Dualism & Consciousness: Exploring a New Perspective

[Paul Martin]

Paul, you are not reading my question correctly. We both know that the Pythagorean theorem assumes Euclid’s postulates (as I keep saying, one cannot make any conclusions without assumptions). My question was given the postulates and definitions (which includes Euclid’s postulates) do you believe there is any way that the PC could have “created” a universe in which this theorem did not hold?

The point I am trying to get at is GIVEN the axioms (including Euclid’s postulates), Pythagoras’ theorem inevitably follows. The PC has no choice in the matter.

I am reading your question correctly but we each want to emphasize something different. We each have been downplaying what the other wants to emphasize.

The issue is when certain concepts might have appeared for the first time. You say that certain concepts always existed, and I say that at the very beginning there were no concepts. Here's the progression I see:

First there were no concepts at all. Then there were choices to adopt certain concepts including rules of logic, axioms and the concept of consistency. Then there was the discovery that certain theorems inevitably follow and the PC has no choice but to accept those theorems, or to go back and change the set of adopted axioms and rules.

I think that in your picture, at the very beginning there were a huge number of concepts already in existence including all the implications of all the possible choices of axioms and rules. Sets of rules and axioms may be freely chosen later, but they bring along with them the constraints imposed by their implications.

The difference, again, is that I claim concepts do not exist unless and until they are conceived in a mind, and you seem to think concepts can and do exist without ever being conceived.

So, back to your specific example, I believe that "given the postulates and definitions (which includes Euclid’s postulates)", there is no way "that the PC could have “created” a universe in which this theorem did not hold." But, I don't agree with your premise. PC was not obliged to adopt Euclid's postulates. It was not a given. And the constraint you ask about does not arise unless and until PC adopts those postulates. If other postulates are chosen, which they very will could be, then the Pythagorean theorem wouldn't necessarily hold in the resulting universe.

I agree. This is not the point. ...

The deterministic relation between “axioms” and “theorem” was there before the PC came along. The PC perhaps chose particular axioms, from which the theorem followed inevitably. Having chosen the axioms, the PC had no subsequent power to choose the theorem, because the axioms (and not the PC) determine the theorem.

The point, it seems, is whether or not the deterministic relations existed before PC came along. I say no, since those relations are concepts and they can't exist without a conceiver, and you evidently say that concepts can, and do, exist without ever having been conceived. If that is your position, then I think we have found a fundamental point of disagreement between us.

We’ll have to agree to disagree here. The complexity was there in your PC world as well, but you simply deny it.

I agree that we will have to disagree. I deny that any concepts were "there" in the beginning of the PC world, thus I avoid the HUGE complexity of the existence of an unimaginably large set of all possible concepts at the very beginning. I also deny the existence of most of the complex aspects of consciousness in the PC. I think there is some simple primordial precursor of consciousness that did exist at the outset. Now, whether my denial is simple or not, I suppose each reader can judge for him/herself.

When I say that the relationship between the diameter and circumference of a circle is Pi, or the relationship between the side of a square and its diagonal is root 2, I am making use of a real number. I may not be able to enumerate that number in its entirety, but that does not prevent me from making use of it.

With respect, you are making use of the relationship, not the number. You frequently make use of numbers which approximate the relationship, but never the actual number itself.

You have provided an explanation based on Russell’s paradox which I have shown is based on self-referentiality, and is irrelevant to the question of “all”. I have not seen any other explanation from you which shows why the notion of “all” leads to problems. Perhaps you could clarify this.

Sorry for not being more explicit. When I answered you on this question earlier, I said that we probably wouldn't be able to go much further because we were not willing to "swallow" the other's position on whether concepts could exist without being conceived. This, I believe, is at the root of the problem of defining "all" of something. If, as you believe, all possible concepts can exist without ever being conceived, then there would be no problem of referring to "all" of something, except for self reference. But, if, as I believe, concepts cannot exist unless and until they are conceived, then the meaning of 'all' becomes time dependent. It will depend on the timing of the interpretation of 'all' with respect to the existence of concepts which might qualify to be in the set designated by "all".

For example, if the only numbers that exist are those that have been explicitly defined, as I say should be the case, then the set of "all numbers" will be different from the set of "all numbers" after some more of them have been explicitly defined in addition to the original ones.

Again, everything rests on assumptions. Make the assumptions, and one can evaluate in terms of true, false or meaningless. If there are no assumptions, then we are left only with meaningless. Imaginary does not enter into it.

Of course you can categorize propositions into those three categories if you like. But your third category, IMHO contains propositions which seem to me to be different enough that they deserve to be further split into two categories. Your "meaningless" category would include those that are pure gibberish which have no meaning whatsoever to anyone, and it would include those that have different meanings to different people. The various meanings would all be understandable, or at least parseable, to all, but just not agreed to by all.

Sorry for being so late with this response.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

If you want to communicate with people who don't have mystical sources of knowledge,. you need to justify yourself in terms of their understanding of knowlege...There are standards of justification articulated by philosophers
and logicians. and if everyone follows the standards, the
need not disagree.

I agree that there are many different reasons for wanting to communicate with other people and that in general we needn't disagree. Most of the reasons are simply to get along with the business of living. The knowledge required for this is practical, but not very precise or even "true". If you want to communicate with scientists or with mathematicians, you need to understand their respective bodies of knowledge. Some of that scientific knowledge may not be true, and none of the mathematical knowledge is claimed to be true by the mathematicians themselves. But in philosophy, if we are trying to make sense of more comprehensive and mysterious issues, I think a different standard of "justifying" the truth or falsity of propositions is necessary. I don't think there is a satisfactory "standard" justification method.

There are many beliefs, but which of them is true?

The ones that correspond to reality.

That's easy to say, but difficult if not impossible to demonstrate.

Can you give me a proposition which you are certain corresponds to reality, other than "thought happens"?

True beliefs and certainly true beliefs are two very different
animals. A belief can be true for mistaken
or chance reasons -- a lucky guess, for instance.

You cannot get to "there are no true beliefs" from "there are no
certainly true beliefs".

I don't get the distinction. If a belief were true for mistaken or chance reasons, why wouldn't it be certainly true as well? It certainly is true, isn't it? The premise is that it is true so isn't it certainly true?

Hmmm. Maybe by 'certainly' you are referring to the believer and not to the proposition. The proposition is true. The belief in the proposition may range from weak to certain in the mind of the believer. Then to say that the proposition is "certainly true" we mean that the proposition is true and that the believer knows for sure that it is true. Is that what you mean? If so, then the question is how the believer can, in any circumstance, know for sure. What can anyone know for sure except for tautologies and that "thought happens"?

And PC isn't slippery ?!

PC is very slippery.

To know is to have access to information (i.e. the "known" information) at what seems to be the present moment in the stream of conscious thought. 'Information', I define (slightly modifying Shannon's) as a difference that makes a difference to the knower.

Does the information have to be accurate ? is it possible
to be misinformed ?

Those are both excellent questions. They get down to the heart of the matter IMHO. I'll take the second question first.

I would say that by definition, it is not possible to be misinformed unless the "access" mechanism altered the information on the way to the knower. So, if knowledge is defined as information available to the knower, then what happened to the information on the way doesn't matter. But that just puts the real question off.

Your first question is the real question. That is, must the information correspond to reality? And, if the answer is "yes", what is meant by 'correspondence'? Lots to think about.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Tournesol]

I agree that there are many different reasons for wanting to communicate with other people and that in general we needn't disagree. Most of the reasons are simply to get along with the business of living. The knowledge required for this is practical, but not very precise or even "true". If you want to communicate with scientists or with mathematicians, you need to understand their respective bodies of knowledge. Some of that scientific knowledge may not be true, and none of the mathematical knowledge is claimed to be true by the mathematicians themselves.

Huh ?

Can you give me a proposition which you are certain corresponds to reality, other than "thought happens"?

I don't need to. I was making a point about truth, not certainty.

I don't get the distinction. If a belief were true for mistaken or chance reasons, why wouldn't it be certainly true as well?

Because of what "certainly" means. It means "not possibly wrong".

It certainly is true, isn't it? The premise is that it is true so isn't it certainly true?

No. "X is not wrong" does not imply "X could not have possible been wrong"

I would say that by definition, it is not possible to be misinformed unless the "access" mechanism altered the information on the way to the knower.

So it is possible to be misinformed. And what if someone just lies to you ?