Would studying MWI be a waste of time?

[Dadface]

There seems to be a lot of discussion on the Many Worlds Interpretation here at the present time and it's something that I personally can't get into very deeply. The reason I can't be bothered too much about it is because I can't help feeling that the whole concept is nonsensical. I base this feeling on what I think is one of the most powerful branches of physics ... what I describe as being general knowledge, common sense and intuition.
Does anyone else feel the same or does anyone think the MWI should be taken seriously?

 

[stevendaryl]

There seems to be a lot of discussion on the Many Worlds Interpretation here at the present time and it's something that I personally can't get into very deeply. The reason I can't be bothered too much about it is because I can't help feeling that the whole concept is nonsensical. I base this feeling on what I think is one of the most powerful branches of physics ... what I describe as being general knowledge, common sense and intuition.
Does anyone else feel the same or does anyone think the MWI should be taken seriously?

Definitely, if you think MWI is nonsense, then it's a waste of time to study it. Pick something that you don't consider nonsense to spend your time on.

 

[Demystifier]

what I describe as being general knowledge, common sense and intuition.

MWI is one of interpretations of quantum mechanics. There are other interpretations too. But if you only want to study things which please your common sense and intuition, then I am not sure that you should study quantum mechanics at all. Or do you think that some other interpretation is compatible with your common sense and intuition? If so, then stick with that interpretation (provided that it doesn't contradict any experiments).

 

[stevendaryl]

My feeling about MWI is that it is the most "pure" framework from which to discuss quantum issues. Every other interpretation makes dubious distinctions between measurements and other types of interactions, or between macroscopic and microscopic, or implicitly makes one choice of basis more equal than others, or one decomposition of the universe into system + environment, or implicitly makes "classical" assumptions that are not justified by quantum theory. This isn't to say that MWI is free of conceptual problems, but in my opinion, most of them are problems for QM, not just MWI--it's just that they are less obvious in other interpretations.

 

[Demystifier]

My feeling about MWI is that it is the most "pure" framework from which to discuss quantum issues. Every other interpretation makes dubious distinctions between measurements and other types of interactions, or between macroscopic and microscopic, or implicitly makes one choice of basis more equal than others, or one decomposition of the universe into system + environment, or implicitly makes "classical" assumptions that are not justified by quantum theory. This isn't to say that MWI is free of conceptual problems, but in my opinion, most of them are problems for QM, not just MWI--it's just that they are less obvious in other interpretations.

MWI appears "pure" because MWI people usually write those dirty stuff (preferred basis, additional assumptions etc) in "fine print". See
https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.08341
Sec. 3.

 

[stevendaryl]

MWI appears "pure" because MWI people usually write those dirty stuff (preferred basis, additional assumptions etc) in "fine print". See
https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.08341
Sec. 3.

I agree completely that your issues in sections 3.2 and 3.3 (3.4, "Quantum Suicide", is not central to MWI, it's just philosophical musing) are serious issues for MWI. My point is that it's possible to attack those issues head-on in MWI, while in other interpretations (such as Copenhagen), the issues are hidden behind fuzzy concepts such as "measurement".

 

[Dadface]

MWI is one of interpretations of quantum mechanics. There are other interpretations too. But if you only want to study things which please your common sense and intuition, then I am not sure that you should study quantum mechanics at all. Or do you think that some other interpretation is compatible with your common sense and intuition? If so, then stick with that interpretation (provided that it doesn't contradict any experiments).

I certainly want to study QM just because I find it interesting. And I find most of QM to make sense and to be intuitive. But there are exceptions, Many Worlds and the Quantum Zeno effect being two of them. If I invest some more time and study these topics in greater detail any increased understanding I get might make the topics seem to be more sensible. But I wonder if it will be worth the effort.
I agree with your comments about experiments but any interpretation has got to conform to observations. Also, I think that if any interpretation is to gain credibility then it should be possible, if only in principle, to make observations that can validate the predictions made.

 

[tom.stoer]

The reason I can't be bothered too much about it is because I can't help feeling that the whole concept is nonsensical.

That was my opinion over a many of years, too.

The problem is that if you do not study the Everett interpretation at least in some detail, you don't get the concept right. So what you believe is nonsensical is not the Everett interpretation itself but something you believe that it could be the Everett interpretation. Many explanations on the Everett interpretation miss the point - both in the positive and in the negative. So the problems you are told the Everett interpretation have may be non-issues or misunderstandings. At the same time you miss the esssentual problem of this interpretation b/c you are bothered with non-issues.

 

[durant35]

I certainly want to study QM just because I find it interesting. And I find most of QM to make sense and to be intuitive. But there are exceptions, Many Worlds and the Quantum Zeno effect being two of them. If I invest some more time and study these topics in greater detail any increased understanding I get might make the topics seem to be more sensible. But I wonder if it will be worth the effort.
I agree with your comments about experiments but any interpretation has got to conform to observations. Also, I think that if any interpretation is to gain credibility then it should be possible, if only in principle, to make observations that can validate the predictions made.

My biggest problem with it is the lack of clear meaning of probability which is vital for the QM formalism itself before we even start to talk about interpretations and metaphysics behind it.

This is something that MWI people (including its proponents on this forum) sweep under the carpet, and others like some respected philosophers of science who tried to derive it in a meaningful way have not did it a convincing way. It seems to me that the determinism of the theory somehow blocks a natural way to derive the probability in it. Before it's done, I believe it should not be taken seriously at all.

To understand what I mean, first try to understand the minimalistic approach and then connect it to the approach in which everything happens and then you may indeed have supstance to conclude it is a waste of time.

 

[vanhees71]

The question is what interpretation of QT are good for. I can't answer that question, because I think from the point of view of physics, it's just the minimal statistical interpretation which is needed to apply the theory to the description of phenomena and to predict outcomes of measurements. That's all what physics is about. It's not the purpose of the natural sciences to provide a world view or religion!

 

[stevendaryl]

The question is what interpretation of QT are good for. I can't answer that question, because I think from the point of view of physics, it's just the minimal statistical interpretation which is needed to apply the theory to the description of phenomena and to predict outcomes of measurements. That's all what physics is about. It's not the purpose of the natural sciences to provide a world view or religion!

I would say that interpretations of a theory are not religious beliefs. Religion is something that teaches moral precepts, such as the true purpose of the natural sciences.

 

[tom.stoer]

My biggest problem with it is the lack of clear meaning of probability which is vital for the QM formalism itself before we even start to talk about interpretations and metaphysics behind it.

This is a problem for QM in general and by no means restricted to the Everett Interpretation. The idea to derive probability i.e. the Born rule from the remaining axioms plus other - hopefully simpler - ingredients is definately interesting in itself. We can learn a lot from these discussions, even of we are not succesfull. The Born rule, the collapse postulate or whatever is so terribly complicated that it's hard to accept it as fundamental axiom.

Postulating probabilities = introducing them via an axiom does provide any clear meaning of probability at all.

In addition we do have indications that there us a chance to find probabilities w/o postulating them, e.g. the Hartle frequency operator.

This is something that MWI people (including its proponents on this forum) sweep under the carpet ...

I had some discussions on this topic here in this forum where nothing has been "swept under the carpet".

... and others like some respected philosophers of science who tried to derive it in a meaningful way have not did it a convincing way.

I agree.

It seems to me that the determinism of the theory somehow blocks a natural way to derive the probability in it. Before it's done, I believe it should not be taken seriously at all.

So you think that we should take e.g. the collapse interpretation seriously? It postulates a collapse w/o explaining why and when it happens, it does not explain what a measurement is and how it can / why it should be distinguished from ordinary unitary time evolution, it postulates a probability w/o any clue to understand where it is coming from ...

Honestly, I like the MWI much more, simply b/c it forces us to think about these questions.

 

[stevendaryl]

Honestly, I like the MWI much more, simply b/c it forces us to think about these questions.

That's what I meant in #4.

 

[durant35]

This is a problem for QM in general and by no means restricted to the Everett Interpretation. The idea to derive probability i.e. the Born rule from the remaining axioms plus other - hopefully simpler - ingredients is definately interesting in itself. We can learn a lot from these discussions, even of we are not succesfull. The Born rule, the collapse postulate or whatever is so terribly complicated that it's hard to accept it as fundamental axiom.

Postulating probabilities = introducing them via an axiom does provide any clear meaning of probability at all.

In addition we do have indications that there us a chance to find probabilities w/o postulating them, e.g. the Hartle frequency operator.

But the problem for the MWI interpretation is not the potential multitude of ways how to get a probabilistic rule. The problem is how to make sense of probability at all in a theory where everything possible happens. That, by definition, in some way contradicts the meaning of probability itself. That is quite different than "going minimal" like Mr Vanhees or doing some experiments and calculating frequencies in a lab. If you feel like I've missed your point, feel free to correct

I had some discussions on this topic here in this forum where nothing has been "swept under the carpet".

As a matter of fact, one of the most interesting threads that I've read was the one where you participated (the topic was of course MWI).

https://www.physicsforums.com/threa...-the-many-worlds-interpretation.706927/page-5

I was left with the impression that the probability issue was strongly swept under the carpet by introducing "hypothesis testing" etc. (not your position ofc) because it doesn't come in a natural way. It seemed to me like adding something so fundamental like the probability rule in a QM interpretation was done in a sort of laid-back 'oh, we need probability here, let's make something up' way.

So you think that we should take e.g. the collapse interpretation seriously? It postulates a collapse w/o explaining why and when it happens, it does not explain what a measurement is and how it can / why it should be distinguished from ordinary unitary time evolution, it postulates a probability w/o any clue to understand where it is coming from ...

Honestly, I like the MWI much more, simply b/c it forces us to think about these questions.

Yes, I do.

First of all, what do you mean by saying that it is postulating probability w/o any clue of where is it coming? I believe that it is pretty simple if we count collapse as a exclusion of other "branches" except one. Or perhaps you meant something else?

I still believe that all of those questions can be answered more naturally than introducing probability in MWI. I believe that measurements have a special meaning which allows us to give a normal way of interpreting probabilities. If that's not the case, I believe that there's something more fundamental than just the "wavefunction unitarity" which is a pretty cheap (I may as go far as to say lame) way to interpret the mystery of quantum mechanics.

 

[stevendaryl]

But the problem for the MWI interpretation is not the potential multitude of ways how to get a probabilistic rule. The problem is how to make sense of probability at all in a theory where everything possible happens.

Well, imagine the following toy model of a universe. It is deterministic except for the fact that there is a special nondeterministic coin which, when flipped, has a 50/50 chance of resulting in "heads" or "tails".

So that's a situation for which probability presumably makes sense. But suppose that the way this nondeterminism is "implemented" is as follows: (I'll make this religious sounding, just to be perverse)

Every time someone flips the coin, God first halts the universe. Then he makes two copies. Then he let's the coin land heads-up in one copy, and heads-down in the other copy. The copies no longer interact after that point.

So there is no nondeterminism in this multiverse. What happens is completely determined, even when people flip the seemingly nondeterministic coin. So it's deterministic, but from the point of view of people's memories, it seems nondeterministic.

 

[Denis]

MWI certainly does not make sense. This starts already with the meaning of probability. A probability that something happens makes no sense if everything happens. To save the game, one uses some common sense concepts about probability. The problem are not these common sense axioms themselves, but why they make sense in a situation which does not make sense.

The definition of the worlds makes no sense. If a world is some point of the configuration space or so where the wave function is nonzero, then there is a continuum of worlds, all except a few points (the zeros of the wave function) would be worlds. A precise definition of something else (local maxima or so) I have never seen.

Then, they use, for some strange purpose, decoherence. Decoherence presupposes some structure (subdivision into systems) which is not defined.

If you want an interpretation which makes sense, start with the minimal one, then look at Copenhagen (but get rid of positivistic nonsense - easy to identify, because it follows the rule "what we cannot observe does not exist", so one simply has to replace all "does not exist" with "is unknown") and try de Broglie-Bohm, given that it explains nicely what the measurement process is, and what the wave function collapse is, and also shows by example that a lot of impossibility claims are wrong, and that the quantum world can be realistic, even deterministic.

 

[tom.stoer]

First of all, what do you mean by saying that it is postulating probability w/o any clue of where is it coming? I believe that it is pretty simple if we count collapse as a exclusion of other "branches" except one. Or perhaps you meant something else?

Yes, I mean something else.

Accepting the "collapse" means observing a statistical behavior in experiments and therefore postulating the Born rule i.e. essentially postulating the collapse. Of course this does not explain anything. Accepting the "branching" means not postulating the Born rule, not postulating the collapse, but trying to derive the observed statistical behavior and the Born rule. In this approach we either understand what causes statistical behavior to appear and what causes the Born rule to emerge, or - if all this will fail - we at least may understand why it fails.

I believe that measurements have a special meaning ...

This is unacceptable for me b/c in practice that means you decide that a specific interaction is not treated using unitary time evolution but collaps, simply b/c this produces the intended results.

Even if it were true, I would like to learn why :-)

 

[stevendaryl]

MWI certainly does not make sense. This starts already with the meaning of probability. A probability that something happens makes no sense if everything happens.

Well, I would argue that that's not true. Given any probabilistic model, you can form an equivalent "ensemble" view where everything is deterministic. The deterministic ensemble model is mathematically equivalent to the probabilistic single-system model.

 

[durant35]

Well, imagine the following toy model of a universe. It is deterministic except for the fact that there is a special nondeterministic coin which, when flipped, has a 50/50 chance of resulting in "heads" or "tails".

So that's a situation for which probability presumably makes sense. But suppose that the way this nondeterminism is "implemented" is as follows: (I'll make this religious sounding, just to be perverse)

Every time someone flips the coin, God first halts the universe. Then he makes two copies. Then he let's the coin land heads-up in one copy, and heads-down in the other copy. The copies no longer interact after that point.

So there is no nondeterminism in this multiverse. What happens is completely determined, even when people flip the seemingly nondeterministic coin. So it's deterministic, but from the point of view of people's memories, it seems nondeterministic.

Thanks for the great analogy mr. stevendaryl, I am buying what you are saying. At least I think so.

But my opinion hasn't changed because of that. After the creation of the copies of the coin you mentioned, an observer should still calculate the probability of getting an outcome. And the outcome is?

100% heads and also 100% tails!

This is something that seems to me like the Achilees heel of MWI, each time an observer tries to include probability you get something which is circular. Saying that both copies deterministically occur is just sweeping the real problem under the carpet in a pretty uncovincing way. Saying the observer becomes both copies after the experiment doesn't give you something like "ok, this makes sense" - it is just avoiding the intrinsic nondeterminism of the theory in a unconvincing way, which makes MWI pretty cheap in my opinion.

 

[durant35]

Yes, I mean something else.

Accepting the "collapse" means observing a statistical behavior in experiments and therefore postulating the Born rule i.e. essentially postulating the collapse. Of course this does not explain anything. Accepting the "branching" means not postulating the Born rule, not postulating the collapse, but trying to derive the observed statistical behavior and the Born rule. In this approach we either understand what causes statistical behavior to appear and what causes the Born rule to emerge, or - if all this will fail - we at least may understand why it fails.

But you're not postulating the Born rule while postulating the collapse. You are postulating the collapse per se and the Born rule comes naturally. It sort of "derives itself" through non-unitarity and the existence of only one result in experiments. This is fundamentally different than deriving it in the MWI. Do you agree that Copenhagen/collapse has a natural probability rule that is sort of already built in it?

This is unacceptable for me b/c in practice that means you decide that a specific interaction is not treated using unitary time evolution but collaps, simply b/c this produces the intended results.

Even if it were true, I would like to learn why :-)

How about irreversible decoherence? That is treated using unitary time evolution and causes apparent collapse. You are free to assume that the non-unitary part occurs for real and that the collapse is not only apparent but real as well. Why it might occur, I would also like to learn

 

[durant35]

Well, I would argue that that's not true. Given any probabilistic model, you can form an equivalent "ensemble" view where everything is deterministic. The deterministic ensemble model is mathematically equivalent to the probabilistic single-system model.

How would you define probability in one particular (single) experiment where all outcomes occur? Let's say I throw an electron through the double slit. Does it make sense to say that it's more likely that it will land somewhere in the middle of the pattern than on the edges if all spots will be hit in some world?

If yes - how?

 

[stevendaryl]

How would you define probability in one particular (single) experiment where all outcomes occur?

It's not possible to observe all possible outcomes. What it is possible to observe is a persistent record of past events. I sketched a toy model above: Every time someone tosses a coin, two copies of the universe is made---one where the result is "heads" and another where the result is "tails". To someone confined to one copy, it seems that the universe is nondeterministic.

Is there probability in such a multiverse? Well there will be some possible universes in which the frequency of heads will approach 50%. For people living in those worlds, it makes sense to assume that the probability of a coin toss is 50/50. The usefulness of the concept of probability in one universe shouldn't be affected by the existence of the other universes.

 

[durant35]

The usefulness of the concept of probability in one universe shouldn't be affected by the existence of the other universes.

That's extremely controversial. Forget the 50-50 coin, that indeed is a toy model. Let's assume a real quantum experiment, like the decay of the radioactive nucleus at some time t.

Suppose that there is 90 percent probability that it does not decay and 10 percent that it does.

Both outcomes occur. Why is non-decay more likely in this case since both branches are equally real?
Speaking of probability in this way implies that there is something wrong with your argument that it makes sense to speak of probability on each particular branch despite the existence of others.

In a toy model, it might. But in concrete examples like mine, MWI is flirting with nonsense and circularity.

 

[Vanadium 50]

I usually avoid interpretation threads because they tend to be filled with people who cannot do an actual QM calculation but are still rooting for Team Wheeler or Team Bohm or Team Cramer etc. Furthermore, they tend to revolve around which interpretation is "right", and since by definition interpretations all produce the same outcomes (otherwise they are theories) this is not a scientific question. But I chimed into say that MWI is perhaps the worst named interpretation. As Sidney Coleman explained to me, in MWI there are not many worlds. There is only one world.

 

[tom.stoer]

But you're not postulating the Born rule while postulating the collapse.

The Born rule is one of the postulates of orthodox QM.

You are postulating the collapse per se and the Born rule comes naturally.

It doesn't come out naturally; it is specified by hand w/o any reasoning except for phenomenology.

It sort of "derives itself" through non-unitarity and the existence of only one result in experiments. This is fundamentally different than deriving it in the MWI. Do you agree that Copenhagen/collapse has a natural probability rule that is sort of already built in it?

No, I don't agree.

There are several step: First you postulate a measurement differing from ordinary dynamics w/o further explanation when it does apply, i.e. when a system will evolve according to unitary time evolution and when it will not; this is essentially some collaps. Second you specify the probability measure associated to the collaps, i.e. that when collapsing |ψ> into some |n> you find p(n) = |<n|ψ>|².

So the challenge is to understand why there appears to be a collapse at all, what a measurement is, what distinguishes a measurement situation from ordinary time evolution for the same apparatus which usually follows ordinary time evolution, why a collaps appears, why we should associate a probability, and which specific probability measure.

None of these questions are addressed in orthodox QM.

How about irreversible decoherence? That is treated using unitary time evolution and causes apparent collapse. You are free to assume that the non-unitary part occurs for real and that the collapse is not only apparent but real as well. Why it might occur, I would also like to learn

There is no irreversible decoherence in quantum mechanics w/o introducing it by hand. The overall dynamics remains unitary (just as in statistical mechanics). And there cannot be any non-unitary part w/o contradicting with ordinary = unitary time evolution. Yes, decoherence somehow explains an "apparent collapse", but it does not explain what happens with the unobserved branches, and why. The only solution to me is that they stay real but unobserved, b/c this is what the theory predicts.

Whether you introduce a collaps w/ of w/o decoherence makes no fundamental difference. Decoherence solves a part of the problem only.

 

[tom.stoer]

This is something that seems to me like the Achilees heel of MWI, each time an observer tries to include probability you get something which is circular. Saying that both copies deterministically occur is just sweeping the real problem under the carpet in a pretty uncovincing way.

No, this is not the Achilles heel, but it's closely related.

The problem is why the Born rule appears as a probability measure. Assume you have a quantum experiment with possible outcomes n = 1,2 and two "branches", i.e. |ψ> = a₁ |1> + a₂ |2> (omitting pointer and environment in this notation).

Why does a prefactor a_n causes an appearent probability?

Look at a classical experiment with a coin with two additional labels a_n. These two labels do not affect the classical probabilities p_z, but in QM they are the probability amplitudes p_n = |a_n|².

 

[tom.stoer]

But I chimed into say that MWI is perhaps the worst named interpretation. As Sidney Coleman explained to me, in MWI there are not many worlds. There is only one world.

Very important point! Thanks.

 

[tom.stoer]

In a toy model, it might. But in concrete examples like mine, MWI is flirting with nonsense and circularity.

No, people don't do that. They (many) try very hard to understand.

 

[Denis]

Well, I would argue that that's not true. Given any probabilistic model, you can form an equivalent "ensemble" view where everything is deterministic. The deterministic ensemble model is mathematically equivalent to the probabilistic single-system model.

But the "ensemble" view is something very different from many worlds. In every particular instance you have a single result. But if you repeat the same experiment, you are unable to guarantee that everything is equal, so in different experiments you obtain different results. Those properties, for which you can guarantee equal values in the repeated experiments are what defines the ensemble. Normal common sense probability theory. In every particular experiment you have only a single world.

I have no problem with the ensemble interpretation. I have only a problem with many worlds.

 

[Denis]

So the challenge is to understand why there appears to be a collapse at all, what a measurement is, what distinguishes a measurement situation from ordinary time evolution for the same apparatus which usually follows ordinary time evolution, why a collaps appears, why we should associate a probability, and which specific probability measure.

None of these questions are addressed in orthodox QM.

Yes. But they are addressed in de Broglie-Bohm theory, thus, not really a problem, except for some interpretations. Instead, in MWI I see no basis for answering these questions.

 

[zonde]

Does anyone else feel the same or does anyone think the MWI should be taken seriously?

I think that all no collapse interpretations are flawed. MWI takes "no collapse" idea to extreme and adds nothing else (while Bohmian mechanics is no collapse as well it has other nice features).

This is unacceptable for me b/c in practice that means you decide that a specific interaction is not treated using unitary time evolution but collaps, simply b/c this produces the intended results.

Even if it were true, I would like to learn why :-)

To specify wave function you treat all potentials as external parameters. So when potentials are part of solution this approach won't work. One example for such a case is amplification process in particle detectors.

 

[Demystifier]

It's not the purpose of the natural sciences to provide a world view ...

So what's the purpose of natural sciences, especially non-applied fundamental sciences such as theoretical elementary particle physics? To make testable predictions? What's the purpose of that?

Even if it's not the purpose of natural sciences to provide a world view, that is one of its byproducts. And if there was no such a byproduct, many scientists would not be interested in science in the first place.

 

[stevendaryl]

So what's the purpose of natural sciences, especially non-applied fundamental sciences such as theoretical elementary particle physics? To make testable predictions? What's the purpose of that?

Even if it's not the purpose of natural sciences to provide a world view, that is one of its byproducts. And if there was no such a byproduct, many scientists would not be interested in science in the first place.

I feel the same way. The reason people are attracted to science is (at least speaking for myself) to try to understand how the world works. Not to make successful predictions. To me, the role of successful predictions is that it provides feedback as to whether your understanding is correct. It's not an end in itself. Except in applied science and engineering, I guess, where you really might not care whether you understand something as long as you are able to make predictions.

People were able to successfully predict the motions of the planets long before gravity was understood, but that wasn't the end of the science of cosmology.

 

[Demystifier]

I feel the same way. The reason people are attracted to science is (at least speaking for myself) to try to understand how the world works. Not to make successful predictions. To me, the role of successful predictions is that it provides feedback as to whether your understanding is correct. It's not an end in itself.

In the beginning, the main purpose of fundamental science was to give a deep understanding of nature. Then at the beginning of 20th century the main purpose became to make testable predictions. Then in the second half of 20th century the main purpose was to publish many papers and to receive many citations. Today the main purpose is to get good grants. By extrapolation, I predict that in the soon future the main purpose will be to make money by itself. If that happens, that will be the end of fundamental science.

But then again, this end might empty space for a reborn of fundamental science with its original purpose. This looks like a spring-summer-autumn-winter-spring-... cycle. At the moment we are in the autumn.

 

[vanhees71]

So what's the purpose of natural sciences, especially non-applied fundamental sciences such as theoretical elementary particle physics? To make testable predictions? What's the purpose of that?

Even if it's not the purpose of natural sciences to provide a world view, that is one of its byproducts. And if there was no such a byproduct, many scientists would not be interested in science in the first place.

The aim of the natural sciences is to provide an as accurate as possible description of nature concerning reproducible phenomena. It answers "how questions" rather than "why questions". Particularly it doesn't answer the question, why the state of physical systems has only a probabilistic meaning; we only know that with an amazing accuracy from comparing observations with QT that this is the case. There's no way to tell, why this is so, and to introduce funny concepts like parallel universes which are not observable in principle is, from the point of view of physics, unnecessary and doesn't lead to any additional insight. Some people feel the necessity for such additional "metaphysical" concepts, but this necessity is outside of the natural sciences. So it's about world views and (religious) believes.