Can Artificial Intelligence ever reach Human Intelligence?

[Tisthammerw]

So someone tell me how this is not just a question of: Are humans super special in the universe or just another animal? Just another complex meat machine...

See the Chinese room thought experiment, in addition to the story of the robot and program X (explained earlier in this thread).

Oh and by the way, I do have a vague idea where to start. Pleasure and displeasure.

Good luck creating an algorithm that implements consciousness, understanding, pleasure etc.

It's not that it's impossible to artificially create something with literal understanding. I imagine we humans could genetically engineer new organisms that possesses consciousness, for instance. But some methods (like "having the right program") just don't seem to work.

 

[moving finger]

Let's recap ...

You are covering old ground here, Tisthammerw.

We can never agree on your conclusions, because we do not agree on your premise.

Like you, I can also construct a tautological argument which shows exactly what I want it to show, but that proves nothing useful (indeed is a waste of time).

With respect, if you want to be taken seriously you need to SHOW that understanding requires consciousness, without using a tautological argument, and without assuming your conclusion in your definition.

If you can do this, we might get closer to agreement on your conclusions.

If you cannot do this, all you have is a tautological argument, which tells us nothing useful, and is wasting both your time and mine.

Until then...

May your God go with you

MF

 

[Psi 5]

As someone with basic AI programming experience, my vote goes to the no camp.
An intelligence is not defined by knowledge, movement or interaction. An intelligence is defined by the ability to understand, to comprehend.
I have never seen nor heard of an algorythm that claims to implement understanding. I have thought about that one for years and I still don't know where I would even begin.

I think that understanding and comprehending is merely adding to the rule set and knowledge base using the rules already known. Those that understand and comprehend better just have a better rule set to start with. Comparing the human brain to current AI using current technology is like comparing a 3.3G P4 to a Z80, only much more so.
Look at Sherlock Holmes for example (yes I know it's a fictional character but real crime solvers work the same way). He solved his cases by having a tremendous knowledge base, not by intuitive leaps of understanding. To make a hardware analogy, he was operating with a 3.3G P4 with 2G of RAM and a couple of Terabytes of memory while eveyone else was using a Z80 with 256k of memory. You people doing AI are in effect using Z80's and trying to emulate a P4, so don't expect a Sherlock Holmes.

 

[Tisthammerw]

You are covering old ground here, Tisthammerw.
We can never agree on your conclusions, because we do not agree on your premise.

And what premise would that be? The definition of understanding? Again, you may mean something different when you use the term. And as I said earlier, Tournesol made a very good point when he said: “Definitions are not things which are true and false so much as conventional or unusual.” We both may mean something different when we use the term “understanding,” but neither of our definitions is necessarily “false.”

I am arguing that a computer (via complex set of instructions acting on input etc.) cannot have literal understanding in the sense that I have defined it. Do you disagree or not?

With respect, if you want to be taken seriously you need to SHOW that understanding requires consciousness, without using a tautological argument

I did show that understanding requires consciousness, at least “understanding” as I use the term. The kind of understanding I am talking about requires consciousness (admittedly, for some other definitions of understanding this is perhaps not the case). Is my argument a tautology? It's every bit the tautology that “all bachelors are unmarried” is. But that still doesn't change the fact that my argument is logically sound (just as the phrase “all bachelors are unmarried” is). Understanding in the sense that I am referring to clearly requires consciousness, and I have demonstrated this. So why are you complaining?

 

[moving finger]

And what premise would that be?

Your premise that understanding requires consciousness

I am arguing that a computer (via complex set of instructions acting on input etc.) cannot have literal understanding in the sense that I have defined it. Do you disagree or not?

I have answered this several times already, but you seem not to understand. I disagree with your conclusion because I disagree with your premise. Period.

What part of "I disagree with your conclusion" do you not understand?

Is my argument a tautology? ... But that still doesn't change the fact that my argument is logically sound

A logically sound argument does not necessarily make for a true conclusion. The premises also need to be true. And you have not shown the premises to be necessarily true, except by "definition".

A logically sound argument is nevertheless fallacious if it is an example of "circulus in demonstrando", which basically means one assumes as a premise the conclusion which one wishes to reach. Your argument may be as logical as you like, but if your conclusion is already contained in one of your premises then all you have achieved is "circulus in demonstrando".

As I said, I can play that game as well, but it is pointless, and I have better things to do.

May your God go with you

MF

 

[moving finger]

Definitions are not things which are true and false so much
as conventional or unusual.

A premise is either true or false.
When a definition takes the form of a premise in a logical argument then it is necessary that that premise (definition) be accepted as either true or false.
I dispute the truth of the premise "understanding requires consciousness".

Can anyone show this premise is necessarily true (without using a tautological argument)?

A tautological argument is an example of "circulus in demonstrando", which basically means the argument is fallacious because one assumes as a premise the conclusion which one wishes to reach.

MF

 

[Psi 5]

I'll try again.
The Chinese Room
Suppose we have a man who speaks only English in a room. Near him are stacks of paper written in Chinese. He can recognize and distinguish Chinese characters, but he cannot discern their meaning. He has a rulebook containing a complex set of instructions (formal syntactic rules, e.g. "if you see X write down Y") of what to write down in response to a set of Chinese characters. When he looks at the slips of paper, he writes down another set of Chinese characters according to the rules in the rulebook. Unbeknownst to the man in the room, the slips of paper are actually questions and he is writing back answers.
The Chinese room can simulate a conversation in Chinese; a person can slip questions written in Chinese under the door of the room and get back answers. Nonetheless, although the person can respond to questions with valid output (via using a complex set of instructions acting on input), he does not understand Chinese at all.
The Chinese room shows that having a complex system of rules acting on input is not sufficient for literal understanding to exist. We'd need computers to have something else besides a set of instructions (however complex) manipulating input to overcome the point the Chinese room makes. It's difficult to conceive how that could even be theoretically possible. What could we possibly add to the computer to make it literally understand? A magic ball of yarn? A complex arrangement of bricks? What?
(Remember, variants of the Chinese room include the system of rules being complex, rewritable etc. and yet the man still doesn’t understand a word of Chinese.)
I believe that literal understanding (in addition to free will) requires something fundamentally different--to the extent that the physical world cannot do it. The soul is and provides the incorporeal basis of oneself.
Grasping the meaning of the information. It is clear from the Chinese room that merely processing it does not do the job.
By all means, please tell me what else a potential AI has other than a complex set of instructions to have literal understanding.
I never said the homunculus wouldn't understand, only that a computer won't. Why? (I've explained this already, but I see no harm in explaining it again.) Well, try instantiating this analogy to real computers. You have cameras and microphones, transducers that turn the signals into 1s and 0s, then use a complex set of rules to manipulate that input and produce output...
And we have the exact same problem as last time. It's the same scenario (set of rules operating on input) with a slightly different flavor. All you've done here is change the source of the input. A different person may ask different Chinese questions, but the man in the room still won't understand the language.
...

This thought experiment doesn't seem to mean much. Like a Zeno 'paradox', you have set out rules designed to cause failure (lack of understanding). A human in that room wouldn't learn much more than an AI. This is not how we learn. For a human to learn chinese or any language, he is shown what the word means or does. If the word is chair, he is shown several. He is then shown that many chairs may have different names as well such as sofa or rocker. Then he is shown that the rocker rocks and so not only learns the name rocker but also the verb rock.

All of this creates visual memories associated with words. Other words like 'of' and 'to' are basically meaningless but are learned to be used properly in context by rules. This is why I say that AI using current technology is extremely primitive compared to the human brain. We have the ability to store vast amounts of data in the form of image recognition in our brains and this is a major component of understanding and it too can be simulated with a computer if it's good enough (read the book about Helen Keller or watch the movie to understand this). They aren't even close to being that powerful yet. We are still trying to compare apples and oranges here. Current computational power is not only vastly inferior in capacity, it is probably still vastly different in kind as well. But the brain is still a computer and we will be able to simulate it in hardware eventually and then AI will start to be more human. If you don't believe this just try to imagine what someone would have said 40 years ago if you described a Pentium 4 to them and told them it was smaller than the palm of their hand and less than a 10th of an inch thick yet has many millions of transistors on it in a 2 dimensional array. The human brain isn't 2 dimensional, it's array of transistors is 3 dimensional. That is why I say that current technology is also different in kind.

 

[moving finger]

The Chinese Room
Let’s show exactly where the argument falls down :

Suppose we have a man who speaks only English in a room. Near him are stacks of paper written in Chinese. He can recognize and distinguish Chinese characters, but he cannot discern their meaning. He has a rulebook containing a complex set of instructions (formal syntactic rules, e.g. "if you see X write down Y") of what to write down in response to a set of Chinese characters. When he looks at the slips of paper, he writes down another set of Chinese characters according to the rules in the rulebook. Unbeknownst to the man in the room, the slips of paper are actually questions and he is writing back answers.
The Chinese room can simulate a conversation in Chinese; a person can slip questions written in Chinese under the door of the room and get back answers. Nonetheless, although the person can respond to questions with valid output (via using a complex set of instructions acting on input), he does not understand Chinese at all.
The Chinese room shows that having a complex system of rules acting on input is not sufficient for literal understanding to exist.

This is the point at which the argument becomes fallacious.
It has in fact not been “shown” that understanding of Chinese does not exist in the system “The Chinese Room”. In the argument as presented it is merely assumed that understanding of Chinese does not exist in the system “The Chinese Room” (presumably the author assumes this because the man, which is but one component of the system, does not understand Chinese).

We'd need computers to have something else besides a set of instructions (however complex) manipulating input to overcome the point the Chinese room makes.

We have already shown above that the supposed “point” (ie that there is no understanding in the system “The Chinese Room”) is assumed and is not shown to be necessarily the case.

It's difficult to conceive how that could even be theoretically possible. What could we possibly add to the computer to make it literally understand? A magic ball of yarn? A complex arrangement of bricks? What?

As we have seen, it has not been shown that there is necessarily no understanding in the system “The Chinese Room”, therefore it is not clear that anything else is in fact needed.

(Remember, variants of the Chinese room include the system of rules being complex, rewritable etc. and yet the man still doesn’t understand a word of Chinese.)

The fact that the man (one component of the system) does not understand Chinese is, as we have seen, not relevant when considering the question “is there understanding of Chinese in the system “The Chinese Room”?”

I believe that literal understanding (in addition to free will) requires something fundamentally different--to the extent that the physical world cannot do it.

“I believe” is a statement of opinion rather than of fact, it does not constitute an acceptable part of the logical argument presented, therefore this statement can be ignored.
With respect
MF

 

[Tournesol]

When I say “understand” I mean “grasp the meaning of.” When I say “grasp the meaning of” I mean he actually knows what the Chinese words mean. When I say he knows what they mean, I am saying that he perceives the meaning of the words he sees/hears, or to put it another way, that he is aware of the truth of what the Chinese words mean.

I think you could make the same point much more clearly by saying
"he knows what the chinese words mean (uses them correctly) and
he knows that he knows".

 

[Tisthammerw]

And what premise would that be?

Your premise that understanding requires consciousness

That's not really a premise; it's a conclusion. And it's not really a “premise” to be disputed because it is an analytic statement (given what I mean when I use the terms). My definition of understanding requires consciousness. Do we agree? Now please understand what I'm saying here. Do all definitions of understanding require consciousness? I'm not claiming that. Does your definition of understanding require consciousness? I'm not claiming that either. But understanding in the sense that I use it would seem to require consciousness. Do we agree? It seems that we do. So why are we arguing?

I am arguing that a computer (via complex set of instructions acting on input etc.) cannot have literal understanding in the sense that I have defined it. Do you disagree or not?

I have answered this several times already, but you seem not to understand. I disagree with your conclusion because I disagree with your premise. Period.

That really doesn't answer my question (I’m assuming you’re not so foolish as to disagree with an analytic statement). Is it the case that computers cannot understand in the sense that I am using the term? Simply saying, “I don't mean the same thing you do when I say ‘understanding’” doesn't really answer my question at all. So please answer it.

What part of "I disagree with your conclusion" do you not understand?

It's pretty unclear why you disagree with it (if you really do). Can computers understand in the sense that I mean when I use the term? Again, simply claiming that “I use the word ‘understanding’ in a different sense” does nothing to answer my question here.

Is my argument a tautology? It's every bit the tautology that “all bachelors are unmarried” is. But that still doesn't change the fact that my argument is logically sound (just as the phrase “all bachelors are unmarried” is).

A logically sound argument does not necessarily make for a true conclusion.

Okay, obviously you don't understand the terminology here. An argument being deductively valid means that if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true also. It is impossible for a valid argument to have true premises and a false conclusion. An argument being deductively invalid means that the conclusion doesn't logically follow from the premises; the conclusion can still be false even if all the premises are true. Another term for the conclusion not logically following from the premises is non sequitur. A sound argument is a deductive argument that is both valid and has all its premises being true. Thus, a logically sound argument necessarily makes for a true conclusion by definition.

Actually, it’s not even much of a deductive argument (at least not in the usual sense) because “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytic statement (given my definitions).

The premises also need to be true. And you have not shown the premises to be necessarily true, except by "definition".

Well, if the premises are true by definition then they are necessarily true.

A logically sound argument is nevertheless fallacious if it is an example of "circulus in demonstrando", which basically means one assumes as a premise the conclusion which one wishes to reach. Your argument may be as logical as you like, but if your conclusion is already contained in one of your premises then all you have achieved is "circulus in demonstrando".

...

A tautological argument is an example of "circulus in demonstrando", which basically means the argument is fallacious because one assumes as a premise the conclusion which one wishes to reach.

Please understand what's going on here. Is the tautology “all bachelors are unmarried” a fallacious argument and "circulus in demonstrado"? Obviously not. Again, tautologies are by definition true, so it hardly makes sense to oppose one. Analytic statements are not fallacious.

 

[Tisthammerw]

When I say “understand” I mean “grasp the meaning of.” When I say “grasp the meaning of” I mean he actually knows what the Chinese words mean. When I say he knows what they mean, I am saying that he perceives the meaning of the words he sees/hears, or to put it another way, that he is aware of the truth of what the Chinese words mean.

I think you could make the same point much more clearly by saying
"he knows what the chinese words mean (uses them correctly) and
he knows that he knows".

I actually think that makes things less clear. I'm not saying that he can't “use them correctly” since he obviously can pass a Chinese Turing test, and “knows that he knows” sounds a little clumsy. I think “he knows what the Chinese words mean” and that he is aware of what the Chinese words mean is a reasonable clarification.

 

[Tisthammerw]

Regarding the Chinese room:

This thought experiment doesn't seem to mean much. Like a Zeno 'paradox', you have set out rules designed to cause failure (lack of understanding).

Well, that is kind of the purpose of a counterexample.

A human in that room wouldn't learn much more than an AI. This is not how we learn. For a human to learn chinese or any language, he is shown what the word means or does. If the word is chair, he is shown several.

Yes, we all know humans can learn. Nobody is disputing that. It seems you're arguing that perhaps a computer can't be programmed with knowledge, but if the “right” learning algorithms are in a computer it can learn to literally understand. In that case we have the story of the robot and program X. Still no literal understanding (in the sense that I mean when I use the term).

To recap the story of the robot and program X:

Let program X equal the “right” program such that, if it were run, literal understanding takes place. Suppose a robot (complete with cameras, microphones, limbs etc.) has program X. Let’s replace the part of the robot that would normally process the program with Bob. Bob uses a rulebook containing a complex set of instructions identical to program X. Bob does not understand what the strings of binary digits mean, but he can perform the same mathematical and logical operations the computer hardware can. We run program X, get valid output, the robot moves its limbs etc. and yet no real understanding is taking place. So it seems that even having the “right” rules and the “right” program is not enough even with a robot.

One could claim that having “the right hardware and the right program” is enough for literal understanding to take place. In other words, it might not be enough just to have the right program. A critic could claim that perhaps a human running program X wouldn’t produce literal understanding, but the robot’s other “normal” processor of the program would. But it isn’t clear why that would be a relevant difference if the exact same operations are being made. Is it that the processor of the program has to be made of metal? Then does literal understanding take place? Does the processor require some kind of chemical? Does an inscription need to be engraved on it? Does it need to possesses a magic ball of yarn? What?

You have had a tendency to avoid these questions.

But the brain is still a computer and we will be able to simulate it in hardware eventually and then AI will start to be more human.

See above, but Searle himself also has a response to the brain simulator reply. The reply goes something like this:

Suppose we create a computer that simulates the actual sequence of neuron firings occurring at the synapses of a native Chinese speaker’s brain when he understands stories in Chinese and gives answers to questions about the story. Surely we would have to say that the computer understands then.

Searle says that even getting this close to the brain is not sufficient to produce real understanding. Searle responds by once again having a modified form of the thought experiment. Suppose we have a man operate a complex series of water pipes and valves. Given the Chinese symbols as input, the rulebook tells him which valves to turn off an on. Each water connection corresponds to a synapse in the Chinese person’s brain, and at the end of the process the answer pops out of the pipes. Again, no real understanding takes place. Searle claims that the formal structure of the sequence of neuron firings is insufficient for literal understanding to take place.

 

[Tisthammerw]

The Chinese Room
Let’s show exactly where the argument falls down :
This is the point at which the argument becomes fallacious.
It has in fact not been “shown” that understanding of Chinese does not exist in the system “The Chinese Room”.

It's been shown using my definition of understanding. See especially when the man inside the room becomes the system and memorizes the rulebook etc. He still does not know a word of Chinese.

We have already shown above that the supposed “point” (ie that there is no understanding in the system “The Chinese Room”) is assumed and is not shown to be necessarily the case.

You have shown no such thing. Ask the man in English if he knows what Chinese word X means and he'll honestly reply “I have no idea” (again, remember the sense of understanding that I am using).

The fact that the man (one component of the system) does not understand Chinese is, as we have seen, not relevant when considering the question “is there understanding of Chinese in the system “The Chinese Room”?”

But when the man becomes the system, the systems reply no longer applies. So your objection fails here, since he still doesn’t know a word of Chinese.

 

[moving finger]

It's been shown using my definition of understanding.

Unfortunately by incorporating consciousness as a necessary prerequisite into your definition of understanding the argument then becomes fallacious, because it is an example of “circulus in demonstrando” (the argument assumes as a premise the conclusion which one wishes to reach, which is that consciousness is necessary for understanding).
With respect, (using the rules of logical argument) it has not therefore been “shown”.

See especially when the man inside the room becomes the system and memorizes the rulebook etc. He still does not know a word of Chinese.

By “He” I assume that you mean simply “the consciousness present within the agent”, as opposed to the “rest of the physical body of the agent”?
The whole point is that it has not been shown that it is necessary for “the consciousness present within the agent” to understand Chinese in order for the rest of the agent (which contains the internalised rulebook) to understand Chinese.
Your argument assumes that “the consciousness present within the agent” necessarily encapsulates all understanding contained within the agent. This has not been shown to be the case (except by your fallacious argument of “circulus in demonstrando” ). It is important to distinguish between “the consciousness present within the agent” and “the rest of the agent” (which latter contains the internalised rulebook).

We have already shown above that the supposed “point” (ie that there is no understanding in the system “The Chinese Room”) is assumed and is not shown to be necessarily the case.

You have shown no such thing. Ask the man in English if he knows what Chinese word X means and he'll honestly reply “I have no idea” (again, remember the sense of understanding that I am using).

Your question is being addressed to, and answered by, “the consciousness present within the agent”, not by the entire agent. Once again, your argument assumes that “the consciousness present within the agent” necessarily encapsulates all understanding contained within the agent. This has not been shown to be the case. It is important to distinguish between “the consciousness present within the agent” and ““the rest of the agent” (which latter contains the internalised rulebook).

The fact that the man (one component of the system) does not understand Chinese is, as we have seen, not relevant when considering the question “is there understanding of Chinese in the system “The Chinese Room”?”

But when the man becomes the system, the systems reply no longer applies. So your objection fails here, since he still doesn’t know a word of Chinese.

With respect, why should the “systems reply” (as you seem to like to call it) apply in the case of the extrenal room, but not in the case of the internalised rulebook? The logic stays the same.
The “systems reply” always applies.
When the “man becomes the system” it is an error to assume (as you do) that “the consciousness present within the agent” is now the total system.
“the consciousness present within the agent” is merely one component of the system.
The total system is in fact now “the consciousness present within the agent” PLUS “the rest of the agent” (which latter contains the internalised rulebook).
May your God go with you
MF

 

[moving finger]

Searle responds by once again having a modified form of the thought experiment. Suppose we have a man operate a complex series of water pipes and valves. Given the Chinese symbols as input, the rulebook tells him which valves to turn off an on. Each water connection corresponds to a synapse in the Chinese person’s brain, and at the end of the process the answer pops out of the pipes. Again, no real understanding takes place.

This (the final sentence above) has not been shown to be the case.
On what basis is it claimed that “no real understanding takes place”?
The above “argument” contains no logical argument which allows one to conclude this, it is simply stated, hence does not constitute a rational argument.

May your God go with you

MF

 

[moving finger]

To recap the story of the robot and program X:
Let program X equal the “right” program such that, if it were run, literal understanding takes place. Suppose a robot (complete with cameras, microphones, limbs etc.) has program X. Let’s replace the part of the robot that would normally process the program with Bob. Bob uses a rulebook containing a complex set of instructions identical to program X. Bob does not understand what the strings of binary digits mean, but he can perform the same mathematical and logical operations the computer hardware can. We run program X, get valid output, the robot moves its limbs etc. and yet no real understanding is taking place.

On what basis is it concluded that “no real understanding is taking place”? Where is the logical argument that demonstrates this? In absence of a logical argument the unsubstantiated statement “no real understanding is taking place” is simply that, an unsubstantiated statement.

So it seems that even having the “right” rules and the “right” program is not enough even with a robot.

Again, an unsubstantiated claim.

Is it that the processor of the program has to be made of metal? Then does literal understanding take place? Does the processor require some kind of chemical? Does an inscription need to be engraved on it? Does it need to possesses a magic ball of yarn? What?

None of the above are relevant, since the original claim “no real understanding is taking place” is an unsubstantiated claim.
What needs to be done, with respect, is to show, via rational and logical argument, that the claim “no real understanding is taking place” is necessarily true. In absence of such an argument, the claim remains unsubstantiated.

May your God go with you

MF

 

[Tisthammerw]

To make things less bulky, I'm going to combine the replies to the various posts.

With respect, why should the “systems reply” (as you seem to like to call it) apply in the case of the extrenal room, but not in the case of the internalised rulebook?

Because the individual is the system and yet there is no understanding (as I defined it) taking place. To recap, when I say he consciously internalized the rulebook, I mean that he has consciously memorized the rulebook, consciously knows all the rules, and consciously applies those rules to the input he receives.

This (the final sentence above) has not been shown to be the case.
On what basis is it claimed that “no real understanding takes place”?

By conducting a simple test in this thought experiment. Ask the man in English if he knows what Chinese word X means and he'll honestly reply “I have no idea” (again, remember the sense of understanding that I am using). I am of course addressing the consciousness within the agent, but since understanding requires consciousness (under the definition of "understanding" I am using) there's no problem here.

BTW, I noticed that you didn't respond to post #210. I suggest you do so, as a lot of things there might clarify matters, particularly regarding your charge of "circulus in demonstrado." You should at least address what I said regarding that criticism before repeating yourself.

 

[moving finger]

Hi Tisthammerw
I do beg your pardon. Posts have been flying so fast on here that I missed this one. Please allow me to reply now :

And what premise would that be?

Your premise that understanding requires consciousness

That's not really a premise; it's a conclusion.

With respect, the “definition of understanding” is open to debate (ie is not a foregone conclusion) – you have said so yourself in other posts that your definition of understanding may be different to others’ definitions of understanding.
If there is more than one possible definition of a term in an argument then it stands to reason that to subjectively select one definition in preference to others automatically places that definition as a “premise” in that argument.

And it's not really a “premise” to be disputed because it is an analytic statement (given what I mean when I use the terms).

Any premise can be disputed.
The statement “consciousness is necessary for understanding” is both the basis of your definition of understanding, and is also a premise in the argument.

My definition of understanding requires consciousness. Do we agree?

We agree that you choose to define understanding such that consciousness is necessary for understanding, yes.

Now please understand what I'm saying here. Do all definitions of understanding require consciousness? I'm not claiming that.

Excellent. Thus we agree your definition is not a “foregone conclsuion”, it is your subjective preference.

Does your definition of understanding require consciousness? I'm not claiming that either.

Excellent

But understanding in the sense that I use it would seem to require consciousness. Do we agree? It seems that we do.

We agree that you choose to define understanding such that consciousness is necessary for understanding, yes.

So why are we arguing?

Where do we disagree?
We seem to disagree about whether or not the following argument is fallacious :
Argument : “understanding is not possible without consciousness, because we define understanding such that consciousness is necessary for understanding”
In the above, the statement “we define understanding such that consciousness is necessary for understanding” is a premise of the argument
And the statement “understanding is not possible without consciousness”
is a conclusion of the argument
This is a perfect example of “circulus in demonstrando” – the conclusion is already contained in the premise - which (with respect) renders the argument fallacious.
The logic is sound – I do not dispute the logic.
But the argument is fallacious.

I am arguing that a computer (via complex set of instructions acting on input etc.) cannot have literal understanding in the sense that I have defined it. Do you disagree or not?

I disagree with your conclusion because I disagree with your premise.

That really doesn't answer my question (I’m assuming you’re not so foolish as to disagree with an analytic statement).

I disagree with the premise.

Is it the case that computers cannot understand in the sense that I am using the term? Simply saying, “I don't mean the same thing you do when I say ‘understanding’” doesn't really answer my question at all. So please answer it.

With respect, you are not asking whether I agree with an “analytic statement”, you are (I believe) asking whether I agree with your “argument”.
But your argument is fallacious. How can I agree with a fallacious argument?
Let me give you another example.
Take the argument
“all bachelors are unmarried because we define a bachelor as an unmarried man”
There is NOTHING wrong with the logic in the above argument, but the CONCLUSION of the argument (all bachelors are unmarried) is contained within the PREMISE of the argument (we define a bachelor as an unmarried man) – hence the argument, whether one agrees with it or not, whether it is logical or not, is a fallacious argument.
Don’t take my word for it - Please read up about logical arguments, and what does and does not constitute a fallacy in a logical argument.

It's pretty unclear why you disagree with it (if you really do).

Then let me repeat it one more time, in great detail.
1) Take the statement “we define understanding such that consciousness is necessary for understanding”. This is one possible definition of understanding. IF this definition is then used as part of an argument, this statement then becomes a PREMISE to the argument.
2) We now ask the question : is the following statement true : “consciousness is necessary for understanding” ?
3) From our premise in (1), we can logically infer that the statement in (2) above is true.
4) CONCLUSION : “consciousness is necessary for understanding”
This is basically your argument, yes?.
There is nothing wrong with the logic.
But the CONCLUSION is already contained in the PREMISE. By definition, this makes the argument fallacious, because it is an example of “circulus in demonstrando”.
It’s like arguing “President Kennedy was an excellent speech giver because he delivered exceptional speeches.”
Can one conclude from this argument that it is indeed true that President Kennedy was an excellent speech giver? No, of course not. The conclusion (that he was an excellent speech giver) is already contaijed in the premise (he delivered excellent speeches), which makes it circular, which makes it fallacious.
If you don’t believe me PLEASE go read up about circulus in demonstrando!

Can computers understand in the sense that I mean when I use the term? Again, simply claiming that “I use the word ‘understanding’ in a different sense” does nothing to answer my question here.

Tisthammerw’s argument :
understanding requires consciousness because we define consciousness as being necessary for understanding
Quantumcarl’s argument :
understanding requires “being human” because we define being human as being necessary for understanding
X’s argument :
understanding requires three heads because we define three heads as being necessary for understanding
All of the above are logically sound arguments, and all are examples of “circulus in demonstrando” and hence fallacious.

Is my argument a tautology? It's every bit the tautology that “all bachelors are unmarried” is. But that still doesn't change the fact that my argument is logically sound (just as the phrase “all bachelors are unmarried” is).

The phrase “all bachelors are unmarried” is not an argument, it is a statement.
Take the argument : “all bachelors are unmarried because we define a bachelor as an unmarried man”
There is NOTHING wrong with the logic in the above argument, but the CONCLUSION of the argument (all bachelors are unmarried) is contained within the PREMISE of the argument (we define a bachelor as an unmarried man) – hence the argument, whether one agrees with it or not, whether it is logical or not, is a fallacious argument.

A logically sound argument does not necessarily make for a true conclusion.

Okay, obviously you don't understand the terminology here.

You believe that you do? It seems you already confuse statements with arguments.

An argument being deductively valid means that if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true also. It is impossible for a valid argument to have true premises and a false conclusion. An argument being deductively invalid means that the conclusion doesn't logically follow from the premises; the conclusion can still be false even if all the premises are true. Another term for the conclusion not logically following from the premises is non sequitur. A sound argument is a deductive argument that is both valid and has all its premises being true. Thus, a logically sound argument necessarily makes for a true conclusion by definition.

And what if the premises are untrue?
A true conclusion ONLY follows if the premises are true AND the logic is sound.
And an argument which already includes its conclusion in the premises is fallacious.
You obviously do not believe me.
Check it out.

Actually, it’s not even much of a deductive argument (at least not in the usual sense) because “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytic statement (given my definitions).

We are not in disagreement about any “analytic statement”, we are in disagreement about your premises and your argument.

The premises also need to be true. And you have not shown the premises to be necessarily true, except by "definition".

Well, if the premises are true by definition then they are necessarily true.

And if the conclusion is contained in the premises the argument becomes fallacious

A logically sound argument is nevertheless fallacious if it is an example of "circulus in demonstrando", which basically means one assumes as a premise the conclusion which one wishes to reach. Your argument may be as logical as you like, but if your conclusion is already contained in one of your premises then all you have achieved is "circulus in demonstrando".
..
A tautological argument is an example of "circulus in demonstrando", which basically means the argument is fallacious because one assumes as a premise the conclusion which one wishes to reach.

Please understand what's going on here. Is the tautology “all bachelors are unmarried” a fallacious argument and "circulus in demonstrado"? Obviously not.

You are confusing “statement” with “argument” again. “all bachelors are unmarried” is not an argument, it is a statement, hence it cannot be a tautology (arguments, not statements, are tautological).
“all bachelors are unmarried because we define a bachelor as an unmarried man” is an argument.
There is NOTHING wrong with the logic in the above argument, but the CONCLUSION of the argument (all bachelors are unmarried) is contained within the PREMISE of the argument (we define a bachelor as an unmarried man) – hence the argument, whether one agrees with it or not, whether it is logical or not, is a fallacious argument.
May your God go with you
MF

 

[moving finger]

With respect, why should the “systems reply” (as you seem to like to call it) apply in the case of the extrenal room, but not in the case of the internalised rulebook?

Because the individual is the system and yet there is no understanding (as I defined it) taking place.

Let us be very careful here. By “the individual is the system” you mean (I presume) the “entire physical and mental body of the agent Searle is the system”, and not just “Searle’s consciousness is the system”?
If the answer to the above is “yes” (as it should be) then all that has been shown is that there is no understanding in “Searle’s consciousness” – it has NOT been shown that there is no understanding in "the individual" (ie in the entire physical and mental body of the agent Searle).
There is a crucial difference.

To recap, when I say he consciously internalized the rulebook, I mean that he has consciously memorized the rulebook, consciously knows all the rules, and consciously applies those rules to the input he receives.

But "his consciousness" does not understand Chinese - "the individual" (as defined above) understands Chinese.
“His consciousness” therefore plays the same role in relation to “the individual” as (in the original argument) “the man in the room” plays in relation to “the room”.
The understanding is in the body, not in the consciousness occupying the body, just as the understanding is in the room, not in the man in the room.

On what basis is it claimed that “no real understanding takes place”?

By conducting a simple test in this thought experiment. Ask the man in English if he knows what Chinese word X means and he'll honestly reply “I have no idea”

We have been through this several times already. Asking a question of "Searle's consciousness" in English is NOT a test of understanding of "the individual" of Chinese. Ask the same question in Chinese and “the individual” (not the consciousness) will reply in the affirmative.

(again, remember the sense of understanding that I am using).

I do remember, but please also remember that I do not agree with your definition.

I am of course addressing the consciousness within the agent, but since understanding requires consciousness (under the definition of "understanding" I am using) there's no problem here.

But the whole point is that I do not agree with the assumption that understanding requires consciousness.

BTW, I noticed that you didn't respond to post #210. I suggest you do so, as a lot of things there might clarify matters, particularly regarding your charge of "circulus in demonstrado." You should at least address what I said regarding that criticism before repeating yourself.

Done.
I do apologise if it seems I am repeating myself – but the only reason I am doing this is because you keep asking the same questions, or making the same statements.
With respect
MF

 

[Tisthammerw]

Hi Tisthammerw
With respect, the “definition of understanding” is open to debate (ie is not a foregone conclusion) – you have said so yourself in other posts that your definition of understanding may be different to others’ definitions of understanding.

It depends what you mean by “open to debate.” Is it open to debate what I mean by “understanding”?

If there is more than one possible definition of a term in an argument then it stands to reason that to subjectively select one definition in preference to others automatically places that definition as a “premise” in that argument.
Any premise can be disputed.

Not really. Suppose a premise for the argument is “all bachelors are unmarried.” This premise cannot reasonably be disputed. Speaking of “subjectively select one definition in preference to others” aren't you doing the same thing yourself by using “understanding” in another sense? Additionally, you yourself seem to be “subjectively select one definition in preference to others” when you use the term “fallacious” (more later).

We agree that you choose to define understanding such that consciousness is necessary for understanding, yes.

Okay, so we agree that “understanding requires consciousness” (given the definitions I am using) is an analytic statement.

Excellent. Thus we agree your definition is not a “foregone conclsuion”, it is your subjective preference.

My definition is a “foregone conclusion” in that this is what I mean when I use the term “understanding.” If my definition is a subjective preference, then so is yours. By the way, what is your definition of understanding? I've asked you this before but you have not answered.

I disagree with the premise.

Given the context of this objection, you seem to disagree with the definitions (e.g. my definition of understanding is considered a “premise”). But how can you say my definition is false? Tournesol made a good point when he said, “Definitions are not things which are true and false so much as conventional or unusual.” Think about it. In what sense is my definition “wrong”? This is what I mean when I use the term understanding. So it is perfectly right, and the definition really doesn't sound very unusual (unless you can explain yourself here). Now granted it may be “wrong” in the sense that it is not what you mean when you use the term “understanding.” But so what? Your definition probably isn't the same as mine either, so your definition is also “wrong” in the sense that other people mean something different when they use the term (e.g. me).

So my conclusion regarding computers being aware of what words mean etc. is sound in part because my definitions are consistent (with e.g. the conclusion). Do we agree that computers cannot understand in the sense that I mean when I use the term? That (given the model of a complex set of instructions manipulating input etc.) computers cannot perceive the meaning of words, and they cannot be aware of what the words mean?

Is it the case that computers cannot understand in the sense that I am using the term? Simply saying, “I don't mean the same thing you do when I say ‘understanding’” doesn't really answer my question at all. So please answer it.

With respect, you are not asking whether I agree with an “analytic statement”, you are (I believe) asking whether I agree with your “argument”.

The “argument” I’m referring to here is about computers being able to understand, not about “understanding requires consciousness.” And in this context you haven’t really answered my question. So please answer it.

But your argument is fallacious.

Please explain why.

Let me give you another example.
Take the argument
“all bachelors are unmarried because we define a bachelor as an unmarried man”
There is NOTHING wrong with the logic in the above argument, but the CONCLUSION of the argument (all bachelors are unmarried) is contained within the PREMISE of the argument (we define a bachelor as an unmarried man) – hence the argument, whether one agrees with it or not, whether it is logical or not, is a fallacious argument.

You need to define here what you mean by “fallacious,” since analytic statements are not generally considered fallacious in logic (usually they're considered the opposite). You yourself are guilty of subjectively selecting one definition in preference to others, and your definition seems rather unusual.

1) Take the statement “we define understanding such that consciousness is necessary for understanding”. This is one possible definition of understanding. IF this definition is then used as part of an argument, this statement then becomes a PREMISE to the argument.
2) We now ask the question : is the following statement true : “consciousness is necessary for understanding” ?
3) From our premise in (1), we can logically infer that the statement in (2) above is true.
4) CONCLUSION : “consciousness is necessary for understanding”
This is basically your argument, yes?.

Here is my “argument” regarding “understanding requires consciousness.”

The first premise is the definition of understanding I'll be using (in terms of a man understanding words):

• The man actually knows what the words mean, i.e. that he perceives the meaning of the words, or to put it another way, that he is aware of the truth of what the words mean.

So in this definition, understanding is to be aware of the true meaning of what is communicated. For instance, a man understanding a Chinese word denotes that he is factually aware of what the word means.

The second premise is the definition of consciousness I’ll be using:

• Consciousness is the state of being characterized by sensation, perception, thought, awareness, etc. By the definition in question, if an entity has any of these characteristics the entity possesses consciousness.

My conclusion: understanding requires consciousness (in the sense that I am using when I use the terms).

To see why (given the terms as defined here) understanding requires consciousness, we can instantiate a few characteristics:

• Consciousness is the state of being characterized by sensation, perception (of the meaning of words), thought (knowing the meaning of words), awareness (of the meaning of words), etc. By the definition in question, if an entity has any of these characteristics the entity possesses consciousness.

Note that the premises are true: these are the definitions that I am using; this is what I mean when I use the terms. You may mean something different when you use the terms, but that doesn’t change the veracity of my premises.

There is nothing wrong with the logic.
But the CONCLUSION is already contained in the PREMISE. By definition, this makes the argument fallacious, because it is an example of “circulus in demonstrando”.
It’s like arguing “President Kennedy was an excellent speech giver because he delivered exceptional speeches.”

No, it is nothing like that. The remark about President Kennedy is not an analytic statement. Mine is, as is the statement “all bachelors are unmarried.”

If you don’t believe me PLEASE go read up about circulus in demonstrando!

I know what circular reasoning is. I also know that this can’t be applied to claim that analytic statements are fallacious. Otherwise all analytic statements and all of mathematics are fallacious. Surely that is a high price to pay to undercut my argument.

The phrase “all bachelors are unmarried” is not an argument, it is a statement.

The statement (like mine) can be phrased as an argument by defining the term “bachelor” and “unmarried” and then drawing the logical conclusion. “Understanding requires consciousness” is also an analytic statement, just as “all bachelors are unmarried” is.

Okay, obviously you don't understand the terminology here.

You believe that you do?

Yes.

It seems you already confuse statements with arguments.

Well, your the one who called my analytic statement an argument (or at least phrased it as such), and it is true that analytic statements can be phrased as arguments as I’ve illustrated above.

And what if the premises are untrue?

They are (see above).

A true conclusion ONLY follows if the premises are true AND the logic is sound.

You mean valid. A sound argument has all true premises by definition.

And if the conclusion is contained in the premises the argument becomes fallacious
You are confusing “statement” with “argument” again. “all bachelors are unmarried” is not an argument, it is a statement, hence it cannot be a tautology (arguments, not statements, are tautological).

That is not correct, at least not how I (and many other people) use the word “tautology.” Both statements and arguments can be tautological because they both can use the needless repetition of an idea, e.g. “All unmarried people are not married” is a tautological statement.

In any case, it is unclear why you disagree with the conclusion I’ve been talking about (if you really do disagree with it). Why is it unclear why you disagree with the conclusion (regarding whether computers can understand in the sense that I am using the term)? Because none of what you said is a reason to disagree with the conclusion. My question: is it the case that computers cannot understand in the sense that I am using the term? Simply saying, “I don't mean the same thing you do when I say ‘understanding’” doesn't really answer my question at all. So please answer it.

 

[moving finger]

With respect, the “definition of understanding” is open to debate (ie is not a foregone conclusion) – you have said so yourself in other posts that your definition of understanding may be different to others’ definitions of understanding.

It depends what you mean by “open to debate.” Is it open to debate what I mean by “understanding”?

This is not what I said.
I said “the definition of understanding is open to debate”; I did not say “Tisthammerw’s definition of understanding is open to debate”.
There is a difference.
Or are you perhaps suggesting there is one and only one possible definition of understanding in the universe, and that is the one called “Tisthammerw’s definition of understanding”?

If there is more than one possible definition of a term in an argument then it stands to reason that to subjectively select one definition in preference to others automatically places that definition as a “premise” in that argument.
Any premise can be disputed.

Not really. Suppose a premise for the argument is “all bachelors are unmarried.”
This premise cannot reasonably be disputed.

The important word here is “reasonably”.
I did not say (as you seem to think) that “any premise can be reasonably disputed”. Obviously it depends on the premise, and it then becomes a matter of opinion whether a dispute is reasonable or not. I could dispute the premise “all bachelors are unmarried”, but I agree that would be unreasonable.
However I do not consider it unreasonable to dispute the premise “consciousness is necessary for understanding”

Speaking of “subjectively select one definition in preference to others” aren't you doing the same thing yourself by using “understanding” in another sense?

Of course. My definition of understanding is just as subjective as any other – I never tried to suggest otherwise. I am not so arrogant as to think that I have special access to the “right definition” – are you?

Additionally, you yourself seem to be “subjectively select one definition in preference to others” when you use the term “fallacious” (more later).

OK, we’ll see later

Thus we agree your definition is not a “foregone conclsuion”, it is your subjective preference.

My definition is a “foregone conclusion” in that this is what I mean when I use the term “understanding.”

Your definition is subjective in the sense that it is chosen by you, but may not be chosen by everyone else as the “preferred” definition of understanding

If my definition is a subjective preference, then so is yours.

Yes, of course it is, I never suggested otherwise

By the way, what is your definition of understanding? I've asked you this before but you have not answered.

See post #86 of the thread John Searle’s China Room
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=93274&page=6

I disagree with the premise.

Given the context of this objection, you seem to disagree with the definitions (e.g. my definition of understanding is considered a “premise”).

I disagree with the premise “consciousness is necessary for understanding”

But how can you say my definition is false? Tournesol made a good point when he said, “Definitions are not things which are true and false so much as conventional or unusual.”

Please read more carefully. I never said your definition is “false”. I said I do not agree with your definition. Are you perhaps suggesting that everyone must agree with every definition, no matter how silly the definition might be?

In what sense is my definition “wrong”?

I never said it is wrong. Again you are misquoting or misreading. Where in any of my posts have I said that your definition is wrong?
Your definition is your opinion – since it is a matter of opinion it cannot be “false” and it cannot be “wrong” – but also it does not make it “correct” or “right” – and that does not mean that it is necessarily the only possible definition, nor that I have to agree with it!

This is what I mean when I use the term understanding.

Yes, I understand that. It’s not what I mean.

So it is perfectly right, and the definition really doesn't sound very unusual (unless you can explain yourself here).

I never said it wasn’t “right”. Again, please do not misquote me, it doesn’t help. I have said that I do not AGREE WITH your definition, I have NEVER said that your definition is false or wrong or not right.

Now granted it may be “wrong” in the sense that it is not what you mean when you use the term “understanding.” But so what?

I never said it was wrong – so I have no idea what you are trying to get at here.

Your definition probably isn't the same as mine either, so your definition is also “wrong” in the sense that other people mean something different when they use the term (e.g. me).

Are you now suggesting my definition is “wrong”?

Do we agree that computers cannot understand in the sense that I mean when I use the term? That (given the model of a complex set of instructions manipulating input etc.) computers cannot perceive the meaning of words, and they cannot be aware of what the words mean?

Given your definition of understanding, it logically follows that a non-conscious agent is unable to understand. Does that make you happy?
Problem is, I do not agree with your definition.

The “argument” I’m referring to here is about computers being able to understand, not about “understanding requires consciousness.” And in this context you haven’t really answered my question. So please answer it.

The argument you are using assumes the premise that understanding requires consciousness. With this premise, it logically follows that a non-conscious agent is unable to understand. Does that make you happy?
Problem is, I do not agree with your definition or premise.

But your argument is fallacious.

Please explain why.

It is an example of circulus in demonstrando, which results in a fallacious argument
If you don’t believe me PLEASE go read up about circulus in demonstrando! Have you done so?

You need to define here what you mean by “fallacious,” since analytic statements are not generally considered fallacious in logic (usually they're considered the opposite).

There you go with confusing statements and arguments again. I am not saying that any statement is fallacious, I am saying that the argument is fallacious.
Are you suggesting that there is no such thing as a fallacious argument?

You yourself are guilty of subjectively selecting one definition in preference to others,

Sure I am, I never suggested otherwise. But then I am not the one trying to claim that I can simply use my definition of understanding to “prove” anything about understanding.

Here is my “argument” regarding “understanding requires consciousness.”
The first premise is the definition of understanding I'll be using:
* The man actually knows what the words mean, i.e. that he perceives the meaning of the words, or to put it another way, that he is aware of the truth of what the words mean.
The second premise is the definition of consciousness I’ll be using:
* Consciousness is the state of being characterized by sensation, perception, thought, awareness, etc. By the definition in question, if an entity has any of these characteristics the entity possesses consciousness.
My conclusion: understanding requires consciousness (in the sense that I am using when I use the terms).

OK, but this conclusion is CONTAINED in your premises (understanding = aware of = is conscious). Thus it is circulus in demonstrando.
I can equally well define understanding (and I have in the China Room thread) such that it does NOT require consciousness, and arrive at a very different conclusion.
Thus, what we conclude depends on how we define understanding. Why should I accept your conclusion over any other conclusion?

Note that the premises are true: these are the definitions that I am using; this is what I mean when I use the terms.

The premises are assumed true by you. The premises are not true “to MF” – because MF’s definition of understanding is different to yours.

You may mean something different when you use the terms, but that doesn’t change the veracity of my premises.

Thank you. Since I have different premises, I can dispute your premises.

It’s like arguing “President Kennedy was an excellent speech giver because he delivered exceptional speeches.”

No, it is nothing like that. The remark about President Kennedy is not an analytic statement. Mine is, as is the statement “all bachelors are unmarried.”

The remark about Kennedy is an argument, not a statement (did you notice that “because” in there?). It contains a premise, an inference, and a conclusion.

If you don’t believe me PLEASE go read up about circulus in demonstrando!

I know what circular reasoning is. I also know that this can’t be applied to claim that analytic statements are fallacious.

Here you go again. Confusing statements with arguments. I am not claiming your statement is fallacious, I am claiming your argument is fallacious.
Did you read up about fallacious arguments?

Otherwise all analytic statements and all of mathematics are fallacious. Surely that is a high price to pay to undercut my argument.

And again. What part of “a statement is not necessarily the same as an argument” do you not understand? I have never claimed that any statement in this thread is “fallacious” – but you have used fallacious arguments.

“Understanding requires consciousness” is also an analytic statement, just as “all bachelors are unmarried” is.

Yes, these are statements, and I am NOT saying they are fallacious.
But try to construct a circular argument using them, and you then create a fallacious argument. By definition.

Well, your the one who called my analytic statement an argument (or at least phrased it as such)

Where did I do that?

and it is true that analytic statements can be phrased as arguments as I’ve illustrated above.

Statements can be used in the construction of an argument, but by definition an argument contains premises, inferences and conclusion (which a statement need not contain).
“Understanding requires consciousness” is a statement, not an argument.
“all bachelors are unmarried” is a statement, not an argument.
Using such statements, we can construct arguments :
Premise : “Understanding requires consciousness”
Inference and conclusion : “Understanding is not possible without consciousness”
The full argument is then “Understanding is not possible without consciousness BECAUSE understanding requires consciousness” (which is circular)
Or
Premise : “A bachelor is an unmarried man”
Inference and conclusion : “All bachelors are unmarried”
The full argument is then “All bachelors are unmarried BECAUSE a bachelor is an unmarried man” (which is again circular)

And what if the premises are untrue?

They are (see above).

Only because you choose to define them as true. I could equally well choose to define them as untrue. Which one of us (according to you) is then “right”?

In any case, it is unclear why you disagree with the conclusion I’ve been talking about (if you really do disagree with it). Why is it unclear why you disagree with the conclusion (regarding whether computers can understand in the sense that I am using the term)?

Why do I disagree with your conclusion?
Because, as I have pointed out countless times already, I disagree with your definition of understanding.

Because none of what you said is a reason to disagree with the conclusion.

With respect, what part of “I disagree with your definition of understanding” (which I have pointed out many times) do you not understand?

My question: is it the case that computers cannot understand in the sense that I am using the term? Simply saying, “I don't mean the same thing you do when I say ‘understanding’” doesn't really answer my question at all. So please answer it.

MF declares to all the world the following statement to be logically true “Understanding as defined by Tisthammerw is not possible in a non-conscious agent”
Does that make you happy?
Problem is, I do not agree with Tisthammerw’s definition of understanding, therefore we conclude nothing of any value from any of this.
With respect
MF

 

[Tisthammerw]

With respect, the “definition of understanding” is open to debate (ie is not a foregone conclusion) – you have said so yourself in other posts that your definition of understanding may be different to others’ definitions of understanding.

It depends what you mean by “open to debate.” Is it open to debate what I mean by “understanding”?

This is not what I said.
I said “the definition of understanding is open to debate”

I agree, but then it still depends on what you mean by “open to debate.” If by this claim you mean that people can mean different things when they use the term “understand” you’ll get no argument from me. But then, this really has no bearing whether computers are capable of understanding in the sense that I mean when I use the term.

Or are you perhaps suggesting there is one and only one possible definition of understanding in the universe, and that is the one called “Tisthammerw’s definition of understanding”?

That is precisely the opposite of what I am suggesting.

I could dispute the premise “all bachelors are unmarried”, but I agree that would be unreasonable.
However I do not consider it unreasonable to dispute the premise “consciousness is necessary for understanding”

Why is it not unreasonable if this “premise” is an analytic statement?

See post #86 of the thread John Searle’s China Room
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=93274&page=6

Yes, I can see your definition of understanding there. See post #88 and we can discuss it in that thread.

I disagree with the premise “consciousness is necessary for understanding”

It’s very puzzling why you disagree with an analytic statement—perhaps you should clarify what you mean by “disagree.”

Please read more carefully. I never said your definition is “false”. I said I do not agree with your definition.

Again, please clarify what you mean by “agree” or “disagree.”

I never said it is wrong. Again you are misquoting or misreading. Where in any of my posts have I said that your definition is wrong?

Apparently I misunderstood what you meant by “disagreeing” with the premise. Usually, “disagreeing” with a premise implies that the individual believes the premise to be false.

I never said it wasn’t “right”. Again, please do not misquote me

I didn’t misquote you, this was a paraphrasing of what I thought you were saying.

Do we agree that computers cannot understand in the sense that I mean when I use the term? That (given the model of a complex set of instructions manipulating input etc.) computers cannot perceive the meaning of words, and they cannot be aware of what the words mean?

Given your definition of understanding, it logically follows that a non-conscious agent is unable to understand. Does that make you happy?

I would be happier if you actually answered my question. Do we agree that computers cannot understand in the sense that I mean when I use the term? That (given the model of a complex set of instructions manipulating input etc.) computers cannot perceive the meaning of words, and they cannot be aware of what the words mean?

Please explain why [my argument regarding computers being able to understand is fallacious].

It is an example of circulus in demonstrando, which results in a fallacious argument

You might want to explain this more. You have attacked my analytic statement as “fallacious” but haven’t yet (I don’t think) shown why my argument regarding computers understanding is circulus in demonstrado.

If you don’t believe me PLEASE go read up about circulus in demonstrando! Have you done so?

Yes I have.

Are you suggesting that there is no such thing as a fallacious argument?

No, I am saying that when analytic statements are properly phrased in the form of an argument the argument is not fallacious.

[Gives an argument justifying that the statement “understanding requires consciousness” is analytical]

OK, but this conclusion is CONTAINED in your premises (understanding = aware of = is conscious). Thus it is circulus in demonstrando.

A number of problems here. How can we demonstrate that statements are analytical if such justifications are all “circulus in demonstrado”? Additionally, (a) the premises are true (b) the argument is valid (c) the argument is perfectly sound. So doesn’t it seem a bit odd to call the argument “fallacious”? Are all justifications for an analytical statement fallacious? In any case, you’re not even disagreeing with the veracity of “understanding requires consciousness” so why attack it as a premise for the argument regarding computers being able to understand (understand in the sense that I am using the term)?

I can equally well define understanding (and I have in the China Room thread) such that it does NOT require consciousness, and arrive at a very different conclusion.

No one is disputing the fact that you can define understanding in a way that does not require consciousness, but this has no bearing on my argument on whether computers can understand in the sense that I am using the term.

Thus, what we conclude depends on how we define understanding. Why should I accept your conclusion over any other conclusion?

Because my conclusion explicitly only applies to understanding as I have defined it. Can computers understand in some other sense of the word? Perhaps so, but even if true it has no bearing on my argument regarding understanding as I have defined it. Can computers understand in the sense that I am using the term? That’s a question I’ve been trying to get you to answer.

Note that the premises are true: these are the definitions that I am using; this is what I mean when I use the terms.

The premises are assumed true by you.

No, the are true. Please do not misunderstand me. Remember what the premises actually were: e.g. “first premise is the definition of understanding I'll be using” and it is true that this is the definition that I am using. It is true that this is what I mean when I use the terms. The premises are perfectly correct. Note that this argument is not about “understanding requires consciousness” for all definitions of those terms.

You may mean something different when you use the terms, but that doesn’t change the veracity of my premises.

Thank you. Since I have different premises, I can dispute your premises.

Not really, at least you can’t dispute them in the sense that you can claim they are wrong or that the conclusion is unsound. Understanding in the sense that I mean when I use the term requires consciousness. That is an indisputable fact.

The remark about Kennedy is an argument, not a statement (did you notice that “because” in there?).

It is a statement (look up “compound statement”).

I know what circular reasoning is. I also know that this can’t be applied to claim that analytic statements are fallacious.

Here you go again. Confusing statements with arguments.

Here you go again, confusing what I am saying. Analytic statements can be phrased as arguments. And it seems you are using the “circular reasoning” thing to “disagree” (whatever you mean by that) with my analytic statement. My analytic statement is true, my argument showing that it is an analytic statement is perfectly sound. So what in blazes are you arguing about? And why aren’t you addressing my question and the topic at hand (the part about computers being able to understand in the sense that I have defined it)?

Well, your the one who called my analytic statement an argument (or at least phrased it as such)

Where did I do that?

Well, in post #218 for instance:

Argument : “understanding is not possible without consciousness, because we define understanding such that consciousness is necessary for understanding”

Statements can be used in the construction of an argument, but by definition an argument contains premises, inferences and conclusion (which a statement need not contain).

Let’s take the statement “President Kennedy was an excellent speech giver because he delivered exceptional speeches” which I pointed out was not an analytic statement and which you claimed to be an argument. Statements are propositions that can be true or false, and so this claim about Kennedy certainly qualifies. We could rephrase the statement as follows:

Given the constants:

K = Kennedy was an excellent speech giver
E = Kennedy delivered exceptional speeches.

The compound statement [(E --> K) & E] --> K nicely rephrases the statement you claimed was an argument. Notice also the statement could be stated as:

(E --> K)
E
Therefore, K.

Similarly, take the phrase “understanding requires consciousness.” You asked my why this is true, and I told you it is true because it is an analytic statement (and justified it as such); since then you have called my justification “fallacious” despite the fact that it is perfectly sound logic. But since we already agree that “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytic statement, why don’t we proceed to the argument at hand (whether computers can understand in the sense that I mean when I use the term)?

They [the premises] are [true] (see above).

Only because you choose to define them as true. I could equally well choose to define them as untrue.

Given that my premises are “here’s the definition I’ll be using…” I’d be interested in seeing how you can demonstrate that these are not the definitions I am using. But I suspect you simply misunderstood what the premises are.

Why do I disagree with your conclusion?
Because, as I have pointed out countless times already, I disagree with your definition of understanding.
…
With respect, what part of “I disagree with your definition of understanding” (which I have pointed out many times) do you not understand?

The part on how that has any bearing to the matter at hand (which I have pointed out many times). Please read carefully this time. Do we agree that computers cannot understand in the sense that I mean when I use the term? That (given the model of a complex set of instructions manipulating input etc.) computers cannot perceive the meaning of words, and they cannot be aware of what the words mean? Simply saying, “I don't mean the same thing you do when I say ‘understanding’” doesn't really answer my question at all. So please answer it.

 

[Smurf]

The part on how that has any bearing to the matter at hand (which I have pointed out many times). Please read carefully this time. Do we agree that computers cannot understand in the sense that I mean when I use the term? That (given the model of a complex set of instructions manipulating input etc.) computers cannot perceive the meaning of words, and they cannot be aware of what the words mean? Simply saying, “I don't mean the same thing you do when I say ‘understanding’” doesn't really answer my question at all. So please answer it.

This is getting into theory of knowledge and understanding. Do we all have the same understanding of any concept, image, object or definition as every other person? Is it even possible?

 

[ormondotvos]

Dancing Angels, Logic and Consciousness...

I've only read about 200 of these posts on this subject, so I might have
missed something, but when do you guys start talking about the slippage and sloppiness of neural nets?

Just because they are apparently impossible to completely describe doesn't mean you don't have to deal with them. Anyone with a computer can tell you that bad lines in the program are kludged over, but I see nothing acknowledging this in your discussion.

 

[Psi 5]

What makes you people think we have understanding? No one commented on my statement that words like 'of' have no meaning to us. Check my thread in brain teasers 'count the letters'. You might find it interesting. It came to mind from this thread's argument about understanding.

 

[moving finger]

I agree…..
……So please answer it.

With respect, Tisthammerw, I see nothing new and significant in your last post that we have not covered many, many times already.

We seem to keep repeating the same questions and answers over and over again. You are entrenched in your position and I in mine. Doubtless you believe you are "right", just as I believe that I am "right". Unfortunately, if you insist on denying even the most basic rules of logical argument (such as the fact that a circular argument is fallacious), then there is little more I can do to bring about any agreement between our two positions.

If you still insist on denying that a circular argument (also known as "begging the question") is fallacious, please read one or more of the following :

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question
http://www.csun.edu/~dgw61315/fallacies.html
http://www.ship.edu/~cgboeree/fallacies.html
http://www.datanation.com/fallacies/index.htm

...there are a multitude of other reputable websites with essentially the same information.

With that I draw a line under the so-far repeated cycle of question and answer.

_________________________________________________________________________

Let me try now to offer a solution to our debate.

There is no single, unique definition of "understanding".

Tisthammerw has his preferred definition, which asserts that consciousness is necesary for understanding. We may call this type of understanding "TH-Understanding", to distinguish it from understanding as defined in other ways.

Similarly, quantumcarl has his preferred definition, which asserts that "being human" is necesary for understanding. We may call this type of understanding "QC-Understanding", to distinguish it from understanding as defined in other ways.

Also, MF has his preferred definition, which asserts that neither consciousness nor "being human" is necesary for understanding. We may call this type of understanding "MF-Understanding", to distinguish it from understanding as defined in other ways.

There are likely many other possible definitions.

None of these different definitions of understanding are either "true" or "false", "wrong" or "right", they are all (until shown otherwise) simply matters of opinion.

What can we conclude from this?

For any agent to possesses TH-Understanding, the agent must also possesses consciousness. If we assume the CR is not conscious then it follows that the CR does not possesses TH-Understanding.

For any agent to possesses QC-Understanding, the agent must also be human. The CR is clearly not human, it follows that the CR does not possesses QC-Understanding.

For any agent to possesses MF-Understanding, the agent need not be human or possesses consciousness. It is possible therefore that the CR possesses MF-Understanding.

If you have anything new to say on the subject, just let me know.

May your God go with you

MF

 

[Tournesol]

For any agent to possesses MF-Understanding, the agent need not be human or possesses consciousness. It is possible therefore that the CR possesses MF-Understanding.

But unless you can show humans don't need consciousness for understandign either, Searle has made his point. The CR (and symbol-manipulation-systems in general) does not have a human
level of understanding, because MF-understanding, lacking as it does consciousness, is not a human level of understanding. It is only weak AI.

 

[Tournesol]

I actually think that makes things less clear. I'm not saying that he can't “use them correctly” since he obviously can pass a Chinese Turing test, and “knows that he knows” sounds a little clumsy. I think “he knows what the Chinese words mean” and that he is aware of what the Chinese words mean is a reasonable clarification.

I disagree. If being aware of what Chinese words mean doesn't mean
"knowing that he uses them correctly", what does it mean ?

Defining consciousness in terms of awareness, is , as MF points out
circular. Defining it as a higher-level meta-knwoledge isn't -- meta-knowledge,
knowing that you know, is structurally different from merely knowing.

 

[moving finger]

But unless you can show humans don't need consciousness for understandign either, Searle has made his point. The CR (and symbol-manipulation-systems in general) does not have a human level of understanding, because MF-understanding, lacking as it does consciousness, is not a human level of understanding.

Firstly, what exactly was the “point” that Searle was trying to make with his CR argument?

Here are Searle’s own words from his 1997 book “The Mystery of Consciousness” published by Granta :

The CR Argument as defined by Searle himself :

1 : Premise : Programs are entirely syntactical
2 : Premise : Minds have semantics
3 : Premise : Syntax is not the same as, nor by itself sufficient for, semantics

Therefore programs are not minds, QED.

No mention of consciousness.

Why is consciousness necessarily required to support an understanding of either syntax or semantics?

With respect

MF

 

[octelcogopod]

Since the brain is simply a "machine", for lack of a better word, or let's say, a biological and chemical prosessing unit, then the question is really:

Can you emulate chemical and biological consciousness with silicon (or some other undiscovered way)?

My answer is definetly: Yes.
I think there are many types of consciousness in the universe, maybe not even based on carbon/chemicals/neuralnets/etc.
We still don't know exactly why evollution gave birth to consciousness, so other evolutions on other planets may have evolved completely different.
So this means that we should be able to emulate the mind in lots of different ways, give the technology and knowledge.

 

[Tournesol]

Firstly, what exactly was the “point” that Searle was trying to make with his CR argument?
Here are Searle’s own words from his 1997 book “The Mystery of Consciousness” published by Granta :
The CR Argument as defined by Searle himself :
1 : Premise : Programs are entirely syntactical
2 : Premise : Minds have semantics
3 : Premise : Syntax is not the same as, nor by itself sufficient for, semantics
Therefore programs are not minds, QED.
No mention of consciousness.
Why is consciousness necessarily required to support an understanding of either syntax or semantics?

There is more to semantics than syntax (ie symbol-manipulation)
The extra ingredient is knowing what symbols mean.
Knowing what symbols mean is more than mere know-how (which
collapses back into symbol-manipulation).
The "something more" is a meta-knowldege about what you
are doing when you manipulate symbols.
Meta-knowledge is conscious knowledge

 

[Tisthammerw]

Let's see if we can trim the fat.

My “argument” when it comes to “understanding requires consciousness” is merely to show that the statement is analytical (using the terms as I mean them). You can call it “fallacious’ if you want to but the fact remains that it is perfectly sound. And since we already agree that “understanding requires consciousness” is analytical, I suggest we simply move on.

With respect, Tisthammerw, I see nothing new and significant in your last post that we have not covered many, many times already.

Not entirely, there’s the question I’ve been asking:

Please read carefully this time. Do we agree that computers cannot understand in the sense that I mean when I use the term? That (given the model of a complex set of instructions manipulating input etc.) computers cannot perceive the meaning of words, and they cannot be aware of what the words mean? Simply saying, “I don't mean the same thing you do when I say ‘understanding’” doesn't really answer my question at all. So please answer it.

I may have covered it (using e.g. the Chinese room thought experiment to justify my position), but we haven’t (so far you really haven’t answered the question).

We seem to keep repeating the same questions and answers over and over again.

I do because you haven’t answered mine. If there are any questions you’ve asked that I’ve left unanswered, I apologize. Tell me what the questions are and I will be happy to answer them.

Unfortunately, if you insist on denying even the most basic rules of logical argument (such as the fact that a circular argument is fallacious)

In terms of justifying that a statement is analytic (by showing that the statement necessarily follows from the definitions of the terms), I deny that it is fallacious. If it were, all justifications for analytical statements would fail (as would most of mathematics). And in any case this is beside the point, since we already agree that the statement “understanding requires consciousness” is analytic.

Usually, circular arguments are fallacious and I recognize that. So you don’t need to preach to the choir regarding that point.

Let me try now to offer a solution to our debate.

There is no single, unique definition of "understanding".

Agreed, and I’ve been saying that for quite some time now. But this response nonetheless does not answer my question. Can an adequately programmed computer literally understand in the sense that I mean when I use the term? That is, using my definition, can such a computer literally understand?

To put forth my disclaimer again (quoting my #210 post)

Now please understand what I'm saying here. Do all definitions of understanding require consciousness? I'm not claiming that. Does your definition of understanding require consciousness? I'm not claiming that either. But understanding in the sense that I use it would seem to require consciousness.

Moving on,

Tisthammerw has his preferred definition, which asserts that consciousness is necesary for understanding. We may call this type of understanding "TH-Understanding", to distinguish it from understanding as defined in other ways.

….

For any agent to possesses TH-Understanding, the agent must also possesses consciousness. If we assume the CR is not conscious then it follows that the CR does not possesses TH-Understanding.

Okay, it’s a start, but then what about the question I’ve asked repeatedly? Would care to answer it now?

If for instance you would have answered “Yes, I agree that computers cannot have this type of understanding,” we could have saved ourselves a lot of time. Frankly I’m puzzled why you’ve delayed so long in answering it.

 

[Tisthammerw]

I actually think that makes things less clear. I'm not saying that he can't “use them correctly” since he obviously can pass a Chinese Turing test, and “knows that he knows” sounds a little clumsy. I think “he knows what the Chinese words mean” and that he is aware of what the Chinese words mean is a reasonable clarification.

I disagree. If being aware of what Chinese words mean doesn't mean
"knowing that he uses them correctly", what does it mean ?

Knowing how to use words correctly may be a necessary condition but it is not sufficient for literal understanding (using my definition of the term). Note for instance that the man in the Chinese room might even be aware that he is conducting a conversation of Chinese when using the rulebook without understanding the language. Being aware of what Chinese words mean is different from being aware that you’re following the rulebook on how to manipulate the symbols. To use another example: In the robot and program X story, you can be aware that you’re manipulating binary digits without having a clue as to what the binary digits represent—even if you know that you’re correctly following the mathematical and logical operations.

Defining consciousness in terms of awareness, is , as MF points out
circular.

In that case all analytic statements are circular, but in this case it is hardly a valid criticism since my definitions of both understanding and consciousness are quite accurate (i.e. this is what I mean when I use the terms). One can mean something different when he or she uses the terms “understanding” or “consciousness,” but one can hardly disagree that my definition is what I mean when I use the terms. And is it really so unconventional that “understanding words” means “to be aware of what the words mean”? Is it really so unconventional to say that awareness is a characteristic of consciousness? I don't think so.

 

[Tournesol]

Knowing how to use words correctly may be a necessary condition but it is not sufficient for literal understanding (using my definition of the term).

I am not saying it is. I am arguing about how best to characterise the missing
element.

Note for instance that the man in the Chinese room might even be aware that he is conducting a conversation of Chinese when using the rulebook without understanding the language.

THe argument works better if yuo assume he isn't.

In that case all analytic statements are circular, but in this case it is hardly a valid criticism since my definitions of both understanding and consciousness are quite accurate (i.e. this is what I mean when I use the terms).

Circular statements are always accurate, but rarely enlightenting.

One can mean something different when he or she uses the terms “understanding” or “consciousness,” but one can hardly disagree that my definition is what I mean when I use the terms. And is it really so unconventional that “understanding words” means “to be aware of what the words mean”? Is it really so unconventional to say that awareness is a characteristic of consciousness? I don't think so.

It is not unconveniotnal. It is not informative, either.

 

[TheAntiRelative]

Personally I define understanding as both a primary similarity (links) engine and secondary difference engine (details) linked to motivations, with a prognostication component on the side.

Understanding is just linking things together and then linking them to your wants and basic motivations. The final part of the understanding is being able to recognize partial matches and determine a percentage of likelyhood regarding the future of the fact or object. Predicting the future is the usefulness of understanding. It practically is understanding.


Understanding is categorizing. "This does this, this is part of this." Then comparing it to your motivations. "How is this part of me?" and then finally "If this then that."

"How will this apply to me, what can this do for me, in what way will it satisfy my motivations"

 

[Tisthammerw]

In that case all analytic statements are circular, but in this case it is hardly a valid criticism since my definitions of both understanding and consciousness are quite accurate (i.e. this is what I mean when I use the terms).

Circular statements are always accurate, but rarely enlightenting.
It is not unconveniotnal. It is not informative, either.

It is somewhat “enlightening” in that it helps make the matter more tractable. It is “enlightening” in the sense that the sort of understanding I am referring to does indeed require consciousness, and that the phrase “understanding requires consciousness” being analytical has some important implications if we are to test the notion of computers being able to literally understand. Take for instance Searle’s response to the systems reply: the man memorizes the rulebook etc. It cannot now be plausibly claimed that there is literal understanding going on here, because the man obviously doesn’t understand a word of Chinese (under the definition I am using), since the man doesn’t know any word of Chinese.

 

[moving finger]

There is more to semantics than syntax (ie symbol-manipulation)
The extra ingredient is knowing what symbols mean.
Knowing what symbols mean is more than mere know-how (which
collapses back into symbol-manipulation).
The "something more" is a meta-knowldege about what you
are doing when you manipulate symbols.
Meta-knowledge is conscious knowledge

imho semantics (knowing what symbols mean) IS precisely symbol manipulation. Just a higher level of symbol manipulation than syntax.

Just because you subjectively "choose to define" semantics in terms of consciousness does not make for a sound argument which allows us to conclude "semantics requires consciousness". Again it is fallacious because it is circular.

Your argument is basically :

Premise : Meta-knowledge is defined (by you) as conscious knowledge
Premise : Understanding of semantics requires meta-knowledge (by your definition)
Therefore semantics requires consciousness

The argument is once again circular (I dispute that the premises are analytic), therefore fallacious

can you show (without using a circular argument) that an understanding of semantics requires consciousness?

MF

 

[moving finger]

My “argument” when it comes to “understanding requires consciousness” is merely to show that the statement is analytical (using the terms as I mean them). You can call it “fallacious’ if you want to but the fact remains that it is perfectly sound.

Are you perhaps confusing “argument” with “statement” yet again?
A circular argument may be valid, but nevertheless it is not sound and by definition is fallacious.
The statement “understanding requires consciousness” has not been “shown” to be analytic – you have simply asserted that it is analytic through your asserted definitions of understanding and consciousness. I disagree your definitions, hence I dispute that the statement is analytic.

And since we already agree that “understanding requires consciousness” is analytical, I suggest we simply move on.

We do not agree that the statement is analytic.

Please read carefully this time. Do we agree that computers cannot understand in the sense that I mean when I use the term? That (given the model of a complex set of instructions manipulating input etc.) computers cannot perceive the meaning of words, and they cannot be aware of what the words mean? Simply saying, “I don't mean the same thing you do when I say ‘understanding’” doesn't really answer my question at all. So please answer it.

I have read your statement very carefully, and No, I do not agree.
We have not been debating here about whether “computers can understand” per se. We have been debating whether a non-conscious agent can understand. Your argument thus far has not been that “computers cannot understand” it has been “non-conscious agents cannot understand”. You have not shown that all computer agents are necessarily non-conscious.

In terms of justifying that a statement is analytic (by showing that the statement necessarily follows from the definitions of the terms), I deny that it is fallacious.

Why do you keep insisting that I am accusing you of making fallacious statements? I am doing nothing of the kind. You keep saying this over and over again, and I keep correcting you. Are you reading what I write? Let’s please clear this up once and for all :
Arguments : A circular argument may be valid, but nevertheless it is not sound and by definition is fallacious.
Statements : The statement “understanding requires consciousness” has not been “shown” to be analytic – you have simply asserted that it is analytic through your asserted definitions of understanding and consciousness. I disagree your definitions, hence I dispute that the statement is analytic.

If it were, all justifications for analytical statements would fail (as would most of mathematics). And in any case this is beside the point, since we already agree that the statement “understanding requires consciousness” is analytic.

But we do NOT agree!
The basic problem is that to engage in any rational debate about anything, we need a common language. You and I clearly do not have a common language, since "understanding" does not mean the same thing to you as it does to me.
An example. If the term "person" means "human being" to you, but to me "person" means "humanoid", then the statement "all persons are examples of the species homo sapiens" would be an analytic statement to you, but NOT to me.
Until we can agree on the language we are using, we will continue to disagree whether the statement "understanding requires consciousness" is analytic or not.

Usually, circular arguments are fallacious and I recognize that. So you don’t need to preach to the choir regarding that point.

But circular arguments are logically valid. The conclusion does indeed from the premises. I thought you found it strange that a logically valid argument could be fallacious? And now you are agreeing with me that circular arguments are fallacious?
Take the example
• Suppose Paul is not lying when he speaks.
• Paul is speaking.
• Therefore, Paul is telling the truth.
Is this, or is it not, a circular argument? It is perfectly valid (the conclusion follows from the premises), but the veracity of the conclusion “Paul is telling the truth” depends on the veracity of the premise “suppose Paul is not lying when he speaks”. If I dispute the premise, the argument is unsound.
Because the argument is circular, the veracity of the conclusion is already assumed in the assumed premise, therefore it is fallacious.
Now replace the premise “suppose Paul is lying when he speaks” with the premise “suppose understanding requires consciousness”
And replace “Paul is speaking” with “Paul is not conscious”
And replace the conclusion “Therefore, Paul is telling the truth” with the conclusion “Therefore, Paul does not understand”
The entire argument is now :
• Suppose understanding requires consciousness
• Paul is not conscious
• Therefore, Paul does not understand
Which is still a circular argument (you have admitted yourself that your argument is circular!) and it is by definition fallacious.

Can an adequately programmed computer literally understand in the sense that I mean when I use the term? That is, using my definition, can such a computer literally understand?

Is “literal understanding” the same as “TH-Understanding”, or is this some new kind of understanding?
You already have the answer in the case of TH-Understanding. Tell me what “literal understanding” is, and how it differs from TH-Understanding, and I might be able to answer.

Okay, it’s a start, but then what about the question I’ve asked repeatedly?

Answer is above
MF

 

[Tisthammerw]

My “argument” when it comes to “understanding requires consciousness” is merely to show that the statement is analytical (using the terms as I mean them). You can call it “fallacious’ if you want to but the fact remains that it is perfectly sound.

Are you perhaps confusing “argument” with “statement” yet again?

Are you misunderstanding me yet again? The purpose of my argument was to demonstrate that “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytic statement.

A circular argument may be valid, but nevertheless it is not sound and by definition is fallacious.

My argument is sound: it is deductively valid and the premises are true (that is the definition of a sound argument).

The statement “understanding requires consciousness” has not been “shown” to be analytic – you have simply asserted that it is analytic through your asserted definitions of understanding and consciousness.

Moving finger, do you know what an analytic statement is? In this context, you can see that I am using the http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?va=analytic. An analytic statement is one whose truth is evident from the meaning of the words it contains (e.g. “no bachelor is married”). So of course I have to show it is analytic through my asserted definitions of understanding and consciousness. Now to reiterate, I’m not saying this statement is analytic for all definitions of understanding and consciousness. You can “disagree” with them in the sense that you yourself might use the term “understanding” in a different sense than my definition. But for the definitions I am using in this thread (e.g. a person understanding a word means he knows what the word means), the statement “understanding requires consciousness” is clearly analytic.

We do not agree that the statement is analytic.

Then what about post #221 in which you said the following:

Given your definition of understanding, it logically follows that a non-conscious agent is unable to understand.

Remember, I’m referring to the definitions of “understanding” and “consciousness” as I have explicitly defined them when I say that the statement “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytic statement.

Please read carefully this time. Do we agree that computers cannot understand in the sense that I mean when I use the term? That (given the model of a complex set of instructions manipulating input etc.) computers cannot perceive the meaning of words, and they cannot be aware of what the words mean? Simply saying, “I don't mean the same thing you do when I say ‘understanding’” doesn't really answer my question at all. So please answer it.

I have read your statement very carefully, and No, I do not agree.

Thank you for finally answering my question. But then what about my arguments regarding this matter, such as the Chinese room thought experiment and especially the robot and program X? (Again, we’re talking about my particular definition of understanding, which you have referred to as “TH-Understanding”). Here the “right” program is being run and still no TH-Understanding. So what about the questions I asked regarding the robot and program X?

We have not been debating here about whether “computers can understand” per se. We have been debating whether a non-conscious agent can understand.

And that, as we all agree, depends on how “consciousness” and “understanding” is defined. TH-Understanding clearly requires consciousness. That’s all I’ve been saying regarding this issue.

Your argument thus far has not been that “computers cannot understand” it has been “non-conscious agents cannot understand”.

Actually, it’s been both (if by “understand” you are referring to TH-understanding). Confer the story of the robot and program X and my comments on the Chinese room thought experiment for more info.

In terms of justifying that a statement is analytic (by showing that the statement necessarily follows from the definitions of the terms), I deny that it is fallacious.

Why do you keep insisting that I am accusing you of making fallacious statements?

I was not referring to the analytic statement here so much as the argument used to justify that the statement is analytic.

Arguments : A circular argument may be valid, but nevertheless it is not sound and by definition is fallacious.

“Circular” arguments—if valid—can actually be sound if the premises are true.

The basic problem is that to engage in any rational debate about anything, we need a common language. You and I clearly do not have a common language, since "understanding" does not mean the same thing to you as it does to me.

And I’ve been saying that we don’t use the same definitions of understanding for quite some time now. Are you reading what I write? My question regarding “can computers understand” rather explicitly refers to my definition of understanding, i.e. what you have called TH-Understanding. The same thing goes for “understanding requires consciousness,” I have explicitly been referring only to TH-Understanding in these contexts here.

I thought you found it strange that a logically valid argument could be fallacious?

No, that a logically sound argument could be fallacious. Do I need to remind you again the definition of a “sound” argument?

Take the example
• Suppose Paul is not lying when he speaks.
• Paul is speaking.
• Therefore, Paul is telling the truth.
Is this, or is it not, a circular argument? It is perfectly valid (the conclusion follows from the premises), but the veracity of the conclusion “Paul is telling the truth” depends on the veracity of the premise “suppose Paul is not lying when he speaks”. If I dispute the premise, the argument is unsound.

Circular arguments usually take the form of something like “abortion is morally wrong because it is unethical.” This justification that abortion is morally wrong commits the fallacy of circular reasoning because the conclusion is merely a restatement of a single premise. But we need to be careful how we levy the charge of circular reasoning. All valid deductive arguments have premises that “assume the truth of the conclusion” in that if all the premises are true so is the conclusion. Note my argument (that justifies “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytic statement) takes the following format:

1. “This is what I mean by understanding…”
2. “This is what I mean by consciousness…”

Therefore: understanding requires consciousness (in the sense that I mean when I use the terms).

This is not a circular argument. Why? Because the conclusion is not a restatement of any single premise. It takes both premises for the conclusion to logically follow. You may claim that, if we assume all of the premises to be true (and they are: this is what I mean by understanding and consciousness) we assume the conclusion; but this is gong to be true for any valid deductive argument (see below for more info on this). Please don’t be one of those people who makes this kind of mistake. And yet you said in post #106 of the other thread:

If the conclusion of the argument is already contained within the premises of the argument then the argument is fallacious.

But if this is true, all valid arguments are fallacious. Note below:

• Suppose understanding requires consciousness
• Paul is not conscious
• Therefore, Paul does not understand

Which is still a circular argument

We can rephrase the argument as follows:

1. If Paul does not possesses consciousness, then Paul cannot understand.
2. Paul does not possesses consciousness.

================

Therefore, Paul cannot understand.


Would you call this a circular argument? Would you say that this argument is fallacious? It seems that you would. After all, the conclusion is contained within the premises of the argument. And yet this “fallacious” argument is using a classic rule of logic called modus ponens. It seems that your definition of circularity and/or fallaciousness would render all logically valid arguments “fallacious.”

Is “literal understanding” the same as “TH-Understanding”

I was referring to “TH-Understanding” (i.e. understanding as I have defined it) when I used the word “literal understanding.”

 

[moving finger]

In this context, you can see that I am using the Merriam-Webster's dictionary definition #2. An analytic statement is one whose truth is evident from the meaning of the words it contains (e.g. “no bachelor is married”).

I would have thought it is abundantly clear by now that you and I do NOT AGREE on the definition of understanding, hence we do not agree what understanding means, hence any statement containing that word is not ncessarily analytic to both of us. The truth of the statement “consciousness requires understanding” is NOT self-evident using my definition of understanding, hence it is NOT an analytic statement.

So of course I have to show it is analytic through my asserted definitions of understanding and consciousness. Now to reiterate, I’m not saying this statement is analytic for all definitions of understanding and consciousness. You can “disagree” with them in the sense that you yourself might use the term “understanding” in a different sense than my definition. But for the definitions I am using in this thread (e.g. a person understanding a word means he knows what the word means), the statement “understanding requires consciousness” is clearly analytic.

An analytic statement must stand or fall by itself – you cannot “make a synthetic statement analytic” by adding qualifications (such as your preferred definition) to it in parentheses (otherwise I could claim that I can make ALL statements analytic, simply by defining the terms the way I wish).

We do not agree that the statement is analytic.

Then what about post #221 in which you said the following:

Given your definition of understanding, it logically follows that a non-conscious agent is unable to understand.

What I have said here is effectively “TH-Understanding requires consciousness” is true.
This is NOT the same as saying the statement “understanding requires consciousness” is true.

Remember, I’m referring to the definitions of “understanding” and “consciousness” as I have explicitly defined them when I say that the statement “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytic statement.

Remember, an analytic statement must stand or fall by itself – you cannot “make a synthetic statement analytic” by adding qualifications (such as your preferred definition) to it in parentheses (otherwise I could claim that I can make ALL statements analytic, simply by defining the terms the way I wish).

But then what about my arguments regarding this matter, such as the Chinese room thought experiment and especially the robot and program X? (Again, we’re talking about my particular definition of understanding, which you have referred to as “TH-Understanding”). Here the “right” program is being run and still no TH-Understanding. So what about the questions I asked regarding the robot and program X?
Why do I not agree with your conclusion?

You have not shown, either here or elsewhere, either that “all possible computers are not conscious” or that “all possible computers do not possesses understanding”.
See also my separate reply to your “program X” argument.

We have not been debating here about whether “computers can understand” per se. We have been debating whether a non-conscious agent can understand.

And that, as we all agree, depends on how “consciousness” and “understanding” is defined. TH-Understanding clearly requires consciousness. That’s all I’ve been saying regarding this issue.

You have not shown, either here or elsewhere, either that “all possible computers are not conscious” or that “all possible computers do not possesses understanding”.

Confer the story of the robot and program X and my comments on the Chinese room thought experiment for more info.

See my separate reply to your program X argument.
You “assert” that the system as described by you in your program X argument does not understand, you have not “shown” that it does not understand. What makes you think the system as described in your program X argument does not understand?

In terms of justifying that a statement is analytic (by showing that the statement necessarily follows from the definitions of the terms), I deny that it is fallacious.

Why do you keep insisting that I am accusing you of making fallacious statements?

I was not referring to the analytic statement here so much as the argument used to justify that the statement is analytic.

Then with respect please be more careful with how you phrase your statements. You clearly posted “In terms of justifying that a statement is analytic …….. I deny that it is fallacious”

“Circular” arguments—if valid—can actually be sound if the premises are true.

The whole point is that the premise “understanding requires consciousness” is synthetic, not analytic, therefore not necessarily true.
With respect I shall “trim the fat” here, because the rest of the post goes on and on about the same issue all over again.
You will not accept that a circular argument is fallacious, that much is clear.
I can back up my claim that circular arguments are fallacious by reference to countless publications on fallacious arguments in logic.
If you can refer to any reputable publication on logic which supports your view that circular arguments are NOT fallacious then you might have a point.
Until then, to continue with this “to and fro” nonsense is pointless.
MF

 

[Tisthammerw]

I would have thought it is abundantly clear by now that you and I do NOT AGREE on the definition of understanding, hence we do not agree what understanding means, hence any statement containing that word is not ncessarily analytic to both of us.

I would have thought it is abundantly clear by now that when I say the statement “understanding requires consciousness” is analytic using my definitions of the terms, not necessarily everyone else’s. I’m not saying you and I use the term “understanding” in the same sense, so please stop with this ignoratio elenchi. It is getting tiresome.

Remember, I’m referring to the definitions of “understanding” and “consciousness” as I have explicitly defined them when I say that the statement “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytic statement.

Remember, an analytic statement must stand or fall by itself – you cannot “make a synthetic statement analytic” by adding qualifications (such as your preferred definition) to it in parentheses (otherwise I could claim that I can make ALL statements analytic, simply by defining the terms the way I wish).

In that case no statements are analytical, because they all depend on how one defines the words. Whether a statement can be considered “properly” analytical in the usual sense depends on if the definitions are conventional or unconventional. I really don’t think mine are all that unusual; that if we took a Gallup poll the majority of people would say “Yes, this matches my definition of understanding.” But since it seems unlikely we will agree on this point, let’s just simply recognize that “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytic statement if we use my definitions (not necessarily everyone else’s). Or if you prefer, we could call my definitions of “understanding” and “consciousness” “TH-understanding” and “TH-consciousness” respectively. In that case “TH-understanding requires TH-consciousness.” It sounds quite odd to me, but if it will cause you stop making ignoratio elenchi remarks I am willing to do it.

You have not shown, either here or elsewhere, either that “all possible computers are not conscious” or that “all possible computers do not possesses understanding”.
See also my separate reply to your “program X” argument.

Remember, I am only referring to computers that follow the “standard” model (e.g. like that of a Turing machine). In that case I think the program X argument works quite nicely, because it represents any possible program that would provide understanding.

You suggest you have a separate reply for the “program X” argument. I will be eager to read it.

You “assert” that the system as described by you in your program X argument does not understand, you have not “shown” that it does not understand. What makes you think the system as described in your program X argument does not understand?

Applying this to the Chinese language, ask Bob if he understands (again, using the “TH” definition) what Chinese word X means and he’ll honestly reply “I have no idea” even though he runs program X. Unless perhaps you are going to claim that the combination of the man, the rulebook etc. somehow magically creates a separate consciousness that understands Chinese, which doesn’t sound very plausible.

I was not referring to the analytic statement here so much as the argument used to justify that the statement is analytic.

Then with respect please be more careful with how you phrase your statements. You clearly posted “In terms of justifying that a statement is analytic …….. I deny that it is fallacious”

That “justifying that a statement is analytic…” should have been a clue, and that the entire argument was clearly about justifying the statement being analytic (as I pointed out earlier) should have been an even bigger clue.

The whole point is that the premise “understanding requires consciousness” is synthetic, not analytic, therefore not necessarily true.

Whether or not is analytic depends on how the terms are defined, and you haven’t shown how “understanding requires consciousness” is something that can be determined by observation.

With respect I shall “trim the fat” here, because the rest of the post goes on and on about the same issue all over again.
You will not accept that a circular argument is fallacious, that much is clear.

No it is not clear. Please read my complete responses more carefully this time. Note for instance what I said in the post you responded to:

Circular arguments usually take the form of something like “abortion is morally wrong because it is unethical.” This justification that abortion is morally wrong commits the fallacy of circular reasoning because the conclusion is merely a restatement of a single premise. But we need to be careful how we levy the charge of circular reasoning.

My criticism is that you levy the charge of circular reasoning quite recklessly, not that circular reasoning can’t be a fallacy.

Note what I say regarding my justification that “understanding requires consciousness” being an analytic statement (using my definitions):

But we need to be careful how we levy the charge of circular reasoning. All valid deductive arguments have premises that “assume the truth of the conclusion” in that if all the premises are true so is the conclusion. Note my argument (that justifies “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytic statement) takes the following format:

1. “This is what I mean by understanding…”
2. “This is what I mean by consciousness…”

Therefore: understanding requires consciousness (in the sense that I mean when I use the terms).

This is not a circular argument. Why? Because the conclusion is not a restatement of any single premise. It takes both premises for the conclusion to logically follow. You may claim that, if we assume all of the premises to be true (and they are: this is what I mean by understanding and consciousness) we assume the conclusion; but this is gong to be true for any valid deductive argument (see below for more info on this).

[I explain more below]

Note what I said, “This is not a circular argument [emphasis added].” Again, please read what I say more carefully. I am not saying that circular reasoning can’t be a fallacy; I’m criticizing how you are levying this charge. As I explained, your definition of circular reasoning would apparently imply that all valid arguments are “fallacious,” which is clearly going too far.

I can back up my claim that circular arguments are fallacious by reference to countless publications on fallacious arguments in logic.

And I can back up my claim that many argument forms you would apparently consider “fallacious” are in fact valid inferential forms (e.g. modus ponens). Again, my criticism is that you are using the charge carelessly, not that circular reasoning isn’t a fallacy.

 

[Psi 5]

Understanding? We don't need no stinking understanding.

Several totally autonomous vehicles completed the driving course and won the prize a few days ago. Did they understand anything? Did they need to understand anything? They operated by a set of rules. That's all they needed to complete the task. That's all they will ever need to complete any task.

This is like the evolution debate. More and more evidence accumulates that AI can do any task with the right rule set but there is still a die-hard group that insists that it can't. Yet AI marches on and becomes more capable as our hardware gets better.

So the cut-off point is human intelligence? That's convenient, AI can do anything just a hair short of human intelligence. That gives you people a few years to argue your point. Lucky thing you didn't say AI would never be able to run an autonomous vehicle for a hundred miles or you would be backing off like the anti-evolutionists when they wanted science to produce the missing link. Well, science has produced many missing links and the anti-evolution crowd is still backing up and evolving their arguments.

 

[moving finger]

Understanding? We don't need no stinking understanding.

Hmmmm, that, I must say, is a very deep and thoughtful conclusion. I wonder why the rest of us didn't see that?

MF

 

[moving finger]

In that case no statements are analytical, because they all depend on how one defines the words.

D’oh! What did I say already? See post #238 :

The basic problem is that to engage in any rational debate about anything, we need a common language. You and I clearly do not have a common language, since "understanding" does not mean the same thing to you as it does to me.
An example. If the term "person" means "human being" to you, but to me "person" means "humanoid", then the statement "all persons are examples of the species homo sapiens" would be an analytic statement to you, but NOT to me.
Until we can agree on the language we are using, we will continue to disagree whether the statement "understanding requires consciousness" is analytic or not.

We can only agree on which statements are analytic and which are not if we firstly agree on the definitions of the terms we are using! That goes without saying. It seems you finally understand that.

I am only referring to computers that follow the “standard” model (e.g. like that of a Turing machine). In that case I think the program X argument works quite nicely, because it represents any possible program that would provide understanding.

My reply is basically the same – You have not shown, either here or elsewhere, either that “all possible Turing machines are not conscious” or that “all possible Turing machines do not possesses understanding”.

Applying this to the Chinese language, ask Bob if he understands (again, using the “TH” definition) what Chinese word X means and he’ll honestly reply “I have no idea” even though he runs program X.

Ahhhh, I see. Your argument is thus “a non-conscious agent does not TH-Understand, because we define TH-Understanding as requiring consciousness”. That is a very impressive and insightful argument, I must say.
Do you have anything more useful to say, since I am not interested in more tautological timewasting?

I was not referring to the analytic………

……. not that circular reasoning isn’t a fallacy.

Groan – not still on about that are you?

IF the sum total of your position on understanding is based on the argument “a non-conscious agent does not TH-Understand, because we define TH-Understanding as requiring consciousness”, which is blatantly tautological, then thank you for that insight!

It’s time to move on……..

MF

 

[chound]

I've always wondered, arent we also programmed to do things? Like we have to get up at 6 am take bath, goto school/office, etc?
Or atleast when we are infants, we do what we are told to do just like computers so is AI better than child's intelligence?

 

[moving finger]

I've always wondered, arent we also programmed to do things? Like we have to get up at 6 am take bath, goto school/office, etc?
Or atleast when we are infants, we do what we are told to do just like computers so is AI better than child's intelligence?

Did you always do what you were told when you were an infant?

If so, I wish my kids had been more like you!

MF

 

[Tisthammerw]

Remember, an analytic statement must stand or fall by itself – you cannot “make a synthetic statement analytic” by adding qualifications (such as your preferred definition) to it in parentheses (otherwise I could claim that I can make ALL statements analytic, simply by defining the terms the way I wish).

In that case no statements are analytical, because they all depend on how one defines the words. Whether a statement can be considered “properly” analytical in the usual sense depends on if the definitions are conventional or unconventional. I really don’t think mine are all that unusual; that if we took a Gallup poll the majority of people would say “Yes, this matches my definition of understanding.” But since it seems unlikely we will agree on this point, let’s just simply recognize that “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytic statement if we use my definitions (not necessarily everyone else’s). Or if you prefer, we could call my definitions of “understanding” and “consciousness” “TH-understanding” and “TH-consciousness” respectively. In that case “TH-understanding requires TH-consciousness.” It sounds quite odd to me, but if it will cause you stop making ignoratio elenchi remarks I am willing to do it.

D’oh! What did I say already? See post #238 :
We can only agree on which statements are analytic and which are not if we firstly agree on the definitions of the terms we are using!

Again, when I said “understanding requires consciousness” I was explicitly referring to my definitions, not necessarily everybody else’s.

I am only referring to computers that follow the “standard” model (e.g. like that of a Turing machine). In that case I think the program X argument works quite nicely, because it represents any possible program that would provide understanding.

My reply is basically the same – You have not shown, either here or elsewhere, either that “all possible Turing machines are not conscious” or that “all possible Turing machines do not possesses understanding”.

You’re forgetting something (something I suggested in the very quote you responded to): program X stands for any program that would allegedly produce understanding (the kind of understanding I am referring to is what you have called TH-understanding). And yet we see that program X is run without TH-understanding.

Applying this to the Chinese language, ask Bob if he understands (again, using the “TH” definition) what Chinese word X means and he’ll honestly reply “I have no idea” even though he runs program X.

Ahhhh, I see. Your argument is thus “a non-conscious agent does not TH-Understand, because we define TH-Understanding as requiring consciousness”.

Yes and no. The existence of consciousness is not, strictly speaking, a part of the definition of TH-understanding. Though it is true that TH-understanding requires consciousness. In terms of a man understanding words, here is the definition I am using:

• The man actually knows what the words mean, i.e. that he perceives the meaning of the words, or to put it another way, that he is aware of the truth of what the words mean.

And here is how I define consciousness:

• Consciousness is the state of being characterized by sensation, perception, thought, awareness, etc. By the definition in question, if an entity has any of these characteristics the entity possesses consciousness.

My justification that “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytic statement comes from instantiating a few characteristics:

• Consciousness is the state of being characterized by sensation, perception (of the meaning of words), thought (knowing the meaning of words), awareness (of the meaning of words), etc. By the definition in question, if an entity has any of these characteristics the entity possesses consciousness.

So, “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytical statement (with the definitions I am using). Or if you prefer, “TH-understanding requires consciousness.”

That is a very impressive and insightful argument, I must say.
Do you have anything more useful to say, since I am not interested in more tautological timewasting?

If you consider the question of whether a computer can have TH-understanding (perceive the meaning of words etc.) what the @#$% are you doing replying to my posts?

I was not referring to the analytic………

……. not that circular reasoning isn’t a fallacy.

Groan – not still on about that are you?

I am. I think it is important for you to understand what circular reasoning is so that you don’t recklessly charge people with it (as you have done here).

IF the sum total of your position on understanding is based on the argument “a non-conscious agent does not TH-Understand, because we define TH-Understanding as requiring consciousness”

See above and post #239 which among other things points out:

Note my argument (that justifies “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytic statement) takes the following format:

1. “This is what I mean by understanding…”
2. “This is what I mean by consciousness…”

Therefore: understanding requires consciousness (in the sense that I mean when I use the terms).

This is not a circular argument. Why? Because the conclusion is not a restatement of any single premise. It takes both premises for the conclusion to logically follow. You may claim that, if we assume all of the premises to be true (and they are: this is what I mean by understanding and consciousness) we assume the conclusion; but this is gong to be true for any valid deductive argument

 

[Psi 5]

Hmmmm, that, I must say, is a very deep and thoughtful conclusion. I wonder why the rest of us didn't see that?
MF

I wonder too.

 

[moving finger]

We can only agree on which statements are analytic and which are not if we firstly agree on the definitions of the terms we are using!

Again, when I said “understanding requires consciousness” I was explicitly referring to my definitions, not necessarily everybody else’s

(a) you have already agreed that your definition of understanding is not the only definition
(b) I have said many times that I do not agree with your definition. In my definition, it is not clear that understanding requires consciousness.

Since we do not agree on the definitions of the terms we are using, it follows that we do not necessarily agree that a statement using those terms is analytic!

It’s so blatantly obvious that it is worth repeating :

We can only agree on which statements are analytic and which are not if we firstly agree on the definitions of the terms we are using

Do you understand this?.

program X stands for any program that would allegedly produce understanding (the kind of understanding I am referring to is what you have called TH-understanding). And yet we see that program X is run without TH-understanding.

If the agent is not conscious it cannot possesses TH-Understanding, by definition.
This does not mean that all possible computers are incapable of possessing either consciousness or TH-Understanding, and you have not shown this to be the case.

The existence of consciousness is not, strictly speaking, a part of the definition of TH-understanding.

Of course it is. Simply because you have “split” the definition such that “TH-understanding requires awareness, and awareness requires consciousness”, does not mean that consciousness is not part of the definition of TH-understanding. By your definition of TH-Understanding, TH-Understanding requires consciousness. Period.

So, “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytical statement (with the definitions I am using). Or if you prefer, “TH-understanding requires consciousness.”

“TH-understanding requires consciousness” is another way of saying ““understanding requires consciousness with the definition of understanding that Tisthammerw is using”

If you consider the question of whether a computer can have TH-understanding (perceive the meaning of words etc.) what the @#$% are you doing replying to my posts?

Does this question make any sense to you? It doesn’t to me.

(One reason I am replying to your posts is because you keep asking me questions, and the words “Please answer my question” keeps cropping up. I guess I’m just too accommodating.)

This is not a circular argument. Why? Because the conclusion is not a restatement of any single premise.

Just because you have split your definition between two premises changes nothing. The premises combined result in the same thing : you choose to define understanding such that it requires consciousness. You have not shown that understanding requires consciousness, you have simply defined it that way.

Using your “logic”, I could define understanding to be anything I like (“understanding requires 3 heads” for example), and then use your deductive argument to then show that it follows that understanding requires 3 heads. Are you suggesting this would be a sound argument?

MF

 

[TheAntiRelative]

I've always wondered, arent we also programmed to do things? Like we have to get up at 6 am take bath, goto school/office, etc?
Or atleast when we are infants, we do what we are told to do just like computers so is AI better than child's intelligence?

The thing is that once we truly replicate child's intellegence, human-like intellegence will immediately follow.

Knowing that you exist and relating to things around you; "Understanding" is required for human-like int. Not just running a program, even though that is certainly a part of it.

The simplest form of "understanding" is the ability to predict the outcome of a complex situation you have never encountered before. This is not yet human understanding but it gets close. (and this is more a symptom of understanding rather than the cause)

The basic set of motivations/instincts that are passed on to us genetically, give us self-awareness. Constantly asking "how does this affect me and satisfy my motivations" and the ability to gain new motivations and change and adapt old ones. That all exists in an infant at birth.