Fukushima Fukushima Management and Government Performance

[joewein]

There's a http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20110627a2.html" in today's Japan Times. Some quotes:

The electric power industry in Japan has such strong political clout that nobody, not even the government, seems capable of liberalizing the generation and distribution of electricity, let alone making a dent in the regional monopoly currently enjoyed by each of the 10 utilities.
(...)
On May 6, Kan surprised the nation and the power industry when he asked Chubu Electric Power Co. (Cepco) to suspend the operation of its Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant, saying the plant is in an area that has a very high probability of being hit by a major earthquake in the near future, is very close to the ocean, does not have walls high enough to protect it from tsunami and, therefore, could be vulnerable to the same disaster as Tepco's Fukushima No. 1. After deliberating for three days, Cepco acceded to the request.

This came as a stunning shock to the FEPC, whose members had long had no doubt whatsoever that they controlled politicians, bureaucrats and journalists and that the government could not possibly decide on any national policy related to the power industry without the consent of the industry.
(...)
An observer has pointed out that not a single politician survives after acting against the will of the power industry. In 1997, for example, then Minister of International Trade and Industry Shinji Sato suggested that liberalization of power generation and transmission be studied. Even though he was a son of former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, his remarks enraged the power industry, and he lost in the subsequent Lower House elections in 2000 and 2003 to an FEPC-supported Democratic Party of Japan candidate.
(...)

Worth a read in my opinion.

 

[zapperzero]

I expect there are actually some legitimate reasons why providing nice accomodation and food for workers is not quite as easy to setup under Fukushima conditions as some suggest. I expect more could have been done though, especially after the first week.

None, zero, zip, nada. There is no legitimate reason for which people should live on-site, instead of doing shifts there. In fact, it is beyond stupid, as it exposes people to more radiation and thus drains the already-shallow pool of available skilled workers at least twice as fast as needed.

There is no legitimate reason for which people should not have access to showers and full decon, even while on site. There is no legitimate reason whatsoever for the lack of proper food, water and clothes. No legitimate reason for the lack of dosimeters, no legitimate reason for outgoing workers to not get a full body scan. No legitimate reason for people to be walking in 1 Sv/h water with no boots on.

There are reasons, but they are not of the legitimate kind: cost control, information control, liability limitation, sheer incompetence. This, from TEPCO. From the government, incapacity and unwillingness to assume and carry responsibility.

Shameful does not begin to cover it. I thought, prior to this, that Japan is a civilized nation, one of a few. Seems it's not so civilized. The lack of reaction from the Japanese civil society to this current unpleasantness is simply incredible to me.

 

[NUCENG]

There's a http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20110627a2.html" in today's Japan Times. Some quotes:



Worth a read in my opinion.

Thanks JoeWein, more confirmation that the tail (industry) in Japan is wagging the dog (regulatory bodies).

 

[NUCENG]

None, zero, zip, nada. There is no legitimate reason for which people should live on-site, instead of doing shifts there. In fact, it is beyond stupid, as it exposes people to more radiation and thus drains the already-shallow pool of available skilled workers at least twice as fast as needed.

There is no legitimate reason for which people should not have access to showers and full decon, even while on site. There is no legitimate reason whatsoever for the lack of proper food, water and clothes. No legitimate reason for the lack of dosimeters, no legitimate reason for outgoing workers to not get a full body scan. No legitimate reason for people to be walking in 1 Sv/h water with no boots on.

There are reasons, but they are not of the legitimate kind: cost control, information control, liability limitation, sheer incompetence. This, from TEPCO. From the government, incapacity and unwillingness to assume and carry responsibility.


Shameful does not begin to cover it. I thought, prior to this, that Japan is a civilized nation, one of a few. Seems it's not so civilized. The lack of reaction from the Japanese civil society to this current unpleasantness is simply incredible to me.

You may be right zapperzero, but SPECULATION FOLLOWS:
If they moved rest areas off site and outside of the exclusion zone, workers going to and from the site would be receiving external and inhalation doses during transit. In addition roads may still be unrepaired from earthquake and tsunami damage, making that trip longer than you might think. At least the filtration of the rest huts means they wouldn't be inhaling as much. Is there any information about the external dose rates in these shelters? In short, could it be that they are doing this to reduce worker doses and reducing their "burnout rate"?

Another sneaky possibility is that the workers on site are not available to the press. Has anyone seen any interviews with the workers about the arrangements?

 

[PLG]

Hi,

I have a hard time believing any advantage would accrue from staying put. While there is some risk of inhaling particles during the trip, I am sure this could be mitigated with the proper equipment. On the other hand, the dose rate from radioactivity on the premises is most certainly at least one order of magnitude higher than 20 or 30 miles North or South along the coast.

http://www.nnistar.com/gmap/fukushima.html

gives more than 5µSv/h when getting close to the plant, and that's not even on the premises, as against 0.5 µSV outside of the zone -isn't it a significant difference? Of course, as you say, Nuceng (got your pseudo right this time, apologies for garbling it earlier), these huts may be designed to prevent exposure to ambiant RA (not sure of the English term, BTW), but I have never heard of such a contraption, which would be I suppose very hight tech (air filters, special coating, etc.), not quite in keeping with the rather makeshift nature of the operation. Then again, I have no technical expertise here... Also, external dose rates play a role in the long run, and none of these workers are supposed to stay long, so it may be that the difference it makes over a few weeks is marginal.

Still, for morale reasons, if I was in charge, I would insist on taking them away when their shift is over. Plus maybe a few of them are informed enough to wonder what will happen if the SFP of reactor 4 gets out of hand while they sleep...

PG

 

[zapperzero]

You may be right zapperzero, but SPECULATION FOLLOWS:
If they moved rest areas off site and outside of the exclusion zone, workers going to and from the site would be receiving external and inhalation doses during transit. In addition roads may still be unrepaired from earthquake and tsunami damage, making that trip longer than you might think. At least the filtration of the rest huts means they wouldn't be inhaling as much. Is there any information about the external dose rates in these shelters? In short, could it be that they are doing this to reduce worker doses and reducing their "burnout rate"?

Another sneaky possibility is that the workers on site are not available to the press. Has anyone seen any interviews with the workers about the arrangements?

Of course they're unavailable to the press, for as long as they are in the exclusion zone. That's got to be a god-send for TEPCO PR and legal.

Filtration is fine, but a site like this should have decon facilities. I will never forgive TEPCO for that picture I saw, with the workers sleeping and resting in their Tyvek overalls. That's wholly unneeded.

I don't see why a 30-km journey would last more than half an hour. We saw the IAEA team arrive on a bus. Surely the same can be done for workers? If you decon the workers on-site at the end of each shift, insulate the buses properly and install additional filtering to their AC, it isn't even necessary for the insides of the buses to become contaminated.

I don't think they could pick up lots of gamma in transit, do you?

 

[NUCENG]

Of course they're unavailable to the press, for as long as they are in the exclusion zone. That's got to be a god-send for TEPCO PR and legal.

Filtration is fine, but a site like this should have decon facilities. I will never forgive TEPCO for that picture I saw, with the workers sleeping and resting in their Tyvek overalls. That's wholly unneeded.

I don't see why a 30-km journey would last more than half an hour. We saw the IAEA team arrive on a bus. Surely the same can be done for workers? If you decon the workers on-site at the end of each shift, insulate the buses properly and install additional filtering to their AC, it isn't even necessary for the insides of the buses to become contaminated.

I don't think they could pick up lots of gamma in transit, do you?

I don't know. In the US one of the analyses we have to do for design basis radiological consequences is the dose received by operators entering and leaving the plant and performing manual safety actions outside the control room. Operator doses in the filtered and shielded control rooms were only larger because of assumed 8 or 12 hour shifts.

 

[zapperzero]

I don't know. In the US one of the analyses we have to do for design basis radiological consequences is the dose received by operators entering and leaving the plant and performing manual safety actions outside the control room. Operator doses in the filtered and shielded control rooms were only larger because of assumed 8 or 12 hour shifts.

I don't really understand what you are saying. How is this relevant, in context? No-one is entering the reactor buildings, these days, save a few scout teams.

 

[NUCENG]

I don't really understand what you are saying. How is this relevant, in context? No-one is entering the reactor buildings, these days, save a few scout teams.

The discussion was why they are keeping cleanup crews on site, and I speculated that it might actually be to lower RA dose to the workers compared to transporting them back and fort through the exclusion zone on damaged roads. It was topical because it concerns how TEPCO was treating the workers. I have done calculations of this nature for American plants to support emergency plants and know the Entry/Exit dose can be substantial.

 

[NUCENG]

For anyone interested in NRC contacts with Japan in the early days

FYI NRC has responded to FOIAs

FOIA/PA 11-0118, 0119, and 0120

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/foia/japan-foia-info.html

Rough count is way over 1000 pp.

 

[NUCENG]

interesting Reuters story that indicates Fukushima had warning signs.

http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/11/07/JapanNuclearRadiation.pdf

 

[swl]

interesting Reuters story that indicates Fukushima had warning signs.

http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/11/07/JapanNuclearRadiation.pdf

How could this be considered a warning of the Fukushima disaster?

 

[NUCENG]

How could this be considered a warning of the Fukushima disaster?

After I read the article, the thought process was like this:

First, keeping worker dose ALARA is a key indicator in safety conscious work environments.

From the Reuters story (p1):

“For five years to 2008, the Fukushima plant was rated the most hazardous nuclear facility in Japan for worker exposure to radiation and one of the five worst nuclear plants in the world on that basis.”

Second, Safety consciousness is a process of continuing improvement: Contrary to this on p5.

““We had largely reached our target by 2009,” said Tokyo Electric’s Sakai. At that point, some of the urgency behind the safety campaign appeared to drain. “We’ll continue to try to reduce occupational exposures by every possible measure after cost performance evaluations,” Shunsuke Hori, a Tokyo Electric safety manager, said at a September 2009 conference in Aomori, Japan." In other words they declared victory and went back to business as usual. They achieved their goal of improving to below average.

At that point they were just under their goal of 2.5 Sv total exposure to their workforce.

Compare that with reports of US plant doses reported in NRC NUREG-0713.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0713/v31/

in 2009 the Average BWR (out of 35 BWRs) total workforce dose was 151 Rem or 1.51 Sv. Less than half the dose in 1994 while production increased from 22 GW/yr to over 30 GW/yr. US plants have worked at Cobalt reduction, zinc injection, hydrogen injection, and noble metal chemistry to reduce corrosion and activation of plant systems. The result is clear evidence of continuous improvement.

As Reuters points out the TEPCO promises of a new safety culture after the shroud cracking coverup scandals were not kept. Further it points out the differences in the way the Japanese regulators ignored the Fukuahima performance while NRC came down on the US Perry plant for similar poor performance.

In a short 5 page story, Reuters has pointed out a TEPCO culture of cost over safety, regulatory collusion and neglect. They wrote this in a factual style without a lot of fear-mongering, but didn't pull any punches either. That is one of the better reports I have seen.

 

[Luca Bevil]

...
In a short 5 page story, Reuters has pointed out a TEPCO culture of cost over safety, regulatory collusion and neglect. They wrote this in a factual style without a lot of fear-mongering, but didn't pull any punches either. That is one of the better reports I have seen.

Agreed, completely

 

[swl]

...First, keeping worker dose ALARA is a key indicator in safety conscious work environments.

From the Reuters story (p1):

“For five years to 2008, the Fukushima plant was rated the most hazardous nuclear facility in Japan for worker exposure to radiation and one of the five worst nuclear plants in the world on that basis.”...

Thank you for explaining http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/11/07/JapanNuclearRadiation.pdf" .

So if I take a look at their list (top p3) of the "five worst plants in the world", what should I think about the number 1 worst plant in the world being the Perry, Ohio BWR?

So, the Perry, OH BWR is the most dangerous plant in the world? <doubting>

Would that indicate anything regarding the state of nuclear safety in the USA, or Ohio?

 

[Astronuc]

So, the Perry, OH BWR is the most dangerous plant in the world? <doubting>

Would that indicate anything regarding the state of nuclear safety in the USA, or Ohio?

The article is a bit sensational and misleading in terms of 'dangerous'. It's comparing particular plants to the global fleet. Someone has to be on the top in terms of expsoure, but that doesn't mean that the environment is necessarily dangerous. Generally, exposure at plants is well below industry safety standards, but certainly above levels that one would find outside the plant. Those rankings reflect those particular plants cited. All facilities strive to reduce exposure to employees, and some do a better job than others.

 

[NUCENG]

Thank you for explaining http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/11/07/JapanNuclearRadiation.pdf" .

So if I take a look at their list (top p3) of the "five worst plants in the world", what should I think about the number 1 worst plant in the world being the Perry, Ohio BWR?

So, the Perry, OH BWR is the most dangerous plant in the world? <doubting>

Would that indicate anything regarding the state of nuclear safety in the USA, or Ohio?

Perry has had a significant negative performance issues since Davis Besse took the attention of FENOC management in 2002. Their ALARA planning and performance were poor and resulted in at least four near overexposure events right about the beginning of the period researched by Reuters. They still are averaging about 2.8 Sv total occupational dose over the last 3 cycles, although they did have some moisture separator repairs in their last outage that didn't help. However in the last few years they have had "White" Performance indicators for ALARA and mitigating systems, and Human Performance issues that have not yet been solved. They have made progress moving from "Multiple Degraded Cornerstones" to "Regulatory Response" and now "Licensee Response" which bring less regulator attention as improvements are made. They are currently all green in performance indicators, but their human performance issues persist. Since this is considered a "Substantive Cross-Cutting Theme" that could affect multiple safety cornerstones.

If you want to explore performance for a specific plant start here:

http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html

Performance Indicators give a Graphical summary of performance and other links allow you to read the Assessment Reports for each plant. Finally the Inspection Reports link allows you to read all inspection reports performed by NRC except those related to security.

So is Perry the worst plant in the world? As Astronuc pointed out the Reuters Report looked at Occupational Dose and Perry was high on that list. They still have performance improvements to make and they are still getting a lot of expensive "help" to get there. Based on what we've learned lately the "worst" plant may be another TEPCO plant.

Edit: Another way to look at this is that the most dangerous plant in the world may be the one at the top of the performance list. One of the surest ways for performance to degrade is complacency or an attitude that you don't need to continue to improve.

 

[tsutsuji]

The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency said the operator informed it just four days before Japan's massive March 11 earthquake and tsunami that waves exceeding 10 meters (33 feet) could hit the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant.
[...]
In 2009, TEPCO notified NISA of a separate calculation showing that a six-meter (20-foot) tsunami could hit the plant, based on studies of a tsunami that occurred in the year 869.
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110825p2g00m0dm050000c.html

TEPCO says it didn't mean to disclose the assessment since it was a tentative calculation for research purposes based on a simulation.
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/24_36.html

Why wasn't this story told in the Japanese government's report to IAEA in June ? The tsunami safety design story in that report ends with

At the 32nd Joint Working Group for Earthquake, Tsunami, Geology, and Foundations
under the Seismic and Structural Design Subcommittee (June 24, 2009) held in order to
conduct examination related to earthquake, it was pointed out that although the
investigation report about tsunami by the Jogan earthquake in 869 was made by National
Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology and Tohoku University, the
earthquake causing the tsunami was not dealt with. Regarding this, NISA requested
TEPCO at the 33rd Joint Working Group (July 13, 2009) to take into account the Jogan
earthquake for evaluating design tsunami height when new knowledge on the tsunami of
the Jogan earthquake is obtained.

III-31 http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/topics/201106/pdf/chapter_iii-2.pdf

Was Mr Makoto Takao of Tepco aware of the "over 10 m" estimate when he presented his O.P. + 5.7 tsunami, "we assessed and confirmed the safety of the nuclear plants" http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/3_sessionB/B-11.pdf page 14 slide at the November 24-26, 2010 Kashiwazaki international symposium on seismic safety of nuclear installations (http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/content.html ) ? Isn't this kind of symposium a place where people are supposed to talk about the latest available research ?

http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=soc_30&k=2011082500390 On 25 August, Junichi Matsumoto insisted that Tepco's earlier comment that the March 11 tsunami is beyond expectations/assumptions ("想定外" sotei-gai) is not a problem. "I want to consistently maintain that it was a trial calculation. It was not something that could cause a change in the design assumptions (想定 sotei)". When the Earthquake Research Promotion Division of the government announced in July 2002 the probability of an earthquake off the coast of the Boso Peninsula and off the coast of Sanriku, Tepco made a trial calculation based on the hypothesis of an earthquake of the same level as the 1896 Meiji Sanriku earthquake occurring off the Fukushima coast, concluding that there is a risk that a tsunami might surge with a maximum of 15.7 meters. The trial calculation assuming an earthquake of the same level as the 869 Jogan earthquake concluded with the possibility of a maximum of 9.2 meters. After receiving these results, Tepco asked the Society of Civil Engineers to revise the tsunami evaluation criteria, and at that time the officers in charge of nuclear power in the top management knew about these estimates. Former president Masataka Shimizu learned about them after the disaster at the latest.

29 March Reuters :

Over the past two weeks, Japanese government officials and Tokyo Electric Power executives have repeatedly described the deadly combination of the most powerful quake in Japan’s history and the massive tsunami that followed as “soteigai,” or beyond expectations.
(...)
The tsunami research presented by a Tokyo Electric team led by Toshiaki Sakai came on the first day of a three-day conference in July 2007 [2006 (1)] organized by the International Conference on Nuclear Engineering [in Miami].
(...)
Sakai's team determined the Fukushima plant was dead certain to be hit by a tsunami of one or two meters in a 50-year period. They put the risk of a wave of 6 meters or more at around 10 percent over the same time span.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/29/us-japa-nuclear-risks-idUSTRE72S2UA20110329

The research disclosed yesterday seems to be different from the one presented in Miami in 2006(1), as it was made in the Autumn of 2008, according to http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110824005905.htm

(1) Reuters was wrong about the year. The Sakai presentation was made in Miami in 2006 :

It is meaningful for tsunami assessment to evaluate phenomena beyond the design basis. Because once we set the design basis tsunami height, we still have possibilities tsunami height exceeds the determined design tsunami height due to uncertainties regarding the tsunami phenomena. It is apparent that probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) gives us an effective clue. PRA is enlarging its usage for seismic design, but rarely used for tsunami risk evaluation due to its underdevelopment.

Sakai et al. Abstract available by clicking "expand all sessions in track" after "TRK 6 Safety and Security" and then the "ICONE14-89183 Development of a Method for Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard Analysis in Japan" link below "Monday, July 17, 2006 10:30 AM-12:30 PM" at http://archive.asmeconferences.org/ICONE14/TechnicalProgramOverview.cfm

 

[NUCENG]

Why wasn't this story told in the Japanese government's report to IAEA in June ? The tsunami safety design story in that report ends with



Was Mr Makoto Takao of Tepco aware of the "over 10 m" estimate when he presented his O.P. + 5.7 tsunami, "we assessed and confirmed the safety of the nuclear plants" http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/3_sessionB/B-11.pdf page 14 slide at the November 24-26, 2010 Kashiwazaki international symposium on seismic safety of nuclear installations (http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/content.html ) ? Isn't this kind of symposium a place where people are supposed to talk about the latest available research ?

http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=soc_30&k=2011082500390 On 25 August, Junichi Matsumoto insisted that Tepco's earlier comment that the March 11 tsunami is beyond expectations/assumptions ("想定外" sotei-gai) is not a problem. "I want to consistently maintain that it was a trial calculation. It was not something that could cause a change in the design assumptions (想定 sotei)". When the Earthquake Research Promotion Division of the government announced in July 2002 the probability of an earthquake off the coast of the Boso Peninsula and off the coast of Sanriku, Tepco made a trial calculation based on the hypothesis of an earthquake of the same level as the 1896 Meiji Sanriku earthquake occurring off the Fukushima coast, concluding that there is a risk that tsunami might surge with a maximum of 15.7 meters. The trial calculation assuming an earthquake of the same level as the 869 Jogan earthquake concluded with the possibility of a maximum of 9.2 meters. After receiving these results, Tepco asked the Society of Civil Engineers to revise the tsunami evaluation criteria, and at that time the officers in charge of nuclear power in the top management knew about these estimates. Former president Masataka Shimizu learned about them after the disaster at the latest.

29 March Reuters :


The research disclosed yesterday is different from the one presented in Miami in 2007, as it was made in the Autumn of 2008, according to http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110824005905.htm

During the earthquake design review following the Kashiwazaki Karawa earthquake the issue came up about the tsunami in 869. See the referenced article in post #125

 

[tsutsuji]

During the earthquake design review following the Kashiwazaki Karawa earthquake the issue came up about the tsunami in 869. See the referenced article in post #125

Thank you.

Found this about evaluation of tsunami and earthquake at Fukushima:

http://msquair.wordpress.com/2011/04/28/common-cause-at-daiichi-fukushima/

That March 28 blog page refers to a "2011/03/22" URL, "Published: March 24" Washington Post article:

The Daiichi panel wrapped up its review and, on June 24, 2009, presented its findings to a larger working group of 40, which included just two tsunami experts.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world...t-of-tsunami/2011/03/22/AB7Rf2KB_story_1.html

which is not very different from what is said page III-31 of http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/...pter_iii-2.pdf and where we understand that some non-Tepco people like seismologist Yukinobu Okamura raised the 869 tsunami issue. What we learn from the 29 March Reuters news and from the 24 August NISA announcement is that Tepco had developed research internally on the tsunami issue which concluded that the risk existed with some non-negligible probability. We can no longer summarise the story by saying that while some non-Tepco people were aware of the risk, Tepco was unaware of the risk or dismissing the claims: the blogger, Matthew Squair, talks about "symptoms of a collective view or ‘groupthink‘ that denied the possibility of a hazard to the plant from a tsunami event". The story seems now to be more complicated than that.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20110825/0430_iaea.html Tepco vice-president Ichiro Takekuro was communicated the above 10 metres tsunami assessment results at the time when a study was commissioned to the Society of Civil Engineers. Junichi Matsumoto said: "The estimate was a calculation resulting from an accumulation of hypotheses, therefore it had no concrete basis, which is why we did not publicly release it". Yoshinori Moriyama, senior NISA official in charge of measures against nuclear disasters [the NISA spokesman in Fukushima Daiichi press conferences], said: "Even if it is a trial calculation, it constitutes material for [safety] evaluation. Tepco should have reported it early. In hindsight, I think the tsunami countermeasures were not sufficient".

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110825_01-e.pdf Tepco press release with a time-line of tsunami research from H14.2 (February 2002) to H23.3 (March 2011). [It includes the Toshiaki Sakai presentation at the ICONE-14 Miami conference in 2006, but it is not saying a word about Makoto Takao's presentation at the November 24-26, 2010 Kashiwazaki international symposium]

I found the links to the following research papers :

* Sawai et al. (2008) : "Marine incursions of the past 1500 years and evidence of tsunamis at Suijin-numa, a coastal lake facing the Japan Trench" The Holocene 18,4 (2008) pp. 517–528 http://www.fsl.orst.edu/wpg/events/S11/Sawai et al 2008 .pdf (in English)

* Satake et al. (2008) : "Numerical simulation of the AD 869 Jogan tsunami in Ishinomaki and Sendai plains" by Kenji Satake, Yuichi Namegaya and Shigeru Yamaki, Annual Report on Active Fault and Paleoearthquake Researches, 8, 71-89, 2008 http://unit.aist.go.jp/actfault-eq/seika/h19seika/pdf/03.satake.pdf (in Japanese, with English abstract and English translations of figure captions).

* Namegaya et al. (2010) : "Numerical simulation of the AD 869 Jogan tsunami in Ishinomaki and Sendai plains and Ukedo river-mouth lowland" by Yuichi Namegaya, Kenji Satake, and Shigeru Yamaki, Annual Report on Active Fault and Paleoearthquake Researches, 10, 1-21, 2010 : http://unit.aist.go.jp/actfault-eq/seika/h21seika/pdf/namegaya.pdf (in Japanese, with English abstract and English translations of figure captions).

 

[NUCENG]

Thank you.


That March 28 blog page refers to a "2011/03/22" URL, "Published: March 24" Washington Post article:


which is not very different from what is said page III-31 of http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/...pter_iii-2.pdf and where we understand that some non-Tepco people like seismologist Yukinobu Okamura raised the 869 tsunami issue. What we learn from the 29 March Reuters news and from the 24 August NISA announcement is that Tepco had developed research internally on the tsunami issue which concluded that the risk existed with some non-negligible probability. We can no longer summarise the story by saying that while some non-Tepco people were aware of the risk, Tepco was unaware of the risk or dismissing the claims: the blogger, Matthew Squair, talks about "symptoms of a collective view or ‘groupthink‘ that denied the possibility of a hazard to the plant from a tsunami event". The story seems now to be more complicated than that.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20110825/0430_iaea.html Tepco vice-president Ichiro Takekuro was communicated the above 10 metres tsunami assessment results at the time when a study was commissioned to the Society of Civil Engineers. Junichi Matsumoto said: "The estimate was a calculation resulting from an accumulation of hypotheses, therefore it had no concrete basis, which is why we did not publicly release it". Yoshinori Moriyama, senior NISA official in charge of measures against nuclear disasters [the NISA spokesman in Fukushima Daiichi press conferences], said: "Even if it is a trial calculation, it constitutes material for [safety] evaluation. Tepco should have reported it early. In hindsight, I think the tsunami countermeasures were not sufficient".

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110825_01-e.pdf Tepco press release with a time-line of tsunami research from H14.2 (February 2002) to H23.3 (March 2011). [It includes the Toshiaki Sakai presentation at the ICONE-14 Miami conference in 2006, but it is not saying a word about Makoto Takao's presentation at the November 24-26, 2010 Kashiwazaki international symposium]

I found the links to the following research papers :

* Sawai et al. (2008) : "Marine incursions of the past 1500 years and evidence of tsunamis at Suijin-numa, a coastal lake facing the Japan Trench" The Holocene 18,4 (2008) pp. 517–528 http://www.fsl.orst.edu/wpg/events/S11/Sawai et al 2008 .pdf (in English)

* Satake et al. (2008) : "Numerical simulation of the AD 869 Jogan tsunami in Ishinomaki and Sendai plains" by Kenji Satake, Yuichi Namegaya and Shigeru Yamaki, Annual Report on Active Fault and Paleoearthquake Researches, 8, 71-89, 2008 http://unit.aist.go.jp/actfault-eq/seika/h19seika/pdf/03.satake.pdf (in Japanese, with English abstract and English translations of figure captions).

* Namegaya et al. (2010) : "Numerical simulation of the AD 869 Jogan tsunami in Ishinomaki and Sendai plains and Ukedo river-mouth lowland" by Yuichi Namegaya, Kenji Satake, and Shigeru Yamaki, Annual Report on Active Fault and Paleoearthquake Researches, 10, 1-21, 2010 : http://unit.aist.go.jp/actfault-eq/seika/h21seika/pdf/namegaya.pdf (in Japanese, with English abstract and English translations of figure captions).

Wow! I just skimmed those articles and I want you on my team for research!

Here is another challenge. Back in the early days I saw some references to another earthqauake/tsunami in the area of Fukushima that left a geological record that was dated back to around 200 BCE. I looked for that when I wrote my previous reply, but didn't find it. I do know that the scientists raised the 869 event with TEPCO, but have no idea if they discussed the earlier event.

Going back that far, there also may be differences in where the coastline was, but that would give three events with about a 1000 to 1100 year recurrence rate. In any case that information was known at least in the scientific community.

There was a clear opportunity to question the 5.7 m design basis tsunami. But that brings me back to NISA's statement to the Convention on Nuclear Safety that they didn't review design basis information unless a utility wanted to build a new plant.

 

[clancy688]

Did anyone of our japanese speaking forum members notice http://www.stippy.com/japan-life/155-days-earthquake-tsunami-and-nuclear-disaster-fuji-tv-documentary/" Fuji TV documentary about the earthquake disaster?

The report about the nuclear part of the disaster is starting around 1:09h, they're showing many pictures and images I haven't seen before, for example workers handling 40tons of ice (?). Perhaps there are informations we haven't had before? Unfortunately I don't speak japanese, so I don't know what they're talking about...

 

[NUCENG]

Here is a link to a story about one of the robot operators at Fukishima. This is a summary because a blog the operator was writing has been deleted. Perhaps another example of trying to prevent communication in a world where the internet makes that impossible and foolish.

http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/industrial-robots/fukushima-robot-operator-diaries

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20110821/t10015043651000.html 21 August : a Hokkaido University team found geological strata near Kesennuma, Miyagi prefecture, providing evidence of 5 large tsunamis in the past over more than 5000 years. In Miyako, Iwate prefecture, 6 tsunami strata have been found. With the 2011 tsunami, this is roughly one large tsunami every 1000 years. Evidence of the Jogan tsunami had not been previously found as far in the North. If some of the strata found by the Hokkaido University team are confirmed to belong to the Jogan tsunami, the Jogan tsunami's magnitude could be revised to 9 instead of 8.3 as was previously thought. See also http://www.kahoku.co.jp/news/2011/08/20110822t75007.htm (with photograph) and http://channel6newsonline.com/2011/08/massive-tsunamis-hit-japans-eastern-coast-every-1000-years/ (in English)

http://www.fsl.orst.edu/wpg/events/bbagS11.htm Oregon State University, Geomorphology Brown Bag - Spring 2011 "Geomorphology of Tsunamis" is a gold mine of tsunami research literature.

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/science/news/20110824-OYT1T00991.htm Tepco's claim that that the tsunami was beyond expectation "has collapsed".

http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/apps/news?pid=90920019&sid=as3_8zR_CaQs In the 25 August joint press conference, the confrontation of points of views between Tepco and the NISA "has sharpened". Although the NISA says it orally instructed Tepco to perform back checks upon receiving the tsunami estimate on 7 March, in the morning press conference, Junichi Matsumoto denied that the NISA provided Tepco any oral instruction. Concerning the discrepancy between Tepco and the NISA, Yoshinori Moriyama said that the NISA provided documents for the investigation panel to review.

http://www.nikkei.com/news/category...E7E2E2938DE0E7E2EAE0E2E3E39790E0E2E2E2;at=ALL Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano expressed regret concerning the fact that the over 10 metres tsunami risk at Fukushima Daiichi was not publicly released by Tepco and the NISA, and was finally found by the investigation panel: "The cabinet's position is that we want to inspect by which process, and where [the information] was stopped".

 

[tsutsuji]

August 4:

Most recently, it was revealed that NISA, the nuclear watchdog, asked utilities to stage supportive questions at a METI-hosted symposium on the controversial use of plutonium-uranium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in an apparent attempt to manipulate public opinion in favor of nuclear power.
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110804x1.html

August 13:

Chubu Electric Power Co. and Shikoku Electric Power Co. said they were ordered to do so by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, ostensibly the government's chief nuclear watchdog. Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Banri Kaieda, who oversees the agency, admitted to, and apologized for, those actions by officials. At a parliamentary hearing where he was berated by opposition lawmakers for his handling of the mushrooming scandal, Mr. Kaieda broke down in tears.

The disclosures prompted Prime Minister Naoto Kan last week to label NISA a "lobby" of the utilities, and spurred the government to propose breaking up NISA by removing its nuclear industry oversight responsibilities and handing them over to the environment ministry.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904823804576499942442007306.html

August 30:
http://www.47news.jp/CN/201108/CN2011083001000703.html Independent panel releases interim report on the involvement of top level NISA officials in recruitments of NPP personnel to attend and influence public opinion in symposiums on the future of Genkai NPP and Hamaoka NPP.

http://mainichi.jp/select/jiken/news/20110831k0000m040063000c.html NISA director-general Hiroyuki Fukano apologises.

http://www.mbs.jp/news/jnn_4814083_zen.shtml The independent panel will release its final report at the end of September after conducting further hearings about what happened concerning Onagawa and Sendai NPPs.

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0902/TKY201109020749.html It was revealed by the NISA on 2 September that after receiving from JNES at 01:57 AM, 12 March 2011, the Emergency Response Support System (ERSS) results for Fukushima Daiichi unit 1 containing predictions about water level, pressure, and when meltdown and reactor damage would occur, the NISA failed to communicate those results to the Kantei (Prime minister residence).Yoshinori Moriyama (NISA) commented that he "does not know the reason" why. The SPEEDI data received at 06:07 AM on the same day were not communicated to the Kantei either.

http://mainichi.jp/select/today/news/20110903k0000m040137000c.html The ERSS results have been disclosed by the NISA on 2 September. Those for units 2 and 3 were sent to Kantei, but they were not used to build evacuation plans. Those for unit 1 failed from being sent.
The ERSS data for unit 2, predicting fuel rod exposure at 22:50 and meltdown at 24:50 were received by NISA on 11 March at around 9:30 PM and given by hand to a cabinet staff member at 10:45 PM, 11 March and after midnight on 12 March. Those for unit 3 were received by NISA at 6:30 AM on 13 March and sent to Kantei 20 minutes later. At the 2 September press conference, Yoshinori Moriyama explained that these data were not exploited to build evacuation plans because they were not based on real facts.

http://www.47news.jp/CN/201109/CN2011090201001046.html No detailed explanation was provided to the Kantei together with the unit 2 ERSS data. Yoshinori Moriyama explained that, as they are not based on real facts, they were provided to the Kantei only as a reference/footnote. The 11 March around 10 PM data predicted fuel damage 2 hours later, meltdown 3 hours later, and the necessity to perform venting with radiation release at 3:20 AM, 12 March.

 

[zapperzero]

Yoshinori Moriyama explained that, as they are not based on real facts, they were provided to the Kantei only as a reference/footnote. The 11 March around 10 PM data predicted fuel damage 2 hours later, meltdown 3 hours later, and the necessity to perform venting with radiation release at 3:20 AM, 12 March.

Fantastic. So, there is no actual data, but we have these simulations. They are the best we have, but we'll just go ahead and ignore them, basing our decisions on gut feeling instead.

 

[tsutsuji]

Copies of the documents sent by the NISA to the Kantei are available in http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/09/20110902005/20110902005-6.pdf (13 pages, 6MB)

 

[tsutsuji]

From the September issue of ATOMOΣ　:

That the information about the core status was not released until mid-May, is highly deplorable, he [a former head of American Nuclear Society] says. Everybody in Japan feels the same.
(...)
He says the meltdown of units 1 ~ 3 could be predicted out of a simple heat balance, and it was supported by the evidence of radioactive substance releases, so he felt considerable despair over the fact that although considerable damage had been done to the citizens, Tokyo Electric and the public authorities admitted meltdown for the first time two months after the accident. To stretch it a little, the citizen's confidence has been betrayed, and this could be an important factor damaging the use of nuclear energy in Japan in the future, he warns.

Hisashi Ninokata, "The Reception of the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident by the ANS: How key members of the ANS perceived accident information", ATOMOΣ, vol. 53 No.9 (September 2011) p.602.
http://www.aesj.or.jp/atomos/tachiyomi/2011-09mokuji.pdf (my translation)

 

[tsutsuji]

http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201109060244.html "In his first interview since leaving office (...) Kan offered new insights into the stresses at the top of government as it struggled to cope with the March 11 earthquake, tsunami and the nuclear disaster".

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110906004963.htm "Kan revealed that the off-site emergency response center near the plant, though supposed to serve as a front-line command center in the event of a crisis, was vacated soon after the accident" (...) Kan: "All the crisis-management arrangements that had been made prior to the accident failed to function properly."

http://sankei.jp.msn.com/region/news/110906/fki11090602100002-n1.htm (Fukui regional page)　A committee working on the revision of Fukui prefecture nuclear emergency manual which is planned to be completed by the end of this year, had a meeting on 5 September discussing issues such as the cooperation from surrounding prefectures with personnel and equipments to help with people radiation screening operations (Fukushima prefecture had to rely on surrounding prefectures' help), and whether to use a separate front-line base (like J-Village) in addition to the off-site centre.

(TBS news) & http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110908p2a00m0na022000c.html "TEPCO submits heavily redacted copy of Fukushima nuke accident manual"