Faulty expectations of a theory of consciousness.

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
What does that mean? I don't mean to be offensive, I'm just confused at how clear something has to be to a person before they "believe" it.

Yes, I didn't put it very well. What I meant was that it makes rational and reasonable sense, but that on top of that my experience confirms it. It is not provable so it has to be experience that decides it in the end.

Anyway, if you can accept such an outlook - wherein there is no "self" and no final "draft" of "experience", but merely a collection of "sub-experiences" - than what more do you want from a theory of consciousness than that which Calvin, LeDoux, Edleman and Tononi, and Dennett have proposed.

But that doesn't follow. It is widely agreed that the writers you mention do not explain consciousness. I certainly agree that they don't.

Also saying that self is an illusion is not at all the same as saying that consciousness is an illusion. (That was my point).

I can still see my post there...has this happened to you on other threads? [/B]

Yes it has, it's driving me nuts. I keep losing track of discussions and posting out of sync. I think it's something to do with pages not updating but I can't pin it down.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
But that doesn't follow. It is widely agreed that the writers you mention do not explain consciousness. I certainly agree that they don't.

They don't explain how all of the information-processing of the brain sums up to a Final Draft of conscious experience, if that's what you mean...but they are not trying to. They have each shown, in their own way, that such a Final Draft is never really produced, but is an illusion (a "trick" that the brain plays on itself, in Dennett's terms) which is processed right along with the rest of the information, which is useful (for the compacitifcation, long-term memorization, and recall...as well as for the evolution of sentience) but misleading (in philosophical discussion, one can take the illusion of compactification to be the real thing, and can spend eternity trying to explain how the Final Draft can "arise" from information-processing, but will never find the answer, since the argument is based on a faulty premise).

Also saying that self is an illusion is not at all the same as saying that consciousness is an illusion. (That was my point).

Well, that's true.

 

[Canute]

Mentat

I must admit I don't really understand your point about final drafts. However I'm not sure how it's relevant. 'Final drafts' is a term from Dennett that may or may not have some relevance to consciousness.

But heterophenonology, the theory behind the term, cannot work as an explanation of consciousness since it excludes what we normally call consciousness, as has been pointed out by many of Dennet's colleagues, notably Gefffrey Harnard.

So to prove that the term 'final drafts' has any meaning in relation to consciousness one would first have to meet the well-rehearsed and so far wholly unanswered objections of just about everyone who isn't Daniel Dennett.

Somewhere online is an email discussion between Harnard and Dennett on this issue which pretty much settles the matter, but I've lost it. A search on the names together might uncover it.

I think you should change your mind. It really just cannot ever make sense to argue that consciousness is anything other than exactly what it appears to be, to you (or I), and what it has been like at other times, in your own experience and in your own words, as best you can tell or remember. If you are anything like me then what it seems to be like is a completely unified experience of what it is like to be conscious as me at this moment, and what it has been like in other remembered moments. That is what conciousness is, what it is that we're supposed to explaining.

This seems so completely obvious that I cannot understand how anyone could argue otherwise. I don't mean you, I mean the thousands of professional academics who get paid to think clearly and deeply about these issues and who agree with you. The arguments go back and forth endlessly in the literature.

Half of these tenured academics and professional researchers writing about consciousness seem to be off their rockers to me, but perhaps I'm off mine. However I'm suspicious. The problem of consciousness has turned into a goldmine for academic philosophers and many others in the research and publication industry, I sometimes wonder if they're really trying to solve it.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
I think you should change your mind. It really just cannot ever make sense to argue that consciousness is anything other than exactly what it appears to be, to you (or I), and what it has been like at other times, in your own experience and in your own words, as best you can tell or remember. If you are anything like me then what it seems to be like is a completely unified experience of what it is like to be conscious as me at this moment, and what it has been like in other remembered moments. That is what conciousness is, what it is that we're supposed to explaining.

That is certainly what it feels like. But then, to quote FZ+, "If reality were exactly the way it seemed, we wouldn't need science at all".

BTW, I want to clarify here and now that I don't believe any of the things I've stated about consciousness to be necessarily true. I just don't think they are necessarily false either, and I'm preferring them over the alternative specifically because it contradicts the belief that "seems obvious".

This seems so completely obvious that I cannot understand how anyone could argue otherwise. I don't mean you, I mean the thousands of professional academics who get paid to think clearly and deeply about these issues and who agree with you. The arguments go back and forth endlessly in the literature.

Half of these tenured academics and professional researchers writing about consciousness seem to be off their rockers to me, but perhaps I'm off mine. However I'm suspicious. The problem of consciousness has turned into a goldmine for academic philosophers and many others in the research and publication industry, I sometimes wonder if they're really trying to solve it.

I sometimes wonder if they are trying to solve the wrong question. The point, IMO, is to understand how a being is conscious and/or sentient. It is not to answer the "hard problem", since that is a compilation of postulates that needn't exist at all for sentience/consciousness to exist.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
That is certainly what it feels like. But then, to quote FZ+, "If reality were exactly the way it seemed, we wouldn't need science at all".

I have to disagree. If we didn't study the way reality seems then science wouldn't exist, as how things seem is all that science can study.

BTW, I want to clarify here and now that I don't believe any of the things I've stated about consciousness to be necessarily true. I just don't think they are necessarily false either, and I'm preferring them over the alternative specifically because it contradicts the belief that "seems obvious".

Fair enough. But obviousness is nevertheless a useful guide to the truth.

I sometimes wonder if they are trying to solve the wrong question.

Yeah, that as well.

The point, IMO, is to understand how a being is conscious and/or sentient. It is not to answer the "hard problem", since that is a compilation of postulates that needn't exist at all for sentience/consciousness to exist. [/B]

But the hard problem is indistinguishable from the problem of understanding how a being can be conscious and/or sentient. That is the hard problem.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
I have to disagree. If we didn't study the way reality seems then science wouldn't exist, as how things seem is all that science can study.

That cannot be the case. Quantum Mechanics, just for one example, does not study how things seem, but studies how they are regardless of the fact that they actually seem to be the exact opposite of what QM has shown.

Fair enough. But obviousness is nevertheless a useful guide to the truth.

Maybe.

Yeah, that as well.

I just wish more people would ponder that (as, I believe, Dennett has - and has arrived at the conclusion that they are indeed asking the wrong question).

But the hard problem is indistinguishable from the problem of understanding how a being can be conscious and/or sentient. That is the hard problem.

That's not exactly how it was presented to me. The "hard problem" as I've seen it described is the problem of showing how certain physical functions can produce consciousness.

If one can avoid the problem of how something "produces" consciousness, by showing that consciousness is synonymous with those physical functions, then one will make the "hard problem" moot while consciousness is still being examined.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
That cannot be the case. Quantum Mechanics, just for one example, does not study how things seem, but studies how they are regardless of the fact that they actually seem to be the exact opposite of what QM has shown.

In the double slit experiments, it seems (appears) that light can either accumulate on one specific point of a barrier or be dispersed across this barrier. From these appearances we infer certain properties of light that might contradict our usual notions of how light seems to be. The point is that science is based on observation. Our knowledge of reality stemming from observation is by definition mediated, not direct, and in this sense it is built entirely from appearances. (Appearances here does not necessarily mean how things literally appear in subjective experience.)

That's not exactly how it was presented to me. The "hard problem" as I've seen it described is the problem of showing how certain physical functions can produce consciousness.

If one can avoid the problem of how something "produces" consciousness, by showing that consciousness is synonymous with those physical functions, then one will make the "hard problem" moot while consciousness is still being examined.

You really need to circumvent this objection of yours. It amounts to a strawman. Think in terms of 'accounting for,' 'making intelligible how,' or whatever-- not 'produces' or 'gives rise to.' The hard problem is an epistemic problem relating to how we can know or understand the processes which underlie the phenomenon of consciousness, not a problem of explaining literal 'products.'

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
That cannot be the case. Quantum Mechanics, just for one example, does not study how things seem, but studies how they are regardless of the fact that they actually seem to be the exact opposite of what QM has shown.

I don't want to be brutal but it is absolutely and completely certainly the case, and no scientist or philospher has ever disagreed. And what Hypnogogue said. This is why it is said that this is a world of appearances, in which we cannot know the essence of things.

I just wish more people would ponder that (as, I believe, Dennett has - and has arrived at the conclusion that they are indeed asking the wrong question).

IMHO all metaphysical questions withour exception are the wrong questions. But that would take all day to explain.

That's not exactly how it was presented to me. The "hard problem" as I've seen it described is the problem of showing how certain physical functions can produce consciousness.

Isn't this exactly the same as the problem of how "to understand how a being is conscious and/or sentient" as you put it?

If one can avoid the problem of how something "produces" consciousness, by showing that consciousness is synonymous with those physical functions, then one will make the "hard problem" moot while consciousness is still being examined. [/B]

If you can do that you will be international academic superstar overnight. Great minds have been trying for decades, if not centuries, perhaps even milenia.

Your arguments are all dealt with in full in the literature if you want to get a more trustworthy refutation of them.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
In the double slit experiments, it seems (appears) that light can either accumulate on one specific point of a barrier or be dispersed across this barrier. From these appearances we infer certain properties of light that might contradict our usual notions of how light seems to be. The point is that science is based on observation. Our knowledge of reality stemming from observation is by definition mediated, not direct, and in this sense it is built entirely from appearances. (Appearances here does not necessarily mean how things literally appear in subjective experience.)

And so what does "appearance" mean when referring to subjective experience itself? What if your subjective experience appears one way that it really isn't (and don't say that it can't be because it is the experience, since it is still perfectly logical to say that what "appears" to be a complete subjective thought is really a collection of "simple" thoughts, each being identical to an impression...ergo, reductively explanable phenomenon with no synergistic reality)?

You really need to circumvent this objection of yours. It amounts to a strawman. Think in terms of 'accounting for,' 'making intelligible how,' or whatever-- not 'produces' or 'gives rise to.' The hard problem is an epistemic problem relating to how we can know or understand the processes which underlie the phenomenon of consciousness, not a problem of explaining literal 'products.'

And the "hard problem" itself, IMO, amounts to a strawman. What is it, exactly that you are trying to explain? You haven't defined subjective experience in any logical terms, you have only stated that you definitely have "it".

The "hard problem" is based on the assumption that there is a subjective experience, but I still haven't seen that term defined.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Isn't this exactly the same as the problem of how "to understand how a being is conscious and/or sentient" as you put it?

Nearly. I just don't think that the subjective experience and the physical function are at all different from each other, which precludes the drawing of a bridge between the two, since there is only one thing to explain.

The hard problem lacks substance, IMO, simply because it raises straw-men at every turn. For example, if I say that I see a red ball, the "hard problem" philosophers will ask "What is the relationship between the stimulation of your visual cortex and the experience of a 'red ball'?". But they are asking a moot and empty question. My question in return is: "What exactly do you people expect to happen when a visual cortex processes a certain wavelength of light? How do you separate the processing of that wavelength from the experience of the color, when the experience of the color is the only method available to a visual cortex to process that wavelength?"[/color]

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
"What exactly do you people expect to happen when a visual cortex processes a certain wavelength of light? How do you separate the processing of that wavelength from the experience of the color, when the experience of the color is the only method available to a visual cortex to process that wavelength?"[/color]

Are you saying that computers that are programmed to distinguish colors are "experiencing colors"? Or are they really just mathematically comparing the wavelengths themselves?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Are you saying that computers that are programmed to distinguish colors are "experiencing colors"? Or are they really just mathematically comparing the wavelengths themselves?

What's the difference?

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
What's the difference?

You don't understand the difference between experiencing red versus green and the act of comparing two numbers?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
You don't understand the difference between experiencing red versus green and the act of comparing two numbers?

Well, if one were to minus the "mathematically" part of your question, and just say that the computer is comparing two wavelengths of light...then what is the difference?

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
Well, if one were to minus the "mathematically" part of your question, and just say that the computer is comparing two wavelengths of light...then what is the difference?

Hmmm, but it is a crucial word. If you were charged with programming a computer to distinguish colors, how would you do it? You would probably have some sort of hardware that measured the wavelength and then the computer would compare the wavelength's mathematically and even label them by comparing them to a table where each wavelength is associated with a color. Where does experiencing the color come in? The only way I know of that this program can be written is to use math.

This is sort of like explaining colors to a blind man. He can do math on wavelengths but he is not experiencing colors.

 

[Sariaht]

Imagine a robot with two brainhalfs both trying to controle the same body and both trying to do what serves them best.

And also, an independent part of the boddy downloads texts from the internet, and another transforms texts into simple movies shown to the robot, so that the robot could learn without doing that much.

 

[pelastration]

Originally posted by Fliption
Where does experiencing the color come in? The only way I know of that this program can be written is to use math.

This is sort of like explaining colors to a blind man. He can do math on wavelengths but he is not experiencing colors.

To have "Experience" you will need to build a history (including values and goals). A goal can be: get as much energy if you can. Or if possible try to expand your processor power. You may include in your program the possibility that he can look for certain wavelengths at his own initiative. If you program the computer that he can activate an extra processor or get extra energy when he locates "three red cards or dots" then it's possible that he first looks for wavelengths of red because you give a goal or target. Run the program and see what happens. Make the computer remember his previous experience. Somewhere such tests have been done in relation to robots (looking for the power-line) and simulations of virtual populations and AI.

So what we see is that some values are coupled or associated, and judged to have an higher or lower priority level. The program gets more dimensions. Therefor we must include multi-dimensions and priority levels when we think about consciousness.

The blind man can not experience colors with his eyes but he can be motivated by telling him that for every red card he gets $10 and tell him that some people can feel colors with their fingers (btw. which is true).

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
Nearly. I just don't think that the subjective experience and the physical function are at all different from each other which precludes the drawing of a bridge between the two, since there is only one thing to explain.

Only nothing to explain, I think you mean? If consciousness is brain then there is nothing to talk about or explain.

The hard problem lacks substance, IMO, simply because it raises straw-men at every turn. For example, if I say that I see a red ball, the "hard problem" philosophers will ask "What is the relationship between the stimulation of your visual cortex and the experience of a 'red ball'?".

Quite right, and scientists ask exactly the same question. I think you may have misinterpreted the scientific view on this issue, confusing it with Dennett's.

But they are asking a moot and empty question. My question in return is: "What exactly do you people expect to happen when a visual cortex processes a certain wavelength of light? How do you separate the processing of that wavelength from the experience of the color, when the experience of the color is the only method available to a visual cortex to process that wavelength?"[/color] [/B]

So what exactly is this 'experience of colour' you are referring to here? Surely you meant to say 'brain state'. Henceforth 'experience' is a word you cannot use because you say it does not exist, it is identical to brain state. You can't have it both ways.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Hmmm, but it is a crucial word. If you were charged with programming a computer to distinguish colors, how would you do it? You would probably have some sort of hardware that measured the wavelength and then the computer would compare the wavelength's mathematically and even label them by comparing them to a table where each wavelength is associated with a color. Where does experiencing the color come in? The only way I know of that this program can be written is to use math.

And yet it is considered an "easy problem" (explanable in principle) to devise a machine (like a visual cortex) which distinguishes between wavelengths of light without the ability to classify them mathematically...besides, what's wrong with saying that they strike with a different amount of force, and thus stimulate differently on that basis (after all wavelength is inversely proportional to frequency, which is directly proportional to energy).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Only nothing to explain, I think you mean? If consciousness is brain then there is nothing to talk about or explain.

1) Consciousness is not the brain, it is a process of the brain.
2) The brain is not completely understood, by any stretch of the imagination (kind of a failed attempt at a pun ), so there is plenty to explain.

Quite right, and scientists ask exactly the same question. I think you may have misinterpreted the scientific view on this issue, confusing it with Dennett's.

Scientists would not ask the question if subjective experience of a red ball were already defined as synonymous with such-and-such stimulation of the visual cortex. It's all about defining the term, and the Chalmereans haven't even done that yet (AFAIK), which leaves them right back at square one.

So what exactly is this 'experience of colour' you are referring to here? Surely you meant to say 'brain state'. Henceforth 'experience' is a word you cannot use because you say it does not exist, it is identical to brain state. You can't have it both ways.

It is identical to a particular brain state...wait, scratch that, it's identical to a particular brain process. If I can say "produce hormones" I can say "subjectively experience"...besides, I've at least defined the term. Can you say that for all the philosophers who challenge Dennett?

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
And yet it is considered an "easy problem" (explanable in principle) to devise a machine (like a visual cortex) which distinguishes between wavelengths of light without the ability to classify them mathematically...besides, what's wrong with saying that they strike with a different amount of force, and thus stimulate differently on that basis (after all wavelength is inversely proportional to frequency, which is directly proportional to energy).

However you wish to program a computer to distinguish color, (and it must be some form of logic. Math comes in if there is analysis of the actual waveforms. If these waveform differences can be detected through some other force measurement then there must be some sort of number comparison somewhere.) the point is that no where in your program will there be any lines of code associated with experiencing the qualia of color. So how does your program do this without being programmed to do this?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
However you wish to program a computer to distinguish color, (and it must be some form of logic. Math comes in if there is analysis of the actual waveforms. If these waveform differences can be detected through some other force measurement then there must be some sort of number comparison somewhere.) the point is that no where in your program will there be any lines of code associated with experiencing the qualia of color. So how does your program do this without being programmed to do this?

By being programmed to tell the difference between colors based exclusively on those things which our eyes and visual cortexes use...I don't know exactly what they are, but I know that they include rods and cones (I think "rods" are sensitive to brightness (which is clearly a simple matter of beings sensitive to the amount of energy entering the eye at any given time) and "cones" are sensitive to texture or something like that...I'm sorry, this is not really my area of expertise).

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
By being programmed to tell the difference between colors based exclusively on those things which our eyes and visual cortexes use...I don't know exactly what they are, but I know that they include rods and cones (I think "rods" are sensitive to brightness (which is clearly a simple matter of beings sensitive to the amount of energy entering the eye at any given time) and "cones" are sensitive to texture or something like that...I'm sorry, this is not really my area of expertise).

The fundamental problem is not how we can compare colors, but how we can be aware of the quality of colors. This problem can be demonstrated with only one color (say a uniform red field subjectively experienced by an observer). It is readily acknowledged that we can build a machine that works on the same functional principles as the brain (a neural network) that can do things like discriminate between two sets of information encoded in it. But it is not clear whether such a machine then necessarily has subjective experience of this information, and if it does, exactly what is responsible.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
The fundamental problem is not how we can compare colors, but how we can be aware of the quality of colors. This problem can be demonstrated with only one color (say a uniform red field subjectively experienced by an observer). It is readily acknowledged that we can build a machine that works on the same functional principles as the brain (a neural network) that can do things like discriminate between two sets of information encoded in it. But it is not clear whether such a machine then necessarily has subjective experience of this information, and if it does, exactly what is responsible.

What difference does it make? You can look at another human and be unsure whether s/he is capable of "subjective experience".

I still don't see how you are going to get any further without defining what it is you wish to explain. As I've said before, you might as well be disappointed at the lack of an explanation for "xxxxxxxxxx yyyyyyyyyy", since that has the same amount of logical meaning as does "subjective experience" (to date).

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
What difference does it make? You can look at another human and be unsure whether s/he is capable of "subjective experience".

I still don't see how you are going to get any further without defining what it is you wish to explain. As I've said before, you might as well be disappointed at the lack of an explanation for "xxxxxxxxxx yyyyyyyyyy", since that has the same amount of logical meaning as does "subjective experience" (to date).

This discussion seems hopeless. I cannot believe that a naturally curious person would not notice the difference between being awake and dreamless sleep and not care to have it explained simply because it cannot be objectified for the rest of the world. This is insane. Hypnagogue's patience is amazing. I wish I could borrow some of it.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Fliption
This discussion seems hopeless. I cannot believe that a naturally curious person would not notice the difference between being awake and dreamless sleep and not care to have it explained simply because it cannot be objectified for the rest of the world. This is insane. Hypnagogue's patience is amazing. I wish I could borrow some of it. [/B]

Well put, and like you I admire Hypno's patience. I fear I've just about lost mine.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
This discussion seems hopeless. I cannot believe that a naturally curious person would not notice the difference between being awake and dreamless sleep and not care to have it explained simply because it cannot be objectified for the rest of the world. This is insane. Hypnagogue's patience is amazing. I wish I could borrow some of it.

I am grateful for the patience that all of you have shown. However, I don't see what the big problem is. You, of all people, should understand the need to define the terms (without circular logic) before logical discussion can take place, and yet now you are amazed that I can't just "know what you mean" by "subjective experience" and move on from there? That's disappointing.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
I am grateful for the patience that all of you have shown. However, I don't see what the big problem is. You, of all people, should understand the need to define the terms (without circular logic) before logical discussion can take place, and yet now you are amazed that I can't just "know what you mean" by "subjective experience" and move on from there? That's disappointing.

If you don't know what it is Mentat then no amount of words I try to attach to it will make any difference. The real issue is that you do know what it is and yet you publicly take such a ridiculous stance.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
I am grateful for the patience that all of you have shown. However, I don't see what the big problem is. You, of all people, should understand the need to define the terms (without circular logic) before logical discussion can take place, and yet now you are amazed that I can't just "know what you mean" by "subjective experience" and move on from there? That's disappointing.

You really should read up on epistemology and mathematics. It is impossible to define all the terms in a non-trivial theory. You have made up your mind too early, before you understand the issues.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
If you don't know what it is Mentat then no amount of words I try to attach to it will make any difference.

I like this statement. I ask you: What good is a concept that can only be explained to someone who already knows what it is, and then only in circular terms?[/color]

The real issue is that you do know what it is and yet you publicly take such a ridiculous stance.

Pay attention to what I'm saying, please: I have asked for nothing more than a logical, working definition of the most integral term in your side of the argument. Without this, the term has no meaning, and any argument built up from that term suffers the same fate; it is a strawman.

It is almost incomprehensible to me that you cannot see this, specifically you, Fliption. We spent a lot of time on this issue in "Why the bias against Materialism", and your stance the entire time was that the terms must first be defined before logical discussion can take place.

And now you blatantly take the stance that I must already know what you mean, and we must just move on from this shared knowledge. It doesn't work that way.

To tell the absolute truth, I really don't know what you mean by "subjective experience", and I can't understand an argument built on the assumption of its existence without understanding what "it" is ITFP.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
You really should read up on epistemology and mathematics. It is impossible to define all the terms in a non-trivial theory.

I have done quite a bit of reading on the subject, and I know that one can never define all the terms in a theory completely. I'm not asking them to (or, at least, I don't mean to); and I think I've made it pretty clear that I only want one term defined, and that term is the most integral term in the entire Chalmerean paradigm: subjective experience.

You don't have to define anything else if you don't want to, but it is absolutely vital that I understand what you mean by this term before it can be discussed logically.

You have made up your mind too early, before you understand the issues.

What are you talking about? I'm the one who's trying to keep an open mind by not assuming off-hand that someone else is going to understand where I'm coming from right from the start. I've taken the open-minded approach, and asked that we define the basic, integral terms before building up arguments based on those terms.

I'm just asking that we stop building strawmen and start building up our arguments.[/color]

 

[Canute]

Mentat

The definition of consciousness is 'what it is like to be'. What's the problem? How many times must everyone post this before you stop asserting that consciousness has no definition?

Also it is not true that because the definition of thing is not to your liking it cannot exist.

Neither is it true that keeping an open mind means arguing that you have no idea what consciousness experiences are. It is not jumping to conclusions to accept what is self-evident.

Neither is it true that you are keeping an open mind.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
The definition of consciousness is 'what it is like to be'. What's the problem? How many times must everyone post this before you stop asserting that consciousness has no definition?

Dear Canute, why must you continue to say that I don't think consciousness is defined? I can't say it enough: Consciousness can be defined. Consciousness is no mystery. There is nothing that I currently can't understand with regard to consciousness.

It's not about consciousness. It's about "subjective experience". If you define "subjective experience" as "what it is like to be" you have created an illogical, circular definition, and I am no closer to an understanding than when we started. Give me something I can use (something that is logically coherent), I'm practically begging you.

Neither is it true that keeping an open mind means arguing that you have no idea what consciousness experiences are. It is not jumping to conclusions to accept what is self-evident.

It is not open-minded to assume that anything is self-evident. If something is self-evident, then it is beyond disproof, and isn't that also a logical fallacy?

 

[Fliption]

I like this statement. I ask you: What good is a concept that can only be explained to someone who already knows what it is, and then only in circular terms?

Who cares about the concept? It's the phenomenon that needs explaining. Reality exists without or without concepts to describe it. Langauge is for communication. That is all.

Originally posted by Mentat
To tell the absolute truth, I really don't know what you mean by "subjective experience", and I can't understand an argument built on the assumption of its existence without understanding what "it" is ITFP.

Mentat, the term HAS BEEN DEFINED.

In contrast, the term "materialism" is a label to categorize a specific view. It is a meaningless term as it is being used by some and I showed how it is so. Consciousness is not just a category label of views. It is assigned to a feature of how the mind works. There is nothing to study with "materialism". It's just a label. Consciousness is a word that describes something that actually does require study and explanation.

If you think you have the solution to this and it's so easy, then you should not be spending time discussing it with the likes of me. You ought to be screaming from the rooftops to people a lot more qualified than I am (who also don't have the solution, btw). Personally, I'm tired of entertaining your need to debate against the obvious. I feel like I'm participating in someone's psychology experiment for school.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
Dear Canute, why must you continue to say that I don't think consciousness is defined? I can't say it enough: Consciousness can be defined. Consciousness is no mystery. There is nothing that I currently can't understand with regard to consciousness.

Consciousness is defined as 'what it is like'. There is no scientific defintion.

It's not about consciousness. It's about "subjective experience". If you define "subjective experience" as "what it is like to be" you have created an illogical, circular definition, and I am no closer to an understanding than when we started. Give me something I can use (something that is logically coherent), I'm practically begging you.

Ok, yet again. Consciousness IS subjective experience. What else could it possibly be? because of this, for convenience, when speaking generically about subjective experience, they are given the same definition.

It is not open-minded to assume that anything is self-evident.
I am not assuming that the existence of consciousness is self-evident. It is a fact. It's not my fault.

[If something is self-evident, then it is beyond disproof, and isn't that also a logical fallacy? [/B]

Interesting point. No it isn't a fallacy. It is well known that we can know more than we can prove, and it is also well known (check out Aristotle or Popper's 'Problem of Induction' paper) that the only self-evident knwledge can be certain. (Certain knowledge must be one with its object.