Faulty expectations of a theory of consciousness.

[Mentat]

Several of the members here have mentioned some of the problems that stand in the way of a scientific theory of consciousness. I've been thinking about them quite a bit, but it seems that some of these problems can be gotten rid of simply by understanding what a scientific theory does and does not do, in normal experience.

This will not solve all the problems of a theory of consciousness, obviously, but it will remove some - such as the "you cannot make a color-blind person understand 'blue' simply by teaching them all of the physical aspects of comprehending that particular wavelength of light" objection.

This is the opinion of Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi, who wrote, in A Universe of Consciousness:

Scientific explanations can provide the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a phenomenon to take place, can explain a phenomenon's properties, and can even explain why the phenomenon only takes place under those conditions. We all accept this fact when we consider, say, the scientific explanation of a hurricane: what kind of physical process it is, why it has the properties it has, and under what conditions it may form. But nobody expects that a scientific explanation of a hurricane will be or cause a hurricane.

This same understanding should, in my opinion as well as that of the authors, be applied to the search for a scientific explanation of consciousness.

 

[olde drunk]

WHY?

we all have a conciousness, ergo we see the color blue.

also, why do we need science to prove something that we know exsits?

what we need is for our conciousness to give science the next leap forward. imho, if science allowed the concept of conciousness, and it's implications, it would make a giant leap.

where do scientists believe all the great ideas came from? GOD or the conscious mind communicating with the physical world thru our brain??


nel blu d'pinto d'blu Or blue on blue??

 

[hypnagogue]

I agree. The objection that a scientific theory of consciousness could not communicate to a colorblind person what the color red looks like (which I have used before) is probably too strong. We should be satisfied with a theory of consciousness that satisfactorily explains how and why consciousness exists and is associated with certain physical systems.

However, there is still strong reason to believe that a purely physical account of consciousness will never be able to answer the question of why consciousness should be associated with physical systems in the first place. There is nothing in the current understanding of time, space, matter, energy and the like that makes it conceivable a priori that these things, arranged in the proper fashion, should somehow result in consciousness. To answer this question, it appears as if we must accept that our ontological map of reality needs to be extended to include a new fundamental entity alongside time, space, matter and the like-- consciousness, or at least 'things' that could conceivably combine to create consciousness.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
However, there is still strong reason to believe that a purely physical account of consciousness will never be able to answer the question of why consciousness should be associated with physical systems in the first place.

But isn't that like asking why a hurricane is associated with physical systems? The consciousness, according to the scientific approaches to the issue, is the physical processes - it isn't just "associated" with them.

There is nothing in the current understanding of time, space, matter, energy and the like that makes it conceivable a priori that these things, arranged in the proper fashion, should somehow result in consciousness.

But that just leads one back to the original Inductive assumption of Science. If you can constantly reproduce something in experiment, then it must be caused by whatever you used to produce it. There is no way, in pure logic, to even "prove" that bodies fall toward each other, e.g. that gravity exists at all. Each of the times that this effect has been observed could (at least, in the realm of pure logic) be a pure coincidence. However, that is not the scientific (nor, in this case, common-sensical) way to look at it.

 

[Adam]

We discussed the nature of intelligence and consciousness for the last six months at university, and all I can say at the end is that nobody has found a comprehensive explanation for either.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Adam
We discussed the nature of intelligence and consciousness for the last six months at university, and all I can say at the end is that nobody has found a comprehensive explanation for either.

Was your course on Neurology or Philosophy of the Mind?

 

[Adam]

Artificial Intelligence.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
But isn't that like asking why a hurricane is associated with physical systems?

Not quite. Given the complete set of microphysical facts about the weather system, it is inconceivable that this system could be anything but a hurricane; it is a conceptual necessity that the weather system, composed in this way, comprises what we call a hurricane on the macroscopic scale.

However, given the complete set of microphysical facts about brain processes, it is still very much conceivable that these processes could be instantiated without consciousness. Thus the association of consciousness with such systems is derived not by a priori necessity as with our hurricane, but rather with a posteriori contingency; it is taken as a brute fact observed to exist in nature.

Consciousness thus cannot be explained in simpler terms, but must be taken as non-reducible and fundamental. As such, our ontology of non-reducible, fundamental entities such as spacetime and matter/energy should be expanded to include consciousness, or theoretical 'things' that could conceivably combine to compose consciousness.

The consciousness, according to the scientific approaches to the issue, is the physical processes - it isn't just "associated" with them.

This view is incoherent without assuming something 'extra' in addition to our usual ontology-- either extra properties for spacetime and/or matter/energy or an extra fundamental entity in its own right.

But that just leads one back to the original Inductive assumption of Science. If you can constantly reproduce something in experiment, then it must be caused by whatever you used to produce it. There is no way, in pure logic, to even "prove" that bodies fall toward each other, e.g. that gravity exists at all. Each of the times that this effect has been observed could (at least, in the realm of pure logic) be a pure coincidence. However, that is not the scientific (nor, in this case, common-sensical) way to look at it.

Gravity (spacetime) is a fundamental entity in our ontology; it cannot be explained by reductive means, but is taken to exist as a fundamental, non-reducible entity. Comparing explanations of consciousness to explanations of gravity only supports the idea that consciousness (or things that could conceivably compose it) as well should be taken to be a fundamental, non-reducible entity.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Not quite. Given the complete set of microphysical facts about the weather system, it is inconceivable that this system could be anything but a hurricane; it is a conceptual necessity that the weather system, composed in this way, comprises what we call a hurricane on the macroscopic scale.

And I'm sure a similar statement will be made in the near future, about consciousness. We simply don't understand neurology well enough.

However, given the complete set of microphysical facts about brain processes, it is still very much conceivable that these processes could be instantiated without consciousness. Thus the association of consciousness with such systems is derived not by a priori necessity as with our hurricane, but rather with a posteriori contingency; it is taken as a brute fact observed to exist in nature.

What if we just happened to have approached this particular mystery from the wrong perspective, ITFP? Now, of course, it would seem that an a posteriori contingency would need to be drawn, but not if it had been approached in the same manner that science first approached hurricanes.

Consciousness thus cannot be explained in simpler terms, but must be taken as non-reducible and fundamental. As such, our ontology of non-reducible, fundamental entities such as spacetime and matter/energy should be expanded to include consciousness, or theoretical 'things' that could conceivably combine to compose consciousness.

And yet, a hurricane is fundamental and irreducible. If you take away the "wind" part, or even (to be slightly more specific) the "counter-action-of-opposing-currents-of-wind" part, you would no longer have a hurricane...and yet "hurricane" is not perfectly synonymous with "opposing currents of wind".

This view is incoherent without assuming something 'extra' in addition to our usual ontology-- either extra properties for spacetime and/or matter/energy or an extra fundamental entity in its own right.

Not at all. If it can be shown that the electrochemical processes of neurons always produce this effect (and not just in human brains), then it can be scientifically shown that there is no extra property required at all, merely a revision of our ideas about consciousness, and its relation to chemical processes.

Gravity (spacetime) is a fundamental entity in our ontology; it cannot be explained by reductive means, but is taken to exist as a fundamental, non-reducible entity. Comparing explanations of consciousness to explanations of gravity only supports the idea that consciousness (or things that could conceivably compose it) as well should be taken to be a fundamental, non-reducible entity.

Every concept should be taken as a fundamental, non-reducible entity. A duck, for example, is not a duck if you cut a piece off...it is a duck-with-missing-piece. However, there is a different kind of reducibility, which relates to the fundamental processes, which must occur to produce the higher function.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
And I'm sure a similar statement will be made in the near future, about consciousness. We simply don't understand neurology well enough.

What if we just happened to have approached this particular mystery from the wrong perspective, ITFP? Now, of course, it would seem that an a posteriori contingency would need to be drawn, but not if it had been approached in the same manner that science first approached hurricanes.

There are good reasons to believe that a purely reductive explanation of consciousness is not possible even in principle, given our currently accepted ontology. A hurricane is a large scale structural/functional event, and it is natural to formulate an explanation of it in terms of smaller scale structures and functions.

This is not the case with consciousness. Even given perfect understanding of the mapping of physical processes in the brain onto conscious experience, we would still be left to wonder how it is that these physical processes can account for experience. Why should these processes be associated with conscious experience in the first place? Given a purely physically reductive account, we can just as well imagine the processes taking place without consciousness. Contrast this with a hurricane, where a sufficiently detailed physically reductive account will not even leave room for us to imagine these processes taking place without a hurricane occurring on the large scale. There is room for imagination to the contrary in the case of consciousness precisely because the explanation is insufficient.

And yet, a hurricane is fundamental and irreducible. If you take away the "wind" part, or even (to be slightly more specific) the "counter-action-of-opposing-currents-of-wind" part, you would no longer have a hurricane...and yet "hurricane" is not perfectly synonymous with "opposing currents of wind".

A hurricane is certainly reducible, in that we can give a reductive explanation of its properties with such force that it is a conceptual necessity that, having accepted and understood the explanation in terms of the microscopic properties, we see that the macroscopic result must be a hurricane.

Not at all. If it can be shown that the electrochemical processes of neurons always produce this effect (and not just in human brains), then it can be scientifically shown that there is no extra property required at all, merely a revision of our ideas about consciousness, and its relation to chemical processes.

No, such a demonstration would force us to revise our notions of electrochemical processes and, more generally, physical processes. We would need to rework our ontological map such that an explanation involving such and such properties makes it a conceptual necessity that consciousness arises, as with our explanation of the hurricane. In the current ontology there is no way in which we can derive such a conceptual necessity; we are still left with the gap.

Every concept should be taken as a fundamental, non-reducible entity. A duck, for example, is not a duck if you cut a piece off...it is a duck-with-missing-piece. However, there is a different kind of reducibility, which relates to the fundamental processes, which must occur to produce the higher function.

For a naturalistic explanation to be successful, it must provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the explanandum. In the case of the hurricane, it is both necessary and sufficient that we explain it in terms of smaller scale physical phenomena-- necessary because there are obviously smaller scale physical phenomena involved, and sufficient because once we have explained the smaller scale phenomena, we have explained everything that needs explaining.

For consciousness, the argument is not that it is not necessary for us to explain in terms of electrochemical processes-- of course it is-- but that this explanation is insufficient. It is insufficient because it leaves us with the explanatory gap; we have not explained everything that needs explaining. What we have left out is how it is that feeling ever enters the equation in the first place. Again, there is room for logically imagining something contrary to what the explanation dictates-- imagining that these processes take place without any attendent subjective experience-- precisely because the part about experience has not been adequately explained.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
There are good reasons to believe that a purely reductive explanation of consciousness is not possible even in principle, given our currently accepted ontology. A hurricane is a large scale structural/functional event, and it is natural to formulate an explanation of it in terms of smaller scale structures and functions.

This is not the case with consciousness. Even given perfect understanding of the mapping of physical processes in the brain onto conscious experience, we would still be left to wonder how it is that these physical processes can account for experience. Why should these processes be associated with conscious experience in the first place? Given a purely physically reductive account, we can just as well imagine the processes taking place without consciousness. Contrast this with a hurricane, where a sufficiently detailed physically reductive account will not even leave room for us to imagine these processes taking place without a hurricane occurring on the large scale. There is room for imagination to the contrary in the case of consciousness precisely because the explanation is insufficient.

I could respond directly, I suppose, but perhaps I should change the analogy. What of the bending of spacetime? Science can clearly explain the functions of warped spacetime, and can show under what conditions it warps. However, we can always "imagine" the presence of energy and the like without spacetime ever bending. I think the reason why this may be a better analogy is because it doesn't refer to something clearly percievable, but to something abstract, while nonetheless scientifically explanable.

A hurricane is certainly reducible, in that we can give a reductive explanation of its properties with such force that it is a conceptual necessity that, having accepted and understood the explanation in terms of the microscopic properties, we see that the macroscopic result must be a hurricane.

I suppose, but what if we could give an account of all of the patterns occurring in conscious experience, such that we could not imagine these processes occurring without consciousness? Then would the expectations on a reductive explanation be satisfied?

No, such a demonstration would force us to revise our notions of electrochemical processes and, more generally, physical processes. We would need to rework our ontological map such that an explanation involving such and such properties makes it a conceptual necessity that consciousness arises, as with our explanation of the hurricane. In the current ontology there is no way in which we can derive such a conceptual necessity; we are still left with the gap.

But what if a theory (such as William Calvin's hexagon theory) could show the Darwinian processes which occur among synchronously-firing neurons, and that these must produce thought, by their very nature?

For consciousness, the argument is not that it is not necessary for us to explain in terms of electrochemical processes-- of course it is-- but that this explanation is insufficient. It is insufficient because it leaves us with the explanatory gap; we have not explained everything that needs explaining. What we have left out is how it is that feeling ever enters the equation in the first place. Again, there is room for logically imagining something contrary to what the explanation dictates-- imagining that these processes take place without any attendent subjective experience-- precisely because the part about experience has not been adequately explained.

And yet, I can imagine pin-pointing a particle at an exact location. It can't happen, but I can imagine it.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
I could respond directly, I suppose, but perhaps I should change the analogy. What of the bending of spacetime? Science can clearly explain the functions of warped spacetime, and can show under what conditions it warps. However, we can always "imagine" the presence of energy and the like without spacetime ever bending. I think the reason why this may be a better analogy is because it doesn't refer to something clearly percievable, but to something abstract, while nonetheless scientifically explanable.

Admittedly I'm not familiar enough with relativity to know to what extent it explains bending spacetime in terms of matter/energy. However, there is no good reason to believe why this would not be satisfactorily explainable in principle, since once again we are talking about coherently bridging structures and functions here. We would have to explain how the structure and function of mass/energy warps the structure of spacetime. Once again, we have a scenario that is explainable, at least in principle, entirely within the framework of materialism. There is no analog for the explanitory gap here.

More on imagining later.

I suppose, but what if we could give an account of all of the patterns occurring in conscious experience, such that we could not imagine these processes occurring without consciousness? Then would the expectations on a reductive explanation be satisfied?

Even a complete mapping of brain activity to conscious experience would not explain why brain activity should be associated with conscious experience in the first place.

Let me put this another way. Suppose we have some non-conscious computer, or demon, or whatever (let's just call it the Deducer, or D), which takes in microphysical facts under a materialist framework and then deduces what these microphysical facts entail on a larger scale. Given a complete physical account of nature, D would presumably be able to deduce the bending of spacetime due to matter/energy, the existence of a hurricane due to microscopic weather phenomena, the properties of water based on the structures and functions of H2O, etc. D would also be able to deduce complex human behavior, including verbal reports pertaining to something called consciousness. At this point, a philosopher like Dennett would be satisfied that D has deduced everything that needs deducing, since verbal reports are supposedly the only relevant things that need to be deduced/explained.

However, D would not be able to deduce consciousness itself; as far as D can tell, humans are very complex physical systems, but D cannot possibly deduce that subjective experience (or, more simply, feelings) exists at all. D simply regards humans as enormously complex physical systems, but nothing more; to D, humans are just like so many philosophical zombies. D has fallen victim to the explanitory gap. There is nothing in materialism as we know it that can possibly account for subjective experience, so D is doomed to leave something out.

But what if a theory (such as William Calvin's hexagon theory) could show the Darwinian processes which occur among synchronously-firing neurons, and that these must produce thought, by their very nature?

Let's be very clear here. Thought is an ambiguous word. We want to explain subjective experience, how it is that certain physical processes feel like something.

And yet, I can imagine pin-pointing a particle at an exact location. It can't happen, but I can imagine it.

I can also imagine that the Earth is flat, or that gravity doesn't exist. This is besides the point. I mean rational imagination, given the complete set of physical facts. Given the complete set of physical facts, it is impossible for me to rationally imagine that the Earth is flat, or that gravity does not exist, or that I can pin-point a particle at an exact location. However, given the complete set of physical facts about the brain, I can still rationally imagine that the physical processes of the brain occur without consciousness. This is precisely because the physical facts don't say anything about how subjective experience can exist in the first place. We just take this as an ad hoc add-on to agree with reality, but in fact under closer scrutiny it is incompatible with materialism as we know it.

 

[Jeebus]

Hypnagogue said:

Let me put this another way. Suppose we have some non-conscious computer, or demon, or whatever (let's just call it the Deducer, or D), which takes in microphysical facts under a materialist framework and then deduces what these microphysical facts entail on a larger scale. Given a complete physical account of nature, D would presumably be able to deduce the bending of spacetime due to matter/energy, the existence of a hurricane due to microscopic weather phenomena, the properties of water based on the structures and functions of H2O, etc. D would also be able to deduce complex human behavior, including verbal reports pertaining to something called consciousness. At this point, a philosopher like Dennett would be satisfied that D has deduced everything that needs deducing, since verbal reports are supposedly the only relevant things that need to be deduced/explained.

However, D would not be able to deduce consciousness itself; as far as D can tell, humans are very complex physical systems, but D cannot possibly deduce that subjective experience (or, more simply, feelings) exists at all. D simply regards humans as enormously complex physical systems, but nothing more; to D, humans are just like so many philosophical zombies. D has fallen victim to the explanitory gap. There is nothing in materialism as we know it that can possibly account for subjective experience, so D is doomed to leave something out.

Ok, this makes sense and all, but I think D would actually be able to understand that humans are very emotional and D could deduce the fact that these humans experience some type of emotional consciousness because:

• D can take in materialist facts under a microphysical framework and then D can deduce these frameworks in a larger scale.

Thus you can conclude that D is a heuristic bot that can understand reason, emotion, and physicality. If he can process materialist frameworks.
Therefore you can list that D can contemplate that these humans have a desire in their nature by observation.

• D observes humans, therefore D contemplates reason, desire, and emotion, even though D doesn't know exactly what the human neurology is. D can semi-comprehend emotional confrontations in fixated situations.
• If D can deduce large frameworks, D can understand the minimal components of consciousness, without knowing how it works or why it works, but D observes that these components and mechanisms happen.
• If D can complete physical accounts of weather patterns, verbalization, and spacetime curvatures, it could be concluded that D understands humanology and nature. Thus D can comprehend that verbalization holds emotion. And physical frameworks have deeper meanings, thus D exposes "himself" to contemplate the mechanisms and functions of the "how" and "why" these things are the way they are or seem.

I'm pretty sure this is dead on by your definition of D, otherwise if there is a mistake then D in definition isn't possible by concluding microphysical facts and verbalization.

 

[hypnagogue]

I think you're missing the force of the argument.

D can predict behaviors (including verbal reports) perfectly well, but has no reason at all from its given facts to suppose that something like subjective experience should exist. Imagine for a moment a zombie called Z, a person who looks, acts and talks like any other person but who in fact is not conscious. That is, from the 3rd person view Z is indistinguishable from a normal person, but from the 1st person view Z is totally different-- if you put yourself in Z's shoes, you would not see, hear, or feel anything at all. Z has no inner life, no consciousness, no subjective experience, no feelings; it is not like something to be Z.

What I am saying is, given only physical facts in a materialist framework, D would deduce that all humans are like Z. Given the complete microphysical information about a person's brain and body, D would be able to predict all of his complex behaviors, including anything we might call emotional behavior. But D would not see the underlying conscious subjective experience of these emotional behaviors-- D would get the 3rd person picture perfectly, but would not get the 1st person picture at all. As far as D can see, there is no such thing as consciousness, because it does not follow from the ontology of materialism that consciousness should somehow arise from such and such configuration of physical processes.

 

[Canute]

Hypno

I agree with what you've said here so clearly. It fact I don't see how it's possible to disagree.

Science takes the existence of certain entities as fundamental (gravity, spacetime, Big Bang etc) and leaves them unreduced and unexplained. It has no choice in this, since it has to take something as being axiomatic, or non-relative, in order to proceed at all. I agree that it should do the same for consciousness, as you and Chalmers suggest.

However if it does this then the question arises as to which of these unreduced entities or substances is ontologically most fundamental. I suspect that this question, which arises inevitably once consciousness is deemed axiomatic, will prevent science from ever taking consciousness as having any inherent existence. To do so would be to undermine the scientific world-view.

For this reason my prophecy is that 100 years, and even a 1000 years into the future, either the current scientific 'episteme' will have been discarded, or the arguments will still be raging inconclusively.

Personally I can't see the problem with assuming that consciousness is fundamental and then building theories on that assumption. We do it for spacetime and matter, the existence of which is scientifically inexplicable, so why not consciousness.

Doing so does not preclude the idea that the brain is a computer, it just asserts that there is something else to consciousness than its output.

 

[Sikz]

But isn't that like asking why a hurricane is associated with physical systems? The consciousness, according to the scientific approaches to the issue, is the physical processes - it isn't just "associated" with them.

The colour blue is not just the wavelength of light, it's a subjective idea ASSOCIATED with a certain wavelength of light.

Every point a distance d from a midpoint FORMS a circle- all of those points (as a whole) are not a circle, they form it. Water is not just H2O- no matter how precise a scientific model you have for water, you can't ever show that it's "wet"- you can show that if it comes in contact with the sensory receptors and nervous system of a human it will be differentiated by the human from non-liquid things, but you can never show the feeling of it being "wet". When we feel an object's wetness we don't simply intake data that the object is liquid with such-andsuch composure, we FEEL a "wetness", a distince subjective feeling that is not data in any way. That feeling is a PRODUCT of the data saying the object is wet, it is ASSOCIATED with that data, but it is a separate entity.

 

[Another God]

In otherwords Sikz, the subjective phenomenon of Wet water, is actually the objective reality of H2O. The subjective understanding of a circle, is actually an infinite number of points equidistant from a single point. The subjective phenomenon of a HUrricane is the objective occurance of a particular weather system. The subjective phenomenon of Lightning and thunder is the objective reality of Static discharge and a vibration of air particles resulting from the discharge... and so on.

For every scientifically reducible objective fact, there is an unreducioble subjective experience.

For the objective fact of the brain, there appears to be a resulting subjective phenomenon creator ...

External Objective (wavelength of light) => Interal objective (brain) => experience of light (How?) + Memory of experience => Ability for memories to be recalled, thereby creating our conscious 'thinking' minds.

The only real question, is how the brain translates the input into experience. Related, is how 'much' or what 'type' of brain is required to achieve this function...

--------------------------------

Here is some food for thought for you all. This is something Dark Wing and I have been thinking about for a few months now, and I think it might help someone to create a better concept for the mind one day.

Think about the stock market. You have the physical reality: Thousands of people, buying, selling or doing neither all together, yet individually. Neither answer to each other, but their actions all have direct consequences on each other. From this objective fact, the 'Stock Exchange' itself arises. The stock exchange is an entity which doesn't really exist. There is no where that the stock market is, and there is no thing that the stock market is. The stock market is nothing beyond the actions of those thousands of people buying, selling, or standing.

Yet we refer to it as an entity. We talk about 'the stock market acting' in particular ways as if it has a life of its own.

I'm not sure how to link the stock market to how the brain creates 'experience' per say, but for now it at least describes how the mind is nothing more than the actions of the brain, yet can be thought of as something else altogether.

Sorry 'bout the ramble.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Another God
For every scientifically reducible objective fact, there is an unreducioble subjective experience.

And the reverse of course.

For the objective fact of the brain, there appears to be a resulting subjective phenomenon creator ...

And the reverse of course.

External Objective (wavelength of light) => Interal objective (brain) => experience of light (How?) + Memory of experience => Ability for memories to be recalled, thereby creating our conscious 'thinking' minds.

It would be great if it was this simple. But it is clear from the research that it isn't.

The only real question, is how the brain translates the input into experience. Related, is how 'much' or what 'type' of brain is required to achieve this function...

The question is IF the brain (alone) translates this into experience.

Think about the stock market. You have the physical reality: Thousands of people, buying, selling or doing neither all together, yet individually. Neither answer to each other, but their actions all have direct consequences on each other. From this objective fact, the 'Stock Exchange' itself arises. The stock exchange is an entity which doesn't really exist. There is no where that the stock market is, and there is no thing that the stock market is. The stock market is nothing beyond the actions of those thousands of people buying, selling, or standing.

That's a good analogy for the brain, not the mind.

I'm not sure how to link the stock market to how the brain creates 'experience' per say, but for now it at least describes how the mind is nothing more than the actions of the brain, yet can be thought of as something else altogether.

You've ommitted to consider that the stock market consists of conscious players. It wouldn't exist otherwise. If your analogy held then neurons would be conscious.

 

[pelastration]

Originally posted by Another God
Think about the stock market. You have the physical reality: Thousands of people, buying, selling or doing neither all together, yet individually. Neither answer to each other, but their actions all have direct consequences on each other. From this objective fact, the 'Stock Exchange' itself arises. The stock exchange is an entity which doesn't really exist. There is no where that the stock market is, and there is no thing that the stock market is. The stock market is nothing beyond the actions of those thousands of people buying, selling, or standing.

The reactions on the stock market are based on information. It can be (1) objective information (real turnover, projections ... of bookkeeping numbers), (2) subjective information (rumours, advertisment, interviews, news, ...) and (3) personal motives (need of cash, intuition to sell, more trust in other opportunities, ...).
So it's a combination of various factors. These factors are valorized by each investor in his personal way.

All that information can be seen as 'memories' on different levels. Buy or sell will dependent of the priority the investor gives at a certain information or at a combination of them.

The same happens in consciousness: priority-choice between values coming from memories from several dimensions.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Another God
Here is some food for thought for you all. This is something Dark Wing and I have been thinking about for a few months now, and I think it might help someone to create a better concept for the mind one day.

AG, I don't really see how this analogy differs from the Hurricane analogy that has already been discussed. It isn't a good analogy for consciousness because hurricanes and stock market characteristics can be reductively explained and accounted for. The argument here is that consciousness cannot be, in principal, reductively explained.

All you're arguing here is for the usefulness of holistic concepts. Which btw, is something that some materialists here would claim doesn't even exists and shouldn't even have a word assigned to it. They're having a hard time claiming the same thing about consciousness.

 

[Another God]

it is different to the hurricane because the hurricane isn't an emergent property of the wind. The hurricane is the wind and nothing more. The term hurricane is our personal subjective experience of the parts.

The stock market is something that arises because of the action of the parts. The parts themselves (the people, the computers) aren't the stock market. The people 'deal with' the stock market. The stock market is viewed as a separate concept.

I am not so sure about it now though...I am thinking about it..

How about this: People deal with 'the stock market', not each other. Molecules in the air deal with each other, and percieve that as the hurricane. The atoms at no time 'deal with the hurricane' though, because there is no such thing (objectively) as a hurricane.

 

[Fliption]

Hmmm, the differences aren't really jumping out at me.

 

[pelastration]

Originally posted by Another God
it is different to the hurricane because the hurricane isn't an emergent property of the wind. The hurricane is the wind and nothing more. The term hurricane is our personal subjective experience of the parts.

The hurricane is the results of various factors, of different qualities.
Some: temperature of sea-water/islands, sea-underground topology, sea-streams, air-pressure zones, air-pollution, tides, etc. and those can result in uprising vortexes of air-molecules, dust, ... . So it is the combination of a number of different physical actors.
The results can be measured and observed, and the result felt.
The term hurricane is a scientific (conventional) description of the specific result of such set of interacting physical phenomena.

Originally posted by Another God
The stock market is something that arises because of the action of the parts. The parts themselves (the people, the computers) aren't the stock market. The people 'deal with' the stock market. The stock market is viewed as a separate concept.

What is a market? It is a physical or symbolic location where 'actors' (acting elements) exchange goods or property. The operations of exchange follow certain rules of conduct. The value of the goods or properties is a subjective interpretation of information.
This information can be:
(1) objective information (real turnover, projections ... of bookkeeping numbers, natural events, political events, automatic computer programs, etc.),
(2) subjective information (organized rumours, Enron's CEO in a CNN-infomercial, interviews, general emotions, ...)
and (3) personal motives (need of cash, intuition to sell, more trust in other opportunities, ...).

So it's a combination of various levels of information (you can call that different dimensions of information). These levels of information are valorized by each investor in his personal way.
All that information can be seen as 'memories' (containers of information) on different levels. Buy, hold, sell will dependent of the priority the investor gives at a certain information or at a combination of them.

The same happens in consciousness: You will notice that what has priority at THAT moment. We can mentally focus that priority for a certain time (attention) on a 'certain' events (ie. reading a book), but then your attention will shift to other (more important) events.(ie. smell of coffee).
So the choice of priority happens on the level of valorization of containers of information (memories) from several dimensions WHICH ARE ALL THE TIME PRESENT or WHICH ARE JUST SENSED.

I showed this in a geometrical membrane model with interacting dimensional layers. It's a dynamic mechanism.

 

[Mentat]

I only have a little bit of time left, and I thought this was the most pertinent point to respond to...

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I can also imagine that the Earth is flat, or that gravity doesn't exist. This is besides the point. I mean rational imagination, given the complete set of physical facts.

Exactly. If it turns out, as Dennett has predicted, that these particular processes of the brain must produce subjective experience, then it will become a non-sequiter to imagine them occurring without the subject being conscious. It'd be like me imagining the presence of a bit of severely bent spacetime, and yet an object still remaining unaffected: it can be imagined, but it is not logical since it is a clear "physical fact" that, when spacetime is bent, and object's position is affected.

Can you see what I'm getting at...I know I'm not being very clear, because I'm trying to type fast.

g2g

 

[nightlight]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
There is nothing in the current understanding of time, space, matter, energy and the like that makes it conceivable a priori that these things, arranged in the proper fashion, should somehow result in consciousness.

The physical description and computations for, supposedly structurless, electron have become highly complex (via perturbative QED). QCD is even more complex. That is a hint that these seemingly simple objects are using something quite different to figure out what to do than our current models are simulating. It is clear that physics is missing completely some kind of control system which is going about its task much more intelligently and more effectively than our physical models and computational techniques are.

So, we have on one hand a hint there is more to it then science of matter/energy knows and that this "more" is very effecive/intelligent. On the other hand we have an inescapable datum of consciousness which is not reflected in our theories. So there is a hole and a peg.

 

[Mentat]

So, hypna, what would happen if it was discovered that one of those "physical facts" you refer to is that "such-and-such process = subjective experience and thought"? In this case, it seems, it would be as rational to imagine the Multiple Drafts process occurring in a non-conscious brain, as it is to imagine a giant object with no gravitational pull whatsoever, or a Universe expanding while everything inside it stays in the same place relative to everything else.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
So, hypna, what would happen if it was discovered that one of those "physical facts" you refer to is that "such-and-such process = subjective experience and thought"? In this case, it seems, it would be as rational to imagine the Multiple Drafts process occurring in a non-conscious brain, as it is to imagine a giant object with no gravitational pull whatsoever, or a Universe expanding while everything inside it stays in the same place relative to everything else.

Mentat, are you suggesting that these two examples cannot be understood reductively, in principal? To me, they appear to be examples of things that aren't intuitive given are current knowledge of physics but this is probably a temporary situation. I suspect you agree with me on this and you're arguing the same thing applies to consciouness.

The view that Hypnagogue has presented in various threads is that consciousness cannot be reductively explained in principal. It's not just an question of current knowledge and technology. So from here you would need to explain why you think consciousness is no different from the examples you mentioned. You only said "it seems as rational" to think so. Why not address the specific points of the argument? It is extremely hard to do, so take your time. I've been trying to figure out a way myself but haven't been able to and currently do not think is is possible.

I copied the relevant quote for convenience.

Let me put this another way. Suppose we have some non-conscious computer, or demon, or whatever (let's just call it the Deducer, or D), which takes in microphysical facts under a materialist framework and then deduces what these microphysical facts entail on a larger scale. Given a complete physical account of nature, D would presumably be able to deduce the bending of spacetime due to matter/energy, the existence of a hurricane due to microscopic weather phenomena, the properties of water based on the structures and functions of H2O, etc. D would also be able to deduce complex human behavior, including verbal reports pertaining to something called consciousness. At this point, a philosopher like Dennett would be satisfied that D has deduced everything that needs deducing, since verbal reports are supposedly the only relevant things that need to be deduced/explained.

However, D would not be able to deduce consciousness itself; as far as D can tell, humans are very complex physical systems, but D cannot possibly deduce that subjective experience (or, more simply, feelings) exists at all. D simply regards humans as enormously complex physical systems, but nothing more; to D, humans are just like so many philosophical zombies. D has fallen victim to the explanitory gap. There is nothing in materialism as we know it that can possibly account for subjective experience, so D is doomed to leave something out.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
So, hypna, what would happen if it was discovered that one of those "physical facts" you refer to is that "such-and-such process = subjective experience and thought"?

This would indeed be an important step in explaining consciousness.

However, it would force us to accept that there is much more to material reality than we currently envision, since such a fact is incoherent purely in terms of our currently accepted ontological model of reality. That is to say, such a fact cannot be logically derived from a conventional physical understanding of the world, and so fundamental addition(s) to our model of reality would be in order. These additions would have to have a non-physical/objective/3rd person flavor about them or else they would simply fall prey to the explanitory gap.

 

[Canute]

Hypno

Off topic but - if you're going to the Tucson conference how about making a few notes to post for us folk when you get back?

 

[hypnagogue]

Sure, if I can actually retain all those ideas that will be passed around.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Mentat, are you suggesting that these two examples cannot be understood reductively, in principal? To me, they appear to be examples of things that aren't intuitive given are current knowledge of physics but this is probably a temporary situation. I suspect you agree with me on this and you're arguing the same thing applies to consciouness.

Yeah, I guess I'm thinking along the same lines as you are. To be sure: Are you saying that it is possible in principle, but not in practice, to reductively explain the examples I gave, and that consciousness is no different?

The view that Hypnagogue has presented in various threads is that consciousness cannot be reductively explained in principal. It's not just an question of current knowledge and technology. So from here you would need to explain why you think consciousness is no different from the examples you mentioned. You only said "it seems as rational" to think so. Why not address the specific points of the argument? It is extremely hard to do, so take your time. I've been trying to figure out a way myself but haven't been able to and currently do not think is is possible.

I see what you mean.

I read your quote, and from it deduced that, in order to prove that consciousness is explanable in principle (even if not in practice), just like those other physical phenomena, I would have to actually take a step-by-step reductive approach to consciousness, myself.

In this attempt, I'd have to draw on work that's already been done by scientists and philosophers. Let me forewarn you all that this explanation may get a little confusing, but I will try to clarify any confusions that I can. Also, it may not seem readily evident that this is a theory of consciousness/sentience per se. However, I will put the idea to the test at the end, and see if it's workable. Here goes...

For consciousness to be reductively explanable, in the way that hurricanes are reductively explanable, something must first be clarified: The aim is to take a reductionist approach to consciousness, using the scientific method only.

This is obviously necessary, since we are trying to deduce the possibility of creating a scientific theory of consciousness. However, there is an important philosophical repercussion to this: One can no longer ask "why" these processes produce consciousness. Science can only show us 1) Which mechanisms are conscious; 2) Which mechanisms are certainly not; and 3) How to create a conscious mechanism.

Now, they only kind of reductive explanation of consciousness that I've been able to agree with has been a "selectionist" kind. Selectionist theories of consciousness are theories that, basically, give the basic unit of conscious experience, and then apply Darwinian mechanics to these units.

Basically, any Darwinian process must have 6 things:

1) There must be a pattern.
2) It (the pattern) must reproduce itself.
3) Variant patterns must sometimes be produced (by chance).
4) The pattern and its variant must compete with one another for occupation of a limited work space.
5) The competition is biased by a multifaceted environment.
6) New variants always preferentially occur around the more successful of the current patterns.

These are the six parts of any Darwinian process, as stated by William Calvin, in The Cerebral Code: Thinking a thought in the mosaics of the mind. (BTW, in his theory, the most basic units of consciousness are hexagonal arrays of synchronously-firing neurons, each of which comes from a synchronously-firing triangular array.

But, what is the relevance of all of this? Well, it is my position that, since this process has indeed been observed occurring in the neocortex of more advanced animals (including humans), this must be the process that brings forth consciousness.

So, let's say that we identify the most discreet unit of consciousness as a hexagonal array of synchronously-firing neurons (btw, I really suggest that you all read The Cerebral Code, as Calvin explains his theory much better than I can). We now have a pattern, and there is nothing philosophically wrong with postulating that this pattern occurs, as it is in no way conscious. Even saying that a spatiotemporal firing pattern is initiated whenever a pyrimidal neuron (those specialized neurons in the neocortex) is stimulated has little (if any) philosophical repercussion.

Now that we have the pattern, we next need a process of reproduction. What must be remembered for this part of it is that each member of the aforementioned hexagonal arrays is capable of firing with neurons outside of it's array, and does indeed do this. So, because of this tendency for synchronicity in self-restimulation (btw, I don't think I was clear enough on this previously: A set of "synchronously-firing" neurons is an array wherein each member is self-restimulating (IOW, each member is repeatedly re-stimulating itself, and is doing so in a pattern that finds synchronicity with the self-stimulation of the other neurons in its array)), one can easily see that other, nearby, neurons ("nearby", referring to the nearness of one neuron's axon terminals to the dendrites of another neuron) may be stimulated, and thus begin to re-stimulate themselves in synch with that "nearby" member of a hexagonal array.

If you're still with me, let's move on to the next step in the Darwinian process: The production of variant patterns (mutations).

I don't think too much time should be spent on this issue as it is a somewhat obvious circumstance that, where there is reproduction of a complex pattern, there will be "error". Thus, the production of variant patterns is just a natural consequence.

Next, the pattern and its variant patterns must compete for occupation of a limited work space. Now, let's say that we have an (hexagonal) array of neurons, that were initially stimulated by (for example) seeing an apple (more specifically: by the entrance of photons, bouncing off of an apple, into the retina, which then stimulated many "nearby" neurons, who, in turn, stimulated other "nearby" neurons, forming many spatiotemporal arrays). We'll call this array an "apple array". But, let's say that, one day, we saw an orange. Now, perhaps we associated these two, and so the orange can be seen as a variant on the original "apple" arrays (or, perhaps, as simply a new introduction). Well, these arrays constantly re-stimulate themselves, and must thus compete for supremacy whenever there is a new stimulation that bears resemblance to an "apple/orange".

IOW, when I see (let's say) an orange sitting on a table, there is a stimulation, and those spatiotemporal patterns which bear closer resemblance to the thing I'm seeing will "adopt" this new memory as one of their own...it will join their array. This takes up some "work space", which the "apple arrays" will have lost.

Points 5 and 6 were basically covered in that example, as well, since - if in this competition (for identification and memorization of the new object) there were neurons that had no previous array to belong to - you could have a "no-man's-land" where there was plenty of room for a completely new stimulus. However, in the case of the apples and oranges, there were arrays that were primed for a new spatiotemporal stimulus, and they quickly competed for this new space.

It's just like in biological evolution, where a population can either be isolated completely, or have varying degrees of interaction with already existent beings - the latter possibility is much more limiting to the new being's ability to variate.

Now, all this may not seem like much of a theory of consciousness, but think of this: If all these processes occur, and there are constant new stimulations (along with re-exitation of purely spatial arrays), then you have a working theory of the processing mechanism of the brain.

Now to test it out. Let's say you want to understand how someone makes "choices" (as this is clearly an integral part of being a sentient creature - being able to make choices). If the choice is something simple, like the old vanilla vs. chocolate ice cream illustration, then it's a bit too easy to just say: Arrays that correspond to "chocolate" happen to also correspond with previous enjoyable experience, whereas this is lacking in the "vanilla" arrays, and so chocolate is the biased choice. Actually, it seems that most (if not all) "choices" can be explained rather simply by such "this array is the biased choice, and thus prevailed over the competition".

No, I think the real test would be to show how it is that these functions translate to subjective experience. The problem is, from the scientific limitations we accepted at first, we can't really ask "why is this mechanism conscious, while others are not". We can, however, see if this approach meets up with the scientific criteria...Let's see, does it: 1) Equip us to decide whether a system is conscious or not? Sure it does - if the system does have this Darwinian process occurring, then it is conscious; 2) Does it help us decide when something is not conscious? Of course, by the inverse logic of #1; 3) Does it allow us to (in principle) produce a conscious mechanism of our own? Absolutely. If we can produce a machine (no matter what it's made of) whose discreet "thought units" are made up of synchronously-self-restimulating quanta, and these patterns can be reproduced, with allowance for error, and competition between the "parent" and "variant" copies in biased environment...well, you have a Darwin machine, and you have consciousness.

Again, I recommend the book The Cerebral Code: thinking a thought in the mosaics of the mind, by William Calvin.

g2g now. I'll check for responses tomorrow, if I can.

 

[Canute]

Mentat

I know you're only constructing an 'in principle' example. But in itself it seems pure conjecture, and it does not seem to do the job. Conjectures first.

Originally posted by Mentat

For consciousness to be reductively explanable, in the way that hurricanes are reductively explanable, something must first be clarified: The aim is to take a reductionist approach to consciousness, using the scientific method only.

Ok, but what is it that you are setting out to explain? Your theory is bound to be very ambiguous without a clear definition of what it is a theory of.

This is obviously necessary, since we are trying to deduce the possibility of creating a scientific theory of consciousness. However, there is an important philosophical repercussion to this: One can no longer ask "why" these processes produce consciousness. Science can only show us 1) Which mechanisms are conscious; 2) Which mechanisms are certainly not; and 3) How to create a conscious mechanism.

Ok, but I would have included 4) How consciousness arises. We know this for hurricanes etc.

Now, they only kind of reductive explanation of consciousness that I've been able to agree with has been a "selectionist" kind. Selectionist theories of consciousness are theories that, basically, give the basic unit of conscious experience, and then apply Darwinian mechanics to these units.

This may work for competition between thoughts (competition for conscious attention?). But this cannot explain how sentience or consciousness evolves.

...as stated by William Calvin, in The Cerebral Code: Thinking a thought in the mosaics of the mind. (BTW, in his theory, the most basic units of consciousness are hexagonal arrays of synchronously-firing neurons, each of which comes from a synchronously-firing triangular array.

Why hexagonal?

What is the relevance of all of this? Well, it is my position that, since this process has indeed been observed occurring in the neocortex of more advanced animals (including humans), this must be the process that brings forth consciousness.

Yes but many other processes have been also been observed in the neocortex. What makes this one so special? Also, as far as I know, there is no evidence that the neocortex is responsible for consciousness.

Now that we have the pattern, we next need a process of reproduction...snip

I'm not sure how you get from competition between neurons to competetion between thoughts. How does Calvin know that neuron patterns are thoughts? And how does this mechanism, if it really is one, explain how we are conscious of our thoughts? Our thoughts come and go but our consciousness does not.

Now, all this may not seem like much of a theory of consciousness, but think of this: If all these processes occur, and there are constant new stimulations (along with re-exitation of purely spatial arrays), then you have a working theory of the processing mechanism of the brain.

It might be one of the mechanisms within the brain. However if it is a theory of neuronal competition then it has nothing to say about consciousness. If it a theory of competition between thoughts then it is similar (or identical) to meme-based theories. Unfortunately while both may hold some truth about mechanical computation in the brain neither have anything to say about how neurons, or hexagonal arrays of neurons become conscious. Without some sort of additional theory an array of neurons is an array of neurons, no more.

Now to test it out. Let's say you want to understand how someone makes "choices" (as this is clearly an integral part of being a sentient creature - being able to make choices).

Hmm. What's your view on freewill? According to science we don't make choices, or at least no more than a thermostat does. If you mean 'conscious choice' here then this theory is not scientific. I'll assume you mean 'choice' in the thermostat sense.

No, I think the real test would be to show how it is that these functions translate to subjective experience.

Agreed

The problem is, from the scientific limitations we accepted at first, we can't really ask "why is this mechanism conscious, while others are not".

True. But we can (and must) ask whether they are, and how this occurs.

We can, however, see if this approach meets up with the scientific criteria...Let's see, does it: 1) Equip us to decide whether a system is conscious or not? Sure it does - if the system does have this Darwinian process occurring, then it is conscious;

I don't think you thought that one through. It is clearly not true. We do not have a test for consciousness, and if we did it would be unlikely to be simply a matter of measuring whether some particular brain process occurs.

2) Does it help us decide when something is not conscious? Of course, by the inverse logic of #1;

Ditto in reverse.

3) Does it allow us to (in principle) produce a conscious mechanism of our own? Absolutely. If we can produce a machine (no matter what it's made of) whose discreet "thought units" are made up of synchronously-self-restimulating quanta, and these patterns can be reproduced, with allowance for error, and competition between the "parent" and "variant" copies in biased environment...well, you have a Darwin machine, and you have consciousness.

That's true in a way. But how do intend to create 'thought units'? Or do you just mean 'hexagonal arrays of synchronously-self-restimulating quanta which we will assume to be thought units of which someone is conscious'?

I'd say this theory doesn't work for practical and scientific reasons. But more importantly it does not work as an in principle explanation of consciousness, since it does not explain the physical mechanism whereby an array of neurons becomes an experience. That is just taken for granted.

While this sort of theory may have a lot to say about mental computation it can say nothing about how the brain gives rise to our consciousness of our thoughts. After all if the array of neurons is the thought, then where is the consciousness of that thought?

Sorry to be so negative, but many great minds have tried to produce a plausible in principle explanation and nobody has managed it yet.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
Yeah, I guess I'm thinking along the same lines as you are. To be sure: Are you saying that it is possible in principle, but not in practice, to reductively explain the examples I gave, and that consciousness is no different?

I was trying to state what I thought your view was and yes, that is what I was stating it to be. So I think we're in sync.

For consciousness to be reductively explanable, in the way that hurricanes are reductively explanable, something must first be clarified: The aim is to take a reductionist approach to consciousness, using the scientific method only.

After reading and thinking about this idea I think I'm agreeing with Canute. I'm still thinking a reductive explanation is not possible. This idea seems to do the same thing that everyone tries to do. It draws a correlation and then makes conclusions based on that correlation. If we observe that "A" always exists in conjunction with "B" then we make the conclusion that "A" and "B" must be correlated. "A" must be causing "B". Therefore, scientifically we can answer the question of "when should "B" occur?". Whenever A ocurs. And we can create "B" by simply creating "A".

All of this is founded on the correlation. But there is no explanation of the correlation itself. Why does "B" necessarily follow from "A"? We have this explanation for hurricanes but not consciousness. From my understanding we only accept these correlations as assumptions with no explanation when they deal with fundamental elements of nature.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Mentat

I know you're only constructing an 'in principle' example...

Thank you for recognizing this. Selectionism needn't be the way to go at all; it's merely intended to show that someone has made a scientific attempt...

Ok, but what is it that you are setting out to explain? Your theory is bound to be very ambiguous without a clear definition of what it is a theory of.

It is a theory of what goes on in our neocortexes which gives rise to experience, memory, and creativity.

Ok, but I would have included 4) How consciousness arises. We know this for hurricanes etc.

Is "arises" really the correct word? I don't want to be too semantically picky, but a hurricane (for example) doesn't "arise" from counter-acting winds that are swirling at intense speeds, it is counter-acting winds that are swirling at intense speeds.

This may work for competition between thoughts (competition for conscious attention?). But this cannot explain how sentience or consciousness evolves.

That's the point though: Consciousness, if it is to be explained as a scientific phenomenon - in the manner of a hurricane - cannot "evolve" or "arise" from the functions of the neocortex, it must literally be those functions, as Dennett (I'm sure your elated that I'm bringing him up again) already predicted in Consciousness Explained.

Why hexagonal?

It's been observed to be hexagonal. That's really the beauty of it, in my opinion: There is no why, and thus it is just like every other event in the Universe (as understood in the eyes of the scientist).

Yes but many other processes have been also been observed in the neocortex. What makes this one so special? Also, as far as I know, there is no evidence that the neocortex is responsible for consciousness.

No, this is simply a very special process, and there have been rudimentary (at best) experiments that link certain memories to certain synchronously-firing arrays. As I said at the outset, this is merely a way of showing that it is possible, in principle, to explain consciousness; however impossible it may currently be, in practice.

I'm not sure how you get from competition between neurons to competetion between thoughts. How does Calvin know that neuron patterns are thoughts? And how does this mechanism, if it really is one, explain how we are conscious of our thoughts? Our thoughts come and go but our consciousness does not.

And herein lies the dividing line between the physical sciences and the rest of philosophy. Science cannot postulate that spacetime curvature is gravity, and then speculate on what would happen if spacetime curved, and yet there was no gravity.

As to how Calvin knows that these patterns are thoughts: he doesn't. It's a simple postulate that may turn out to be true. Anyway, it's a necessary one, since the most discreet unit of memory must be established before an understanding of the re-stimulation of memories (integral to consciousness) can be created.

It might be one of the mechanisms within the brain. However if it is a theory of neuronal competition then it has nothing to say about consciousness. If it a theory of competition between thoughts then it is similar (or identical) to meme-based theories. Unfortunately while both may hold some truth about mechanical computation in the brain neither have anything to say about how neurons, or hexagonal arrays of neurons become conscious. Without some sort of additional theory an array of neurons is an array of neurons, no more.

And without some sort of additional theory a dip in spacetime is just a dip in spacetime, no more. You see, you are again demanding more of a scientific theory of consciousness than you would of any other such scientific theory. It's like in quantum mechanics: Any form of energetic reaction (aka "observation") can collapse the wave-function of a particle, and thus produce seemingly absolute properties out of the typical chaos of that realm. Sure, it's not conceivable, and not really understood yet; but no one says it's impossible in principle to understand it because we can't make the connection of why energetic reactions should collapse the wave-function ITFP...right? It's just the way it is, and the scientific quest is to understand exactly how it is, not why it is that way and not some other way.

Hmm. What's your view on freewill? According to science we don't make choices, or at least no more than a thermostat does. If you mean 'conscious choice' here then this theory is not scientific. I'll assume you mean 'choice' in the thermostat sense.

Ok...hold on, isn't psychology a science? Psychologists often refer to our free will. Of course, we may have free will, and all the "thermostat" scientists still may be correct at the same time...we'd simply have to say that the ability to make true conscious choices does exist, but is - at it's most fundamental level, perhaps - as rudimentary as those choices that a thermostat makes (and then it is just the level of complexity - each rudimentary choice playing a role in a more complex one, and so on - that determines the level of "consciousness" in the choice).

True. But we can (and must) ask whether they are, and how this occurs.

And if, by experiment, it can be shown that all things performing these processes behave consciously, and can show exactly how it occurs (hopefully you mean how the physical process occurs), we will then have a working theory of consciousness, right?

I don't think you thought that one through. It is clearly not true. We do not have a test for consciousness, and if we did it would be unlikely to be simply a matter of measuring whether some particular brain process occurs.

Are you serious? I don't mean to be offensive in any way, I just think we must be discussing two different things here. I was talking about a physical, scientific, reductionist theory of consciousness. This would indeed give rise to a test of consciousness that would be a matter of measuring whether some particular process was occurring or not...that process being consciousness. That seems logical to me. What exactly is it that you expected from a scientific theory of consciousness?

That's true in a way. But how do intend to create 'thought units'? Or do you just mean 'hexagonal arrays of synchronously-self-restimulating quanta which we will assume to be thought units of which someone is conscious'?

I'd say this theory doesn't work for practical and scientific reasons. But more importantly it does not work as an in principle explanation of consciousness, since it does not explain the physical mechanism whereby an array of neurons becomes an experience. That is just taken for granted.

"Becomes an experience"?

While this sort of theory may have a lot to say about mental computation it can say nothing about how the brain gives rise to our consciousness of our thoughts. After all if the array of neurons is the thought, then where is the consciousness of that thought?

And if consciousness of a thought is simply thinking about that thought, then where is the problem?

Sorry to be so negative, but many great minds have tried to produce a plausible in principle explanation and nobody has managed it yet.

Just so long as you're not repeating that as a sort of mantra, and then setting out to prove it against all odds, I'm appreciative of your taking the time to educate me. I just don't want anyone to irrationally assume that something "can't be done", without first looking at all the possibilities. I, myself, am not perfectly convinced that it can be done. I'm just taking that side because most people take the other one, and because the current theories intrigue me .

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
After reading and thinking about this idea I think I'm agreeing with Canute. I'm still thinking a reductive explanation is not possible. This idea seems to do the same thing that everyone tries to do. It draws a correlation and then makes conclusions based on that correlation. If we observe that "A" always exists in conjunction with "B" then we make the conclusion that "A" and "B" must be correlated. "A" must be causing "B". Therefore, scientifically we can answer the question of "when should "B" occur?". Whenever A ocurs. And we can create "B" by simply creating "A".

All of this is founded on the correlation. But there is no explanation of the correlation itself. Why does "B" necessarily follow from "A"? We have this explanation for hurricanes but not consciousness.

Do we? This strikes at the very heart of the matter, Fliption...what if I can imagine the counter-action of very powerful, swirling, winds without their being a hurricane at all. What is it that causes a hurricane to arise from these physical processes?[/color]

Is not the rational answer "nothing, the hurricane doesn't 'arise' from these processes it is those processes"? Isn't that exactly what I - along with Dennett and precious few others - have been saying for quite some time on this topic?

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
Do we? This strikes at the very heart of the matter, Fliption...what if I can imagine the counter-action of very powerful, swirling, winds without their being a hurricane at all. What is it that causes a hurricane to arise from these physical processes?[/color]

Is not the rational answer "nothing, the hurricane doesn't 'arise' from these processes it is those processes"? Isn't that exactly what I - along with Dennett and precious few others - have been saying for quite some time on this topic?

Then a hurricane is a poor analogy. The word "hurricane" is define by humans as the very physical processes that you used to describe it i.e very powerful swirling winds. So it is correct to say that a hurricane doesn't arise from these winds. It is the winds. By definition this is true. However, this is not the case with consciousness. Consciousness as it is being discussed here has not been defined as any physical process. It is defined as "what it is like to be". It is defined this way because this is what needs to be explained. So to simply equate consciousness to some physical process the way you do a hurricane leaves an explanatory gap. How do you get from brain process to "what it's like to be"?

I was trying to show the difference between hurricanes and conscouness earlier and my last sentence threw you off the point entirely. That point was on the idea you posted.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Do we? This strikes at the very heart of the matter, Fliption...what if I can imagine the counter-action of very powerful, swirling, winds without their being a hurricane at all. What is it that causes a hurricane to arise from these physical processes?[/color]

Is not the rational answer "nothing, the hurricane doesn't 'arise' from these processes it is those processes"? Isn't that exactly what I - along with Dennett and precious few others - have been saying for quite some time on this topic?

What we have, initially, are two sets of phenomena; the macroscopic hurricane and the microscopic actions of atoms and molecules. The question of how to coherently connect the two is best phrased not with the term 'arising' but with 'accounting for': How can the microscopic actions of atoms and molecules account for the macroscopic phenomenon of a hurricane? What we need is a bridge principle to show how the explanation of latter completely satisfies our need to explain the former. The bridge principle is simple: the actions of those individual atoms and molecules, when taken as a whole, are the hurricane.

Why does this bridge principle work? Well, imagine that we are not concerned with hurricanes at all, but rather that we start off with a description of a set of atoms and molecules (from what turns out to be a hurricane) and we want to work out what this set of microscopic phenomena will 'look like' on the macroscopic scale. So we do a bunch of calculations using the laws of physics and, lo and behold, we have derived something that, on a macroscopic scale, looks exactly like a hurricane! Every salient feature of the hurricane that is in need of explaining has been completely derived from that set of microscopic phenomena. Given this result, our bridge principle stating that the hurricane is that set of dynamic atoms and molecules makes perfect sense, and appears to have been completely justified. So what we have is a successful reductive explanation.

Now, you propose a similar bridge principle for consciousness. You say that we can coherently connect conscious experience with physical neurons by just saying that subjective experience is the activity of the neurons.

Why does this bridge principle not work? Well, imagine that we are not concerned with consciousness at all, but rather that we start off with a description of a set of atoms and molecules (from what turns out to be a brain) and we want to work out what this set of microscopic phenomena will 'look like' on the macroscopic scale. So we do a bunch of calculations using the laws of physics and, lo and behold, we have derived something that, on a macroscopic scale, looks exactly like a brain, but looks nothing like subjective experience. Every salient feature of the objective brain that is in need of explaining has been completely derived from that set of microscopic phenomena. But no salient feature of subjective experience that is in need of explaining has been derived whatsoever from that set of microscopic phenomena. Given this result, our bridge principle stating that subjective experience is that set of dynamic atoms and molecules makes no sense at all, and indeed appears to have been invalidated. After all, if subjective experience is the activity of neurons, why has thoroughly analyzing the activity of neurons given us asbolutely no indication of subjective experience? The end result is that we do not have a successful reductive explanation of subjective experience.

For instance, in the case of the hurricane, we see completely clearly why a bunch of molecules moving in such and such a way must account for a macroscopic wind current. But in the case of consciousness, we do not see at all why a bunch of molecules moving in such and such a way must account for a subjective experience of a certain color.

The way around this is to add certain fundamental postulates to our model of reality, such as "neurons doing such and such will always be accompanied by a subjective experience of such and such." Only after taking such postulates to be axiomatically true could we (trivially) see why molecules moving in such and such a way must account for a subjective experience of a certain color.

But in assuming such a fundamental, axiomatic existence for subjective experience, we have not reductively explained the existence of certain subjective experiences under certain circumstances at all. Rather, we have just taken it for granted that certain subjective experiences exist under certain circumstances. Using this approach we may be able to explain more complex features of subjective experience in terms of simpler ones, but we will still not be able to explain those most basic components of subjective experience in terms of anything else. So we will not have a truly reductive explanation of subjective experience.

 

[Jeebus]

Good post, hypna.

I have a question relating to subjective experience. Since axiomatic principles would not reductively explain the certain instances of subjective experience … and why the neurons do what they do in general purposes. Do you think it is possible that Evolutionary Psycology could explain someday the fundamental, algoristic co-option of neurons and subjection subconscious experience are correlated and are directly parallel to each other? or is (EP) not a matter of human-based subconsciousness in the realm of subjectivity?

 

[Canute]

Mentat

I think Hypno answered your post very clearly so just a couple of additional points.

Originally posted by Mentat
It is a theory of what goes on in our neocortexes which gives rise to experience, memory, and creativity.

Not really it isn't. It is a theory predicated on the ad hoc conjecture that what goes on in out neocortex gives rise to experience. No account is given of how this occurs and even whether it does.

That's the point though: Consciousness, if it is to be explained as a scientific phenomenon - in the manner of a hurricane - cannot "evolve" or "arise" from the functions of the neocortex, it must literally be those functions, as Dennett (I'm sure your elated that I'm bringing him up again) already predicted in Consciousness Explained.

Ah, He who must not be named. You say 'must literally be those functions'. Why is that, and what evidence leads you (or Calvin) to say this?

It's been observed to be hexagonal. That's really the beauty of it, in my opinion: There is no why, and thus it is just like every other event in the Universe (as understood in the eyes of the scientist).

Hexagonal arrays of neurons have been observed. That is all that has been observed. There is no reason to assume that these have anything to do with causing consciousness, (even if they correlate with certain states of consciousness).

No, this is simply a very special process, and there have been rudimentary (at best) experiments that link certain memories to certain synchronously-firing arrays. As I said at the outset, this is merely a way of showing that it is possible, in principle, to explain consciousness; however impossible it may currently be, in practice.

But this does not show that it is possible. In fact it suggests it is not possible, since it is forced to merely assume consciousness. As you acknowledge here..

As to how Calvin knows that these patterns are thoughts: he doesn't. It's a simple postulate that may turn out to be true. Anyway, it's a necessary one, since the most discreet unit of memory must be established before an understanding of the re-stimulation of memories (integral to consciousness) can be created.

And without some sort of additional theory a dip in spacetime is just a dip in spacetime, no more. You see, you are again demanding more of a scientific theory of consciousness than you would of any other such scientific theory.

That is not the case. No scientific theory that successfully accounts for the existence of a phenomena starts by just assuming its existence. It would be back to front.

It's like in quantum mechanics: Any form of energetic reaction (aka "observation") can collapse the wave-function of a particle, and thus produce seemingly absolute properties out of the typical chaos of that realm. Sure, it's not conceivable, and not really understood yet; but no one says it's impossible in principle to understand it because we can't make the connection of why energetic reactions should collapse the wave-function ITFP...right? It's just the way it is, and the scientific quest is to understand exactly how it is, not why it is that way and not some other way.

Can;t argue with that, but here you are talking about a physical reaction that is scientifically observable. Consciousness is not scientifically observable.

Ok...hold on, isn't psychology a science?

It's a long-standing debate. Psychologists would like it to be, and go to some trouble to make it look it look like it is, but the jury is still out.

Psychologists often refer to our free will. Of course, we may have free will, and all the "thermostat" scientists still may be correct at the same time...we'd simply have to say that the ability to make true conscious choices does exist,

Science is very clear on this issue. The physical universe is taken to be 'causally complete', entirely explicable in terms of physical interactions. Consciousness cannot be causal in this view. For science consciousness is a waste product, a whiff of wasted steam from the engine of a train driven by, well, er, steam, as Gilbert Lyle, Dennett's teacher, argued.

Lyle argued that we are making a mistake in thinking that consciousness is a real thing in need of a real explanation, saying that to do this is to make a category error of the same type as 'she came home in floods of tears and a sedan chair'. (I always liked that).

Even if consciousness was causal science could not accept that freewill exists, since it contradicts the doctrine of physical determinism.

Are you serious? I don't mean to be offensive in any way, I just think we must be discussing two different things here. I was talking about a physical, scientific, reductionist theory of consciousness. This would indeed give rise to a test of consciousness that would be a matter of measuring whether some particular process was occurring or not...that process being consciousness. That seems logical to me.

And me also. A scientific theory of consciousness would indeed give rise to a test for it. The question is whether such a theory is possible.

What exactly is it that you expected from a scientific theory of consciousness?

I would be content with a proof that it is a scientific entitity. Some indication of the physical mechanism by which it is caused would also be required.

And if consciousness of a thought is simply thinking about that thought, then where is the problem?

This approach is taken by 'higher-order thoughts' theories (HOTs). They don't work since ultimately they disappear up their own backside in self-reference.

Just so long as you're not repeating that as a sort of mantra, and then setting out to prove it against all odds,

Yeah, that's the danger. I don't think I'm doing this.

I'm appreciative of your taking the time to educate me.

Thank you also. We're all educating each other as far as I'm concerned.

I just don't want anyone to irrationally assume that something "can't be done", without first looking at all the possibilities. I, myself, am not perfectly convinced that it can be done. I'm just taking that side because most people take the other one, and because the current theories intrigue me . [/B]

That seems a good approach. In fact it's very difficult to prove that consciousness cannot be explained scientifically (mainly because there is no scientific definition of it, so there's nothing to get ones teeth into). What is not so difficult is to show that all the ways of scientifically explaining proposed so far won't work, and that certain classes of explanation cannot ever work.

Apart from a short break during the reign of Behaviourism thinkers have been specualting about the causes of consciousness for centuries. (Much of the best work was done in the 19th century) I feel that if a scientific explanation was possible then by now someone would have come up with something at least workable in principle.

It is easy to forget that so far we do not have an in principle explantion for the existence of matter. Nobody has yet ventured a book called 'Matter Explained'.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Then a hurricane is a poor analogy. The word "hurricane" is define by humans as the very physical processes that you used to describe it i.e very powerful swirling winds. So it is correct to say that a hurricane doesn't arise from these winds. It is the winds. By definition this is true. However, this is not the case with consciousness. Consciousness as it is being discussed here has not been defined as any physical process. It is defined as "what it is like to be". It is defined this way because this is what needs to be explained. So to simply equate consciousness to some physical process the way you do a hurricane leaves an explanatory gap. How do you get from brain process to "what it's like to be"?

I was trying to show the difference between hurricanes and conscouness earlier and my last sentence threw you off the point entirely. That point was on the idea you posted.

Fliption, you make a very interesting point. You say that consciousness is defined as "what it is like to be"...perhaps that's the problem. Doesn't that make the assumption that it really is like something be you, and you don't just think it is? IOW (and I'll probably start a thread on this), doesn't this definition pre-suppose that there is a central self and that it's like something to be that central self?

The second assumption is perfectly sound, but the first one is up for a lot of debate.

(btw, the reason it must pre-suppose a central, indivisible, self is that, if there were no such "self", but were instead mere processes of the brain that could - with the right amount of complexity in computation - produce the illusion of "me" and the illusion that it is something that it is like to be "me", then reductionism is possible...if, however, there is a central "self", and that "self" is sentient, then it is like something to be that one, indivisible, being, and that may not be reductively explanable).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Now, you propose a similar bridge principle for consciousness. You say that we can coherently connect conscious experience with physical neurons by just saying that subjective experience is the activity of the neurons.

Why does this bridge principle not work? Well, imagine that we are not concerned with consciousness at all, but rather that we start off with a description of a set of atoms and molecules (from what turns out to be a brain) and we want to work out what this set of microscopic phenomena will 'look like' on the macroscopic scale. So we do a bunch of calculations using the laws of physics and, lo and behold, we have derived something that, on a macroscopic scale, looks exactly like a brain, but looks nothing like subjective experience.

Kudos on this post, Hypna. My hat's off to you.

There is (of course ) one thing I don't get : Do we know what a subjective experience looks like? And, if we do, do we know what it looks like from all perspectives? Really, what does a hurricane feel like to a hurricane? This question is, obviously, a non-sequitor, since the hurricane is not conscious, and thus that extra perspective doesn't exist. However, it does exist in the case of brains. If we can work up from the molecular scale, and produce a functioning brain, then, to that brain, it will indeed "feel like" consciousness. But it will only feel like consciousness from that perspective.

Do you see what I'm getting at?

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
There is (of course ) one thing I don't get : Do we know what a subjective experience looks like? And, if we do, do we know what it looks like from all perspectives? Really, what does a hurricane feel like to a hurricane? This question is, obviously, a non-sequitor, since the hurricane is not conscious, and thus that extra perspective doesn't exist. However, it does exist in the case of brains. If we can work up from the molecular scale, and produce a functioning brain, then, to that brain, it will indeed "feel like" consciousness. But it will only feel like consciousness from that perspective.

Do you see what I'm getting at?

Yes, I do, and it is certainly a reflection of the central problem. We have no knowledge of subjective experience strictly from objective observation. What we do have is individual knowledge of subjective experience coming directly from our own first hand perceptions of it, and from this we can try to infer associations between objective observations (such as listening to another human's verbal reports) and subjective experience, based on the assumption that this person is indeed conscious in the same general sense that we are. But this approach entirely presupposes our own firsthand knowledge of subjective experience, since just going by a purely objective, 3rd person approach there should be no reason to believe or even postulate such a thing as subjective experience in the first place.

Of course, this is a massive problem for any attempt at a scientific (objective) account of consciousness. It seems to strongly suggest that there is some component contributing to the existence of consciousness that we cannot objectively observe.

I think the best we can do at present is to guess at the nature of this unobservable component, using observations of brain activity in conjunction with assumptions of the validity of verbal reports and the like, to infer what subjective experience does and does not 'look like' from the 3rd person perspective of observing a human brain. This approach entirely acknowledges that there is nothing in our current 3rd person understanding of physical reality that can suggest, a priori, that system A is conscious but B is not, but rather that our key intuition about the existence and nature of subjective experience comes from our own personal, first-hand knowledge of it. Rather than try to artificially break our epistemic limitations when we try to understand and explain consciousness, we should work within them and use them to structure our approach. That is, rather than try to write off the explanitory gap by supposing that consciousness is entirely explainable via physical reductionism, we should acknowledge that the explanitory gap reflects a deep and significant fact about the nature of reality, and then very carefully go about fleshing out what exactly what that deep and significant fact might be.

 

[Canute]

Hypno

I couldn't possibly agree with you more. It mystifies me why this approach is so rarely explored. It leads straight to the solution. Perhaps it is too tainted with Buddhism for most academics. But it has to be the only way forward.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
with the right amount of complexity in computation - produce the illusion of "me" and the illusion that it is something that it is like to be "me", then reductionism is possible...if, however, there is a central "self", and that "self" is sentient, then it is like something to be that one, indivisible, being, and that may not be reductively explanable).

Who is experiencing the illusion?

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
(btw, the reason it must pre-suppose a central, indivisible, self is that, if there were no such "self", but were instead mere processes of the brain that could - with the right amount of complexity in computation - produce the illusion of "me" and the illusion that it is something that it is like to be "me", then reductionism is possible...if, however, there is a central "self", and that "self" is sentient, then it is like something to be that one, indivisible, being, and that may not be reductively explanable). [/B]

Not quite sure what you mean but this does not seem to be quite right.

The reason that 'what it is like' is so widely accepted as a definition, and can be accepted by Buddhists etc., is that it does not entail the existence of a 'self'. In most (all?) idealist accounts of consciousness 'self' is an illusion (or evolved epiphenomenon). Thus 'self' is not necessary to the existence of consciousness or experience.

In other words, 'what it is like' entails the existence of an experience, but (at the limit) it does not entail the existence of a self that is apart from the experience. Consciousness can exist in a state of selflessness.

Thus Buddhists, who in one way claim that the universe arises from consciousness, also sometimes assert that consciousness does not exist. There are subtle differences in these two applications of the term 'consciousness', related directly to the treatment of 'self'.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Jeebus
Good post, hypna.

I have a question relating to subjective experience. Since axiomatic principles would not reductively explain the certain instances of subjective experience … and why the neurons do what they do in general purposes. Do you think it is possible that Evolutionary Psycology could explain someday the fundamental, algoristic co-option of neurons and subjection subconscious experience are correlated and are directly parallel to each other? or is (EP) not a matter of human-based subconsciousness in the realm of subjectivity?

I think evolutionary psychology's stance on consciousness will follow from neurobiology and philsophy, not the other way around. After learning more about the nature of consciousness and what functions it serves, we would be able to make better sense of how it is evolutionarily advantageous. But conjecturing how consciousness might be evolutionarily advantageous without getting a better handle on it in its own right would seem to be the wrong approach, perhaps even question begging.

However, analyzing in depth the ontogeny of the human brain and its relationship with the development of consciousness could lead to some fruitful results, and I suppose that has a bit of EP flavor to it.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Who is experiencing the illusion?

No one in particular. As explained in another thread, the many sub-experiences (I just really like that term, for some reason) - which are the basic computations of incoming information by the brain - do not ever produce a complete, final draft, but they do process the illusion that there is such a thing, so that it looks like it in retrospect. I think this is actually a very useful tool for the brain to have developed, as it allows for the compactification of lots of information.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Not quite sure what you mean but this does not seem to be quite right.

The reason that 'what it is like' is so widely accepted as a definition, and can be accepted by Buddhists etc., is that it does not entail the existence of a 'self'. In most (all?) idealist accounts of consciousness 'self' is an illusion (or evolved epiphenomenon). Thus 'self' is not necessary to the existence of consciousness or experience.

In other words, 'what it is like' entails the existence of an experience, but (at the limit) it does not entail the existence of a self that is apart from the experience. Consciousness can exist in a state of selflessness.

Thus Buddhists, who in one way claim that the universe arises from consciousness, also sometimes assert that consciousness does not exist. There are subtle differences in these two applications of the term 'consciousness', related directly to the treatment of 'self'.

I see what you are getting at, but the central "illusion" is not really of the self, but of the idea that there is a coherent gestalt arising from those little sub-experiences. The reason I mention the self is because, when one introspects at what is like to just "be 'me'", one is succumbing to the same illusion as always, but in this case it is in reference to their very "selves". And, since it is often said that consciousness=a state in which it is "like something" to be "me", it appeared intrinsically related.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
I see what you are getting at, but the central "illusion" is not really of the self, but of the idea that there is a coherent gestalt arising from those little sub-experiences. The reason I mention the self is because, when one introspects at what is like to just "be 'me'", one is succumbing to the same illusion as always, but in this case it is in reference to their very "selves". And, since it is often said that consciousness=a state in which it is "like something" to be "me", it appeared intrinsically related.

This is a confusing issue. You're right that when on introspects then in a way one is succumbing to the illusion of 'me'. 'Me' is where all introspection has to start. But when one introspects sufficiently successfully you find 'me' isn't really there, but somehow 'your' experience still is. I haven't got too far with this, but far enough to believe it.

This is why I feel in discussions of consciousness it's very important to distinguish between mind and consciousness, or at least be careful about how they are defined. Mind and brain may both arise from some fundamental state of consciousness.

(Is anyone else having trouble here. Posts keep disappearing. This post of Mentat's that I quoted isn't there any more, not the rest of that page. Is it just me?)

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
This is a confusing issue. You're right that when on introspects then in a way one is succumbing to the illusion of 'me'. 'Me' is where all introspection has to start. But when one introspects sufficiently successfully you find 'me' isn't really there, but somehow 'your' experience still is. I haven't got too far with this, but far enough to believe it.

What does that mean? I don't mean to be offensive, I'm just confused at how clear something has to be to a person before they "believe" it.

Anyway, if you can accept such an outlook - wherein there is no "self" and no final "draft" of "experience", but merely a collection of "sub-experiences" - than what more do you want from a theory of consciousness than that which Calvin, LeDoux, Edleman and Tononi, and Dennett have proposed.

This is why I feel in discussions of consciousness it's very important to distinguish between mind and consciousness, or at least be careful about how they are defined. Mind and brain may both arise from some fundamental state of consciousness.

(Is anyone else having trouble here. Posts keep disappearing. This post of Mentat's that I quoted isn't there any more, not the rest of that page. Is it just me?)

I can still see my post there...has this happened to you on other threads?