Fukushima Management and Government Performance

Click For Summary

Discussion Overview

The discussion centers on the management of the Fukushima disaster and the performance of the Japanese government and TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company). Participants explore themes of accountability, trust in the nuclear industry, and the complexities of disaster response, touching on cultural factors and the roles of various stakeholders within the nuclear sector.

Discussion Character

  • Debate/contested
  • Conceptual clarification
  • Exploratory

Main Points Raised

  • Some participants acknowledge serious mistakes and communication failures by both the government and TEPCO during the crisis, suggesting that these lapses will require accountability.
  • Others argue that engineers and managers at nuclear plants have a personal stake in safety, as they live in the communities affected by their operations, which may motivate them to prioritize safety.
  • One participant expresses frustration with the negative portrayal of TEPCO and the Japanese government in Germany, suggesting that such views overlook the efforts being made to resolve the situation.
  • Concerns are raised about the potential for management to prioritize profit over safety, with some participants expressing distrust in management's commitment to doing the right thing.
  • There is a discussion about the psychological factors influencing people's willingness to report safety issues, with references to studies on human behavior and authority dynamics.
  • Some participants highlight the importance of regulatory oversight, noting that executives are legally bound to provide accurate information to regulatory bodies, which may mitigate some concerns about cutting corners.

Areas of Agreement / Disagreement

Participants express a mix of agreement and disagreement regarding the performance of TEPCO and the government. While some acknowledge efforts to manage the crisis, others remain critical of the overall response and the systemic issues within the nuclear industry.

Contextual Notes

Participants discuss various classes of stakeholders involved in the nuclear industry, including owners, management, engineers, and technicians, highlighting the complexity of accountability and trust. There are also references to cultural factors that may influence perceptions and behaviors related to safety and disaster management.

  • #301
tsutsuji said:
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110906004963.htm "Kan revealed that the off-site emergency response center near the plant, though supposed to serve as a front-line command center in the event of a crisis, was vacated soon after the accident" (...) Kan: "All the crisis-management arrangements that had been made prior to the accident failed to function properly."

We knew that already. Everyone left as it appeared that Unit 1 was ready to blow, but they returned later.

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110908p2a00m0na022000c.html "TEPCO submits heavily redacted copy of Fukushima nuke accident manual"

As in, 90% or more is blanked out.
 
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  • #302
zapperzero said:
We knew that already. Everyone left as it appeared that Unit 1 was ready to blow, but they returned later.

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/20110316-866921/news/20110905-OYT1T01170.htm (in Japanese) summarizes Naoto Kan as saying that "personnel failed from gathering at the offsite center". What is meant is, I suppose, the Offsite Center located in Shimonogami, Ookuma (map http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/genshiryoku/jimusho/1_shoukai_6_fukushima1.html ).

I could find the following in the Japanese government report to IAEA :

In relation with the Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, since the accident events rapidly proceeded in a situation where communication with the Off-site center was difficult due to the disaster, the initial collection of information and communication were conducted mainly by ERC.
(...)
As preparation for earthquakes and tsunamis, etc. in power supplies, communication and reserves, etc. was not sufficient at the Off-site Center (OFC) where the Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters was set up, and also, as enough information on the plant was not obtained as an external factor, expected function of information gathering and communication was not performed from the beginning.
(...)
Meanwhile, convening related parties and dispatching them to the site planned in the framework of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness was also insufficient in the initial startup stage. This was partly because advanced notices and the register of members to be convened was not fully performed and is to be improved. There is also a background factor that many of current members are planned to be convened from a long distance and improvement should be made for realistic response to a case in which a disaster event proceeds rapidly as in this time.

This time it is contemplated that OFC failed to effectively function under such combined conditions leading to a delay in full-fledged operation of the Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters.
Pages V-42, V-43 http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/topics/201106/pdf/chapter_v.pdf (my boldening added)

See also page V-4 : "Plant information, ERSS, SPEEDI and others were still unavailable at the Off-site Center for some period of time"
 
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  • #303
zapperzero said:
We knew that already. Everyone left as it appeared that Unit 1 was ready to blow, but they returned later.



As in, 90% or more is blanked out.

OK, hope this doesn't come as a shock, hearing this from me.

Claiming that emergency procedures are protected as intellectual property and refusing to provide them in unredacted form to the regulator and the grovernment is just plain bovine excrement. Even if that could be justified, the standard practice in the US is to provide an original unredacted version for official use and a redacted vesion for public release.

And if the exerpts are typical of the detail of those procedure, I doubt that they would be of use even to the operators during an accident. Bad procedures would definitely make mistakes by operators more likely.

"When reactor pressure rises, stabilizes the pressure at (redacted) Mpa by using an emergency condenser and other techniques, and report."

"Other techniques?" Please, the next step was probably "Do what you can and hope that a miracle occurs."
 
  • #304
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20110930/1600_seiritsu.html The law creating a 10 member nuclear accident investigation commission with investigative powers has been enacted. It is the first time in history that an investigation commission composed of experts is created at the Diet of Japan.

The above commission is different from the "Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company" ( http://icanps.go.jp/eng/about/ ) whose legal basis is a cabinet decision.

http://jp.wsj.com/Japan/Politics/node_317037 Contrasting with the investigation committee appointed by the cabinet in May, the new investigation commission will have a legally binding power to request documents or hear witnesses.
 
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  • #305
Another major difference:
According to the legislation enacted Friday, the new panel will be open to the press,

(...)

The government panel, meanwhile, is not open to the media.

http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20111001a5.html
 
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  • #306
25 August:
tsutsuji said:
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency said the operator informed it just four days before Japan's massive March 11 earthquake and tsunami that waves exceeding 10 meters (33 feet) could hit the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant.
[...]
In 2009, TEPCO notified NISA of a separate calculation showing that a six-meter (20-foot) tsunami could hit the plant, based on studies of a tsunami that occurred in the year 869.
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110825p2g00m0dm050000c.html
TEPCO says it didn't mean to disclose the assessment since it was a tentative calculation for research purposes based on a simulation.
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/24_36.html

tsutsuji said:
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110825_01-e.pdf Tepco press release with a time-line of tsunami research from H14.2 (February 2002) to H23.3 (March 2011).

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20111003/1305_tsunamishisan.html The 7 March Tepco report to NISA has been publicly released in answer to a NHK request. All documents are marked with "handle with care" and "for preliminary consultation purposes". Based on the 1896 Meiji Sanriku earthquake, it predicts tsunamis from 8.4 to 10 metre at Fukushima Daiichi units 1 ~ 6. It plans to start studying tsunami countermeasures in April, so that tsunami safety evaluation and countermeasures would match the October 2012 update of the Japanese Civil Engineering Society manual. Tepco's Junichi Matsumoto commented: "At the time of 7 March, the probability of occurrence of such a tsunami was not known, such calculated estimate was in a research phase, and there was no thought that a prompt response was needed". The NISA's Yoshinori Moriyama commented: "I think that three years after producing the calculated estimate, it should have been publicly discussed by specialists, and tsunami countermeasures should have been carried out. Retrospectively it is highly disappointing that this didn't take place".

http://www.asahi.com/national/update/1003/TKY201110030186.html The 7 March Tepco report to NISA has been publicly released on 3 October by the NISA in answer to an Asahi Shimbun request. The report's title is "Fukushima Daiichi and Daini nuclear power plant tsunami evaluation". It is made of one A4 format page and two A3 format pages. Taking into account the deliberations of the Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion and of the Japanese Civil Engineering Society, it provides three kinds of estimates. All of them are above the 5.7 metre level, and two are above 10 metre. Upon reception of this report, the NISA's office manager in charge requested Tepco to deliver a report and to take countermeasures at the facilities. Concerning the mega-tsunami of the past (Jogan earthquake), it quotes a specialist as saying "it is necessary to expand knowledge further, and this shall take 2~3 years". It plans the scientific publication in October 2011 of research concluding that tsunami vestiges above 4 metres cannot be found in Fukushima prefecture. Based on the above, it plans to reassess tsunami estimates in time with the expected October 2012 update of the Japanese Civil Engineering Society manual.

http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0918/TKY201109180217.html (18 September) The Atomic Energy Society of Japan has just created a draft probabilistic tsunami safety evaluation manual. Until now, there was a probabilistic manual for earthquakes, but not for tsunamis. Tsunami safety was relying on the standards of the Japanese Civil Engineering Society published in 2002, but in the present accident, those were largely exceeded, the emergency diesel generators were flooded, reactor cooling became impossible, and large amounts of radioactive substances were released. In response, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan decided in May to create a probabilistic tsunami safety evaluation manual. In the draft, tsunami heights and frequencies are predicted using data such as tsunamis of the past and active faults' sizes. The manual provides a method to calculate for each tsunami wave height, the probability of seawater flooding, of building and pipe damages caused by shocks of floating objects. It provides a method to calculate scenarios and related frequencies as regards the accumulation of failures and damages of every equipment leading to core damage. The purpose is to find out which equipment changes or reinforcements can lower the accident probability and to use these results in real safety countermeasures.
 
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  • #307
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20111002p2g00m0dm083000c.html
TEPCO finds own nuclear accident manual useless
 
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  • #308
tsutsuji said:
...

http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0918/TKY201109180217.html (18 September) The Atomic Energy Society of Japan has just created a draft probabilistic tsunami safety evaluation manual. Until now, there was a probabilistic manual for earthquakes, but not for tsunamis. Tsunami safety was relying on the standards of the Japanese Civil Engineering Society published in 2002, but in the present accident, those were largely exceeded, the emergency diesel generators were flooded, reactor cooling became impossible, and large amounts of radioactive substances were released. In response, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan decided in May to create a probabilistic tsunami safety evaluation manual. In the draft, tsunami heights and frequencies are predicted using data such as tsunamis of the past and active faults' sizes. The manual provides a method to calculate for each tsunami wave height, the probability of seawater flooding, of building and pipe damages caused by shocks of floating objects. It provides a method to calculate scenarios and related frequencies as regards the accumulation of failures and damages of every equipment leading to core damage. The purpose is to find out which equipment changes or reinforcements can lower the accident probability and to use these results in real safety countermeasures.

tsutsuji, can you find a link to the actual draft document? All I can find is the story that the draft was created. I'd like to see the actual draft. Thanks
 
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  • #309
gmax137 said:
tsutsuji, can you find a link to the actual draft document? All I can find is the story that the draft was created. I'd like to see the actual draft. Thanks

I am afraid I can't find the document either. All I could find is the following presentation http://www.aesj.or.jp/information/20110919yamaguchi.pdf (which is linked on http://www.aesj.or.jp/information/session.html ). Pr Yamaguchi seems to be the head of the relevant committee.

Incidentally, I found "A Probabilistic Risk Assessment Practioner looks at the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami" by Woody Epstein, 29 April 2011 at http://woody.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/A-PRA-Practioner-looks-at-the-Great-East-Japan-Earthquake-and-Tsunami.pdf which is asking interesting questions such as "If the TAMNPP methodology is correct, why did TEPCO’s implementation of it indicate a tsunami wall of 5.7m was sufficient ?"
 
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  • #310
I have not been able to find the AESJ draft standard for tsunami PRA on their website, but I have found the Epstein paper and other more recent discussions of 'what happened'.

Epstein comments (pg 23/55): "I am also not sure how TEPCO applied the JSCE guidelines. The presentation made by TEPCO in 2008, after their preliminary tsunami risk assessment, only indicates that they used the Chilean Tsunami of 1960 as the scenario tsunami for the far field study; there is no mention of the scenario for the near field study which produced the results of a 5.7m design basis for Daiichi. Perhaps the correct application of the JSCE methods, both historical data collection and implementation of the mathematics, was beyond the scope of TEPCO PRA analysts."

Earlier, Epstein states (pg 13/55) "Dr. Geller correctly points out that one of the leading contributors to “what went wrong” at Fukushima Daiichi was an inability by anyone involved in decision making or regulation to “expect the unexpected”."

I think such a large earthquake and tsunami were forseeable, based on earthquakes since 1900, in addition to historical information. Governments need look at changes in frequencies/trends of such natural phenomena.

This might also be of interest (Nov 24-26, 2010) - http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/content.html

and particularly - Session C - http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/4_sessionC/C-10.pdf (Seismic PSA Implementation Standard in Japan)

See also paper B-06, "Tsunami Assessment method for NPP in JSCE, Japan"

and http://committees.jsce.or.jp/ceofnp/system/files/JSCE_Tsunami_060519.pdf

Those papers/presentations represent the thinking prior to March 11, 2011. Obviously, things have changed.

There is also this - Members of nuclear academic society voice repentance over Fukushima disaster
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110920p2a00m0na001000c.html

Hisashi Ninokata, a professor with the Tokyo Institute of Technology, said, "A myth that nuclear plants were completely safe took on a life of its own and delayed efforts to improve their safety. We experts, too, were overconfident that a nuclear disaster of such magnitude would never happen."
. . . .
One audience member asked, "Does it take a disaster like this to make you notice problems?" In reply, Hosei University visiting professor Hiroshi Miyano said, "We need to reflect on our lack of imagination (regarding possible dangers to nuclear plants)."

Osaka University professor Akira Yamaguchi said, "I think we were in an environment that did not encourage us to exercise our imaginations."
. . . .
Unfortunately, such revelations come after the fact.
 
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  • #311
Astronuc said:
...Osaka University professor Akira Yamaguchi said, "I think we were in an environment that did not encourage us to exercise our imaginations."

Unfortunately, such revelations come after the fact.

We in the nuclear industry must aspire to exercise our imaginations, and I hope we don't all focus on earthquakes, tsunamis, and SBO -- we need to take this lesson and apply it to all areas of analysis and operations -- we must question and re-question our assumptions and the validity of all our design bases. The same sneaky complacency can exist in areas completely unrelated to natural events.
 
  • #312
gmax137 said:
We in the nuclear industry must aspire to exercise our imaginations, and I hope we don't all focus on earthquakes, tsunamis, and SBO -- we need to take this lesson and apply it to all areas of analysis and operations -- we must question and re-question our assumptions and the validity of all our design bases. The same sneaky complacency can exist in areas completely unrelated to natural events.
Folks (e.g. US NRC) are already looking at beyond design basis events (BDBE), but I see that the goal posts are starting to move - which is a good thing.

I would caution those who seem to think certain things can't happen. I've heard comments to the effect that some folks "don't look, because they might find something, and then have to deal with it."


In the Fukushima case, had the tsunami protection been more robust, they might have survived. Or, had the EDG fuel tanks, the EDGs, and electrical equipment been better protected from effects of flooding - we would be reading a thread with over 11,300 posts and 1.6 million views.
 
  • #313
Examples of the things that are currently being studied in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident can be found in the http://www.stuk.fi/ydinturvallisuus/ajankohtaista_ydinturvallisuus/ajankohtaiset_uutinen/fi_FI/uutinen_15092011/_files/86251419958379456/default/eu-stress-tests-national-progress-report-finland.pdf concerning the European "stress tests". The final results are to be expected by the end of the year.
 
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  • #314
rmattila said:
Examples of the things that are currently being studied in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident can be found in the http://www.stuk.fi/ydinturvallisuus/ajankohtaista_ydinturvallisuus/ajankohtaiset_uutinen/fi_FI/uutinen_15092011/_files/86251419958379456/default/eu-stress-tests-national-progress-report-finland.pdf concerning the European "stress tests". The final results are to be expected by the end of the year.

Yes, I am aware of the ENSREG-specified 'stress tests.' Earthquake, flooding, SBO/loss of heat sink, severe accident guidelines. These are all fine things to look at, I am simply wishing that we don't stop looking once these areas are evaluated.
 
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  • #315
ZDF report on Fukushima (subtitles in English)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=V1T4Ac9nHeY

highlight of the piece: workers required to sign NDAs and waive their right to sue for compensation if they get sick.

Also a bit of ground-level footage from J-village. People standing around in a line with no masks on.
 
  • #316
zapperzero said:
ZDF report on Fukushima (subtitles in English)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=V1T4Ac9nHeY

highlight of the piece: workers required to sign NDAs and waive their right to sue for compensation if they get sick.

Also a bit of ground-level footage from J-village. People standing around in a line with no masks on.

After looking at the link you provided, it is my undersanding using the english sub-titles that

1) the workers are not "Required" to waive their right to sue for compensation if they get sick. They "choose" this as an option so that they receieve the "Higher Bounus Pay". I understood the employee to say, we are forced to take the bouns pay so as to receive the higher wage, not that the company mandates it.

It sounds like a standardly used procedure to shift the future liabilities of the company to the present. The company would not be complelled to maintaine as large of an account on their books to pay the potential (unknown) future medical payments. It becomes a form of gambling for the employee. As he is choosing to receive compensation today for an illness that he may/maynot experience in the future. Also by taking the bounus pay he has received payment for something he maynot experience, but if he does and turns down the "bouns pay" he would then be relying on two things of major importance. First the the company will still exist and have the funds to cover an illness, second should he work (in the future) at a second NPP he may have to prove the exposure and the % of exposure that came from his work at Fuku. Please note this information is based on my understaning of the US laws, I have no understanding of the Japan regulations.

Also the employee is choosing to work there. He is not being forced to work at the plant. He has the same options as the rest of the Japanese people. He is also choosing to work in a hazards enviorment, no different than firefighters, police and military.

It also is very common in the US for employees to sigh Confidentuality Agreements when they work for a company. I suspect the one that they are signing is must more strigient than normal, but I also can understand many reason that this would be needed. (I can not say that I would agree with everything listed in the agreement, I probably would not)

It apperars signing the document made no difference because he did a interview anyway. Do you happen to know if he received any compensation for it!

With that said, I am not referring to compensation for the employees/firefighters/miliatry that responded to the intial days of the accident. They did not choose to (in the same manner) to put themselves in the exposure. The fireman/military assume you could have a call to duty at the plant, but they did not sign on knowing the hazards that exist today.

Please forward a clearer link if possible, as I do not understand german and find that the translations are not always correct. And sometimes I am not always correct. But I did go back through the subtitles in depth and understood it as an option.
 
  • #317
http://www.asahi.com/national/update/1014/TKY201110140490.html The ministerial ordinance setting the worker's maximum exposure back (from 250) to 100 mSv [over which time span?] will be enacted in the first decade of November.
 
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  • #318
tsutsuji said:
http://www.asahi.com/national/update/1014/TKY201110140490.html The ministerial ordinance setting the worker's maximum exposure back (from 250) to 100 mSv [over which time span?] will be enacted in the first decade of November.

My understanding is its a total allowed cumulative dose during work in the emergency area.

Basically, company must plan for work shifts so that no one gets total dose more than that. If anyone comes close to the limit, this worker is removed. I don't know when such worker can continue working elsewhere (such as a normal NPP).
 
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  • #319
http://mainichi.jp/select/weathernews/20110311/nuclear/news/20111015k0000m040101000c.html On 14 October, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) released the contents of 39 cases of analysis it carried out about the Fukushima Daiichi accident. It was learned that on 26 March, JNES had concluded that the EPZ (evacuation prepared zone), originally set to comprise the 8 ~ 10 km range, had to be extended to a 24.5 km range as the accident concerned 3 reactors. But the NISA, which had requested that analysis, failed from taking these results into account. In mid March, JNES had concluded that there was a possibility of recriticality in case the fuel racks at unit 4 would be broken. On 30 June, JNES concluded that a meltdown would occur after 7.7 hours if an aftershock opens a crack, and water disappears from unit 4 spent fuel pool, thus revealing that unit 4's reinforcement work was a pressing matter.

http://www.asahi.com/national/update/1013/TKY201110130700.html On 13 October, the NISA revealed that Tepco had failed to perform safety assessment and reinforcement works following the 2006 update of earthquake guidelines. Work at more than 600 items at Fukushima units 1 ~6, concerning such things as control bars or pipes failed from being done. In March 2008 Tepco sent an interim report to the government analysing earthquake safety and concluding that there was no need to reinforce RPVs. The more than 600 items including control bars and pipes were to be included in the final report, which was announced "for the Autumn of 2010 or later".

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/science/news/20111014-OYT1T00529.htm One of the reasons why Tepco was late to take into account the 2006 earthquake guideline update at Fukushima Daiichi and Daini was, according to Tepco, that they were "busy with the troubles at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa".

http://mainichi.jp/select/biz/news/20111014k0000m020109000c.html In 2006 the earthquake guideline was changed, multiplying the earthquake acceleration by 1.6. Tepco was late to perform the safety assessment of S-class equipments.

http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=soc_30&k=2011101400937 The NISA has informed Tepco which parts of unit 1's operation manual must be publicly released. Those parts will be released at the end of next week at the earliest.
 
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  • #320
maddog1964 said:
1) the workers are not "Required" to waive their right to sue for compensation if they get sick. They "choose" this as an option so that they receieve the "Higher Bounus Pay". I understood the employee to say, we are forced to take the bouns pay so as to receive the higher wage, not that the company mandates it.

Well, they say that they "need" those extra bucks. I nearly slammed my head into the wall when I watched that part the first time.
"'You want a danger bonus?' they ask. 'If yes, sign here.' We have no other choice, because of course we want that danger bonus of up to 10 euros an hour, but if you sign, you sign also that you won't sue the contractor if you're getting sick later." (most literal translation I could come up with)
It's said that they work for 80-100 € a day, but it isn't specified whether the danger bonus is already included into this number (from my understanding, it's not) or under which conditions they'd get that danger bonus.
They're working for TEPCO (and therefore at the plant) because there's "no other work in the area" and they have to support their families somehow.
The news report makes it sound like TEPCO's taking advantage of all those people who're suddenly unemployed because of the evacuation, but I'd take all those statements with a grain, or better a ton of salt. If there's something you can truly relay on, besides that the sky is blue, then that a german news organization will never ever understate any radiation connected dangers. It's actually the opposite...

Please forward a clearer link if possible, as I do not understand german and find that the translations are not always correct. And sometimes I am not always correct. But I did go back through the subtitles in depth and understood it as an option.

The youtube translation is quite literal. I didn't find any big error while watching it, and while the subtitles probably must sound horrible to native speakers, they are basically a one to one conversion from german to english.
 
  • #321
maddog1964 said:
After looking at the link you provided, it is my undersanding using the english sub-titles that

1) the workers are not "Required" to waive their right to sue for compensation if they get sick. They "choose" this as an option so that they receieve the "Higher Bounus Pay". I understood the employee to say, we are forced to take the bouns pay so as to receive the higher wage, not that the company mandates it.

It sounds like a standardly used procedure to shift the future liabilities of the company to the present. The company would not be complelled to maintaine as large of an account on their books to pay the potential (unknown) future medical payments. It becomes a form of gambling for the employee. As he is choosing to receive compensation today for an illness that he may/maynot experience in the future. Also by taking the bounus pay he has received payment for something he maynot experience, but if he does and turns down the "bouns pay" he would then be relying on two things of major importance. First the the company will still exist and have the funds to cover an illness, second should he work (in the future) at a second NPP he may have to prove the exposure and the % of exposure that came from his work at Fuku. Please note this information is based on my understaning of the US laws, I have no understanding of the Japan regulations.

Also the employee is choosing to work there. He is not being forced to work at the plant. He has the same options as the rest of the Japanese people. He is also choosing to work in a hazards enviorment, no different than firefighters, police and military.

It also is very common in the US for employees to sigh Confidentuality Agreements when they work for a company. I suspect the one that they are signing is must more strigient than normal, but I also can understand many reason that this would be needed. (I can not say that I would agree with everything listed in the agreement, I probably would not)

It apperars signing the document made no difference because he did a interview anyway. Do you happen to know if he received any compensation for it!

With that said, I am not referring to compensation for the employees/firefighters/miliatry that responded to the intial days of the accident. They did not choose to (in the same manner) to put themselves in the exposure. The fireman/military assume you could have a call to duty at the plant, but they did not sign on knowing the hazards that exist today.

Please forward a clearer link if possible, as I do not understand german and find that the translations are not always correct. And sometimes I am not always correct. But I did go back through the subtitles in depth and understood it as an option.

It is an option, yes. No telling what happens if you do not "choose" it. Maybe you don't get signed on? Would you try and modify the terms of employment if you had a family to feed? Would you even read the contract, if you were a regular Joe-san unskilled laborer?

I see no good reason for a jumper to sign an NDA. Can you explain?
 
  • #322
tsutsuji said:
http://mainichi.jp/select/weathernews/20110311/nuclear/news/20111015k0000m040101000c.html On 14 October, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) released the contents of 39 cases of analysis it carried out about the Fukushima Daiichi accident. It was learned that on 26 March, JNES had concluded that the EPZ (evacuation prepared zone), originally set to comprise the 8 ~ 10 km range, had to be extended to a 24.5 km range as the accident concerned 3 reactors. But the NISA, which had requested that analysis, failed from taking these results into account. In mid March, JNES had concluded that there was a possibility of recriticality in case the fuel racks at unit 4 would be broken. On 30 June, JNES concluded that a meltdown would occur after 7.7 hours if an aftershock opens a crack, and water disappears from unit 4 spent fuel pool, thus revealing that unit 4's reinforcement work was a pressing matter.

Holy smokes.
 
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  • #323
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20111015/0420_shiryo.html In a 25 March document, JNES studied how much the concrete bottom of PCV would be eroded by melt fuel, assuming various melting speeds, and the conclusion was that the concrete would not be eroded.

http://www.jnes.go.jp/jyohou/kouhyo/kaiseki_published.html The analysis documents released by JNES
 
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  • #324
zapperzero said:
It is an option, yes. No telling what happens if you do not "choose" it. Maybe you don't get signed on? Would you try and modify the terms of employment if you had a family to feed? Would you even read the contract, if you were a regular Joe-san unskilled laborer?

I see no good reason for a jumper to sign an NDA. Can you explain?

Explaination:

1) My response was to "CORRECT" the statement as I understood the subtitles. Forced vs option are not the same. Not the merits of the video, as I know nothing about this station/and the source of the information other that the employee apparently signed a confidentiality statement and did not honor it, nor stand behind it with his/her name. So I must then question his/her motivation, as they and it said only two (there are thousand of employees at the plant to my understanding), that's a very small %?

2) As I stated in my post, there are business models that this is based on, and if I was to work there, would take the money now because if it is not a ligit company, its likely they will not exist or be sueable 10/20 years from now. And there are many web sites that are dedicated to bringing TEPCO/others down, so that's not to say they would be around.

3) As I tell my children: education is one of the few things that no one can take from you,(other than some medical cond. such as stroke etc) Reputation/your word is next, although that can be destroyed at the hands of other. With this said, I ask why are these people unemployable when other are?

4) I also do not believe that the term "jumpers" and the information on the web stating "jumpers" can be lumped into one category. In our business it is quite common for *some of the best* to jump from outage to outage(shutdown for maintance). They choose to do this, make most of their yearly salary in *short windows* then lay out,work other jobs the rest of the time, we as employers depend on the *expetice of knowledge they bring to the table*. Its a win/win for both. Along with that there is the need for their support employees, hence labled the unskilled.

I would, unless able to see the raw data myself, (that not going to happen/and should not) not make a stand or statement as to *who the employees are* ?

NOTE: its is apparent that the Media had a full copy of the contract or should if they went on the air with it, so the questions that are need to really understand if these are people being taken advantage of should be as avalible as the *negitive* information. Has anyone seen the whole contract on the web? Please forward link.

I am not sure of the rules of this thread on PF. if its strictly factual or not, but one should state the difference if they are presenting their interpitation vs what the link *actually said*.

Zapperzero do you know the pay scale of similar jobs before the accident/or other sites? How does the payscale (including/not including) relate to those not working at the site? It seems there is not enough information that i have seen to run the needed numbers! Also I would ask you "what is the acceptible" payscale? Also the inablity to sue a company (that may not exist in 10 years) and the ablity to have health care and living pay compensation are not the same. Do you believe, as you lable them "jumpers" are taking that "bouns pay" and investing it in stocks or something so that they have the "need care funds" down the road? I do not! Some will. Also do you even know how many are from the area that is evacuated? Also some are out of work related to the flooding and has nothing to do with the Fuku incident. Again lack of appropiate information to make broad statements.

Not sure this is the right site, but the business model of the so called "jumpers" (your term not mine) is not being fully/factually represented is my belief. Its ony part of the story.
 
  • #325
maddog1964 said:
Explaination:

1) My response was to "CORRECT" the statement as I understood the subtitles. Forced vs option are not the same. Not the merits of the video, as I know nothing about this station/and the source of the information other that the employee apparently signed a confidentiality statement and did not honor it, nor stand behind it with his/her name. So I must then question his/her motivation, as they and it said only two (there are thousand of employees at the plant to my understanding), that's a very small %?

But what is the reason for an NDA in the first place? I know as little as you about ZDF... but I think they are as scared of lawsuits as anyone else and would not state untruths - interpretation is another matter, as is the reliability of sources.
 
  • #326
maddog1964 said:
Explaination:

1) My response was to "CORRECT" the statement as I understood the subtitles. Forced vs option are not the same. Not the merits of the video, as I know nothing about this station/and the source of the information other that the employee apparently signed a confidentiality statement and did not honor it, nor stand behind it with his/her name. So I must then question his/her motivation, as they and it said only two (there are thousand of employees at the plant to my understanding), that's a very small %?

2) As I stated in my post, there are business models that this is based on, and if I was to work there, would take the money now because if it is not a ligit company, its likely they will not exist or be sueable 10/20 years from now. And there are many web sites that are dedicated to bringing TEPCO/others down, so that's not to say they would be around.

3) As I tell my children: education is one of the few things that no one can take from you,(other than some medical cond. such as stroke etc) Reputation/your word is next, although that can be destroyed at the hands of other. With this said, I ask why are these people unemployable when other are?

4) I also do not believe that the term "jumpers" and the information on the web stating "jumpers" can be lumped into one category. In our business it is quite common for *some of the best* to jump from outage to outage(shutdown for maintance). They choose to do this, make most of their yearly salary in *short windows* then lay out,work other jobs the rest of the time, we as employers depend on the *expetice of knowledge they bring to the table*. Its a win/win for both. Along with that there is the need for their support employees, hence labled the unskilled.

I would, unless able to see the raw data myself, (that not going to happen/and should not) not make a stand or statement as to *who the employees are* ?

NOTE: its is apparent that the Media had a full copy of the contract or should if they went on the air with it, so the questions that are need to really understand if these are people being taken advantage of should be as avalible as the *negitive* information. Has anyone seen the whole contract on the web? Please forward link.

I am not sure of the rules of this thread on PF. if its strictly factual or not, but one should state the difference if they are presenting their interpitation vs what the link *actually said*.

Zapperzero do you know the pay scale of similar jobs before the accident/or other sites? How does the payscale (including/not including) relate to those not working at the site? It seems there is not enough information that i have seen to run the needed numbers! Also I would ask you "what is the acceptible" payscale? Also the inablity to sue a company (that may not exist in 10 years) and the ablity to have health care and living pay compensation are not the same. Do you believe, as you lable them "jumpers" are taking that "bouns pay" and investing it in stocks or something so that they have the "need care funds" down the road? I do not! Some will. Also do you even know how many are from the area that is evacuated? Also some are out of work related to the flooding and has nothing to do with the Fuku incident. Again lack of appropiate information to make broad statements.

Not sure this is the right site, but the business model of the so called "jumpers" (your term not mine) is not being fully/factually represented is my belief. Its ony part of the story.

The original reason I started this thread was to discuss performance of TEPCO and Japanese government and regulators with respect to the accident. We are in the accident mitigation phase and the treatment of workers is a legitimate discussion pont here. There are some posters who will consistently take positions that TEPCO is evil incarnate. I haven''t seen any indication that people here think TEPCO was totally effective, open, and honest (including the preliminary report from IAEA).

That said, the real question is why a citizen would risk working in a high radiation, physically dangerous industrial recovery, why they would agree to NDA and no-sue restrictions. Is it the money, unemployment due to destruction during the earthquake and tsunami, national and world economic problems, search for adventure, or simply because Japanese culture leads them to pitch in and just get on with it. The Japanese did not become a world economic power through stupidity or laziness and it seems a little insulting for us to be arguing about whether they are being abused by their employers.

The game of GO is an ancient Japanese strategic game played on a thick wooden board with a grid on the playing surface. The bottom of the board is often hollowed out, which I initially believed was for weight or reigidity. The concentration required to play the game is amazing. I have watched a game between Japanese masters of the game and they made chess grandmasters look like dervishes. There was a story of a Go player who starved to death waiting for a move by his oponent who passed away during a game.

In fact, I was later told that the reason the board was hollowed out was that in the days of the Samurai someone who interrupted the players or kibbitzed would be beheaded and their bloody head left in the hollow of the overturned board as a warning to others. Lesson learned - I'll let the workers and Japanese society decide if they are being fairly treated. :smile:
 
  • #327
NUCENG said:
In fact, I was later told that the reason the board was hollowed out was that in the days of the Samurai someone who interrupted the players or kibbitzed would be beheaded and their bloody head left in the hollow of the overturned board as a warning to others. Lesson learned - I'll let the workers and Japanese society decide if they are being fairly treated. :smile:

Ah. But that NDA, a part of TEPCO's policy of silence, is making it hard for the rest of us to know what is going on. It was obvious to me that such an agreement existed, because otherwise the Japanese-speaking web would be filled with personal diaries and tweets and picture blogs of Fukushima work and whatnot.

Moreover, the fact that there will be no lawsuits for damages, coupled with the effect of the NDAs and the system of using myriad subcontractors will severely skew epidemiological data. What is the use of tracing the cause of a case of cancer or leukemia, if there is no compensation forthcoming anyway?

In this way, the truth is hidden because disclosure would be expensive and painful. I think this is a performance that should not be repeated.

Eventually, because of this many more people may be put in harm's way - "oh there were zero extra cancers from Fukushima workers; those guys took up to 250 mSv each, so the safe allowable dose in emergencies must be higher still".

EDIT: moreover, when real info is unavailable, this kind of thing

flourishes and the tin foil hat brigade comes out in force, further muddying the waters...
 
Last edited:
  • #328
zapperzero said:
EDIT: moreover, when real info is unavailable, this kind of thing

flourishes and the tin foil hat brigade comes out in force, further muddying the waters...

Um, what's that? A Light Novel about Fukushima...? Could you please give some informations for those poor guys among us who can't read japanese? ;)
 
  • #329
zapperzero said:
Ah. But that NDA, a part of TEPCO's policy of silence, is making it hard for the rest of us to know what is going on. It was obvious to me that such an agreement existed, because otherwise the Japanese-speaking web would be filled with personal diaries and tweets and picture blogs of Fukushima work and whatnot.

Moreover, the fact that there will be no lawsuits for damages, coupled with the effect of the NDAs and the system of using myriad subcontractors will severely skew epidemiological data. What is the use of tracing the cause of a case of cancer or leukemia, if there is no compensation forthcoming anyway?

In this way, the truth is hidden because disclosure would be expensive and painful. I think this is a performance that should not be repeated.

Eventually, because of this many more people may be put in harm's way - "oh there were zero extra cancers from Fukushima workers; those guys took up to 250 mSv each, so the safe allowable dose in emergencies must be higher still".

EDIT: moreover, when real info is unavailable, this kind of thing

flourishes and the tin foil hat brigade comes out in force, further muddying the waters...


In the case of Japan with the poor performance of the regulators, this may be the weakest answer I've given. But an independent regulator and the government of Japan should not be hindered during investigations by agreements signed by employees. If they do their job, the truth should emerge. If they don't do their job, I doubt we'll ever know the full story - even without NDAs because no individual has the whole story.

Having an independent regulator that is empowered and in charge is vital.
 
  • #330
It's been more than half a year since the disaster. Are there ANY investigation results at all regarding the events of the first week?

IIRC in Challenger and Columbia accidents investigators provided reports in about half a year.
 

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