DrChinese said:
I think it is better than the Wiki article on the subject, which has been in severe need of attention for a long time.
Well that's a relief. Some of us actually tried for a while to clean up the wikipedia pages about Bell's theorem, dBB, etc., and it was just too frustrating to deal with established editors who don't understand the issues but who have the power to revert changes, etc. So we jumped instead at the chance to create a better alternative to the wikipedia pages. Hopefully it will become widely known as such.
In some ways even your early conclusion that "our world is non-local" is not too bad. Aspect prefers "non-separable". I personally prefer the term "quantum non-local" because there are time-symmetric models (Relational Blockworld for example) that yield the appearance of non-locality but still respect light cones in your sense that "...goings-on in one region of spacetime should not affect — should not influence — happenings in space-like separated regions."
Bell simply defines "nonlocality" as: any causal influence on an event that comes from outside the past light cone. An influence coming from the future light cone hence counts as "non-local" and is in no way a counterexample to the theorem. Some people (maybe because they think it is easier to reconcile with fundamental relativity) would prefer to respond to Bell's theorem by having slower-than-light-but-backwards-in-time influences. Some people (maybe because they think the idea of a "backwards-in-time influence" doesn't make any sense) prefer to have direct influences between spacelike separated events. And maybe there are other possibilities too, that combine these or don't fit nicely into either option. But what all these have in common is that they violate "locality" as defined by Bell. That's the theorem.
Incidentally, it's not really true that a time-symmetric model avoids causal influences between spacelike-separated events. You will still have such influences in such a model -- they just won't be "direct". For example, you can zig-zag from A to (spacelike separated) B by going forward in time at the speed of light, then backward in time at the speed of light. (One of the problems faced by advocates of such models is to give some kind of coherent definition of "direct" so that we'd have a basis for worrying less about such zig-zag influences than we would about "direct" influences from A to B.)
On the other hand, there is a pretty fair amount of the latter material that is not generally accepted.
I'm not sure what you mean. You mean there is stuff in the article that is "not generally accepted"? That's certainly true, but that's what happens when you write an accurate article about a subject that most people are confused about!
I would say that controversy regarding the term "realism" is reserved for those with a more philosophical bent (and I might be one of those). I would definitely say that the vast majority of published articles dismiss the idea that particle observables have well-defined values at all times. You may consider that an imprecise definition of realism, but nonetheless I would say it is the most common.
Yes, that definition of "realism" is somewhat imprecise -- for example, do you mean that *all* observables have a definite value at all times? If so, then, e.g., dBB is not a "realist" theory. (That should strike you as absurd!) Or if it means that *some* observables have a definite value all the time, then dBB is realist (and, e.g., ordinary QM isn't). Or if it means that some observables have a definite value some of the time, then even ordinary QM is realist. So you should be more precise.
But the real point, vis a vis Bell's theorem, is that this doesn't matter at all, because "realism" is not at all an *assumption* of the theorem. To the (very limited) extent to which it plays a role at all, it is *inferred*, from locality and the perfect correlations (predicted by QM). That is, in the usual EPR-Bell setup (measuring spin along 3 possible directions on each side on a pair of spin 1/2 particles in the singlet spin state) it follows from locality that each particle must carry pre-scripted "answers" to the three possible measurements/"questions". So if you want to call that "realism", then the theorem has the following logical structure:
(a) locality + perfect correlations --> "realism"
(b) "realism" --> Bell's inequality
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(conclusion) locality + perfect correlations --> Bell's inequality
Since, experimentally, "perfect correlations" is true and "Bell's inequality" is false, it follows that locality is false.
See how "realism" only comes up as an intermediate term in the logic, about which (therefore) nothing at all follows? Note in particular that denying the truth of "realism" in no way allows you to avoid the conclusion that locality is false.