BobG said:
If we don't know, then the war doesn't qualify as a legitimate pre-emptive war.
At the time, they thought they did know, is how I see it.
Since 1841, when Secretary of State Daniel Webster laid out the US position, our policy toward pre-emptive force is that it's justified only in the presence of an imminent threat, must be necessary for self-defense, only be used after nonlethal measures and attempts to dissuade the adversary from acting had failed, plus be limited to dealing just with the immediate threat and discriminate between armed/unarmed and innocent/guilty.
Well the Bush administration thought very much that Iraq was an imminent threat, and went through the various non-lethal measures to try to convince Saddam to reveal the WMD they thought he had.
If you want to argue that that policy should be changed in light of how fast things can happen in the present day, then that's a valid issue. Just keep in mind that that's a two edged sword. If a single person is going to make a decision about using pre-emptive force because the damage from a threat to the US could do irreparable damage to the US before the US could respond normally, then the threat of a bad decision by that single individual doing irreparable harm before his actions can be corrected is just as great.
I agree.
Any damage done by a foolish invasion of Iraq pale in comparison other mistakes a President could make and those risks are absolutely unavoidable.
Giving the President authorization to use military force in a situation where the President supposedly hasn't even decided force is necessary was truly reckless behavior, however. Having to assume certain real and serious risks isn't an excuse to assume every risk ranked lower than the most serious. (Congress's authorization to use military force was given before UN Resolution 1441 was even passed, let alone before the UN decided whether violations were serious enough to warrant military action. I suppose we should be grateful Congress at least changed the wording of the resolution, since the original draft would have authorized Bush to implement military force anywhere in the Middle East in response to anything he saw as a possible threat.)
IMO, I do not think the UN would authorize the use of force in the face of a truly imminent threat. It is a corrupt organization. For example, when Iran gets a nuke, I doubt the UN will seek to do much of anything.
Which other guy? The guy you had the agreement with or any guy at random?
With the next question being - what agreement with the US did Hussein violate?
And the question after that being - what type of retaliation for what type of violation? Is it anything goes? Or does the retaliation have to be proportional to the violation?
The "other guy" being the United States. Saddam Hussein violated the 1991 Gulf War cease-fire, and as such the 2003 invasion of Iraq can be considered a continuation of the war that started in 1991.
The cease-fire was UN Resolution 687, and Resolution 1441 found Iraq in material breach of the cease-fire.
As for retaliation, I think that depends on what type of attack. If country A lobs a few dozen bombs into a city in country B, then country B should not respond by just lobbing the same proportion of bombs back into country A, they should do everything they can to destroy the ability of country A to execute any future such attacks.
Regarding what Saddam violated (or supposedly violated), they were the following UN resolutions:
17 UN Security Council Resolutions
UNSCR 1441 - November 8, 2002
• Called for the immediate and complete disarmament of Iraq and its prohibited weapons.
• Iraq must provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA full access to Iraqi facilities, individuals, means of transportation, and documents.
• States that the Security Council has repeatedly warned Iraq and that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.
UNSCR 1284 - December 17, 1999
• Created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace previous weapon inspection team (UNSCOM).
• Iraq must allow UNMOVIC "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" to Iraqi officials and facilities.
• Iraq must fulfill its commitment to return Gulf War prisoners.
• Calls on Iraq to distribute humanitarian goods and medical supplies to its people and address the needs of vulnerable Iraqis without discrimination.
UNSCR 1205 - November 5, 1998
• "Condemns the decision by Iraq of 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation" with UN inspectors as "a flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687 and other resolutions.
• Iraq must provide "immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation" with UN and IAEA inspectors.
UNSCR 1194 - September 9, 1998
• "Condemns the decision by Iraq of 5 August 1998 to suspend cooperation with" UN and IAEA inspectors, which constitutes "a totally unacceptable contravention" of its obligations under UNSCR 687, 707, 715, 1060, 1115, and 1154.
• Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors, and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
UNSCR 1154 - March 2, 1998
• Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, and notes that any violation would have the "severest consequences for Iraq."
UNSCR 1137 - November 12, 1997
• "Condemns the continued violations by Iraq" of previous UN resolutions, including its "implicit threat to the safety of" aircraft operated by UN inspectors and its tampering with UN inspector monitoring equipment.
• Reaffirms Iraq's responsibility to ensure the safety of UN inspectors.
• Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
UNSCR 1134 - October 23, 1997
• "Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a "flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
• Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
• Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors want to interview.
UNSCR 1115 - June 21, 1997
• "Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a "clear and flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
• Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
• Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors want to interview.
UNSCR 1060 - June 12, 1996
• "Deplores" Iraq's refusal to allow access to UN inspectors and Iraq's "clear violations" of previous UN resolutions.
• Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
UNSCR 1051 - March 27, 1996
• Iraq must report shipments of dual-use items related to weapons of mass destruction to the UN and IAEA.
• Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
UNSCR 949 - October 15, 1994
• "Condemns" Iraq's recent military deployments toward Kuwait.
• Iraq must not utilize its military or other forces in a hostile manner to threaten its neighbors or UN operations in Iraq.
• Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors.
• Iraq must not enhance its military capability in southern Iraq.
UNSCR 715 - October 11, 1991
• Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors.
UNSCR 707 - August 15, 1991
• "Condemns" Iraq's "serious violation" of UNSCR 687.
• "Further condemns" Iraq's noncompliance with IAEA and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
• Iraq must halt nuclear activities of all kinds until the Security Council deems Iraq in full compliance.
• Iraq must make a full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction and missile programs.
• Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
• Iraq must cease attempts to conceal or move weapons of mass destruction, and related materials and facilities.
• Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors to conduct inspection flights throughout Iraq.
• Iraq must provide transportation, medical and logistical support for UN and IAEA inspectors.
UNSCR 688 - April 5, 1991
• "Condemns" repression of Iraqi civilian population, "the consequences of which threaten international peace and security."
• Iraq must immediately end repression of its civilian population.
• Iraq must allow immediate access to international humanitarian organizations to those in need of assistance.
UNSCR 687 - April 3, 1991
• Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities."
• Iraq must "unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material" or any research, development or manufacturing facilities.
• Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 KM and related major parts and repair and production facilities."
• Iraq must not "use, develop, construct or acquire" any weapons of mass destruction.
• Iraq must reaffirm its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
• Creates the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify the elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs and mandated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verify elimination of Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
• Iraq must declare fully its weapons of mass destruction programs.
• Iraq must not commit or support terrorism, or allow terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq.
• Iraq must cooperate in accounting for the missing and dead Kuwaitis and others.
• Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.
UNSCR 686 - March 2, 1991
• Iraq must release prisoners detained during the Gulf War.
• Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.
• Iraq must accept liability under international law for damages from its illegal invasion of Kuwait.
UNSCR 678 - November 29, 1990
• Iraq must comply fully with UNSCR 660 (regarding Iraq's illegal invasion of Kuwait) "and all subsequent relevant resolutions."
Authorizes UN Member States "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."
Because I don't think Bush-Cheney, et al, saw al-Qaeda as that serious of a threat. They were more valuable as an excuse to pursue other goals than they were a threat to be neutralized.
I think Bush and Cheney have, and still do, see al-Qaeda as a very serious threat.
The fact of the matter is that they weren't totally off base in that assessment (hence putting the number of casualties into perspective). A terrorist organization isn't going to directly threaten the security of a nation like the United States.
How do you know this? A terrorist organization could do serious damage to a nation like the United States if left to get away with itself for too long.
Suppose before hitting the WTC, they had flown two planes straight into the White House and the Capitol Building in Washington, D.C. What if the president was in the White House at said time?
Some may say, "Oh, they'd have people standing by to watch out for that," yet there was a guy who flew his plane directly over the White House, then you have those two who just got into the White House uninvited recently.
Or if terrorists are ever able to detonate a form of large bomb or chemical weapon in say a place like NYC or Los Angelos (or in multiple cities).
Or if they detonate a nuke, even a small one, the simple fear it would create could paralyze the nation in many ways.
The "value" of a WTC type incident to al-Qaeda is the increase in prestige for an anti-US organization such as al-Qaeda. The "value" of a WTC type incident to neo-cons is the ability to generate support for policies the neo-cons felt the US should have been pursuing all along.
Neoconservatives only will use something like a terrorist attack on the United States that is serious (9/11 was an act of war), to rally support for policies to defeat terrorism. As said, the main justification for Iraq (or most publicized) was not 9/11, it was WMD and Saddam's supposedly being an imminent threat.