might exist in the absence of all minds.

IMHO, this question is esoteric enough that it would be a waste of time to debate it in vernacular language, simply due to the ambiguous nature of language I described above. If we can come to any reasonable conclusions about it at all, I think it can only be done mathematically. And, in fact, I think it can't even be done in mathematics but requires meta-mathematics instead. The reason I think that is because we have a question concerning concepts as a concept itself and mathematics deals only with concepts.

Now, I think you would agree with me that the elements of mathematics are all concepts: from the primitive terms, to the axioms, to the relationships, to the propositions, to the logical rules. And I think you would agree that in the entire development of mathematics, these concepts were present in some human mind before they were first encoded in language symbols and recorded on paper to allow other humans to get the concept into their respective minds as ideas or thoughts.

So, in this picture, the concepts could be seen to exist in two different ways: as ideas in human minds, and as literature. (In fact there are historical examples of some of these concepts which existed for periods of time only as literature to be discovered later and absorbed by minds.) But even though some concepts might exist as literature and not be in any mind, I think you would agree that a mind was necessary to produce the literature in the first place.

We do not invent mathematics, we discover it. Similarly, we do not invent concepts, we discover them.

I am glad you stated your position so that I know how to proceed with this analysis. I think this is at the crux of our discussion and of our disagreement.

Mathematicians themselves are divided on the question of whether mathematics is discovered or invented. But for my part, I take what is probably a very unusual position that makes both answers correct: In a nutshell, PC invented mathematics (a finite amount of symbols and theorems), the results make up the Platonic world (a finite number and amount of "forms"), and humans (actually PC vicariously acting through human brains) discover it (just as Socrates suspected).

I realize this is an outlandishly sounding and preposterously looking and seemingly ridiculous position to take, but in spite of first impressions, it all makes perfect (whoops. I mean nearly perfect) sense to me. Instead of anticipating your questions and objections and going into them now, I will wait and let you ask or object if you would be so kind and then I will respond. This post is going to be long enough the way it is.

(more to follow)

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

Are you suggesting that explanations exist only within conscious minds?

It depends on what you mean by 'explanation'. If you mean a set of language symbols, then in that form it can exist in books outside of a conscious mind. But even in that case, the explanation can only have originated in a conscious mind. The point is that a conscious mind is necessary for the existence of an explanation (or any other concept for that matter).

What happened to the Platonic realm? Every concept that every mind has ever conceived already exists somewhere in the Platonic realm, just as every mathematical equation that any mind has conceived already exists in the same realm.

You explained somewhere that you believe that the Platonic realm exists in the same sense as the existence of all logical possibilities.

I may have trouble explaining this, but I think we are getting at the very essence of our disagreement. I deny that a space of all logical possibilities exists, or even can exist, in any form. Mathematically, I think your position is identical with the acceptance of the Axiom of Choice, and I am convinced that the acceptance of the AC leads to contradictions, and thus should not be accepted into the body of mathematics. (Nearly all mathematicians disagree with me but none I have talked to about it have changed my opinion. As an example, you might check out my thread "I Need Help with a Question of Foundations" at https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=49732 ).

In my view, the very notion of the concept "all" is ambiguous and if used in mathematical systems can lead to contradictions. Most of the well-known paradoxes in math are a result of such usage, the "set of all sets" being a familiar example.

In the axiomatic development of mathematical systems, some axiom such as the AC is logically necessary in order to rigorously define a set of infinite cardinality, such as the set of whole numbers. Cantor was the first to rigorously deduce the consequences of admitting sets of infinite cardinality and he immediately encountered what is known as The Cantor Paradox. Rather than denying the AC, and accepting a finite limit on the integers, mathematicians tried to avoid encountering the paradoxes by categorizing certain concepts and disallowing certain usages of those concepts. Russell was instrumental in developing this approach with his Theory of Types.

In my view, Goedel's Theorem is the general conclusion that any mathematical system robust enough to contain the infinite set of integers, must be either inconsistent or incomplete and you can't determine which. That is, there may be inconsistencies in the system which you may not be able to discover in principle. Mathematicians typically don't see it that way. They seem to see it only as a limit on what they might otherwise think they could achieve.

I think that recent developments regarding the Riemann Hypothesis can also be interpreted to support my position. It has been shown that the RH being true is consistent with the rest of the system and it has also been shown that the RH being false is also consistent with the rest of the system. In my view, that should be seen as an inconsistency in the system, and the way to fix it is to drop the AC.

So, after all that, in my view it is logically inconsistent to assume the existence of any space of all possibilities of anything. Therefore, I believe no such thing exists in any sense.

Instead, the only concepts which can be allowed into the body of mathematics without introducing inconsistency, are those which are explicitly taken as primitive and those which are explicitly defined in terms of previously defined terms and primitives. This means that a consistent body of mathematics must be finite in all respects.

Now I'll relate this to my speculations on the PC hypothesis, and our question of the existence of a Platonic realm. I argued above that any concept-space, which is what a Platonic realm must be, cannot exist without a prior mind. If the universe, or any part of it, depends on any concepts, such as numbers, equations, or laws, then there must have been a mind which originated those concepts prior to the instantiation of the universe. If minds first emerged associated with brains, that would be many billions of years too late.

On the other hand, if my PC hypothesis is true, the PC could in principle and in fact do all the necessary mathematics to develop the concepts necessary for the determination and instantiation of a universe. Otherwise, it is a huge mystery.

I know you don't like me quoting other thinkers in order to support my own views, but in this case I'll take the risk. In "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences," 1960, Eugene P. Wigner (as quoted by Clifford A. Pickover in "A Passion for Mathematics") said, "The enormous usefulness of mathematics in natural sciences is something bordering on the mysterious, and there is no rational explanation for it. It is not at all natural that 'laws of nature' exist, much less that man is able to discover them. The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve."

If you think you have a rational explanation for this borderline mystery, I am sure that scientists like Wigner would like to hear it. Since you used to work in science, you might get an audience.

For my part, I think my PC hypothesis explains all aspects of this near-mystery. But the closest I might get to a scientific audience for it is probably the people reading this forum.

I believe it best serves the interests of other participants in this forum if we present all of the arguments on this thread.

There are many questions that spring to mind...

Good. I'll try to answer them.

 What exactly is this primordial consciousness (PC), how does it work?

Out of fairness, I don't think I should be expected to answer this question any better than a scientist would be expected to answer a question like, "What exactly is energy and how does it work?" I admit that we know a lot about how energy works, but I don't think we know exactly what it is.

But I have answered this question before. I think the primordial consciousness is the ability to know (similar to energy being the ability to do work). I think that at its earliest essence, the PC looked a lot like a minimal Natural Individual as described by Rosenberg. It had a receptive principle, which constituted its ability to know, and it had (or maybe developed a short time later) an effective principle which could influence other things which might exist. (At the very beginning, nothing else existed so if the effective principle was indeed primordial, there was nothing for it to affect. There was also nothing for the receptive principle to receive either until somehow at least one bit of information became known. The acquisition of this primordial bit, and how and when it happened, is equivalent to a similar mystery occurring in any and all alternative explanations, and, as you have pointed out, this particular mystery may be unsolvable in principle and it would be a waste of time to work on it. I hope you don't expect more than that from me here.)

As for how it works, it is a learning process. Once the first bit was known, the PC could construct new (emergent) information by noticing (using the receptive principle) previously unnoticed (unknown) relationships among the then-known information. The body of known information would thus accumulate providing an ever richer set of information (the Platonic realm).

I cannot explain the details, but I know of two thinkers who have said that they have worked out the details of how the constituents of the observable universe could evolve through the type of learning process I have described. One of them is George Spencer-Brown whose work, "Laws of Form", I have not studied. The other is Chris Langan (http://ctmu.org/ ) who I have tried to understand. To the extent that I understand Chris' work, it corresponds with and supports my PC hypothesis.

 Why would, and how does, the PC create the Big Bang and the rest of the universe?

Why? To explore ways of adding novelty to the evolving Platonic realm and whatever other structures have evolved in the accumulating set of knowledge (reality). Yes, I believe a teleological principle began to work early on in this evolution and that it continues today.

How? By constructing conceptual substrates which are capable of containing structures with the ability to compute the results of algorithms, by choosing algorithms and installing them in these structures, by initializing the algorithms with initial sets of information, and by letting those algorithms grind out the consequential new reality. (Nothing in principle would prevent PC from interacting willfully in one of these running algorithms.)

 Why and how does the PC bring everything else into existence?

Why? For the same reason as above: to see what might produce interesting novelty.

How? By letting the various algorithms run unattended for the most part. I suspect that there are various points along the way, however, when PC might willfully alter the outcomes of the algorithms, to help things along. (Much like you might do if you were running one of those cellular automata on your computer and you had the ability to stop the action, change a few cells, and then let it resume.)

 What relationship is there between this PC and the rest of reality?

The same as the relationship between a mind and its thoughts.

 Was there any consciousness in the universe before conscious organic organisms evolved, if so how was it manifest?

Yes. PC was present from the beginning. It was manifest in the construction of (it would be my guess) myriad other universes and proto-universes as well as things like mathematical definitions, theorems, games, random garbage, and whatever else went through the PC mind before the really elegant combination of initial conditions for our universe was stumbled onto.

 Does PC infect otherwise unconscious organic beings and cause them to be conscious?

I cringe a little at your use of the word 'infect', but that's OK. I could only guess, but my guess would be about the same as the answer to the question, "Does a radio program ever come through a non-radio device or material structure which was not specifically designed to be a radio?" Well, yes. Some people have received radio programs through their dentures. I suppose that it might be possible for some otherwise unconscious organic beings to accidentally receive the signals being used by PC and thereby provide PC with some unexpected input. In fact, this might be the very mechanism driving the evolution of new and better proto-brains. The brain is a fantastically intricate device and the fossil record shows that it evolved to its present state of complexity.

 What is the mechanism by which PC interacts with the physical world?

I have described this before. There are two ways:

In the direction of PC acquiring information from the physical world, (perception) it starts with some biological sense organ developing information encoding some physical stimulus. That information is transformed in the brain, and it is transmitted to PC via a mechanism very similar to radio signals. In fact, it may even be radio signals themselves. What is needed is a path up the hierarchy of Natural Individuals using their effective principles to send and their receptive principles to receive. Each layer or level of the hierarchy is some sort of "universe" or "world" constructed as described above and each one involved in the interaction of PC with our physical world contains Natural Individuals capable of relaying information up and down the hierarchy. In each of those levels, my guess would be that there is a set of forces much like our electric and magnetic forces, (or it may be those same forces if they manifest effects in those other dimensions) which are capable of transmitting encoded signals.

In the direction of PC sending command signals to cause willful action in an organism, the same sort of radio communication mechanism is used as described above (there is a two-way radio link). The command signals appear in the brain structure in what would be equivalent to the antenna circuits of a radio. Those structures must be able to be influenced by the signals below the threshold of the HUP. Penrose and Hameroff have suggested a mechanism in the neurons which I believe could operate this way. The dimers making up the neuronal microtubles could change their bi-stable state in response to the outside signals and yet, to within the precision possible with our instruments, the changes of state would appear to be random. This way, the laws of physics would not be broken but macro physical effects could be willfully achieved. (PC, of course, is the only conscious entity in this picture, so PC is the only entity with free will.)

 What would happen if a human being was not infected with this PC, would it be a zombie?

No, it would not be a zombie. It would be asleep or dead.

I can't resist noting at this point that science has as yet absolutely no reasonable explanation for sleep in spite of the fact that sleep in animals should IMHO be seen as a huge counterexample to the theory of evolution as the sole explanation for animal behavior. In my PC hypothesis, sleep has a perfectly understandable explanation and, if we didn't already know about sleep, my hypothesis would predict it.

(there are many more questions, but let’s start with these)

I agree. This might be a good place to stop.

Thanks again for your thoughts and interest, MF

Warm regards to all,

Paul

(PS : The phoenix is a myth – perhaps not a good symbol to associate with the notion of primordial consciousness?)

I didn't mean that PC was the phoenix. What I really meant was that the notion of dualism was the phoenix. I made a typo when I typed that title and typed 'dualist' when I meant to type 'dualism'. When I noticed the typo, I realized that it made me the phoenix, and since I haven't yet been reduced to ashes, it didn't quite fit. I didn't bother to change the typo, though, so maybe I will end up being a myth.

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi octelcogopod,

Paul if I may, I have a couple of questions about this primordial consciousness..

Of course. My apologies for being so late to respond.

First off, what IS this fundamental consciousness?

I'd say it is the ability to know. I explained this in more detail in my last responses to MF.

Is it made of anything?

I'd say "no". Since it is primordial, it was not made. But you probably meant, of what is it composed? I'd say it is composed simply of an ability. It might be a general ability, or it might specifically be the ability to know. Or it might be a Natural Individual in the sense of Gregg Rosenberg with specific principles or capabilities.

Can we empirically measure and predict it in any way?

I would guess that we might be able to. Physicists and cosmologists already talk about the information in a system and they have devised ways of measuring information. I think by upgrading that approach to talking about knowledge, as some on this forum have suggested, we might be able to extend the laws of Thermodynamics to include the effects of PC on the world. Those are just wild guesses, though.

Is it the direct opposite of the physical world? (Or at least, something that contrasts it sort of)

I wouldn't say the direct opposite, but I would say that PC contrasts with the concepts in the PC which constitute all the rest of reality. I'm sure that would qualify as "dualism" to some.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[PIT2]

I can't resist noting at this point that science has as yet absolutely no reasonable explanation for sleep in spite of the fact that sleep in animals should IMHO be seen as a huge counterexample to the theory of evolution as the sole explanation for animal behavior. In my PC hypothesis, sleep has a perfectly understandable explanation and, if we didn't already know about sleep, my hypothesis would predict it.

Interesting reply, but this bit surprised me since i wasnt aware there exists an explanatory problem in science with regard to sleep. Can u explain?

 

[Paul Martin]

Interesting reply, but this bit surprised me since i wasnt aware there exists an explanatory problem in science with regard to sleep. Can u explain?

I'll try. Not only do all animals sleep, but all individual animals sleep and many of them spend a significant amount of time sleeping. There is no known reason for sleep. There is recent evidence of mother whales staying awake for weeks or months on end in order to keep their newborn calves from drowning which indicates that sleep is not necessary. During sleep an animal is more vulnerable to predation and other risks to life. During sleep, the animal is unable to perform many necessary life functions, like eating, pursuing mates, elimination, fighting, fleeing, finding or constructing shelter, etc. Animals have evolved to survive at all times of the day and night. Some, like cats, can successfully function day or night. If Darwinian evolution were the sole explanation of animal behavior, these facts would indicate that any animal that slept very much should have gone extinct long ago. Yet, we find the phenomenon ubiquitous.

I don't know if scientists see that as a contradiction and a problem, but I sure do.

Thanks for asking.

Paul

 

[moving finger]

Greetings Paul,

Once again I apologize for being so intermittent in my responses. I feel badly that I have opened up this discussion and then not been able to find the time to respond to each of your arguments and questions. I will try to catch up with you by picking and choosing some of your responses that I think are key to our disagreements and misunderstandings. If I have missed some that you think still need addressing, please forgive me and then let me know that you think I need to address them. I'll try to go back and respond to them. Thank you for your patience.

Hey, no problem Paul. I know exactly what you mean, I also have many demands on my time which tend to be very sporadic. Sometimes I can spend hours on here, other times I have to go days without access. I do appreciate it that you take the time and trouble to respond.

If I agreed with you, that Metzinger has provided a satisfactory explanation of consciousness, then I would also agree that we would have no need for my "multiplying metaphysical entities". But, as I have explained, I don't.

Paul, I’m sorry, but you have not explained why you don’t agree. You have simply said (in effect) “I do not agree with Metzingers’s hypothesis” and that’s it. No explanation why. I am trying to understand exactly why you reject his explanation. Can you tell me?

Occam's Razor is a good guideline as long as you have competing explanations which adequately explain the phenomena in question. But if you don't have a satisfactory explanation, then you might have to accept something more complicated.

I agree. And to my mind Metzinger’s explanation IS a satisfactory explanation. I accept that you do not agree with me, but what I need to know is why. What is it about Metzinger’s explanation which you think is wrong, and why?

Even the MWI interpretation of QM with its infinities seems much more complex to me than my proposal.

I agree. I reject the MWI interpretation also (but this is not the right thread to get into that)

I don't know for sure whether we have a way, but I suspect that we might have one or more ways of knowing. Here are two in particular:

1. The mathematical approach (this should be acceptable to science): We may posit some primordial, or essential, entity and then see if by logical deduction we can't derive an explanation for the phenomena we experience. (That is the approach I am trying to take here).

The problem (it seems to me) is that your approach needs to assume something extremely metaphysically complex, this “primordial consciousness”, which itself has no explanation. It seems an easy way out (to me) to generate a complex universe if one assumes complexity as the starting point. But most scientific theories do just the opposite – they explain how complexity arises from simple and uncomplicated beginnings. And to me, the more powerful theories are the ones that can start with the minimum number of very simple assumptions, and build the entire beautiful complexity of our universe out of these simple beginnings. If we need to “build in” part of the complexity into the premises (as it seems we need to do with your idea of primordial consciousness) then this seems a less useful and less powerful explanation.

On top of this, I have yet to see how your mathematical approach works……

2. The "direct access" approach (this is undoubtedly not acceptable to science): We may have direct access somehow to information or knowledge revealing something of the nature of the primordial or essential entity responsible for the existence of the universe. This is the religious approach and to date it has produced a lot of erroneous and confusing explanations. It could be that it is the inadequacy of language which is responsible for the errors and confusion and that if we investigated the revelations in other ways than by scripting and preaching, we might get closer to the truth. (I am not taking that approach myself, but I leave the possibility open.)

This is akin to the “revelation” approach. “I know it is true because I have had a vision”, that kind of thing? I think most rational agents could be forgiven for rejecting such an approach outright.

If Metzinger's explanation were satisfactory to me I would immediately drop and lose interest in the idea of a primordial consciousness. But his explanation is not satisfactory to me

But still I have no idea why

There are a few reasons I believe a concept necessarily requires a mind. What you call "anthropomorphic thinking" is one of them. That is, all concepts I am familiar with are the product of minds. And you are right; this in itself does not imply the necessity of a mind.

Another reason is simply the definition of the word as I have come to understand it during my lifetime. A concept is an idea or a notion or a thought. These are all products of mental processes and a mind is a mental processor. It would be a distortion of language to try to separate these ideas in such a way that concepts could exist independently of mind.

And for the same reason (and this is indeed anthropomorphic thinking) most people will say that “understanding” is something that only humans can do, because they are simply used to thinking in terms of “understanding is what humans do”. But this is simply an instinctive, intuitive “gut reaction” response. My point is that it makes no sense to discuss who or what can possesses “understanding”, or who or what can possesses “consciousness”, until we can agree objective operational definitions of “understanding” and “consciousness”.

According to Chomsky, we are born with certain innate language capabilities. According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of the various language elements develops in each of our minds in conjunction with the usage of the language by all the other people with whom we come into linguistic contact. The meanings of the various language elements are therefore individual and distinct. Any attempt to be precise about the meaning of any language element will result in the discovery that the meaning is different in some respect for any two individuals if the precision is carried out far enough. The precision of meaning of language elements is plenty adequate, however, to be useful in conducting most human affairs, although we still have ubiquitous arguments, disputes, wars, and other consequences of misunderstandings.

I agree with this 100%. Langauge is inherently ambiguous, but it is OK for it to be ambiguous for 99.9% of the cases in which language is used. In common, everyday usage, we do not need to agree a rigorous definition of “consciousness” in order to simply relay the approximate meaning that we think we have of the term from one person to another (because in everyday usage of the term we are almost always referring to human consciousness). Approximation and ambiguity in meaning is quite acceptable for everyday use. (This is precisely why I often object to “common and everyday definitions of words” derived from simple dictionaries, because the everyday meaning of a word is NOT necessarily the meaning that the same word has in philosophical or scientific circles). When we come to debate fundamental principles, as we are doing here, it is often impossible to make progress unless and until we can agree on rigorous definitions which transcend the simple dictionary definitions. If “consciousness” does not mean precisely the same to you as it does to me, then the chances are we will never arrive at an agreement as to what gives rise to consciousness.

The subject and purpose of mathematics is to try to bring as much precision to the meaning of language statements as possible.

I would agree this could be seen as one of the purposes of mathematics.

In the opinion of some philosophers, and in my own opinion, mathematics is an attempt to answer the question, "What can we say with certainty?".

We can say many things with certainty, but all certainty (even mathematical certainty) rests on premises – and premises are propositions assumed to be true. Fundamentally, everything we say (including mathematical assertions) is based on assumptions.

I think that at this stage, in the 21st century, most mathematicians would say that the answer has been found, and it is "Nothing. We can say nothing with certainty".

I replied above before I read this sentence. Thus I do not quite agree with you. I think we CAN say “assuming X, then Y is certain”. To this extent we can say something with certainty. The problem is that our “certainty” rests on assumption. And this is precisely the problem I have with positing anything as being primordial.

Mathematicians themselves are divided on the question of whether mathematics is discovered or invented. But for my part, I take what is probably a very unusual position that makes both answers correct: In a nutshell, PC invented mathematics (a finite amount of symbols and theorems), the results make up the Platonic world (a finite number and amount of "forms"), and humans (actually PC vicariously acting through human brains) discover it (just as Socrates suspected).

PC invented mathematics? So this PC (and by the way, we still have no idea what created the PC) took “nothing” and somehow created mathematics (lord knows how) from this “nothing”? A bit like “in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was God, and God said let there be light”? That seems either religious or metaphysical to me. Sorry.

The problem is that this is not an “explanatory hypothesis”. Your premise is that somehow this exceedingly complex PC already exists (with no explanation as to how or why) and for some reason this PC “creates mathematics” (with no explanation as to how or why). It sounds exactly like the bible story of Genesis.

The point is that a conscious mind is necessary for the existence of an explanation (or any other concept for that matter).

With this I disagree. An explanation is simply a particular set of information. And in just the same way that mathematics and concepts exist in a logical realm quite independently of conscious minds, so too do explanations.

I am curious. I thought that you believed in Plato’s world of “forms” – mathematical concepts. And yet you do not think that concepts, or explanations, can exist outside of a conscious mind? Can you explain?

You explained somewhere that you believe that the Platonic realm exists in the same sense as the existence of all logical possibilities.

Yes, that is correct.

I deny that a space of all logical possibilities exists, or even can exist, in any form.

That’s fine. I don’t.

In my view, the very notion of the concept "all" is ambiguous and if used in mathematical systems can lead to contradictions. Most of the well-known paradoxes in math are a result of such usage, the "set of all sets" being a familiar example.

I disagree. These alleged paradoxes result from particular types of self-reference, not simply from the concept of “all”.

Instead, the only concepts which can be allowed into the body of mathematics without introducing inconsistency, are those which are explicitly taken as primitive and those which are explicitly defined in terms of previously defined terms and primitives. This means that a consistent body of mathematics must be finite in all respects.

As you yourself have pointed out, Godel has already shown that no sufficiently complex system of mathematics can be both consistent and complete. A finite system is a complete system. How then can a consistent body of mathematics be “finite in all respects”?

Now I'll relate this to my speculations on the PC hypothesis, and our question of the existence of a Platonic realm. I argued above that any concept-space, which is what a Platonic realm must be, cannot exist without a prior mind. If the universe, or any part of it, depends on any concepts, such as numbers, equations, or laws, then there must have been a mind which originated those concepts prior to the instantiation of the universe.

I fail to see this at all.
Saying that something exists as a logical possibility is not the same as saying that any part of the universe depends on that something.

On the other hand, if my PC hypothesis is true, the PC could in principle and in fact do all the necessary mathematics to develop the concepts necessary for the determination and instantiation of a universe. Otherwise, it is a huge mystery.

Your PC is (to me) a huge mystery. Your premise is exceedingly more complex that the premise that the universe emerged from a quantum fluctuation. Setting aside the premise of the quantum fluctuation, what else is a mystery to you?

I know you don't like me quoting other thinkers in order to support my own views, but in this case I'll take the risk.

I apologise. It is not that I “don’t like you quoting other thinkers”, it is that I do not believe “other thinkers” can be a substitute for one’s own thinking. If you can present the argument in question then I will accept (or refute) it, but I cannot accept an argument based on “somebody else believes this, therefore it must be true” (because then I would believe in Santa Claus, tooth fairies and leprechauns, to name just a few). When you have quoted people like Penrose and Chalmers (for example) and I have challenged you to provide the argument, you have declined.

In "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences," 1960, Eugene P. Wigner (as quoted by Clifford A. Pickover in "A Passion for Mathematics") said, "The enormous usefulness of mathematics in natural sciences is something bordering on the mysterious, and there is no rational explanation for it. It is not at all natural that 'laws of nature' exist, much less that man is able to discover them. The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve."

There is in fact a simple rational explanation.
The universe is (I believe) constrained both to be consistent, and to behave in a regular fashion. If it were not consistent or regular it would not have reached this level of complexity that we have today. Mathematics includes regular descriptions of everything that is consistent. Thus it is not unreasonable that we find many parallels between mathematics and the way the universe works, since they both have a basis in regularity and consistency. To me it’s not mysterious, it’s a beautifully rational symmetry.

For my part, I think my PC hypothesis explains all aspects of this near-mystery. But the closest I might get to a scientific audience for it is probably the people reading this forum.

Now you presumably believe that your PC generates mathematics, and that mathematics in turn generates the physical universe. Thus you have a very similar belief to mine in terms of the relationship between mathematics and the physical universe. You thus have an explanation for the supposed mysterious relationship between mathematics and the physical universe, which is not a million miles from my explanation. Why would either of us believe that Wigner is correct in asserting that we do not understand this relationship?

The difference is that you need to posit this metaphysically complex PC to bring it all into existence (and one might also ask why the PC chooses to do this), whereas I posit a simple quantum fluctuation.

see part 2...

 

[moving finger]

... part 2

 What exactly is this primordial consciousness (PC), how does it work?

Out of fairness, I don't think I should be expected to answer this question any better than a scientist would be expected to answer a question like, "What exactly is energy and how does it work?" I admit that we know a lot about how energy works, but I don't think we know exactly what it is.

To be fair, I don’t think your analogy is accurate. A property such as energy is characterized in very formal and rational ways, and this property can be contained within the consistent framework of mathematics which describes our universe. How energy “works” is therefore reduced to a formal and consistent mathematical description. We can show how energy is linked to other properties of the world through straightforward rational and deterministic mathematical relationships.

But your PC is something completely different. It seems to be totally inaccessible from the material universe, we cannot measure it or detect it, we have no idea what properties it might have (we can only speculate) and we have no idea how it is related or linked to other properties of the world (we can only speculate). We cannot even demonstrate any relationship between PC and mathematics (we can only speculate). This PC seems to play the role of an omnipotent but inaccessible God which creates everything from nothing based on a whim.

But I have answered this question before. I think the primordial consciousness is the ability to know (similar to energy being the ability to do work). I think that at its earliest essence, the PC looked a lot like a minimal Natural Individual as described by Rosenberg. It had a receptive principle, which constituted its ability to know, and it had (or maybe developed a short time later) an effective principle which could influence other things which might exist. (At the very beginning, nothing else existed so if the effective principle was indeed primordial, there was nothing for it to affect. There was also nothing for the receptive principle to receive either until somehow at least one bit of information became known. The acquisition of this primordial bit, and how and when it happened, is equivalent to a similar mystery occurring in any and all alternative explanations, and, as you have pointed out, this particular mystery may be unsolvable in principle and it would be a waste of time to work on it. I hope you don't expect more than that from me here.)

In the beginning, then, we have a PC which can do absolutely nothing but examine its own navel?

Thus you have exactly the same problems with a priori assumptions that other theories have, BUT you have also added the additional and unnecessary metaphysical premise of an unexplained self-referential complex entity called the PC. This is multiplying concepts unnecessarily.

As for how it works, it is a learning process. Once the first bit was known, the PC could construct new (emergent) information by noticing (using the receptive principle) previously unnoticed (unknown) relationships among the then-known information.

How can the first bit be known if the PC exists in a vacuum? As you have acknowledged, this is a problem for your theory. It is the equivalent of the premise of “quantum fluctuation” in conventional physical theories. But the difference in your case is that you also need to posit the prior existence of this complex metaphysical entity called PC.

 Why would, and how does, the PC create the Big Bang and the rest of the universe?

Why? To explore ways of adding novelty to the evolving Platonic realm and whatever other structures have evolved in the accumulating set of knowledge (reality). Yes, I believe a teleological principle began to work early on in this evolution and that it continues today.

Thus you are also assuming that this PC had some kind of intelligence? That it also possessed desires, and wants, volitions, intentions? Your PC seems to get more and more complex – and all of this complexity we are supposed to believe is primordial with no explanation? That’s a very hefty metaphysical concept to posit as a premise – akin to the concept of God and Genesis.

How? By constructing conceptual substrates which are capable of containing structures with the ability to compute the results of algorithms, by choosing algorithms and installing them in these structures, by initializing the algorithms with initial sets of information, and by letting those algorithms grind out the consequential new reality. (Nothing in principle would prevent PC from interacting willfully in one of these running algorithms.)

What are these “substrates” and “structures” made of?
Does it actually create matter and energy, or is the existence of matter and energy simply an illusion created by the PC? (I seem to recall in an earlier post you suggested that the physical universe is actually an illusion constructed by the PC?)

 Why and how does the PC bring everything else into existence?

Why? For the same reason as above: to see what might produce interesting novelty.

The PC thus has some internal primordial structure, the source of its curiousity?
Is the PC thus simply playing/experimenting with mathematics? Is that basically what it is doing?
Does it follow that the PC creates everything that is logically possible, or does the PC only create a subset of what is logically possible?
If the latter, why would it choose one particular set of logical possibilities rather than another?

How? By letting the various algorithms run unattended for the most part.

Run unattended? Thus the PC does actually create matter and energy, and it is in effect building a computer for the running of these algorithms? Or are you suggesting that algorithms can run “unattended” with no physical substrate?

I suspect that there are various points along the way, however, when PC might willfully alter the outcomes of the algorithms, to help things along. (Much like you might do if you were running one of those cellular automata on your computer and you had the ability to stop the action, change a few cells, and then let it resume.)

The PC has definite internal and innate objectives, ambitions and intentions then, but it is obviously incapable of “figuring out for itself” how an algorithm will work out and thus needs to create a substrate (a computer) on which to run the algorithm?

 What relationship is there between this PC and the rest of reality?

The same as the relationship between a mind and its thoughts.

Thus our universe is not physical after all, it does not exist as a physical reality, everything is being created as part of a virtual reality simulation within the mind of the PC?

 Was there any consciousness in the universe before conscious organic organisms evolved, if so how was it manifest?

Yes. PC was present from the beginning. It was manifest in the construction of (it would be my guess) myriad other universes and proto-universes as well as things like mathematical definitions, theorems, games, random garbage, and whatever else went through the PC mind before the really elegant combination of initial conditions for our universe was stumbled onto.

Sorry, Paul. Why don’t you just call this PC God? From your description, it seems to me that it is very similar in many respects to the concept of God.

Do you believe (a) our universe is the only logically possible universe based on “elegant combination of initial conditions” containing intelligent life-forms, and (b) if the answer to (a) is in the negative, has the PC also created all these other logically possible universes in parallel to our own universe, and (c) if the answer to (b) is in the negative, why not?

 Does PC infect otherwise unconscious organic beings and cause them to be conscious?

I suppose that it might be possible for some otherwise unconscious organic beings to accidentally receive the signals being used by PC and thereby provide PC with some unexpected input.

The PC receives input only from beings which are conscious? I thought the PC received input from everything (in which case there must be some kind of signal being transmitted from everything back to the PC, not just from conscious beings)?
If it is the case that the PC received input from everything, why does it apparently single out only very particular structures to be the apparent centres of consciousness – why cannot the PC make anything or everything conscious? Or perhaps it does?

 What is the mechanism by which PC interacts with the physical world?

I have described this before. There are two ways:
In the direction of PC acquiring information from the physical world, (perception) it starts with some biological sense organ developing information encoding some physical stimulus. That information is transformed in the brain, and it is transmitted to PC via a mechanism very similar to radio signals.

Thus the PC cannot gain any information about the world in the absence of these biological transmitters with brains? Is that what you are saying?
It follows then that the PC was totally blind to the universe (received no information from the universe) for the first few billion years of existence, is that correct?

In the direction of PC sending command signals to cause willful action in an organism, the same sort of radio communication mechanism is used as described above (there is a two-way radio link).

Are you saying that organisms are not the sources of their willful actions, that in fact all organisms are like dumb robots, centrally controlled by this single PC?

 What would happen if a human being was not infected with this PC, would it be a zombie?

No, it would not be a zombie. It would be asleep or dead.
I can't resist noting at this point that science has as yet absolutely no reasonable explanation for sleep in spite of the fact that sleep in animals should IMHO be seen as a huge counterexample to the theory of evolution as the sole explanation for animal behavior. In my PC hypothesis, sleep has a perfectly understandable explanation and, if we didn't already know about sleep, my hypothesis would predict it.

Can you explain how your hypothesis predicts that animals would need sleep?
Why does the PC choose to vacate most animals on a regular basis? Why would the PC not want to keep a human being conscious for 24 hours a day, for example?
An animal who can stay conscious for 24 hours a day would have a significant survival advantage – why doesn’t the PC do this?
Why does the PC choose not to completely vacate dolphin brains in the same way (see below)?

Interesting reply, but this bit surprised me since i wasnt aware there exists an explanatory problem in science with regard to sleep. Can u explain?

I'll try. Not only do all animals sleep, but all individual animals sleep and many of them spend a significant amount of time sleeping. There is no known reason for sleep.

Paul, did you not read the link I pasted in my first post in this very thread? Apparently not. Here it is again :

http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio.NC/0512026

Thus to say “there is no known reason for sleep” is incorrect. There are various scientific hypotheses which attempt to explain why animals need to sleep (and fundamentally, all “reasons” are hypotheses). The generally accepted explanation is that normal brain activity produces toxins in the form of free radicals which eventually lead to cell damage, and the only way the body is able to prevent and repair this damage is to spend significant periods of “brain shutdown” when it is effectively “clearing out” these free radicals. Unlike most of the rest of the body, the cells which make up our brain are (for the most part) not replaced during our lifetimes. If brain cells die, they are gone for good. Thus it is vitally important to ensure that they do not die in the first place.
Rats die within 10 to 20 days of sustained sleep deprivation, and studies have shown direct evidence for brain cell damage caused by sleep deprivation (Scientific American, November 2003). This hypothesis is supported by the observation that smaller animals tend to require more sleep. An elephant sleeps for a total of just 3 to 4 hours per day, humans require 7 to 8, and ferrets sleep 14 hours a day. Why? Because smaller animals tend to have a higher metabolism, faster heartrate, hence toxins and free radicals build up much faster than in larger animals.

Paul, you may not believe these hypotheses, but your lack of belief does not mean “there are no known reasons”, it means simply that you do not believe the hypotheses are correct.

Perhaps you could explain why you think these scientific hypotheses are incorrect?

There is recent evidence of mother whales staying awake for weeks or months on end in order to keep their newborn calves from drowning which indicates that sleep is not necessary.

I’m interested to know where you found the above snippet of information?
Whales (and dolphins) are mammals which spend almost all of their lives under water. As mammals, they need to come to the water’s surface to breathe. What do you suppose would happen if one of these creatures (either adult or young) completely “lost consciousness” (which is what sleep basically is) for an extended period of time? They would most likely drown! Doesn’t this seem to you like a very good “reason” why whales and dolphins have evolved to have some way of “staying awake” almost continuously?

In the case of dolphins there is direct evidence that these animals can shut down half of their brain at a time, keeping the other half “awake”. Scientists have studied this phenomenon in dolphins, using electroencephalography. In this process, electrodes hooked up to the head measure electricity levels in the brain. The resulting electroencephalograms (EEGs) of dolphin brains demonstrate that in the sleep cycle, half of the dolphin's brain does indeed "shut down" while the other half is still active. Researchers have observed that dolphins are in this state for approximately eight hours a day, roughly the same period that humans sleep for. It’s not unreasonable to think that whales do something similar (but of course whales are not so amenable to study with EEG probes as dolphins are).

This does not mean that ‘sleep is not necessary”, it just means that different animals have found different ways to deal with the necessity of sleep.

During sleep an animal is more vulnerable to predation and other risks to life. During sleep, the animal is unable to perform many necessary life functions, like eating, pursuing mates, elimination, fighting, fleeing, finding or constructing shelter, etc. Animals have evolved to survive at all times of the day and night. Some, like cats, can successfully function day or night. If Darwinian evolution were the sole explanation of animal behavior, these facts would indicate that any animal that slept very much should have gone extinct long ago. Yet, we find the phenomenon ubiquitous.

You are right - for any animal living in the wild, it just doesn't seem very smart to design in a mandatory eight-hour (plus or minus) period of near-total unconsciousness every day. Yet that is exactly what evolution has done. So there must be a pretty good reason for it!

Reptiles, birds and mammals all sleep. That is, they become unconscious to their surroundings for periods of time. Some fish and amphibians reduce their awareness but do not become unconscious like the higher vertebrates do. Insects do not appear to sleep, although they may become inactive in daylight or darkness.

Different animals sleep in different ways. Some animals, like humans, prefer to sleep in one long session. Other animals (dogs, for example) like to sleep in many short bursts. Some sleep at night, while others sleep during the day.

The conclusion, therefore, is that sleep IS in fact a very necessary function in ALL animals (including whales and dolphins) - otherwise, as you rightly point out, animals which do not need to sleep would have evolved and these would have dominated the planet by now. The fact that we do not see such animals dominating the planet is a very strong indication that sleep is indeed a very essential and necessary part of most animals’ lives.

I don't know if scientists see that as a contradiction and a problem, but I sure do.

And how does your PC premise explain sleep?
Given that staying awake 24 hours a day provides a significant competitive advantage, and if we assume that it is physically possible for animals to stay awake 24 hours a day, why do you think the PC doesn’t actually do this?

There is no contradiction or problem with the physicalist explanation, as I have already pointed out above. But if you do not accept the explanations I have offered, could you perhaps tell us why you don’t accept them, and whether you have what you consider to be a better explanation?

Best Regards

 

[Lars Laborious]

If one dons a virtual reality headset which is plugged into a flight simulator, and via the sensory inputs from that headset one imagines that one is piloting a plane, then is the “plane” which one is piloting “real”? The plane exists as a virtual construct, it can be traced back to the real world only in terms of information flow from the simulator via the headset to your brain. There is no “real plane”, and since there is no real plane there is no plane to interact with the physical world, even though the plane is constructed (as a virtual entity) within the information processing that is going on in the “system” (in this case the “system” is simulator+headset+your brain).

Ah, so you think that qualia are not representations of physical entities? Or at least don't have to be?
Sorry, but I’m still not sure what exactly you think qualia is. You’ve said that:

[...] qualia are themselves nothing other than virtual entities constructed within the information processing which is consciousness.

And that a quale is:

[...] a virtual object that exists only in relation to your consciousness.

You’ve also said:

I am not postulating that Plato's world of forms actually exists except in a logical sense.

But then you said:

[...] concepts and virtual objects can exist in a logical sense quite independently of any "mind" thinking about them, just as a circle can exist in a logical sense independently of any mind thinking about it. But it certainly does not follow from this (as you seem to think) that concepts, virtual objects and circles exist ONLY in a logical sense.

Aren’t the two last statements contradictory?

 

[selfAdjoint]

You’ve also said:

I am not postulating that Plato's world of forms actually exists except in a logical sense.

But then you said:

[...] concepts and virtual objects can exist in a logical sense quite independently of any "mind" thinking about them, just as a circle can exist in a logical sense independently of any mind thinking about it. But it certainly does not follow from this (as you seem to think) that concepts, virtual objects and circles exist ONLY in a logical sense.

Aren’t the two last statements contradictory?

Yeah, MF, what about that? Just how do those unperceived circles exist? Or take triangles; any three rocks, if looked at by a human, will be seen to form a triangle. Does the triangle, as opposed to the rocks, exist when nobody is looking?

 

[octelcogopod]

selfAdjoint that's an excellent question..

It can be said that the universe in itself doesn't exist when nobody is looking..

It's sort of like, either everything exists regardless of a perceiver, or nothing does.
It is my opinion that you cannot have degrees in the universe.
Everything is absolute, but it is observers that apply degrees because they do not have the complete truth.

That being said, if we apply absolute truth to the triangle example, then we end up with a question;

If all observers are physical, and everything around the observer is physical, is the triangle a physical entity spawned by the observer looking at the rocks?
Maybe, if everything was physical in that everything exists as either 1 or 0, it either exists, or it doesn't, regardless of HOW it exists, or what it is composed of, then the triangle is simply an emergent physical "layer", stemming in some odd way from the physical world.

THis of course, requires that we prove empirically that EVERYTHING exists in some sort of physical state; defining physical as something which is not dependant on an observer.
Then again everything that is defined as "mental" could be physical, and vice versa.

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

I am overwhelmed with gratitude for the time and energy you are spending on trying to understand my ideas. Your incredulity is understandable, but your patience and perseverance are surprising and much appreciated. Thank you.

In an attempt to try to shorten our exchanges, instead of responding point by point, I'll try to address the general problems between us as I see them, and then go on to answer some specific questions where I think they still present some problem in our mutual understanding.

The problem (it seems to me) is that your approach needs to assume something extremely metaphysically complex, this “primordial consciousness”, which itself has no explanation. It seems an easy way out (to me) to generate a complex universe if one assumes complexity as the starting point.

I think this indicates one of our biggest misunderstandings. I don't see the PC as metaphysically complex at all, but instead I see it as being as rudimentary and simple as possible.

I think the thing you are missing is that I see PC as a minimal ability at the "outset", the outset being the acquisition of that first single bit of knowledge. At that point in time, there was no space, no time, no substance, or energy, or information (save that one bit), or concepts, or anything else which we might consider to exist, except for that ability to know and that one bit which it somehow came to know. The "consciousness" at that moment was truly primitive and primordial, thus "PC".

Now, as I have admitted several times elsewhere, it causes some confusion to continue to identify that consciousness as "primordial" after it underwent who-knows-how-many evolutionary changes resulting in an enormous increase in potential and knowledge. I maintain that the PC, (or by this time it should probably be called CC - for Cosmic Consciousness) became "extremely metaphysically complex" by the time of the Big Bang.

So, in a sense, your interpretation of my ideas is correct: I do maintain that PC was complex prior to the Big Bang. But I do not claim that the Big Bang was the origin of reality. Far from it. I think that in the big picture, the Big Bang is a relatively recent and comparatively sophisticated event. A huge amount of development happened prior to the BB, and to answer an outstanding question of yours, -- What was PC doing all those eons prior to the emergence of brains? -- there was a huge amount of work done in figuring out how to make a stable universe and get it going in an interesting way.

The very beginning was extremely simple but by the time of the BB things were already very complex. Complexity over time has been increasing increasingly steeply here on Earth for the past few billion years. Yet, nothing IMHO in reality is infinite. We are just talking about some extremely large but finite quantities.

One aspect of my ideas, which I haven't mentioned much in these threads, is that the notion of time is more complex than we normally think it to be. With SR we have come to understand that time is more complex than the simple continuum as conceived by Newton and Kant, but people still seem reluctant to consider the possibility of multiple, independent, temporal dimensions. In my view of the big picture, in which the Big Bang of our particular universe is a single event, there are many, or at least several separate dimensions of time, the dimension in which the evolution of our universe takes place being only one. But I think it is even more complex than that. (I don't know whether to get into that right now. ... I think not. I'll address how I see the extra temporal dimensions if and when the answers and explanations I am giving here require it. Or, I will if you ask.)

Now, it seems that you think I posit this complexity as a starting point. That is not how I see it. Instead, I posit only a bare minimum starting point and then try to logically deduce what might have, or must have, happened from that simple starting point to lead to the conditions for the BB. What might have, or must have, happened within our universe from the BB to the present day is largely explained by science. I have no disagreements with those explanations, except for a couple claims that some people make. These are that conscious experience emerged from within the material structures and functions of this universe, and that Darwinian evolution (and its variants) is the sole explanation for the development and behavior of biological life.

I admit that in formulating my scenario of what might have happened ante-BB I cast a wider net and accept some parameters that you would no doubt find to be objectionable. In particular, among the mysteries I am interested in explaining are, (1) Why is it that there seem to be some common threads in the stories offered by religions mystics? Could there be something to them?(2) Can the nonsense and contradictory stories offered by religions be interpreted in a way that makes sense? (3) Is there a sensible explanation for credible paranormal reports such as the medical success of Edgar Cayce, or for the phenomenal mental abilities of people like Ramanujan or the severely mentally handicapped and blind guy who could play the piano without training or experience?

I realize that by even considering such reports and phenomena my viewpoint will seem tainted to many, and thus avoided and/or rejected. But you seem tolerant even of my wildest ideas, MF, so I am opening my vest a little here.

My method, for developing my ideas of the ante-BB "world", has been to identify what I consider to be the simplest, most undeniable, most accessible and identifiable entity which in turn could provide a logical starting point for an evolutionary process that could lead to an explanation of not only all physical phenomena, but of all those tainted reports and phenomena as well, and then to work out what that evolution might have been.

Of course I am nowhere near completing that project. Much of it remains very sketchy. But I have identified and chosen that simple, undeniable, accessible, and identifiable entity: it is the ability to know. It is simple if we don't imbue it with anything more than the basic principle of receptivity, as described by Rosenberg as a fundamental property of his Natural Individuals. It is undeniable, since each thoughtful person knows from immediate experience that there is such a thing as an ability to know. It is accessible to each of us (It is true that you can't access mine, nor I yours, but still, it is more accessible than, say, a false vacuum fluctuation.) It is identifiable by having words such as "consciousness", "know", "learn", "think", etc. already developed in our languages.

Beyond that primordial entity, (PC), the sketch of the evolutionary history has gotten very complex as I have modified my views in order to make sense of all the things I want explained. It would be hard for me to take you through the history of that development, and it would probably not be useful. Instead, what I am trying to explain is the final (really current) set of conclusions I have come to. Instead of focusing on how I came to these conclusions, or why I believe them (which I know you are very much interested in), I would rather state the premise, the conclusions, and how they explain all the mysteries. That way, regardless of how I arrived at them, if they do indeed explain all the mysteries, they might be seen as useful suggestions for further investigations by people who have more credentials, time, and intelligence than I do.

You have graciously considered my ideas, MF, and even though you are understandably incredulous, you at least understand what I am trying to say. So to continue in this spirit, I'll answer some of your specific questions, try to clear up some remaining misunderstandings, and try to clear up some doubts.

Paul, I’m sorry, but you have not explained why you don’t agree. You have simply said (in effect) “I do not agree with Metzingers’s hypothesis” and that’s it. No explanation why. I am trying to understand exactly why you reject his explanation. Can you tell me?

Well, MF, I'm sorry that you have reduced all my attempts at explaining why I disagree with Metzinger's hypothesis to a simple declaration that I don't. What is behind that declaration is a judgment that I have made. I did not make that judgment by flipping a coin, or without giving considerable thought to the question. I tried to explain to you before that the basis of my judgment consisted of two major components: my personal experience of consciousness, and my personal experience with computers. Knowing what I know about those two experiences, I feel compelled to accept the notion that a machine cannot experience consciousness. No one can add to or detract from my knowledge of my personal conscious experiences, but it is possible that someone could add to my knowledge of computers. If someone would explain to me how a computer could be designed/programmed in order to achieve the same experience which I have, I would change my view. But Metzinger did not explain any mechanism of which I was not already well aware. I am confident that I could program a computer to do exactly as he specifies, and I am equally confident that when that program ran, it would not be conscious as I am. That confidence comes from my judgement, my background, and the case presented by Metzinger. I don't know how else to explain it to you. If this is inadequate, then I have no adequate explanation and I will take whatever penalty comes along with that failure. Sorry. It's the best I can do.

I do not quite agree with you. I think we CAN say “assuming X, then Y is certain”. To this extent we can say something with certainty. The problem is that our “certainty” rests on assumption.

I think we do agree on this one. I am usually careful, when I claim that we know nothing with certainty, to make an exception for tautologies. For example, I am certain that my pickup is a GMC. That is true simply because the people involved have tacitly agreed to call it a GMC. Similarly, all of mathematics is a tautology. It all rests on primitive assumptions and only states consequences of those assumptions. In light of the usefulness of mathematics and of statements like "My pickup is a GMC" I guess I shouldn't dismiss this set of certainties so cavalierly.

PC invented mathematics? So this PC (and by the way, we still have no idea what created the PC) took “nothing” and somehow created mathematics (lord knows how) from this “nothing”? A bit like “in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was God, and God said let there be light”? That seems either religious or metaphysical to me. Sorry.

Yes, PC invented mathematics. And, yes, it does seem sort of religious or metaphysical. So does, "in the beginning was the false vacuum, and the false vacuum fluctuated, and the fluctuation caused light which lit up the firmament (or exploded in the Big Bang, or whatever details followed)." (and by the way, we still have no idea what created the false vacuum, or the fluctuation, or whatever was truly primordial).

As I have said many times before, when it comes to explaining or describing the primordial state and the first event, all explanations and descriptions reduce to essentially the same thing, just using different words. In my view, in this context, 'PC', 'false vacuum', and 'word' are all synonyms.

I am curious. I thought that you believed in Plato’s world of “forms” – mathematical concepts. And yet you do not think that concepts, or explanations, can exist outside of a conscious mind? Can you explain?

Yes, I think I can explain. I guess I wasn't very clear. I didn't say that concepts couldn't exist outside of a conscious mind. I acknowledged that they could, and do, in the form of literature. What I said was that a conscious mind is necessary for concepts to exist. They are at least necessary for the origination of the concept. Once the concept has been conceived, it may then be encoded into language and stored in some non-conscious physical medium. It is the necessity of the mind for the origination that you missed.

As you yourself have pointed out, Godel has already shown that no sufficiently complex system of mathematics can be both consistent and complete. A finite system is a complete system. How then can a consistent body of mathematics be “finite in all respects”?

Finite systems in general are not complete. There have been some axiomatic systems I have heard of some which are, but they are unusual. A system is incomplete if you can form a proposition which can't be proved or disproved in the system. If the system is constructed from a set of axioms which are consistent, and no inconsistent proposition is included in its development, then IMHO, that system will remain "finite in all respects". The number of primitives, defined terms, axioms, numbers, elements, and anything else in the system would all be finite.

As I said, though, that is a matter of opinion. In my opinion, the acceptance of the Axiom of Choice, or any other axiom which allows the introduction of sets of infinite cardinality, necessarily introduces inconsistencies. If I were in charge, I would not allow it. Mathematicians on the other hand, IMHO, re-label these inconsistencies as 'antinomies' or 'paradoxes' and then go about developing the system anyway, trying to be careful to avoid the inconvenient antinomies and paradoxes.

Now I'll relate this to my speculations on the PC hypothesis, and our question of the existence of a Platonic realm. I argued above that any concept-space, which is what a Platonic realm must be, cannot exist without a prior mind. If the universe, or any part of it, depends on any concepts, such as numbers, equations, or laws, then there must have been a mind which originated those concepts prior to the instantiation of the universe.

I fail to see this at all.

With respect, I think it is because you misunderstood the point about the mind necessarily existing prior to the appearance of the universe.

Saying that something exists as a logical possibility is not the same as saying that any part of the universe depends on that something.

True. But saying that the universe "obeys laws of physics", or "evolves according to laws" seems to imply that those laws must exist before the universe does. And since the laws are concepts, that implies that the mind that originally conceived them must have existed prior to that conception. And thus the mind must pre-exist the universe.

When you have quoted people like Penrose and Chalmers (for example) and I have challenged you to provide the argument, you have declined.

True. And I apologize. Both of those arguments were long and involved. It was about all I could do to comprehend them. So your request to me is to do justice to those arguments by quoting them here on this forum in a way that would be as convincing and compelling as the original arguments as presented in the respective books. Of course, I cannot do that. I admit defeat. Instead, I asked you to refer to the original arguments as presented by Chalmers and Penrose and make up your mind from them. As I understand it, you have done that and came to a different conclusion than I did. Since you have already gone to the horse's mouth, I think that there is nothing I can add to change your opinion. So, I respectfully declined to provide you with a version of those arguments. Sorry. I think that's all I can do.

You thus have an explanation for the supposed mysterious relationship between mathematics and the physical universe, which is not a million miles from my explanation. Why would either of us believe that Wigner is correct in asserting that we do not understand this relationship?

It is encouraging to me that we seem to be close to an understanding on this question. I suppose Wigner could be correct because he wouldn't believe either my explanation or yours.

But your PC is something completely different. It seems to be totally inaccessible from the material universe, we cannot measure it or detect it, we have no idea what properties it might have (we can only speculate) and we have no idea how it is related or linked to other properties of the world (we can only speculate). We cannot even demonstrate any relationship between PC and mathematics (we can only speculate).

Well, hold on now. First of all, we need to distinguish between PC (the primordial one) and the PC (or CC) that is the single consciousness at work in each seemingly-conscious animal today. The former was the simple, minimal one I described which is more or less equivalent to your primordial quantum fluctuation. The latter is what you and I are right now, if you identify yourself with the thinking, or knowing, function with which I am communicating now.

Then, of course, there was the PC in various states of capability and complexity as it evolved from that primordial state, to one sophisticated enough to pull off a BB, to the one at work today after some fourteen billion years of material evolution and some four billion years of trial-and-error development of these brains and bodies.

So the modern PC is accessible from the material universe, maybe not as objectively as you would like, but it is certainly accessible. Maybe we can't measure it very precisely, but we certainly can detect it. We know a lot about its properties, for example we know it can know, perceive, conceive, remember, recall, judge, feel, sense, etc. (This knowledge is not from speculation but from direct experience.) We have clear ideas of how it is related or linked to other properties of the world. We know that certain properties can be perceived, that others can be modified by willful action, etc. (This knowledge is not from speculation but from direct experience.)

This PC seems to play the role of an omnipotent but inaccessible God which creates everything from nothing based on a whim.

To the contrary, the only thing I will grant here is the whim. The PC is intimately accessible, but seems nearly impotent. And it creates everything but the ability to know, which preceded everything else. Whether it created itself is a question just as confusing as whether a quantum fluctuation or a turtle can create itself.

(more to follow)

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

In the beginning, then, we have a PC which can do absolutely nothing but examine its own navel?

Less. It has no navel. It can only contemplate, and only very simplistically at that. All it can do is know.

Now, maybe at some "point" it might dawn on it that it can know. Then, it can know that it can know. Then later, it might realize that there was a difference between knowing and knowing that you know. That difference might have constituted the first primordial bit. That's sort of along the line of thought of George Spencer-Brown, if I am not mistaken.

Thus you have exactly the same problems with a priori assumptions that other theories have,

Agreed.

BUT you have also added the additional and unnecessary metaphysical premise of an unexplained self-referential complex entity called the PC. This is multiplying concepts unnecessarily.

I think that's unfair. Starting at the end of your charge, the primordial concept of nothing but an ability to know, if it is a multiple of the number of concepts in the quantum fluctuation picture, then the multiplier is a number less than one and greater than zero. The quantum fluctuation needs as much supporting structure (something to fluctuate, a place to do it, etc.) as the ability to know does. The PC is no more complex than the quantum fluctuation. It is not necessarily self-referential. It need only refer to concepts it has conceived, not to itself. And, if it happened to have conceived of the concept of "PC", then I think even you would agree that the concept of PC is different from the PC itself, just as a unicorn is different from the concept of a unicorn. No self-reference. And finally, it is not unexplained; I have just spent a lot of space on this forum explaining it.

How can the first bit be known if the PC exists in a vacuum? As you have acknowledged, this is a problem for your theory. It is the equivalent of the premise of “quantum fluctuation” in conventional physical theories. But the difference in your case is that you also need to posit the prior existence of this complex metaphysical entity called PC.

See above. PC is every bit as simple as a quantum fluctuation, and I have given you a guess about how that first bit arrived.

Thus you are also assuming that this PC had some kind of intelligence?

Yes, "some kind". But it was extremely rudimentary at the outset. It would hardly qualify as intelligence. It was much less intelligent than a thermostat. It was only the raw ability to know, with nothing being known.

That it also possessed desires, and wants, volitions, intentions?

Not at the outset by any means. Those things must have developed and evolved over who-knows-how-long a period of time. But I think it is clear, from the unlikeliness of the BB's initial conditions, that those things were fairly well developed by then.

Your PC seems to get more and more complex – and all of this complexity we are supposed to believe is primordial with no explanation?

Once again, you have misunderstood me here. Yes, the PC got more and more complex over a long period of time, but the complexity was not primordial. I think the explanation of the evolution of this complexity may well be within our grasp; the explanation of the primordial PC I think will be as elusive as the explanation for a primordial quantum fluctuation or for any other origin we are supposed to believe.

What are these “substrates” and “structures” made of?
Does it actually create matter and energy, or is the existence of matter and energy simply an illusion created by the PC? (I seem to recall in an earlier post you suggested that the physical universe is actually an illusion constructed by the PC?)

Here we are really getting close to the fringes. Yes, in principle, everything is an illusion constructed by the PC. But, if we look at that hierarchy of substrates, forgetting for the moment that they are nothing but thoughts in the mind of PC, I think we would find much interesting variety. Just starting with our own substrate here in our 4D BB generated substrate, we find that "things" like atoms have very peculiar and complex structures and behaviors. The fundamental essence of atoms, might be sets of concepts (in PC's mind) which describe tiny strings, small BBs (I was thinking of BB guns, but they could be small Big Bangs as well), arrays of numbers, or whatever. But from a different vantage point, atoms seem to be well-defined entities with predictable properties which in huge aggregations, present our senses with perceptions of things that seem to be chairs. So it is useful to talk about our substrate as consisting of atoms and containing chairs. Other substrates might consist of completely different "things", the biggest difference, IMHO, would be the different dimensionality. I would expect that in the different dimensions of the different substrates, there would be some "things", similar to our matter and energy, which could form structures and perform functions. I would expect that at higher dimensionalities, the possibilities would be far richer than what we have here in 4D. I would like to encourage mathematicians to try to predict what some of those possibilities might be.

The PC thus has some internal primordial structure, the source of its curiousity?

Ultimately, yes. But the curiosity was not primordial, I don't think. I think that developed much later after a sufficient amount of concepts had populated the Platonic world.

Is the PC thus simply playing/experimenting with mathematics? Is that basically what it is doing?

Yes. But looking at some of the results, I don't think it is "simple".

Does it follow that the PC creates everything that is logically possible, or does the PC only create a subset of what is logically possible?

Only a finite subset. I explained earlier why I think the notion of "everything that is logically possible" leads to contradictions and thus is nonsense.

If the latter, why would it choose one particular set of logical possibilities rather than another?

Because some work better than others. They lead to stable, interesting, fruitful universes.

Run unattended? Thus the PC does actually create matter and energy, and it is in effect building a computer for the running of these algorithms?

Yes. I think that the computer that is running the algorithm that drives the unitary quantum evolution in our 4D universe is running on hardware in the next higher substrate. (Please don't jump to the conclusion that I have fallen into infinite regress here. I have not concluded that our particle behavior is a computer simulation in order to explain it. It is explained as you understand me: it is nothing but thoughts in the mind of PC. The reason I introduce a hierarchy of substrates is that it is consistent with a lot of evidence that you are not interested in accepting. Moreover, it makes more sense to me that for something as complex as reality, a hierarchical structure is probably at work. After all, that's how we organize virtually everything we do or build that is very complex. This hierarchy is nowhere near infinite. My guess at the number of levels is a number between 5 and 20. If I had to pick a number right now, I think I would pick 11. That's the number Plato picked, and it is a popular number in various versions of M-Theory.)

Or are you suggesting that algorithms can run “unattended” with no physical substrate?

No.

The PC has definite internal and innate objectives, ambitions and intentions then, but it is obviously incapable of “figuring out for itself” how an algorithm will work out and thus needs to create a substrate (a computer) on which to run the algorithm?

Yes. PC is not omniscient and is frequently surprised -- sometimes even dismayed.

Sorry, Paul. Why don’t you just call this PC God? From your description, it seems to me that it is very similar in many respects to the concept of God.

I don't for many reasons. One is that the term 'God' has already been taken to mean something quite different in many respects. Another is that I would get myself in trouble from many quarters. From the scientific quarter, I would get shunned and/or derided. From the religious quarter, I could find myself under a fatwa, or bound to a stake. The word 'God' comes with so much baggage that I think it is best to avoid using it when working out answers to the great mysteries.

The big differences between PC and popular notions of God are that God is taken to be infinite, perfect, eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, incorruptible, and omni-benevolent. PC is none of these.

PC, however, is omnipresent in the sense that there is no space except for the concepts in the PC mind, and you could interpret this as PC is present "in" or "at" those concepts. It's a stretch, but you could make that claim.

PC is also just: since PC is the conscious entity driving all people (as well as all other animals) that means that as far as the entity doing any feeling goes, all perpetrators, victims, benefactors, and beneficiaries are one and the same entity. So when the scales of justice are weighed, all goodness, badness, blame, and benefit accrue to one and the same PC. It can't get more just than that.

The PC receives input only from beings which are conscious?

Good question. I think the answer is, "no". I think there may be other input available.

I thought the PC received input from everything (in which case there must be some kind of signal being transmitted from everything back to the PC, not just from conscious beings)?
If it is the case that the PC received input from everything, why does it apparently single out only very particular structures to be the apparent centres of consciousness – why cannot the PC make anything or everything conscious? Or perhaps it does?

I think PC receives input from our 4D substrate in about the same way as we receive input from a Mars rover. The JPL scientist has a direct VR like connection to the rover so she (or he) can have a vicarious experience which might even give the scientist the illusion that he (she) was really a conscious rover operating on Mars (similar to the illusion experienced by PC when reading my post via your eyes). In addition, the JPL scientists have input coming from earth-based telescopes. This is very coarse by comparison with the telemetry data, but it is also larger in scope. And in addition to those two sources of information, the knowledge of the on-board algorithms on the rover, together with some key data transmitted back to the scientists, would allow the scientists to deduce additional detailed information from Mars that they couldn't otherwise observe, either through the telescopes or the VR goggles.

Of course, the picture of PC observing our 4D universe via several layers of different substrates would be a lot more complex. But I think you get the idea. And, in no case do I think PC is omniscient or has any "magical" access to information about reality that isn't accounted for by specific communication structures, like telescopes and neurons.

Thus the PC cannot gain any information about the world in the absence of these biological transmitters with brains? Is that what you are saying?
It follows then that the PC was totally blind to the universe (received no information from the universe) for the first few billion years of existence, is that correct?

I don't think so. I think PC knows close up and personal what is going on in brains, and when a sparrow falls, only via biological transmitters. But I think there is probably some other way of gaining information as I mentioned above. It's probably about the same as our knowledge of what is going on when we watch a screen delivered to our PC (different sense) by Google Earth. We can see the image pretty clearly, we know what it represents on Earth, we have considerable control over what we want to look at, we have a basic understanding of how the satellite cameras capture and transmit the images, how those are stored and cataloged in the Google computers, how they are retrieved, transformed, transmitted, transformed again, and displayed on your screen. We may even have a detailed understanding of how the programs driving all of that are written. But even if we comprehend all of that, we can't easily know which instructions of every computer involved are executing at every moment in order to present the images. I think a similar thing happens with PC, with the vast majority of activity in reality "running unattended" including the early billions of years of our universe.

Are you saying that organisms are not the sources of their willful actions, that in fact all organisms are like dumb robots, centrally controlled by this single PC?

Yes, that's what I'm saying.

Can you explain how your hypothesis predicts that animals would need sleep?

I did that for you once before, in post #34 at https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=790041#post790041

Paul, did you not read the link I pasted in my first post in this very thread? Apparently not. Here it is again :

http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio.NC/0512026

Yes, I read it -- the first page anyway. In part it said, "...we emphasize that our hypothesis is purely speculative at this time. Although the ``garbage collection'' hypothesis has been previously advanced, we believe that our speculation is useful...".

I have heard this speculation before but it is not satisfying. It doesn't make sense. Evolution (or whatever the real explanation is) has come up with some extremely sophisticated mechanisms to deal with some very complex problems. It seems unlikely to me that taking out the garbage is such a difficult problem as to require shutting the whole organism down and putting its life at risk.

Think of some other biological function done by all individuals of all species nearly every day, like eating. Suppose biologists could not explain why animals are compelled to stuff organic material into their bodies any better than by saying, "We have noticed that if you withhold food, the animal dies. We speculate that this organic material acts as a scrubber and it cleans the inside of the organism as it goes through. After all, look at how filthy it is when it comes out!"

Instead, biologists can explain how food ingestion is necessary to supply the body with material and energy for growth and functioning. I am looking for a similar explanation for sleep.

I’m interested to know where you found the above snippet of information [about mother whales staying awake]?

I read it in a recent issue of "Science News". I'm sure it was within the last two or three months. I just tried to find it in their on-line archives but I couldn't find it. I throw my old copies of the magazine away so I can't retrieve it that way. Sorry. I'm not very good at finding things when I search; maybe someone else can do better.

Once again, it's been great talking with you, MF

Warm regards to all,

Paul