Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

[AntonL]

Breaches in containment vessels 1 & 2 before explosion
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110526a1.html

Another analysis by Tepco has shown that breaches may have occurred at containment vessels encasing reactors 1 and 2 at the power plant, possibly causing leaks of highly radioactive water there.

The possible breaches to the containment vessels there are certain to compound efforts to deal with accumulating contaminated water at the sites, raising questions about the viability of a Tepco plan to re-establish a stable cooling system by around mid-July.

Tepco said if it hypothesizes that a breach of about 3 cm wide occurred at the reactor 1 containment vessel 18 hours after the quake and widened to about 7 cm 50 hours later, that corresponds well to changes in pressure readings inside the containment vessel.

The utility also hypothesized that a breach roughly 10 cm wide occurred at the No. 2 reactor's containment vessel 21 hours after the quake due to elevated temperatures, among other factors.

This finding also corresponds with data obtained.

Tepco also said it believes that parts used to ensure air tightness may have broken from overheating

explosion unit 1: 3:36PM March 12 = 25 hours after earthquake but containment breached 18 hours after the quake

explosion unit 2: 6:14AM March 15 = 88 hours after earthquake but containment breached 21 hours after the quake

Elevated temperature should not be a ground for the breach in containment - surely it is designed to withstand such temperatures. Has Tepco made this statement as as defence against possible damage by earthquake, which would imply that all containment of NPP of similar designs are at extreme danger of failing by a stronger quake or they already have failed but not yet tested or noticed as no elevated pressure in containment under normal operating or shutdown condition.

Are there any other references to this report?

 

[NUCENG]

Even without knowing about the tsunami on way?

Oops, that is right! Great point. They had cooling and AC power and expected to be able to control cooldown. The operators may have done what they thought was right based on what they knew at 1503 hr. It can be tricky to keep hindsight out of our evaluations. After they lost All AC after the tsunami, they would have been dealing with all sorts of lost instrumentation and trying to figure out what was going on. They may not have thought about restoring the IC to prevent air-binding the IC system.

 

[bytepirate]

...I am inclined to believe the isolation was deliberate by operators.

how can one explain, that TEPCO does not *know* what the operators did?

this draws a picture in my head: panicing people running around pushing random buttons...

i am pretty sure, that it has not been like this, there should not be more than one or two people, that could have pushed that button (or issued the order to do so).

how about asking them?

 

[Marita]

Even without knowing about the tsunami on way?

Yep it's real easy for us to sit here without all the alarms screaming and lights flashing after the whole building was shaking for 5 minutes and say "what were they thinking" why didn't they just do x y or z. Been in those situations and sometimes it is really hard to sort out the the highest priority emergency you need to handle "Right Now" and then your incoming information is hidden by a power loss , I can only imagine the "pucker factor" those operator experienced.

 

[NUCENG]

Breaches in containment vessels 1 & 2 before explosion
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110526a1.html



explosion unit 1: 3:36PM March 12 = 25 hours after earthquake but containment breached 18 hours after the quake

explosion unit 2: 6:14AM March 15 = 88 hours after earthquake but containment breached 21 hours after the quake

Elevated temperature should not be a ground for the breach in containment - surely it is designed to withstand such temperatures.

Are there any other references to this report?

It wasn't just temperature. Unit 1 pressure was more than double the pressure limit and containment would have been expected to start leaking at pressures as low as 0.18 MPa. At 0.81 MPa the predicted leakage area is 5.42 cm^2 per: (units converted to metric)

http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/5630475-EX87x5/5630475.pdf

If containment temperatures exceeded 260 degC to 371 degC other seals and containment penetrations are also expected to begin failing. The typical design basis limits for containment are about 140 degC and 0.39 MPa. Once the plants at Fukushima lost all decay heat removal, containment cooling, and fuel pool cooling in an extended station blackout the inevitable results were what we see now.

 

[NUCENG]

how can one explain, that TEPCO does not *know* what the operators did?

this draws a picture in my head: panicing people running around pushing random buttons...

i am pretty sure, that it has not been like this, there should not be more than one or two people, that could have pushed that button (or issued the order to do so).

how about asking them?

The graphs show that the IC was isolated at 1503 hr. The May 24 TEPCO report cited above says it was done to slow cooldown rate. Rive pointed out that based on what they knew at that time, their actions were probably justified. Everything I see in the data released to date is consistent with an operable IC system that was secured after a few minutes of normal operation. Other releases and news stories may indicate something different, but based on the discussion here it looks doubtful that the earthquake damaged the system. This will probably be a point covered in any investigations.

As to paniced operators pushing random buttons, I wasn't there, but as Marita pointed out there was likely a strong "pucker factor." Operator training and drills in simulators is pretty intense and they have a lot of practice at upset conditions. The fact that this was real was a bigger stress factor, I am certain. Have any news reports actually included interviews of the operators?

 

[WhoWee]

Oops, that is right! Great point. They had cooling and AC power and expected to be able to control cooldown. The operators may have done what they thought was right based on what they knew at 1503 hr. It can be tricky to keep hindsight out of our evaluations. After they lost All AC after the tsunami, they would have been dealing with all sorts of lost instrumentation and trying to figure out what was going on. They may not have thought about restoring the IC to prevent air-binding the IC system.

That's what I was thinking - they had to prioritize - deal with certainties first.

 

[NUCENG]

Having 'partially damage' (light green) above significant melting (brown) is rather odd/strange/seemingly unlikely. Molten fuel would not support any solid structure. Anything above the melting would likely be severely damaged.

I am picturing a similar natural phenomena - volcanic lava. In Hawaii you can walk on a crust over liquid magma. The crust acts to insulate the magma allowing it to remain liquid. In the reactor they were using core spray to inject into the vessel over the top of the core. This would promote forming a crust. Would that make sense for why a cooler area might be flloating on a hotter area?

 

[tsutsuji]

TEPCO is apparently being careful in stating it may have been damaged in the earthquake,

Because it is "more political", I am answering in the "more political" thread at : https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=3322455#post3322455

 

[NUCENG]

Good you posted this again Anton:
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110516a3.html

As here they are explaining (hopely some expert has made some calculations?) that rising pressure alone cannot explain the findings in unit 1:

It is very difficult to overpressurize the RPV itself due to the capacity of the Safety Relief Valves. These valves relieve pressure to tghe torus which thenh relieves back to the Drywell through the torus-DW vacuum breakers. Containment design pressure is about 0.39 MPa and can be reached fairly quickly in an extended SBO like occurred at Fukushima. At the same time the pressure is rising, the temperature is rising.

 

[NUCENG]

I believe the reactor (power generation) was shutdown manually just after the quake. The reactor cooling was working at the time. Normally, even at shutdown, the cooling continues.

That very well could be. In other words, the quake may have damage the core or cooling systems and/or containment.

The press/media are frequently not careful with wording.

We need to be careful with wording too but it can be tough. According to the logs the three operating reactors at Fukushima Daiichi all received automatic scram signals from the seismic sensors. The shutdown was NOT manual. In the case of Unit 1, the Isolation Condenser was initiated manually and probably isolated manually a few minutes later but before the tsunami.

I think these two distict events have been confused.

 

[NUCENG]

That very well could be. In other words, the quake may have damage the core or cooling systems and/or containment.

The press/media are frequently not careful with wording.

The possibility of radiation release prior to the tsunami is something I have been looking to confirm. There are numerous press reports of a single radiation sensor alarm about 1.5 km from Unit 1 that was received at 1529 hr about 15 minutes before the 14 m tsunami wave hit the site.

However if you look at the timeline and press releases you can find that the first tsunami waves hit the site at 1529 hr. Coincidence?

Why was only one sensor triggered? None of the graphs or logs published by TEPCO so far show any radiation levels or alarms prior to the tsunami. Many instruments in nuclear plants alarm on downscale or loss of power as well as at a setpoint to alert operators to instrument failures. It is possible that the sensor that alarmed was inundated by the lower waves that hit the site at 1529 hr.

 

[ThomS]

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11052508-e.html

This is in regards to detection of radioactive materials, specifically Pu-238, 239, and 240.

What does this tell us? The report states that TEPCO tested up to 500m from the reactors, but should they be testing further away. I *assume* that these materials could travel as other materials such as cesium and iodine.

Is it significant that they are still finding it? I understand that Pu has a very long half-life, however, the second report (pdf) says that the values have NOT changed greatly.

Thank you for your time and thoughts.

 

[NUCENG]

I am quoting some posts from the political thread








and now http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/25_30.html


So it seems that the quake did cause some severe damage to the integrity of the plants

Also remember Unit 6 is collecting water in both the basements of the reactor and turbine buildings.

In conclusion - the NPP are not that earthquake safe as previously thought!

AntonL,

To some extent the following is playing devils advocate. Your interpretation is absolutely plausable.

However, another possibility requires consideration of the difference in design of the HPCI and RCIC systems. The design basis for HPCI is a small break LOCA that does not depressurioze the RPV. The RCIC system is sized for a Loss of Feedwater accident. In this event the MSIVs closed at the time of the SCRAM and there did not appear to be significant loss of coolant. This was more likely to use RCIC, which is the smaller of the two systems. However from the graphs for unit 3 neither HPCI nor RCIC was operated for some time after the SCRAM. There were multiple SRVs cycling losing water from the RPV to the suppression chamber. From the latest reports on 5/24 the RCIC system eventually was able to recover level in Unit 3. It is unclear why the HPCI system auto started on 3/12 but it is possible the RCIC system failed or was secured for some reason. (?) Anyway, when HPCI started it would have much higher flow rate and would also draw more steam. Together with a lower decay heat after 24 hours from the SCRAM, both of these effects would have reduced RPV pressure faster than with the RCIC system in operation.

The HPCI system uses 250 VDC batteries. RCIC uses 125 VDC. There are early press releases that indicate Unit 3 tried to restart the RCIC system but it failed to start. This could be due to 125 VDC battery depletion or that the steam pressure was too low to run the system.

This alternative sequence of events is possible without postulating earthquake damage. Again, this is not to say that your sequence is wrong, but it is not a sure thing.

 

[ThomS]

http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110526a1.html

Has this been discussed? Apologies if it has.

 

[Bodge]

http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110526a1.html

Has this been discussed? Apologies if it has.

It looks like an 'old school' BWR cannot take a direct hit from a 6-7 magnitude quake, tsunami or not.

 

[ThomS]

http://enenews.com/japan-switches-measurements-reactor-no-1-drywell-not-suppression-chamber-now-at-192-sieverts-per-hour

I can't find the original source for this. Can someone point me to it?

Also, (apologies for all the questions), assuming this is correct, why the big jump? Why measure from this point instead of the prior point?

 

[Bodge]

Astronuc, NUCENG, et. al.

What are we to understand from the 215 Sv/Hr readings in No.1's drywell?
[215 is the latest number from TEPCO's daily update]*

Does this indicate ongoing criticality or has a fragment of corium 'just' migrated nearer the sensor?

What should we expect to happen next if there is corium in the drywell, with or without ongoing fission?

Additionally, why is the pressure in the RPV edging ever upwards?

TIA

* see also: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/05/25/ap/business/main20065975.shtml

"In addition, some chunks of the fuel appeared to have entered the inner containment chambers, or drywell, causing some damage."

 

[LabratSR]

http://enenews.com/japan-switches-measurements-reactor-no-1-drywell-not-suppression-chamber-now-at-192-sieverts-per-hour

I can't find the original source for this. Can someone point me to it?

Also, (apologies for all the questions), assuming this is correct, why the big jump? Why measure from this point instead of the prior point?

I believe this is the original source for that and note status = Instrument Failure

http://atmc.jp/plant/rad/?n=1

This is TEPCO's Unit 1 parameter page and if you go al the way to the bottom under CAMS data you will see they also state Instrument Failure.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/images/11052506_level_pr_data_1u-e.pdf

 

[Bodge]

From the UN:

"In addition, some chunks of the fuel appeared to have entered the inner containment chambers, or drywell, causing some damage."

Maybe sensor A is malfunctioning and sensor B is working OK?

Sensor B shows a history of 30-40 Sv/Hr readings that aren't shown at the atmc link.

Sensor A always shows a non-worrying level of radiation.

...when I look back at the reactor 1 drywell CAMS readings I noted in the past, I have just one sensors data for the date range march 20th->april 8th, and it was yoyoing around the 30-50 range over this time, tending to be towards the lower end of this range as time went on. Then it suddenly went up to 100 on the 8th, then back down to 68.3 later on the 8th april. Then no more data was published from unit 1 D/W CAMS all the way until 17th may where we get 2 sensors readings ever since, one of which is usually well below 1 and the other which darts around from either 25-35 or sometimes leaps to 200 or more.

Here is a snapshot of No.1 on the 23rd March:

0.5 Sv at Sensor A, 33 Sv at sensor B. Sensor B correlates much better with the sensors in No.2 and 3 drywells.

http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/05/20110523006/20110523006-3.pdf

 

[Azby]

The TEPCO originals for reactor 2 & 3 are shown within this document:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110524e14.pdf

Thanks. Seeing that the diagrams in that presentation are so similar to what's in the newspaper, I now get the feeling that they're based on a software simulation that uses a similarly simplified graphic image.

(Am I the ony one who has trouble with multi-quote? Using Firefox 3.5.7...)

 

[NUCENG]

Thanks. I had seen that data before, but I forgot to compare it to the original data that I had been recording manually from each status update.

By looking at both sets of data, it seems highly likely that the reason they originally stopped publishing unit 1 CAMS for the drywell after April 8th is not just because it spiked upwards and then wobbled all over the place, but because they got the 2nd sensor working at this time and it completely disagrees with what the other sensor was saying, by quite some orders of magnitude. I am not really sure why they started showing it on the overall status updates again as of may 17th, because the 2 sensors still disagree a lot.

Probably a self-defense strategy - the old "even a broken watch is accurate twice a day" strategy. If they weren't publishing the data someone would certainly accuse them of witholding vital data.

 

[robinson]

Have any news reports actually included interviews of the operators?

I saw two interviews on TV with people who were actually working at the plant, inside the plant at the time of the earthquake. It was pretty much get out any way you could, and run away. During the quake, which lasted quite a while. Eyewitness reports of large cracks in the reactor buildings, massive damage to the facility, one American there stated they pried open the safety doors to get out of the building.

Then later when the tsunami was coming everyone ran for high ground. Nobody stayed at the controls when the tsunami hit. This was on television, CNN I believe.

 

[ThomS]

I believe this is the original source for that and note status = Instrument Failure

http://atmc.jp/plant/rad/?n=1

This is TEPCO's Unit 1 parameter page and if you go al the way to the bottom under CAMS data you will see they also state Instrument Failure.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/images/11052506_level_pr_data_1u-e.pdf

I appreciate it. But this really does not answer my question. Let me explain if I can. I see the note, but it doesn't *mean* anything to me. I see the numbers jumping around some over the last five days. So, does this mean that these high reading is incorrect or regarded as dubious at best? And should it be ignored? Honestly, I don't see how amtc came up with the numbers.

OTOH, did the meter fail on or after 5/25? Before?

Frankly, I don't know what to make of that headline, readings, etc. I am looking the amtc and enenews but it seems that it is either 1) sensationalist and not reliable, or 2) really scary.

Based on the data, really which one it it? This sort of headline scares and worries everyday people without technical backgrounds to dig into the guts of all those numbers. Remember that people here in Japan (including me) do want to understand and make informed decisions on reliably interpreted data.

Apologies if this came across a bit bluntly.

Thank you

 

[NUCENG]

That's pretty unbelievable... I really think that we will need some time to draw all the conclusions about the technical flaws enlightened by this tsunami. And I'm really convinced that whatever the disaster is already, to some extent, japanese and ALL OF US also have been very lucky when you consider all the parameters involved, with all the uncontrolled risks.

We talked a lot about the EDG and the electric blackout, but really i think the problems related to the pumps and more generally the loss of the cold source have been understated or perhaps not even fully revealed, and the design flaws are also to be considered in this department...

If the EDG can in a way be installed at a much higher level from sea level (if we want to secure them), the problem of the pumps is i think even more problematic to solve. By definition, a seawater pump has to be at sea level, at list the turbine part. Then, of course, the electrical part can be installed at a much higher level, with a long shaft linking the motor and the impeller. I'm not sure that in the Daichi plant, and even at Daini, this is sufficient to secure them though in case of tsunami.

We can also imagine that a so big wave rushing into the impellers can probably break them, or damage them to a certain extent. Then, even with electrical power left, the cold source is lost or diminished. We can also imagine that the intakes can be heavily obstructed by big debris. All these risks explain why the big wall with Y concrete blocks has been constructed into the sea, to create the port where the remaining waves are supposed to be small and the debris kept at a minimum. But a tsunami easily go over this wall... then the cold source is at risk.

The articles reveal an other domino effect with the cooling of the EDG being done with the pumps... which is kind of scary thinking about it! The backup for electrical power is dependent of the same cold source than the one used for the reactors, so no cold source leads to big reactors cooling problem AND electrical backup failure after maybe one hour.

Definitely, this problem related to the pumps and the possible loss of cold source is in my mind as inportant, and even more important perhaps, than the one related to the EDG. And it has not been discussed a lot in reality (here or in the medias), even if i think that at the very beginning, i heard from some reports that Daichi lost its cold source before losing its power (I mean the backup power).

Do we know more on this for the various reactors/plants? Which pumps did fail?

These pumps should at least be put in a bunker if they have to stay close to the sea...

At Daini, from the picture i posted, i don't see the main pumps being inside a building. This picture is from the 12th of March, one day after the tsunami.

US BWRs I am familiar with have pump houses to protect the cooling water pumps for General Service Water, Emergency Service Water and Circulating Water systems. These buildings are safety-related, sesmically qualified and water tight where to protect the pump motors. Impeller shafts drive the impellers through a water sealed fitting on the motor floor. Power cables can be elevatedor routed in water tight conduits. So it is possible to protect pumps from flooding damage even if they are located near the water edge.

 

[NUCENG]

Do we know more on this for the various reactors/plants? Which pumps did fail?

All of them failed due to loss of Power. Whether or not they were physically damaged is irrelavent at Fukushima, but should be considered during investigation and development of lessons learned.

 

[NUCENG]

The following article http://astand.asahi.com/magazine/judiciary/articles/2011051100015.html?iref=chumoku expresses the view that most diesel generators at Fukushima Daiichi are water-cooled : "The tsunami hit the seawater pumps and water intake became impossible. As a consequence, the 10 water-cooled emergency diesel generators stopped (...) Unit 2, unit 4 and unit 6 have one air-cooled emergency diesel generator each. (...) Those at unit 2 and unit 4 failed too. They are located high above sea level, which raises the possibility that what failed was the metal-clad switchgear which acts as the electric power receiving end at the building"

A photograph showing seawater pumps being removed for inspection at Ikata NPP can be viewed at : http://mytown.asahi.com/areanews/ehime/OSK201105190135.html

Switchgear or fuel tanks could have been damaged with the same result as flooding the generator rooms themselves. If it turns out impossible to protect the whole site, protect the essential parts of the site from inundation.

 

[NUCENG]

Broken pipes discovered at Hamaoka's No. 5 nuclear reactor
http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201105210146.html

[URL]http://www.asahicom.jp/english/images/TKY201105210310.jpg

[/URL]

I have seen pictures of similar damage to condenser tubes from a broken baffle plate in a US BWR. The circulating water pumps are sending millions of kg of seawater water through the condenser. It5 doesn't take long to put tons of water into the condensate and the feedwater system dutifully pumps that water into the reactor.

 

[Most Curious]

Do the seawater pumps have a safety for loss of NPSH?

Surely they sucked air when the sea retreated in the moments before the tusnami!

Secondly, do the seawater pumps supply the various condensers directly or is there an intervening surge tank or pond?

 

[Most Curious]

I have seen pictures of similar damage to condenser tubes from a broken baffle plate in a US BWR. The circulating water pumps are sending millions of kg of seawater water through the condenser. It5 doesn't take long to put tons of water into the condensate and the feedwater system dutifully pumps that water into the reactor.

Are nukes like coal plants in that the main condenser actually draws a vacuum on the turbine outlet ? If so, a tube rupture would allow a LOT of seawater to flow into the condensate return system!

 

[robinson]

Considering the amount of water being pumped to cool an operating reactor, (even one shutting down), any interruption of cooling water from the ocean source might be catastrophic. I thought they had a secondary system to cover that eventuality?

 

[NUCENG]

Yes. It is daughter of Ba-140, which in turn can be found in the decay chains of both U-238 and U-235, iirc. But I can't find a chart so... let's wait for the experts.

Use:

http://atom.kaeri.re.kr/index.html

Click on the chart and enter the isotope you are interested in the box at the top left of the screen (e.g., BA140). If it is a daughter fission product there will be a field for "Parent Nuclide" Click on that and you will go to that nuclide and you may find it too has a parent nuclide. By exploring these links you can build a complete decay chain.

 

[WhoWee]

Considering the amount of water being pumped to cool an operating reactor, (even one shutting down), any interruption of cooling water from the ocean source might be catastrophic. I thought they had a secondary system to cover that eventuality?

About 7,000(?) posts ago I also pondered the possibility of a mechanical backup. It seems reasonable something could operate off the excess heat - like a giant thermostat - to open and let sea/fresh water in - then close when the temperature drops?

 

[NUCENG]

Ok, on google maps i checked but it is very difficult to see it due to the poor resolution. On the picture below, you see on the right the four water intakes (one for each reactor, N°1 is smaller because the reactor is smaller in fact). Then if you move a little bit on the left, then you will see some spherical grey objects, aligned parallel to the intake, these are the pumps: 2 for N°1, 3 for N°2 to 4 but at N°4, because they were doing maintenance on the core, it seems they were also doing maintenance on the pumps because they seem to be removed on this picture. You can see that they are very vulnerable from tsunami standpoint (they must be close to the sea to some extent of course!) and they are also critical in order to keep the cold source working!

http://www.netimago.com/image_202942.html

I add this other satellite view, you see very well the difference between the N°1 and the others (size of intake and N° of pumps)

http://www.netimago.com/image_202943.html

I add a picture showing how they look like -these are from N°5 reactor and got hit by this big blue structure, but they look similar to the others:

http://www.netimago.com/image_202944.html

Do you see them?

Note 1 : I add this other picture showing the all 6 reactors from the sea, so you see very well the size of the various intakes and the grey pumps in the alignment:

http://www.netimago.com/image_202948.html

Note 2: At DAINI plant, which is newer, they added some buildings close to the sea but to me, these pumps are still outside, close to these buildings (the 3 aligned white/grey circles each time)

http://www.netimago.com/image_202950.html

Each of the plants has three circulating water pumps (Unit 1 may only have 2). Those are the largest pumps in your pictures. Each plant probably also has two general service water pumps and two emergency service water pumps. If you look at Unit 4 you see the four small pumps and three circular areas at the inlet that are where the motors for the circulating water pumps should be. Since the plant was in an outage the motors may have been removed for maintenance. Or they may have been destroyed in the tsunami.

 

[NUCENG]

I like your analysis. I think the red is red marker powder.
Let me throw my $0.02 in the rubble debate, from a very different angle.

I had been looking for a way to avoid having to think of burning concrete and burning metals, because I didn't understand why such high temperatures would not also produce other observable effects. Seems I found it.

The yellow stuff is indeed insulating foam. To be more precise, it is polyurethane foam, widely used for insulation and as a fire retardant. If you are looking for an explanation for what generated massive amounts of black smoke on several occasions, this may be it. A small electrical fire in a cable duct (a la Browns Ferry) can be enough to get it going.

Diablo Canyon incidents:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1988/in88004s1.html

LATER EDIT: the small orange-brown pieces you ask about are also insulating foam. It gets like this from being exposed to UV light.

What would be the ignition source if power was out? The Information notice involved fires in a fire barrier for the EDG exhaust system at Diablo Canyon. The diesels weren't operating at Fukushima.

 

[Astronuc]

For experts: how can you interpret that water from N°1 is significantly less contaminated (orders of magnitude lower for most isotopes) than N°2 and N°3, and that Ba-140, La-140 (short half life) and Sr 89 and 90 are much lower in this N°1 water (see page 3 of pdf)?

Is La-140 a daughter isotope in the decay process of other elements?

Interestingly, and complementing the contributions of others, . . .

http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/nucene/fisfrag.html#c3

 

[NUCENG]

The easiest explanation is there's some steel thing with a fresh thick coat of radioactive cesium. Could be anything, really, although spent fuel should be much hotter.

Does equipment get that hot? Hmm... the cooling loop is pretty hot with very short-lived stuff, but may also get contaminated with all sorts of activated junk from the reactor.

I'm pretty sure I read somewhere that turbine blades are rad waste by the time they're done with them.

During BWR plant operation there are areas that get to 1 Sv per hour primarily near steam piping due to N-16 gamma radiation. These areas are locked high radiation errors where personnel access is not allowed during operation. Examples include the steam jet air ejector area, the reactor water cleanup area, and the steam tunnel between the reactor building and turbine building.

 

[Astronuc]

I have seen pictures of similar damage to condenser tubes from a broken baffle plate in a US BWR. The circulating water pumps are sending millions of kg of seawater water through the condenser. It5 doesn't take long to put tons of water into the condensate and the feedwater system dutifully pumps that water into the reactor.

I think I mentioned this earlier or perhaps elsewhere, but there was a US plant that had a LP turbine throw some blades through the condenser. Tubes were ruptured, and river water entered the feedwater system. It also happened late winter/early spring, so the water had an elevated salt content from the run off from area roads that are salted in winter.

The issue for the utility was impact of salt on IASCC/IGSCC of the stainless steel component and surfaces, particularly the control rods and control rod drive mechanisms.

 

[NUCENG]

Reactor is source of steam, then steam is going to turbine, this turbin is connected to pump, water source is torus, pump is pumping water from torus to RPV and steam which go to turbine is condensated in torus.
http://a2.sphotos.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash4/188425_211896475487877_113650851979107_876237_7212984_n.jpg

In normal lineup RCIC initially pumps water from the clean condensate storage tank. Suction can be switched to torus, but that is not the first choice.

 

[Astronuc]

Are nukes like coal plants in that the main condenser actually draws a vacuum on the turbine outlet ? If so, a tube rupture would allow a LOT of seawater to flow into the condensate return system!

It's been years since I've done a calculation on the turbine side, but I remember a vacuum drawn on the condenser since the water temperature is cold (relative to the turbine) and the vapor pressure is very low - less the 1 atm. That water would be passed to the reheaters coming off the LP stages.

 

[NUCENG]

Do the seawater pumps have a safety for loss of NPSH?

Surely they sucked air when the sea retreated in the moments before the tusnami!

Secondly, do the seawater pumps supply the various condensers directly or is there an intervening surge tank or pond?

Yes the pumps may trip on overspeed, over current, ground fault, discharge valve closure or high vibration. Specifics may vary from plant to plant. Fukushima plants are once-through designs. The Circulating Seawater Pumps pump directly to the condensers and back to the sea. Other plants that have cooling towers will have supply pumps and separate circulating water pumps. Cooling towers are used to reduce heat returned to the water source on smaller rivers and lakes. The sea is a very large heat sink so Fukushima can use the once through design.

 

[NUCENG]

I saw two interviews on TV with people who were actually working at the plant, inside the plant at the time of the earthquake. It was pretty much get out any way you could, and run away. During the quake, which lasted quite a while. Eyewitness reports of large cracks in the reactor buildings, massive damage to the facility, one American there stated they pried open the safety doors to get out of the building.

Then later when the tsunami was coming everyone ran for high ground. Nobody stayed at the controls when the tsunami hit. This was on television, CNN I believe.

I saw one of those reports - an electrician who was inside the reactor building. But what I was wondering was if anyone in the control room operating crew had been interviewed yet. They are the only ones who can answer to "pucker" or panic.

 

[NUCENG]

Astronuc, NUCENG, et. al.

What are we to understand from the 215 Sv/Hr readings in No.1's drywell?
[215 is the latest number from TEPCO's daily update]*

Does this indicate ongoing criticality or has a fragment of corium 'just' migrated nearer the sensor?

What should we expect to happen next if there is corium in the drywell, with or without ongoing fission?

Additionally, why is the pressure in the RPV edging ever upwards?

TIA

* see also: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/05/25/ap/business/main20065975.shtml

"In addition, some chunks of the fuel appeared to have entered the inner containment chambers, or drywell, causing some damage."

Possibilities:

High radiation

• More of the core is being released to the drywell where it is not shieded by RPV so radiation continues to increase.
• Instrument failure
• Unlikely, but possible, Recriticality

Corium in drywell

• May continue to melt through vessel, Drywell liner, concrete, etc.
• May solidify in place as decay heat continues to drop and cooling efforts continue.

Pressure

• Pressure rising because containment is not completely failed
• Instrument failure
• pressure rising due to continuing heating from corium inside or outside the vessel
• pressure rising due to continuing release of hydrogen anbd other non condensibles.
• pressure may drop if containment fails further
• unlikely but possible recriticality

In short, your guess of what comes next is probably as good as mine.

 

[NUCENG]

It looks like an 'old school' BWR cannot take a direct hit from a 6-7 magnitude quake, tsunami or not.

This report is a verbatim quote from other news reports. My first criticism is the description of a 3 cm or 7 cm fault. A linear crack is not a significant leak. Leakage requires a differential pressure AND a break AREA. If this is a newsperson misquote and the answer is 3 cm² or 7 cm² that is way less than the area that would be classified as containment failure. Other posts have indicated that unit one reached pressures more than double the containment vessel limit and TEPCO reports also indicate high temperatures which could have ruptured containment penetrations increasing leakage. The data released on 5/24 from TEPCO indicates similar failure precursers in units 2 and 3. In looking at the graphs, annunciator and alarm logs and reports I have read I have not found any data that indicates a failure before the tsunami. I posted separately about the reported high radiation at the site boundary at 1529 on 3/11/2011. If TEPCO has information about seismic damage to safety systems, they haven't released it to my knowledge. On the other hand, TEPCO spokesman have been beaten up so often (deservedly so) that they may not be willing to say anything is out of the question.

Call me devils advocate. Again, I am not saying there wasn't seismic damage. there were reports of water leakage inside reactor buildings, but apparently it was not radioactive as some workers feared. Unit 3 had a fairly significant delay before starting RCIC or HPCI and there is no clear explanation why. But both systems were used later. There was speculation that the Unit 1 Isolation Condenser failed due to sesmic damage, but now it appears that was operator action that secured the system after only a few minutes. I just haven't seen any conclusive evidence of safety system failures prior to the tsunami.

 

[elektrownik]

wastewater disposal facility is leaking water...:
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/26_18.html
reactor 1,2 and 3 drywell damaged:
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110525006455.htm

 

[zapperzero]

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11052508-e.html

This is in regards to detection of radioactive materials, specifically Pu-238, 239, and 240.

What does this tell us? The report states that TEPCO tested up to 500m from the reactors, but should they be testing further away. I *assume* that these materials could travel as other materials such as cesium and iodine.

Is it significant that they are still finding it? I understand that Pu has a very long half-life, however, the second report (pdf) says that the values have NOT changed greatly.

Thank you for your time and thoughts.

It means some of the fuel has been vaporized or otherwise turned into dust and then got out. If it was there earlier, it's normal for it to be there now. It would be abnormal if the concentration had increased.

Plutonium travels as dust, not dissolved in water like Cesium and Iodine. You'd expect it to fall out sooner, if it wasn't blown up very high.

 

[zapperzero]

Use:

http://atom.kaeri.re.kr/index.html

Click on the chart and enter the isotope you are interested in the box at the top left of the screen (e.g., BA140). If it is a daughter fission product there will be a field for "Parent Nuclide" Click on that and you will go to that nuclide and you may find it too has a parent nuclide. By exploring these links you can build a complete decay chain.

Excellent resource, thanks.

 

[Rive]

It means some of the fuel has been vaporized or otherwise turned into dust and then got out. If it was there earlier, it's normal for it to be there now. It would be abnormal if the concentration had increased.

Plutonium travels as dust, not dissolved in water like Cesium and Iodine. You'd expect it to fall out sooner, if it wasn't blown up very high.

This also imply the possibility of direct release from an RPV (or less likely from an SFP): otherwise it would be trapped in the torus.

 

[Rive]

Possibilities:
...
unlikely but possible recriticality
...

When the possibility of recriticality come in sight I made some digging through the relevant 'googles' and every source suggested that recriticality is expected in a severely damaged core during 'reflood'. Already molten core or corium was never mentioned IIRC. Is recriticality possible in corium too? It has no internal cavities for water

 

[jim hardy]

be patient guys my first try at photo well maybe second

Has this been posted?

found it at Cryptome..was taken March 16, and the deck looks a lot worse in later photos.
it's in the zipped file of full size photos and has this name: aerial-2011-3-18-14-50-0.jpg
(editing mine, with MS-Paint, which clobbers the resolution)

you can see the concrete cap not there but i can't tell for sure about the yellow thing on right. In the hi-res it's a maybe.

Would one who knew how to lighten be able to see down into that black hole and tell if yellow containment cap is there?