Can Moral Absolutism Be Proven Through the Concept of the Philosopher King?

[Tide]

Not really, I just didn't feel like answering. Regardless, you still havn't responded to barely anything I said and asked you.
Do you want a detailed explanation of how I would view those situations you cited?

Oh, I'm sorry. I thought I had answered your questions. Sometimes I reply to several posts at once rather than posting individual replies to each so I may not have addressed one or two specifically to you.

 

[Curious3141]

Moral absolutism is a given if the existence of an absolute moral authority is presupposed. Most commonly, that authority is 'god'. God defines certain actions as immoral, the rest are OK. Just don't indulge in the former, and you'll be assured of a comfortable, climate controlled dwelling in the eternal hereafter.

Of course there could be argument about the exact nature of those actions that would fall under the 'immoral' category. But that's a problem of lucidity of the written versions of divine law. Often, the bible, the koran, etc. are internally inconsistent, simultaneously sanctioning and condemning a particular action. While this is a problem, it is possible to assume that there is in fact a 'correct' interpretation of absolute moral divine law (the one that god would have wanted us to follow), and these accounts written by man are merely imperfect representations thereof. (It's a bit more of a problem for the koran since muslims believe that the koran is the inerrant literal word of their god).

Without an absolute moral law giver, there can be no moral absolutism. We are left with moral relativism, which is an eminently human construct.

BTW, I believe nothing to be more dangerous than moral absolutism (and in fact, fundamentalist religion is a very dangerous thing). Thank god for moral relativism.

 

[JonahHex]

The Hebrews have been released from bondage in Egypt. God leads them to the Promised Land. They find there are a whole bunch of other people already there. God tells them to drive these people out, using whatever force is required. When war is required, He goes so far as to cause the sun to stand still in the sky so the Hebrews are better able to kill them.

Discuss God's morality. Did He advise the current residents to leave? When they first arrived and found the place empty, did He notify them that they were trespassing? He was capable of hardening and softening Pharoh's heart. Was He not also capable of creating a desire in the trespassers to leave rather than fight? If so, why did He chose killing them over this alternative? Presumably Hebrews also died in the war to reclaim the land. What do you think of bringing your "chosen people" to the "promised land" and allowing them to die before they get it? What is your opinion of parents who require their children to fight to the death in order to get the presents that are under the Christmas tree?

While it was true that the trespassers worshipped false gods, were they aware of this? God had interacted with the Hebrews for centuries. When the Hebrews broke God's laws they were punished. Had God given the idoliters any notification of His wishes or the errors of their ways? Or was their punishment just "out of the blue?"

Was God following a credo of "Do as I say, not as I do"?

 

[Dawguard]

This isn't a discussion about specific religions, and I do not intend to argue for one religion over the other. My opinion has always remained simple, that moral relativism logicaly leads to the belief that each person can create their own moral code, thereby nullifying itself. It is inherently self-denying and thus cannot be true.
This leads to the logical conclusion that one of two things must be true; either morals do not exist or they are absolute. Neither one can be proved and this alone is that which results in moral relativism. It is nothing more then the response to the unprovability of morals themselves.

 

[selfAdjoint]

This isn't a discussion about specific religions, and I do not intend to argue for one religion over the other. My opinion has always remained simple, that moral relativism logicaly leads to the belief that each person can create their own moral code, thereby nullifying itself. It is inherently self-denying and thus cannot be true.

Welcome to the discussion Dawguard. Could you outline for us in what way the proposition that everyone can make up their own moral code nullifies itself? I can see how it might nullify the concept of morality, but that is not quite the same thing.

But for example we could state: "It is observed that each human being interprets whatever moral code they have received individually." Does this destroy morality?

 

[WarrenPlatts]

one of two things must be true; either morals do not exist or they are absolute.

You are bewitched by your language. If morals exist, what are they like, and where do they exist? Do they have beginnings and ends, or are they eternal? Morals certainly are not physical objects--they can't be seen or detected with scientific instruments. So if they are not in this universe, do they exist in some Platonic realm of the Forms? If so, how can we ever hope to learn anything about them?

There is a third option: moral realism. Moral claims are either true or false. We learn the definitions of right and wrong ostensively from our mothers; this provides an empirical foundation for ethics that is consistent with physicalism. In this way, the useless ontological quagmire of what morals actually are is entirely avoided.

 

[Dmstifik8ion]

You are bewitched by your language. If morals exist, what are they like, and where do they exist? Do they have beginnings and ends, or are they eternal? Morals certainly are not physical objects--they can't be seen or detected with scientific instruments. So if they are not in this universe, do they exist in some Platonic realm of the Forms? If so, how can we ever hope to learn anything about them?
There is a third option: moral realism. Moral claims are either true or false. We learn the definitions of right and wrong ostensively from our mothers; this provides an empirical foundation for ethics that is consistent with physicalism. In this way, the useless ontological quagmire of what morals actually are is entirely avoided.

Do you mean before, during or after birth. How does this explain the mother who comes to witness her sons extinction on death row upon being convicted of rape/murder? I can only guess that she would gladly take his place for believing that morals are hereditary.
Morality is a matter of life and death, not only for individuals but for civilization as well. Important stuff deserves important consideration.

 

[WarrenPlatts]

Dmstifik8ion, your writing style baffles me. By "Do you mean before, during or after birth[?]" I assume you are referring to learning about right and wrong ostensively at a young age--in which case the learning would take place after birth.

"How does this explain the mother who comes to witness her sons extinction on death row upon being convicted of rape/murder?" I guess you mean here that the son would not be on death row if the mother had properly taught her son the difference between right and wrong. In which case there are at least three explanations: (1) she did not properly teach her son causing her son to grow up a moral cripple; (2) she did properly teach her son, but he suffers from some sort of neurological problems; (3) she did properly teach her son, but for whatever sociological or personal reasons the son chose to do evil. What's the relevance, though? The mere fact that some people are evil does not eliminate the difference between right and wrong.

By this mystifying sentence, "I can only guess that she would gladly take his place for believing that morals are hereditary" I can only assume you misunderstood me when I wrote "learned ostensively". I should have been more clear. An ostensive definition is where one learns how a word is used by showing, rather than through other words. If you want to learn what 'yellow' means, you have to have someone show you. Same with the earliest development of morality within a child. Ostensive definitions have nothing to do directly with genetic heredity.

Then this statement, "Important stuff deserves important consideration" --which is rather ironic in a thread consisting of 56 sound bites--I assume you are implying that I have not given due consideration to this "stuff". This is a false accusation, however, as you can see for yourself if you also care about morality:

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=98081

 

[Dmstifik8ion]

Dmstifik8ion, your writing style baffles me. By "Do you mean before, during or after birth[?]" I assume you are referring to learning about right and wrong ostensively at a young age--in which case the learning would take place after birth.
"How does this explain the mother who comes to witness her sons extinction on death row upon being convicted of rape/murder?" I guess you mean here that the son would not be on death row if the mother had properly taught her son the difference between right and wrong. In which case there are at least three explanations: (1) she did not properly teach her son causing her son to grow up a moral cripple; (2) she did properly teach her son, but he suffers from some sort of neurological problems; (3) she did properly teach her son, but for whatever sociological or personal reasons the son chose to do evil. What's the relevance, though? The mere fact that some people are evil does not eliminate the difference between right and wrong.
By this mystifying sentence, "I can only guess that she would gladly take his place for believing that morals are hereditary" I can only assume you misunderstood me when I wrote "learned ostensively". I should have been more clear. An ostensive definition is where one learns how a word is used by showing, rather than through other words. If you want to learn what 'yellow' means, you have to have someone show you. Same with the earliest development of morality within a child. Ostensive definitions have nothing to do directly with genetic heredity.
Then this statement, "Important stuff deserves important consideration" --which is rather ironic in a thread consisting of 56 sound bites--I assume you are implying that I have not given due consideration to this "stuff". This is a false accusation, however, as you can see for yourself if you also care about morality:
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=98081

My apologies for my thinking out loud without providing context writing style. What seems perfectly clear to me is evidently confusing to you. I share with you in this dilemma as I have difficulty myself with your writing style; (this is not meant as a criticism of your style, just an explanation). Please consider all responses as an attempt to arrive at understanding and truth rather than a pointed refutation of your position.

There is a third option: moral realism. Moral claims (as opposed to moral absolutes which are necessarily true) are either true or false. We learn the definitions of (I would change this to for since definitions as given are not necessarily accurate) right and wrong ostensively from our mothers; this provides an empirical foundation for ethics that is consistent with physicalism. In this way, the useless ontological quagmire of what morals actually are is entirely avoided.

Perhaps the confusion can be deciphered by an understanding of my method (or madness if you prefer). I do not attempt to drag reality out of a quagmire of false premises and fuzzy (if not faulty) logic. Also confusion can arise out of an inability to distinguish whether a statement is of ones position or to refute another’s. Sometimes (and it seems to me more often that not) we need to start with a clean slate and define, or at lest reaffirm, the basics.
Once these are established we are in a position where ironing out the details becomes possible. If we can not agree at least on the basics then further exploits quickly degenerate in incoherence.

I am providing the following because this is the best I have to offer for the moment. I hope it is a little better slop than the slop I left you with last time.

Morality first arises as the availability of a choice and the means to choose becomes a reality. Next a basis for making the best possible choice must be established.
Morality has as least two primary interrelated and coexisting paradigms; personal and interpersonal morality.

On a personal level it involves the reasoning that leads to making the best possible choice in the face of an alternative; the most primary alternative of all and obviously the most important, life and death but beyond this the ultimately achievable quality of life.

Interpersonal morality has two main derivative but related branches; relationships between two individuals and the relationship between different individuals in a group; this group might be an association or society, humanity, as a whole.

When morality involves more than one person, agreement upon the rules is essential to the success of a moral code and the resulting success in the case of humanity of civilization. It would be ideal if everyone could agree on such a moral code. Up until this moment in history unanimous agreement seems unlikely if not impossible so a more reasonable goal might be to have as wide ranging an agreement as possible with no more restrictions placed upon individuals or groups than is absolutely necessary. In this framework where it becomes necessary to enforce certain moral precepts upon those for whom agreement is not appreciated for its inherent value, the more people who appreciate the justification for a given moral precept, the more people will stand behind it and the easier and less costly in terms of human suffering it will be to enforce.

No moral precept should limit individual freedom beyond an absolute necessity and tolerance should be viewed as a benefit to us all in respect to enjoying our individual freedoms.

This brings us to a point where it becomes essential to define what is and what constitutes an absolute necessity. Life stands out as an obvious precondition for, let alone an absolute standard for establishing morality. Choice quickly follows as an obvious precondition since without choice there would be no need for or the ways and means to determine what those standards are.

 

[russ_watters]

I realize I haven't participated in this thread, but this caught my eye:

Moral absolutism is a given if the existence of an absolute moral authority is presupposed.

True, but irrelevant, because...

Without an absolute moral law giver, there can be no moral absolutism. We are left with moral relativism, which is an eminently human construct.

Not true. There are absolute physical laws of the universe as well (gravity) - does that require that there is a law-giver for physics? Certainly not.

BTW, I believe nothing to be more dangerous than moral absolutism (and in fact, fundamentalist religion is a very dangerous thing). Thank god for moral relativism.

Well, consider this: one of my best friends is an athiest and a moral absolutist. He recognizes the logic in, for example, the fact that murder is detrimental to society and is thus morally wrong. If it is religion that you are afraid of, then you are making a logical leap that is not necessary. If you set aside your preconception of religious implications and consider the morality on its logical and functional basis alone, you may find that you will agree that absolute morality works through logic alone. That is what happened in these seminars I went to in college, that I've discussed in other threads: most people start with a knee-jerk rejection of moral absolutism because they don't like the religious (and know-it-all-ist) implications of it. But the seminars force them to examine moral absolutism absent of any religious context and as a result, most eventually conclude that moral absolutism works and moral relativism is self-contradictory and fatally flawed.

 

[russ_watters]

Welcome to the discussion Dawguard. Could you outline for us in what way the proposition that everyone can make up their own moral code nullifies itself? I can see how it might nullify the concept of morality, but that is not quite the same thing.

I think that's probably what Dawguard was going for. Either way, that is what I have argued in the past: if morality is truly relative, then there is no basis for any person to tell any other person that what they are doing is wrong. The basis for societal laws (not to mention international relations) goes out the window - the US Constituiton is not just a contract, it is also based on "self-evident truths": moral absolutes. The founding fathers recognized that moral relativity -> anarchy. If we live in a moral relativistic society, then this society is a house of cards, ready to collapse the moment a person asserts individual relative morality as a justification for a crime in court. The closest we've come, however, is people arguing for religous free exercise as a justification for crimes (ironic, since it's a religious justification for relative morality...). Such arguments always fail because it is a fundamental component of our Constitution that the moral code on which it is based trumps even individual religious freedom.

 

[WarrenPlatts]

the US Constituiton is not just a contract, it is also based on "self-evident truths": moral absolutes. . . . The closest we've come [to moral relativity], however, is people arguing for religous free exercise as a justification for crimes (ironic, since it's a religious justification for relative morality...). Such arguments always fail because it is a fundamental component of our Constitution that the moral code on which it is based trumps even individual religious freedom.

Actually, the reference to self-evidence comes from the Declaration of Independence--not the Constitution. And the truth it refers to is that all men "are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights". Yet judging by your sardonic comments regarding believers, you yourself must not believe that 'rights are God-given' to be self-evident.

So just what do you mean by "self-evident moral absolutes"?

Perhaps you think that moral absolutes are analytically self-evident, but surely not in the sense of 'bachelors are unmarried males'. We wouldn't want moral absolutes to rest on definitional fiat. The other possibility is that moral absolutes are self-evident in the same sense that '2 + 2 = 4' or '~(p & ~p)' are self-evident. But in that case, how can moral absolutes have anything concrete to say about the real world of blood, sweat, and tears that we humans live in?

So maybe moral absolutes are empirically self-evident--sort of like how 'it is raining' or perhaps 'if you've ever been mistreated then you know just what I'm talking about' are self-evident. When people are on the receiving end of mistreatment, it's pretty self-evident to them. Indeed, the vast majority of the Declaration is a long list of grievances against the King of England, suggesting this is the kind of self-evidence that the Founding Fathers had in mind. Yet, I sense that you would not be satisfied with an empirical account of moral "absolutes". After all, it is sunny at my location as I write this, but why deify this fact by calling it an "Absolute"? Correct me if I'm wrong.

You all keep referring to "Moral Absolutes", yet none of you has yet said what a "Moral Absolute" actually IS.

BTW it is unconstitutional to make the free exersize of religion a crime (1st Amendment).

 

[WarrenPlatts]

OK, I'm still waiting for someone to tell me what a Moral Absolute actually IS. . . . Probably will have to wait forever. . . .

 

[Dawguard]

OK, I'm still waiting for someone to tell me what a Moral Absolute actually IS. . . . Probably will have to wait forever. . . .

It is impossible to say, "here is a moral, and it is absolute." The truth of the matter is that morals must be believed, and never proved. While this seems to contradict most people's logical inclanation we must also consider the opposite. To not believe in morals simply becuase they cannot be proven will result in catastrophe. Do you want an entire society thinking anything is OK so long as they get away with it? I know that this directly opposite the common idea that we should believe what we know and no more; but sometimes something has to be believed in even though it might not exist and can never be proven. Morals are one of these things, and whether you say they came from God, Karma, or ourselves, the most essential thing is that we agree they are real. Moral relativism erodes this belief, for reasons I have stated elswhere, and therefore I am forced to hold with absolutism.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Dawguard, I couldn't agree more with your sensible post. Let me add a couple of additional points:

• Morals are a society phenomena, not primarily an individual one
• Morals vary over a society, with partisans, opponents, and a more tepid center
• Morals are always in flux, over a decade major changes can be seen

To illustrate these points consider divorce, abortion, and gay marriage. A century ago the great majority of Americans would have agreed that all three were unthinkably immoral. Fifty years ago divorce was accepted (gingerly) but abortion and gay marriage remained beyond the pale. Today the situation is as we all know: abortion is bitterly controversial but accepted (gingerly) as a fact by a majority, while the majority still is very disapproving of gay marriage. I cite these examples not to suggest a trend or predict the future, but just to show that deeply felt moral values can change over time.

 

[Dmstifik8ion]

The problem with moral absolutes is that once discovered and defined most people fear being confined to practicing them. Funny thing about this is that we suffer the benefits of following them and the consequences of not following them whether we define them or not. In a very real and inescapable way one is responsible for the consequences of ones actions, (a moral absolute), again, whether they choose to acknowledge this or not. One real benefit of defining and proving moral absolutes is that it demonstrates the justification for defending and protecting individual rights and freedoms in a court of reason.

 

[arildno]

Dawguard, I couldn't agree more with your sensible post. Let me add a couple of additional points:

• Morals are a society phenomena, not primarily an individual one
• Morals vary over a society, with partisans, opponents, and a more tepid center
• Morals are always in flux, over a decade major changes can be seen

To illustrate these points consider divorce, abortion, and gay marriage. A century ago the great majority of Americans would have agreed that all three were unthinkably immoral. Fifty years ago divorce was accepted (gingerly) but abortion and gay marriage remained beyond the pale. Today the situation is as we all know: abortion is bitterly controversial but accepted (gingerly) as a fact by a majority, while the majority still is very disapproving of gay marriage. I cite these examples not to suggest a trend or predict the future, but just to show that deeply felt moral values can change over time.

And a follow-up in the other direction so that it becomes clear that there isn't just a trend in terms of "loosening of morals":
1. Corporal punishment of kids
This was considered both effective and morally acceptable (within proper limits).
It was seen as essential that children were corrected, so that they did not become spoiled and/or "soft".

2. Slapping your wife at times if she was a nag or pest

 

[WarrenPlatts]

OK, so you're making a little progress. As far as I can tell, you all are saying that a moral is a sentence, containing a moral predicate like good or evil or right or wrong. You believe that such sentences have a truth-value, but such sentences are not provable at least in the logical sense of proof. Moreover, the truth-values of such sentences are subject to change over time, am I right? If I understand you correctly, then, why add the qualification 'absolute' to your definition of morals as sentences? What further use does 'absolute' serve? In other words, how does your version of moral absolutism differ from the more ordinary moral realism of Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, for example?

 

[Dawguard]

The inherent properties of morals, i.e. their insubstantiality, make them impossible to prove. Therefore no one moral can be completely proven to be absolute. However, there are very few alternitives to absolutism. Relativism will lead to the belief in no morals, for reasons I have said otherwhere; a belief in no morals certanly is the last thing I want; so that left absolutism. While we must discover what they are by simply experimenting and hitting on the best result, the simple belief that they are absolute will sustain them while nothing else can. Such absolutes were found in statements like, "All men are created equal". Certanly this is moraly correct, and to believe it isn't will lead only to suffering. Moral realism seems like a middle ground between absolutism and relativism. What it does is ignore the fact that absolutism never claims to know what all the absolutes are, only that they do, in fact, exist. We have certain foundations and we learn from there, as does everything in human history. Thus, little by little and with each passing age we make progress and discover what our absolute morals are and how to apply them to society.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Relativism will lead to the belief in no morals, for reasons I have said otherwhere; a belief in no morals certanly is the last thing I want!

So what? Neither the world nor society is in business to make you (or me) feel good.

 

[WarrenPlatts]

The inherent properties of morals, i.e. their insubstantiality, make them impossible to prove. Therefore no one moral can be completely proven to be absolute.

See, this is where you lose me. Thinking of morals as "insubstantial" entities is ontologically extravagant and epistemologically otiose. On the principle of Ockham's razor, it is much better to think of morals as actual sentences as concrete and meaningful as the pixels on your computer screen that you are reading at this moment. Therefore, since moral sentences--we can call them "morals" if you like--are as meaningful as any other sentence written down or spoken in English, then such sentences are either true or false.

We have certain foundations and we learn from there, as does everything in human history.

Here, we can agree that foundations are necessary. The advantage of moral realism, however, is that it offers a concrete foundation, whereas moral absolutism rests on a "spooky" or, as you say, insubstantial foundation.

If we grant that morals are a type of sentence, then let us further grant that moral sentences must include a moral predicate of some kind, at a minimum, one of these four words: 'right', 'wrong', 'good', or 'evil'. Thus, 'All men are created equal' should, strictly speaking, be rewritten as something like 'it is right that x treats y and z equally' where x, y, and z are all fellow humans. Thus, the question is, how are moral predicates to be defined?

We can't define moral predicates in nonmoral terms. That would be to commit the naturalistic fallacy of G. E. Moore. Indeed, if we could so define moral predicates in nonmoral terms, it would be possible to completely eliminate moral predicates from the language--and we agree that we can't do that.

Furthermore, it is useless to define moral terms circularly, as if we could say 'moral' means the same as 'right' which means the same as 'good' which means the same as 'ethical' which means the same as 'moral', etc.

So, one alternative is the one that you (and Moore) propose, that morals are insubstantial and can only be accessed through a spooky faculty of moral intuition.

Or, we can learn the meaning of 'right' and 'wrong' ostensively, like we learn the definition of 'yellow'. It does no good to explain to a person blind from birth that yellow is the color of egg yolks and ripe lemons. To know the meaning of 'yellow', yellow must be experienced. Similarly, for the moral predicates. So, if you had an alien friend who wanted to learn English, you might show him a grown man extinguishing a cigarette on the skin of a baby, and then say 'That is wrong!' And so your friend might be confused at first, so then you show him some teenagers setting fire to a cat, and you say again 'That is wrong!' The alien then begins to see the common thread.

An example from English literature of this process comes from Dickenson's A Christmas Carol. Scrooge has forgot the meaning of 'right' and 'wrong' that he learned as a child because of decades being a ruthless capitalist pig. So the various spirits out to teach him a lesson don't tell him the meaning of 'right' and 'wrong', they instead show Scrooge various scenes where Scrooge is able to experience right and wrong for himself, and Scrooge thereby regains his humanity--and indeed, what other defining mark is there for humanity, other than our capacity to be moral, i.e., to be humane?

With the ostensive definition of 'wrong' now in hand, it is possible to theorize about the wrongness of situations where the wrongness is far from obvious. For example, stealing a $10 item from a WalMart store would have the consequence of reducing the annual earnings of WalMart by 0.00000000001%, or whatever, so that the harm is negligible--yet we probably still want to say that it is wrong that someone shoplifts, other things being equal.

And so we proceed, historically, and our theories are bound to evolve as society evolves, but now morality is built on the firm foundation of empirical experience rather than an insubstantial pie-in-the-sky that can only be accessed through extrasensory perception.

 

[Dawguard]

See, this is where you lose me. Thinking of morals as "insubstantial" entities is ontologically extravagant and epistemologically otiose. On the principle of Ockham's razor, it is much better to think of morals as actual sentences as concrete and meaningful as the pixels on your computer screen that you are reading at this moment. Therefore, since moral sentences--we can call them "morals" if you like--are as meaningful as any other sentence written down or spoken in English, then such sentences are either true or false.
Here, we can agree that foundations are necessary. The advantage of moral realism, however, is that it offers a concrete foundation, whereas moral absolutism rests on a "spooky" or, as you say, insubstantial foundation.
If we grant that morals are a type of sentence, then let us further grant that moral sentences must include a moral predicate of some kind, at a minimum, one of these four words: 'right', 'wrong', 'good', or 'evil'. Thus, 'All men are created equal' should, strictly speaking, be rewritten as something like 'it is right that x treats y and z equally' where x, y, and z are all fellow humans. Thus, the question is, how are moral predicates to be defined?
We can't define moral predicates in nonmoral terms. That would be to commit the naturalistic fallacy of G. E. Moore. Indeed, if we could so define moral predicates in nonmoral terms, it would be possible to completely eliminate moral predicates from the language--and we agree that we can't do that.
Furthermore, it is useless to define moral terms circularly, as if we could say 'moral' means the same as 'right' which means the same as 'good' which means the same as 'ethical' which means the same as 'moral', etc.
So, one alternative is the one that you (and Moore) propose, that morals are insubstantial and can only be accessed through a spooky faculty of moral intuition.
Or, we can learn the meaning of 'right' and 'wrong' ostensively, like we learn the definition of 'yellow'. It does no good to explain to a person blind from birth that yellow is the color of egg yolks and ripe lemons. To know the meaning of 'yellow', yellow must be experienced. Similarly, for the moral predicates. So, if you had an alien friend who wanted to learn English, you might show him a grown man extinguishing a cigarette on the skin of a baby, and then say 'That is wrong!' And so your friend might be confused at first, so then you show him some teenagers setting fire to a cat, and you say again 'That is wrong!' The alien then begins to see the common thread.
An example from English literature of this process comes from Dickenson's A Christmas Carol. Scrooge has forgot the meaning of 'right' and 'wrong' that he learned as a child because of decades being a ruthless capitalist pig. So the various spirits out to teach him a lesson don't tell him the meaning of 'right' and 'wrong', they instead show Scrooge various scenes where Scrooge is able to experience right and wrong for himself, and Scrooge thereby regains his humanity--and indeed, what other defining mark is there for humanity, other than our capacity to be moral, i.e., to be humane?
With the ostensive definition of 'wrong' now in hand, it is possible to theorize about the wrongness of situations where the wrongness is far from obvious. For example, stealing a $10 item from a WalMart store would have the consequence of reducing the annual earnings of WalMart by 0.00000000001%, or whatever, so that the harm is negligible--yet we probably still want to say that it is wrong that someone shoplifts, other things being equal.
And so we proceed, historically, and our theories are bound to evolve as society evolves, but now morality is built on the firm foundation of empirical experience rather than an insubstantial pie-in-the-sky that can only be accessed through extrasensory perception.

Your definition of morals depends entirely on right and wrong. Saying that morals are sentences, consider the sentence, "It is wrong to kill an innocent person". This is a moral, but to be truly understood every word of the sentence must be defined. What then is wrong? It cannot be used in a factual sense, so it must be referring to morally wrong. What then is morally wrong, and what are morals? Do you see the problem? You are using morals to define themselves. Also, why is it wrong, if you know what wrong is. What makes it wrong for you to do something? Take for example shooting someone: there is nothing physicaly "wrong" about using a bullet to alter an organic mass. Therefore the idea has to stem from inherent rights of human beings which do not have anything physical to them. While words and sentences are used to define this ambiguous "thing", the words themselves only represent them. Certanly while Ockham's Razor says it is better to accept the simplest solution, it does not say that solution is always correct.
Not only that, but your method of teaching right and wrong is nothing more then simple brainwashing. It has no reason behind it, since it is composed only of repetition. Using your example of a Christmas Carol, Scrooge was convinced of right and wrong becuase of what he had drilled into him as a child. he was remebering, nothing more, and the rembrences were those of simple repetition. One could use this ostensive method to teach people it is wrong to be kind and good to steal. In this regard moral realism slips into moral relativism and allows each person to have their own morals. After all, brainwashing was used to teach people that the Earth was the center of the solar system, but we all know how well that turned out. Reason will always prevail, and so people will question their ostensively learned morals.
So, having ruled out morals as sentences, and showing that ostensive learning will collapse on itself, I am still left with only absolutism. What we must understand is that morals are undefinable. It goes against anyone who has any morals at all, for nobody likes to hear that they are believing in something that might not even exist. Why do you think atheism is so opposed by religious groups? Unfortunatly morals and religion are very alike, and neither a god nor a moral can be proven. Perhaps this is why they were always connected?
Unlike religion however, it is dangerous to say that there are no morals. I go back to what I said a few posts back, that you cannot have a society believe anythign is OK as long as they get away with it. Therefore relativism is disqualified, and realism is disqualified. Eventually people will question whether the morals they believe are real, and they will come to see that they cannot be proven. They will then cast them off utterly, and that would be calamity. Instead of trying to say they exist, what we should be teaching is the importance of those things we know cultivate a good society, and use those as morals. Such things would be; people are equal, don't kill, steal, rape, commit purgury, etc. These then become our morals, and they must be absolute if they are to be believed.
Oh, by the way, pie-in-the-sky and extrasencorsy perception is utter nonsense. Reason and logic are the only things to reach that which we cannot see.

 

[Dawguard]

So what? Neither the world nor society is in business to make you (or me) feel good.

It is not to make you feel good, and it is for no one's benefit in particular. Consider what happens when there are no morals. Anything is acceptabel so long as you aren't caught. Where does this lead? To selfish corruption, especially by those in power. Wow, corruption by those in power, who would've thought that possible? Anyway, this further leads to people only looking out for their own interets; they have no motivation to do otherwise. Now, how can a society continue when its people only care about themselves? They will have no vision of the future and will squander everything away in the present. The next generation wastes what is left, and so one until there is nothing but ignorance and poverty.
See the problem? Morals are not intended to make you "feel better". Go to a phyciatrist if you want that, don't come to me and so its none of my business. I want no part of it. My interest is sheer survival; I couldn't care less if it makes you feel good or bad.

 

[WarrenPlatts]

Your definition of morals depends entirely on right and wrong. Saying that morals are sentences, consider the sentence, "It is wrong to kill an innocent person". This is a moral, but to be truly understood every word of the sentence must be defined. What then is wrong? It cannot be used in a factual sense, so it must be referring to morally wrong. What then is morally wrong, and what are morals? Do you see the problem? You are using morals to define themselves. Also, why is it wrong, if you know what wrong is. What makes it wrong for you to do something?

Of course my definition of morals qua moral sentences depends on moral right and wrong. What else can a moral possibly be based on? There is nothing circular about writing 'it is morally wrong that p' and calling that sentence a moral sentence.

The only thing that I can guess that you're trying to get at is that you believe that "morals" take the logical form of an imperative rather than a description. That is you want to write down 'Do not kill babies!' But imperatives are logically problematic, however. For one thing, imperatives don't have truth-values in the ordi0nary sense. What is the truth-value of 'Shut the door!' or 'Shut up!'? In addition, the imperative form begs the question as to why someone should not kill babies. If you accepted God's authority, then you could follow the command 'Do not kill babies' without worrying why by trusting in God--but you do not trust in God.

On the other hand, the general description 'it is wrong that someone kills a baby' obviously has a truth-value, and it also says why one should not kill babies--one shouldn't kill babies because it's morally wrong to kill babies.

'Moral wrong' itself cannot be defined, however, as you agree. Likewise 'yellow' cannot be defined--a blind person will never be able to fully understand the concept. Similarly, there will be people who, through whatever reasons of nurture and nature will never "get" the concept of moral wrongness--they are moral cripples. If you see someome torturing a baby, and you will not assent to the sentence 'That is wrong!', the best that can be said for you is that you don't understand English, and at worst, you must be mentally deranged. You could not properly be described as evil, however; an evil person clearly recognizes the moral wrongness, but chooses to laugh and participate in the moral wrongness himself. The rapist knows what he is doing is wrong, yet he freely chooses to do it anyway--THAT is evil. I hope you don't disagree. . . .

your method of teaching right and wrong is nothing more then simple brainwashing. It has no reason behind it, since it is composed only of repetition. . . . One could use this ostensive method to teach people it is wrong to be kind and good to steal.

If one learns multiplication tables through a certain amount of repitition, that amounts to brainwashing?!? I don't think so. The mere fact that repetition is involved in the process of learning does not entail that there is no reasoning behind what is being taught. And sure its possible to teach some one that good is evil and evil is good and yellow is blue and black is white, but whatever it is that such a perverse teacher was teaching, it would certainly not be the English language.

And moral rules are not learned ostensively. Moral rules are generalizations that are learned inductively after witnessing particular events. We see a particular baby being tortured, then we generalize, and come up with the general rule 'it is wrong that anyone tortures any baby'.

Instead of trying to say they exist, what we should be teaching is the importance of those things we know cultivate a good society, and use those as morals. . . . These then become our morals, and they must be absolute if they are to be believed.

The first part is what I've been saying all along, so we're getting somewhere. But we don't believe in such morals because they are "absolute" (whatever that means); rather we believe them simply because they are true.

Oh, by the way, pie-in-the-sky and extrasencorsy perception is utter nonsense. Reason and logic are the only things to reach that which we cannot see.

Well, since ESP does not exist, I'll grant your point that nothing can be reached through ESP. On the other hand, if a thing doesn't exist at all, it's not going to be reached through logic or reason either. Moral realism can do all of the moral work that absolutism can, and because of moral realism's empirical foundation, it's possible to use logic and reason in order to argue for a given moral. Within moral absolutism, there is only the dull thud of conflicting intuitions.

 

[Dawguard]

Of course my definition of morals qua moral sentences depends on moral right and wrong. What else can a moral possibly be based on? There is nothing circular about writing 'it is morally wrong that p' and calling that sentence a moral sentence.
The only thing that I can guess that you're trying to get at is that you believe that "morals" take the logical form of an imperative rather than a description. That is you want to write down 'Do not kill babies!' But imperatives are logically problematic, however. For one thing, imperatives don't have truth-values in the ordi0nary sense. What is the truth-value of 'Shut the door!' or 'Shut up!'? In addition, the imperative form begs the question as to why someone should not kill babies. If you accepted God's authority, then you could follow the command 'Do not kill babies' without worrying why by trusting in God--but you do not trust in God.
On the other hand, the general description 'it is wrong that someone kills a baby'

Why?

obviously has a truth-value, and it also says why one should not kill babies--one shouldn't kill babies because it's morally wrong to kill babies.

This is using your own argument to justify itself. It's circular.
Let me make this plain. I've no preference over an imperitive statement or anything else. It really doesn't matter to me how you say it. In this, I think you've missed my point. Let me make it clearer: sentences and words express moral truths but are not themselves morals. However you word a sentence, whether imperitive or not, does no make it an actual moral. I could say anything, such as "it is morally acceptable to kill a baby", but that doesn't make it correct. Therefore sentences cannot be morals.

'Moral wrong' itself cannot be defined, however, as you agree.

Then how can you claim to know it? How can you claim that words, which are nothing more then representations, represent that which cannot be defined? What good is a word if you don't know what it is? The foundation of your moral claims rests on something you don't know.

Likewise 'yellow' cannot be defined--a blind person will never be able to fully understand the concept. Similarly, there will be people who, through whatever reasons of nurture and nature will never "get" the concept of moral wrongness--they are moral cripples. If you see someome torturing a baby, and you will not assent to the sentence 'That is wrong!', the best that can be said for you is that you don't understand English, and at worst, you must be mentally deranged. You could not properly be described as evil, however; an evil person clearly recognizes the moral wrongness, but chooses to laugh and participate in the moral wrongness himself. The rapist knows what he is doing is wrong, yet he freely chooses to do it anyway--THAT is evil. I hope you don't disagree. . . .

No, I don't disagree there.

If one learns multiplication tables through a certain amount of repitition, that amounts to brainwashing?!? I don't think so. The mere fact that repetition is involved in the process of learning does not entail that there is no reasoning behind what is being taught.

The equation is not similar. Multiplication tables can be proven by logic. And yes, they are a form of brainwashing, since I could take a toddler and convince him that five times five equals six. What I couldn't do is prove it, and when he grows older he will doubtless question my reasoning. With multiplication tables they are blatanly true and no one would question them for more then two seconds. With morals it is different, because you cannot prove them to be right. Therefore to simply try to pound ideas into their head will always fail.

And moral rules are not learned ostensively. Moral rules are generalizations that are learned inductively after witnessing particular events. We see a particular baby being tortured, then we generalize, and come up with the general rule 'it is wrong that anyone tortures any baby'.

If you grew up in a society where torturing babies was normal, you would not have this reaction. You wouldn't even think twice about it. How can you base morals on a gut reaction? This sounds like an excuse to justify relativism which is entirely based individual feeling. What if I am a sociopath and haev no averse reaction? Why does your thought that it is wrong make it wrong for me?
I hope you see the relatavism that realism leads to. Realism is nothing more then an attempt to make relativistic morals seem concrete. While I am glad that realism is not as flippant as relativism I cannoot accept it. We must look to the end product of our thoughts and base everything around that.

 

[WarrenPlatts]

However you word a sentence, whether imperitive or not, does no make it an actual moral. I could say anything, such as "it is morally acceptable to kill a baby", but that doesn't make it correct. Therefore sentences cannot be morals.

I must not have been clear enough. Let me reiterate: A moral is a true sentence containing a moral predicate. Therefore, since the sentence 'it is morally acceptable to kill babies' is false, that sentence does not count as a genuine moral. Therefore, your counterargument does not apply to moral realism.

But OK, you've made it plain that you don't think that "morals" are true sentences containing moral predicates. Then I repeat my question: what are morals?

You say they are not concrete. You say they are not pie-in-the-sky. Are they abstract entities then? Platonic forms? If there were no humans, would absolute morals still exist? Where do they exist if not in this universe?

You say morals are not definable, yet they can be "reached" through logic and reason, but really, the only justification you've given so far is a pragmatic one: it's good for society if people believe in morals, and they are more likely to believe in morals if we say they are absolute. So basically, morality is in our enlightened self-interest, so we should believe in morals, and we call them "absolute" in order to get more people to believe in them. But enlightened self-interest has never been an adequate foundation for ethics, and pragmatism is but one step removed from relativism. Relativism says do what you want. Pragmatism says do whatever works--for you! So, until you can come up with better logic and reason, it seems you're stuck in the same boat as you say I'm in.

But I'm not stuck in the same boat as the relativists. Just because ancient cultures used to sacrifice babies, it does not follow that the moral realist position that the sentence 'it is wrong that someone tortures babies' is not objectively true. I can only speak from my position as a person raised in a modern, English-speaking civilization, but you are probably correct that if I was raised as an Aztec, I wouldn't have a problem with human sacrifice. Yet, according to moral realism, it would still be morally wrong that I participated in human sacrifice notwithstanding that I actually sacrificed humans. Like I said earlier, there are moral cripples. According to moral realism, a human-sacrificing Aztec would be a moral cripple--though not necessarily evil because they just didn't know the difference between right and wrong. If you were to say that human sacrifice was moral--for Aztecs--THAT is moral relativism. But surely that's not your position. . . .

To use your own analogy, just because someone is brainwashed into believing that 2 + 2 = 5, it does not follow that someone taught through repetition that 2 + 2 = 4 did not learn the truth. Similarly, if someone was raised to think that sacrificing babies to Satan is morally good, it does not follow that someone properly brought up to think that it is morally wrong to sacrifice babies did not learn the objective truth. Just because repetition is involved in learning falsities as well as truth, it does not follow that truth learned through repetition is not truth. Correct me if I'm wrong.

Regarding the indefinability of the moral predicates: as you say, words are intended to represent something. Some words represent simple things, and some words represent complex things. Thus words representing complex things can be defined using words that represent simple things. For example, I could define the word 'horse' as meaning the same as 'a large, solid-hoofed, herbivorous quadruped'.

Alas, it is not so easy with words that represent simple things. Take for example, the word 'yellow'. Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines 'yellow' as 'a color like that of egg yolk, ripe lemons, etc.' But what kind of a definition is THAT? Does 'yellow' mean the same as 'egg yolk', or does 'yellow' mean the same as 'ripe lemon'? I don't think it's either. Rather, if you want to know the definition of 'yellow' the dictionary instructs you to find an egg, crack it open, and look at the yolk, then find a ripe lemon and compare the two, and you will see for yourself the one thing that the egg yolk and the ripe lemon have in common: YELLOW!

Oh my God! Repetition! Again! !Que horrible!

In other words, the dictionary itself gives an ostensive definition (look it up!) for the word 'yellow'.

And so it is with the moral predicates. The predicate 'morally wrong' is intended to represent something. The problem is that something is simple, just like yellow is simple. So moral terms cannot be defined using nonmoral terms, in the way 'horse' can be defined using nonhorse terms. So, to say, as you have come close to saying, that 'that which is morally good is that which is conducive to survival' commits a logical fallacy, the naturalistic fallacy, first identified by G.E. Moore in his 1903 Principia Ethica. Similarly, some animal rights activists would like to define 'morally wrong' as 'causing suffering'. But this is like saying that 'yellow' means the same as 'lemon'.

So, moral predicates like 'morally wrong' cannot be defined in nonmoral terms. All I can do is show you suffering, murdering, cheating, mutilating, raping, wasting, vandalizing, etc. But 'morally wrong' does not mean the same as 'suffering', nor does 'morally wrong' mean the same as 'murdering', etc., nor does 'morally wrong' mean all those things taken together. Rather, 'morally wrong' is that quality that all those things have in common, just as 'yellow' represents that quality that egg yolks, ripe lemons, and ripe bananas all have in common.

Sorry, that's the best I can do. But it's also the best anyone else can do. . . .

And a final note, the ostensive definition of 'morally wrong' is absolutely NOT based on a "gut reaction", as you have suggested. Of course feelings of outrage are present upon witnessing a man beat a cripple in a wheelchair. However, feelings of outrage are also present in situations where there is no reason to suppose that something immoral has happened, as when one is caught in a traffic jam.

 

[Dawguard]

I must not have been clear enough. Let me reiterate: A moral is a true sentence containing a moral predicate. Therefore, since the sentence 'it is morally acceptable to kill babies' is false, that sentence does not count as a genuine moral.

Why? What makes it wrong? How can you prove that is not the actual moral truth? My only point is that morals cannot be proven as such.

But OK, you've made it plain that you don't think that "morals" are true sentences containing moral predicates. Then I repeat my question: what are morals?
You say they are not concrete. You say they are not pie-in-the-sky. Are they abstract entities then? Platonic forms? If there were no humans, would absolute morals still exist? Where do they exist if not in this universe?

The closest you could come to defining them would be laws of ideas. Like laws of physics they are not real in an inherent sense, but no one can deny the law of inertia is absolutely true. Problem is, inertia can be proved through observation while morals cannot.

You say morals are not definable, yet they can be "reached" through logic and reason, but really, the only justification you've given so far is a pragmatic one: it's good for society if people believe in morals, and they are more likely to believe in morals if we say they are absolute. So basically, morality is in our enlightened self-interest, so we should believe in morals, and we call them "absolute" in order to get more people to believe in them. But enlightened self-interest has never been an adequate foundation for ethics, and pragmatism is but one step removed from relativism. Relativism says do what you want. Pragmatism says do whatever works--for you! So, until you can come up with better logic and reason, it seems you're stuck in the same boat as you say I'm in.
But I'm not stuck in the same boat as the relativists. Just because ancient cultures used to sacrifice babies, it does not follow that the moral realist position that the sentence 'it is wrong that someone tortures babies' is not objectively true. I can only speak from my position as a person raised in a modern, English-speaking civilization, but you are probably correct that if I was raised as an Aztec, I wouldn't have a problem with human sacrifice. Yet, according to moral realism, it would still be morally wrong that I participated in human sacrifice notwithstanding that I actually sacrificed humans. Like I said earlier, there are moral cripples. According to moral realism, a human-sacrificing Aztec would be a moral cripple--though not necessarily evil because they just didn't know the difference between right and wrong. If you were to say that human sacrifice was moral--for Aztecs--THAT is moral relativism. But surely that's not your position. . . .

No, it is not my position. My only pragmatism is that morals must be believed no matter what. I might not have made myself clear enough, let me try to remedy that. Pragmatism should only be used to believe in morals, but the process of discovering what morals are is entirely separated from it.

Regarding the indefinability of the moral predicates: as you say, words are intended to represent something. Some words represent simple things, and some words represent complex things. Thus words representing complex things can be defined using words that represent simple things. For example, I could define the word 'horse' as meaning the same as 'a large, solid-hoofed, herbivorous quadruped'.
Alas, it is not so easy with words that represent simple things. Take for example, the word 'yellow'. Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines 'yellow' as 'a color like that of egg yolk, ripe lemons, etc.' But what kind of a definition is THAT? Does 'yellow' mean the same as 'egg yolk', or does 'yellow' mean the same as 'ripe lemon'? I don't think it's either. Rather, if you want to know the definition of 'yellow' the dictionary instructs you to find an egg, crack it open, and look at the yolk, then find a ripe lemon and compare the two, and you will see for yourself the one thing that the egg yolk and the ripe lemon have in common: YELLOW!
Oh my God! Repetition! Again! !Que horrible!
In other words, the dictionary itself gives an ostensive definition (look it up!) for the word 'yellow'.
And so it is with the moral predicates. The predicate 'morally wrong' is intended to represent something. The problem is that something is simple, just like yellow is simple. So moral terms cannot be defined using nonmoral terms, in the way 'horse' can be defined using nonhorse terms. So, to say, as you have come close to saying, that 'that which is morally good is that which is conducive to survival' commits a logical fallacy, the naturalistic fallacy, first identified by G.E. Moore in his 1903 Principia Ethica. Similarly, some animal rights activists would like to define 'morally wrong' as 'causing suffering'. But this is like saying that 'yellow' means the same as 'lemon'.
So, moral predicates like 'morally wrong' cannot be defined in nonmoral terms. All I can do is show you suffering, murdering, cheating, mutilating, raping, wasting, vandalizing, etc. But 'morally wrong' does not mean the same as 'suffering', nor does 'morally wrong' mean the same as 'murdering', etc., nor does 'morally wrong' mean all those things taken together. Rather, 'morally wrong' is that quality that all those things have in common, just as 'yellow' represents that quality that egg yolks, ripe lemons, and ripe bananas all have in common.
Sorry, that's the best I can do. But it's also the best anyone else can do. . . .

And it does a pretty good job. However, I thik you would agree that the list of things you said are completely wrong, i.e. absolutely wrong. Realism is simply a way of finding morals, and not saying that those morals are absolute or not. Therefore I say that realism and absolutism are not opposites, but rather could be considered complimentory to each other. Unfortunatly they somehow are considered 'alternitives' of each other, and this has most regretably led to an argument over something we basically agree on. I think that realism's way of finding morals is probably one of the best there is, and it appears that you think the morals you find through realism are absolute. Please correct me if I'm wrong about that, I wouldn't want to misinterpret your view.

 

[WarrenPlatts]

Originally Posted by WarrenPlatts
I must not have been clear enough. Let me reiterate: A moral is a true sentence containing a moral predicate. Therefore, since the sentence 'it is morally acceptable to kill babies' is false, that sentence does not count as a genuine moral.
Why? What makes it wrong? How can you prove that is not the actual moral truth? My only point is that morals cannot be proven as such.

According to moral realism, we are firmly in the realm of empiricism where nothing can be proved in the logical sense of proof at least. It is a truism of science that scientific truth is always accepted provisionally; similarly, for moral realism--unlike mathematical truth, which can be proved with zero doubt, and is therefore unrevisable, as long as the axioms remain the same. Even the law of inertia cannot be logically proved true. Einstein's version of the law of inertia is different from Newton's, and Einstein has not had the last word on inertia (cf. the latest paper by http://redshift.vif.com/JournalFiles/V13NO1PDF/V13N1MAS.pdf"). Nevertheless, you and I both know that for practical purposes, the moral 'it is wrong to torture babies' is as true as any truth of science--we can bet our lives on it--though neither it, nor the truths of science can be proved.

So, the question is, how do you know that 'it is morally wrong to torture babies' is true? I maintain you know it's true the same way I do, and that is empirically. In past posts you have vaguely alluded to the fact that bad s*** has happened to you in the past (I think that's why you believe that mere survival is the highest good). So you don't need anyone to tell you what 'moral wrong' means, because you have directly experienced it for yourself. And there's no point in seeking a proof of this knowledge, any more than seeking a proof for the fact that dandelion flowers are yellow.

However, I think you would agree that the list of things you said are completely wrong, i.e. absolutely wrong. Realism is simply a way of finding morals, and not saying that those morals are absolute or not. Therefore I say that realism and absolutism are not opposites, but rather could be considered complimentory to each other. Unfortunatly they somehow are considered 'alternitives' of each other, and this has most regretably led to an argument over something we basically agree on. I think that realism's way of finding morals is probably one of the best there is, and it appears that you think the morals you find through realism are absolute. Please correct me if I'm wrong about that, I wouldn't want to misinterpret your view.

I agree that you and I are basically on the same page. My main problem with moral absolutism is two-fold: (1) it doesn't provide an account as to how we know the truth of morals like 'it is wrong to torture babies'; and (2) the excess baggage of the connotations of totalitarianism and unrevisability that 'absolutism' carries with it.

For example, Osama bin Laden exemplifies this two-fold problem perfectly. He starts off on the wrong foot when he uses the Koran, instead of everyday experience as his moral foundation, and then climbing the ladder of logic and reason, concludes the moral that it's OK to nuke Americans by the millions is absolute and true. Now that he's arrived at his freakish moral philosophy that he believes is absolute, he has kicked down the ladder of reason and logic because he has no use for them anymore since he knows the absolute truth. So there is no use in reasoning or arguing with him anymore. On the other hand, while recognizing the reality of moral truth, moral realism retains a certain humility in that its truths are as provisional as the truths of science. For bin Laden, the truths of the Koran are absolute and unrevisable, and this leads to enslavement, chaos, death, and destruction.

But anyway, thanks for your comments. They have helped me to figure out how to express my own ideas more clearly.

 

[Dawguard]

I agree that you and I are basically on the same page. My main problem with moral absolutism is two-fold: (1) it doesn't provide an account as to how we know the truth of morals like 'it is wrong to torture babies'; and (2) the excess baggage of the connotations of totalitarianism and unrevisability that 'absolutism' carries with it.

Ah, the crux of the problem. I haven't been promoting the complete philosphy of absolutism. I've argued against relativism, and the only other option was absolutism. Realism is slightly different then either, and could be concidered the antidote to absolutism's problems; one that it desperatly needed. In this regard then, I completely agree with everything you have said.

 

[bao_ho]

A Good King will upbring his city.
That city will stockpile many fruit.
The citizens will divide into two classes.
One class works on creating free time.
The second class creates work from free time.
A mass orgy takes place.
The citizens multiply and outgrow The Good kings ability to uphold his city and citizen.
The City comes crashing down again.
History may repeat for some time...

 

[Dmstifik8ion]

Life and death are absolutes. Morals are to guide the choices of those with the capacity to choose. The life of those with the capacity and freedom to choose will only be defended by those who benefit from and therefore value that capacity and freedom.

It is the branch of philosophy devoted to ethics that must establish the relationship between the absolute of reality and the life and freedom of those for whom a proper moral guidance is understood to be an absolute necessity for their survival and well-being. The failure of ethics to substantiate this correlation will leave those not armed with the conviction of this truth vulnerable to those who prey upon the weak in body, mind and spirit. Determining what supports the existence of those with the capacity to choose and what is detrimental to their existence is the cornerstone in the foundation of a rationally based ethics.

Those involved with discovering and establishing ethical guidelines must understand that the existence and well-being of humanity is at stake. In the end reality will prove whether the moral percepts we choose to uphold and follow are absolutely right or wrong.

 

[octelcogopod]

I especially like the yellow egg analogy that Warren came up with.
When a human perceives yellow, the brain translates the lightwave frequencies into yellow, which is by an unknown process created in the consciousness (yet another unknown process.)

The quality of yellow is indeed like the quality of the moral dilemma of killing a baby.
But you realize how people always come up with baby killing in these discussions?
I've read it on several forums over the years. It seems to me that killing anything else, is morally up for discussion, which is kind of proof in itself.
Because if we say "killing your mother" or something, then that's not taken to the extreme (apparently), which means the other person might not find it morally disgusting.
This shows that morals are relative to the mind creating them.

Maybe that gut feeling we get, when we do something wrong as a child, may be just the way we're created. It must not mean that other species think the same.

There are also two different ways of looking at morals, objectively and subjectively.
For instance, say on a far away planet, people had to sacrifice their babies to an evil god every week, or else the god would kill 20 of their women.
The moral dilemma is of course; 1 baby sacrificed or 20 women sacrificed.
This is hard cold reality, where humans then apply the "problem", which is the moral dilemma.
The truth is that there is no solution to such a problem, it's up to the perceiver.
For instance the mothero fthe child would of course say "sacrifice the women!" and she would believe this to be right.
The others would perhaps say "sacrifice the baby! 20 women is not worth one baby!"
And here's the thing; we all get that gut feeling, when reading this; "but the baby is young and innocent, it doesn't deserve to die, it can live a happy life."

Where does that gut feeling come from? Does this signify objective moralism?
IMO no.
I think that this is the way we are born, it's the way we see things.
But as always, I will leave it up to science to figure it out.

 

[Dmstifik8ion]

I especially like the yellow egg analogy that Warren came up with.
When a human perceives yellow, the brain translates the lightwave frequencies into yellow, which is by an unknown process created in the consciousness (yet another unknown process.)

The quality of yellow is indeed like the quality of the moral dilemma of killing a baby.
But you realize how people always come up with baby killing in these discussions?
I've read it on several forums over the years. It seems to me that killing anything else, is morally up for discussion, which is kind of proof in itself.
Because if we say "killing your mother" or something, then that's not taken to the extreme (apparently), which means the other person might not find it morally disgusting.
This shows that morals are relative to the mind creating them.

Maybe that gut feeling we get, when we do something wrong as a child, may be just the way we're created. It must not mean that other species think the same.

There are also two different ways of looking at morals, objectively and subjectively.
For instance, say on a far away planet, people had to sacrifice their babies to an evil god every week, or else the god would kill 20 of their women.
The moral dilemma is of course; 1 baby sacrificed or 20 women sacrificed.
This is hard cold reality, where humans then apply the "problem", which is the moral dilemma.
The truth is that there is no solution to such a problem, it's up to the perceiver.
For instance the mothero fthe child would of course say "sacrifice the women!" and she would believe this to be right.
The others would perhaps say "sacrifice the baby! 20 women is not worth one baby!"
And here's the thing; we all get that gut feeling, when reading this; "but the baby is young and innocent, it doesn't deserve to die, it can live a happy life."

Where does that gut feeling come from? Does this signify objective moralism?
IMO no.
I think that this is the way we are born, it's the way we see things.
But as always, I will leave it up to science to figure it out.

Back here on Earth I say, "we kill the god".
The gut feeling is subjective; why we experience it is what must be determined objectively.

 

[pierre45]

I think the only absolute moral is expressed in the descriptive sense of the word, i.e. acting in ways consistent with your idea of a moral life is absolutely good, acting in ways that you believe are morally wrong is absolutely bad.

Inherent in that attempt to live a moral life is an attempt to reason out to the best of your abilities what actions are moral, and the degrees to which you fail to do so you are a moral failure.

It works more or less like a democracy when it comes to voting, the only absolutely bad citizen during an election is one who does not concern himself with attempting to define for himself through reason what he thinks the correct actions of the government should be, and also does not work to attempt to realize those actions. What conclusions that persons actually comes to, who they actually vote for, are really beside the point...if they have honestly attempted to do right to the best of their abilities they are successful, they are good.

Only in acting in ways in which we believe are wrong, and in not attempting to through reason define the best morals you can, can you fail in an absolute way.

But I don't think any of this could be proven to exist outside our own minds, unless our survival is the measuring stick.

 

[clouded.perception]

On the original post,
I'm confused.
What you've basically done is assume that morals ar absolute in order to prove that morals are absolute. You have assumed that one can have asolute wisdom and justice (which depend on morals) to show absolute morals.
Obviously, it still depends on context. (In my opinion) "Right" and "Wrong" are not absolute on a universal scale, but my own morals are absolute so long as they remain inside my own mind. Your morals are absolute IN YOUR PERSPECTIVE.
But as for your argument that opened the thread, it just looks to me like creative wordplay.

 

[Dawguard]

Obviously, it still depends on context. (In my opinion) "Right" and "Wrong" are not absolute on a universal scale, but my own morals are absolute so long as they remain inside my own mind. Your morals are absolute IN YOUR PERSPECTIVE.

I respecfully dissagree with, and let me explain why. If morals are based around perseption then my perception of what's right could be totally different then yours. OK you say, that's fine, that's what I say. Now what if my idea of morals is that they don't exist and I can do anything I want. In my mind its alright to tortue you to death. Does that make it right for me to do it to you? Of course not, because you think it's wrong. So who is right?
The simple fact is that we cannot isolate morals to individuals, they have to be based around a community. A such they cannot be dependent on individual opinion. Becuase they rely on everyone there must be laws regarding them that apply equally to everyone. If these laws are flexible and change, then something is both right and wrong, it just depends on the time. Such obvious duplicity would destroy the purpose of morals and as such is illogical. The only conclusion is that these equal laws must be absolute.

 

[RVBuckeye]

The simple fact is that we cannot isolate morals to individuals, they have to be based around a community. A such they cannot be dependent on individual opinion. Becuase they rely on everyone there must be laws regarding them that apply equally to everyone. If these laws are flexible and change, then something is both right and wrong, it just depends on the time. Such obvious duplicity would destroy the purpose of morals and as such is illogical. The only conclusion is that these equal laws must be absolute.

Someone tried that once already Dawguard. They were called the 10 commandments.

 

[Dawguard]

Someone tried that once already Dawguard. They were called the 10 commandments.

Just because they tried it once doesn't mean the method can't be refined and tried again and again until we can get it right. Will we ever truly understand everything about morals? Perhaps not, but we can at least learn and improve. The 10 commandments were a great system for the time, and a truly good legal system for the country. Now when we have freedom of religion, etc., we can improve on them. This does not abrigate the absolutness of morals, only recognizes that we do not know where those absolute boundries fall and must continuously struggle to find them.

 

[RVBuckeye]

Just because they tried it once doesn't mean the method can't be refined and tried again and again until we can get it right. Will we ever truly understand everything about morals? Perhaps not, but we can at least learn and improve. The 10 commandments were a great system for the time, and a truly good legal system for the country. Now when we have freedom of religion, etc., we can improve on them. This does not abrigate the absolutness of morals, only recognizes that we do not know where those absolute boundries fall and must continuously struggle to find them.

There are no absolute boundaries to morals. Morals are the reasoning out of your instincts.

The old theological problem of `faith' and `knowledge' ‑ or, more clearly, of instinct and reason ‑ that is to say, the question whether in regard to the evaluation of things instinct deserves to have more authority than rationality, which wants to evaluate and act according to reasons, according to a `why?', that is to say according to utility and fitness for a purpose ‑ this is still that old moral problem which first appeared in the person of Socrates and was already dividing the minds of men long before Christianity. Socrates himself, to be sure, had, with the taste appropriate to his talent ‑ that of a superior dialectician ‑ initially taken the side of reason; and what indeed did he do all his life long but laugh at the clumsy incapacity of his noble Athenians, who were men of instinct, like all noble men, and were never able to supply adequate information about the reasons for their actions? Ultimately, however, in silence and secrecy, he laughed at himself too: he found in himself, before his more refined conscience and self‑interrogation, the same difficulty and incapacity. But why, he exhorted himself, should one therefore abandon the instincts! One must help both them and reason to receive their due one must follow the instincts, but persuade reason to aid them with good arguments. This was the actual falsity of that great ironist, who had so many secrets; he induced his conscience to acquiesce in a sort of self‑outwitting: fundamentally he had seen through the irrational aspect of moral judgement. ‑ Plato, more innocent in such things and without the craftiness of the plebeian, wanted at the expenditure of all his strength ‑ the greatest strength any philosopher has hitherto had to expend! ‑ to prove to himself that reason and instinct move of themselves towards one goal, towards the good, towards `God'; and since Plato all theologians and philosophers have followed the same path ‑ that is to say, in moral matters instinct, or as the Christians call it `faith', or as I call it `the herd', has hitherto triumphed. One might have to exclude Descartes, the father of rationalism (and consequently the grandfather of the Revolution), who recognized only the authority of reason: but reason is only an instrument, and Descartes was superficial.
- Nietzsche, Beyond good and evil

Thought this was relevant as pointing out instincts are absolute, morals are relative.

 

[Dawguard]

There are no absolute boundaries to morals. Morals are the reasoning out of your instincts.
Thought this was relevant as pointing out instincts are absolute, morals are relative.

If insticts are absolute and morals are the reasoning out of instincts, doesn't it logically follow that the result will be an absolute definition?

 

[RVBuckeye]

Maybe I should have said morals are the reasoning out of individual instincts.
Your morals are either learned, or "brainwashed" into you, from an external source. Your instincts you are born with. I would suppose they are coded in our genes. Not just in humans either, but all living creatures. So what is the one characteristic that humans share with all living things? Survival. (I don't suspect anyeone can argue this not to be the case, because if it wasn't, I would suppose they would already be dead).

The survival instinct is no more moral, than it is immoral. Arguing the pro's and con's of morality, ultimately ends up in someone becoming a hypocrite.

This does not imply that morals aren't a useful tool to aid in survival. Of course they are, but they don't apply to everyone in every situation. What difference does it make if you accept that morals are relative? You still can believe in a God, you still can choose to live harmoniously. But obviously that is not an absolute property of survival. (you can still survive and not believe in God and live unharmoniously). The quality of that life, is irrelevant to this discussion, imo.

 

[selfAdjoint]

After all this discussion of morals and instincts, I should ask: Do humans even HAVE any real instincts? Aside from the suckle instinct in newborns I can't think of any. The usual suspects (happiness, self-preservation, etc.) are all controverted by widespread human behavior.

 

[RVBuckeye]

After all this discussion of morals and instincts, I should ask: Do humans even HAVE any real instincts? Aside from the suckle instinct in newborns I can't think of any. The usual suspects (happiness, self-preservation, etc.) are all controverted by widespread human behavior.

I was going to mention that in my last post (the suckle instinct). I think satisfying hunger is another one...but I too am unable to come up with any that doesn't boil down to survival instincts.

 

[Dawguard]

Maybe I should have said morals are the reasoning out of individual instincts.
Your morals are either learned, or "brainwashed" into you, from an external source.

Ah, the crux of the problem. What you are referring to is what I call the belief of morals. Here I agree with you, and this is the way we come to believe in morals. However, this does not touch the question of the nature of morals themselves. If you think that morals are nothing more then a belief then you must ultimatly admit that, like all nonphysical beliefs, morals will eventually be thought of as obsolete, much like most people think of theism. By placing morals in such a place you have ultimetly doomed them to the same slow, painful dimming that religion has suffered.

By changing the nature of morals from a belief to a law that requires defenition we can prevent morals from falling into this trap. I don't think any wants to live in a society without morals, so we have to find a way to preserve morals. This is by far the most practical I have found, and if they are laws, then by defenition they are absolute. Beliefs come and go, beliefs change, beliefs are taught and brainwashed, but not the laws.

 

[RVBuckeye]

If you think that morals are nothing more then a belief then you must ultimatly admit that, like all nonphysical beliefs, morals will eventually be thought of as obsolete, much like most people think of theism. By placing morals in such a place you have ultimetly doomed them to the same slow, painful dimming that religion has suffered.

That is entirely possible. Right now, I would say morals are useful to my survival. Making moral laws absolute is what is dooming religion,imo.

By changing the nature of morals from a belief to a law that requires defenition we can prevent morals from falling into this trap. I don't think any wants to live in a society without morals, so we have to find a way to preserve morals. This is by far the most practical I have found, and if they are laws, then by defenition they are absolute. Beliefs come and go, beliefs change, beliefs are taught and brainwashed, but not the laws.

We have changed morals from a belief to laws, from the 10 commandments, to Hammurabi's law, to Hittite law, to Neo-babylonian law, etc., to present day democracy. Nothing about them is absolute. Laws can change, as do our beliefs in what is moral.

Man is not, by nature (without special training), a logical (reasoning, intelligent) creature. He is, instead, totally reactive (instinctive, intuitive). His behavior is determined entirely by the interaction (conflict resolution, competition, cooperation, coordination) between his various instincts (genetically determined neural mechanisms provided by evolution for behavioral guidance). There is no mechanism for intelligence or memory which is separate from sensory, motor and instinct mechanisms. Man may be trained (his behavior may be controlled by edict). He may be educated (he may be taught knowledge for use as raw material in his decision making). The untrained and uneducated human is totally instinctive and not capable of objective reasoning or proper cultural behavior under modern social environments. The self-disciplined and educated (if educated in real knowledge) human is fully capable of both. The human has been provided by evolution with instincts (genetically specified neural mechanisms) which causes him to seek both training and education (he is a competitive social animal). He is quite capable of logic, reason, and intelligence when he chooses to be so, provided that he learns and follows the necessary discipline and rigid methodology. Even then, however, he is instinctive in his goals (the need for and the application of the reasoning). His instincts provide the direction, drive and power behind his every action.

 

[Dawguard]

That is entirely possible. Right now, I would say morals are useful to my survival. Making moral laws absolute is what is dooming religion,imo.

Moral laws have always been considered to be absolute. The recent change that has so greatly damaged morals is the rise in materialism: i.e. believe what we see.

We have changed morals from a belief to laws, from the 10 commandments, to Hammurabi's law, to Hittite law, to Neo-babylonian law, etc., to present day democracy. Nothing about them is absolute. Laws can change, as do our beliefs in what is moral.

This is a different use of the word law. I was referring to laws such as the law of inertia, or laws of nature, not legallity. I agree, our beliefs in morals change, thankfully, but that does not mean the morals change.

Man is not, by nature (without special training), a logical (reasoning, intelligent) creature. He is, instead, totally reactive (instinctive, intuitive). His behavior is determined entirely by the interaction (conflict resolution, competition, cooperation, coordination) between his various instincts (genetically determined neural mechanisms provided by evolution for behavioral guidance). There is no mechanism for intelligence or memory which is separate from sensory, motor and instinct mechanisms. Man may be trained (his behavior may be controlled by edict). He may be educated (he may be taught knowledge for use as raw material in his decision making). The untrained and uneducated human is totally instinctive and not capable of objective reasoning or proper cultural behavior under modern social environments. The self-disciplined and educated (if educated in real knowledge) human is fully capable of both. The human has been provided by evolution with instincts (genetically specified neural mechanisms) which causes him to seek both training and education (he is a competitive social animal). He is quite capable of logic, reason, and intelligence when he chooses to be so, provided that he learns and follows the necessary discipline and rigid methodology. Even then, however, he is instinctive in his goals (the need for and the application of the reasoning). His instincts provide the direction, drive and power behind his every action.

Very interesting, and in my opinion, completely true.

 

[RVBuckeye]

Moral laws have always been considered to be absolute. The recent change that has so greatly damaged morals is the rise in materialism: i.e. believe what we see.

Which would be the viewpoint of a religious fundamentalist.

This is a different use of the word law. I was referring to laws such as the law of inertia, or laws of nature, not legallity.

Our legal system is based on an approximation of our morals. Do you disagree? If so, sorry for the confusion.

I agree, our beliefs in morals change, thankfully, but that does not mean the morals change.

I would agree with this statement if it read: our beliefs in morals change, thankfully, but that does not mean our instincts change.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Our legal system is based on an approximation of our morals.

On an approximation to the morals as they stood centuries ago, and very slowly updated. Stability is more important to the Law than currency; hence the doctrine of stare decisus.

 

[RVBuckeye]

On an approximation to the morals as they stood centuries ago, and very slowly updated. Stability is more important to the Law than currency; hence the doctrine of stare decisus.

stare decisis - Lat. "to stand by that which is decided." The principal that the precedent decisions are to be followed by the courts.

A moral doctrine or an instinctual one?

 

[Dawguard]

Which would be the viewpoint of a religious fundamentalist. [/QUOTE
So, I'm outed at last.

Our legal system is based on an approximation of our morals. Do you disagree? If so, sorry for the confusion.

Sure they, but that approximation is simply our belief. Therefore when the laws change, it is becuase our beliefs have changed.

I would agree with this statement if it read: our beliefs in morals change, thankfully, but that does not mean our instincts change.

I don't think that morals are insticts, simply becuase morals run contrary from instincts. If I've been having a horrible day, everything's been going wrong and then as I'm driving home someone cuts me off I might fell like ramming their car and beating the crap out them. Morals and fear stop me, and therefore my instincts and morals are in direct contradiction. If morals were nothing more then the reasoning out of instincts then they would become something similar to psycology.