DarMM said:
More accurate for what though. The general view of linguists is that these models don't really achieve anything. I've worked in both mathematics and linguistics. I like dynamical systems as an area of mathematics, but I still don't see anything that is really needed in linguistics from these models or anything interesting they have produced.
This opinion of the linguists mirrors that of the opinion of most economists w.r.t. econophysics: they don't see the scientific value nor the potential of sophisticated mathematical models, but are content with what is already available i.e. the orthodox theories despite the clear limitations of the orthodox theories, which delimit the very interest in their respective subjects. Their specialized interest in only what has been conquered already and a select set of remaining issues as dictated by the community of elders as well as direct utility is typical narrow minded thinking which serves mostly to uphold a status quo and obscure their ignorance of their subject's proper foundations.
How many people are specifically not interested in studying language? The majority of those who go into STEM explicitly have a disinterest because natural language is in their own fields seen as a vague thing to be hated upon and avoided, i.e. scientific anathema. This disregard is far more corrosive than is realized, because the remaining population who may be interested, usually do not have the stomach for formal linguistics, which halts the overall march of science; this is related to why modern linguistics - i.e. after the arrival of Chomsky et al. - did not arise earlier despite Leibniz already laying some foundations almost 400 years ago.
DarMM said:
Of course. What has this got to do with Latin? I'm also not really sure how the quote from Poincaré is relevant. I'm not arguing that one must
study mathematics for its own sake. I'm not even talking about mathematics, I'm talking about learning Latin.
My apologies, I was not being as clear as I could be. I was responding against the typical justification for specialism and indirect assault on universalism (or generalism) by calling it a very 19th century view, as you espouse here:
DarMM said:
In line with the thread all I'll say is if you want to learn mathematics, learn mathematics. If you want to learn a language, even a Romance language then learn that language. If you want to learn linguistics, get a linguistics textbook. The idea of Latin as this great secondary skill is very "19th Century" to me where Latin was ascribed daft almost magical properties of being "deeper" or "more logical" than other languages
The quote from Poincaré is literally the opposed 19th century pro-universalism stance against 20th century specialism. I acknowledge, like Poincaré, that scientifically studying any and all natural phenomena, including natural languages and all related aspects - i.e. their usage, dynamics, evolution, and so on - end in mathematics, i.e. pure mathematics once properly appreciated actually touches nature. Poincaré's stance here is essentially an argument in favor of universalism and also a proclamation of both the unity of mathematics as well as the unity of science.
The fact that Poincaré, who at the turn of the century was simultaneously the most potent constructive pure mathematician of his age, a major force in theoretical physics as well as the best philosopher of physics in his time - literally the last universalist - felt this way, yet this view is almost specifically ignored or rejected by the viewpoint of modern academic mathematics, just shows how strongly politicized academic sociology really is by systematically censoring the viewpoint of opponents. This just shows how much Poincaré's premature death markedly altered the march of science, leaving us with only a yearning for what could have been in mathematics and science had he lived a full life.
The tale of Feynman - himself an avid follower of most of Poincaré's philosophies - can be understood in a more tragic sense once seen in this light:
Feynman was one of the only scientists after Poincaré to come close to a level of universalism like which Poincaré and a few others before him had attained. Feynman's personal philosophy of science is the ultimate example of being a product of unfortunate circumstances: he wanted to be a mathematician but openly rejected modern mathematics because logicism and formalism had become the academic norm after Poincaré - the only serious opponent - died; as a consequence of his death, Feynman's ambition of becoming a mathematician was already made nigh impossible from the get go.
Moreover, Feynman openly rejected philosophy - including the philosophy of science and physics - partly because of the upheaval of the subject which took place within the foundations of physics due to both the arrival of GR which occurred one year after Poincaré's death, as well as the subsequent complete degeneration of the foundation by QT, leaving the foundations of physics in the abysmal state that we know too well. This degeneration happened again because Poincaré died before being able to do anything about it and no one else of his calibre was around to handle the task.
Feynman, despite all of this, ultimately rejoins in the Poincaréian view of the unity of science by uttering the following words:
So, ultimately, in order to understand nature it may be necessary to have a deeper understanding of mathematical relationships. But the real reason is that the subject is enjoyable, and although we humans cut nature up in different ways, and we have different courses in different departments, such compartmentalization is really artificial, and we should take our intellectual pleasures where we find them.
There are many interesting phenomena … which involve a mixture of physical phenomena and physiological processes, and the full appreciation of natural phenomena, as we see them, must go beyond physics in the usual sense. We make no apologies for making these excursions into other fields, because the separation of fields, as we have emphasized, is merely a human convenience, and an unnatural thing. Nature is not interested in our separations, and many of the interesting phenomena bridge the gaps between fields.
