Is Time Merely Constant Change?

[Ghostfaith]

I can no longer see time. All I recognize is the morphing and changing of energies/masses/matters. This concept of time we have is slowly deteriorating from my mind. There is no time, all things are just constantly changing? Nothing ever really leaves us... and nothing is ever really born new in terms of energy. So all that we have is all that we have and it never goes anywhere except for changing into differenent physical, dimensional, and material states? So everything is not really passing... only changing. Time will never leave us, we must learn to leave time.

That's a fascinating experience sounds like you have there, OE - I also have had some experiences like that. Good for you!

 

[Ghostfaith]

If I crunch a chip down to nothing, does that
mean chips don't exist ?

(crunches chip).

Interesting. Is that the correct question, do you think, T?? What if we say "Does THAT chip still exist?"

Isn't it about seeing "categories" such as time, when indivdual "portions" of time or space can "be", on their own - "crunched" or otherwise. Isn't it about how we look at things - mass categories?

 

[Ghostfaith]

I've never understood the appeal of this question to people. Is length an illusion?

Is that the right question to ask? Further back in that we could say "Is illusion an illusion...?"

What does that really ask?

THAT'S a good question to ask, lol. The problem is in language use,in my view. Saying "Length is an illusion" is a bit of a game - it doesn't in any way "define" "length", it just widens the fuzzy meaning of "illusion" to include things like "length".

Length is a property of physical objects in that each and every one of them has spatial extent.

There's an interesting sub-premise in your thinking - that is, that physical objects "can" possesses qualities. Much as Aristotle thought I suppose - not that I knew him, lol. But "length" is not "possessed" by any object - "possessed" is a judgement, existing solely in conceptual space.

Each and every one of them also has temporal extent, which means they can be measured not only with how long they are in space, but how long they exist in time.

Interesting. The masurement of time is always just that- a measurement. Lao Tzu said "Without long there is no short" - kind of pre-empting Derrida, all that while back.

Here is the problem - it's deeperint he archaeology of the means by which we examine time than we normally think. To "measure" time requires a sense of temporal awareness - we simply have to move from one point in time to another in order to measure the temporal span of a thing. So we never step "outside" of the "sense" of time - so even fromt he point of view of someone who believes in objective perspectives, you never get an objective perspective on time - you are always using the thing you are measuring as anspect of the mechanism by which you measure itself. For example, how do I measure an hour? I wait an hour - or I get a clock that runs for an hour... Do I measure it into existence? A bit too crude, that, I think - but is getting to the point of it.

To say that time exists because we can measure it would require some means of measuring time that transcends time as the key measurement of time - kind of a tautological or "incestuous" proof otherwise - see Wittgenstein. But if we remove the human sense of time, then are generating a new concept? Isn't "time" actually a concept relating to human experience of states of events changing, and a sense of connectivity between them? Connectivity is also a conceptual creation - see Hume.

But,t hat all being by the by, to say that "time exists" never narrows down what time is, in ym view - it just widens the meaning of "existence"... see Heidegger.

The Hundred Years War, for instance, occurred in England and France over a 116 year period. Spatially, it had an amorphous extent that cannot strictly be referred to in terms of length and breadth, but if you want to speak of maxima only, then it had a spatial length and breadth, as well as a height. It also had a temporal extent, of 116 years.

Well, interesting example because the Hundred Years War was actually a series of wars. What you are pointing out there is how humans like to categorise "mass amounts" of onformation by "folding" them into neat conceptual packets. Looking back, we have generated the concept of "the Hundred Years War" but did the thing we mean by that even exist at the time for the people involved? The experienced wars - but the concept of "The HUndred Years War" is an external "folding" of information - "The HUndred Years War" is not an event, it's a label for an event, replete with modern judgements. See Foucault.

When we ask whether time is an illusion, what are we asking?

We're asking if we can further refine language use which is being pushed to the extent of its lmeaning.

Is this extent real? What the heck does that mean? Between the beginning and the end of the war, the Earth orbited the sun 116 times; that's all the statement means.

That's what time is. It is not illusory to say that the Earth revolved around the sun 116 times between the beginning and end of the war; it's a factually correct statement.

Well, to my mind what you are saying there is "Why would I ever need to look at the complex way language is related to meaning? After all, my everyday language use is perfectly adequate for describing the world."

Which is cool. To paraphrase Gramsci, common sense is the practical ideology of the ruling paradigm. But, measuring the meaning of a thing from within its own meaning system is a bit like proving that hours exist by waiting an hour - seems right, at first, and seems pointless to question.

What is the difference between reifying time and reifying "change" but not calling it time? A physical object need not change to have temporal extent, so it seems to me that the only difference is that they do not really refer to the same thing. Nonetheless, they are both properties of objects, not objects themselves, so if we reify one, why not the other? If we simply want to say that time is not fundamental to the universe in that the universe could exist without any passage of time, fine, but human intelligence is not fundamental to the universe either, and neither are human personalities or human bodies. Does that mean there is a meaningful sense in which we do not exist?

Well, tell you who should ask about that- The Buddha. Buddhist philosophy is based on a profound concept relating to just that - the non-existence of self.

 

[Ghostfaith]

OK, then your argument derives from a contradiction, for "two different words" never denote the "same concept". Every word (except proper names) is a symbol for a single unique concept that stands for an infinite number of entities of a certain kind.

Hi Rade - I don't thinkthat's true. Bit of Plato in your thinking there? Not that that's a bad thing, lol.

The relationship between words and concepts is a bit tricker than that, I'm afraid. The meaning of a wordisn't just "given" - it relies on context. All of our concepts are a bit "fuzzy" until defined by context. It's not true to say that one word=one definite concept.

Even proper names - if someone loves you, and someone hates you, they use the same noun to describe you, but have completely different concepts of what "you" means. Point being that concepts exist in conceptual space - not "out there" with perfect, idealised meanings. The same word can have thousands of different meanngs - in fact, each time it is used is a unique use - see Wittgenstein.

Until you have integrated a mental unit by means of a specific word, you cannot form "a concept".

Well that just can not be true. Concepts are not only linguistic, and even linguistic concepts don't necessarily impart concrete meaning. What does "be cool" mean, concretely? What does "blow me!" mean? Its literal sense, or something else?

 

[Ghostfaith]

You are correct, “we can never know”;

Well, that depends on "know", of course - and also on how we use knowledge. If we want to build on our premises, thinking that the "direction of knowledge" is always like that - going forwards, conclusion upon premise and so on - then we can generate posers that we can't asnwer ad infinitum. But that's about how language workd, not about how the universe works. For example, asking if time exists is a question about linguistics, masquerading as a question about the universe.

Knowledge can have a reversed direction - insteadof building on our premises to answer questions, we can investigate the archaeology of our conceptual structures, to find out why the questions gained meaning in the first place.

We CAN know - or at least, we can be aware of and understand EVERYTHING that is within our conceptual structure - because we ourselves bought the meaning of every aspect of it at every stage. Langauge is full of contradictions - it is always a "dirty tool" for deconstructing itself, and yet, that is only a problem if we are still obsessed with the "forward direction of knowledge" - building linguistic models. In fact, awareness and understanding can be non-linguistic - and understanding ourlanguage use can generate non-linguistic understanding of howit artificially generates conceptual depth.

however, we must admit of the possibility that a true foundation exists: i.e., that a given attempt to communicate a specific ontology might be based upon a true foundation.

No - we don't have to admit that, in my view. In fact, we can prove that it doesn't exist, just by re-tracing the steps we used to generate our ontology.

"True" is an ideological creation, strictly within that meaning-set - so we can demonstrate to ourselves absoloutely that there is no "true" base.

After all, it seems everyone believes their personal ontology is valid; one of them (the billions which exist) could be right.

That presupposes that everyone is processing information in the same way. Many people actively approach information by negating it - even their own beliefs and methods.

Again, you cannot know that it is true; however, you can certainly determine if it is false.

Yes - I agree, although of course "false" is also an ideological creation... "bonded" to it is the ideology of "true"... But I agree - we can dismantle our meaning structures and show how things are "artificial" - rather than false, to my mind.

Any specific ontology exists because it explains reality to the person who believes in it.

I agree. Scenario fulfillment.

 

[Rade]

...The meaning of a word isn't just "given" - it relies on context. All of our concepts are a bit "fuzzy" until defined by context. It's not true to say that one word=one definite concept...

Thank you for your interest in my comments. I agree that concepts cannot be formed outside a context, and that the "meaning" of a word is not just given as an axiom. When it is claimed, as in my previous post, that "Every word (except proper names) is a symbol for a single unique concept that stands for an infinite number of entities of a certain kind", what is being claimed is that a "word" for concept [A] is nothing more than a symbol used to communicate the contextual relationship between the {a}, {a'}, {a''} concrete units of [A], and that the "word" has no meaning other than that of the concept [A] it symbolizes. And here we do not have a theory of concept formation from our dear ancient Plato, but from our dear contemporary Ayn Rand. Thus, it most clearly is true to say that one word = one concept if you accept the Rand theory of concept formation, for as she wrote : "Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind" (A. Rand, 1979, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology"). Of course one cannot understand such a statement in a vacuum, one must read Rand.

 

[mosassam]

it doesn't address what causes the observed "time dilation" effects.

Trying miserably to get even a superficial grasp of Relativity. A quick question or two about time dilation. Does the relative difference between two time measuring devices represent two different "Now"s? Or, does the difference represent a change in the relationship/interconnectedness of the two devices in the same Now moment? Or, most probably, does it represent something mind-bendingly different?
I'm not sure if 'represent' is the right word
(in fact, I'm not sure of much!)

 

[B.E.M]

Hi, I actually thought it was the concept of a 'now' (that time flows past)rather than time, which physics does not seem to require. Is there a good duscussion on this?

(I read the first couple of pages of this thread and the last couple. Learnt nothing, but my brain hurts.. apologies if all this was covered concisely between 3 and 16 )

 

[Ghostfaith]

Thank you for your interest in my comments.

You are welcome.

I agree that concepts cannot be formed outside a context, and that the "meaning" of a word is not just given as an axiom.

Hmmm.. interesting *sub message* to what you are saying there... as if it is *almost* given, maybe? Understanding that meanings are defined and applied is important, in my view - otherwise wordslike *reality* and *consciousness* would not be still causing such massive debate. But, even within those debates all that really happens is that the terms are re-defined -never explained. A change of contextual elements simply "widens the cradle", so to speak.

When it is claimed, as in my previous post, that "Every word (except proper names) is a symbol for a single unique concept that stands for an infinite number of entities of a certain kind", what is being claimed is that a "word" for concept [A] is nothing more than a symbol used to communicate the contextual relationship between the {a}, {a'}, {a''} concrete units of [A], and that the "word" has no meaning other than that of the concept [A] it symbolizes.

I am clear on what you are saying. I personally challenge "just" when people say "I am just saying..." or "It just means..." and I encourage others to do so also. Nothing is "just..." nothing at all - nothig is, everything has become.

"Just" allows un-noticed pre-suppostions to infect your thinking. It does not "just" mean that at all. Simply by using symbols to relate an idea -as in the example - you have distorted perception of it by causing the observer to unconsciously associate the symbol-base you are using with an actual state of affairs - i.e. his own word use - which generates a completely artificial sense. This is an "Analogy osmosis" whereby the analogy affects our perception of the thing that we hoped to makle clearer.

When it is claimed, as in my previous post, that "Every word (except proper names)

That in itself shows a lack of clarity of thought - hopefully on Rand's part, becuase I am not really greatly impressed by Rand, to be honest. People are also concepts - inability to distinguish between a conceptual sturcture and an actual thing it refers to is a basic error in thought. Think about anyone you know. The "concept" of them exists whether they are in the roolwith you, away, or dead. The name you use for them does not refer to "them" it refers to your concept of them, and only sometimes to their actual physical mass. There is a difference between "where is David?" and "David is very nice!"

is a symbol for a single unique concept that stands for an infinite number of entities of a certain kind",

That's just pop philosophy to me. All concepts are unique if we define unique in specific ways. I'm reminded of Wittgenstein drawing a circle and saying is it a circle? And then exploring the ontology of circles - pointing out that every circleis unique, and only *exists* as a circle within mental human categories.

To say that single concepts "stand" for an infinite number of entities of a certain kind is just not true - it's meaningless word play, based on artificial senses being applied to things like "entitiy" - it doesn't define what a colour is in any way, it just fuzzy-fies "entitiy" so that it can include colour.

Most of all, it fails to understand that language doesn't work as a coded map of objective reality, it works entirely within its own structures - it is not only the "map" but also the "mapped". Colours don't "exist" at all, except as human concepts, so all human word play regarding colour remains entirely within a conceptual nexus.

what is being claimed is that a "word" for concept [A] is nothing more than a symbol used to communicate the contextual relationship between the {a}, {a'}, {a''} concrete units of [A], and that the "word" has no meaning other than that of the concept [A] it symbolizes.

Bah - it's a round about way of saying nothing. I'm reminded of Piero Sraffa's insulting gesture to Wittgenstein.

And here we do not have a theory of concept formation from our dear ancient Plato, but from our dear contemporary Ayn Rand.

Well, I'm thinking replace "is a symbol for a single unique concept" with "Ideal form" and " that stands for an infinite number of entities of a certain kind" with well, infinite variations, and it's just a kind of muddled up, re-hashed Plato. Not as smart or original as Plato, I'll grant you.

Thus, it most clearly is true

I'm sorry? Could you please say that again?

And here we do not have a theory of concept formation from our dear ancient Plato, but from our dear contemporary Ayn Rand. Thus, it most clearly is true"

Is clearly true because Ayn Rand said it? No wonder people think she is some kind of cult figurehead, lol. It's clearly true at all - it's not even true, never mind clearly true. Rand never properly questrions her own ideological assumptions relating to objectivism - which accounts for a lot of this muddle.

to say that one word = one concept if you accept the Rand theory of concept formation, for as she wrote : "Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind" (A. Rand, 1979, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology"). Of course one cannot understand such a statement in a vacuum, one must read Rand.

Understanding it is easy. Understand why it is wrong - that is another matter.

 

[Doctordick]

Well it's hard to say whether I am interpreting your text correctly. You are saying that the valid ontology is a set (of rules?)

No, you are apparently getting things backwards. Saying that "a valid ontology is a set" is certainly not saying "every set is an ontology". I am simply saying that, whatever a "valid ontology" might be (and, with regard to this statement, it makes utterly no difference as to what it is), it can be regarded as a set because a set can be a collection of "anything". The only reason I put forth this assertion is because I want to be able to use a vocabulary which allows me to refer to an element of this "valid ontology" without requiring that I define the element.

... and any consequent knowledge of reality is associated with this set one way or another... Are you talking about some kind of bottom-most set of knowledge from which everything else we know of follows?

Philosophers divide issues into two different categories, ontology and epistemology. Take a look at "Definitions of Ontology on the Web". For example, "An ontology is a controlled vocabulary that describes objects and the relations between them in a formal way, and has a grammar for using the vocabulary terms to express something meaningful within a specified domain of interest. The vocabulary is used to make queries and assertions. Ontological commitments are agreements to use the vocabulary in a consistent way for knowledge sharing.[/color] ..." An ontology is what stands behind your logical arguments: i.e., what your explanation of reality (the epistemology you propose) presumes to exists.

When you say there are elements in the valid ontology of which we are ignorant, are you just saying there currently are elements of which we are ignorant, or that there must always be elements of which we are ignorant or otherwise we cannot function?

If, "a valid ontology" is to be identified with "reality" (i.e., what really exists) then certainly you must accept the fact that, no matter what ontology you might believe to be "valid", the possibility exists that there is some element of reality (that valid ontology) of which you are ignorant (to think otherwise is to believe you are infallible).

I am saying three very simple things: first, any ontology can be referred to as a set; second, an acceptable epistemology must be based on reality in some way (i.e., it is reasonable to presume there are aspects of that valid ontology in our beliefs) and third, there are truths (valid ontological elements) of which we are ignorant.

Either way, I can't see how I could disagree.

Neither can I. Do I take that to mean you will accept those three assertions as objectively true statements?

At the same time I'm thinking that perhaps your further assertions give me a better idea about what you are saying...

I don't know what further assertions you are talking about. I only asked you about those three.

Let me know if you will accept those three statements as a valid presentation of the problem -- Dick

PS Rade has once again reaffirmed that he has utterly no interest in exact science but would much rather do his best to create a mock battle by searching out obscure methods of misinterpreting what I say.

 

[Rade]

(most recent post)

I am saying three very simple things:
first, any ontology can be referred to as a set;
second, an acceptable epistemology must be based on reality in some way (i.e., it is reasonable to presume there are aspects of that valid ontology in our beliefs)
third, there are truths (valid ontological elements) of which we are ignorant.

PS Rade has once again reaffirmed that he has utterly no interest in exact science but would much rather do his best to create a mock battle by searching out obscure methods of misinterpreting what I say.

Hello again Doctordick. But I do have an interest in what you have to say, and I see that you took a very great interest in my previous post because I now read above that you have significantly modified your "three simple things" (what you view as axioms of your philosophy) in direct response to my critical review. Now, such a response by you in reaction to my comments is not an example of a "mock battle"--I call it good thinking on your part.

Just so you (and others) are clear about what I say here, let us take a look at how you stated your "three simple things" before you read my post a few days ago:

(Previous post, a few days ago)

There are at least three things which I think I can correctly say about that unknown "valid ontology" I would like to talk about.
First, it {eg, valid ontology}fulfills the definition of "a set"...
Second, any reasonable understanding of "the universe" must be based in some way upon that "valid ontology"; that is no more than saying that any reasonable understanding of the universe should be based on the universe...
third, And finally, it is quite reasonable to presume there are elements of that "valid ontology" of which we are ignorant and which would most probably be destructive to our most well thought out speculative edifices.

Now, as to your "first simple thing" we see that you now (most recently) hold that "any" ontology can be referred to as a set, whereas, just a few days ago you limited your argument to a very specific type of ontology, what you then called a "valid ontology" (thus clearly a non-valid ontology cannot be referred to as a set). But I ask, how can an axiomatic concept so simple change its form so quickly in your mind, unless it really is/was not in your mind as simple ?

Then, as to your "second simple thing" we read that you now remove completely the concept of the "universe" (after I explained to you that its use was improper), but more significantly, we read that the entire logical structure of this second axiomatic "thing" has been modified to discuss "reality" and not the "universe", which are two completely different concepts. Again I ask (and not in mocking voice) how can a "thing" so very simple completely change form in your mind in a few days ?

As to your "third very simple thing" I see only that it has changed form, yet the meaning appears to be intact--but again, if the words you used just a few days ago were so simply known to you as "correct" (your word), I ask, why have they changed at all ?

How can you seriously expect me (and others) to believe that you have discovered some new philosophy already worked out in your mind long ago based on axioms (eg, simple things) that you now change in meaning from one day to another ? No mock battles here Doctordick, just the inconvenient reality of the truth of the words you express.

 

[Rade]

Understanding it is easy. Understand why it is wrong - that is another matter.

Dear Ghostfaith--I am constantly amused at the reaction of professional philosophers to the name (and philosophy) of Ayn Rand. Of course nothing you have stated above meets the bar of being a critical review of the statement I cited by Rand (the one that you "understand why it is wrong"), for the simple reason that you do not show in your post (1) any knowledge of how Rand derives her theory of concepts from axiomatic statements and then defines the two critical aspects of the statement--"words" and "concepts" and their logical connection, nor (2) did you provide any alternative theory of concepts (and words) to support your "correct understanding" as opposed to Rands "false understanding".

But, this thread about "is time an illusion" is no place for serious discussion about philosophy that links "words" and "concepts" -- so I will start a new thread on the topic, and I hope you will join the discussion.

 

[mosassam]

But, this thread about "is time an illusion"

Hurrah, someone finally noticed.
Can anyone help - it seems established that Time is an abstract notion that has no objective reality. If so, how does "time dilation" occur, surely this demonstrates the objective existence of time. If not, what does it demonstrate?
PS is it possible for DoctorDick and AnssiH to have their own thread where they can discuss DD's big theorem without interruption, and maybe a separate thread for discussion of their progress?

 

[AnssiH]

Trying miserably to get even a superficial grasp of Relativity. A quick question or two about time dilation. Does the relative difference between two time measuring devices represent two different "Now"s?

I assume you mean the relative difference of the (timewise) speed of two time measuring devices(?)

Or, does the difference represent a change in the relationship/interconnectedness of the two devices in the same Now moment? Or, most probably, does it represent something mind-bendingly different?
I'm not sure if 'represent' is the right word
(in fact, I'm not sure of much!)

Well I think I understand what you are asking about.

In the most straightforward interpretation of relativity each measuring device has got their own "now"-moment that includes different events simultaneously. I.e. the objects do not share simultaneity. This is often suggested to be unequivocally true and this is also what Einstein often asserted to be what reality is like.

But actually relativity of simultaneity is not observable at all. Only time dilation is. This is why all the talk about the topology of events before, and that is what Einstein himself also noted at some point.

So there is no way to devise an experiment that could tell us whether or not in reality there is such a thing as a universal "now"-moment after all and time dilation is just "a change in the relationship/interconnectedness of the two devices in the same Now moment?", because the experiment devices are also physical objects that obey all the laws they are "measuring" (i.e. they cannot measure what spacetime is like without existing outside of spacetime).

Which just reminds us that relativity is a model, and your questions are basically about how should we interpret the model.

I hope I answered the right question.

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

Hi, I actually thought it was the concept of a 'now' (that time flows past)rather than time, which physics does not seem to require. Is there a good duscussion on this?

No, apparently :)

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

No, you are apparently getting things backwards. Saying that "a valid ontology is a set" is certainly not saying "every set is an ontology". I am simply saying that, whatever a "valid ontology" might be (and, with regard to this statement, it makes utterly no difference as to what it is), it can be regarded as a set because a set can be a collection of "anything". The only reason I put forth this assertion is because I want to be able to use a vocabulary which allows me to refer to an element of this "valid ontology" without requiring that I define the element.

Okay, if I'm reading you correctly, then I cannot agree that this should be considered "necessarily true".

Am I right to assume that what you are saying is the same as asserting; "what exists is a set", i.e. that reality is made of a number of things (where "thing" can refer to a force or a law or "anything") rather than just one thing?

The view where this cannot be said to be true is incidentally the view that I hold. To point out some "thing that exists" is to assume metaphysical identity to some stable pattern. That is, to assume that a rock is something that has got temporal and spatial identity to it even when we don't define it that way (as oppose to being more accurately kind of a "stable pattern" we care to name). Of course we cannot say that the rock certainly does have metaphysical identity (even one of a "pattern"); that it is metaphysically "one thing". (This is obviously different from asking whether or not the rock exists. It just questions its ontological nature)

Extrapolating this to anything we can point at leads me to think that it is intrinsic to the brain to classify reality into "things" (forces, objects), to assume identity to stable patterns ("stable behaviour", if you will), in order to build a predictive model of reality.

That is to say that we cannot understand any system without breaking it into elements that have got stable identity to themselves in our minds. When we find different perspectives to understand the same system, we are basically just braking it into different sorts of elements that nevertheless form a working predictive model. Hence I say our worldview is made of semantical elements.

In the questions of ontology we ask what are the elements that are more than semantics; what is the set that truly exists. And here I would like to point out that just because our understanding is intrinsically about classifying reality into a (semantical) set of elements, it is also limited to think of or to comprehend anything as a set of elements. This doesn't mean that reality must also be made of a set of some sort. It may be that to classify reality into a set is to confuse its true nature, so to speak.

Am I just confused about what you are saying, or would you say the first assumption is not necessarily true anymore?

Are you talking about some kind of bottom-most set of knowledge from which everything else we know of follows?

Philosophers divide issues into two different categories, ontology and epistemology. Take a look at "Definitions of Ontology on the Web". For example, "An ontology is a controlled vocabulary that describes objects and the relations between them in a formal way, and has a grammar for using the vocabulary terms to express something meaningful within a specified domain of interest. The vocabulary is used to make queries and assertions. Ontological commitments are agreements to use the vocabulary in a consistent way for knowledge sharing.[/color] ..." An ontology is what stands behind your logical arguments: i.e., what your explanation of reality (the epistemology you propose) presumes to exists.

Yeah, and epistemology is also in many ways "standing behind" ontology (can't form ontology without knowledge and without also considering what and how knowledge is, like I did above)

I've always found it really hard to keep ontology and epistemology as separated discussions because they are married to such an extent. The reasoning just goes round and round from one to another. This is related to when I say our worldview is without a root; that it is a self-supporting structure without any explicit truth to our knowledge.

This is why I asked if in your view there exists a root to our knowledge when we dig deep enough, as oppose to all ontological assertions being capable of only supporting each others (to form a self-coherent worldview but nothing more).

If, "a valid ontology" is to be identified with "reality" (i.e., what really exists) then certainly you must accept the fact that, no matter what ontology you might believe to be "valid", the possibility exists that there is some element of reality (that valid ontology) of which you are ignorant (to think otherwise is to believe you are infallible).

Yeah I agree that "there exists the possibility that there are elements of reality of which we are ignorant", or a more proper way to word it considering what I said above; "we don't necessarily know everything about reality".

And additionally, in my particular view I assume there necessarily is something of which we are ignorant, in the sense that we are limited to classifying reality into objects when at the same time we understand we can do this in great many ways without giving up any predictive powers and it is not given that there is any sort of "correct way" to classify reality into elements.

I am saying three very simple things: first, any ontology can be referred to as a set; second, an acceptable epistemology must be based on reality in some way (i.e., it is reasonable to presume there are aspects of that valid ontology in our beliefs) and third, there are truths (valid ontological elements) of which we are ignorant.
Neither can I. Do I take that to mean you will accept those three assertions as objectively true statements?

If I understood you correctly this time, then I don't readily agree with the first assertion...

The second assertion, well, I certainly would not accept any epistemology that is not in line with an ontological assertions, but they pretty much necessarily are in line with each others as long as they are found from the same self-coherent worldview (i.e. are believed by the same person). So I can say I basically agree.

The third I agree with as well.

I don't know what further assertions you are talking about. I only asked you about those three.

I was referring to you saying "If you can accept these three statements as representing a "correct" foundation for the study of ontology, I will present my first revelation consistent with that foundation."

I thought perhaps your revelation would explain to me better why you set those three assertions the way you did. Because I am not quite sure if you are saying what I think you are.

Perhaps it would also be helpful to hear what led you to those assertions.

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

Hurrah, someone finally noticed.
Can anyone help - it seems established that Time is an abstract notion that has no objective reality. If so, how does "time dilation" occur, surely this demonstrates the objective existence of time. If not, what does it demonstrate?

Referring to my previous post to you (#264), in common terms it either demonstrates the objective existence of time, or that the physically observable motion of objects proceeds at different speeds in different conditions (any time measuring device is more properly a "motion measuring device"; any clock has got internal motion whose speed defines how much time it measures, atomic clocks measure the motion of the atom, etc...)

I.e. you can look at it as if there are objects that move through time dimension at different rates, or as if there are objects that just move (internally) at different rates in certain conditions. Both perspectives give you the same physically observable behaviour. And both raise many difficult questions.

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Am I right to assume that what you are saying is the same as asserting; "what exists is a set", i.e. that reality is made of a number of things (where "thing" can refer to a force or a law or "anything") rather than just one thing?

Yes, I am asserting that "what exists is a set"; however, as far as being accurate goes, a set can consist of "just one thing"; in fact, the existence of the "NULL" set implies that a set can consist of nothing at all. It follows that the first statement makes utterly no constraint as to what this "valid ontology" consists of. As I said, the only reason I put it in was to provide me with a vocabulary for referring to elements of reality.

Hence I say our worldview is made of semantical elements.

A collection of "semantical elements" is a set; so your view is certainly included. Certainly it is possible that a "valid" set of semantical elements might exist; if that is the case than that set could at least be called a reference to a "valid ontology".

This doesn't mean that reality must also be made of a set of some sort. It may be that to classify reality into a set is to confuse its true nature, so to speak.

Now that assertion you will have to clarify. What you are saying is that something exists which cannot be thought of as a set. How would you handle the set, "that which exists"?

Yeah, and epistemology is also in many ways "standing behind" ontology (can't form ontology without knowledge and without also considering what and how knowledge is, like I did above)

A defined ontology certainly requires an acceptable epistemology for justification, but that doesn't imply the "defined ontology" is valid. That is exactly why I wish to work with an undefined ontology.

I've always found it really hard to keep ontology and epistemology as separated discussions because they are married to such an extent. The reasoning just goes round and round from one to another.

This is a direct result of limiting your interest to "defined ontologies".

This is related to when I say our worldview is without a root; that it is a self-supporting structure without any explicit truth to our knowledge.

Saying it is "a self-supporting structure" is quite a different thing from saying it is "without any explicit truth", and the difference is a critical element.

This is why I asked if in your view there exists a root to our knowledge when we dig deep enough, as oppose to all ontological assertions being capable of only supporting each others (to form a self-coherent worldview but nothing more).

This is a question to be laid aside until the issue of creating that "self-supporting structure" is completely understood. So let us not worry about it for the time being.

And additionally, in my particular view I assume there necessarily is something of which we are ignorant, in the sense that we are limited to classifying reality into objects when at the same time we understand we can do this in great many ways without giving up any predictive powers and it is not given that there is any sort of "correct way" to classify reality into elements.

My only complaint with this comment is that it is a mere opinion and we shouldn't be concerned with opinions here. Not if we are intending to be exact about our conclusions.

If I understood you correctly this time, then I don't readily agree with the first assertion...

In that case, I want to know why you think that assertion is invalid.

I was referring to you saying "If you can accept these three statements as representing a "correct" foundation for the study of ontology, I will present my first revelation consistent with that foundation."

I thought perhaps your revelation would explain to me better why you set those three assertions the way you did. Because I am not quite sure if you are saying what I think you are.

Perhaps it would also be helpful to hear what led you to those assertions.

What led me to those assertions is the fact that philosophers talk about ontologies all the time without making any statements as to what a valid ontology should be. How can you look for something if you have no idea as to what it is you are looking for?

I am still waiting for your response -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Yes, I am asserting that "what exists is a set"; however, as far as being accurate goes, a set can consist of "just one thing"; in fact, the existence of the "NULL" set implies that a set can consist of nothing at all. It follows that the first statement makes utterly no constraint as to what this "valid ontology" consists of. As I said, the only reason I put it in was to provide me with a vocabulary for referring to elements of reality.

I see. So this also means you recognize that we cannot comprehend the functions (derive any predictions) of any system without classifying it into a set of components that we assume to exhibit such and such behaviour under such and such conditions?

A collection of "semantical elements" is a set; so your view is certainly included. Certainly it is possible that a "valid" set of semantical elements might exist; if that is the case than that set could at least be called a reference to a "valid ontology".

Yeah, although then the case would be that the best we can do is to have a reference to a valid ontology (instead of actually having the valid ontology itself). And I don't actually expect there is a valid set of semantical elements. But that is just an opinion too. :)

This doesn't mean that reality must also be made of a set of some sort. It may be that to classify reality into a set is to confuse its true nature, so to speak.

Now that assertion you will have to clarify. What you are saying is that something exists which cannot be thought of as a set. How would you handle the set, "that which exists"?

Now here's the beef. I cannot actually "handle" any system without classifying it into such a set, and this is why it seems to me that everything is made of some sort of fundamental set (of elements). This is how I think, but it is not necessarily how things are at all. When you try to "figure out" any system you form a mental image about how it works by assuming some components that behave in some predictable ways (so to be able to predict the behaviour of the system, which is what "figuring it out" means). This is clearly a good survival method; to make meaningful predictions about reality around you.

What this has to do with ontology is that we cannot presume reality must be made of some fundamental set of elements. This is not that different from what people like Thomas Kuhn are observing, only I don't only question the reality of the elements that exist in our most succesfull models of reality, but I also question the ontological validity of defining reality into any sort of "set".

This is not to question the validity of such a thing as far as making predictions go. It is entirely possible that we can define a set of elements that produces 100% success rate for our predictions, but we still could not know whether our particular method of classification is true to reality in any ontological sense.

Also I would like to say that whether or not this is valid philosophy, it certainly seems like a useful paradigm in that it makes you more aware of the distinction between models and reality. It makes you ask yourself more readily questions like, where does the boundary between atom and space lie (and subsequently what do we mean by space and why should we expect it to be a valid concept at all, etc...)

I.e. it gives you some ideas about epistemology that most people seem to be completely ignorant of.

Keep in mind that to classify reality into a set is to assume metaphysical identity onto some stable patterns. We often do this while knowing it is physically unjustified (according to our best physical models). Like when we assume identity onto a shadow (we think it is the same shadow over some space and time region, while knowing this is not "really" so; we just see it so semantically). I.e. I am noting that it could be wrong to assume metaphysical identity to ANYTHING (temporal nor spatial, and this includes the identity we tend to assume to "space" and "time" also)

This would also mean that it is not more valid to see reality as a one big canvas either. This would be a case of assuming identity to this canvas without justification (which would constraint us to define all the other phenomena accordingly).

This is what I meant when I claimed we are not playing 21 questions with the nature but all by ourselves, and this is why I've been claiming ontology is unanswerable; because the very method with which we comprehend reality is not a method for answer it.

So, is this something you have already considered and come to conclude that we can still say valid ontology certainly is some kind of a set?

Saying it is "a self-supporting structure" is quite a different thing from saying it is "without any explicit truth", and the difference is a critical element.

Can you still try and explain what the difference is, because I don't think I got it...?

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

Oh, I just thought of an analogy which, while not completely elegant, should give you a better idea of what I'm trying to say.

Imagine a being that is only able to conceive reality in form of numbers and mathematical formulas (and performs predictions this way).

So whatever the true nature of reality might be, that being can only think and perceive numbers and formulas, and since it can perform accurate predictions with many different formulas, it can only come to ask such ontological question as, what is the real fundamental formula with which nature itself calculates its functions (motion).

We on the other hand conceive reality in form of semantical things. Everything we see are different things in interaction with each others. The ontological question we ask is thus "what are the THINGS that really exist".

So I am questioning if this is a valid ontological question at all. It is possible, if not even likely, that to ask what "things" exist is already presupposing too much. It is not given that reality performs its functions in terms of "things in interaction", just because our thinking works this way (for clear evolutionary reasons). So if that is the case, we can at most come to form a 100% accurate MODEL of reality, but we cannot form more sublime understanding (which is what ontology would be asking for).

If I understand your assertion about "set" correctly, it seems to me that you are presupposing in true ontology there are "things" (with real metaphysical identity)

 

[Doctordick]

I see. So this also means you recognize that we cannot comprehend the functions (derive any predictions) of any system without classifying it into a set of components that we assume to exhibit such and such behavior under such and such conditions?

No, saying that any ontology qualifies as a set merely give us a vocabulary to use in discussing ontology without defining it. What one can and can not comprehend has nothing to do with the issue. What one can and can not comprehend is a epistemological issue.

Yeah, although then the case would be that the best we can do is to have a reference to a valid ontology (instead of actually having the valid ontology itself).

You are explicitly trying to define what qualifies as an ontology and that is the exact issue to be avoided as any such move is essentially a presumption which removes possibilities and we don't want to make presumptions.

Now here's the beef. I cannot actually "handle" any system without classifying it into such a set, and this is why it seems to me that everything is made of some sort of fundamental set (of elements).

I don't know what you mean by "such a set". Under normal circumstances, the modifier "such a" is a implicit reference to some constraining rule: i.e., used when one is trying to define some presumed qualifications. You are apparently having difficulty comprehending an undefined set.

... but I also question the ontological validity of defining reality into any sort of "set".

Then would you please explain to me what constraint exists in the concept of a set which makes an assumption as to "what sort" of thing the set is?

It is entirely possible that we can define a set of elements that produces 100% success rate for our predictions, but we still could not know whether our particular method of classification is true to reality in any ontological sense.

Again, you are off in the field of epistemology; the issue under discussion here was supposed to be ontology. (Is time an illusion is an ontological question based upon the common speculative edifice referred to as one's world view.)

... questions like, where does the boundary between atom and space lie (and subsequently what do we mean by space and why should we expect it to be a valid concept at all, etc...)

Once again, you want to take some speculative edifice (an epistemology dealing with atoms and space) and then talk about the ontological concepts behind it. As Kant said:

It is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only inquire whether the foundations be sure.

This is exactly the issue which is to be avoided. Let us first inquire into the issue of a "valid ontology"; when we understand what we are dealing with (this undefined valid ontology), then we can make rational inquires as to how the problem (creating rational explanations) can be solved. Before that, everything is little more than a stab in the dark.

Keep in mind that to classify reality into a set is to assume metaphysical identity onto some stable patterns.

I am referring to reality (or the "valid" ontology conceived to be reality) as a set and that reference makes no assumptions about reality at all. And pray, what do you mean by "some stable patterns"? That concept involves the concept of "time" and makes the presumption that "time" is an aspect of your "valid ontology". You are already off in a speculative edifice and outside the area of examining a valid ontology.

We often do this while knowing it is physically unjustified (according to our best physical models). Like when we assume identity onto a shadow (we think it is the same shadow over some space and time region, while knowing this is not "really" so; we just see it so semantically). I.e. I am noting that it could be wrong to assume metaphysical identity to ANYTHING (temporal nor spatial, and this includes the identity we tend to assume to "space" and "time" also)

You seem to have an overwhelming urge to see the question of ontology in terms of the speculative edifice the ontology supposedly supports. I need you to see the "valid ontology" as an undefined[/color] thing (that is why I want to use the term "set").

This is what I meant when I claimed we are not playing 21 questions with the nature but all by ourselves, and this is why I've been claiming ontology is unanswerable; because the very method with which we comprehend reality is not a method for answer it.

What you are saying is very simple: ontological analysis is not to be done by epistemological methods. That is perfectly clear. That is why I am trying to show you an alternate method. But in order to show you the method, I need an abstract way of referring to that "undefined valid ontology".

So, is this something you have already considered and come to conclude that we can still say valid ontology certainly is some kind of a set?

I am not saying anything about what a "valid ontology" is; I am merely saying that referring to it as a set makes no constraints whatsoever as to what it is and yields a vocabulary which can be mapped into any vocabulary which might be required to discuss that "valid ontology". That should be clear to you as "any vocabulary" may be considered a set[/color] of representations of concepts.

A "self-supporting structure" is what is commonly called "a tautology"; all it need be is totally internally consistent (explicit truth has nothing to do with the definition). It is entirely possible that such a structure may be either "based on some explicit truth" or it could be "without any explicit truth". Go read about Solipsism; it is well accepted that one cannot prove that Solipsism is false, but neither can one prove Solipsism is truth. You are apparently making the assumption that all "self-supporting structures" are without a grain of explicit truth; that is an assumption that Solipsism is truth.

If I understand your assertion about "set" correctly, it seems to me that you are presupposing in true ontology there are "things" (with real metaphysical identity)

That is the standard interpretation of the question implied by the definition of ontology: i.e., "what exists". And I brought up the Null set as an explicit possibility (nothing with real metaphysical identity) in order to assure you that I wished to make no assumptions. Again, you are making the argument for the possibility of Solipsism but as I said, that need not be the case (and is a rather extreme one at that). Solipsism is an epistemological argument and says nothing about "a valid ontology". All I am saying is that "a valid ontology" might lie behind our "world view" and, if that is true, what kind of consequences should one expect (before we chase off after some speculative edifice). What can we say about "sure foundations" before we create a speculative edifice? I know your answer is "nothing"; however, I don't think you have thought the problem out.

My central purpose here is to make no assumptions -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Just replying in a hurry, hoping I'll still be somewhat clear :)

No, saying that any ontology qualifies as a set merely give us a vocabulary to use in discussing ontology without defining it. What one can and can not comprehend has nothing to do with the issue. What one can and can not comprehend is a epistemological issue.

Well it's certainly true that I am diving headlong into epistemology with that assertion, just that it appears unavoidable to me. But I promised I'd keep the door open to other possibilities than my current view, so let me accept your first assertion. Perhaps your further steps will tell me better what you mean by an undefined set exactly.

I don't know what you mean by "such a set". Under normal circumstances, the modifier "such a" is a implicit reference to some constraining rule: i.e., used when one is trying to define some presumed qualifications. You are apparently having difficulty comprehending an undefined set.

"Such a set" referred to any kind of set. Understanding something as a set is something we need to do in order to be able to discuss it (like you said) and also in order to understand it in our own mind. It seems like this is already more than an ontology, even when we don't define what the set might be. But perhaps you are right and I just don't understand what you mean by an undefined set.

Then would you please explain to me what constraint exists in the concept of a set which makes an assumption as to "what sort" of thing the set is?

That there is something (even just a single thing) with ontological/metaphysical identity even when there is no semantical mind defining it that way.

I see you clarified that by "null set" you meant it'd be fair to call it a set even when it doesn't refer to anything atl all (not even to a single thing). I am little bit confused about how the first assertion has got any meaning to it anymore (i.e. why make the assertion), but perhaps I'll understand it later.

I am referring to reality (or the "valid" ontology conceived to be reality) as a set and that reference makes no assumptions about reality at all. And pray, what do you mean by "some stable patterns"? That concept involves the concept of "time" and makes the presumption that "time" is an aspect of your "valid ontology". You are already off in a speculative edifice and outside the area of examining a valid ontology.

This is exactly the problem I am talking about. I am calling things "patterns" knowing perfectly well that this is too a semantical concept and involves an assumption about identity of many things. We need to talk about semantical entities in order to discuss or understand anything at all. That, I reckon, is always invalid ontology. Yet it's all we can do :(

What you are saying is very simple: ontological analysis is not to be done by epistemological methods. That is perfectly clear. That is why I am trying to show you an alternate method. But in order to show you the method, I need an abstract way of referring to that "undefined valid ontology".

I keep failing to see how it's possible to think about anything at all without epistemological methods, but let's just advance to next step, maybe that'll clear things up.

That is the standard interpretation of the question implied by the definition of ontology: i.e., "what exists". And I brought up the Null set as an explicit possibility (nothing with real metaphysical identity) in order to assure you that I wished to make no assumptions. Again, you are making the argument for the possibility of Solipsism but as I said, that need not be the case (and is a rather extreme one at that).

Yeah ok, the null set.

btw, I'm not referring to solipsism at all with my assertions (although it seems my assertions are often understood that way).

I am assuming there is a reality out there without my subjective experience, but that my subjective experience is caused by the brain classifying reality into semantical things and comprehending it as an artificial model or an artifical expression of the real reality. As a crude analogy I referred to the way some being could understand only numbers, and the same way we understand only semantical/"sensible things", while reality is hardly made of semantical components.

So what I'm saying is that perhaps *any* "perspective" we choose to view some system from, is just an approximated model of the reality of that system.

In fact another topic just went straight into the same area of "limits of comprehension", and I presented my views from slightly different angle, perhaps it explains you better how I am actually presenting fairly standard materialistic view;

(Don't worry, I know the text is full of wild hypotheses... Again, just to be able to discuss anything at all, I must make assertions knowing perfectly well that they are completely undefendable)
http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy/message/10393

But regardless of our particular views, let's get to the next step in your assertions about ontology?

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Hi AnssiH, I hope that nothing I say upsets you. I appreciate your responses immensely; you are quite clear and quite thoughtful, the only problem here is that what I am saying is quite far from the common approach and few people can even begin to comprehend what I am doing.

Well it's certainly true that I am diving headlong into epistemology with that assertion, just that it appears unavoidable to me.

It appears unavoidable to everyone; that is why no one ever attempts to avoid it.

Understanding something as a set is something we need to do in order to be able to discuss it (like you said) and also in order to understand it in our own mind. It seems like this is already more than an ontology, even when we don't define what the set might be.

What I believe you are doing is confusing the ontology of logic (something we need to communicate) with the subject of ontology itself. That is to say,

The ontology of mathematics is as intuitively (i.e.,from experience) generated as is any other field. What makes it “pure” is the fact that it is without contradiction (at least as best as the mathematicians can manage to achieve).

the speculative edifice constructed upon that limited and concise ontology provides us with the only dependable means of communication (dependable meaning we can be fairly confident that we both understand the relationships being expressed in a mathematical expression). Of course, there is a very serious disadvantage of using an exact language and that is the fact that only a small range of relationships can be expressed. Now that is a real problem; however, the value of clarity certainly supersedes that limitation.

I would like to point out that the "speculative edifices" associated with mathematics and logic are what one might call abstract constructs having utterly nothing to do with reality. Their value resides entirely in the issue of self consistency. Self consistency is a quality one desires in any explanation as it is the only guarantee that answers will not be a function of the particular path taken through analysis of a problem. Consistency is a quality required of an acceptable explanation. That is why mathematics and logic play such a big roll in the exact sciences.

The problem we are trying to deal with here is the fact that we must do our best to avoid the presumption that the "valid ontology" we wish to talk about is defined as that is the very source of Kant's complaint. That constraint does not disallow speculative edifices such as language or the ontological elements used to establish language, it merely makes it imperative that we be very careful in expressing the relationships connected to this "valid ontology" under examination. A point Rade cannot seem to comprehend.

It is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only inquire whether the foundations be sure.

We owe it to ourselves not to confuse the two issues.

That there is something (even just a single thing) with ontological/metaphysical identity even when there is no semantical mind defining it that way.

And it is exactly that set of "things" which is to be the subject of this discussion. The problem is that we need a method of referring to that set without defining it. This is why I refer to it as a set and give no further constraint.

I see you clarified that by "null set" you meant it'd be fair to call it a set even when it doesn't refer to anything at all (not even to a single thing). I am little bit confused about how the first assertion has got any meaning to it anymore (i.e. why make the assertion), but perhaps I'll understand it later.

It is possible that you missed the essence of the assertion (probably because you found little meaning in it). The assertion is simply that I can refer to reality (another name for this "valid ontology") as a set and nothing else is to be inferred.

We need to talk about semantical entities in order to discuss or understand anything at all. That, I reckon, is always invalid ontology. Yet it's all we can do :(

The only problem with that particular assertion I have is that "semantical entities" already requires presumption of an ontology. I think that you understand that in some subtle way, but I don't think you have entirely faced the problem.

I am assuming there is a reality out there without my subjective experience, ...

That reality is exactly what I am referring to as my "valid ontology" and your "subjective experience" is the intuitive speculative edifice you have constructed to explain that ontology. In the absence of a speculative edifice, that ontology is absolutely "undefined".

I keep failing to see how it's possible to think about anything at all without epistemological methods, but let's just advance to next step, maybe that'll clear things up.

Perhaps it will.

I read your reference to see what you had in mind and have only one comment to make:

So I am assuming conscious thoughts are caused by certain arrangement of physical stuff, and that for this reason I can never REALLY know how.

You may not know "how" but you could understand the limits rationally imposed upon your metal model by the simple issue of internal consistency. They are far more specific than imagined by most everyone.

But regardless of our particular views, let's get to the next step in your assertions about ontology?

I have already made all the assertions about that "valid ontology" which I had to make.

I am saying three very simple things: first, any ontology can be referred to as a set; second, an acceptable epistemology must be based on reality in some way and third, there are truths (valid ontological elements) of which we are ignorant.

The next step is to understand the problem of "explaining" that ontology in the absence of definition. In order to simplify the examination of the problem, I will first examine a somewhat simpler problem. But before I go into that problem, let me first point a very usefull abstract "tool".

There are some simple logical conclusions which may be deduced from those three assertions above. The first one is that any mental model (any solution to the problem of explaining that valid ontology) can not depend upon those "valid ontological elements" of which we are ignorant. Since a correct solution to the problem must include any collection of "valid ontological elements", the correct solution must include the existence of "valid ontological elements" of which we are ignorant. This means that the set of possible rational mental models must be a collection; each of which depends upon the particular subset of those "valid ontological elements" which underly the model. I will propose a method of handling this fundamental problem. Note that this proposition is not an assertion, it is no more than a mechanical method of handling this quite subtle circumstance. What one might call a "mental tool".

For the sake of analysis, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying any specific solution, "the past"[/color]. Likewise, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" omitted from that specific solution, "the future"[/color]. I give these sets these names because I happen to know what the logical consequences will be (it should be clear to everyone that such a categorization will allow the correct solution to accommodate differences in the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying a specific solution). Clearly the next significant definition is the difference between a given collection of "valid ontological elements" and a second collection of "valid ontological elements". I will call this set (the difference set) "the present"[/color].

Since "the present" consists of the difference between two specific collections of "valid ontological elements", "the past" (any collection of "valid ontological elements") can always be seen as a collection of "presents". I always thought it funny that, although the concept "gift" was not intended there, the idea that the past was a collection of presents (seen as gifts) seemed quite an appropriate relationship . But that's getting into other issues .

I will let the presentation pause this point because I think I need to know your reaction so that I can be sure the step is clearly understood before I go on. What you should begin to comprehend here is that what I am defining is tool of analysis which is valid even if reality (that valid ontology we are trying to think about) does not include the concept "time". It is no more than a mechanism designed to handle ignorance of the valid ontology. I might comment that this is, in fact, the answer to the issue questioned by this thread, "Is time just an illusion?": that is, there is utterly no need for time to be a valid ontological element (which, in a way, makes time little more than a valuable illusion); but proof of that fact will require some further work.

Think about it -- Dick

 

[baywax]

Is time just an illusion?

Three words answer the five word question.

Yes and no.

 

[Rade]

...My central purpose here is to make no assumptions -- Dick

The statement:

[My central purpose is to make no assumptions]​

Sure does sound like an "assumption" to me, sounds like a claim you are taking for granted as being a fact, (not to mention your "three simple things"--all assumptions you wish us to take for granted as facts). So I claim you have failed your central purpose if this is how you "start" your "undefined ontology"--eg., your argument starts with "an assumption" of "three simple things".

 

[sd01g]

Is time just an illusion?

Three words answer the five word question.

Yes and no.

I would agree with the 'no' part. Time is something that we experience. Things move and thus change. Each individual is constantly moving and changing in many different ways, including the cellular and molecular. There are multiple meanings of the word illusion but none of them apply to time.

 

[Rade]

...For the sake of analysis, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying any specific solution, "the past"[/color]. Likewise, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" omitted from that specific solution, "the future"[/color]. I give these sets these names because I happen to know what the logical consequences will be (it should be clear to everyone that such a categorization will allow the correct solution to accommodate differences in the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying a specific solution). Clearly the next significant definition is the difference between a given collection of "valid ontological elements" and a second collection of "valid ontological elements". I will call this set (the difference set) "the present"[/color]. Since "the present" consists of the difference between two specific collections of "valid ontological elements", "the past" (any collection of "valid ontological elements") can always be seen as a collection of "presents"...Think about it -- Dick

OK, you have me thinking.

So, let this set [A,B,C] be the set of valid ontological elements that underlay the specific solution [&], therefore the set [A,B,C] is called "the past".

then,

let [1,2,3] be the set of valid ontological elements that are omitted from [&], therefore the set [1,2,3] is called "the future"

thus,

the total of all possible valid ontological elements as relates to [&] is the set
[A,B,C,1,2,3]

now, you state,

...the difference between a given collection of "valid ontological elements" and a second collection of "valid ontological elements". I will call this set (the difference set) "the present"[/color].

clearly from above, the set [A,B,C,1,2,3] is a given collection of valid ontological elements.

now, let us find a second such collection, as the set [X,Y,C,7,8,9].

next you claim, that the difference between [A,B,C,1,2,3] and [X,Y,C,7,8,9]
is called "the present", and we see that while they are mostly different, they are not completely different, since they share the element [C], thus the set for "the present" is [A,B,X,Y,1,2,3,7,8,9].

Now, you claim that "the past", which is the set [A,B,C], ...can always be seen as a collection of "presents"...

But, clearly this is a false claim, because nowhere in the present set of [A,B,X,Y,1,2,3,7,8,9] do we find the past set [A,B,C], let alone "always".

Your model is thus falsified.

But I'm sure you will correct the error(s) of my thinking

 

[baywax]

I would agree with the 'no' part. Time is something that we experience. Things move and thus change. Each individual is constantly moving and changing in many different ways, including the cellular and molecular. There are multiple meanings of the word illusion but none of them apply to time.

There is the illusion that "time has slowed down" "time flies"
These phrases illustrate the illusions we have created out of the simple measurement system of time.

There are many illusions we have built around the measuring system of time. Another one is where we have arbitrarily decided that
"time is up" or "there's no time".

An illusion can be defined as a representation of an object or idea that is not the actual object or idea.

Time is a conceptual representation of change and motion.

An "inch" or a "foot" or a "meter" are specific to conceptual models that are not based on anything in nature other than our own conceptual way of partitioning the universe.

Measuring systems don't seem like an illusion to us because they are our tools we use to organize our environment and our experience of it.

The system only applies to humans and their way of thinking. To all other species, the measurment of change and motion and the measurement of distance and volume are all illusionary and have no relation to the actual universe. They are simply conceptual representations of reality.

 

[AnssiH]

Hi AnssiH, I hope that nothing I say upsets you.

It doesn't. But it may take me a while to reply sometimes, because there are days when I don't feel like thinking too hard :)

The problem we are trying to deal with here is the fact that we must do our best to avoid the presumption that the "valid ontology" we wish to talk about is defined as that is the very source of Kant's complaint. That constraint does not disallow speculative edifices such as language or the ontological elements used to establish language, it merely makes it imperative that we be very careful in expressing the relationships connected to this "valid ontology" under examination. A point Rade cannot seem to comprehend.

Well I'm very much struggling too.

The only problem with that particular assertion I have is that "semantical entities" already requires presumption of an ontology. I think that you understand that in some subtle way, but I don't think you have entirely faced the problem.

I'm painfully, painfully aware of the problem every day. :P (Except those days when I don't feel like thinking too hard :)

The next step is to understand the problem of "explaining" that ontology in the absence of definition. In order to simplify the examination of the problem, I will first examine a somewhat simpler problem. But before I go into that problem, let me first point a very usefull abstract "tool".

There are some simple logical conclusions which may be deduced from those three assertions above. The first one is that any mental model (any solution to the problem of explaining that valid ontology) can not depend upon those "valid ontological elements" of which we are ignorant. Since a correct solution to the problem must include any collection of "valid ontological elements", the correct solution must include the existence of "valid ontological elements" of which we are ignorant. This means that the set of possible rational mental models must be a collection; each of which depends upon the particular subset of those "valid ontological elements" which underly the model. I will propose a method of handling this fundamental problem.

Let me make sure I'm reading you right.

In other words are you saying that, when we try to understand a physical system, it is a case of building a mental model out of "assumed ontological elements" (concepts).

And that we are capable of building a number of rational (self-coherent) models because there are elements that are unknown to us. I.e. if these unknown elements were known, they would constrain our worldview into the "correct ontological view" (so to speak). But since they aren't known, the other elements are to an extent unconstrained too (which is why they are called assumed ontological elements), which is to say we can build many different models?

For the sake of analysis, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying any specific solution, "the past"[/color]. Likewise, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" omitted from that specific solution, "the future"[/color]. I give these sets these names because I happen to know what the logical consequences will be (it should be clear to everyone that such a categorization will allow the correct solution to accommodate differences in the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying a specific solution). Clearly the next significant definition is the difference between a given collection of "valid ontological elements" and a second collection of "valid ontological elements". I will call this set (the difference set) "the present"[/color].

I will let the presentation pause this point because I think I need to know your reaction so that I can be sure the step is clearly understood before I go on.

Well I'm starting to get lost more and more. You seem to be drawing a relationship to a subjective experience of time (or motion).

"I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying any specific solution, "the past"[/color]."

a "specific solution" is here the same as "a particular mental model"?

"Likewise, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" omitted from that specific solution, "the future"[/color]."

...and the "valid ontological elements omitted from that specific solution" are referring to elements that would yield a different mental model? Something that a person has not yet formed, but might in the future?

Like I said, I'm very much struggling to interpret you properly.

-Anssi

 

[mosassam]

Clearly the next significant definition is the difference between a given collection of "valid ontological elements" and a second collection of "valid ontological elements". I will call this set (the difference set) "the present"[/color].

Do both collections of "valid ontological elements" refer to the same specific solution (as for the 'past' and 'future')? If so, why is the second collection required? If not, what is the connection between them?

 

[Doctordick]

I am only answering Rade because I wish to make sure others aren't sucked into his obvious misdirection of attention.

Sure does sound like an "assumption" to me, sounds like a claim you are taking for granted as being a fact, (not to mention your "three simple things"--all assumptions you wish us to take for granted as facts).

They do not qualify as "assumptions" as none of them contain any information at all; they merely lay down the issues germane to the problem facing us.

Ontology can be referred to as a set as anything can be "referred to" as a set. As I explained to AnssiH, even nothing can be referred to as a set, namely the "Null" set. This step does nothing except pull in the vocabulary associated with the mathematical concept of sets.

The second, "an acceptable epistemology must be based on reality in some way", merely asserts my (and I hope any other rational person's) lack of interest in arguments based on invalid ontological concepts. Since the "valid ontology" I am talking about has not been defined, no ontological concept has been eliminated and nothing at all need be "taken for granted as facts".

And, finally, "there are truths (valid ontological elements) of which we are ignorant", corresponds very closely to the statement "all I know for sure is that I know nothing for sure". I would say that any violation of that statement would constitute an assumption but either that is over Mr. Rade's head or his intention is to purposely misinterpret things in order to create a mock battle. I don't believe he is stupid so I attribute his acts to the second purpose.

His second post is about as well thought out as his the one above. He first sets a possible set to be considered as an example:

So, let this set [A,B,C] be the set of valid ontological elements that underlay the specific solution [&], therefore the set [A,B,C] is called "the past".

I doubt any entity faced with a valid ontology (a past) consisting of but three elements would concern itself with the issue of epistemology at all; however, there are those who argue for solipsism as a rational basis for our experiences. Since solipsism is clearly based on the null set (no valid ontological elements at all), we could call Rade's example "semi-solipsism". If that were the case, then it could certainly be argued that the specific solution [&] could be essentially identical to the common world view held by Humanity (one could no more prove that wrong than one could prove solipsism is wrong). If such a view could be obtained from nothing, might it also not be obtained from three valid elements?

In that case, let us look at an entity whose past might consist of but three valid ontological elements [A,B,C]. Presuming [&] is our common world view, those three elements might well consist of A as an egg, B as a sperm and C as fertilization. So Rade's example could be thought of as "the past" as seen by a fertilized egg (the valid information upon which that egg would base [&]). So let's go on.

let [1,2,3] be the set of valid ontological elements that are omitted from [&], therefore the set [1,2,3] is called "the future"

The entire "valid ontology" underlying reality consists of but six elements? Well now, that certainly deserves the title "semi-solipsism" and, just as an aside, how does he happen to know that? I suppose Rade must be presuming he is God and is actually aware of the entire "valid ontology" underlying reality; in that case it would seem reasonable that one of those six elements is Rade himself (the all knowing God) and the rest of [&] whatever epistemological solution for reality that might be, is based mostly on self generated illusion. (Maybe some of you can see why I don't hold out a lot of interest in "solipsism".) But, let us go on anyway.

Certainly, in his example, "the total of all possible valid ontological elements as relates to [&] is the set [A,B,C,1,2,3]"; but then he says:

... let us find a second such collection, as the set [X,Y,C,7,8,9].

Where in the world is he going to find that set? He has already specified that "all of reality" (the valid ontological elements known plus the valid ontological elements not known being the total collection of valid ontological elements) consists of nothing but [A,B,C,1,2,3]. Certainly [X,Y,C,7,8,9] is either not a collection of valid elements or he has merely given different names to the elements of the valid ontology under discussion.

Now, you claim that "the past", which is the set [A,B,C], ...can always be seen as a collection of "presents"...

Yes, I certainly did and, in Mr. Rade's example (since the future is known), the entire set of possible "pasts", "future" and "presents" can be explicitly listed. (Note that any member of this collection could be considered to be a possible "past", "future" or present; which role it plays is a function of [&] your epistemological explanation.)

The entire collection of possibilities consist of the following:
No elements -- [NULL],
One element -- [A], , [C], [1], [2], [3],
Two elements -- [A,B], [A,C], [A,1], [A,2], [A,3], [B,C], [B,1], [B,2]. [B,3], [C,1], [C,2], [C,3], [1,2], [1,3], [2,3],
Three elements -- [A,B,C], [A,B,1], [A,B,2], [A,B,3], [A,C,1], [A,C,2], [A,C,3], [A,1,2], [A,1,3], [A,2,3], [B,1,2], [B,1,3], [B,2,3], [C,1,2], [C,1,3], [C,2,3], [1,2,3],
Four elements -- [A,B,C,1], [A,B,C,2], [A,B,C,3], [A,B,1,2], [A,B,1,3], [A,B,2,3], [A,C,1,2], [A,C,1,3], [A,C,2,3], [B,C,1,2], [B,C,1,3], [B,C,2,3], [A,1,2,3], [B,1,2,3], [B,1,2,3], [C, 1,2,3]
Five elements – [A,B,C,1,2], [A,B,C,1,3], [A,B,C,2,3], [A,B,1,2,3], [A,C,1,2,3], [B,C,1,2,3]
Six elements – [A,B,C,1,2,3]

That collection can be seen as the entire collection of possibilities for a possible past given Rade's proposed six element valid ontology. Given anyone of those pasts, the future is represented by a specific member of the collection (the member which completes the set [A,B,C,1,2,3]). The present is defined to be the difference between two possible pasts. Now, if your explanation of reality ([&], your epistemological construct) is going to allow knowledge of reality to vanish (i.e., to proceed from a past which contains an element of that valid ontology to one which lacks that particular element, which one could call a "reality of forgetfulness") then the present could consist of any selection from the above collection (you could move from one past to another without constraint). I guess one could call that "time travel".

However, our explanations of reality (our epistemological constructs) generally do not allow for valid knowledge of the past to vanish as including such a concept kind of defeats the usefulness of the explanation. Thus it is that our explanations of reality usually allow only addition of valid ontological elements not subtraction. That constraint (and please note that the constraint is a self imposed constraint on the acceptability of an explanation and not a constraint on reality) forces one to consider only a limited set of ordered "presents" and any specific "past" can be seen as a collection of presents occurring in some specific sequence.

But I'm sure you will correct the error(s) of my thinking

Actually, I don't think that is possible; I make these comments for others who you might confuse. To paraphrase another, "when people are confronted with new information, their most probable reaction will be to deny that information as to do otherwise requires them to review their beliefs".

... may take me a while to reply sometimes, because there are days when I don't feel like thinking too hard :)

To paraphrase Kant, I think you are trying very hard to construct some speculative edifice (which makes what I am saying make sense in your world view) without first building a foundation. At this point, I am saying some very simple things and I suspect that you can't comprehend anything of value arising from such simple ideas. As a consequence, you are trying to conceive of implications which will make these foundations profound. The foundations I am laying are not profound at all; they are no more than rather obvious conditions on the problem we want to solve. Conditions people never consider seriously because they see nothing of value coming from them; they thus regard a close examination of such things as a total waste of time. I think you are being drawn by these same forces.

To restate the issues succinctly, we are trying to build a solid foundation upon which we can construct solid and dependable speculative edifices. That foundation is called a "valid ontology" (reality). Of interest is exactly what conclusions can be drawn from a valid ontology (reality) given that the ontology is both unknown and undefined (remember, it is our speculative edifices which presume definitions for these ontological elements). Confusing? Perhaps, but it is really no more than a clear statement of the problem facing any entity trying to understanding reality.

In other words are you saying that, when we try to understand a physical system, it is a case of building a mental model out of "assumed ontological elements" (concepts).

When we try to understand anything[/color], it is a case of conceiving of a world view built out of "assumed ontological elements"[/color] (i.e., ideas which are presumed true). The reason I restated your comment is that the issue is much more general than implied by the content of your statement as written.

And that we are capable of building a number of rational (self-coherent) models because there are elements that are unknown to us. I.e. if these unknown elements were known, they would constrain our worldview into the "correct ontological view" (so to speak). But since they aren't known, the other elements are to an extent unconstrained too (which is why they are called assumed ontological elements), which is to say we can build many different models?

That would be a very accurate assessment of the situation.

Well I'm starting to get lost more and more. You seem to be drawing a relationship to a subjective experience of time (or motion).

Again, I think you are trying very hard to construct some speculative edifice which makes what I am saying make sense in your world view. There is a very strong compulsion amongst human thinkers to construct speculative edifices in order to define a specific ontology. I think they want that so that they can use their intuition to provide them with solutions. (Another issue I tried to communicate a long time ago; and failed.) I am hoping that my response to Rade's confused presentation will make this issue a little clearer.

... and the "valid ontological elements omitted from that specific solution" are referring to elements that would yield a different mental model? Something that a person has not yet formed, but might in the future?

Maybe, maybe not! The issue here is that the future, in my definition, constitutes aspects of reality (valid ontological elements) of which he is ignorant. I am only saying one thing: being ignorant of them, he cannot build a speculative edifice based upon them. But that does not mean that his speculative edifice is "incorrect" (i.e., contains a demonstrable flaw). It could be that he just happened to make a good guess: i.e., his speculative edifice just might be built on a foundation containing a valid ontological element which were not represented in his past. What is important here, and I will get to it in detail later, is that it is impossible to differentiate between valid and invalid ontological elements so long as no flaw can be found in the speculative edifice. You should understand that, if it were possible to determine the difference, one could prove solipsism invalid. But this is an issue down the line from where we are now and I wouldn't worry about it if I were you. Just take my statements at face value; I will get to the issue after I solve the simple problem I will present when I am pretty sure you understand what I have said to date.

Like I said, I'm very much struggling to interpret you properly.

Again, I think you are trying to find the consequences of what I have said. All I want is for you to accept the steps themselves; I will show you the consequences as I build upon them.

Do both collections of "valid ontological elements" refer to the same specific solution (as for the 'past' and 'future')? If so, why is the second collection required? If not, what is the connection between them?

I think you are viewing ontology as something defined by the "solution" (some speculative edifice) and not as an issue unto itself. The "valid ontological elements" do not refer to anything; they are what really exists and provide the foundation for any possible specific solution. To repeat myself, I have defined reality to be a valid ontology (the entirety of what exists is the entirety of what exists). I have simply divided that valid ontological set into two parts which I have decided to call "the past" and "the future". The future is defined to be the portion of that valid ontology of which we are ignorant. That's the whole of it and there is no more.

looking to hear from you -- Dick

 

[sd01g]

There is the illusion that "time has slowed down" "time flies"
These phrases illustrate the illusions we have created out of the simple measurement system of time.

There are many illusions we have built around the measuring system of time. Another one is where we have arbitrarily decided that
"time is up" or "there's no time".

An illusion can be defined as a representation of an object or idea that is not the actual object or idea.

Time is a conceptual representation of change and motion.

An "inch" or a "foot" or a "meter" are specific to conceptual models that are not based on anything in nature other than our own conceptual way of partitioning the universe.

Measuring systems don't seem like an illusion to us because they are our tools we use to organize our environment and our experience of it.

The system only applies to humans and their way of thinking. To all other species, the measurment of change and motion and the measurement of distance and volume are all illusionary and have no relation to the actual universe. They are simply conceptual representations of reality.

I agree that we experience time at different rates according to our conscious state. In deep sleep, time seems to stop. Depending on our brain chemistry balance and synaptic activity, we experience time at different rates-sometimes fast, sometimes slow, sometimes stopped.

To describe the experience of time at different rates as an 'illusion', instead of trying to understand brain activity, is not accurate or enlightening.

 

[baywax]

To describe the experience of time at different rates as an 'illusion', instead of trying to understand brain activity, is not accurate or enlightening.

I can agree that studying brain activity as one of the sources of illusion makes sense.

Trying to find a congruent experience and understanding of time that is shared in more than one set of brain activities would be like trying to find a common pattern of CO2 activity in two separate glasses of pop. The commonalities would be restricted to how "the bubbles go up and down and burst on occasion".

 

[I_AM]

I can no longer see time. All I recognize is the morphing and changing of energies/masses/matters. This concept of time we have is slowly deteriorating from my mind. There is no time, all things are just constantly changing? Nothing ever really leaves us... and nothing is ever really born new in terms of energy. So all that we have is all that we have and it never goes anywhere except for changing into differenent physical, dimensional, and material states? So everything is not really passing... only changing. Time will never leave us, we must learn to leave time.

you summed it up well as time = change or the marking of, nothing more :)

"All I recognize is the morphing and changing of energies/masses/matters."

" Nothing ever really leaves us... and nothing is ever really born new in terms of energy. So all that we have is all that we have and it never goes anywhere except for changing into differenent physical, dimensional, and material states? So everything is not really passing... only changing."

 

[Rade]

.. The "valid ontological elements" do not refer to anything; they are what really exists and provide the foundation for any possible specific solution...

Here then, with this statement, we see how the philosophy being presented by Docterdick is based on contradiction. How ? In a previous post where he discussed my example of a past set with valid ontological elements [A,B,C], Doctordick made this claim:

In that case, let us look at an entity whose past might consist of but three valid ontological elements [A,B,C]. Presuming [&] is our common world view, those three elements might well consist of A as an egg, B as a sperm and C as fertilization. So Rade's example could be thought of as "the past" as seen by a fertilized egg (the valid information upon which that egg would base [&])...

But now, in discussion with AnssiH, we have Doctordick saying that "valid ontological elements do not refer to anything" . But how can this be , since in the exact same post he informs that the "valid ontological element" A refers to an egg, B refers to a sperm--thus A & B refer to THINGS ! (ps, he does state that C refers to a "process", what he calls fertilization, thus C is not referring to any "thing", nor is C a "thing that really exists").

...I have defined reality to be a valid ontology...

OK, now we are getting somewhere--"reality" is defined by Doctordick as a valid "study of being" (= ontology--note the "ology" in the word = "study of"). So, the philosophy of Doctordick is that, priori to the existence of an entity that could carry out the operation of "ology", there was (by his definition) no reality, which is nothing more than the position of logical positivism.

...(the entirety of what exists is the entirety of what exists)...

Bravo. Finally it is "explained" that the "Philosophy of Doctordick" derives from one of the fundamental axioms of logic--the Law of Identity-- A = A; let A = "the entirety of what exists". So, here I agree with Doctordick, any "valid philosophy" must have the Law of Identity as a fundamental assumption--what is called an axoim. But, note that before Doctordick can say [A] = [A], FIRST MUST BE [A] AS EXISTENCE ITSELF, thus, the fundamental axiom of ALL VALID ONTOLOGY is the axoim "Existence Exists" -- this is what is "undefined", the axiom [existence exists] is undefined, not the "ontology" or "study of" [the entirety of what exists]. And here we have one of many reasons why I do not agree with this approach to the development of a philosophy based on the axiom of "undefined ontology", it is "existence" itself that must be "undefined", not the "study of existence", where "being = existence".

...I have simply divided that valid ontological set into two parts which I have decided to call "the past" and "the future". The future is defined to be the portion of that valid ontology of which we are ignorant. That's the whole of it and there is no more...

Here we read yet another contradiction in the philosophy being presented, for he has made it clear in previous posts that this is not "the whole of it"--for the "whole of time" must not only include the past and future, but also the "present". Now, let me make a prediction, I predict Doctordick will contradict himself in any attempt to respond to this comment, and he will attempt to claim that within his "valid ontological set" are not only two parts (past and future), but will build yet another layer of contradiction to add "the present" as a "mathematical operation" to his "valid ontological set", even after we are informed that past and future is "the whole of it". I claim that the discourse of Doctordick on the past, future, and present elements of time is a long drawn out argument based on one contradiction after another after another, etc., derived from the false axiom of the "undefined ontology".

 

[AnssiH]

I doubt any entity faced with a valid ontology (a past) consisting of but three elements would concern itself with the issue of epistemology at all; however, there are those who argue for solipsism as a rational basis for our experiences. Since solipsism is clearly based on the null set (no valid ontological elements at all), we could call Rade's example "semi-solipsism".

Just a side-note, wouldn't we say that solipsism is based on one thing, the self?

To paraphrase Kant, I think you are trying very hard to construct some speculative edifice (which makes what I am saying make sense in your world view) without first building a foundation. At this point, I am saying some very simple things and I suspect that you can't comprehend anything of value arising from such simple ideas. As a consequence, you are trying to conceive of implications which will make these foundations profound. The foundations I am laying are not profound at all; they are no more than rather obvious conditions on the problem we want to solve. Conditions people never consider seriously because they see nothing of value coming from them; they thus regard a close examination of such things as a total waste of time. I think you are being drawn by these same forces.

That is probably true.

In other words are you saying that, when we try to understand a physical system, it is a case of building a mental model out of "assumed ontological elements" (concepts).

When we try to understand anything, it is a case of conceiving of a world view built out of "assumed ontological elements" (i.e., ideas which are presumed true). The reason I restated your comment is that the issue is much more general than implied by the content of your statement as written.

Yes of course. I've been known to reduce everything into a "physical system" in my (materialistic) semantical mind ;) I know what you are saying though.

Again, I think you are trying very hard to construct some speculative edifice which makes what I am saying make sense in your world view.

Well yes, I'm trying my hardest to figure out why you call them "past" and "future". Maybe it'll get clearer soon.

Just take my statements at face value; I will get to the issue after I solve the simple problem I will present when I am pretty sure you understand what I have said to date.

Ok, let's hear how this continues.

 

[AnssiH]

But now, in discussion with AnssiH, we have Doctordick saying that "valid ontological elements do not refer to anything" . But how can this be , since in the exact same post he informs that the "valid ontological element" A refers to an egg, B refers to a sperm--thus A & B refer to THINGS !

He said he isn't referring to any specific ontological elements when he talks about a set. He is only referring to a framework that could refer to specific element(s) (just that we don't know what those elements are... ...or if there even are things that can be referred to, which is my main confusion right now)

And then he talked about your example separately, as in "what if the set were referring to a specific set of egg, fertilization, etc..."

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Just a side-note, wouldn't we say that solipsism is based on one thing, the self?

Why not presume that too could be an illusion: i.e., prove you exist! Seriously, I spend little time worrying about solipsism no matter how it is defined as I find the entire concept to be problematical (it provides little if any guidance on what to expect; that is to say, it explains nothing).

Well yes, I'm trying my hardest to figure out why you call them "past" and "future". Maybe it'll get clearer soon.

The most serious reason I define past and future that way is that the definition makes it quite clear that the "future" is a totally open subject. That is to say, anything you manage to explain resides in the past. That you can make any predictions about the future at all is a presumption and the one thing I want to avoid is making any presumptions (presumptions might preclude discovering the correct solution).

Speaking of "explaining things", you might try a quick read of "Commonalities of intelligence in the cosmos". On page 2, post number 23, I define exactly what I mean by "an explanation".

I define "An explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information.

If you are confused by that definition, note the following: "given known information" can be absolutely anything you wish it to be (whatever it is you are explaining); your "expectations" consist of what you expect (as guided and defined by that explanation).

I have laid out the situation as follows:

I am saying three very simple things: first, any ontology can be referred to as a set; second, an acceptable epistemology must be based on reality in some way (i.e., it is reasonable to presume there are aspects of that valid ontology in our beliefs) and third, there are truths (valid ontological elements) of which we are ignorant.

For the sake of analysis, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" underlying any specific solution, "the past"[/color]. Likewise, I will call the collection of "valid ontological elements" omitted from that specific solution, "the future"[/color].

Any specific "past" can be seen as a collection of presents occurring in some specific sequence. Thus it is that "time", in this presentation, is nothing more than a list of the "presents" going to make up the totality of the past upon which your explanation is based. That makes "time" a very personal thing having everything to do with your personal experiences and absolutely nothing to do with that "valid ontology" (which constitutes my definition of reality). As I said, time, as thus defined, is a tool which is valuable for analysis when the valid ontological elements of which we are ignorant are not fixed (one could say: when one overtly recognizes the existence of any possible future).

When we try to understand anything, it is a case of conceiving of a world view built out of "assumed ontological elements" (i.e., ideas which are presumed true). For the sake of argument and explanation of my attack, I will first consider a much simplified problem. Let us examine the mechanical problem of obtaining specific expectations from given known information when that known information (that past) consists of nothing except valid ontological elements. That is to say, there are no illusions and the valid ontological elements in each and every "present" going to make up the past upon which our solution is built are known.

When I say those valid ontological elements are known, I am of course presuming an epistemological solution (some speculative edifice built upon those ontological elements) which, if known, would include definition of those elements. In order to actually solve the problem, I would have to know that epistemological solution; however, I am not interested in solving the problem, I am interested in the procedure necessary to solve the problem, another matter entirely.

The first step in solving such a problem would be to lay the problem out in detail. In order to accomplish such a feat, one would need a label for each and every valid ontological element going to make up every "present" in that personal list of "presents" which make up the "past" on which the given epistemological solution was based. What needs to be reccognized here is that the problem does not actually require knowing the definitions of the labels; all that is actually required is that the labeling itself can be performed.

Consider that statement of the "simplified problem", and let me know if you find any part of it unclear.

Looking forward to hearing from you again -- Dick

 

[mosassam]

Still having problems with the "present". I can see that;
Anything known = the past
Anything unknown = the future
But when you say:

Any specific "past" can be seen as a collection of presents occurring in some specific sequence

.

Does this mean that "Any specific "past" can be seen as a collection of 'specific elements of the known' occurring in some specific sequence"?
In other words, the "present" = a specific element of the "past".
I am aware that your emphasis lies with the procedure "to obtain expectations" and not with any specific solution.
Previously you have stated:
"Clearly the next significant definition is the difference between a given collection of "valid ontological elements" and a second collection of "valid ontological elements". I will call this set (the difference set) 'the present'."
I am still a bit baffled about the arrival of the second collection.

 

[Doctordick]

In other words, the "present" = a specific element of the "past".

You sort of have the emphasis on the wrong issue. I am saying that the past of interest can be seen as built from a collection of "presents" (changes in the past which have been accumulated).

I introduced a concept (which I choose to call "time", because of where it leads me; which you will have to wait to see) which allows me to include the fact that, whatever it is that an explanation explains, explanations are based on less than full knowledge of the entire "valid ontological set". Not only that, but different explanations are often based on different knowledge. Any logical analysis of the problem of setting up "speculative edifices" based on different collections of knowledge must include a mechanism for handling such changes. I am simply defining any change in the valid ontology underlying the analyzers "speculative edifices" to be the present.

Surely you see the obvious connection to your personal world view: the past is continually changing as you proceed into the future (information which was once part of your unknown future becomes part of your past), that change is what you have chosen to call the present (to quote someone on this thread, "everything happens in the present"). The only difference between your perspective and the one that I am defining is that your's makes an assumption of a unique and continuous process. I do not make that assumption; under my definition, your awareness proceeds from one given past to another without constraint beyond the presumption that your knowledge of reality (that valid ontology) increases only. Actually, I'll get back to that issue later, when I will point out some of the consequences of relaxing that constraint.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

... That you can make any predictions about the future at all is a presumption and the one thing I want to avoid is making any presumptions (presumptions might preclude discovering the correct solution).

No, when one claims to make a scientific "prediction" one says nothing more or less that their exists a constraint. So, if as you claim a prediction is a presumption, and "all you want to avoid is making any presumption", then what you claim to do is not science.

...Any specific "past" can be seen as a collection of presents occurring in some specific sequence...

. Yes, and it is the "specific sequence" of these events that is a form of constraint and thus what allows for "prediction".

...Thus it is that "time", in this presentation, is nothing more than a list of the "presents" going to make up the totality of the past upon which your explanation is based.

I think "time" would find it strange indeed that it must wait for you (or any human) to put together a list before it could exist.

That makes "time" a very personal thing having everything to do with your personal experiences and absolutely nothing to do with that "valid ontology"...

Well, here we have it in a nutshell, a rehash of worn out logical positivism--as if there was no "time" in the universe before the personal experience of Doctordick.

...As I said, time, as thus defined, is a tool which is valuable for analysis when the valid ontological elements of which we are ignorant are not fixed...

Yes, exactly--exactly why what you present has no value at all, for the simple reason that "valid ontological elements" (REALITY) is fixed.

 

[Rade]

He said he isn't referring to any specific ontological elements when he talks about a set. He is only referring to a framework that could refer to specific element(s) (just that we don't know what those elements are... ...or if there even are things that can be referred to, which is my main confusion right now)...

Thank you for your reply. As I see it, not only do we have your "main confusion", (eg, can Doctordick begin with an "undefined philosophy" from a framework without "things"), but also this confusion of mine--is not the concept of a "framework" itself an "ontological element" of a more general concept known as "mathematics" ? Just two of many confused notions being put forward by Doctordick as the axioms of a new philosophy.

 

[Rade]

...The only difference between your perspective and the one that I am defining is that your's makes an assumption of a unique and continuous process. I do not make that assumption; under my definition, your awareness proceeds from one given past to another without constraint beyond the presumption that your knowledge of reality (that valid ontology) increases only...

OK, so here we have the fundamental "assumption" of the philosophy being presented by Doctordick--it is the "assumption" of a "non-unique and dis-continuous process". Which is fine with me, as long as it is clear to all that then the philosophy being presented by Doctordick DOES begin with "an assumption"--which is the negation of what has been claimed in previous posts, and the reason I have stated all along that this philosophy derives from a logical contradiction--it claims no use of "assumption" when in fact one clearly exists.

 

[mosassam]

Dear Doctordick, is the life you share with your wife/lover/children/relatives/friends etc. an assumption?

 

[Rade]

... I am saying that the past of interest can be seen as built from a collection of "presents" (changes in the past which have been accumulated)...

But this is just plain false. Consider the TV remote control I now hold. The functionality of its program guide can be viewed as being a valid ontological metaphor of the concept "time", a type of "tinder-box". And what a capital tinder-box it is, for when I strike it once in the negative direction (the past) out comes the TV show about the dog that sat upon the chest of copper money, and when I strike it a second time in the positive direction (the present) out comes the TV show about the dog who had the chest of silver, and when I strike it a third time in the positive direction (the future) then appears the TV show of the dog who had the chest of gold. Your philosophy of the past of interest (say my interest in TV shows) being "built from a collection of presents" is thus falsified.

 

[AnssiH]

Why not presume that too could be an illusion: i.e., prove you exist! Seriously, I spend little time worrying about solipsism no matter how it is defined as I find the entire concept to be problematical (it provides little if any guidance on what to expect; that is to say, it explains nothing).

It just struck me a bit odd when you said solipsism is a case of "nothing existing" since the subjective experience exists. Call it an illusion or add any other kind of spin on it whatsoever, but at least one thing always exists in it, which is the experience (or whatever causing the experience) the person is having.

Perhaps it's a bit irrelevant to this discussion, but I wonder if you agree that in your framework too we would say that at least one ontological element exists in solipsistic view. Because if you don't agree, then perhaps I have understood something wrong about your philosophy.

The most serious reason I define past and future that way is that the definition makes it quite clear that the "future" is a totally open subject. That is to say, anything you manage to explain resides in the past. That you can make any predictions about the future at all is a presumption and the one thing I want to avoid is making any presumptions (presumptions might preclude discovering the correct solution).

Ok yeah. I guess you don't assume this view is the ontologically correct view of "time/motion" though? I.e. that the ontological nature of time is still somewhat shrouded behind some elements we are ignorant of.

Speaking of "explaining things", you might try a quick read of "Commonalities of intelligence in the cosmos". On page 2, post number 23, I define exactly what I mean by "an explanation".

Yeah that's a reasonable/useful definition.

That makes "time" a very personal thing having everything to do with your personal experiences and absolutely nothing to do with that "valid ontology" (which constitutes my definition of reality). As I said, time, as thus defined, is a tool which is valuable for analysis when the valid ontological elements of which we are ignorant are not fixed (one could say: when one overtly recognizes the existence of any possible future).

Yeah so it's not an attempt to pin down the ontological nature of time? This seems to be one source of confusion, it is easy to take your description as an assertion about the true nature of time... (reading the other posts, looks like many people already did...)

When we try to understand anything, it is a case of conceiving of a world view built out of "assumed ontological elements" (i.e., ideas which are presumed true). For the sake of argument and explanation of my attack, I will first consider a much simplified problem. Let us examine the mechanical problem of obtaining specific expectations from given known information when that known information (that past) consists of nothing except valid ontological elements. That is to say, there are no illusions and the valid ontological elements in each and every "present" going to make up the past upon which our solution is built are known.

When I say those valid ontological elements are known, I am of course presuming an epistemological solution (some speculative edifice built upon those ontological elements) which, if known, would include definition of those elements. In order to actually solve the problem, I would have to know that epistemological solution; however, I am not interested in solving the problem, I am interested in the procedure necessary to solve the problem, another matter entirely.

The first step in solving such a problem would be to lay the problem out in detail. In order to accomplish such a feat, one would need a label for each and every valid ontological element going to make up every "present" in that personal list of "presents" which make up the "past" on which the given epistemological solution was based. What needs to be reccognized here is that the problem does not actually require knowing the definitions of the labels; all that is actually required is that the labeling itself can be performed.

Consider that statement of the "simplified problem", and let me know if you find any part of it unclear.

Well it seems pretty clear but I have a feeling I could be interpreting some things little bit wrong. I'm trying not to jump ahead and start guessing how do you label ontological elements without defining anything. Let's see it.

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

No, when one claims to make a scientific "prediction" one says nothing more or less that their exists a constraint. So, if as you claim a prediction is a presumption, and "all you want to avoid is making any presumption", then what you claim to do is not science.

Well if I'm allowed to butt in a bit, and I cannot stress this enough; ontology is different matter than science. They are related to a great extent, but it is absolutely imperative to understand clearly where they part. That is to say, scientific models are not reality itself, they are models. Anyone abiding to scientific philosophy needs to understand this. Far better than it is generally understood.

I'll let Thomas Kuhn explain it more:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Kuhn
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Structure_of_Scientific_Revolutions

There are more recent authors reminding us of the same distinction. Like, say, Andrew Pickering. ("Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle Physics")

Thank you for your reply. As I see it, not only do we have your "main confusion", (eg, can Doctordick begin with an "undefined philosophy" from a framework without "things"), but also this confusion of mine--is not the concept of a "framework" itself an "ontological element" of a more general concept known as "mathematics" ?

Well I think our confusions are basically the same. I.e. I am wondering if even the minimal framework - which exist because without it there could be no discussion/thoughts about ontology at all - is already such that it precludes correct ontology. (Although of course we need to understand "valid" as different than "correct"... this is in fact the same difference as there exists between ontology and scientific models; model can be valid but not true. It's a muddy field we are walking on :)

I was explaining this concern in post #269 in more detail.

But then let's see how far we can get with this minimal framework, you know...

-Anssi

 

[Paul Martin]

I am not interested in solving the problem, I am interested in the procedure necessary to solve the problem, another matter entirely.

I think this needs to be emphasized because I think it is a common stumbling block for people trying to understand Dick's work. Maybe a simple analogy will help.

Suppose one were interested in solving a particular problem whose solution is a solution to a quadratic equation. To solve that particular problem, one would have to know the coefficients of the particular equation. It would also be helpful to know the quadratic formula.

But if, on the other hand, one were not interested at all in solving any particular quadratic equation, but instead were interested in deriving the quadratic formula, then knowing any particular coefficients would be irrelevant and completely useless. The quadratic formula can be derived without such knowledge. And, armed with the quadratic formula, one can solve many quadratic equations if only the specific coefficients are known.

Similarly, Dick has developed a general method of solving the problem of producing expectations from any set of information, without any need to be specific about, or to know, any of that information.

For the sake of argument and explanation of my attack, I will first consider a much simplified problem. Let us examine the mechanical problem of obtaining specific expectations from given known information when that known information (that past) consists of nothing except valid ontological elements.

So the problem Dick is attacking is the problem of producing some "mechanical" process, like that of plugging coefficients into the quadratic formula and calculating the solutions, which will produce expectations from known information.

Now, here's a question for you, Dick. What exactly constitutes "known information"? Known by whom? Shannon has given us a definition for 'information' which is essentially an ordered set of bits which presumably represents something. As I see it, the representation part of it must be defined prior to the gathering and ordering of the bits. Of course, the "representation" may not be strictly necessary for the existence of information. For example, physical entities beyond the ken of any intelligent being are considered to carry information in physical theory as far as I know. The instruments on the Voyager spacecraft might very well have captured some information and stored it in ordered bit patterns on board after the radio lost its ability to transmit that information back to Earth. I would think those stored bit patterns would still be considered "information". The bit patterns were arranged according to a pre-planned representation scheme even though they have not been known by any intelligence to date.

But you specifically referred to "known information". So it seems that you require a "knower" and a process or state of "knowing". That requirement seems to be an assumption in your work that you overlook. It seems that we must assume some kind of "knower" in order to have "known information". No?

The first step in solving such a problem would be to lay the problem out in detail. In order to accomplish such a feat, one would need a label for each and every valid ontological element going to make up every "present" in that personal list of "presents" which make up the "past" on which the given epistemological solution was based.

Let's take that a little slower. Let's examine just exactly what is required for that first step.

You say, "In order to accomplish such a feat, one would need ..." One? Who is this One? It seems to me that a requirement that you overlook is some intelligent or conscious agent (One) who is, or will be, instrumental in going about solving the problem, not to mention being interested in the problem in the first place.

From what you have said before, I think you would say that you, or I, or some reader of your work, is the "one" who is the agent that will "operate" the mechanism your work spells out. This seems to me to be a huge complex assumption, that is if you consider you, or me, or others to be these complex material bodies-with-brains existing in some kind of physical world "out there".

I agree that if you posit such a "One", then your development is without error -- at least any error that I could detect. But I think you should acknowledge that such a "One", who is in a position to "know" information, is a necessary assumption behind your work. No?

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[raolduke]

Its to bad time is money, because we are all going god-damned broke.

 

[Rade]

Well if I'm allowed to butt in a bit, and I cannot stress this enough; ontology is different matter than science. They are related to a great extent, but it is absolutely imperative to understand clearly where they part. That is to say, scientific models are not reality itself, they are models. Anyone abiding to scientific philosophy needs to understand this. Far better than it is generally understood...

But when someone (as did Doctordick) claims...that you can make any predictions about the future at all is a presumption...taken at face value I find this to be a false statement, since the process of Science is all about making predictions, it is the essence of the "hypothesis"--where one makes an educated prediction (in the present) of the future based on "uncertain knowledge" of the past. Now, the prediction (the hypothesis) may in fact be that "no prediction of the future can be made"--but, you see, this is not the same as saying "no prediction (eg, hypothesis) can be made"--which I take to be the false statement of Doctordick.

Now, it seems to me that there are only two types of "knowledge" (1) certain knowledge, and (2) uncertain knowledge. I hold that Science = process of gaining uncertain future knowledge of the metaphysical. Thus as you say, Science is "not reality itself", Science is the process of gaining uncertain knowledge of the metaphysical given (= reality). If one wishes to gain certain knowledge of the metaphysical it is not by Science that such knowledge will be obtained. Clearly the process of ontology (= study of existence) differs from the process of science (= gaining uncertain knowledge of existence).