Does Consciousness Have Non-Causal Properties?

[StatusX]

If the physical world is causally closed, then there is a physical reason we talk about something called "consciousness." Any claims we might make that it can't be physically explained become somewhat outlandish, since the reason we make these claims can be.

But even if the physical isn't closed, we still identify consciousness with intrinsic properties that aren't defined solely by their causal roles. For example, the color yellow is more than just "that which causes us to judge things yellow." There is something it is like to be experiencing the color yellow. The problem is that anything we can say about yellow, or a yellow experience, or consciousness in general, must have been caused by something, be it physical or non-physical. If there are intrinsic (ie, non-extrinsic, or non-causal) properties, how could we ever talk about them, or even know about them?

The problem is more tractable if it's broken up into two parts. First, does the specific nature of an experience have an effect. That is, if someone saw green as what I call red, could they still conceivably behave the same as me? The answer to this seems to be yes, and is evidence that there can be properties that do not cause and yet we can still know about (ie, I know what green looks like to me). There is nothing my inverted spectrum twin could say that would cause me to realize we see the color differently, and hence there is no infringement on the causal closure of the physical world. And yet, there is still a natural difference between me and him.

The more difficult question is "Can the existence or absence of experience have an effect?" The trouble is, while we can't convey the specific nature of an experience, which meshes well with that nature not being able to cause, we can tell people that we have experiences. How can it be that intrinsic properties cause us to talk about their existence? What causes us to believe in things that can't cause?

 

[Tournesol]

If the physical world is causally closed, then there is a physical reason we talk about something called "consciousness."

If the (metaphysically neutral) world is causally closed, then there is a (metaphysically neutral) reason we talk about something called "consciousness."..which may be that exists and we are aware of it.
And which may or may not be capturable by the language of physics.

Any claims we might make that it can't be physically explained become somewhat outlandish, since the reason we make these claims can be.

OTOH any claim that we can physically explain the reason for
such claims is outlandish since physics does not concern
itself with consciousness,but with mass. charge, spin and so on.
We might be able to give a very cumbersome and uninfomative account of why (causally) such-and-such a series of phonemes issued from so-and-so's
mouth in terms of neural firings and so on, but it is unlikely to say
much about reasons, which are psychological, and not explicitly within
the vocabulary of physics. It could be objected that whatever reasons
are, and whatever consciousness is, they are implemented neurally,
and that some kind of bridging theory that matches nerual firings
off against experiences and reasons is therefore possible. However,
such a theory would be a solution to the Hard Problem. See
Davidson's Anomolous Monism.

But even if the physical isn't closed, we still identify consciousness with intrinsic properties that aren't defined solely by their causal roles. For example, the color yellow is more than just "that which causes us to judge things yellow." There is something it is like to be experiencing the color yellow. The problem is that anything we can say about yellow, or a yellow experience, or consciousness in general, must have been caused by something, be it physical or non-physical.

Or caused by something which has a physical AND a non-physical explanation.

If there are intrinsic (ie, non-extrinsic, or non-causal) properties, how could we ever talk about them, or even know about them?

You have slid from "not defined solely by causal role" to "non-causal".
Something like a pain is both a quale and has a very obvious causal role.

The problem is more tractable if it's broken up into two parts. First, does the specific nature of an experience have an effect. That is, if someone saw green as what I call red, could they still conceivably behave the same as me? The answer to this seems to be yes,

This is not psychologically realistic. eg someone who saw geen as red
would think of green as a "warm colour". See "Consciousness Reconsidered",
by Owen Flanagan.

 

[StatusX]

First, from the other thread:

There is "something it is like" to have an experience. Staring at a color, it actually looks like something. It isn't just defined by what it causes you to say or think. Do you see the diffference? If you really do intend to say consciousness is nothing more than it's causal role, you in fact are an eliminativist.

I didn't say that. Consciousness can cause does not mean "there is nothing
more to consciousness than its causal role". And "consciousness can cause" includes qualia.

Yes, but the problem is, how do we know there are aspects of consciousness that can't cause? What causes us to talk about them?

Back to your reply here:

OTOH any claim that we can physically explain the reason for
such claims is outlandish since physics does not concern
itself with consciousness,but with mass. charge, spin and so on.
We might be able to give a very cumbersome and uninfomative account of why (causally) such-and-such a series of phonemes issued from so-and-so's
mouth in terms of neural firings and so on, but it is unlikely to say
much about reasons, which are psychological, and not explicitly within
the vocabulary of physics. It could be objected that whatever reasons
are, and whatever consciousness is, they are implemented neurally,
and that some kind of bridging theory that matches nerual firings
off against experiences and reasons is therefore possible. However,
such a theory would be a solution to the Hard Problem. See
Davidson's Anomolous Monism.

"Experiences" and "reasons" (by which I assume you mean something like "intentions") are not the same thing, and there is no hard problem of intentions. Intentions could conceivably be explained by starting with mass and charge, moving up to atoms, chemicals, complex biochemicals, cells, and then the brain. The reason this could be possible is that intentions are defined by their causal roles. That is, when I intend to do something, it means I am in a state that causally inclines me to do that thing with a higher probability, or something roughly like that. But experiences (including the experience of an intention) are not defined by such a role. Dennett might say experiences are those things that cause us to say we are having experiences, but this is clearly oversimplifying.

This is not psychologically realistic. eg someone who saw geen as red
would think of green as a "warm colour". See "Consciousness Reconsidered",
by Owen Flanagan.

I've read those types of arguments, but it is perfectly conceivable that someone could see green, be taught all their life that this is called "red" and is "warm" and never think twice about it. Warm is just a label we assign to the colors "red", "orange", etc, whatever they happen to look like to each of us.

A more powerful argument I've heard against the inverted spectrum argument is that there are more shades of blue than, say, red, so phenomenal red could not fill all the roles of phenomenal blue. However, this just seems to be reflecting a lack of imagination. Even if not, it is not inconceivable to imagine a twin who looks at the sky and sees some color I can't even imagine, but is capable of having as many different shades as my experience of blue.

 

[Tournesol]

Yes, but the problem is, how do we know there are aspects of consciousness that can't cause?

You're asking the wrong guy: I don't think there are.

"Experiences" and "reasons" (by which I assume you mean something like "intentions") are not the same thing, and there is no hard problem of intentions.

Maybe, maybe not. Davidson's Anomolous Monism is all about intentionallity.

Intentions could conceivably be explained by starting with mass and charge, moving up to atoms, chemicals, complex biochemicals, cells, and then the brain.

That might explain the causal role of intentions, but for Davidson it is a
defining an necessary characteristic of a physical explanation that it
does not use intentional terms, like "thought", "belief" etc. So a complete
theory would have to "bridge" intentional terms to physics, just as
a solution to the HP would have to relate experience to physics.

The reason this could be possible is that intentions are defined by their causal roles. That is, when I intend to do something, it means I am in a state that causally inclines me to do that thing with a higher probability, or something roughly like that.

You could be inclined to do A rather than B as a result of being drunk. That
doesn't really capture intentionallity.

A more powerful argument I've heard against the inverted spectrum argument is that there are more shades of blue than, say, red, so phenomenal red could not fill all the roles of phenomenal blue. However, this just seems to be reflecting a lack of imagination. Even if not, it is not inconceivable to imagine a twin who looks at the sky and sees some color I can't even imagine, but is capable of having as many different shades as my experience of blue.

Whatever. There is no good reason to suppose epiphenomenalism is true, so there is no good reason to believe in the real possibility of inverted spectra.

 

[Steve Esser]

So:
First-person conscious experience is not reducible to physical descriptions, but it is absurd to think it is epiphenomenal. It is necessarily connected to the world described by physics (specifically our body/brain), but science proceeds assuming physics is causally closed at the micro-level.

What is the way out? It could be that there is an aspect of causation which is unacknowledged presently, but is manifested in complex natural systems. This aspect may be a combining, binding or organizing property responsible for the seemingly irreducible (emergent) macro-level behavior of these systems. From the perspective of the system itself, this aspect of causation is manifested as experience.

(here I must plug the reading group discussion of "a place for consciousness", a book which has a much more sophisticated treatment linking a new theory of causality to the problem of consciousness).

 

[StatusX]

(here I must plug the reading group discussion of "a place for consciousness", a book which has a much more sophisticated treatment linking a new theory of causality to the problem of consciousness).

I know, and I felt a little bad posting this now, since I'm participating in that discussion, but I wanted to know of any other possible theories. Obviously Rosenberg's isn't embraced by all philosophers who believe in the hard problem, so how do they resolve this paradox?

It is also for other people who aren't participating in the Rosenberg discussion. If there isn't any interest from these people, maybe we can bump this thread back up after the discussion is over and talk about all the ways the paradox can be resolved, including Rosenberg's.

 

[StatusX]

You're asking the wrong guy: I don't think there are.

Well that makes you an eliminativist, and our ideologies are so different, we'll never come to any agreement here.

That might explain the causal role of intentions, but for Davidson it is a
defining an necessary characteristic of a physical explanation that it
does not use intentional terms, like "thought", "belief" etc. So a complete
theory would have to "bridge" intentional terms to physics, just as
a solution to the HP would have to relate experience to physics.

How do you bridge from "quark" to "table"? Table is not a word in physics, and yet no one should deny we'll be able derive facts about tables with physics. If you want to derive every possible fact from the physical facts, including ones like "Most dining rooms have tables" and "John Smith intends to ask Sally Sue to be his wife", you need to include definitions of all the terms involved with your available information. This isn't extra information you're stealing from some non-physical source, it is just a way of putting these facts into the particular form that makes it easiest for us to talk about them.

You could be inclined to do A rather than B as a result of being drunk. That
doesn't really capture intentionallity.

It is usually impossible to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for some object to be x. But we don't need strict conditions, as long as we know what it takes to be x. We might be at a point where we're looking at all the atoms in some drunk guys head and we say "well he seems to fit the textbook defintion of having an intention, but he's drunk, so I'll say he doesn't." There's nothing wrong with that. And some might say he still can have an intention, but then you can hardly blame that on the physical. It just means that particular fact doesn't have a well defined truth value.

 

[Tournesol]

Well that makes you an eliminativist, and our ideologies are so different, we'll never come to any agreement here.

I don't think there are aspects of consciousness which don't cause.
Obviously I'm not an eliminatavist - I think "consciousness is a real feature of brains".

How do you bridge from "quark" to "table"? Table is not a word in physics, and yet no one should deny we'll be able derive facts about tables with physics. If you want to derive every possible fact from the physical facts, including ones like "Most dining rooms have tables" and "John Smith intends to ask Sally Sue to be his wife", you need to include definitions of all the terms involved with your available information. This isn't extra information you're stealing from some non-physical source, it is just a way of putting these facts into the particular form that makes it easiest for us to talk about them.

A theory that could explain thoughts, ideas and feelings in terms
of physics would have to be able to predict entirely new thoughts (etc)
generate by novel brain-states. What vocabulary could express such thoughts?

It is usually impossible to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for some object to be x. But we don't need strict conditions, as long as we know what it takes to be x. We might be at a point where we're looking at all the atoms in some drunk guys head and we say "well he seems to fit the textbook defintion of having an intention, but he's drunk, so I'll say he doesn't."

The textbook defintion of inetionality or purpose involves consciousness, not just
a disposition to behave in certain ways.

 

[Tournesol]

So:
First-person conscious experience is not reducible to physical descriptions, but it is absurd to think it is epiphenomenal. It is necessarily connected to the world described by physics (specifically our body/brain), but science proceeds assuming physics is causally closed at the micro-level.

What is the way out? It could be that there is an aspect of causation which is unacknowledged presently, but is manifested in complex natural systems. This aspect may be a combining, binding or organizing property responsible for the seemingly irreducible (emergent) macro-level behavior of these systems. From the perspective of the system itself, this aspect of causation is manifested as experience.

Or it could be that the fact that consciouness isn't captured by physical
descriptions is a limitation of physical descriptions. An explanation
in terms of subjectivity ("I went ouch! because I felt a pain") and an
explanation in nerual terms ("I went ouch becuase my C-fibres were stimulated") are two different accounts of the same event. Since there is
not a phsyical event and a separate mental event, the "closure" of the
physical explanation does not exclude the mental explanation.

 

[StatusX]

I don't think there are aspects of consciousness which don't cause.
Obviously I'm not an eliminatavist - I think "consciousness is a real feature of brains".

That obviously depends on how you define consciousness. If you think it is nothing more than the web of causal connections in our brain, you are an eliminativist. If you think there is something intrinsic about experiences, that goes beyond what they do, then you aren't.

A theory that could explain thoughts, ideas and feelings in terms
of physics would have to be able to predict entirely new thoughts (etc)
generate by novel brain-states. What vocabulary could express such thoughts?

I don't know, ask a neuroscientist. They study the brain, including thoughts, ideas and feelings, and their basis is physics, just like a chemist or biologist. Words aren't the problem, it's explaining events in a systematic way, and there are no indications this won't be possible for the brain.

The textbook defintion of inetionality or purpose involves consciousness, not just a disposition to behave in certain ways.

Seperate them out, into p-intentionality (the experience) and a-intentionality (the causal state). That is, unless you believe you can't act like you intend to do something unless you're experiencing that intention. But that would be hard to show, unless you could somehow prove the people around you are conscious.

 

[Philocrat]

If the physical world is causally closed, then there is a physical reason we talk about something called "consciousness." Any claims we might make that it can't be physically explained become somewhat outlandish, since the reason we make these claims can be.

But even if the physical isn't closed, we still identify consciousness with intrinsic properties that aren't defined solely by their causal roles. For example, the color yellow is more than just "that which causes us to judge things yellow." There is something it is like to be experiencing the color yellow. The problem is that anything we can say about yellow, or a yellow experience, or consciousness in general, must have been caused by something, be it physical or non-physical. If there are intrinsic (ie, non-extrinsic, or non-causal) properties, how could we ever talk about them, or even know about them?

The problem is more tractable if it's broken up into two parts. First, does the specific nature of an experience have an effect. That is, if someone saw green as what I call red, could they still conceivably behave the same as me? The answer to this seems to be yes, and is evidence that there can be properties that do not cause and yet we can still know about (ie, I know what green looks like to me). There is nothing my inverted spectrum twin could say that would cause me to realize we see the color differently, and hence there is no infringement on the causal closure of the physical world. And yet, there is still a natural difference between me and him.

The more difficult question is "Can the existence or absence of experience have an effect?" The trouble is, while we can't convey the specific nature of an experience, which meshes well with that nature not being able to cause, we can tell people that we have experiences. How can it be that intrinsic properties cause us to talk about their existence? What causes us to believe in things that can't cause?

Well, the spooky 'DRIVER INSIDE A DRIVER' version of Dualism (the Cartesian type) tends to suggest this. That Consciousness does possesses causal power. That if you are driving, for example, the car's driver is driven by something external to the driver. The mind. Aristotle's Soul is slightly more sophisticated in that certain aspect of it is 'FORMLESS', NEUTRAL and IMMORTAL in a non-material sense. Aristotle argued that this aspect of the soul is formless and only takes the forms of things when they are being perceived. The eye, for example, takes the form of a red car when the red car is being perceived. The same is true about thinking. During thinking, the soul takes the form of whatever we think about. This is sort of way by which Aristotle distinguished PERCEPTION via visual organs from THINKING via the intellect. In a sense, they are just capacities. But he controversially upheld the Intellect as an aspect of the soul that is immortal, independent and post-exist mortal material body.

Occassionalism (Malebranche and others) claims that the soul is devoid of causal power and that God is constantly respossible for maintaining causal relations between the mind and the body, including when we are not consciouslly or visually attending to things.

Well, all well and good. On a whole and deeper reflection, it is just plain strange that something could be part of something and be causally redundant. The BIG question now is WHAT TYPE OF CAUSE are we talking about?:

1) CONTRIBUTORY CAUSATION: Are we talking about things coming together to form something else by everyone of it actively particiapting in making this possible? Something is partly the cause of another thing when it does something that helps create or bring that thing into existence, or temprorarily or ephemerally participate in keeping that thing going, or both (participatively creates and participatively keeps it going).

2) SINGLE (WHOLE) CAUSATION: Something is wholly the cuase of another thing if it single-handedly creates and maintains that thing. It may form part of the thing or may not form part of the thing but nevertheless manages to externally create and control it. All the working parts of what is created and controlled in this way are functionally redundant, regardless of whether the creator forms part of it or not. The creator and controller of the thing concerned.

NOTE: The problem in being a creator of any sort is that you may be independently observed and judged according to how well or good or perfect what you create works. It is universally, a very serious responssibility because you are not only expected to wholly or perticipatively create but also to wholly or participatively take charge and control of what you create. Those who invent belief systems should take note of this. It is intellectually very tasking, and we must be very careful as we fundamentally but consequentially owe those we propagate such beliefs to a DUTY OF CARE.

 

[Canute]

("I went ouch! because I felt a pain") and an
explanation in nerual terms ("I went ouch becuase my C-fibres were stimulated") are two different accounts of the same event.

I'm not sure this affects your point but - these are only superficially different accounts. Both require that you are conscious so in this context there is no real difference between them. They can be elided by saying "I, whoever or whatever 'I' is, experienced myself saying ouch! and conclude that the reason I did this was because I felt pain which, given that according to science pain is non-causal, I will intentionally assume was caused by my C-fibres being stimulated". The problem is the same for both accounts. It is not why we went ouch, but how we know we went ouch.

 

[Tournesol]

That obviously depends on how you define consciousness. If you think it is nothing more than the web of causal connections in our brain, you are an eliminativist. If you think there is something intrinsic about experiences, that goes beyond what they do, then you aren't.

I've already explained what I think. I am neither an eliminativist nor a metaphysical dualist.

A theory that could explain thoughts, ideas and feelings in terms
of physics would have to be able to predict entirely new thoughts (etc)
generate by novel brain-states. What vocabulary could express such thoughts?

I don't know, ask a neuroscientist.

It's a rhetorical question; the point is that it is supposed to be
imposible in principle. Of course neuroscience hasn't advanced to anything like the stage of having that predictive kind of theory.
BTW, it's kind of amusign that you think that all neuroscientists are
happy to work with folk-psyhological terms, when eliminativists are always insiting that none of them are.

The textbook defintion of inetionality or purpose involves consciousness, not just a disposition to behave in certain ways.

Seperate them out, into p-intentionality (the experience) and a-intentionality (the causal state). That is, unless you believe you can't act like you intend to do something unless you're experiencing that intention.

I don't see what you mean. If you make up your mind to do something , and
do it, it is intentional. If it is a mere reflex action , it isn't.

But that would be hard to show, unless you could somehow prove the people around you are conscious.

Huh ? If they are walking and talking they are conscious. As usual,
you seem to be insisting that consc. is epiphenomenal, so, as usual,
I will have to point out that I disagree.

 

[Tournesol]

I'm not sure this affects your point but - these are only superficially different accounts.

To you perhaps. Yet they are the starting point for eliminativism, epiphomenalism, etc.

Both require that you are conscious so in this context there is no real difference between them. They can be elided by saying "I, whoever or whatever 'I' is, experienced myself saying ouch! and conclude that the reason I did this was because I felt pain which, given that according to science pain is non-causal,

No, according to certain philosophers it is. They may insist that they
are being scientific, but scientists may not see things the same way.
All psychologists tacitly assume that human subjects are conscious,
because they expect subjects to understand and follow their instructions.

I will intentionally assume was caused by my C-fibres being stimulated".

But that can be verified independently of what seems to me to be the case.

The problem is the same for both accounts. It is not why we went ouch, but how we know we went ouch.

The Hard Problem is the nature and role of the feeling. All other
asepcts of consc. are behavioural and therefore more easily dealt with.

 

[StatusX]

Tournesol,
I'm not sure what you're trying to say anymore. You seem to think you've found an explanation of consciousness (brain states looked at from a different point of view), but then you claim these brain states cannot be physically explained. Are you saying both consciousness and the accompanying brain states are unphysical? If so, then I could see why you would believe they could be aspects of the same thing. But I'm making the assumption that brain states are physical. It is an argument for another thread, but I could point you to David Chalmers' paper: Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness. In the introduction, Chalmers, someone who takes consciousness and the hard problem very seriously, admits and explains how things like reportability and intentions (at least their functional roles) could be explained physically.

The problem is that if you accept that brain states are physical, and can be explained in terms of atoms interacting by forces, then it is very difficult to see how this is another way of looking at consciousness. Perhaps it is, but it is far from obvious how this could be, and you have not taken it any further than to say "they are different aspects of the same thing." How this could be is the hard problem.

But whatever one's take on the relationship is, they still have to answer the question in the title of this thread. Because consciousness, the thing they're trying to explain, is characterized as being more than just it's functional role. But how can something that has no functional role cause us to talk about it's existence? Even if some parts of consciousness are functional, the question still applies to the parts that are not. It seems awkward to say there is a causal property of consciousness that makes us talk about the non-causal part, unless you can describe a way in which these are inseperable, and in which the causal part couldn't exist even in principle without the non-causal part. Otherwise we're back to epiphenomenalism.

 

[Tournesol]

I'm not sure what you're trying to say anymore. You seem to think you've found an explanation of consciousness (brain states looked at from a different point of view), but then you claim these brain states cannot be physically explained.

yes,they can be explained in that the Easy Problem behavioural aspects of consc. can be explained causally.

No they can't in that a physical account of consciousness does not capture
the Hard problem Phenomenal aspects.

Are you saying both consciousness and the accompanying brain states are unphysical?

I am saying that there are no physical things and no non-physical things.
(There are no French or German things either)
There are things which we can look at in a physical or non-physical way.

The problem is that if you accept that brain states are physical, and can be explained in terms of atoms interacting by forces, then it is very difficult to see how this is another way of looking at consciousness.

Perhaps it is, but it is far from obvious how this could be, and you have not taken it any further than to say "they are different aspects of the same thing." How this could be is the hard problem.

I am not claiming to solve the HP, just to state it in a way that avoids
eliminatavism, dualism, and epiphenomenalism.

But whatever one's take on the relationship is, they still have to answer the question in the title of this thread. Because consciousness, the thing they're trying to explain, is characterized as being more than just it's functional role.

Everything that actually exists is more than its functional role, because
funcitonal roles are abstractions.

But how can something that has no functional role cause us to talk about it's existence?

Again, there is no inference from "not entirely characterised by a functional role" to "entirely lacking a functional role".

Even if some parts of consciousness are functional, the question still applies to the parts that are not.

Which parts of consciousness are entirely lacking a functional/causal role ?
I see no evidence for the problem in the first place

 

[Tournesol]

It is generally suppose that the causal powers of an entity 'latch onto' the
properties of that entity (it has the particular powers it has by virtue of the properties it has), and that the properties it has cannot be defined in terms of further causal
powers without leading to a vicious regress. So we would should expect
to find some properties that are not defined in terms of causal powers (although they are still causally relevant in that they explain why entities have the
causal powers they have).

 

[Tournesol]

http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/mm.htm

 

[Doctordick]

OTOH any claim that we can physically explain the reason for
such claims is outlandish since physics does not concern
itself with consciousness,but with mass. charge, spin and so on.

Aristotle introduced the word "metaphysics" meaning "beyond physics". Since that time many things have come to be understood and things which were once "metaphysics" and thought to be "occult" are now very much a part of physics. Once, electricity and magnetism were thought to be very much a part of the "occult". And now chemistry, after first graduating from the "occult" field of "alchemy" into the more exact field of "chemistry" has become a fundamental area of physics "physical chemistry". Why should any of you believe the process is over? In many chemical laboratories today, the question, to actually do the experiment with real chemicals or to calculate the result on a computer, is a budget question. When neurosicence reaches that stage (and to think it cannot seems to me to be quite foolish), does consciousness not become a "physical" concern. The only cavil I might have is that the "physics" academy might move itself completely into a religious mode and "exact thinkers" would have to come up with a new title.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

Or it could be that the fact that consciouness isn't captured by physical
descriptions is a limitation of physical descriptions. An explanation
in terms of subjectivity ("I went ouch! because I felt a pain") and an
explanation in nerual terms ("I went ouch becuase my C-fibres were stimulated") are two different accounts of the same event. Since there is
not a phsyical event and a separate mental event, the "closure" of the
physical explanation does not exclude the mental explanation.

Much of what you say is concerned with the inadequacies of language itself. I think that you and I see a lot of things in a very similar manner. So far I have found nothing you say to be poorly thought out. I appologize again for not paying attention.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

The Hard Problem is the nature and role of the feeling.

I really don't see that as a very "hard". The "feeling" is a reference to the fact that we are made intensely aware of a problem in a manner which is extremely difficult (but not impossible) to ignore. This brings our higher faculties to bear on the issue causing the pain and that is certainly beneficial to our behavior from a survival perspective.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[moving finger]

Well, the spooky 'DRIVER INSIDE A DRIVER' version of Dualism (the Cartesian type) tends to suggest this. That Consciousness does possesses causal power.

I would go further and suggest that everything which "exists" possesses causal power (where by causal power we mean the ability to influence events). Even something as epehemeral as an "idea" has causal power. Consciousness clearly exists (even in the solipsist's world there is at least one consciousness) therefore consciousness has causal power.

That if you are driving, for example, the car's driver is driven by something external to the driver.

This is something different, and I do not agree that "the car's driver is driven by something external to the driver". This way leads to an infinite regression, so why not simply stop at the first level - the driver is "I" and "I" is self-contained with no further reduction (to a smaller "I" within the "I") possible.

The mind. Aristotle's Soul is slightly more sophisticated in that certain aspect of it is 'FORMLESS', NEUTRAL and IMMORTAL in a non-material sense. Aristotle argued that this aspect of the soul is formless and only takes the forms of things when they are being perceived. The eye, for example, takes the form of a red car when the red car is being perceived.

How quaint and naive . And your point is?

The same is true about thinking. During thinking, the soul takes the form of whatever we think about.

What soul? What is this thing?

This is sort of way by which Aristotle distinguished PERCEPTION via visual organs from THINKING via the intellect. In a sense, they are just capacities. But he controversially upheld the Intellect as an aspect of the soul that is immortal, independent and post-exist mortal material body.

Yes. Quite.

Occassionalism (Malebranche and others) claims that the soul is devoid of causal power and that God is constantly respossible for maintaining causal relations between the mind and the body, including when we are not consciouslly or visually attending to things.

Pretty much like Newton’s God had to constantly intervene to re-adjust the clockwork universe? Yes. Quaint.

Well, all well and good. On a whole and deeper reflection, it is just plain strange that something could be part of something and be causally redundant. The BIG question now is WHAT TYPE OF CAUSE are we talking about?:

1) CONTRIBUTORY CAUSATION: Are we talking about things coming together to form something else by everyone of it actively particiapting in making this possible? Something is partly the cause of another thing when it does something that helps create or bring that thing into existence, or temprorarily or ephemerally participate in keeping that thing going, or both (participatively creates and participatively keeps it going).

What do you mean by “keeping that thing going”?

2) SINGLE (WHOLE) CAUSATION: Something is wholly the cuase of another thing if it single-handedly creates and maintains that thing.

What do you mean by “creates and maintains”?

It may form part of the thing or may not form part of the thing but nevertheless manages to externally create and control it.

Causation has nothing to do with “maintaining” or “controlling” things, that I am aware of, except in the sense that all macroscopic events are caused.

All the working parts of what is created and controlled in this way are functionally redundant, regardless of whether the creator forms part of it or not. The creator and controller of the thing concerned.

NOTE: The problem in being a creator of any sort is that you may be independently observed and judged according to how well or good or perfect what you create works. It is universally, a very serious responssibility because you are not only expected to wholly or perticipatively create but also to wholly or participatively take charge and control of what you create. Those who invent belief systems should take note of this. It is intellectually very tasking, and we must be very careful as we fundamentally but consequentially owe those we propagate such beliefs to a DUTY OF CARE.

I disagree. I believe in evolution, and I believe our belief systems also evolve. It matters not if poor beliefs are postulated from time to time, the “fit” ones will survive and reproduce, and the “unfit” ones will fall by the wayside and decay.

MF

 

[Paul Martin]

This is something different, and I do not agree that "the car's driver is driven by something external to the driver". This way leads to an infinite regression, so why not simply stop at the first level - the driver is "I" and "I" is self-contained with no further reduction (to a smaller "I" within the "I") possible.

You have overlooked many possibilities here. There are many numbers between 1 and infinity. I agree with your dismissal of an infinite set of drivers. But your choice of only one self-contained driver leads to the Hard Problem, which doesn't seem to have an explanation in physicality alone.

Please give some thought to some other possibilities, starting with 2 and going as high as maybe 11. I think there might be a finite explanation for everything if we expand our thinking.

 

[moving finger]

If the physical world is causally closed, then there is a physical reason we talk about something called "consciousness." Any claims we might make that it can't be physically explained become somewhat outlandish, since the reason we make these claims can be.

But even if the physical isn't closed, we still identify consciousness with intrinsic properties that aren't defined solely by their causal roles. For example, the color yellow is more than just "that which causes us to judge things yellow."

Need to be careful to distinguish between “the colour yellow” and “the experience of the colour yellow”.

There is something it is like to be experiencing the color yellow.

Yes, and this (the experience of the colour yellow) is a particular neurophysiological state within each consciousness. It is also peculiar to that consciousness (which is why Mary could never know all there was to know about the colour yellow, no matter how much scientific information she had about the colour, if she had never known the neurophysiological state of experiencing the colour yellow).

The problem is that anything we can say about yellow, or a yellow experience, or consciousness in general, must have been caused by something, be it physical or non-physical. If there are intrinsic (ie, non-extrinsic, or non-causal) properties, how could we ever talk about them, or even know about them?

The problem is more tractable if it's broken up into two parts. First, does the specific nature of an experience have an effect. That is, if someone saw green as what I call red, could they still conceivably behave the same as me?

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the neurophysiological state of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your neurophysiological state of you seeing either red or green.

The answer to this seems to be yes, and is evidence that there can be properties that do not cause and yet we can still know about (ie, I know what green looks like to me).

Why do you think that the neurophysiological state of seeing green does not “cause” anything (if this is indeed what you are saying)?

There is nothing my inverted spectrum twin could say that would cause me to realize we see the color differently,

Again, I would argue that the question is meaningless.

and hence there is no infringement on the causal closure of the physical world. And yet, there is still a natural difference between me and him.

No matter what he sees and what you see, your neurophysiological states will not be identical.

The more difficult question is "Can the existence or absence of experience have an effect?"

If you mean causal effect then yes, I would say this is obvious. Even a simple “idea” can have a dramatic causal effect (just look at how many people died in religious wars).

The trouble is, while we can't convey the specific nature of an experience, which meshes well with that nature not being able to cause, we can tell people that we have experiences. How can it be that intrinsic properties cause us to talk about their existence? What causes us to believe in things that can't cause?

I think the assumption that "experiences do not cause" is false. Where is the support for such a notion?

MF

 

[moving finger]

You have overlooked many possibilities here. There are many numbers between 1 and infinity. I agree with your dismissal of an infinite set of drivers. But your choice of only one self-contained driver leads to the Hard Problem, which doesn't seem to have an explanation in physicality alone.

Please give some thought to some other possibilities, starting with 2 and going as high as maybe 11. I think there might be a finite explanation for everything if we expand our thinking.

I agree that in going from infinity to 1 I have skipped over the possibility of 2, 3, 4... and even 42. But unless and until someone can show how the introduction of another "level" explains anything that is not explained at the top level then I see no point in inventing additional levels of explanation.

I personally do not agree that there IS a "hard problem".

MF

 

[medium]

Questionn the cause and effect issues here; Is there a general "reaction" to experiencing something for the first time or the experience of deja'vu!? What is academic is that everything already exists. What is not is our coming to realize this!?? Please comment>...MEDIUM.....>

 

[Paul Martin]

I agree that in going from infinity to 1 I have skipped over the possibility of 2, 3, 4... and even 42. But unless and until someone can show how the introduction of another "level" explains anything that is not explained at the top level then I see no point in inventing additional levels of explanation.

I personally do not agree that there IS a "hard problem".

Fair enough. If I didn't see a Hard Problem I wouldn't see a need for additional levels of explanation either. In my case, I have seen the Hard Problem for most of my life so I had no problem relating to Searles' and Chalmers' expositions of it. (Maybe I was too receptive to their arguments and gave them a pass.) If they haven't convinced you of the existence of the problem, then I am sure nothing I could say would either.

It would help me, though, if you would explain why their arguments and analysis fail. Maybe you could change my mind.

 

[moving finger]

It would help me, though, if you would explain why their arguments and analysis fail. Maybe you could change my mind.

I may not be thinking of the same arguments and analysis that you are. There have been many expositions of so-called Hard Problems. I am aware that some (like Searle & Chalmers) seem to consider that consciousness is for some reason not amenable to neuroscientific investigation, whereas others (Churchland and Dennett for example) see no problem.

Perhaps if you could provide (or at least provide a link to) an explanation of the arguments and analysis that you refer to, I might then be able to explain why I think there is not in fact a Hard Problem.
MF

 

[Tournesol]

Need to be careful to distinguish between “the colour yellow” and “the experience of the colour yellow”.

and, thirdly, the subjective 'feel' of yellow, the yellow-quale.

Yes, and this (the experience of the colour yellow) is a particular neurophysiological state within each consciousness. It is also peculiar to that consciousness

There is no reason to suppose that.

(which is why Mary could never know all there was to know about the colour yellow, no matter how much scientific information she had about the colour, if she had never known the neurophysiological state of experiencing the colour yellow).

By hypothesis, Mary's scientific information will include the neurophysiological
state, it just doesn't include the yellow-quale.

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the neurophysiological state of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your neurophysiological state of you seeing either red or green.

There is good reason to suppose that this is not the case. People
cannot have unique, in some strong sense, brains because you would
not be able to form a single, coherent brain out of two genomes.
All brains must be broadly similar. Likewise psychological states
in anatomically normal humans must have broadly similar neurla correlates.

Why do you think that the neurophysiological state of seeing green does not “cause” anything (if this is indeed what you are saying)?

Probably the causal closure of the phsycial coupled with rejection of any kind
of identity theory.

No matter what he sees and what you see, your neurophysiological states will not be identical.

But if they are very similar -- and they almost certainly are -- why should
we not say the subjective expereiences will be very similar ? How
does "not identical" come to do the job of "completely different" ?

 

[moving finger]

and, thirdly, the subjective 'feel' of yellow, the yellow-quale.

Please explain what you consider to be the difference between "the experience of the colour yellow" and the "subjective feel of yellow (the yellow-quale)"?

Yes, and this (the experience of the colour yellow) is a particular neurophysiological state within each consciousness. It is also peculiar to that consciousness

There is no reason to suppose that.

Au contraire, mon ami, there is no reason to suppose, and also no evidence to suggest, that my subjective experience of the colour yellow is identical to your subjective experience of the colour yellow.

(which is why Mary could never know all there was to know about the colour yellow, no matter how much scientific information she had about the colour, if she had never known the neurophysiological state of experiencing the colour yellow).

By hypothesis, Mary's scientific information will include the neurophysiological state, it just doesn't include the yellow-quale.

I prefer the hypothesis that the neurophysiological state of experiencing the colour yellow is entirely subjective, and 3rd person objective science is unable to represent this in an objective manner which could be transferred to Mary in any other way.
The idea that there is a “quale” of the colour yellow, which is somehow distinct from the neurophysiological state of “experiencing the colour yellow”, I find (IMHO) unnecessary and absurd.

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the neurophysiological state of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your neurophysiological state of you seeing either red or green.

There is good reason to suppose that this is not the case. People cannot have unique, in some strong sense, brains because you would not be able to form a single, coherent brain out of two genomes.

I cannot make any rational sense out of this statement at all. Why on Earth do you think (what rational argument is there to support the idea) that a single coherent brain could not be formed from two genomes?

All brains must be broadly similar. Likewise psychological states in anatomically normal humans must have broadly similar neurla correlates.

Broadly similar is very different to identical.
All people are broadly similar, but no two people have identical experiences.
One cannot reach the conclusion that my neurophysiological states are identical to yours just because we are broadly similar.

Why do you think that the neurophysiological state of seeing green does not “cause” anything (if this is indeed what you are saying)?

Probably the causal closure of the phsycial coupled with rejection of any kind of identity theory.

A neurophysiological state is a dynamic physical pattern/arrangement of neurons/chemicals/synapses in space and time, in this sense it is physical, in this sense it can have causal powers. I fail to see what “identity theory” has to do with this.

No matter what he sees and what you see, your neurophysiological states will not be identical.

But if they are very similar -- and they almost certainly are -- why should we not say the subjective experiences will be very similar ? How does "not identical" come to do the job of "completely different" ?

How does “very similar” come to do the job of “identical”? It does not.
I did not say that two persons’ neurophysiological states are not similar; I said that two persons’ neurophysiological states are not identical. This is the critical point. Similar states can give rise to similar effects, but only identical states give rise to identical effects.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

Please explain what you consider to be the difference between "the experience of the colour yellow" and the "subjective feel of yellow (the yellow-quale)"?

according to your definition (which I find odd) the "experience" is a neurophysiological state.

Au contraire, mon ami, there is no reason to suppose, and also no evidence to suggest, that my subjective experience of the colour yellow is identical to your subjective experience of the colour yellow.

Nor is there any eveidence to suggest that they are different in
a problematical way -- certainly not amounting to the "meaninglessness"
of questions about what different people's experience is like, as you have claimed.

I prefer the hypothesis that the neurophysiological state of experiencing the colour yellow is entirely subjective, and 3rd person objective science is unable to represent this in an objective manner which could be transferred to Mary in any other way.

Your use of the word "neurophysiological" is confusing, if you are in
fact talking about a 1st-person experience and not neuroscience.

The idea that there is a “quale” of the colour yellow, which is somehow distinct from the neurophysiological state of “experiencing the colour yellow”, I find (IMHO) unnecessary and absurd.

You are not making it clear whether you are talking about the sorts
of states that are subjectively accesible, or the sort
that neurosicnetists deal with.

I cannot make any rational sense out of this statement at all. Why on Earth do you think (what rational argument is there to support the idea) that a single coherent brain could not be formed from two genomes?

Obviously they can, but only because the brain the genomes code
for are variations on a theme and not radically different. The question
is: if every brain is a variation on a theme,

Broadly similar is very different to identical.
All people are broadly similar, but no two people have identical experiences.
One cannot reach the conclusion that my neurophysiological states are identical to yours just because we are broadly similar.

But if our brains differ only a little bit, why shouldn't our subjective states
also differ a litte bit ?
How do you justify the idea that there is no resemblance at all between
the subjective expreience of different people, when it is based on slight
variations in brain structure ?

A neurophysiological state is a dynamic physical pattern/arrangement of neurons/chemicals/synapses in space and time,

All of which is objective and 3rd-person. Yet a while back you were claiming
that NP states are somehow equivaent to subjective exprience.

in this sense it is physical, in this sense it can have causal powers. I fail to see what “identity theory” has to do with this.

You have just answered your own question. If there is some
sort of identity betwen subjective expereinces and brain-states,
expriences have whatever causal powers brain states have.
However, the identity is not simple and total, because we do
not experience brain states as such.

How does “very similar” come to do the job of “identical”? It does not.
I did not say that two persons’ neurophysiological states are not similar; I said that two persons’ neurophysiological states are not identical. This is the critical point. Similar states can give rise to similar effects, but only identical states give rise to identical effects.

That is not what you were saying before:-

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the neurophysiological state of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your neurophysiological state of you seeing either red or green.

Why should the question be meaningless (!) when all you can muster
is the idea that people with slightly different brains will see
slightly different shades ?

 

[moving finger]

Please explain what you consider to be the difference between "the experience of the colour yellow" and the "subjective feel of yellow (the yellow-quale)"?

according to your definition (which I find odd) the "experience" is a neurophysiological state.

Sorry, is this supposed to be an explanation of what you consider to be the difference between "the experience of the colour yellow" and the "subjective feel of yellow (the yellow-quale)"?

Au contraire, mon ami, there is no reason to suppose, and also no evidence to suggest, that my subjective experience of the colour yellow is identical to your subjective experience of the colour yellow.

Nor is there any eveidence to suggest that they are different in a problematical way -- certainly not amounting to the "meaninglessness" of questions about what different people's experience is like, as you have claimed.

If there is no evidence either way then the most we can conclude is that it comes down to beliefs. I believe that my subjective experience of the colour yellow is not necessarily identical to your subjective experience of the colour yellow, whereas you believe it is necessarily identical?

I prefer the hypothesis that the neurophysiological state of experiencing the colour yellow is entirely subjective, and 3rd person objective science is unable to represent this in an objective manner which could be transferred to Mary in any other way.

Your use of the word "neurophysiological" is confusing, if you are in fact talking about a 1st-person experience and not neuroscience.

Not if one believes that there is a neurophysiological basis for consciousness.

The idea that there is a “quale” of the colour yellow, which is somehow distinct from the neurophysiological state of “experiencing the colour yellow”, I find (IMHO) unnecessary and absurd.

You are not making it clear whether you are talking about the sorts of states that are subjectively accesible, or the sort that neurosicnetists deal with.

Neuroscientists deal with the objective (3rd person) manifestations of neurophysiological states; the subjective (1st person) experience of a neurophysiological state is not accessible to 3rd person objective science.
No neuroscientist has ever seen a “quale” in a scientific experiment, neither has he/she experienced a neurophysiological state in a scientific experiment (except as a 1st person subject). There is no evidence to suggest that anything like qualia, as distinct from neurophysiological states, exist.

I cannot make any rational sense out of this statement at all. Why on Earth do you think (what rational argument is there to support the idea) that a single coherent brain could not be formed from two genomes?

Obviously they can, but only because the brain the genomes code for are variations on a theme and not radically different. The question is: if every brain is a variation on a theme,

The genomes are essentially the blueprint for a particular design. The brain is developed, from conception, based on this design but modified by experience. Thus no two developed brains are identical, regardless of genomes.

Broadly similar is very different to identical.
All people are broadly similar, but no two people have identical experiences.
One cannot reach the conclusion that my neurophysiological states are identical to yours just because we are broadly similar.

But if our brains differ only a little bit, why shouldn't our subjective states also differ a litte bit ?

I never said that they didn’t “differ a little bit”. I said they are not identical.

How do you justify the idea that there is no resemblance at all between the subjective expreience of different people, when it is based on slight variations in brain structure ?

Please read my posts more carefully. I never said that “there is no resemblance at all”, I said (in most cases) the experiences are not identical, and (in one case) the experiences do not necessarily resemble each other. And I still stand by those statements.

With respect, which part of the word “identical” do you not understand?

A neurophysiological state is a dynamic physical pattern/arrangement of neurons/chemicals/synapses in space and time,

All of which is objective and 3rd-person. Yet a while back you were claiming that BOP states are somehow equivaent to subjective exprience.

The manifestation of a neurophysiological state within a consciousness leads to subjective experience within that consciousness. This is 1st person subjectivity.
The external observation of a neurophysiological state (which is what neuroscientists do) tells us nothing directly about that subjective experience. This is 3rd person objectivity.

in this sense it is physical, in this sense it can have causal powers. I fail to see what “identity theory” has to do with this.

You have just answered your own question. If there is some sort of identity betwen subjective expereinces and brain-states, expriences have whatever causal powers brain states have. However, the identity is not simple and total, because we do not experience brain states as such.

Hypothesis : The subjective experience, along with the rest of consciousness, is not identical with but is contained within (is part of) the neurophysiological (brain) state. The neurophysiological state contains a lot more information than is accessible to subjective experience. Thus there is indeed not a total identity between subjective experiences and neurophysiological states.

How does “very similar” come to do the job of “identical”? It does not.
I did not say that two persons’ neurophysiological states are not similar; I said that two persons’ neurophysiological states are not identical. This is the critical point. Similar states can give rise to similar effects, but only identical states give rise to identical effects.

That is not what you were saying before:-

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the neurophysiological state of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your neurophysiological state of you seeing either red or green.

Nowhere in here does it say that similar states cannot give rise to similar effects. What on Earth are you trying to say?

Why should the question be meaningless (!) when all you can muster is the idea that people with slightly different brains will see slightly different shades ?

I did NOT say that people with slightly different brains will see slightly different shades! Where did you get this idea from?

To explain – the original question was :

if someone saw green as what I call red, could they still conceivably behave the same as me?

To which I answered

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the neurophysiological state of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your neurophysiological state of you seeing either red or green.

In other words, the neurophysiological state of “person A seeing green” does not necessarily bear any resemblance to the neurophysiological state of either “person B seeing red” or “person B seeing green”, therefore why should it necessarily follow that they cannot behave in a similar way?

Honestly, Tournesol, and with respect, I am trying to discuss things rationally with you and I am doing my best to answer your questions where I can, but in return I find that you not only usually avoid answering my questions but you continually accuse me of saying things that I have not said!

MF

 

[<<<GUILLE>>>]

I think that consciousenss causes everything that happens in reality and under a level of logic.

 

[Tournesol]

If there is no evidence either way then the most we can conclude is that it comes down to beliefs. I believe that my subjective experience of the colour yellow is not necessarily identical to your subjective experience of the colour yellow, whereas you believe it is necessarily identical?

No

Not if one believes that there is a neurophysiological basis for consciousness.

"Basis" is not straightforward identity. There is still the 1st person/3rd person differerence.

Neuroscientists deal with the objective (3rd person) manifestations of neurophysiological states; the subjective (1st person) experience of a neurophysiological state is not accessible to 3rd person objective science.
No neuroscientist has ever seen a “quale” in a scientific experiment, neither has he/she experienced a neurophysiological state in a scientific experiment (except as a 1st person subject). There is no evidence to suggest that anything like qualia, as distinct from neurophysiological states, exist.

"Quale" is just a label for what you call "subjective (1st person) experience of a neurophysiological state". Whether and how qulia
are distinct from NP states depends on your stance on the HP. It
is neither a fact, nor an idea wtih no evidence whatsoever (the
evidence of course being the difference between the 1st and 3rd person views).

Hypothesis : The subjective experience, along with the rest of consciousness, is not identical with but is contained within (is part of) the neurophysiological (brain) state. The neurophysiological state contains a lot more information than is accessible to subjective experience. Thus there is indeed not a total identity between subjective experiences and neurophysiological states.

So subjective experience is a mere subset of the total NP state, and if you had a complete description of an NP state, you would be able to find
subjective experience within it ? That is not most peoples intuition.

In other words, the neurophysiological state of “person A seeing green” does not necessarily bear any resemblance to the neurophysiological state of either “person B seeing red” or “person B seeing green”, therefore why should it necessarily follow that they cannot behave in a similar way?

But if consciousness is produced naturally, the NP state of A haviong a green
quale must differ from the state of B having a red quale-- otherwise you would have
to concede that there is no realtionship between neural activity and experience.

 

[medium]

Forgive my brief digress to something that at the moment seems to me to be quite profound: On the nature of ""can consciousness cause"". I''m struck with an immediate ""yes indeed"!. I've been considering the question,""Are we just fixed by destiny( reflecting on the ultimate consciousness), or are we somehow just floating like on a breeze""(doing our own, or someone elses thing). It would appear at this point, that it must be a little of both. We are indeed expeiencing the ""great experience""(as prime mover), but because there are other beings arround us, we are experiencing their reflections as well. Some reflections, we will all agree, are quite harmless, even vivifying. Some though, quite deadly. My point arrives when I considered its natural counterpart in nature, namely, in plants. Plants, as you recall, heliotrophe towards the sun to maximize the full impact of the suns nurishing rays. We too, I propose, do much the same when we, unaware(search) and or on purpose,(meditate): heliotrophe towards the ""great experience"". A kind of turning towards the source of some great ?? inspiration/motivation ?? as it were. The warning potential of such a ""receptive"" state has been afore mentioned. This seems to me, that this is what was being alluded to in ""Eastern"" thought, as the ""net of gems, or the ""net of Indra"". Please comment>...MEDIUM.....>

 

[moving finger]

If there is no evidence either way then the most we can conclude is that it comes down to beliefs. I believe that my subjective experience of the colour yellow is not necessarily identical to your subjective experience of the colour yellow, whereas you believe it is necessarily identical?

No

Is that “No, I do not believe that your subjective experience of the colour yellow is necessarily identical to my subjective experience of the colour yellow”?

(sorry, but as usual, your brief and incomplete answers are often ambiguous – perhaps intentionally so?)

Not if one believes that there is a neurophysiological basis for consciousness.

"Basis" is not straightforward identity. There is still the 1st person/3rd person differerence.

Yes, there is a difference between 1st/3rd person perspectives of neurophysiological states. I explained the difference in my last post :

Neuroscientists deal with the objective (3rd person) manifestations of neurophysiological states; the subjective (1st person) experience of a neurophysiological state is not accessible to 3rd person objective science.
No neuroscientist has ever seen a “quale” in a scientific experiment, neither has he/she experienced a neurophysiological state in a scientific experiment (except as a 1st person subject). There is no evidence to suggest that anything like qualia, as distinct from neurophysiological states, exist.

"Quale" is just a label for what you call "subjective (1st person) experience of a neurophysiological state".

Ahhh, ok. So now you are saying "the experience of the colour yellow" and the "subjective feel of yellow (the yellow-quale)" are in fact the same thing?

Previously you claimed these were not the same.

Whether and how qulia are distinct from NP states depends on your stance on the HP. It is neither a fact, nor an idea wtih no evidence whatsoever (the evidence of course being the difference between the 1st and 3rd person views).

OK. You claimed that “the experience of the colour yellow” and “the subjective 'feel' of yellow, the yellow-quale” were different. Can you explain how you think they are different?

Hypothesis : The subjective experience, along with the rest of consciousness, is not identical with but is contained within (is part of) the neurophysiological (brain) state. The neurophysiological state contains a lot more information than is accessible to subjective experience. Thus there is indeed not a total identity between subjective experiences and neurophysiological states.

So subjective experience is a mere subset of the total NP state, and if you had a complete description of an NP state, you would be able to find subjective experience within it ? That is not most peoples intuition.

Firstly, you (as a 3rd person objective observer) would never be able to find subjective experience by examining an NP state from the outside. The only route to “finding subjective experience” (as you put it) is through the manifestation of an NP state within a consciousness – ie 1st person subjectively.
Secondly, I am not “most people”. And what makes you think you know most people’s intuition in this respect? And why should most people’s intuition matter anyway in our debate? I am interested in your thoughts, not in “most peoples”.

In other words, the neurophysiological state of “person A seeing green” does not necessarily bear any resemblance to the neurophysiological state of either “person B seeing red” or “person B seeing green”, therefore why should it necessarily follow that they cannot behave in a similar way?

But if consciousness is produced naturally, the NP state of A haviong a green quale must differ from the state of B having a red quale-- otherwise you would have to concede that there is no realtionship between neural activity and experience.

I did not say that the NP of “A having a green quale” does not differ from that of “B having a red quale”; but it does not follow that different NPs must necessarily result in completely different behaviour. Dissimilar NPs may cause dissimilar behaviour, but there can conceivably be similarities in behaviour resulting from dissimilar NPs.

MF

 

[moving finger]

Forgive my brief digress to something that at the moment seems to me to be quite profound: On the nature of ""can consciousness cause"". I''m struck with an immediate ""yes indeed"!. I've been considering the question,""Are we just fixed by destiny( reflecting on the ultimate consciousness), or are we somehow just floating like on a breeze""(doing our own, or someone elses thing). It would appear at this point, that it must be a little of both. We are indeed expeiencing the ""great experience""(as prime mover), but because there are other beings arround us, we are experiencing their reflections as well. Some reflections, we will all agree, are quite harmless, even vivifying. Some though, quite deadly. My point arrives when I considered its natural counterpart in nature, namely, in plants. Plants, as you recall, heliotrophe towards the sun to maximize the full impact of the suns nurishing rays. We too, I propose, do much the same when we, unaware(search) and or on purpose,(meditate): heliotrophe towards the ""great experience"". A kind of turning towards the source of some great ?? inspiration/motivation ?? as it were. The warning potential of such a ""receptive"" state has been afore mentioned. This seems to me, that this is what was being alluded to in ""Eastern"" thought, as the ""net of gems, or the ""net of Indra"". Please comment>...MEDIUM.....>

can all be explained assuming determinism is true
MF

 

[StatusX]

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the neurophysiological state of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your neurophysiological state of you seeing either red or green.

I'm not talking about neurophysiological states, I'm talking about experience. They may be different ways of looking at the same thing, but a priori, they are distinct concepts, and it is perfectly coherent to wonder if someone might be able to see green the way I see red. Just to be clear, it is just as logically possible that someone with the exact same physical brain as me could experience red the way I experience green. Experiences are completely different from brain states. They probably are fundamentally tied together, but that is an empirical question, like asking if light and electromagnetic waves are the same thing (although the method of answering this question is likely much different).

The point was that the specific nature of experience does not seem to have a physical effect. There is nothing I can do to influence the physical world so as to make it clear to others what my experiences are like. I know you have experiences, but I don't know if they are anything like mine, and I never will. On the other hand, they do affect the physical world in that we can talk about their existence. I was just trying to show that epiphenomalism isn't as black and white as it seems, and that we can still retain some of its intuitive qualities while diluting the blatant paradox that arises from the fact that we talk about consciousness. The only problem now is how its existence can affect the physical world.

 

[moving finger]

I'm not talking about neurophysiological states, I'm talking about experience. They may be different ways of looking at the same thing, but a priori, they are distinct concepts, and it is perfectly coherent to wonder if someone might be able to see green the way I see red.

IMHO, a particular conscious experience is a consequence of the manifestation of a particular neurophysiological state within a consciousness. But no problem, replace my words “neurophysiological states” with the word “experience” and you get the following :

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the experience of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your experience of you seeing either red or green.

Just to be clear, it is just as logically possible that someone with the exact same physical brain as me could experience red the way I experience green.

Just to be clear, what you seem to want is that “two brains can be exactly the same, but not be exactly the same, at the same time”, a clear contradiction.
Two things here. Firstly I challenge that no two people can have the “exact same physical brain”. The exact composition and pattern of each physical brain is determined not only by genetic history but also by total life experience. No two people have the same total life experience, hence there is no reason to expect that any two brains are “exactly the same”.
Secondly, the mere fact that one experiences red where the other experiences green is direct evidence that the two brains are not exactly the same.

Experiences are completely different from brain states. They probably are fundamentally tied together, but that is an empirical question, like asking if light and electromagnetic waves are the same thing (although the method of answering this question is likely much different).

IMHO, a particular conscious experience is a consequence of the manifestation of a particular neurophysiological (brain) state within a consciousness.

The point was that the specific nature of experience does not seem to have a physical effect.

Why on Earth do you say that? My experience of me seeing my daughter about to walk across the road in front of an oncoming car would have a VERY immediate physical effect on me!
What evidence do you have that experience does NOT have a physical effect?

There is nothing I can do to influence the physical world so as to make it clear to others what my experiences are like.

That is because experience is a 1st person subjective phenomenon, whereas “to make it clear to others” you must necessarily translate it into a 3rd person objective description, and the 3rd person objective description can never convey everything about the 1st person objective experience. This is the reason why “Mary can never know all there is to know about the experience of seeing red” if she has never HAD the experience of seeing red, and also why it is meaningless to ask “what is it like to be a bat?”, because the only agent who CAN know what it is like to be a bat …… is a bat!
But NONE of the above is evidence that experience does not have a physical effect.

I know you have experiences, but I don't know if they are anything like mine, and I never will.

Agreed! That is what I was trying to say in “the neurophysiological state of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your neurophysiological state of you seeing either red or green”

On the other hand, they do affect the physical world in that we can talk about their existence.

AND they cause us to take certain actions – therefore they are very much part of our decision making and cause-and-effect.

I was just trying to show that epiphenomalism isn't as black and white as it seems, and that we can still retain some of its intuitive qualities while diluting the blatant paradox that arises from the fact that we talk about consciousness.

What paradox? I see no paradox. Can you explain where the paradox is?

The only problem now is how its existence can affect the physical world.

Because eperience is PART OF the physical world! I’m sorry, but its so blindingly obvious. There IS no dualism, there IS no separate “thinking self” which somehow exists out of causal contact with the physical self. This is a philosophical dead-end.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

Is that “No, I do not believe that your subjective experience of the colour yellow is necessarily identical to my subjective experience of the colour yellow”?

yes.

Ahhh, ok. So now you are saying "the experience of the colour yellow" and the "subjective feel of yellow (the yellow-quale)" are in fact the same thing?

yes.

Previously you claimed these were not the same.

Not deliberately. I may have been misled by your strange use of NP.

OK. You claimed that “the experience of the colour yellow” and “the subjective 'feel' of yellow, the yellow-quale” were different. Can you explain how you think they are different?

I didn't.

Firstly, you (as a 3rd person objective observer) would never be able to find subjective experience by examining an NP state from the outside. The only route to “finding subjective experience” (as you put it) is through the manifestation of an NP state within a consciousness – ie 1st person subjectively.

Again, your use of an "NP state" as somehow embracing subjectivity is confusing.

Secondly, I am not “most people”. And what makes you think you know most people’s intuition in this respect? And why should most people’s intuition matter anyway in our debate? I am interested in your thoughts, not in “most peoples”.

I share that intuition.

I did not say that the NP of “A having a green quale” does not differ from that of “B having a red quale”; but it does not follow that different NPs must necessarily result in completely different behaviour. Dissimilar NPs may cause dissimilar behaviour, but there can conceivably be similarities in behaviour resulting from dissimilar NPs.

If qualia are causes, they will always be detectable in principle; that
was the issue the original question was getting at. You seem to have
fallen back on the position that they might not be detectable in practice.

 

[Tournesol]

IMHO, a particular conscious experience is a consequence of the manifestation of a particular neurophysiological state within a consciousness

The consciousness is separate from the NP state ?

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the experience of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your experience of you seeing either red or green.

The idea that experiences could be so loosely related to physical brain-states
implies a dualism which you elsewhere reject.

Just to be clear, what you seem to want is that “two brains can be exactly the same, but not be exactly the same, at the same time”, a clear contradiction.

I think he supposes that it is logically conceivable that two
brains could be physically in the same state, but experientially
in different states. And it is logically conceivable, but, like flying pigs, naturalistically impossible.

Two things here. Firstly I challenge that no two people can have the “exact same physical brain”. The exact composition and pattern of each physical brain is determined not only by genetic history but also by total life experience.

Two people in a thought-experiment can. You are addressing naturalistic possibility, not logical conceivability.

No two people have the same total life experience, hence there is no reason to expect that any two brains are “exactly the same”.
Secondly, the mere fact that one experiences red where the other experiences green is direct evidence that the two brains are not exactly the same.

Naturalistically, yes. Logically ?

Why on Earth do you say that? My experience of me seeing my daughter about to walk across the road in front of an oncoming car would have a VERY immediate physical effect on me!
What evidence do you have that experience does NOT have a physical effect?

If it is logically possible for conscious states to vary across identical
brains, then it follows that they make no physical difference. Logically.
Naturalistically, this isn't very plausible.

That is because experience is a 1st person subjective phenomenon, whereas “to make it clear to others” you must necessarily translate it into a 3rd person objective description, and the 3rd person objective description can never convey everything about the 1st person objective experience. This is the reason why “Mary can never know all there is to know about the experience of seeing red” if she has never HAD the experience of seeing red, and also why it is meaningless to ask “what is it like to be a bat?”, because the only agent who CAN know what it is like to be a bat …… is a bat!
But NONE of the above is evidence that experience does not have a physical effect.

But it is very plausible that everyhting in phsyics, as a matter of principle can be explained in 3rd-person language. So the very existence of anything
that is intriniscally 1st-person suggests that there is somehtign non-physical.
Couple that the cuasal closure of the physical , and you get the causal
idleness of the experiential.

It is for you to explain how your commitment to physicalism squares
with your commitment to irreducibly 1st-person experience.

AND they cause us to take certain actions – therefore they are very much part of our decision making and cause-and-effect.

That (call it I) stands up by itself, but how does it square with
II physicalism
III the principle that everyhting physical can be expressed in a 3rd-person way ?

What paradox? I see no paradox. Can you explain where the paradox is?

Between "consciousness doesn't cause anything" (epiphenomenalism) and
"I am talking about consciousness".

Because eperience is PART OF the physical world! I’m sorry, but its so blindingly obvious. There IS no dualism, there IS no separate “thinking self” which somehow exists out of causal contact with the physical self. This is a philosophical dead-end.

For you there is a dualism of 1st-person-understandable and 3rd-peson describable.

 

[StatusX]

IMHO, a particular conscious experience is a consequence of the manifestation of a particular neurophysiological state within a consciousness. But no problem, replace my words “neurophysiological states” with the word “experience” and you get the following :

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the experience of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your experience of you seeing either red or green.

Experiences and brain states are not the same thing. It is like something to have an experience, but a brain state is just a certain physical state, defined completely by structure and function. They are surely closely related, and possibly one thing looked at in two different ways, but when I say "experience" I mean something different from when I say "brain state."

Just to be clear, what you seem to want is that “two brains can be exactly the same, but not be exactly the same, at the same time”, a clear contradiction.

Of course, this presupposes the physical is all that is real. But beyond that, I am talking about counterfactual worlds. I don't mean that two physically identical brain states in this universe could correspond to different experiences, and in fact I don't believe that is possible. I am saying that experiences are different from brain states, and it is possible to imagine worlds where someone physically identical to you (ie, you from this world) has different experiences. On the other hand, it is not possible to imagine a physically identical world where your twin behaves differently, because behavior supervenes on the physical.

Why on Earth do you say that? My experience of me seeing my daughter about to walk across the road in front of an oncoming car would have a VERY immediate physical effect on me!
What evidence do you have that experience does NOT have a physical effect?

Again, you are mixing up experiences and brain states. Your reaction is a result of electric signals in your brain, not because of what it was like to see the event. The experience could be different, or not existent (again, in counterfactual worlds), and your brain could have reacted identically.

That is because experience is a 1st person subjective phenomenon, whereas “to make it clear to others” you must necessarily translate it into a 3rd person objective description, and the 3rd person objective description can never convey everything about the 1st person objective experience. This is the reason why “Mary can never know all there is to know about the experience of seeing red” if she has never HAD the experience of seeing red, and also why it is meaningless to ask “what is it like to be a bat?”, because the only agent who CAN know what it is like to be a bat …… is a bat!
But NONE of the above is evidence that experience does not have a physical effect.

So are you saying there is more to explain beyond the third person physical account, just that it is impossible to do it? That is a strong possibility. I'm just saying that there is more, which many people disagree with.

You might find it frivolous to talk about what "might be" in "counterfactual worlds", but that is actually central to scientific investigation. In this case, if it is possible to imagine another universe that is physically identical where experiences are different, there are further laws we don't know about yet that make experiences the way they are here. When god made the physical, he had to do more to make our universe this one and not the other one.

I think most of the rest of your post is addressed by what I've said here, but if you think anything wasn't, please tell me.

 

[moving finger]

Is that “No, I do not believe that your subjective experience of the colour yellow is necessarily identical to my subjective experience of the colour yellow”?

yes.

Thank you. We agree on this.

So now you are saying "the experience of the colour yellow" and the "subjective feel of yellow (the yellow-quale)" are in fact the same thing?

yes.

Thank you. We also agree on this.

OK. You claimed that “the experience of the colour yellow” and “the subjective 'feel' of yellow, the yellow-quale” were different. Can you explain how you think they are different?

I didn't.

See post #29, first 3 lines. (but I don’t want to make a fuss)

Firstly, you (as a 3rd person objective observer) would never be able to find subjective experience by examining an NP state from the outside. The only route to “finding subjective experience” (as you put it) is through the manifestation of an NP state within a consciousness – ie 1st person subjectively.

Again, your use of an "NP state" as somehow embracing subjectivity is confusing.

IMHO perhaps your confusion is caused by the insistence on clinging to the intuition that everything (including subjective experience) must be interpretable (explainable) from a 3rd person objective perspective.

I share that intuition.

Intuition is a wonderful but dangerous thing.

I did not say that the NP of “A having a green quale” does not differ from that of “B having a red quale”; but it does not follow that different NPs must necessarily result in completely different behaviour. Dissimilar NPs may cause dissimilar behaviour, but there can conceivably be similarities in behaviour resulting from dissimilar NPs.

If qualia are causes, they will always be detectable in principle; that was the issue the original question was getting at. You seem to have fallen back on the position that they might not be detectable in practice.

IMHO, qualia are 1st person subjective experiences (which it seems you now agree with, as per the 2nd exchange above). As such, they can be causes (affecting our behaviour). But as 1st person subjective experiences, they are NOT amenable to study by 3rd person objective science, and therefore they are IN PRINCIPLE not “detectable” by 3rd person objective science.

The consciousness is separate from the NP state ?

Look at an NP state from the outside (3rd person objective science) and you see one thing. Look at an NP state from the inside (1st person subjective experience, aka a part of consciousness) and you see another.
One cannot understand the difference by clinging to the intuition that everything (including subjective experience) must be interpretable (explainable) from a 3rd person objective perspective.

If you mean simply “if someone sees my green as his red and my red as his green” then I would say the question is meaningless, because the experience of that person seeing green is unique to that person and does not necessarily bear any resemblance or connection to your experience of you seeing either red or green.

The idea that experiences could be so loosely related to physical brain-states implies a dualism which you elsewhere reject.

Loosely connected?
Look at an NP state from the outside (3rd person objective science) and you see one thing. Look at an NP state from the inside (1st person subjective experience, aka a part of consciousness) and you see another.
Call this “dualism” if you wish, but one cannot understand the difference between “experiences” and “observing brain states” by clinging to the intuition that everything (including subjective experience) must be interpretable (explainable) from a 3rd person objective perspective.

Just to be clear, what you seem to want is that “two brains can be exactly the same, but not be exactly the same, at the same time”, a clear contradiction.

I think he supposes that it is logically conceivable that two brains could be physically in the same state, but experientially in different states. And it is logically conceivable, but, like flying pigs, naturalistically impossible.

I do not consider it even “logically conceivable”.

I challenge that no two people can have the “exact same physical brain”. The exact composition and pattern of each physical brain is determined not only by genetic history but also by total life experience.

Two people in a thought-experiment can. You are addressing naturalistic possibility, not logical conceivability.

Nope. For two people to have “exactly the same physical brain” they would in fact have to be exactly the the same person. I do not accept that two different people could share the “exact same physical brain”, even in principle.

No two people have the same total life experience, hence there is no reason to expect that any two brains are “exactly the same”.
Secondly, the mere fact that one experiences red where the other experiences green is direct evidence that the two brains are not exactly the same.

Naturalistically, yes. Logically ?

Logically also. How can two brains be logically “exactly the same” if one brain interprets a visual scene as “red” and the other interprets the same scene as “green”?

Why on Earth do you say that? My experience of me seeing my daughter about to walk across the road in front of an oncoming car would have a VERY immediate physical effect on me!
What evidence do you have that experience does NOT have a physical effect?

If it is logically possible for conscious states to vary across identical brains, then it follows that they make no physical difference. Logically.
Naturalistically, this isn't very plausible.

Identical brains, as I have said, is (IMHO) a non-starter in principle.
Even if we allow identical (truly identical) brains, that (to my mind) also implies identical conscious experiences.

That is because experience is a 1st person subjective phenomenon, whereas “to make it clear to others” you must necessarily translate it into a 3rd person objective description, and the 3rd person objective description can never convey everything about the 1st person objective experience. This is the reason why “Mary can never know all there is to know about the experience of seeing red” if she has never HAD the experience of seeing red, and also why it is meaningless to ask “what is it like to be a bat?”, because the only agent who CAN know what it is like to be a bat …… is a bat!
But NONE of the above is evidence that experience does not have a physical effect.

But it is very plausible that everyhting in phsyics, as a matter of principle can be explained in 3rd-person language.

Everything contained within 3rd person objective physics can be explained in 3rd-person language. But 1st person subjective experiences are not accessible to 3rd person objective science (how many times have I typed this?). 1st person subjective and 3rd-person objective provide two different perspectives on the world which cannot be totally reconciled with each other. What more needs to be explained?

So the very existence of anything that is intriniscally 1st-person suggests that there is somehtign non-physical.

Nope. It suggests there is something that is not accessible to 3rd person objective science, and that something is 1st person subjective experience. But 1st person subjective experience is nevertheless physical. 1st person subjective and 3rd-person objective provide two different perspectives on the world which cannot be totally reconciled with each other. What more needs to be explained?

Couple that the cuasal closure of the physical , and you get the causal idleness of the experiential.

1st person subjective experiences are physical. But they are not amenable to study using 3rd-person objective science. Thers is no causal idleness, whatever that might be.

It is for you to explain how your commitment to physicalism squares with your commitment to irreducibly 1st-person experience.

1st person subjective experiences are physical. But 1st person subjective experiences are not amenable to study using 3rd-person objective science. 1st person subjective and 3rd-person objective provide two different perspectives on the world which cannot be totally reconciled with each other. What more needs to be explained?

AND they cause us to take certain actions – therefore they are very much part of our decision making and cause-and-effect.

That (call it I) stands up by itself, but how does it square with II physicalism
III the principle that everyhting physical can be expressed in a 3rd-person way ?

I & II = 1st person subjective experiences are physical. But they are not amenable to study using 3rd-person objective science.
III = Where is it written that “everything” can be expressed in a 3rd-person way?

What paradox? I see no paradox. Can you explain where the paradox is?

Between "consciousness doesn't cause anything" (epiphenomenalism) and "I am talking about consciousness".

But consciousness IS physical, it DOES cause, and I can talk about it, and talk about it causing. Where is there a paradox?

Because eperience is PART OF the physical world! I’m sorry, but its so blindingly obvious. There IS no dualism, there IS no separate “thinking self” which somehow exists out of causal contact with the physical self. This is a philosophical dead-end.

For you there is a dualism of 1st-person-understandable and 3rd-peson describable.

If one looks hard enough one can find “examples” of so-called “dualism” everywhere – but there is a world of difference between this emergent observed dualism and the intrinsic but wholly intuitive “physical/spiritual” Dualism (with an upper-case D) that Libertarians espouse and finds its roots in Descartes ideas, postulating that there is some intrinsic yet unexplained “non-physical something” which allegedly causes and controls our consciousness and which also somehow “controls itself” independently of the physical world, and yet still mystically interacts (when it wishes to) with the physical world.
I submit that the Libertarian/Descartes idea of Dualism is in fact an illusion arising from the refusal to give up the intuition that “everything in the world, , including subjective experiences, must be explainable from a 3rd person objective perspective”. This intuition (IMHO) is false.

Unlike Libertarian/Descartes Dualism, The “dualism” that you refer to above in the form of 1st person subjective experience versus 3rd-person objective science is not an intrinsic dualism “of” the world, it is simply an emergent dualism “in” the world caused by looking at the world from two irreconcilable perspectives (one perspective from inside consciousness, one perspective from outside consciousness). This is fully understandable and explainable, but it is certainly NOT the Dualism of Descartes or Libertarianism.

The dualism provided by the different perspectives of 1st person subjective and 3rd-person objective emerge (if you like) as a kind of “epistemic dualism”. It recognises that there are fundamental, in principle, limits to our knowledge which depend on our chosen perspective. With due respect to Nagel, I can never know what it is like to be a bat, for example, and Mary can never know what it is like to experience the sight of red until she actually does experience red, but there is no physical/spiritual Dualism in the sense that parts of the “non-physical essence of a bat” exists in some kind of objective but “causal limbo” separate from the rest of the deterministic and physical universe.

MF

 

[moving finger]

Experiences and brain states are not the same thing.

StatusX, I never said they were “the same thing”. But they are related (as you agree below)

They are surely closely related, and possibly one thing looked at in two different ways, but when I say "experience" I mean something different from when I say "brain state."

I agree. “Experience” is a 1st person subjective phenomenon, whereas when we examine a “brain state” from the outside what we are doing is looking at it in a 3rd person objective way. The two are related but different things.

Just to be clear, what you seem to want is that “two brains can be exactly the same, but not be exactly the same, at the same time”, a clear contradiction.

Of course, this presupposes the physical is all that is real.

See my later comment on axioms.

But beyond that, I am talking about counterfactual worlds. I don't mean that two physically identical brain states in this universe could correspond to different experiences, and in fact I don't believe that is possible.

By definition, “universe” is all that exists.

I am saying that experiences are different from brain states

Yes, we have already agreed this above.

and it is possible to imagine worlds where someone physically identical to you (ie, you from this world) has different experiences.

What do you consider would be “different” about such an identical person in an identical world that could give rise to “different” experiences?

My experience of me seeing my daughter about to walk across the road in front of an oncoming car would have a VERY immediate physical effect on me!
What evidence do you have that experience does NOT have a physical effect?

Again, you are mixing up experiences and brain states. Your reaction is a result of electric signals in your brain, not because of what it was like to see the event.

In saying that “My experience of me seeing my daughter about to walk across the road in front of an oncoming car would have a VERY immediate physical effect on me”, I am saying something about a change in my consciousness which is related to my experiences, I am saying nothing exlicitly about my brain states (my 1st person subjective perspective is not even aware of brain states).
I am not mixing up anything – we both agree that experiences and brain states are not identical, but they are closely related (as you have agreed above).
The electrical signals in my brain are part of my neurophysiological state (NS) at that time. The manifestation of that NS as part of my consciousness = my subjective experience at that time. This does not imply that experiences “are the same things” as brain states, but it does imply there is a close connection.

Can you clarify what you mean by the words “physical effect” in the statement “experience does not seem to have a physical effect”?

The experience could be different, or not existent (again, in counterfactual worlds), and your brain could have reacted identically.

Different NSs would normally be associated with different experiences, I agree. But IMHO an identical world would give rise to an identical person with identical brain states and identical experiences, leading to identical reactions.

So are you saying there is more to explain beyond the third person physical account,

Yes, that is exactly what I am saying

just that it is impossible to do it?

No, I am saying it is impossible to explain it from a 3rd person objective perspective (which is what conventional science tries to do).

That is a strong possibility. I'm just saying that there is more, which many people disagree with.

What “more” do you think there is?

You might find it frivolous to talk about what "might be" in "counterfactual worlds", but that is actually central to scientific investigation.

I do not think it frivolous, but to be meaningful such a discussion must first agree axioms. I think we have not agreed all our axioms.

In this case, if it is possible to imagine another universe that is physically identical where experiences are different,

This is an area where we disagree on axioms. IMHO, one possible axiom is that everything arises from the “physical” – define the physical and everything else is defined. Therefore to suggest that a world can exist which is physically identical with our own but where experiences are not identical is clearly incompatible with this axiom.

there are further laws we don't know about yet that make experiences the way they are here.

This is clearly one of your axioms

When god made the physical, he had to do more to make our universe this one and not the other one.

“God” is therefore another of your axioms (but I’m not sure what relevance this axiom has in the present discussion?)

MF

 

[Tournesol]

]See post #29, first 3 lines. (but I don’t want to make a fuss)

Where you said:

Need to be careful to distinguish between “the colour yellow” and “the experience of the colour yellow”.

And I said:-

and, thirdly, the subjective 'feel' of yellow, the yellow-quale.

Because you went on to say:-

Yes, and this (the experience of the colour yellow) is a particular neurophysiological state within each consciousness. It is also peculiar to that consciousness

Now, just about anybody would take 'NP state' to indicate a 3rd person
description, so it would appear you were leaving the 1st-person aspect
out entirely.

IMHO perhaps your confusion is caused by the insistence on clinging to the intuition that everything (including subjective experience) must be interpretable (explainable) from a 3rd person objective perspective.

If physicalism doesn't mean that, what does it mean ?

IMHO, qualia are 1st person subjective experiences (which it seems you now agree with, as per the 2nd exchange above). As such, they can be causes (affecting our behaviour). But as 1st person subjective experiences, they are NOT amenable to study by 3rd person objective science, and therefore they are IN PRINCIPLE not “detectable” by 3rd person objective science.

Which means there is something going on causally which is not
detectable to the 3rd-person perspective, so physics
is not explanatorily closed. Does that mean
physical closure is false ? If, so , does that mean physicalism
is false ?

Look at an NP state from the outside (3rd person objective science) and you see one thing. Look at an NP state from the inside (1st person subjective experience, aka a part of consciousness) and you see another.
One cannot understand the difference by clinging to the intuition that everything (including subjective experience) must be interpretable (explainable) from a 3rd person objective perspective.

The 3rd-person perspective isn't proposed as a way of understanding
exprience, it is proposed as an implication of physicalism. If physicalism
doesn't mean that, what does it mean ?

I do not consider it even “logically conceivable”.

Which would mean that it is somehow self-contradictory. Where is the
cotradiction ?

Nope. For two people to have “exactly the same physical brain” they would in fact have to be exactly the the same person.

That doesn't follow at all. Indistinguishability does not imply numerical identity.
Every electron is the same as every other, but there are a lot of them!

I do not accept that two different people could share the “exact same physical brain”, even in principle.

There is no law of the universe agasint it. It may be unlikely, but that is hardly an objection un principle.

Logically also. How can two brains be logically “exactly the same” if one brain interprets a visual scene as “red” and the other interprets the same scene as “green”?

The idea is that if they are phsyically identical, but subjectively diffeent, there must be a non-physical element to account for the difference.
You keep confusing physical identity with identity simpliciter.

Identical brains, as I have said, is (IMHO) a non-starter in principle.
Even if we allow identical (truly identical) brains, that (to my mind) also implies identical conscious experiences.

Naturally or logically ?

Everything contained within 3rd person objective physics can be explained in 3rd-person language. But 1st person subjective experiences are not accessible to 3rd person objective science (how many times have I typed this?). 1st person subjective and 3rd-person objective provide two different perspectives on the world which cannot be totally reconciled with each other. What more needs to be explained?

Whether and how the above is compatible with physicalism.

AND they cause us to take certain actions – therefore they are very much part of our decision making and cause-and-effect.

That (call it I) stands up by itself, but how does it square with
II physicalism
III the principle that everyhting physical can be expressed in a 3rd-person

I & II = 1st person subjective experiences are physical. But they are not amenable to study using 3rd-person objective science.
III = Where is it written that “everything” can be expressed in a 3rd-person way?

It is an implication of physicalism.

But consciousness IS physical, it DOES cause, and I can talk about it, and talk about it causing. Where is there a paradox?

The tension is between physicalism as an explanatory position (everything can in principle be explained in physics) and as an ontological position (there are no spirits or ghosts). But if you think The former is false and the latter
is true (and it looks like you do), you would make your self
a lot clearer by using phrases like "consciousness is metaphysically physical"
as Owen Flanagen does.

If one looks hard enough one can find “examples” of so-called “dualism” everywhere – but there is a world of difference between this emergent observed dualism and the intrinsic but wholly intuitive “physical/spiritual” Dualism (with an upper-case D) that Libertarians

aaaagh!

espouse and finds its roots in Descartes ideas, postulating that there is some intrinsic yet unexplained “non-physical something” which allegedly causes and controls our consciousness and which also somehow “controls itself” independently of the physical world, and yet still mystically interacts (when it wishes to) with the physical world.
I submit that the Libertarian/Descartes idea of Dualism is in fact an illusion arising from the refusal to give up the intuition that “everything in the world, , including subjective experiences, must be explainable from a 3rd person objective perspective”. This intuition (IMHO) is false.

What explains the impossibiliy of explaining consc. from a 3rd-peson
perspective ? If that epistemological issue isn't rooted in metaphysics, what is it rooted in ?

Unlike Libertarian/Descartes Dualism, The “dualism” that you refer to above in the form of 1st person subjective experience versus 3rd-person objective science is not an intrinsic dualism “of” the world, it is simply an emergent dualism “in” the world caused by looking at the world from two irreconcilable perspectives (one perspective from inside consciousness, one perspective from outside consciousness). This is fully understandable and explainable, but it is certainly NOT the Dualism of Descartes or Libertarianism.

Explainable in what way ? If the 1st-peson perspective is generated by
the brain using physical processes, shoudn't it be physically explainable ?

The dualism provided by the different perspectives of 1st person subjective and 3rd-person objective emerge (if you like) as a kind of “epistemic dualism”. It recognises that there are fundamental, in principle, limits to our knowledge which depend on our chosen perspective. With due respect to Nagel, I can never know what it is like to be a bat, for example, and Mary can never know what it is like to experience the sight of red until she actually does experience red, but there is no physical/spiritual Dualism in the sense that parts of the “non-physical essence of a bat” exists in some kind of objective but “causal limbo” separate from the rest of the deterministic and physical universe.

But that dualism, and I don't doubt that it exists, must come
about for some reason , and I don't doubnt that the reason in question
must be something to do with the kind of explanatory lanhuage or framework
employed, but I don't see how it can be entirely due to that. There
must be some metaphysical/ontological reason why particular epistemolgical/explanatory problems only arise regarding particular phenomena.

 

[moving finger]

IMHO perhaps your confusion is caused by the insistence on clinging to the intuition that everything (including subjective experience) must be interpretable (explainable) from a 3rd person objective perspective.

If physicalism doesn't mean that, what does it mean ?

A physicalist is one who believes that structure & function is all there is, and that consciousness (and conscious experiences) can be explained as part of the functionalist framework (it is just more structure and function).
Perhaps you can explain what the definition of physicalism has to do with your intuition?

Which means there is something going on causally which is not detectable to the 3rd-person perspective, so physics is not explanatorily closed. Does that mean physical closure is false ? If, so , does that mean physicalism is false ?

No. I was saying nothing about physics or physicalism. A physicalist is one who believes that structure & function is all there is, and that consciousness (and conscious experiences) can be explained as part of the functionalist framework (it is just more structure and function). And I won’t repeat again the difference between 1st and 3rd person perspectives, I’m getting fed up of repeating myself.

The 3rd-person perspective isn't proposed as a way of understanding exprience, it is proposed as an implication of physicalism.

Whose “law” is this?
I see the 3rd person objective perspective as a “description of the way that science traditionally views the world”. Such a perspective is incompatible with 1st person subjective perspectives. Simple as that.
And a physicalist is one who believes that structure & function is all there is, and that consciousness (and conscious experiences) can be explained as part of the functionalist framework (it is just more structure and function). This does not imply that the physicalist must necessarily be limited to the 3rd person perspective.

If physicalism doesn't mean that, what does it mean ?

See above.

Which would mean that it is somehow self-contradictory. Where is the cotradiction ?

The law of logical non-contradiction. Something cannot be both “identical” and “not identical” at the same time.

For two people to have “exactly the same physical brain” they would in fact have to be exactly the the same person.

That doesn't follow at all. Indistinguishability does not imply numerical identity.
Every electron is the same as every other, but there are a lot of them!

We are not talking about indistinguishability (an epistemic property) we are talking about ontic identity. Electrons may be epistemically indistinguishable in some circumstances, but it does not follow from this that every electron is ontically the same as every other. That’s the whole point. Each one has a different wavefunction.

I do not accept that two different people could share the “exact same physical brain”, even in principle.

There is no law of the universe agasint it. It may be unlikely, but that is hardly an objection un principle.

The law of logical non-contradiction. Something cannot be both “identical” and “not identical” at the same time.

The idea is that if they are phsyically identical, but subjectively diffeent, there must be a non-physical element to account for the difference.
You keep confusing physical identity with identity simpliciter.

Nope. I assume that everything is grounded in the physical, thus any two physically identical systems are by definition identical. Period.

Identical brains, as I have said, is (IMHO) a non-starter in principle.
Even if we allow identical (truly identical) brains, that (to my mind) also implies identical conscious experiences.

Naturally or logically ?

I assume that everything is grounded in the physical, thus any two physically identical systems are by definition identical. Period.

What more needs to be explained?

Whether and how the above is compatible with physicalism.

See above.

Where is it written that “everything” can be expressed in a 3rd-person way?

It is an implication of physicalism.

See above.

The tension is between physicalism as an explanatory position (everything can in principle be explained in physics) and as an ontological position (there are no spirits or ghosts). But if you think The former is false and the latter is true (and it looks like you do), you would make your self a lot clearer by using phrases like "consciousness is metaphysically physical" as Owen Flanagen does.

See above. (and I am not Owen Flanagan.)

What explains the impossibiliy of explaining consc. from a 3rd-peson perspective ?

The fact that consciousness is a 1st person subjective experience, and not a 3rd person objective phenomenon. How many times do you want me to repeat this?

If that epistemological issue isn't rooted in metaphysics, what is it rooted in ?

Epistemic perspective. There is nothing metaphysical about it.

If the 1st-peson perspective is generated by the brain using physical processes, shoudn't it be physically explainable ?

It is physically explainable in principle, but there is once again the issue of epistemic perspective. 1st person subjective is not explainable from a 3rd person perspective.
Has it got through to you yet?

But that dualism, and I don't doubt that it exists, must come about for some reason , and I don't doubnt that the reason in question must be something to do with the kind of explanatory lanhuage or framework employed, but I don't see how it can be entirely due to that.

Why not?

There must be some metaphysical/ontological reason why particular epistemolgical/explanatory problems only arise regarding particular phenomena.

Why? Which particular phenomena and which particular problems are you referring to?

MF

 

[Tournesol]

A physicalist is one who believes that structure & function is all there is, and that consciousness (and conscious experiences) can be explained as part of the functionalist framework (it is just more structure and function).

Perhaps you can explain what the definition of physicalism has to do with your intuition?

It is obvious that anything structural and functional can be exhaustively described from a 3rd person perspective. That, and empiricism, is what the objectivity of science and maths is all about.

I see the 3rd person objective perspective as a “description of the way that science traditionally views the world”. Such a perspective is incompatible with 1st person subjective perspectives. Simple as that.
And a physicalist is one who believes that structure & function is all there is, and that consciousness (and conscious experiences) can be explained as part of the functionalist framework (it is just more structure and function). This does not imply that the physicalist must necessarily be limited to the 3rd person perspective.

Yes it does, because the existence of something which is
a) purely structural and functional and
b) incomunicable from a 3rd-person perspective
is contradictory.

The law of logical non-contradiction. Something cannot be both “identical” and “not identical” at the same time.

Two things can be indistiguishable but numerically distinct.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/

We are not talking about indistinguishability (an epistemic property) we are talking about ontic identity. Electrons may be epistemically indistinguishable in some circumstances, but it does not follow from this that every electron is ontically the same as every other. That’s the whole point. Each one has a different wavefunction.

And two human can be physically indistinguishable but numerically (ontically
as you say) distinct.

Nope. I assume that everything is grounded in the physical, thus any two physically identical systems are by definition identical. Period.

And any physical system is entirely describable in structural and functional
terms and thus entirely describable in 3rd person terms with no 1st-person
residue.

I assume that everything is grounded in the physical, thus any two physically identical systems are by definition identical. Period.

Yet two conscious systems have 1st-person perspectives which cannot be
conveyed in 3rd-person terms, and thus cannot be conveyed in physical terms.

The fact that consciousness is a 1st person subjective experience, and not a 3rd person objective phenomenon. How many times do you want me to repeat this?

When are you going to explain how 1st person-ness can come
about in an entrirely structural and functional universe ?

If that epistemological issue isn't rooted in metaphysics, what is it rooted in ?

Epistemic perspective. There is nothing metaphysical about it

But epistemic perspective is not (for phsycialists) some weird,
miraculous exception to the laws of nature; it is the result
of the activity of the human nervous system. If you have
a complete description of human neurophysiology, how could it fail to
describe how a 1st-person conscious perspective is generated ITFP?

If the 1st-peson perspective is generated by the brain using physical processes, shoudn't it be physically explainable ?

It is physically explainable in principle, but there is once again the issue of epistemic perspective. 1st person subjective is not explainable from a 3rd person perspective.

Has it got through to you yet?

There is indeed the issue of 1st person perspective. If everything is
explainable physically in principle so is the existence of 1st-person perspectives.
If the existence of 1st-person perspectives is inexplicable, everything is
NOT explainable physically in principle.

Since your position is basically contradictory, it is impossible to 'get'.

There must be some metaphysical/ontological reason why particular epistemolgical/explanatory problems only arise regarding particular phenomena.

Why? Which particular phenomena and which particular problems are you referring to?

The (in)explicablity of the 1st person perspective.

 

[moving finger]

It is obvious that anything structural and functional can be exhaustively described from a 3rd person perspective.

I disagree.
Your assertion is the foundation of 3rd person objective science. It is an approximation, but it is not true.
IMHO a (1st person) perspective from “inside the function”, where the 1st person IS part of the function, cannot necessarily be exhaustively described by a (3rd person) perspective from “outside the function”, where the 3rd person is NOT part of the function..

That, and empiricism, is what the objectivity of science and maths is all about.

Agreed. And that is precisely why 3rd person objective science fails to fully describe 1st person subjective phenomena. It seems very obvious to me!

I see the 3rd person objective perspective as a “description of the way that science traditionally views the world”. Such a perspective is incompatible with 1st person subjective perspectives. Simple as that.
And a physicalist is one who believes that structure & function is all there is, and that consciousness (and conscious experiences) can be explained as part of the functionalist framework (it is just more structure and function). This does not imply that the physicalist must necessarily be limited to the 3rd person perspective.

Yes it does, because the existence of something which is
a) purely structural and functional and
b) incomunicable from a 3rd-person perspective
is contradictory.

I disagree. You assume “physically” necessarily implies “3rd person objectively”. For an explanation see my first reply in this post.

The law of logical non-contradiction. Something cannot be both “identical” and “not identical” at the same time.

Two things can be indistiguishable but numerically distinct.

Indistinguishable is not the same as identical.
Indistinguihable refers to epistemic qualities.
Identical refers to ontic qualities.
(I’m sure I said this already)
Thus two indistinguishable things are not necessarily identical, thus they certainly can be distinct.

We are not talking about indistinguishability (an epistemic property) we are talking about ontic identity. Electrons may be epistemically indistinguishable in some circumstances, but it does not follow from this that every electron is ontically the same as every other. That’s the whole point. Each one has a different wavefunction.

And two human can be physically indistinguishable but numerically (ontically as you say) distinct.

Physical indistinguishability does not imply “not identical”.
The original question was whether two “identical brains” could be different to each other, not whether two “indistinguishable brains” could be different to each other.

Nope. I assume that everything is grounded in the physical, thus any two physically identical systems are by definition identical. Period.

And any physical system is entirely describable in structural and functional terms and thus entirely describable in 3rd person terms with no 1st-person residue.

Disagree. You assume “physically” necessarily implies “3rd person objectively”. For an explanation see my first reply in this post.

I assume that everything is grounded in the physical, thus any two physically identical systems are by definition identical. Period.

Yet two conscious systems have 1st-person perspectives which cannot be conveyed in 3rd-person terms, and thus cannot be conveyed in physical terms.

Disagree. You assume “physically” necessarily implies “3rd person objectively”. For an explanation see my first reply in this post.

The fact that consciousness is a 1st person subjective experience, and not a 3rd person objective phenomenon.

When are you going to explain how 1st person-ness can come about in an entrirely structural and functional universe ?

1st person subjective is a perspective. Just as 3rd person objective is a perspective. You assume “physically” necessarily implies “3rd person objectively”. For an explanation see my first reply in this post.

If that epistemological issue isn't rooted in metaphysics, what is it rooted in ?

Epistemic perspective. There is nothing metaphysical about it

But epistemic perspective is not (for phsycialists) some weird, miraculous exception to the laws of nature; it is the result of the activity of the human nervous system. If you have a complete description of human neurophysiology, how could it fail to describe how a 1st-person conscious perspective is generated ITFP?

A 3rd person objective description can describe to some extent a 1st person subjective perspective, but not completely. Any more than I can completely describe to a blind person what the experience of seeing the colour green is like. There is no way to fully KNOW what the experience of seeing the colour green is like, unless you actually experience it – ie 1st person subjective.

If the 1st-peson perspective is generated by the brain using physical processes, shoudn't it be physically explainable ?

It is physically explainable in principle, but there is once again the issue of epistemic perspective. 1st person subjective is not explainable from a 3rd person perspective.

There is indeed the issue of 1st person perspective. If everything is explainable physically in principle so is the existence of 1st-person perspectives.

Yes. But the “existence of” a 1st person perspective is not the issue. The issue is whether that 1st person perspective can be fully explained from a 3rd person perspective.

If the existence of 1st-person perspectives is inexplicable, everything is NOT explainable physically in principle.

Disagree. You assume “physically” necessarily implies “3rd person objectively”. For an explanation see my first reply in this post.

There must be some metaphysical/ontological reason why particular epistemolgical/explanatory problems only arise regarding particular phenomena.

Why? Which particular phenomena and which particular problems are you referring to?

The (in)explicablity of the 1st person perspective.

This is not inexplicable. But it is not totally explainable in 3rd person objective language. For an explanation see my first reply in this post.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

IMHO a (1st person) perspective from “inside the function”, where the 1st person IS part of the function, cannot necessarily be exhaustively described by a (3rd person) perspective from “outside the function”, where the 3rd person is NOT part of the function..

There is no reason why that should be the case. Note that a SF description
does not contain within it any perspective or POV, so why should being
"inside the function" make a difference. Note also that *what* we find
difficult t convey about our conscious experience is not the
SF asepcts thereof. If I see a red square, I have no difficulty conveying he squareness of the square, which is structure, what I have difficulty with is the
redness, which, prima facie, isn't.

<the objectity of 3P descriptions> and empiricism, is what the objectivity of science and maths is all about.

Agreed. And that is precisely why 3rd person objective science fails to fully describe 1st person subjective phenomena. It seems very obvious to me!

The question is what would motivate us to accept that physicalism is true ontologically , if it fails explanatorilly.

Indistinguishable is not the same as identical.
Indistinguihable refers to epistemic qualities.
Identical refers to ontic qualities.
(I’m sure I said this already)
Thus two indistinguishable things are not necessarily identical, thus they certainly can be distinct.

So , contrary to what you were saying before, you can have
two distinct but physically indistinguishable brains.

My paraphrase of statusX's point was:

think he supposes that it is logically conceivable that two brains could be physically in the same state, but experientially in different states.

1st person subjective is a perspective. Just as 3rd person objective is a perspective.

No, 3rd person is not perspective, it is a "view from nowhere"

A 3rd person objective description can describe to some extent a 1st person subjective perspective, but not completely.

Why shouldn't we conclude that the world is physical, but not completely?

more than I can completely describe to a blind person what the experience of seeing the colour green is like. There is no way to fully KNOW what the experience of seeing the colour green is like, unless you actually experience it – ie 1st person subjective.

That is not in dispute. The question is whether that ineffability is compatible
with physicalism.

Yes. But the “existence of” a 1st person perspective is not the issue. The issue is whether that 1st person perspective can be fully explained from a 3rd person perspective.

The latter, epistemic, issue would not even exist without the former, ontic, one. Trying to portray physicalism as false epistemically but true ontologically, as you have been, is going to come undone if the
epistemic situation comes about for ontic reasons (ie there are
subjective perspectives becuase subjects exist).

 

[moving finger]

Note that a SF description does not contain within it any perspective or POV, so why should being "inside the function" make a difference.

What do you mean by SF please?

Note also that *what* we find difficult t convey about our conscious experience is not the SF asepcts thereof. If I see a red square, I have no difficulty conveying he squareness of the square, which is structure, what I have difficulty with is the redness, which, prima facie, isn't.

Because properties such as “squareness” can be explained in 3rd person objective terms, whereas “redness” cannot. It is purely a 1st person subjective property.

The question is what would motivate us to accept that physicalism is true ontologically , if it fails explanatorilly.

It seems no matter how many times I repeat it, you do not take it in.
Physicalism does not necessarily imply 3rd person objectivism.
It is not that physicalism fails explanatorily, it is that the 3rd person objective perspective cannot be used to fully explain 1st person subjective perspective.

Thus two indistinguishable things are not necessarily identical, thus they certainly can be distinct.

I never said they could not. The original assertion was that two IDENTICAL things could at the same time be NOT IDENTICAL, which I disagreed with. Now you are trying to replace identical with indistinguishable. Fine.

3rd person is not perspective, it is a "view from nowhere"

It’s a perspective. It assumes the world can be separated into “observed” and “observer” with no interdependency between the two.

Why shouldn't we conclude that the world is physical, but not completely?

Why should we conclude the world is not completely physical?

The question is whether that ineffability is compatible with physicalism.

Please define what you mean by ineffability.

Trying to portray physicalism as false epistemically but true ontologically, as you have been, is going to come undone if the epistemic situation comes about for ontic reasons (ie there are subjective perspectives becuase subjects exist).

You still do not read my posts properly, do you?
I am not trying to portray physicalism as false epistemically – YOU are the one doing that.
I have said several times that I believe physicalism can account for everything.
You seem to insist that physicalism necessarily implies 3rd person objectivism, and I disagree with this.
3rd person objective and 1st person subjective perspectives are both IMHO compatible with physicalism, but traditional science tends to use exclusively the 3rd person objective approach (for obvious reasons).
Though 1st person subjective phenomena can be explained physically, they cannot be fully explained on the basis of 3rd person objectivism alone.

MF