Many Worlds Interpretation and Coffee

[phillovix]

Hey there.

Based on the many worlds interpretation, is:
Everyone simultaneously having coffee with everyone else?

Has everyone already had coffee with everyone else?
Are these possibilities occurring 'somewhere' continuously?
Do these possibilities only occur one at a time, or does the theory imply that absolutely 'all' possibilities are constantly continuously occurring? Is freewill factored into the equations? There are scenarios that as an individual I would chose not to experience, regardless of throwing infinite set logic at the statement by implying 'eventually' it would be experienced; That 'eventually' would entail a different entry point and would thus be a different set of circumstances.

Thank you for your time in reading,

Phillip H.

 

[StevieTNZ]

Hey there.

Based on the many worlds interpretation, is:
Everyone simultaneously having coffee with everyone else?

Has everyone already had coffee with everyone else?
Are these possibilities occurring 'somewhere' continuously?
Do these possibilities only occur one at a time, or does the theory imply that absolutely 'all' possibilities are constantly continuously occurring? Is freewill factored into the equations? There are scenarios that as an individual I would chose not to experience, regardless of throwing infinite set logic at the statement by implying 'eventually' it would be experienced; That 'eventually' would entail a different entry point and would thus be a different set of circumstances.

Thank you for your time in reading,

Phillip H.

Dear Phillip

It does depend what the fundamental Schrodinger equation predicts, whether it predicts everyone has coffee with everyone else (but I would say, if it does predict this, it may limit the humans involved, i.e. not babies etc.) or one person has coffee with 50% of the "coffee-drinking" population, or any other possibility. Let's just say it is not easy to solve the equation to find out what the prediction would be.

"or does the theory imply that absolutely 'all' possibilities are constantly continuously occurring?" - No.*
*by theory, I presume you mean Quantum Mechanics and not the Many-Worlds Interpretation, as the latter is not a theory.

Is freewill factored into the equations? - I would say no.

 

[phillovix]

Dear Phillip

It does depend what the fundamental Schrodinger equation predicts, whether it predicts everyone has coffee with everyone else (but I would say, if it does predict this, it may limit the humans involved, i.e. not babies etc.) or one person has coffee with 50% of the "coffee-drinking" population, or any other possibility. Let's just say it is not easy to solve the equation to find out what the prediction would be.

"or does the theory imply that absolutely 'all' possibilities are constantly continuously occurring?" - No.*
*by theory, I presume you mean Quantum Mechanics and not the Many-Worlds Interpretation, as the latter is not a theory.

Is freewill factored into the equations? - I would say no.

I am trying to narrow in my understanding of the general consensus on the grand scheme of things scale. Would not any limitation (Babies not having coffee, to reference your example) thus limit the notion of an infinite space for the possibilities to occur in even after including a multiverse? Infinite repetition of that space, allowing for the possibility of everything occurring-occurred-reoccurring, remains plausible, however, I am concerned the notion of freewill is not factored into the extent that I feel it should be.
To bring together a unified theory of everything while clinging to anthropism by excluding the philosophical implications of everything is energy, seems like madness. Branching the topic off slightly to explain, specialization in physics, particularly in reaching tiers that are taken seriously by the community could in itself jeopardize the polymath-esqe concept that I think will be necessary to achieve a solve.

Apologies for referring to MWI as theory. ^_^

To wrap that up, primary concern is that geniuses are attempting to figure this out through the framework of 'all possibilities that can occur, are occurring'. Something that I think will be a logical fallacy in hindsight.

Kind regards,
Phillip H.
<3

 

[StevieTNZ]

I am trying to narrow in my understanding of the general consensus on the grand scheme of things scale. Would not any limitation (Babies not having coffee, to reference your example) thus limit the notion of an infinite space for the possibilities to occur in even after including a multiverse? Infinite repetition of that space, allowing for the possibility of everything occurring-occurred-reoccurring, remains plausible, however, I am concerned the notion of freewill is not factored into the extent that I feel it should be.
To bring together a unified theory of everything while clinging to anthropism by excluding the philosophical implications of everything is energy, seems like madness. Branching the topic off slightly to explain, specialization in physics, particularly in reaching tiers that are taken seriously by the community could in itself jeopardize the polymath-esqe concept that I think will be necessary to achieve a solve.

Apologies for referring to MWI as theory. ^_^

To wrap that up, primary concern is that geniuses are attempting to figure this out through the framework of 'all possibilities that can occur, are occurring'. Something that I think will be a logical fallacy in hindsight.

Kind regards,
Phillip H.
<3

Every possible outcome, as predicted by QM, is realized in the Many-World's interpretation.

At various points in time (e.g. t=2), some outcomes may have 0% probability of occurring, whilst later on (t=3) (or even earlier on, eg. t=1) have some probability of happening.

 

[A. Neumaier]

Every possible outcome, as predicted by QM, is realized in the Many-World's interpretation.

And also every possible outcome not predicted by QM. Everything goes in some world, and we are left wondering why most things don't go in our world.

 

[phillovix]

Every possible outcome, as predicted by QM, is realized in the Many-World's interpretation.

At various points in time (e.g. t=2), some outcomes may have 0% probability of occurring, whilst later on (t=3) (or even earlier on, eg. t=1) have some probability of happening.

And also every possible outcome not predicted by QM. Everything goes in some world, and we are left wondering why most things don't go in our world.

Could the term possible be defined please. Depending on usage, that includes all outcomes.
Particularly, Mr. Neumaier. "Everything goes in some world" is the concept I am suggesting to be a logical fallacy.
Is an artificially created asexual flying spaghetti monster from another universe visiting this one and circling this planet exactly 1239719231.1231 times with a party hat on while riding an oversized telepathic Tardigrade that communicates in Hsilgne and finds the letter M to be blasphemy, 'possible'? Do not get me wrong, I can happily logically support the concept of a flying spaghetti monster from another universe, I can also happily logically support the concept of it neither appearing or being created in this cycle.
A point to consider would be the string of variables before it agreeably becomes an impossible.

At the least, that concept as a bit of nonsense thought experiment to articulate that not all possibilities are likely to have occurred the same amount of times, even if absolutely all have occurred at least once.
When into different actual occurrences of various events in the grand scheme of things, there is plenty of room to argue against the "Everything goes in some world" logic.
Flipping that around, Everything 'has gone in' in some world, at some point - Is at least logically feasible, although I can happily support arguing against that notion as well though.

Kind regards,
Phillip H.
<3

 

[A. Neumaier]

Could the term possible be defined please.

Everything goes - that means everything that you can formulate in terms of particles and fields.
Thus it is you who should define in physical terms what it means to be a spaghetti monster, etc.. Otherwise your statement is physically meaningless, and, of course, such things have no place in physics, hence not in MWI.

What is likely depends on which particular world you are in. On the other hand, if you count likelihood by the number of possible worlds in a coarse-grained resolution, there are many more worlds in MWI very different from ours than worlds that are like ours.

 

[StevieTNZ]

And also every possible outcome not predicted by QM. Everything goes in some world, and we are left wondering why most things don't go in our world.

As per my email, perhaps you can clarify what you mean by the comment "And also every possible outcome not predicted by QM."? If its not predicted by QM, shouldn't it not occur in a universe in the Many-Worlds interpretation?

 

[A. Neumaier]

If its not predicted by QM, shouldn't it not occur in a universe in the Many-Worlds interpretation?

It depends on your interpretation of probability. In a scientific context, probabilities that are too small to be significant are not considered predictions. But in MWI, even these happen in infinitely many of the worlds, and the inhabitants of any these worlds find that their observations are not predicted by QM - in the sense that far too often, too improbable things happen.

Thus to apply MWI to our particular world we must assume in addition to MWI that we are in one of the worlds where the quantum mechanical predictions accurately reflect the probabilities. This means that, for our particular world, we need to postulate what should have been explained!

 

[vanhees71]

This I don't understand. If you have probablities for something that are small, it's just hard to measure them, i.e., you have to prepare a huge ensemble and perhaps have to fight a large background, but still it's a prediction of your model that can be tested at least in principle. Also one shouldn't underestimate the wit of our experimental colleagues. Nowaday's signal is tomorrow's background!

 

[A. Neumaier]

it's a prediction of your model that can be tested at least in principle.

I was very careful in my formulation:

probabilities that are too small to be significant

cannot be tested, even in principle. If you make a more complex experimental setting, what is significant changes, perhaps by a few orders of magnitude.

But there are many nonzero probabilities that are far too small to be measured with any experiment realizable in our universe.

An example is the nonzero probabilitiy that a Cesium atom prepared in our lab in a coherent state with minimal position/momentum uncertainty will the next moment be found on the invisible side of the moon. Another example is the positive probability that the random motions of all atoms in a brick go in the same upward direction for a second, so that the brick lifts into the air without an external cause.

But according to MWI, there are infinitely many worlds in which precisely this happens, once every minute during a prescribed week. People in one of these worlds will go crazy and will throw away all their physics books...

 

[vanhees71]

Well, people taking MWI literally must go crazy (if they aren't already) ;-)).

 

[Demystifier]

Well, people taking MWI literally must go crazy (if they aren't already) ;-)).

Well, the same can be said for many other interpretations.
The reality does not exist until you observe it?
Only macroscopic phenomena are real?
The future can change the past?

 

[vanhees71]

Well, then I'm still on the sane side, because I don't see, where quantum theory implies any of these claims ;-)).

 

[Demystifier]

Well, then I'm still on the sane side, because I don't see, where quantum theory implies any of these claims ;-)).

Quantum theory is like life. To stay sane, don't take it too seriously.

Or to quote R. M. Wald, "If you really believe in quantum mechanics, then you can't take it seriously."

 

[A. Neumaier]

But according to MWI, there are infinitely many worlds in which precisely this happens, once every minute during a prescribed week. People in one of these worlds will go crazy and will throw away all their physics books...

I can heartily recommend the reading of ''The Metaphysician's Nightmare'' by Bertrand Russell!

I hold that the intellect must not be taken as a guide in life, but only as affording pleasant argumentative games and ways of annoying less agile opponents.

I dreamt that I was in Hell, and that Hell is a place full of all those happenings that are improbable but not impossible. The effects of this are curious. Some of the damned, when they first arrive below, imagine that they will beguile the tedium of eternity by games of cards. But they find this impossible, because, whenever a pack is shuffled, it comes out in perfect order, beginning with the Ace of Spades and ending with the King of Hearts. There is a special department of Hell for students of probability. In this department there are many typewriters and many monkeys. Every time that a monkey walks on a typewriter, it types by chance one of Shakespeare's sonnets. There is another place of torment for physicists. In this there are kettles and fires, but when the kettles are put on the fires, the water in them freezes. [...]

[philosophers] every time that they have made an induction, the next instance falsifies it. This, however, happens only during the first hundred years of their damnation. After that, they learn to expect that an induction will be falsified, and therefore it is not falsified until another century of logical torment has altered their expectation. Throughout all eternity surprise continues, but each time at a higher logical level.

MWI realizes his nightmare, in arbitrarily many worlds...

 

[StevieTNZ]

It depends on your interpretation of probability. In a scientific context, probabilities that are too small to be significant are not considered predictions. But in MWI, even these happen in infinitely many of the worlds, and the inhabitants of any these worlds find that their observations are not predicted by QM - in the sense that far too often, too improbable things happen.

Thus to apply MWI to our particular world we must assume in addition to MWI that we are in one of the worlds where the quantum mechanical predictions accurately reflect the probabilities. This means that, for our particular world, we need to postulate what should have been explained!

Oh I see, you're talking about predictions with tiny probabilities. Yes, they would occur. I wouldn't go as far as saying they're not predicted by QM when they are with, though, small probabilities.

 

[A. Neumaier]

I wouldn't go as far as saying they're not predicted by QM when they are with, though, small probabilities.

The point is that people in infinitely many worlds (among them Russell's Hell) will experience these events far too frequently, hence would think that quantum mechanical predictions are grossly violated!

 

[Brian Johnston]

There are universes which are probable and universes which are less probable and many universes which are improbable and most that are very improbable. That MW is real is proved by the tunneling diode where in the electrons pass over an impassible barrier. They appear in the other "world" on the other side of the barrier. In special cases it may be necessary for the Shrodinger equation's wave function to collapse in another universe, but this is all to do with probabilities. Many probabilities of possible events are so improbable that you may have to wait billions, or trillions of years for them to happen. Does then everyone have coffee with anyone else? Only if it is very probable to do so.

 

[Nugatory]

That MW is real is proved by the tunneling diode where in the electrons pass over an impassible barrier.

There's no doubt that tunnelling happens, but it does not prove that MWI is real - all interpretations agree that tunneling happens.

 

[entropy1]

Perhaps entropy has something to do with the likelyhood of certain universes; entropy wants to increase as fast as possible and hence 'drives' the course of events in a certain 'direction'; the most probable direction. Since the 'most probable' on quantum scale is pure chance, the effects on macro scale may be pretty well determined in all.

 

[Jilang]

Perhaps some things are so improbable that the age of the universe precludes them.

 

[eloheim]

It depends on your interpretation of probability. In a scientific context, probabilities that are too small to be significant are not considered predictions. But in MWI, even these happen in infinitely many of the worlds, and the inhabitants of any these worlds find that their observations are not predicted by QM - in the sense that far too often, too improbable things happen.

Okay I get that we're having some fun here but these kinds of arguments are basically staw-men. First of all, even if the universe is just infinitely large (spatially) you're going to have every single one of these insane things happening somewhere if you travel far enough. The same goes on the possibility that the universe continues on through heat death with no end to time: if you wait long enough you will get all these ridiculous things occurring eventually just by chance fluctuation.

Now I fully agree that worrying about such things is ridiculous, but that's exactly the point! So is worrying about some infinitesimal probability in MWI.

The straw-man I'm referring to mostly is the idea that because a branch 'exists' it's somehow on equal footing with every other branch. That kind of thinking is like assuming that because each player can either win the lottery or lose the lottery both are equally likely! If MWI ignored every notion of amplitude and probability then whatever was left would certainly not be an interpretation of QM that reproduces all the predictions of the other models.

I'm certainly not denying that there are questionable issues concerning MWI that need to be considered (proper measures, born rule status, preferred basis/factorization, etc.) but the line of argument presented in the quote isn't a serious consideration of anything. ;-)

 

[Jilang]

But there are many more worlds where you don't win the lottery than those where you do.

 

[A. Neumaier]

the idea that because a branch 'exists' it's somehow on equal footing with every other branch.

But if there is only one distinguished branch - namely our world - then MWI is just empty talk about fictitious other worlds that explains nothing about the only distinguished world that counts.

 

[eloheim]

But there are many more worlds where you don't win the lottery than those where you do.

Yes, sorry the analogy I picked is kind of upside-down in that respect. What I mean is 99% of the time you drive home safely. The other 1% of the time you crash in any of a multitude of different ways. There are many more ways to fail at driving home than taking the proper route and arriving successfully. The point is that the expectation of making it home isn't extinguished just because one can imagine more ways to crash than succeed.

 

[eloheim]

But if there is only one distinguished branch - namely our world - then MWI is just empty talk about fictitious other worlds that explains nothing about the only distinguished world that counts.

Mostly I'd say see Demystifier's Post #13. Lessly I'd say there are many equally distinguished branches and that's the problem.

 

[entropy1]

There are many more ways to fail at driving home than taking the proper route and arriving successfully.

On the surface, you'd say so. However, we may have to consider the brain of the driver as a (functioning) system. If his/her brain functions without (many) flaws, and they have set their mind on driving home, then the probability of them arriving there may be (much) greater. We can see the brain as a system of some kind, in a way like a computer as a system, that implements a function. After all, I think not many drivers intend to drive themselves off the road.

 

[eloheim]

@entropy1: Yes 100% that's exactly the point! (And just to reiterate for context: I was saying, "If you don't worry NOW about crashing your car due to the odd full-body spasm or sudden psychological breakdown, then there's no reason for you to worry about it in MWI either.")

 

[secur]

Clearly, MWI is not proven; if it were, it wouldn't be an ontological interpretation, but the only accepted theory: in fact, it would be "MWT". Traditional QM would be only an approximation, like Newton's gravity in the light of GR.

 

[vanhees71]

MWI is another interpretation of QT not a different theory. As far as observable facts are concerned all interpretations lead to the same conclusions as minimally interpreted QT.

 

[phillovix]

I would like to try another angle on trying to find an answer to my initial query, that I understand may not of been worded too well.

Say I pick up a salt shaker and keep going between almost shaking it and not shaking it, without actually shaking it from my perspective, however being very close in the decision to shake it.
Say I keep that up for an hour and am willing to flip a coin on keeping that for another hour and so on.
Say the coin flip dictates that I stop, and I stop.

Does MWI imply that the salt shaker was shook, somewhere? At what point does it become impossible that the salt shaker was shook as a result of that game? When I elected to stop, or when death kicks in?
As stated in an earlier post, is freewill factored into calculations? Or is it being based on a purely mechanical deterministic view that everything that can happens, happens and we are just passengers observing whatever sequences we observe.

Kind regards,
Phill <3

 

[PeterDonis]

Does MWI imply that the salt shaker was shook, somewhere?

It's actually very hard to properly formulate a scenario such that you can even apply the MWI, because we are so used to talking in terms of only one thing happening. To even admit the MWI as a possibility, you would have to formulate your scenario something like this:

Say I have a salt shaker in my hand, and there is some quantum-level uncertainty in whatever part of my brain is determining whether I will shake it or not. Then it is possible that I shake it, and possible that I don't. If the MWI is true, both of these possibilities are realized. If a collapse interpretation of QM is true, only one of them is. But both interpretations make the same predictions about what I will observe; both, for example, will predict that, if my brain ends up determining that I shake the shaker, then others around me will observe it being shaken; whereas if my brain ends up determining that I do not shake the shaker, then others around me will observe it not being shaken. If a collapse interpretation is true, then, again, only one of these possibilities is realized; but if the MWI is true, both of them are.

is freewill factored into calculations?

As far as physics is concerned, "free will" is just a physical process, so of course it is factored into calculations, just like any other physical process.

Or is it being based on a purely mechanical deterministic view that everything that can happens, happens and we are just passengers observing whatever sequences we observe

As far as physics is concerned, this is not a different way things could be from us having free will; "free will" and "everything that can happen, happens" are just two different descriptions of the same reality. If the MWI is true, anything that it is physically possible for you to freely choose to do, you do freely choose to do in some branch of the wave function.

 

[phillovix]

It's actually very hard to properly formulate a scenario such that you can even apply the MWI, because we are so used to talking in terms of only one thing happening. To even admit the MWI as a possibility, you would have to formulate your scenario something like this:

Say I have a salt shaker in my hand, and there is some quantum-level uncertainty in whatever part of my brain is determining whether I will shake it or not. Then it is possible that I shake it, and possible that I don't. If the MWI is true, both of these possibilities are realized. If a collapse interpretation of QM is true, only one of them is. But both interpretations make the same predictions about what I will observe; both, for example, will predict that, if my brain ends up determining that I shake the shaker, then others around me will observe it being shaken; whereas if my brain ends up determining that I do not shake the shaker, then others around me will observe it not being shaken. If a collapse interpretation is true, then, again, only one of these possibilities is realized; but if the MWI is true, both of them are.
As far as physics is concerned, "free will" is just a physical process, so of course it is factored into calculations, just like any other physical process.
As far as physics is concerned, this is not a different way things could be from us having free will; "free will" and "everything that can happen, happens" are just two different descriptions of the same reality. If the MWI is true, anything that it is physically possible for you to freely choose to do, you do freely choose to do in some branch of the wave function.

Wonderful, thank you for your response, given me a lot to think about.
Given what I've read, I am favoring a collapse style interpretation. I think there is an infinite repetition of a finite amount of possibilities.
Even when factoring in a multiverse, I do not think there is an infinite amount of universes. Probably a greater number of them than I can actively fathom, still, not an infinite amount though.

Kind regards,
Phillip
<3

 

[PeterDonis]

Given what I've read, I am favoring a collapse style interpretation. I think there is an infinite repetition of a finite amount of possibilities.
Even when factoring in a multiverse, I do not think there is an infinite amount of universes. Probably a greater number of them than I can actively fathom, still, not an infinite amount though.

The MWI does not say there are "an infinite amount of universes". It says there is just one universe, but its quantum wave function does not have any interpretation as a single classical "world".