The Time Symmetry Debate in Quantum Theory

[TrickyDicky]

Every so often discussions come up about completeness of quantum theory and I often can't see what their point is so I might be missing something.

Is it not possible for a theory to be incomplete and at the same time give very accurate predictions in its domain of applicability? Newton mechanics comes to mind as an example.

How is the Newtonian case in principle different from the quantum theory case besides the obvious the fact that the theory that would extend the domain of QM ("quantum gravity") hasn't benn found yet while in the Newtonian case we have relativistic mechanics?

 

[dx]

I believe the discussions about the completeness of quantum mechanics (for example Einstein's paper "Can the quantum mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?") are concerned with the adequacy of the quantum state as a representation of the physical situation. Einstein argues that since it is possible to have a situation where either P or X can be predicted "without disturbing the particle" by making measurements on another system with which the particle has been in interaction, that both P and X have an element of 'physical reality', and therefore he concludes that the quantum mechanical state cannot be a complete description.

 

[VantagePoint72]

Einstein argues that since it is possible to have a situation where either P or X can be predicted "without disturbing the particle" by making measurements on another system with which the particle has been in interaction, that both P and X have an element of 'physical reality', and therefore he concludes that the quantum mechanical state cannot be a complete description.

And, since any discussion of EPR without mentioning Bell is incomplete, it should be pointed out for OP's benefit that Einstein seems to have been wrong. Bell showed that a theory that respects Einstein's notion of locality (no "spooky action-at-a-distance") and 'physical reality' must disagree with quantum mechanics as we know it in certain experiments. Thus far, such experiments have agreed with quantum mechanics.

 

[DrChinese]

Adding to what dx says: You could also say either "QM is incomplete" with the caveat "no more complete representation is possible". Some folks will quibble with the terminology. I think if you read the "incompleteness" word as a statement that there is always uncertainty, then it is easier to swallow. On the other hand, EPR intended the term as a criticism.

Obviously, "incomplete" QM is a very successful theory.

 

[dx]

Also, Bohr wrote a paper in response to Einstein, soon after Einstein published his, with the same title.Abstract: "It is shown that a certain "criterion of physical reality" formulated in a recent article contains an essential ambiguity when it is applied to quantum phenomena. In this connection a viewpoint termed 'complementarity' is explained from which quantum mechanical description of physical phenomena would seem to fulfill, within its scope, all rational demands of completeness"

 

[Charles Wilson]

Yeah, Bohr pushed "Complementarity" which is as Metaphysical as the EPR assertion.

It appears that Einstein and EPR make an assertion, "Assume an electron here, going through a slit to a screen which catches it." At every presented duration, you can "measure" that there is an electron "there".

THEREFORE, the electron WAS THERE - atomic, isolated - even when we didn't "measure" it being there. This step is denied by QM. That this is so is to be found in the examples of the "2 gloves". "If I open a box that contains a right handed glove and the other glove is in another box, I know it must be the left handed glove".
At this point, Bohr wants to stick his nose in where it doesn't belong and argue that "SUDDENLY!" the situation changed to a complementarian description, which also goes beyond the data and the QM math which describes "All we can know."

If Bohr believed that "The observation created the situation", HE should have been the one to produce the EPR experiment. But both Einstein and Bohr could not see beyond the assumptions. "Is there NO THING that can travel faster than light?" is only a start to the possibilities.

Entanglement is the game changer here and Stapp is correct.
If you accept that there is NO THING that can travel faster than light AND Entanglement exists, then NECESSARILY you are positing a Universe greater than this one, which encompasses this one. Entanglement must map onto this universe somehow or we are left in a Solipsistic Universe where we "seemingly" perceive a "das Noumena" (The "Why" of entanglement.) but can never ever get to it.
QM therefore is complete in this universe (Bell's FAPP) but may be supplemented by the final (Mathematics) of the Universe Above.

Neither Einstein nor Bohr win.

CW

 

[TrickyDicky]

Thanks for the comments, they are all reasonable and dwell on the usual well known quantum mechanical facts, characters and narratives:EPR, Bell, Einstein, complementarity, success of the theory, measurements, etc...
Important as all that is I wanted to take the completeness debate out of there for a moment as that kind of discussion has a tendency to get a bit circular anyway. Thus my comparison with the Newtonian case which no one chose to address, so I take it there's agreement quantum theory is incomplete in that specific sense and that doesn't detract anything from it as a theory.
But I guess it is is quite difficult to discuss this without at least touching upon all those issues: it is IMO worth noting that most of the Einstein vs Bohr controversy, echoed in different forms countless times refers to problems that arise when considering particles as "real" objects. I thought (please correct me if I'm wrong) that since QFT reigns in physics the dichotomy particle-field had been clearly overcome in favor of fields, and particles as excitations of fields are considered simply a property of the quantum fields, remaining in the language simply as a graphical and practical depiction of those localized properties but not being considered fundamental anymore.

 

[audioloop]

Thanks for the comments, they are all reasonable and dwell on the usual well known quantum mechanical facts, characters and narratives:EPR, Bell, Einstein, complementarity, success of the theory, measurements, etc...
Important as all that is I wanted to take the completeness debate out of there for a moment as that kind of discussion has a tendency to get a bit circular anyway. Thus my comparison with the Newtonian case which no one chose to address, so I take it there's agreement quantum theory is incomplete in that specific sense and that doesn't detract anything from it as a theory.
But I guess it is is quite difficult to discuss this without at least touching upon all those issues: it is IMO worth noting that most of the Einstein vs Bohr controversy, echoed in different forms countless times refers to problems that arise when considering particles as "real" objects. I thought (please correct me if I'm wrong) that since QFT reigns in physics the dichotomy particle-field had been clearly overcome in favor of fields, and particles as excitations of fields are considered simply a property of the quantum fields, remaining in the language simply as a graphical and practical depiction of those localized properties but not being considered fundamental anymore.

right and that quantum theory is an approximation to a fuller theory.

 

[DrChinese]

... quantum theory is an approximation to a fuller theory.

I think that is more or less the opposite of the usual conclusion. There is currently no sign of the existence of a more complete theory than QM.

 

[audioloop]

you said it "currently"

 

[DevilsAvocado]

Every so often discussions come up about completeness of quantum theory and I often can't see what their point is so I might be missing something.

If I was a philosopher, I would naturally start with – Please define completeness.

I think inevitably, when you bring the word (in)completeness into a discussion about QM you end up with the famous 20 year long Bohr–Einstein debates. However this seems not to be the issue here, right?

IMHO, these are the facts:

• No scientific theory represents the ultimate truth.
• A scientific theory must be falsifiable.
• A scientific theory is only valid as long as not proven false.
• A new scientific theory must include previous theories and empirical verifications (i.e. Newton's Apple can never go the other way).
• A scientific theory is a working model to help humans understand nature and the universe.
• Gödel’s incompleteness theorems show that there are inherent limitations in all axiomatic systems.
• Quantum mechanics is the most accurate theory we have so far.

Any questions on that?

Now, when it comes to the extremely well working model of quantum mechanics; it all works like a dream – mathematically. But when you start talking about QM and try to provide “natural explanations”, it doesn’t always work that great...

Why??

Because, for one thing; the theory does not say anything about what happens at (macroscopic) measurements, and often it’s right there the ‘weirdness’ starts. Where exact is the border between microscopic QM fields/particles and classical macroscopic objects (if any)? Could two elephants be entangled? No one knows for sure... And furthermore, the “Reality Show”; even if you only use fields – are these fields real? No one knows for sure... And what about the Schrödinger wavefunction, is this ‘thing’ real? And lately Bell's theorem + empirical verifications have shown that QM forces us to give up locality and/or reality – i.e. for real! If we give up locality – what ‘stuff/function’ can transmit casual effects to the other side of the universe instantaneously!? And if we give up reality... eh...

Hello! Where’s the ‘completeness’ in all that??

As you see, it’s a weird world out there... and I love it! (i.e. if it exists )


P.S:
My very personal guess is that we will be forced to do a ‘slight adjustment’ to QM and/or SR...

 

[VantagePoint72]

• Gödel’s incompleteness theorems show that there are inherent limitations in all axiomatic systems.

No, they don't. They make very specific claims about specific axiomatic systems—those that describe the properties of the natural numbers. To naively carry this over into axiomatized physics models is to assume, with no justification, that every statement about the natural numbers has an analogous physical statement (i.e. a statement about a physically realizable state in terms of elementary processes). What physical process is a reflection of, e.g., the Goldbach conjecture? Fermat's Last Theorem? If you look at the Gödel statements used in the theorems, the suggestion that they have physical analogues is even sillier. Plus, there's a fundamental difference between choosing axioms for the natural numbers and choosing axioms for physics: the latter have empirical consequences. This wishy-washy pop sci idea that Gödel's incomplete theorems have anything to do with scientific models is just as unfounded (and annoying) as New Agers saying, "Quantum mechanics says anything you can imagine is possible!" Mathematical theorems are precisely worded for a reason: if you start running off with vague assertions based on out-of-context generalizations, you're going to say a lot of very incorrect things.

Now, when it comes to the extremely well working model of quantum mechanics; it all works like a dream – mathematically. But when you start talking about QM and try to provide “natural explanations”, it doesn’t always work that great...

And this is supposed to count against the theory somehow? Our brains evolved in environments completely dominated by classical behaviour. Quantum theory is weird because it's unfamiliar, and likely always will be to some extent. The inability to describe QM with 'natural explanations' just demonstrates the shortcomings of intuition—since a natural explanation is just something that makes sense intuitively to us. That is precisely why we use the mathematical models: they take us where our intuition can't. The difficulty of making intuitive sense of QM has no relevance to whether or not the theory is complete.

Because, for one thing; the theory does not say anything about what happens at (macroscopic) measurements, and often it’s right there the ‘weirdness’ starts. Where exact is the border between microscopic QM fields/particles and classical macroscopic objects (if any)?

This, and nearly everything else in this paragraph, is wrong. QM has no restrictions about length scales. There is no postulate saying, "By the way, all this stuff only applies to microscopic objects (whatever that means)." The emergence of classical behaviour from quantum phenomena is well understood through mechanisms like quantum decoherence, Ehrenfest's theorem (and other specific instances of the correspondence principle), the path integral formulation of QM (in which the ratio of the classical action to $\hbar$ determines how dominant quantum effects are), and many other derived properties of QM. There is no arbitrary cut-off point at which we say, "Well, let's stop using QM here." There is no mystery as to how the equations of classical mechanics emerge from various limiting cases of quantum mechanics; disagreements about the nature of quantum states has absolutely no bearing on that fact.

Hello! Where’s the ‘completeness’ in all that?

Nothing you've said has anything to do with the 'completeness' of QM, by any standard definition of the word. You're apparently confusing 'incomplete' with 'makes me uncomfortable'.

As you see, it’s a weird world out there

And it's plenty weird enough as it is without people pointing to well-understood phenomena while waving their hands about and saying, "Ooh, isn't that mysterious?"

 

[Jano L.]

This, and nearly everything else in this paragraph, is wrong. QM has no restrictions about length scales. There is no postulate saying, "By the way, all this stuff only applies to microscopic objects (whatever that means)." The emergence of classical behaviour from quantum phenomena is well understood through mechanisms like quantum decoherence, Ehrenfest's theorem (and other specific instances of the correspondence principle), the path integral formulation of QM (in which the ratio of the classical action to ℏ determines how dominant quantum effects are), and many other derived properties of QM. There is no arbitrary cut-off point at which we say, "Well, let's stop using QM here." There is no mystery as to how the equations of classical mechanics emerge from various limiting cases of quantum mechanics; disagreements about the nature of quantum states has absolutely no bearing on that fact.

Let me give you opposite viewpoint.

The parts of the quantum theory you mention in no way address the problem DevilAvocado's pointing to. There is no derivation of deterministic models of classical physics or at least classical mechanics from the quantum formalism in the sense of direct mathematical limit as there is in the special relativity (excluding perhaps statistical physics). The theory is probabilistic, and there does not seem to be a way to recover deterministic description of a single system approaching that of classical theory. Most practical applications of the quantum theory involve the Born rule. The decoherence studies deal with density matrices, not with variables of individual systems.

There is no mystery as to how the equations of classical mechanics emerge from various limiting cases of quantum mechanics; disagreements about the nature of quantum states has absolutely no bearing on that fact.

Can you explain how the equation of motion of a point-like electron in the Coulomb potential emerges from quantum mechanics?

 

[Nugatory]

This is one of those threads that I'm going to be so sorry that I ever stepped into...

The theory is probabilistic, and there does not seem to be a way to recover deterministic description of a single system approaching that of classical theory.

Classical thermodynamics is also essentially probabilistic and lacks any way of recovering a deterministic description, yet does amazingly well as a deterministic description of the macroscopic world.

Can you explain how the equation of motion of a point-like electron in the Coulomb potential emerges from quantum mechanics?

We can't, and we don't need to. There is no theory of a point-like electron in the Coulomb potential that comes even remotely close to agreeing with observation, so there is no need to make such a description emerge from quantum mechanics. What we DO need to emerge from QM is a description of how a macroscopic body composed of many electrons in the coulomb potential of many nuclei will act according to Coulomb's law.

And that's clearly possible, even if it involves an unspeakable amount of computational drudgery. I still feel sympathy for a colleague of mine whose PhD thesis (early '70s) was a quantum-mechanical description of a bouncing ball.

 

[Jano L.]

Classical thermodynamics is also essentially probabilistic and lacks any way of recovering a deterministic description, yet does amazingly well as a deterministic description of the macroscopic world.

I am afraid you are confusing properties of two different theories.

"Classical thermodynamics" usually refers to the theory of heat - work transformation based on macroscopic variables with no involvement of probabilistic description. Indeed it does amazingly well as a deterministic description of the equilibrium processes in macroscopic bodies.

On the other hand, it is classical statistical physics which is essentially probabilistic and indeed it does lack any way of recovering the deterministic description itself alone.

This last property is not a problem, because everybody knows that classical statistical physics is not some basic theory from which we would like to derive deterministic models. Everybody knows it is the other way around: the classical statistical physics is built upon already available deterministic classical mechanics and probability theory.

We can't, and we don't need to. There is no theory of a point-like electron in the Coulomb potential that comes even remotely close to agreeing with observation, so there is no need to make such a description emerge from quantum mechanics.

Plasma theory, Rutherford scattering...

Anyway, the Coulomb potential is not crucial for the problem at hand. What about electron in electrical condenser? in uniform magnetic field? Can you derive the equation of motion ffrom quantum theory? (as you surely know, it is confirmed very well).

 

[San K]

Every so often discussions come up about completeness of quantum theory and I often can't see what their point is so I might be missing something.

Is it not possible for a theory to be incomplete and at the same time give very accurate predictions in its domain of applicability? Newton mechanics comes to mind as an example.

How is the Newtonian case in principle different from the quantum theory case besides the obvious the fact that the theory that would extend the domain of QM ("quantum gravity") hasn't benn found yet while in the Newtonian case we have relativistic mechanics?

QM is complete in the sense that it answers the questions (related to particular phenomena in QM) correctly mathematically (or mathematically correctly...;)).

QM is incomplete in the sense that we will discover more about the nature of our universe/QM/space-time. QM is incomplete in the sense that there is more to be discovered related to QM itself plus there is, obviously, more to be discovered about non-QM as well.

It is very hard for us to visualize (dimensions) "beyond" space-time. However there is still lot out there and QM will play an important role in (explaining, finding) those discoveries.

QM will improve/evolve on understanding of a bigger/better picture.

 

[VantagePoint72]

Anyway, the Coulomb potential is not crucial for the problem at hand. What about electron in electrical condenser? in uniform magnetic field? Can you derive the equation of motion ffrom quantum theory? (as you surely know, it is confirmed very well).

Yup. Leading order behaviour of QED.

 

[Demystifier]

Every so often discussions come up about completeness of quantum theory and I often can't see what their point is so I might be missing something.

Is it not possible for a theory to be incomplete and at the same time give very accurate predictions in its domain of applicability? Newton mechanics comes to mind as an example.

How is the Newtonian case in principle different from the quantum theory case besides the obvious the fact that the theory that would extend the domain of QM ("quantum gravity") hasn't benn found yet while in the Newtonian case we have relativistic mechanics?

There is one important difference between incompleteness of Newtonian mechanics (NM) and incompleteness of quantum mechanics (QM).

We know that NM is incomplete because there are EXPERIMENTS which demonstrate so. But there is nothing in the Newtonian THEORY itself suggesting that it should be incomplete on the basis of internal theoretical inconsistencies.

The situation with QM is exactly the opposite. There no experiments demonstrating incompleteness of QM. But there are serious theoretical arguments suggesting that something important must be missing in the standard version of quantum theory.

 

[yossell]

No, they don't. They make very specific claims about specific axiomatic systems—those that describe the properties of the natural numbers.

No, they make a specific claim about *all* axiomatic systems which logically include a minimal basis for arithmetic. Any axiomatic system which contains a certain amount of arithmetic is subject to Godel's theorems. The mathematical systems employed by physicists certainly include this minimal base and any axiomatisation of the mathematical systems physicists use will be subject to Godel's theorems.

Having said that, I agree that Godel's incompleteness theorem has zilch to do with alleged quantum incompleteness.

I also agree that it's an interesting to ask: what is the weakest mathematical theory needed to `do' physics -- perhaps the systems that are actually used -- which include arithmetic, include calculus, include theories or real numbers -- go too far. But if we want to at least leave it open that spacetime is continuous, or even just that the potential positions of an object have the structure of the reals, it's going to be hard to avoid systems subject to Godel's theorem.

 

[VantagePoint72]

No, they make a specific claim about *all* axiomatic systems which logically include a minimal basis for arithmetic.

That is the exact same as what I said. If a system includes a minimal basis for arithmetic then it describes the properties of the natural numbers. You're being unnecessarily argumentative.

In any case, I recall Hawking talking about the Gödel angle once. As I understood it, his position was that since number theoretic statements can be well-formed in the mathematical language of physics, incompleteness is inevitable. That's fine, but—I think—entirely uninteresting. If you're going to include mathematical theorems in the scope of your "Theory of Everything" then I think it's an abuse of what physicists mean by the term. If someone wants to say, "Quantum mechanics will never be complete because physics is phrased in terms of mathematical frameworks which are subject to the incompleteness theorems," then they are (trivially) correct. That is completely different from suggesting that the theorems are relevant for whether or not a single mathematical framework describing the four fundamental forces is possible. That would, as I said, require there to be actual physical analogues of number theoretic statements. That, I think, is nonsense.

 

[Jano L.]

I do not think so. In quantum electrodynamics the electron is described by the operator field, and only "average values" can be directly calculated. How do you arrive at the equation of motion for one electron

$$
\frac{d\mathbf p}{dt} = q\mathbf E(\mathbf r) + q\mathbf v\times\mathbf B(\mathbf r),
$$

where $\mathbf E,\mathbf B$ are the external fields (due to condenser, magnet...)?

 

[VantagePoint72]

Huh? Those are the average values. That is the point of the correspondence principle: the average behaviour of quantum systems corresponds to classical behaviour, and in the limit of large systems the variance falls off to zero.

One electron like you're describing is a quantum system. I don't understand your objection. You're apparently saying the fact that you can't extract the exact classical equations of motion for a quantum-scale system is a problem. That's ridiculous. When I say that the emergence of classical behaviour for classical (i.e. large) systems from quantum behaviour is well-understood, I'm obviously talking about systems for which classical mechanics is known to be a good approximation. Of course quantum mechanics won't yield classical descriptions for systems that classical mechanics is a poor approximation for.

You seem to be bizarrely hung up on the fact that, while QM reproduces the valid descriptions of classical mechanics (à la Nugatory's friend with the bouncing ball), it doesn't reproduce the invalid ones.

 

[Jano L.]

Huh? Those are the average values. That is the point of the correspondence principle: the average behaviour of quantum systems corresponds to classical behaviour, and in the limit of large systems the variance falls off to zero.

"Average behaviour" is a description of ensemble, or probabilistic description of a single system. You cannot derive deterministic description of a single system from it.

Furthermore, to my knowledge, the above equation cannot be derived from the quantum field theory even in the mean value sense; the quantum field description leads to divergences for point-like electron.

One electron like you're describing is a quantum system. I don't understand your objection. You're apparently saying the fact that you can't extract the exact classical equations of motion for a quantum-scale system is a problem. That's ridiculous.

The electron may be small, but the experiments do not need to be on atomic scale. The equation I wrote above is widely used description used in the classical electron theory (very successful in explaining many optical phenomena) and accelerator design.

 

[VantagePoint72]

Coulomb's law, with further corrections as needed, comes directly from the QED Lagrangian. You can derive it either as the lowest order perturbation of the free vacuum (as Peskin and Schroeder do in 4.8)—in which it corresponds to the exchange of one virtual photon—or simply by integrating out the gauge freedom of the QED Hamiltonian and observing the (non-perturbative) expression for Coulomb's law that falls out of it. That gives you the first half of your equation. Using the now-justified expression for Coulomb's law, the second half follows immediately from the Lorentz covariance of the electromagnetic field strength tensor (see any derivation of the magnetic force law from Coulomb's law + special relativity). Hence, the total Lorentz force law for a charged particle comes, as I said, as the leading order of QED.

the quantum field description leads to divergences for point-like electron.

So does the classical field theory, which breaks down at a certain length scale do to the electron self-force, self-energy, etc. Once again, you are pointing to the fact that quantum theory doesn't reproduce the bad predictions of classical theory and declaring that it proves the classical theory isn't a limiting case of the quantum theory. I don't think you understand what it means for one theory to reduce to another in some limit.

 

[Jano L.]

LastOneStanding, the second procedure you mention (separation of the terms with the Coulomb potential from the field Lagrangian) is independent of whether the potential and current are numbers or operators. You can do it in classical theory as well. It thus says nothing about the derivation of classical theory from the quantum theory.


The section in Peskin & Schroeder derives the main part of the scattering amplitude due to the term $1/r$. This quantity refers to probability of the overall result of the process that spans infinite time. It gives no temporal description of the process, and it is probabilistic. You cannot derive classical differential equation of motion from it.

If you do not think that such derivation is necessary then we can discuss that.

The classical equation of motion above is not a prediction, but inference from the experiments done with electrons in vacuum tubes. And it is not bad equation, since CRT tubes and cyclotrons work rather well, don't you think?

So does the classical field theory, which breaks down at a certain length scale do to the electron self-force, self-energy, etc.

Yes, but I did not require derivation of the diverging classical field theory. That is not necessary, as the self-force acting on the electron is entirely hypothetical concept. I am talking about derivation of the equation of motion in external field, which is simpler, free of problems and well confirmed by experiment. (These two are incompatible for point-like particles, by the way.)

I don't think you understand what it means for one theory to reduce to another in some limit.

Then please explain, what does it mean?

 

[TrickyDicky]

There is one important difference between incompleteness of Newtonian mechanics (NM) and incompleteness of quantum mechanics (QM).

We know that NM is incomplete because there are EXPERIMENTS which demonstrate so. But there is nothing in the Newtonian THEORY itself suggesting that it should be incomplete on the basis of internal theoretical inconsistencies.

The situation with QM is exactly the opposite. There no experiments demonstrating incompleteness of QM. But there are serious theoretical arguments suggesting that something important must be missing in the standard version of quantum theory.

That's an interesting point. I hadn't thought about that difference.
But I would argue about the experimental side being comparable. Probabilities are tricky.

 

[VantagePoint72]

The section in Peskin & Schroeder derives the main part of the scattering amplitude due to the term $1/r$. This quantity refers to probability of the overall result of the process that spans infinite time. It gives no temporal description of the process, and it is probabilistic. You cannot derive classical differential equation of motion from it.

I don't know if you have a different edition than I do, but in mine they explicitly compute an effective potential—the Coulomb potential—induced by the leading order scattering amplitude. There is nothing probabilistic about the potential. Indeed, as I said, you can even obtain the same result without perturbation theory. Again, the behaviour of the electron is probabilistic because it's a system dominated by quantum effects. You still seem to have the expectation that predicting classical behaviour for classical-scale objects means QM should predict classical behaviour for quantum-scale systems. You're putting the cart before the horse: what we call the "classical scale" exists because it's the scale at which quantum mechanics predicts the classical behaviour we're familiar with. Compute the time evolution of a system composed of sufficiently large objects using the path integral formulation, and you find it converges to the corresponding classical time evolution with asymptotically unit probability (since the classical action defines the only path that doesn't destructively interfere with others). Quantum mechanics thus predicts the same equation of motion—the Euler-Lagrange equations—as classical mechanics. I don't know how to make it any more explicit than this.

Then please explain, what does it mean?

If theory X reproduces theory Y in some limit, then theory X predicts the same outcomes of experiments as theory Y does within theory Y's domain of validity. You are repeatedly ignoring the italicized part, and insisting that QM should make classical predictions for quantum-scale systems.

I'm just repeating myself now, so I don't believe I have anything further to add.

 

[DEvens]

Can you explain how the equation of motion of a point-like electron in the Coulomb potential emerges from quantum mechanics?

It's the Feynman path integral, and the classical path. The classical path is the "most likely" or least action path. Among other places you can see the explanation, there is a series of youtube vids where Feynman himself explains this in detail. Search on youtube for Feynman quantum point of view.

In that series he talks about a pair of boxes with three buttons and a light that can have one of two colors when you push a button. If anybody knows of a more complete explanation of those boxes and how they related to Bell's theorem, Id be very glad to know.
Dan

 

[Jano L.]

I don't know if you have a different edition than I do, but in mine they explicitly compute an effective potential—the Coulomb potential—induced by the leading order scattering amplitude. There is nothing probabilistic about the potential.

Yes, that is true. They also infer it from the scattering amplitude. That is probabilistic notion, far from temporal description of particle trajectory.

You still seem to have the expectation that predicting classical behaviour for classical-scale objects means QM should predict classical behaviour for quantum-scale systems.

No, I don't. You talk about quantum scale and classical scale and fighting what I may think of them, but I did not ever claim that electron is a quantum-scale or classical-scale system. I do not even know what that would mean, since both classical and quantum theory have applications in both microscopic and macroscopic settings.

Classical theory or quantum theory are particular frameworks in which try to understand it. It makes no sense to claim that electron is quantum or is classical, when its behaviour lacks perfect explanation in both theories.

Electron is a piece of nature. It has always the same mass and charge, and sometimes can be inferred to move closely along the trajectory described by the differential equation of motion I wrote above. These simple facts lack simple explanation based solely on the quantum theoretical ideas.

Compute the time evolution of a system composed of sufficiently large objects using the path integral formulation, and you find it converges to the corresponding classical time evolution with asymptotically unit probability (since the classical action defines the only path that doesn't destructively interfere with others). Quantum mechanics thus predicts the same equation of motion—the Euler-Lagrange equations—as classical mechanics. I don't know how to make it any more explicit than this.

Perhaps the last statement was true:-) Please send us some reference to such computation, it seems interesting. I am curious how the trajectory is actually recovered in such an approach, since in ordinary quantum theory, we do not have position unless we measure it and no autonomous motion governed by the differential equation if we do.

If theory X reproduces theory Y in some limit, then theory X predicts the same outcomes of experiments as theory Y does within theory Y's domain of validity. You are repeatedly ignoring the italicized part, and insisting that QM should make classical predictions for quantum-scale systems.

The trajectories computed from the Lorentz-Newton differential equations for electrons are often within the domain of their validity, since they are used successfully to construct such devices as cyclotrons, CRT displays, electron microscopes and mass spectrometers. Do you agree these are within the domain of the mentioned equations ?

 

[DevilsAvocado]

If anybody knows of a more complete explanation of those boxes and how they related to Bell's theorem, Id be very glad to know.
Dan

http://faraday.physics.utoronto.ca/PVB/Harrison/BellsTheorem/Flash/Mermin/Mermin.html
http://www.drchinese.com/David/Bell_Theorem_Easy_Math.htm

 

[audioloop]

There is one important difference between incompleteness of Newtonian mechanics (NM) and incompleteness of quantum mechanics (QM).

We know that NM is incomplete because there are EXPERIMENTS which demonstrate so. But there is nothing in the Newtonian THEORY itself suggesting that it should be incomplete on the basis of internal theoretical inconsistencies.

The situation with QM is exactly the opposite. There no is [STRIKE]experiments demonstrating [/STRIKE]incompleteness of QM. But there are serious theoretical arguments suggesting that something important must be missing in the standard version of quantum theory.

Information Paradox.

and:

Is quantum linear superposition an exact principle of nature?
http://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0135

 

[kith]

Jano L., just to make sure I understand your line of reasoning: you don't think QM tells us how classical mechanics emerges because in all derivations, expectation values and probabilities are involved. QM is a theory of the behaviour of individual quantum objects. If it is a fundamental theory, we should be able to recover a theory of individual classical objects from it. Instead, we get a theory of an ensemble of such objects. In other words, we don't get classical mechanics but classical statistical mechanics.

 

[kith]

Is quantum linear superposition an exact principle of nature?
http://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0135

I haven't read the paper but I don't think that a "stochastic nonlinear theory" answers the question of the transition from QM to classical mechanics better than QM itself. Such a theory is a theory about ensembles and QM already explains how the classical world emerges for ensembles (decoherence). Controversy arises only if we try to say something about individual systems.

 

[audioloop]

I haven't read the paper but I don't think that a "stochastic nonlinear theory" answers the question of the transition from QM to classical mechanics better than QM itself. Such a theory is a theory about ensembles and QM already explains how the classical world emerges for ensembles (decoherence). Controversy arises only if we try to say something about individual systems.

Decoherence is not enough to explain classicality.

 

[DevilsAvocado]

Well LastManStanding, I must say you did a pretty decent job, misinterpreting almost everything I said, putting words in my mouth never spoken, in this debate-battle-warzone...

No, they don't. They make very specific claims about specific axiomatic systems—those that describe the properties of the natural numbers. To naively carry this over into axiomatized physics models is to assume, with no justification, that every statement about the natural numbers has an analogous physical statement (i.e. a statement about a physically realizable state in terms of elementary processes). What physical process is a reflection of, e.g., the Goldbach conjecture? Fermat's Last Theorem? If you look at the Gödel statements used in the theorems, the suggestion that they have physical analogues is even sillier. Plus, there's a fundamental difference between choosing axioms for the natural numbers and choosing axioms for physics: the latter have empirical consequences. This wishy-washy pop sci idea that Gödel's incomplete theorems have anything to do with scientific models is just as unfounded (and annoying) as New Agers saying, "Quantum mechanics says anything you can imagine is possible!" Mathematical theorems are precisely worded for a reason: if you start running off with vague assertions based on out-of-context generalizations, you're going to say a lot of very incorrect things.

[my bolding]

I must be missing something... because to me this looks like a wishy-washy contradiction... you seem to be saying that Gödel has nothing to do with real physics, “it’s just silly”. Then you point out that mathematics is indeed needed in physics – not to say a lot of very incorrect things, with vague assertions based on out-of-context generalizations.

I think I agree on that very last statement...

And this is supposed to count against the theory somehow?

Did I really say anywhere that there is anything wrong about quantum mechanics, really??

I think I made it pretty clear:

Quantum mechanics is the most accurate theory we have so far.

That is precisely why we use the mathematical models: they take us where our intuition can't.

And this is precisely why I mentioned Gödel, which you somehow refute as “silly wishy-washy pop sci idea”. Which is pretty interesting as it is...

This, and nearly everything else in this paragraph, is wrong.

Thanks, great news.

There is no mystery as to how the equations of classical mechanics emerge from various limiting cases of quantum mechanics; disagreements about the nature of quantum states has absolutely no bearing on that fact.

This is even greater news. You have solved the measurement problem!? If you could provide a link to the peer reviewed paper, I will see to it that Nobel Committee for Physics gets a copy immediately!

And since you seem to have closed the divine book of QM completeness – could you please describe exactly what entanglement is and how it works? If it’s okay with you, I’ll send the answer to Anton Zeilinger (he doesn’t know either). Phew! Finally a clear answer on the main feature of quantum mechanics:

I would not call [entanglement] one but rather the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its entire departure from classical lines of thought.
— Erwin Schrödinger (1935)

Nothing you've said has anything to do with the 'completeness' of QM, by any standard definition of the word.

Please, I can’t wait – what’s the standard definition of the word [in relation to QM]??

You're apparently confusing 'incomplete' with 'makes me uncomfortable'.

Confused seems to be the word of the day. You’re obviously reading stuff that isn’t there. Above my imagination how the phrase “it’s a weird world out there... and I love it!” could ever be coupled to “makes me uncomfortable”... but I guess you have some ‘complete interpretation’ on the shelf for that too...

The only thing I tried to say was – let’s not pretend QM is the [complete and] ultimate truth and the final chapter of science. I hope you agree this is not how science works, right? This could be the methodology for the Vatican, but not for scientist, right? History has told us that when one question is answered, two new arises at the horizon. And isn’t that freaking great!? What an utterly boring place this would be if “the heavenly completeness” has answered every question there is to ask... could we even bear to live in a “Lego-universe” where everything is “small plastic bricks of completeness”... stacked on one another? And superfluous questions are to be sent to the CEO Jørgen Vig Knudstorp??

Does this mean QM is wrong??

I sure hope everybody understand that’s not what I’m saying. However, this endeavor for ultimate completeness/truth looks more like some sort of religion than science, or maybe something for a New-Age-Brahmaputra-Guru type of guy.

What about “mystery” then?

First, I never used the word – it’s pretty superfluous if you ask me. One could make everything into a “mystery”, and if you are religious even the wind could be a “mysterious” sign of “something greater” (even if science tells us otherwise). Since “something greater” never interested me, mystery goes the same way – it’s pretty great as it is.

Finally: The mandatory question – What if I’m wrong!?

Could be, however with the consolation – I’m in pretty darned good company:

I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.
— Richard Feynman, The Character of Physical Law (1965)


We always have had a great deal of difficulty in understanding the world view that quantum mechanics represents. At least I do, because I'm an old enough man that I haven't got to the point that this stuff is obvious to me. Okay, I still get nervous with it. And therefore, some of the younger students... you know how it always is, every new idea, it takes a generation or two until it becomes obvious that there's no real problem. It has not yet become obvious to me that there's no real problem. I cannot define the real problem, therefore I suspect there's no real problem, but I'm not sure there's no real problem.
— Richard Feynman, Simulating physics with computers (1982)


The theory of quantum electrodynamics describes Nature as absurd from the point of view of common sense. And it agrees fully with experiment. So I hope you accept Nature as She is — absurd.
— Richard Feynman, QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter (1985)


I don’t feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in a mysterious universe without having any purpose, which is the way it really is, as far as I can tell, possibly. It doesn’t frighten me.
— Richard Feynman, The Pleasure of Finding Things Out (1999)

 

[Jano L.]

Kith, what you say is quite close to my view. I might add that the probabilistic description of evolution of configuration could in principle be satisfactory, if its implications in the physical space would be close to autonomous behaviour known from the models of classical physics.

For example, if the calculation of the function $\psi$*or some other quantum theoretical procedure lead to well localized probability distribution of electron's position in physical space moving closely to the trajectory described by the Newton-Lorentz equations, one could say that the classical description has been recovered from the quantum theory, the classical position being the centroid of the quantum probability distribution, thus leaving the details of the actual fluctuations negligible.

However, ordinary quantum theory happens in abstract many-dimensional configuration space. The implicated probability distribution in physical space does not seem to lead to such central localized packets naturally, except perhaps for a particle in harmonic potential. Typically, one expects rather that the probability distributions will have more unconnected maxima at distant positions and spread out in time.

Instead, we get a theory of an ensemble of such objects. In other words, we don't get classical mechanics but classical statistical mechanics.

We get a theory giving probability distributions. I do not know whether the classical statistical physics can be derived from the quantum theory, there may be some problems, but the basic point is right: the classical mechanics is not a statistical theory.

 

[kith]

Decoherence is not enough to explain classicality.

For ensembles of systems, it is.

 

[VantagePoint72]

Perhaps the last statement was true:-) Please send us some reference to such computation, it seems interesting. I am curious how the trajectory is actually recovered in such an approach, since in ordinary quantum theory, we do not have position unless we measure it and no autonomous motion governed by the differential equation if we do.

Any reasonably complete textbook on QM will introduce the path integral approach. Then take take a classically sized object and put in a well-localized position and momentum state (which is possible because its large enough and massive enough that the uncertainty principle requires a very small uncertainty relative to the overall size and position). The position and momentum of the object can be described by, e.g., extremely narrow—narrower than any reasonable measurement precision—Gaussians. Then a quick application of the path integral formulation shows that the expectation values of the position and momentum follow those predicted by the classical equations of motion, whatever your potential looks like. Since both the position and momentum wavefunctions are extremely well localized around this expectation value, the experimental predictions of quantum mechanics are identical to those of classical mechanics. To essentially arbitrary precision, you have a particle whose position and momentum evolves according to the equations of classical mechanics. This, in a nutshell, is the correspondence principle.

 

[kith]

For example, if the calculation of the function $\psi$*or some other quantum theoretical procedure lead to well localized probability distribution of electron's position in physical space moving closely to the trajectory described by the Newton-Lorentz equations, one could say that the classical description has been recovered from the quantum theory, the classical position being the centroid of the quantum probability distribution, thus leaving the details of the actual fluctuations negligible.

Thanks for your comment. Do you think such a description is likely within the framework of a more fundamental theory? Personally, I doubt this because I don't think that a more fundamental theory will be able to explain entanglement in more classical terms than QM.

 

[Jano L.]

Then take a classically sized object ...

Does a dust grain with mass $10^{-15}$ kg qualify ? How do you describe it - as one havy particle, or as a collection of many particles? Such are very hard to analyze.

To essentially arbitrary precision, you have a particle whose position and momentum evolves according to the equations of classical mechanics.

For how long? Does not the probability distribution spread out eventually?

What about the electron beams? Does the path integral lead to the Newton-Lorentz equations for a persistently peaked probability distribution ?

 

[VantagePoint72]

I must be missing something... because to me this looks like a wishy-washy contradiction... you seem to be saying that Gödel has nothing to do with real physics, “it’s just silly”. Then you point out that mathematics is indeed needed in physics – not to say a lot of very incorrect things, with vague assertions based on out-of-context generalizations.

The entire point of that part of the comment was explaining why, just because mathematics is used in physics, there's no reason to expect the completeness of mathematics has any bearing on the completeness of a physical theory. Physics is not the study of the natural numbers. The fact that certain statements about the natural numbers are undecidable in number theory has no bearing on whether there are undecidable statements in physics. Obviously a combined "physical theory and mathematical formalism" would trivially be incomplete because number theoretic statements would exist within its language and some of them would be undecidable. That has no bearing on whether the physical statements in its language would be undecidable.

Did I really say anywhere that there is anything wrong about quantum mechanics, really??

Yes, a great deal, particularly with respect to the classical limit of QM.

This is even greater news. You have solved the measurement problem!? If you could provide a link to the peer reviewed paper, I will see to it that Nobel Committee for Physics gets a copy immediately!

The measurement problem as zero to do with whether QM reproduces the empirical claims of classical mechanics in the latter's domain of validity. Nothing. Zip. It is a largely philosophical problem that is irrelevant for the experimental predictions of QM's formalism. As a purely side note, I happen to find the Everettian interpretation of QM compelling, according to which there is no measurement problem, but that is not relevant to this discussion. Quantum formalism is agnostic about the ontological status of measurement and the wavefunction—going as far as allowing a purely instrumentalist view for those who prefer to avoid philosophy altogether—and the fact that its predictions for what we consider classical systems are indistinguishable from those of classical systems is just a mathematical fact.

And since you seem to have closed the divine book of QM completeness – could you please describe exactly what entanglement is and how it works? If it’s okay with you, I’ll send the answer to Anton Zeilinger (he doesn’t know either). Phew! Finally a clear answer on the main feature of quantum mechanics:

You are, as I said in my first post, confused about the difference between intuition and formalism. The fact that we lack intuition for these has no bearing on the strength of the theory. It's entirely possible that as we go along we will come to understand quantum theory better. That isn't quantum theory changing and becoming 'closer to complete'; that's us changing. Of course, I'm not suggesting the theory itself is immune to corrections. Any theory in physics may be altered if necessary. I'm saying that our lack of intuition for concepts like entanglement is not a reason why it needs to.

The only thing I tried to say was – let’s not pretend QM is the [complete and] ultimate truth and the final chapter of science. I hope you agree this is not how science works, right?

I certainly do. I just disagree that any of your reasons for this are any good. Rather, I think all of them suggest that, to varying degrees, you don't understand how quantum mechanics as it is currently formulated works. Quantum theory may altered if necessary on the basis of experiment; it doesn't need to be altered on the basis of your incorrect claims about its alleged problems with the classical limit. There are no such problems.

Finally: The mandatory question – What if I’m wrong!?

Nothing happens. I'm not sure exactly what you're expecting. I don't believe your issues with quantum mechanics are some kind of life or death issue. You're welcome to continue believing wrong things about QM if you like.

Could be, however with the consolation – I’m in pretty darned good company:

In all your quotations—particularly the second and the third—Feynman is discussing the exact point I'm making: that our inability to intuit quantum mechanics (necessitating a reliance on the formalism) is not a problem for the theory. It just means we don't—and possibly can't—understand what it means. However, the theory doesn't care whether or not a bunch of hairless apes who evolved in a classical world understand it. For one thing, I don't see how the third quote doesn't strike you as contradictory to your view that quantum mechanics can't account for the classical behaviour of every day physics. That would constitute an experimental contradiction.

The validity of a physical theory is determined solely by its ability to make good experimental predictions. The extent to which we can make sense of its formalism with our very limited intuition says nothing about how 'complete' it is. "No one understands quantum mechanics," isn't a comment on quantum mechanics; it's a comment on physicists.

 

[VantagePoint72]

Does a dust grain with mass $10^{-15}$ kg qualify ? How do you describe it - as one havy particle, or as a collection of many particles? Such are very hard to analyze.

Whatever is big enough to display classical behaviour experimentally qualifies. This is what I meant about putting the cart before the horse. You may treat it either in aggregate or as a complex system; and, yes, the latter is extremely difficult. Treating a bouncing ball quantumly was given as an example by someone else earlier. That is why we just make the observation the correspondence principle (e.g. Ehrenfest's theorem, etc.) guarantees the process will always work and skip right to the classical equations as an approximation. When you prove a theorem, you don't need to check cases any more.

For how long? Does not the probability distribution spread out eventually?

According to a quick back-of-the-envelope calculation on an easy studied classical system, a standard baseball thrown in a ball game would have to be in motion for over a million years before the uncertainty in its position became comparable to its size due to quantum effects. I think we'll be safe in using classical mechanics to describe its trajectory without doing quantum theory an injustice.

What about the electron beams? Does the path integral lead to the Newton-Lorentz equations for a persistently peaked probability distribution ?

Again, an electron beam is a quantum object. It is capable of interference. Why do you continue to insist that quantum mechanics should predict classical behaviour for things that don't behave classically?

 

[Jano L.]

It just means we don't—and possibly can't—understand what it means. However, the theory doesn't care whether or not a bunch of hairless apes who evolved in a classical world understand it.

The theory cannot care, because it is a theory, i.e. artificial construction.

The validity of a physical theory is determined solely by its ability to make good experimental predictions.

This was debunked already by Kepler and Newton in their theories of planetary motion. Did you know how good predictions were made by the epicycle theory? The epicycles were very accurate in describing apparent motions on the sky. But perhaps the epicycles were ugly because there was a lot of them - dozens, and people may have had scratched their heads, "are these additional epicycles necessary? what the hell do they mean ? What is really going on in the heavens? Isn't there something simpler, better ?" And then the Newton's physics brought light.

"No one understands quantum mechanics," isn't a comment on quantum mechanics; it's a comment on physicists.

If it was few physicists, it would be comment on physicists. But Feynman said no one. If the theory cannot be understood by anybody, isn't it worthy of critical reconsideration ? After all, it is only a creation of humans, and such are superable. Wouldn't it be better to have a theory that is more acceptable to people? Wouldn't it make them more happy and achieve more?

 

[VantagePoint72]

The theory cannot care, because it is a theory, i.e. artificial construction.

As we've reached the point where you treating as literal what any reasonable person would immediately see is a figure of speech, it's clear I'm at an impasse with you and there's no sense in continuing. I've answered every single objection you've put forward, in most cases repeatedly.

(PS: when I said things like "according to quantum mechanics" earlier, I wasn't implying quantum mechanics was a living entity capable of articulating opinions. Just want to be clear, since apparently metaphorical language is difficult for you.)

 

[Jano L.]

The example with the baseball is not very convincing, because the Schroedinger equation does not describe balls as heavy particles. It describes them as a collection of many light particles.

That is why we just make the observation the correspondence principle (e.g. Ehrenfest's theorem, etc.) guarantees the process will always work and skip right to the classical equations as an approximation. When you prove a theorem, you don't need to check cases any more.

This sounds like a belief to me. What do you mean by "correspondence principle" ? That the classical mechanics is a limiting case of quantum mechanics? Is that an assumption, or a derived fact?

If it does not work for one light particle, why do you expect it will for system composed of many such particles?

Why do you continue to insist that quantum mechanics should predict classical behaviour for things that don't behave classically?

Let me repeat myself:

The trajectories computed from the Lorentz-Newton differential equations for electrons are often within the domain of their validity, since they are used successfully to construct such devices as cyclotrons, CRT displays, electron microscopes and mass spectrometers.

Do you agree these are within the domain of the mentioned equations ?

 

[Jano L.]

LastOneStanding, I think you are being too feisty. I am not trying to prove you wrong by showing your statements are wrong when taken literally. They are wrong semantically. You suggested that it does not matter that nobody understands a theory, that the theory can be nevertheless right, independently of humans.

Now, I do not believe that can be supported. When I said that theory cannot care, it was said figuratively as well; I meant that only humans can decide whether the theory is sound or not. If nobody can understand it, it is most probably wrong somewhere.

I would be interested in what you think of the examples I repeated in my last post. Do you recognize them?

 

[DennisN]

In my opinion, it's experiments which ultimately decides whether a theory needs to be corrected or replaced. Our understanding has nothing to do with this. Nature decides. We observe. And we try to understand what nature is telling us. If/when there will come an experiment that disagrees with QM, it will become famous, no doubt about it.

 

[DevilsAvocado]

The entire point of that part of the comment was explaining why, just because mathematics is used in physics, there's no reason to expect the completeness of mathematics has any bearing on the completeness of a physical theory. Physics is not the study of the natural numbers. The fact that certain statements about the natural numbers are undecidable in number theory has no bearing on whether there are undecidable statements in physics. Obviously a combined "physical theory and mathematical formalism" would trivially be incomplete because number theoretic statements would exist within its language and some of them would be undecidable. That has no bearing on whether the physical statements in its language would be undecidable.

Undecidable? You are confused about Gödel's incompleteness theorems, which are about the inherent limitations of all axiomatic systems capable of doing arithmetic – the consistency of arithmetic is provably impossible.

Yes, a great deal, particularly with respect to the classical limit of QM.

You seem to have some hiccup about the classical limit. I think I wrote one line about your beloved classical limit.

The measurement problem as zero to do with whether QM reproduces the empirical claims of classical mechanics in the latter's domain of validity. Nothing. Zip. It is a largely philosophical problem that is irrelevant for the experimental predictions of QM's formalism.

More classical hiccup... but let me ask you this: The Schrödinger wavefunction is deterministic, right? Why can we not predict precise results for QM measurements, if the measuring apparatus itself is described by the deterministic wavefunction? Do you really think that’s a totally irrelevant philosophical problem?? Wow...

As a purely side note, I happen to find the Everettian interpretation of QM compelling,

Now we’re talking totally irrelevant philosophical problems, and I don't see how this doesn't strike you as contradictory to your distaste for mystery cults?

according to which there is no measurement problem,

Gosh, why am I not surprised...?

You are, as I said in my first post, confused about the difference between intuition and formalism. The fact that we lack intuition for these has no bearing on the strength of the theory. [...] Of course, I'm not suggesting the theory itself is immune to corrections. Any theory in physics may be altered if necessary. I'm saying that our lack of intuition for concepts like entanglement is not a reason why it needs to.

So you are saying that a complete mathematical description of entanglement is right now available in QM theory, i.e. a complete description that will undoubtedly tell us if the world is non-local or/and non-real? And if it’s non-local, there’s a mathematical description that exactly explains instantaneous casual effects across the entire universe. It’s just because the lack of human intuition that we haven’t seen this mathematical description yet?

Did I get that right?

It's entirely possible that as we go along we will come to understand quantum theory better. That isn't quantum theory changing and becoming 'closer to complete'; that's us changing.

Wow, that’s really interesting. Schrödinger and those guys had no idea what they were doing, right? They created a kind of “QM Monster” that lives its own life, right? And if we are lucky the “QM Monster” will take us to the “QM Cave” and show us things that we never knew existed, right?

Please tell me it’s a joke? Humans create scientific theories, period. The opposite rarely happens, and if it does – it’s only in mystery cults and the wishy-washy New-Age-Brahmaputra domain.

it doesn't need to be altered on the basis of your incorrect claims about its alleged problems with the classical limit. There are no such problems.

Seriously, I get the very strong feeling that you are talking about the “problems with the classical limit” 10 times more than I do?? And all other issues are dismissed as “philosophical problems”? I do think we have problem here, but I’m not sure it’s classical...

In all your quotations—particularly the second and the third—Feynman is discussing the exact point I'm making: that our inability to intuit quantum mechanics (necessitating a reliance on the formalism) is not a problem for the theory. It just means we don't—and possibly can't—understand what it means. However, the theory doesn't care whether or not a bunch of hairless apes who evolved in a classical world understand it.

Here we go again – the “QM Monster” has now turned into a superior philosopher...

For one thing, I don't see how the third quote doesn't strike you as contradictory to your view that quantum mechanics can't account for the classical behaviour of every day physics.

Gee, I’m about to sign out... more classical hiccup... seriously, this is what I wrote about your BIG fixation:

Where exact is the border between microscopic QM fields/particles and classical macroscopic objects (if any)? Could two elephants be entangled? No one knows for sure...

I do hope you noticed --> (if any) <-- ??

But okay, I’ll give you something to chew on:

Could two elephants be entangled? If not, why? If yes, where can I go to see them?

And maybe you could also elaborate on what happens to classical (elephant) gravity at the quantum level?

This will probably keep you occupied for a couple of hours...

 

[TrickyDicky]

Even though I was trying to avoid this kind of polarized debate I understand the OP theme was probably ripe for it.
LastOneStanding, IMO the way you present your point emerges as somewhat caricature like or exaggerated. Such maximalist positions are usually wrong in science.

 

[DevilsAvocado]

TrickyDicky, agree 100%.

And I’m sorry if the ‘preposterous’ debate between me and LastOne almost hijacked this thread... promise to be a brief and good guy... ;)