Fundamental things, emergent things

[jostpuur]

Some things are clearly fundamental, and some emergent. As examples of fundamental concepts I could mention energy, momentum and location. An object has a location in space, because its' particles each have own locations. On the other hand some things are emergent, for example behaviour of a system, or its shape. A system can have some behaviour even if its' small particles don't have it.

A big question is then, that is conciousness fundamental or emergent?

I thought for some time that fundamental would be an obvious answer, but noted that some fellows instead considered emergent as an obvious one. I'm not really sure what are the typical beliefs conserning this.

 

[lalbatros]

emergent complex is the right answer

 

[JonF]

Do you mean consciousness wrt to "being self-aware" or "cognitive".

if self-aware then fundamental
if cognitive then emergent

 

[jostpuur]

I think it is obvious, that the process of thinking, being so complicated, is emergent. But I'm not so sure about the consciousness. They are not really the same thing. I'm not going to try to define these concepts in full rigor, because nobody else has succeeded in that either (Although the forum guidelines do tell to do so...)

But yeah,

if self-aware then fundamental
if cognitive then emergent

something like this is what I had in mind.

 

[JonF]

You also should address emergent from what? Matter? Conception? Self-awareness? Humanness?

 

[Rade]

Do all things that are metaphysically given have a consciousness ? Would seem the answer is no. If so, then consciousness as a thing cannot be fundamental--a newborn is not "self-aware" yet it has a consciousness. So I conclude that the answer to the OP is that consciousness is under all cases emergent--that is, it emerges from Existence itself as the faculty with the ability to perceive that which Exists (= Reality).

 

[nabuco]

Some things are clearly fundamental, and some emergent. As examples of fundamental concepts I could mention energy, momentum and location.

Actually, energy was not always seen as fundamental. The concept of energy started off as a very abstract notion defined as "the ability to do work". Until the advent of modern physics, no one could conceive of energy existing in the absence of objects (matter) in which the energy would be "stored".

The same goes for momentum. Location, too, is a relative term and implies the existence of objects. In fact, except for people who claim to understand modern physics, everyone's intuitive notion tells them that matter is more fundamental than anything else. And I seriously doubt anyone, physicist or otherwise, intuitively understands how energy, a completely abstract notion, can be more fundamental than solid "stuff".

But I'm not saying this thing or that thing is fundamental or emergent, only making the point that the difference between fundamental and emergent is completely subjective.

A big question is then, that is conciousness fundamental or emergent?

From the above, I would say that the answer depends on how you choose to view the world. If you believe everything is a creation of your own mind, or some universal mind, then consciousness must necessarily be more fundamental.

I thought for some time that fundamental would be an obvious answer, but noted that some fellows instead considered emergent as an obvious one. I'm not really sure what are the typical beliefs conserning this.

I'd say most people believe consciousness is fundamental and everything else is emergent. But most people know little about philosophical jargon, and usually express that understanding in terms of a sentient God who created the world with the power of His mind, or something alone those lines.

 

[J12345]

After sitting ZAZEN for many years, I have come to see that form is emptiness, emptiness is form. The sense of consciouness is the ever emerging firing of our synapse translated down to the level of illusion of "I am ". During long 'sits' I have had the experience of having it all suddenly momentarily STOP. No past, no future. The stream of consciousness halts. Consciousnessness I would gather is emergent based on the fundamental firing of that organ up there ever trying to create the illusion of a self separate from all else. At the Quark level we are the same as the universe. No separation. We are observers of various transmissions and vibrations.
Want to test how much control you DON'T have of consciousness? Sit quietly, restful, half close your eyes, breath easily in silence and DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!

Do my cats have MU?

 

[madness]

I've never understood how anyone can believe that consciousness (meaning qualia or "inner experience") is entirely emergent from matter. But that seems to be the standard materialist viewpoint.

 

[magpies]

I think its pretty normal if your spiritual to think that the mind and aspects of the mind are fundamental while if your not spiritual you think the other way. So it might come down to religious views on this issue. For an atheist to admit that mind can be fundamental is basicaly like saying a god like being could be possible imo.

 

[madness]

Well I'm agnostic and I still can't understand the materialistic view. I see a fundamental difference between my experience of red, and the physical phenomena of electromagnetic light at a certain frequency. I gather from what other people say that they might not make a distinction.

 

[magpies]

Would you say the typical belief is that of fundamental? I would think so with more then 90% of the worlds population being religious? I don't really know if its 90% I just heard that a few times... My own personal experience is that most people are religious but the more years you spend in college the more likely you won't be. Of course that could be expected as most schools are state run basicaly. So... am I right in thinking the difference is mostly between believers in god and non believers in god?

 

[madness]

"Would you say the typical belief is that of fundamental?"

Not really sure what you mean there.

"My own personal experience is that most people are religious but the more years you spend in college the more likely you won't be."

The vast majority of people I meet are not religious. But I'm sure this isn't the case in other parts of the world.

"So... am I right in thinking the difference is mostly between believers in god and non believers in god?"

You mean the difference between people who believe consciousness is entirely emergent from matter? I wasn't aware of any such correlation. I suppose religions like Hinduism see the individual as a microcosm of the macrocosm (God), so there could be some correlation.

 

[JoeDawg]

For an atheist to admit that mind can be fundamental is basicaly like saying a god like being could be possible imo.

Not at all.
Mind is fundamental, to epistemology.
It is not fundamental to ontology.

That is an important difference. You don't have to believe in the supernatural to understand that you can't know anything, if you don't have a mind.
Descartes said, I think therefore I am. He wasn't saying, I think myself into existence. He was saying, I know that I exist, because I see that I am a thing that thinks.

Mind is not fundamental to existence, because there are 'things' that do not have minds. But it is fundamental to knowledge. You can't know anything about existence without a mind.

When someone says mind is an emergent phenomena, they are talking about the existence or source of consciousness. Where consciousness comes from, or what it is caused by.

More simply, consciousness is fundamental to experience, but not fundamental, to the source of experience. Kant called the source, the thing-in-itself, and said it was unknowable, since it is outside experience.

 

[madness]

"Mind is fundamental, to epistemology.
It is not fundamental to ontology."

That is just an assertion. It is not at all obvious to me, in fact the opposite seems obvious to me.

"You don't have to believe in the supernatural to understand that you can't know anything, if you don't have a mind."

Yes I agree.

"He was saying, I know that I exist, because I see that I am a thing that thinks."

Do you make a distinction between the thing that thinks and the thoughts? I can see that thoughts and perceptions exist, I can see that my perception of the colour red exists. I would not necessarily say that I think myself into existence, but I would say that the only things I am aware of are thoughts and perceptions (qualia).

"When someone says mind is an emergent phenomena, they are talking about the existence or source of consciousness. Where consciousness comes from, or what it is caused by."

I could only imagine my consciousness emerging from simpler units of awareness or perception (qualia), I cannot conceive of these things emerging as some kind of emergent quality of material processes. This does not mean that the consciousness is not in direct correspondence with the material processes, just that from the material processes alone there is nothing which could allow us to deduce any consciousness would emerge.

 

[JoeDawg]

in fact the opposite seems obvious to me.

Why?

Do you make a distinction between the thing that thinks and the thoughts?

I think Russell argued that it should more correctly be 'thinking exists'. But it seems more of a semantic point to me. 'Thing', in this context, does not imply a physical entity, its merely a convenient conceptualization, or container.

I can see that thoughts and perceptions exist, I can see that my perception of the colour red exists. I would not necessarily say that I think myself into existence, but I would say that the only things I am aware of are thoughts and perceptions (qualia).

That is the epistemological part. This really says nothing about what red is, or where perceptions, or thoughts come from, how they exist.

I could only imagine my consciousness emerging from simpler units of awareness or perception (qualia), I cannot conceive of these things emerging as some kind of emergent quality of material processes.

That's not really emergence. Emergence occurs when a synthesis produces new properties, which were not properties of the individual parts.

Consider water. If there is a combustible fire, you can pour water on it to put it out.
I would not suggest pouring oxygen and hydrogen on the same flame. The property of wetness only exists in the combined state... and of course at a certain temperature.
So the fact you can't concieve of it, actually indicates it is a trully emergent property.

there is nothing which could allow us to deduce any consciousness would emerge.

Why does there need to be? It really wouldn't be an emergent property if it did.

 

[madness]

"in fact the opposite seems obvious to me.

Why?"

Because the only things I know to exist are my perceptions. It is possible that:
1) my experience of the colour red exists AND electromagnetic light of that wavelength exists
2) my experience of the colour red exists but electromagnetic waves do not exist

but it is not possible that

3) electromagnetic waves exist and my experience of red does not exist

I have to allow for the possibility of case 2), whereby either there is nothing ontological or my perceptions are ontological. Case 3) is not possible, so it cannot be that electromagnetic waves are ontological but my experience of red is not ontological. Therefore, in order that anything at all is ontological, it must be the case that either:

i) both electromagnetic waves and my perception of red is ontological
ii) my perception of red is ontological but electromagnetic waves are not (because they don't exist)

That is my reasoning for why perceptions must be ontological. The rest of your points I think rest on the idea that mind is not ontological, so I will leave it here.

 

[tauon]

Some things are clearly fundamental, and some emergent. As examples of fundamental concepts I could mention energy, momentum and location. An object has a location in space, because its' particles each have own locations. On the other hand some things are emergent, for example behaviour of a system, or its shape. A system can have some behaviour even if its' small particles don't have it.

A big question is then, that is conciousness fundamental or emergent?

I thought for some time that fundamental would be an obvious answer, but noted that some fellows instead considered emergent as an obvious one. I'm not really sure what are the typical beliefs conserning this.

I disagree. For example, "location" is not at all fundamental (or is it).
Location is merely a relation between objects: no objects, no location. so which one is fundamental here?

Perhaps fundamental and emergent (in this sense) are not mutually exclusive, nor exhaustive of all possibilities.
Perhaps they are a little like open, and closed sets/spaces (a very important notion in topology): a set is closed if it's complementary in a given space is open. also, a set is open if it's complementary is closed. however, saying "a set is open if it's not closed" and variations of it is a trivial mistake, as there are sets neither closed nor open, and sets that are both closed and open.

So while "fundamental" and "emergent" are complementary, maybe they are not mutually exclusive and they do not dually describe phenomena... something to ponder about...

^_^

 

[J12345]

You misunderstood me. ZEN is an A- religious practice of the mind. It recognizes consciousness as what fills the mind most of our waking life. ZEN strives to shut off the noise. To peel away the layers of all that mental chaff. To wake up to the moment in which we live. Recognize like I said at that quark level we are connected to the universe. We are receptors of transmissions that surround us. Consiouness, reality as the mind sees it is an illusion yet because of the compression of electrons, we can't walk through walls. Neurons are constantly firing. We put all our organs together into an 'organism' and this translates to consciousness. It is emergent constinuously. In ZEN we strive in ZAZEN meditation to shut up that constant noise to wake up from the illusion of a conscious ego. To know the self is to forget the self.

 

[octelcogopod]

It seems to me that everything is fundamental and emergent at the same time.
The things we intuitively call fundamental would at the same time since birth have been capable of creating the emergent properties.
But aren't then they actually fundamental properties all along?

Consciousness would have been possible ever since the birth of the universe, at least if the universe is a closed deterministic system that doesn't get anything "added" to it later. Or it gets modified by external sources.
It's like a programming language.. The fundamental code already contained all the code necessary to create everything emergent and fundamental, ever since it came into existence.

 

[JoeDawg]

Because the only things I know to exist are my perceptions

That is an epistemological statement. Its a statement about knowledge.

It is possible that:
1) my experience of the colour red exists AND electromagnetic light of that wavelength exists
2) my experience of the colour red exists but electromagnetic waves do not exist

Those are ontological statements.

That is my reasoning for why perceptions must be ontological. The rest of your points I think rest on the idea that mind is not ontological, so I will leave it here.

That is not what I was saying.

"I think therefore I am" is NOT an ontological argument.

Descartes' argument was about knowledge. The translation can be confusing.

If something thinks, then it is something that exists. I think, therefore I know that I exist.
Not simply:
Thinking exists, or even, I exist.


Epistemological:
How do 'I know' red exists?
I know red exists because I experience it.

Ontological:
Does red exist?
How does red exist?
What makes something red?
Is red a part of the thing I see, or does it only exist in my head.

Mind is fundamental to epistemology because it is about what 'the mind' does. The nature of knowledge.

The 'experience of red' also requires a mind, of course. But in this case 'mind' is secondary. The experience exists within a mind.

Ontologically, the experience is fundamental, it either exists or not, mind is how it exists. Mind is like an explanation in this case. Wavelength is another explanation.

 

[vectorcube]

It seems to me that everything is fundamental and emergent at the same time.

It is like saying everything is nothing, vise versa. I know a lot of mystic that love it.

 

[octelcogopod]

It is like saying everything is nothing, vise versa. I know a lot of mystic that love it.

How are those the same?

 

[vectorcube]

How are those the same?

Maybe not. Maybe your question don` t even make sense.

Explain to me your idea, and be extra clear this time.

 

[madness]

"Originally Posted by madness
Because the only things I know to exist are my perceptions

That is an epistemological statement. Its a statement about knowledge"

It is an epistemological statement about what I know to exist, ie about what I know to be ontological.

""I think therefore I am" is NOT an ontological argument.

Descartes' argument was about knowledge. The translation can be confusing."

What Descartes' meant doesn't affect the validity of my own argument.

 

[JoeDawg]

It is an epistemological statement about what I know to exist, ie about what I know to be ontological.

You're missing the point, and doing backflips in order to accomplish it.

What Descartes' meant doesn't affect the validity of my own argument.

Actually its a good example of the kind of confusion you seem to be having.

If you are discussing the nature of knowledge that is epistemology. Throwing the word ontological in there doesn't change that. And mind, thinking, thought, is fundamental to any understanding of knowledge.

If you are discussing ontology, its more about what is objectively true... regardless of what can be known. But... whatever.

 

[madness]

"You're missing the point, and doing backflips in order to accomplish it."

I really don't think I am. It seems to me that you're missing my point.


"If you are discussing the nature of knowledge that is epistemology. Throwing the word ontological in there doesn't change that. And mind, thinking, thought, is fundamental to any understanding of knowledge.

If you are discussing ontology, its more about what is objectively true... regardless of what can be known. But... whatever."

Ontology is about categorising the things that exist, and most fundamental and direct things that exist for me are my perceptions and senses. In order to explain how I know that these things exist, I have to use epistemology - without explaining how I know something I couldn't argue anything.

Look again at case 2) from my previous post. How do you cater for this possibility without allowing qualia to exist ontologically? Epistemologically you cannot know for certain that 2) isn't the case. However, if 2) is the case and qualia do not exist ontologically, then nothing exists ontologically, which I take to be an unacceptable result.

 

[JoeDawg]

How do you cater for this possibility without allowing qualia to exist ontologically?

Ontology is the study of what exists. 'exist ontologically' is redundant.

Something existing, and its nature as an existing thing involves ontology.
Knowing about anything, involves epistemology.
Knowing whether something exists has nothing to do with whether and how that thing exists.

If I ask you, how you know x exists, it doesn't matter that I'm using the word 'exist', the question is about how you know... because you may think you know x exists, but you might be wrong, and it does not exist.

They are two distinct areas of investigation.

Epistemologically you cannot know for certain that 2) isn't the case. However, if 2) is the case and qualia do not exist ontologically, then nothing exists ontologically, which I take to be an unacceptable result.

You're getting bogged down in words.

You cannot know 2) for certain, but whether something exists physically, or as qualia doesn't change the fact you're dealing with an ontological question. If it doesn't exist, it doesn't exist. If it exists, it could either be A or B, or A and B.

If you are talking about whether and how qualia exist, you're talking ontology.
If you are talking about whether and how you can know qualia exist, you're talking epistemology.

This is not an easy thing to get your mind around, I know.

How do I know I exist, how do I know I'm not an illusion?
I know I exist, because I'm thinking about whether I exist.

I might be a brain in a vat, some mystical solipsist energy being, or a high tech simulation, but whatever I am, I know I exist as something.

 

[apeiron]

Look again at case 2) from my previous post. How do you cater for this possibility without allowing qualia to exist ontologically? Epistemologically you cannot know for certain that 2) isn't the case. However, if 2) is the case and qualia do not exist ontologically, then nothing exists ontologically, which I take to be an unacceptable result.

Epistemology would be how things seem (subjective) and ontology would concern how things really are (objective). So the natural course of your argument would lead you to either idealism (mind is real, and all that is real), or else dualism (both mind and matter are the real).

If you don't like these choices, you then have to retreat back to the epistemological view in which there is how we make things seem (ideas and impressions, models and measurements) and then probably (but unknowably in the ontically certain sense) the things in themselves, objectively "out there".

Talking about qualia does have a way of smuggling in ontic status, which is why I personally would stick to talking about impressions or experiences. Qualia exist (so it would seem) whereas impressions imply that act of constuction.

 

[JoeDawg]

Epistemology would be how things seem (subjective)

Well, no.

Epistemology is the study of knowledge or what can be known. Physical science for instance is epistemically empirical, mathematics relies on a more rationalist epistemology. What you are describing... I'm guessing... would be better described as Phenomenology, which is where qualia come in.

and ontology would concern how things really are (objective).

Not really, it concerns the nature of existense. Not all theories of existence include an objective component.

And if you are talking about subjective/objective, you're more than likely talking about knowledge again. Kant's idea of 'thing-in-itself' describes the problem associated with knowing anything objectively.

So the natural course of your argument would lead you to either idealism (mind is real, and all that is real), or else dualism (both mind and matter are the real).

Or matter is real, and mind is an illusion.

 

[apeiron]

Well, no.

You are jumping to conclusions. I was not making definitions, just employing a commonplace dichotomy to make my point simple. And clearly subjectivity relates to what we accept as the internal part of the knowing process, objective to what would be really out there.

Also, as I take the modelling relations approach to epistemology, how things seem - the subjective view - is constructed by ideas in interaction with impressions. Whereas phenomenology would be just about the impressions. So back to qualia again and not jargon I would use.

And if you are talking about subjective/objective, you're more than likely talking about knowledge again. Kant's idea of 'thing-in-itself' describes the problem associated with knowing anything objectively.

I'm talking about modern epistemology - Polyani, Rosen, Pattee, Godel, Nozick, etc. So post-QM and all those good things. The problem, nay impossibility, of knowing things directly has long been taken for granted. The measurement issue demands an epistemic cut, etc.

 

[disregardthat]

Not at all.
Mind is fundamental, to epistemology.
It is not fundamental to ontology.

What? The mind is obviously fundamental to ontology.

 

[JoeDawg]

You are jumping to conclusions. I was not making definitions, just employing a commonplace dichotomy to make my point simple. And clearly subjectivity relates to what we accept as the internal part of the knowing process, objective to what would be really out there.

There are plenty of people on this board who would say that math is objective, a priori knowledge which means internal and objective. I disagree, you can't just ignore it.
Your position was less than crispy.

Also, as I take the modelling relations approach to epistemology

That doesn't make it fundamental.

The problem, nay impossibility, of knowing things directly has long been taken for granted.

In philosophy, making such assumptions could easily be construed as not doing one's homework.

 

[JoeDawg]

What?

What?

 

[apeiron]

There are plenty of people on this board who would say that math is objective, a priori knowledge which means internal and objective. I disagree, you can't just ignore it.
Your position was less than crispy.

That doesn't make it fundamental.

In philosophy, making such assumptions could easily be construed as not doing one's homework.

Now you are just trolling. If you want to discuss these matters seriously, by all means launch a thread.

 

[WaveJumper]

It is like saying everything is nothing, vise versa. I know a lot of mystic that love it.

You don't know what everything is, neither do you know what nothing is(what do you mean by nothing?) Can you give an example of something undefined? Yes the question when worded about 'something' and that something being 'undefined' is totally meaningless. I hope you can clear up what you meant by 'nothing'.

When you get to the 'bottom' of physical reality, something and nothing aren't defined as crispy as macroscopic reality is. The hard question is - why is the 'something' so well defined at all times at our level of existence? What makes this possible?

BTW, you probably know this, but anyway - naive realism is extremely hard to maintain, if not totally impossible.

 

[madness]

"Epistemology would be how things seem (subjective) and ontology would concern how things really are (objective). So the natural course of your argument would lead you to either idealism (mind is real, and all that is real), or else dualism (both mind and matter are the real).

If you don't like these choices, you then have to retreat back to the epistemological view in which there is how we make things seem (ideas and impressions, models and measurements) and then probably (but unknowably in the ontically certain sense) the things in themselves, objectively "out there"."

Of course, I am arguing that mental experiences are the most direct and fundamental things and the only things I know to be real. This leads to idealism, dualism, or maybe some kind of monism. This is my point - I could be lead to accept that my sense experiences have no physical basis, but I could not be lead to accept that my sense experiences don't exist.

 

[apeiron]

Of course, I am arguing that mental experiences are the most direct and fundamental things and the only things I know to be real. This leads to idealism, dualism, or maybe some kind of monism. This is my point - I could be lead to accept that my sense experiences have no physical basis, but I could not be lead to accept that my sense experiences don't exist.

No quarrel with the essential cogito argument. I'm sure everyone does find that compelling. But it is how people build out towards some certainty from a position of almost absolute doubt that is the live issue.

People jump too quick towards certain things. Such as claiming there are mathematical truths that also cannot be doubted, that must be objectively true of any possible world.

This could be true, but starting from cartesian doubt, the case would have to be closely argued. And we have seen how rarely anyone does that.

And another way people jump too quick is even to think that they can treat their own experience as veridical data - the qualia approach. I see red and how can I doubt that fact?

But in fact, study cognitive neuroscience and psychophysics closely, and the idea of impressions as separate from ideas - thoughts about sensations being separate from the sensations themselves - is very questionable.

Indeed, I would argue strongly that sense experiences do not "exist" in any brute fact fashion. It is way more complicated than that.

So just like QM demands an update on traditional Enlightment views of epistemology, so does modern neuroscience. We cannot do 21st century philosophy with an 18th century level of scientific insight.

 

[madness]

"And another way people jump too quick is even to think that they can treat their own experience as veridical data - the qualia approach. I see red and how can I doubt that fact?

But in fact, study cognitive neuroscience and psychophysics closely, and the idea of impressions as separate from ideas - thoughts about sensations being separate from the sensations themselves - is very questionable."

So now if I experience red I can't be sure that I really am experiencing red? Maybe Descartes should have said "I think therefore I am, but maybe I just think that I think and actually I'm not".

 

[madness]

I don't think this thread can come to any reasonable conclusion unless there is a clear definition of what it means for something to "exist". It could be that the whole argument is just a matter of semantics.

 

[JoeDawg]

But in fact, study cognitive neuroscience and psychophysics closely, and the idea of impressions as separate from ideas - thoughts about sensations being separate from the sensations themselves - is very questionable.

Indeed, I would argue strongly that sense experiences do not "exist" in any brute fact fashion. It is way more complicated than that.

Because they are constructed?

If I'm reading this correctly, I don't see much difference between this and saying chairs don't exist because they are infact just particles and forces.

 

[WaveJumper]

Because they are constructed?

If I'm reading this correctly, I don't see much difference between this and saying chairs don't exist because they are infact just particles and forces.

...manifested as physical matter by (exchange of)virtual particles that come and go at Planck times. You are right though, the reality of perception is a construct.

 

[apeiron]

If I'm reading this correctly, I don't see much difference between this and saying chairs don't exist because they are infact just particles and forces.

Well, wouldn't that be more that we "know better" from physical level modelling that chairs are mostly empty space? In the same way, we would know that red is really 650-ish range nanometre EM frequency. So that is the kind of scientific understanding that perhaps does not alter the experiencing - the chair still looks like a solid object, and red does not look any more wavelengthy.

So talking about developed brains, the redness constructing response is really already baked in, so to speak. But the details of the how it gets constructed can still be revealed by careful psychophysical experiment.

Redness is so often put forward as the philosophical challenge because it is about the hardest example of "qualia" to explain away. Yet it can indeed be largely picked apart as a complex construction of brains.

For example, the classic Land colour constancy effect demonstrates how we can still see "red" even when the actual wavelength being detected is green.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Color_constancy

 

[JoeDawg]

The thing is, generally in philosophy, with regards to epistemology, scientific explanations are not much use, because they are constructed... further down the road.

Red, whatever wavelengths, whatever brain functions, however you choose to divide red, the colour represented, is what is immediate to consciousness, and therefore fundamental. The fact that science shows us that it is constructed in different ways at different times, doesn't change the experience of red.

So if we are talking about what is fundamental to consciousness, and that is what we are doing when we talk about epistemology, then red does exist. It is not the source of red that really counts, but the result.

As another example, just because matter is made up of, and can be converted to, energy, doesn't mean that matter doesn't exist. It just means science provides a good explanation of how matter is constructed.

 

[apeiron]

So if we are talking about what is fundamental to consciousness, and that is what we are doing when we talk about epistemology, then red does exist. It is not the source of red that really counts, but the result.

Agreed that there is something there are the end of the day. There is "a result" which seems pretty irreducible.

But still, what remains to be explained only becomes clear once as much as possible has been explained away.

So, for example, the ability to introspect generally is language scaffolded, and the ability to introspect in a way that leads you to be able to focus on just "pure redness" would be one of those scaffolded actions. The idea of "colour" is an intellectual metric that allows measurements.

This is not claiming the more extreme Whorfian position, but it does show there is a intellectual scaffolding of the supposedly canonical experience of "seeing red".

And then 1) I said we would all find it compelling that the fact we are aware of something seems to be the irreduciable fact - the cogito from which we start. We already know that there is a something rather than a nothing (and also a something rather than an everything too).

Furthermore 2) science would support the contention that even perception, even seeing red, is about ideas shaping impressions (and impressions generalising over time to become ideas).

The key thing I was arguing is that the scientific evidence would show that we do not simply contemplate sense data, sensations are always constructed contextually. And human belief that we do in fact just sit witnessing displays is a socially constructed idea, not the psychophysical reality.

 

[madness]

"In the same way, we would know that red is really 650-ish range nanometre EM frequency."

Red is not 650 nm light. Red is the subjective experience most people have when receiving this light. Some people also experience green, or grey when they receive 650 nm light.

 

[pftest]

How about this:

All things are fundamental, except our misconceptions/optical illusions/etc. about those things. For example, everything about a chair is fundamental, except our misconceptions that it is solid, motionless, etc. Fundamentally, as far as we physically know so far, chairs are mostly empty space and lots of moving ingredients.

The emergent properties of the chair (solid, motionless) are the result of optical illusions. The emergent properties only happen in our minds.

 

[ValenceE]

Hello to all,

The way I see it, fundamental VS emergent can be expressed as a hierarchy within a closed loop. So here it goes…


From an objective perspective, energy and motion are fundamentals. From the interaction of these fundamentals emerge all radiations and matter, giving existence to our Universe.

From a human perspective, being part of this Universe, the act of procreation is fundamental to our emerging bodies and existence.

From our functioning, energized brain emerges our mind, which exits as an energetic immaterial field, generating all our mental processes, giving them form in order to interact with each other, either consciously or not.

There is a constant interaction between our bodies’s sensorial inputs and our minds, giving rise to our consciousness. The emergent results of mental processes, such as thoughts, feelings and emotions, have the possibility of a direct impact on our body, includind puting it in motion.

The loop closes with a very special kind of energetic body/mind activity that fuses two complementary human beings with the Universe in the act of procreation.



Regards.

VE