Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics (is there a general consensus?)

  • #51
Ken G said:
I say no-- "information" is inherently anthropic, and what is so ironic is how totally anthropomorphic is their very argument that it isn't!

I'm not an expert on this stuff but there's a whole branch in theoretical biology, etc. I believe that questions whether information is inherently anthropic:

Biological Information
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/information-biological/

Information in Biological Systems
http://collier.ukzn.ac.za/papers/Information in Biological Systems.pdf

Life and semiosis: The real nature of information and meaning
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/semi.2006.2006.issue-158/sem.2006.007/sem.2006.007.xml
Information is any type of pattern that influences the formation or transformation of other patterns. In this sense, there is no need for a conscious mind to perceive, much less appreciate, the pattern. Consider, for example, DNA. The sequence of nucleotides is a pattern that influences the formation and development of an organism without any need for a conscious mind.
Information
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information
 
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  • #52
bhobba said:
You forgot one - the Ensemble interpretation, which I hold to, which Balentine in his well respected textbook adheres to, which Einstein adhered to, which a lot of other physicists like Lubos Motol adhere to (in fact he is very critical of that link you posted - I don't agree with him on that - but he knows his stuff). I do not agree the link you gave disproves the statistical interpretation - I do not agree with Lubos who thinks its a load of rubbish, but I do not agree it disproves anything.
I don't think PBR affects Ballentine's scheme because that model is concerned not with the epistemic probabilities, but with objective ones. This is how I interpreted this paper that just got posted today regarding PBR:
Abstract: Different realistic attitudes towards wavefunctions and quantum states areas old as quantum theory itself. Recently Pusey, Barret and Rudolph (PBR) on the one hand, and Auletta and Tarozzi (AT) on the other, have proposed new interesting arguments in favor of a broad realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics that can be considered the modern heir to some views held by the fathers of quantum theory. In this paper we give a new and detailed presentation of such arguments, propose a new taxonomy of different realistic positions in the foundations of quantum mechanics and assess the scope, within this new taxonomy, of these realistic arguments.
Statistical-Realism versus Wave-Realism in the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/902...m_in_the_Foundations_of_Quantum_Mechanics.pdf
 
  • #53
bohm2 said:
I don't think PBR affects Ballentine's scheme because that model is concerned not with the epistemic probabilities, but with objective ones. This is how I interpreted this paper that just got posted today regarding PBR:

Statistical-Realism versus Wave-Realism in the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/902...m_in_the_Foundations_of_Quantum_Mechanics.pdf

The Ensemble Interpretation is not a realism based one - the wave-function is simply a device for calculating probabilities and has no existence other than what a theorist uses in calculations. Because of that wave-function collapse is not an issue and solves Schrodinger's Cat with ease - it is no more of a mystery than lifting your hand to observe a tossed coin. It is however an issue for Copenhagen because it considers wave-function collapse real and a result of interaction of a quantum system with the observing apparatus. The link you gave where the person thought Copenhagen was not realism based is incorrect - any interpretation that worries about wave-function collapse is realism based - because if it wasn't real then there is nothing to worry about.

Think about it for a minute - does the six probability numbers that predicts the random behavior of a dice have a real existence? Is it something to worry about when the dice is thrown and that suddenly changes so that one of those six possible outcomes has a one in it? That's basically the Ensemble interpretation - its simply the standard law of large numbers interpretation of probability. You consider a state to be an extremely large number of systems prepared the same but divided into categories with a different measurement outcome - the proportion giving the probability.

I have zero idea what you mean by epistemic and objective probabilities. Probabilities are simply a way of codifying the behavior of systems whose outcome we cannot predict. We notice that when prepared exactly the same while we can not predict individual outcomes the proportion of those outcomes approaches a stable limit as the number of times we prepare the system and observe it increases. It is merely a calculational device. I can't see how you can divide probabilities into objective or epistemic - in fact my understanding of both those terms means probabilities are both. But I know philosophy types can use words in funny sorts of ways different to guys like me whose background is applied math.

I have read your link and disagree with one of its tenants:
'It is maybe worth recalling here the distinction between epistemic probabilities, i.e. probabilities understood as degrees of belief, and objective probabilities, such as relative frequencies. The probability p(λ/P) is an example of the first kind of The term “ontic” was introduced into modern philosophical language by Martin Heidegger, in order to grasp the notion of something before any contact with the knowing subject. Harrigan and Spekkens (2007) refer to λ as the “ontic state”. On a more careful analysis it seems to us that the λ they introduce is a hypothesis of the subject, so we believe the term “ontological” to be more appropriate. probabilities, since it encodes our hypothesis about the properties of a system given a certain preparation method.'

There are a number of philosophical foundations for probability. The ensemble interpretation is the usual one taught to students like me that studies applied math and built around the law of large numbers. There are other ones such as the Kolmogorov axioms (used more by those interested in certain theoretical aspects of probability such as measure theory and rigorous proof of stuff such as the continuity and mathematical existence of Wiener processes) and others still such as the propensity and degrees of belief one the paper mentions. Anyone of them can be used as the basis of the Statistical interpretation - it doesn't make any difference - the ensemble one is used simply for pictorial vividness and resides nowhere except in the theorists mind.

But seeing you find it such an issue, for the purpose of this discussion, I will base the Statistical interpretation instead on the Kolmogorov axioms which are totally abstract.

Thanks
Bill
 
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  • #54
bohm2 said:
I'm not an expert on this stuff but there's a whole branch in theoretical biology, etc. I believe that questions whether information is inherently anthropic:
"Information is any type of pattern that influences the formation or transformation of other patterns. In this sense, there is no need for a conscious mind to perceive, much less appreciate, the pattern. Consider, for example, DNA. The sequence of nucleotides is a pattern that influences the formation and development of an organism without any need for a conscious mind."
Yet more anthroporphisms! If what they were claiming really made any sense, don't you think they could argue it without using terms like "patterns" and "influences"? What makes them think there is any such thing as a pattern or an influence without a mind to say those things? Does a dumb molecule care if it has a string of atoms like ABABABAB or AABABBAA? How is one any different from the other if there isn't a brain to imagine that there is a difference there? Dumb molecules don't have patterns by themselves, we might imagine they have locations or wave functions or whatever other ways the human mind has devised to describe them, but it's clear that the pattern is something our brain is doing. And do they really think that a molecule "influences" another molecule, without a human mind to say what that means? These are all models, made by our heads, to great advantage. If someone says that nature really involves "influences", rather than just repeated correlations that we have chosen to notice using our minds, then I would challenge them to tell me what is the definition of an influence. That's all you have to do-- define "pattern" and "influence," and exactly where you have invoked the human mind becomes obvious.

The argument that any of these things exist independently of the human mind is quite naive. It's essentially the same thing as saying that a tree can fall and make noise without a human mind, but what is actually meant is that a tree can fall and make noise without a human mind being present in the forest-- which does not imply that any of those words make the least bit of sense without a human mind to say they do. Those are two very different issues, but it is the latter, not the former, that speaks to the question of what information is.
 
  • #55
bhobba said:
The link you gave where the person thought Copenhagen was not realism based is incorrect - any interpretation that worries about wave-function collapse is realism based - because if it wasn't real then there is nothing to worry about.
I didn't think there was a necessary relationship between wave function "realism" and wave function collapse. For example, Bohmian, many-minds interpretation, and MWI treat the wavefunction as "real" but none involve collapsing wavefunctions.
Ken G said:
The argument that any of these things exist independently of the human mind is quite naive.
In your scheme does "gravity" exist independently of the human mind?
 
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  • #56
bohm2 said:
I didn't think there was a necessary relationship between wave function "realism" and wave function collapse. For example, Bohmian, many-minds interpretation, and MWI treat the wavefunction as "real" but none involve collapsing wavefunctions.
I think bhobba's point was that taking the wavefunction seriously is a subset of realism, and wavefunction collapse is a subset of taking the wavefunction seriously, so wavefunction collapse is a subset of realism. If so, then other forms of realism that take the wavefunction seriously but don't refer to collapse are not counterexamples. I think he is making a valid point, although I think you are alluding to the fact that the Bohr vs. Einstein debate is often characterized as non-realism vs. realism (in regard to possible elements of reality that are outside of the wavefunction). I have always seen some irony in that way of painting things-- in my view, Bohr's approach is more "realistic", because it is realistic to recognize that our models of reality are designed to connect reality to our experience, but most people think of "realism" as independent of our experience, which I view as quite unrealistic! To anyone who thinks it makes sense to talk about reality outside of how we perceive and interact with it, I say, "get real."
 
  • #57
bohm2 said:
I didn't think there was a necessary relationship between wave function "realism" and wave function collapse. For example, Bohmian, many-minds interpretation, and MWI treat the wavefunction as "real" but none involve collapsing wavefunctions.

My comment had to do with the link you gave to Mat Leifer
http://mattleifer.info/2011/11/20/can-the-quantum-state-be-interpreted-statistically/

That is generally a good article that explains why the PBR paper doesn't really rule out any of the three alternatives he gives. It was better than Lubos's rant that, as Mat correctly pointed out, missed the point.

But even Mat gets something wrong - that is lumping Copenhagen in category 2 ie Wave-functions are epistemic, but there is no deeper underlying reality.

Copenhagen believes a system evolves according to the Schroedinger equation then every now and then interacts with a measuring apparatus and instantaneously changes to another state - this is the wave-function collapse issue. It is an operational interpretation and the wave function collapse is a real collapse and change of the quantum system bought about by the interaction with the measuring appartus - as an operationally based interpretation you really can't think of the things you are being operational about as not real:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wave_function_collapse

The existence of the wave function collapse is required in
the Copenhagen interpretation
the objective collapse interpretations
the transactional interpretation
the von Neumann interpretation in which consciousness causes collapse.

On the other hand, the collapse is considered as a redundant or optional approximation in
the Bohm interpretation
the Ensemble Interpretation
the Many-Worlds Interpretation
interpretations based on Consistent Histories

This is one reason Consistent Histories was introduced as a modern variant of Copenhagen - it is Copenhagen done right some would say - it specifically avoids the issue. My suspicion is Mat really means Consistent Histories and not Copenhagen. I have Griffiths book on Consistent Histories and read it a while ago now, but it might be a good idea for me to give it another read.

Thanks
Bill
 
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  • #58
Ken G said:
Does a dumb molecule care if it has a string of atoms like ABABABAB or AABABBAA? How is one any different from the other if there isn't a brain to imagine that there is a difference there? Dumb molecules don't have patterns by themselves, we might imagine they have locations or wave functions or whatever other ways the human mind has devised to describe them, but it's clear that the pattern is something our brain is doing. And do they really think that a molecule "influences" another molecule, without a human mind to say what that means? These are all models, made by our heads, to great advantage. If someone says that nature really involves "influences", rather than just repeated correlations that we have chosen to notice using our minds, then I would challenge them to tell me what is the definition of an influence. That's all you have to do-- define "pattern" and "influence," and exactly where you have invoked the human mind becomes obvious.

I could do with some clarification and maybe some direction here. I get confused by your usage of the term “mind” – I get the impression that you refer to “thought” as being the factor that gives us patterns and thus outside of that thought there are no patterns. Rather like looking at the stars, many people make up constellations, but outside of that thought, there are no constellations, just a random collection of stars in space.

But what if the patterns are subject to “rules” that exist within the construct that is our reality? By a construct I mean a reality that is not produced from the hardware of a dualistic brain, rather mind emerges from “something” that gives us empirical reality. Within that reality brains are the same stuff as external objects, everything is a dualist construct from “something”. So the “hardware” of the rock doesn’t exist without the “hardware” of the senses and the brain. But within that “whole” surely we can then say that “rules” exist without thought. That doesn’t imply the “rules” exist in that cause/effect manner outside of the “whole”, but within the “whole”, they can be thought of as existing without any cognitive action on our part.

Imagine a scenario where by nature outside of the “whole” consists of random irreducible elements not “existing” in space or time. We cannot logically think of an exception to this scenario that involves a brain sitting in a corner taking in all of these elements from “something” and creating “rules” – the brain can only be part of a dualistic construct that emerges from this “something”. That construct consists of “rules” that give rise to mechanisms that allow us to use our brains in apprehending the results of these “rules”. The mechanisms change from sense organ to sense organ, the eyes uses a lens and not a uniform transparent material, the ear uses a diaphragm - these are all mechanisms that requires “rules” of our reality and are independent of cognitive thought. The molecules do not care about their differences, but those differences involve “rules” that are part of our reality and are used in the emergence of the hardware that is us. Those “rules” will be there whether we discern patterns or not.

None of this is to suggest that gravity exists as gravity (to make use of bhom2’s question) outside of the “whole”. Outside of the “whole” from my perspective lay “true” mind independent reality, and it would be a reality that can’t be conceived of in terms of our familiar notions – those notions are only applicable to our “whole”, so gravity or anything else exists in that place. But I make a distinction between cognitive thought and mind. Gravity exists outside of cognitive thought, but outside of mind, matter, space, time (in other words everything that constitutes our reality) gravity doesn’t exist. “Rules” that manifest themselves in terms of lenses, ears etc. do exist outside of cognitive thought but do not exist (at least in any kind familiar cause/effect form operating within space and time) outside of the “whole” (our reality).

I just don’t think that you can easily use the dualism of our reality to imply that cognitive thought gives rise to that dualism (unless one considers that dualisms exists as such within mind independent reality). To my mind it is the construct of dualism that gives us “rules” and those “rules” are independent of any cognitive process that arises from dualism. It is the construct (the “whole”) that comes first and the cognitive thoughts second – existence comes before knowledge.

None of this implies that our senses and brain do not have an effect on what we perceive, but that effect takes place within the construct that is the “whole” and within that “whole” there are rules that manifest themselves in terms of mechanisms that are purposeful and independent of cognitive thoughts. The lens of the eye emerges to aid our survival in accordance with “rules” governing objects to be perceived. The diaphragm of the ear emerges in accordance with different “rules”. There is not a universal sense organ responding to irreducible random elements that our cognitive thoughts organise into perceptions, like the brain in a vat scenario. Within our reality, (our “whole”) there seems to be purposeful things going on according to “rules”. It is those “rules” that constitutes physics and we assign lots of interpretations to those “rules” (and thus I see physics as exploring the rules of our reality but not those of mind independent reality). But fundamentally, those “rules” are surely independent of the interpretations or of any cognitive process that fits the “rules” to our perception of things. There are “rules” that mean if we throw a ball, that same ball will come down. Our cognitive thought process expands and fits those “rules” to differing frameworks, but at the end of the day, that ball falling down is part of a mechanism that exists within our reality (the “whole”) that is independent of any cognitive thought. The ball doesn’t get thrown or fall down outside of our “whole” but the “rules” that manifest themselves in terms of the thrown and falling ball maybe emerge in some unknown form (not in any terms of cause and effect) from outside of the “whole” i.e. outside of mind, intersubjective agreement, space and time. In other words within “true” mind independent reality.

It is almost as if you talk about “cognitive thought independent reality” as a notion where as I take d’Espagnat’s more literal notion of “mind independent reality”. The former seems to me to model our reality as if our brain is in one corner absorbing irreducible random elements from nature and creating phenomena. The latter sees dualism as “real” along with the “rules” that exist within that dualism, but that dualism is itself a construct that cannot be separated into part mind and part object, everything - objects, space, time, us, brains (the hardware) emerges in terms of mind. So whilst we may see patterns in the molecules and label them as this or that, those patterns exist in terms of necessary mechanisms within the “whole” and thus they exist outside of thought, but not outside of the “whole”.

This is a rather lengthy piece, and I am not implying that I see your stance in the manner I describe, but it is a perception I do get. And that perception of mine seems to be a sticking point in trying to distinguish between “thoughts” determining the nature of our reality and “rules” that exist independently of thoughts, but not independently (in any kind of cause/effect manner) of the “whole” (our reality, or empirical reality). In other words, whilst we cannot separate mind from our reality, within our reality there are mechanisms going on that do not seem to be connected with the mind, other than we have the ability to classify and expound on the mechanisms. There seems to me to be inherent mechanisms that gives rise to everything we apprehend which fundametally is "there" independently of that apprehension (though not "there" outside of the dualistic construct that constitutes our reality).
 
  • #59
bhobba said:
The existence of the wave function collapse is required in
the Copenhagen interpretation
[...]
Do be clear here. CI invokes wave function collapse but the wave function itself is understood to represent knowledge about the system, not to represent the reality of the system. The wave function collapses "on paper". It is, I believe, many peoples failure to appreciate this point which leads them to object to CI because they feel it reeks of "mind over matter". The wave-function collapse here is rather "matter over mind", we see something happen and update our knowledge. It is not qualitatively distinct from the collapse of a classical probability distribution for a system when we make an observation. (e.g. the collapse of the expectation value for a lotto ticket to $0 when the drawing occurs.)

For a good exposition of CI see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.
 
  • #60
jambaugh said:
Do be clear here. CI invokes wave function collapse but the wave function itself is understood to represent knowledge about the system, not to represent the reality of the system. The wave function collapses "on paper". It is, I believe, many peoples failure to appreciate this point which leads them to object to CI because they feel it reeks of "mind over matter". The wave-function collapse here is rather "matter over mind", we see something happen and update our knowledge. It is not qualitatively distinct from the collapse of a classical probability distribution for a system when we make an observation. (e.g. the collapse of the expectation value for a lotto ticket to $0 when the drawing occurs.)

For a good exposition of CI see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.

Ok - a question then. According to Copenhagen when the position of a quantum particle is measured prior to that it may not even have the property of position - it is the interaction with the measurement apparatus that gives it the property of position. I can't quite follow how something could not have been said to happen to the quantum particle as a result of the measurement. The Ensemble interpretation says its simply a statistical observation like tossing a dice and is silent on what happens to the particle - but Copenhagen seems to be saying something happened to it caused by interaction with the measurement apparatus.

Thanks
Bill
 
  • #61
bhobba said:
Ok - a question then. According to Copenhagen when the position of a quantum particle is measured prior to that it may not even have the property of position - it is the interaction with the measurement apparatus that gives it the property of position. I can't quite follow how something could not have been said to happen to the quantum particle as a result of the measurement.
Something does happen, the particle's position is measured. But given no prior measurement we cannot say for example that the act of measurement did or did not change the particle. In the sense of a change we cannot say something did or did not happen to the particle during measurement.

However in the case of two immediate position measurements we will according to QM measure the same position the 2nd time and so we can positively say no change occurred during the 2nd measurement. So after the 1st measurement we collapse our description to express this fact.

The Ensemble interpretation says its simply a statistical observation like tossing a dice and is silent on what happens to the particle - but Copenhagen seems to be saying something happened to it caused by interaction with the measurement apparatus.
The Ensemble interpretation and Copenhagen interpretation are not very different. The EI says the wave-function (or hilbert space vector) represents an ensemble of systems while the CI says it represents a class of systems. Both EI and CI and all other QM interpretations assert something happens or may happen during measurement. Measurement is a two-way interaction not a God-like peaking at the state without disturbing of the system.

For example in EI if you have a stream of photons with vertical polarization and you measure oblique polarization (with a polaroid film) you will end up with a reduced number of oblique photons. The photons which survive have been changed and the photons which didn't likewise since they are absorbed. In CI you replace "reduced number" with a (classical) probability distribution but you are still representing an attenuation of either probability or number.

The problem with EI is if you presuppose objective states prior to measurement you fail to get Bell inequality violation. Current EI doesn't assume this it just refuses to apply QM to single systems.
 
  • #62
jambaugh said:
CI invokes wave function collapse but the wave function itself is understood to represent knowledge about the system, not to represent the reality of the system.

That is said very often, but I don't think that is the case in CI. The wave function represents the state of the system, not knowledge.
 
  • #63
martinbn said:
That is said very often, but I don't think that is the case in CI. The wave function represents the state of the system, not knowledge.

"...many physicists and philosophers see the reduction of the wave function as an important part of the Copenhagen interpretation. But Bohr never talked about the collapse of the wave packet. Nor did it make sense for him to do so because this would mean that one must understand the wave function as referring to something physically real. Bohr spoke of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, including the state vector or the wave function, as a symbolic representation." from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-copenhagen/

This characterizes Bohr's view and I generally mean Bohr CI when I speak of CI. This may be improper. The view of a unified CI is something of a myth.

" The Copenhagen Interpretation denies that the wave function is anything more than a theoretical concept, or is at least non-committal about its being a discrete entity or a discernible component of some discrete entity.
The subjective view, that the wave function is merely a mathematical tool for calculating the probabilities in a specific experiment, is a similar approach to the Ensemble interpretation.
There are some who say that there are objective variants of the Copenhagen Interpretation that allow for a "real" wave function, but it is questionable whether that view is really consistent with logical positivism and/or with some of Bohr's statements. Bohr emphasized that science is concerned with predictions of the outcomes of experiments, and that any additional propositions offered are not scientific but meta-physical. Bohr was heavily influenced by positivism. On the other hand, Bohr and Heisenberg were not in complete agreement, and they held different views at different times. Heisenberg in particular was prompted to move towards realism."[/color] - from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copenhagen_interpretation

If you like, I'm a "Bohr-ist", call it BCI, vs. a Heisenberg-ist HCI.

[EDIT] And I believe when you read about CI being the historical consensus view among physicists, that statement is referring to the pragmatic/positivistic Bohr version.
 
  • #64
jambaugh said:
"...many physicists and philosophers see the reduction of the wave function as an important part of the Copenhagen interpretation. But Bohr never talked about the collapse of the wave packet. Nor did it make sense for him to do so because this would mean that one must understand the wave function as referring to something physically real. Bohr spoke of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, including the state vector or the wave function, as a symbolic representation." from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-copenhagen/

This characterizes Bohr's view and I generally mean Bohr CI when I speak of CI. This may be improper. The view of a unified CI is something of a myth.

" The Copenhagen Interpretation denies that the wave function is anything more than a theoretical concept, or is at least non-committal about its being a discrete entity or a discernible component of some discrete entity.
The subjective view, that the wave function is merely a mathematical tool for calculating the probabilities in a specific experiment, is a similar approach to the Ensemble interpretation.
There are some who say that there are objective variants of the Copenhagen Interpretation that allow for a "real" wave function, but it is questionable whether that view is really consistent with logical positivism and/or with some of Bohr's statements. Bohr emphasized that science is concerned with predictions of the outcomes of experiments, and that any additional propositions offered are not scientific but meta-physical. Bohr was heavily influenced by positivism. On the other hand, Bohr and Heisenberg were not in complete agreement, and they held different views at different times. Heisenberg in particular was prompted to move towards realism."[/color] - from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copenhagen_interpretation

If you like, I'm a "Bohr-ist", call it BCI, vs. a Heisenberg-ist HCI.

[EDIT] And I believe when you read about CI being the historical consensus view among physicists, that statement is referring to the pragmatic/positivistic Bohr version.

I was complaining about the statement that the wave function represents the knowledge about the system. In these quotes there is nothing about knowledge. I also think that Bohr was not a positivist.
 
  • #65
martinbn said:
I was complaining about the statement that the wave function represents the knowledge about the system. In these quotes there is nothing about knowledge. I also think that Bohr was not a positivist.

No Bohr was an operationalist. But that's down on the positivistic side of the spectrum.
(positivism is another of those loaded words with multiple versions of definition)

But how can a "tool used to calculate probabilities" be other than a representation of knowledge about the system, said knowledge is express by the predictions of behavior i.e. transition probabilities and not metaphysical assertions about the reality of the system as is done e.g. in Bohmian pilot waves or MW? CI is NOT a metaphysical interpretation. It is exactly that which Einstein objected to in the famous debates and why he asserted it and with it QM was incomplete. It failed to give a description of the underlying reality Einstein asserted must exist in a complete theory.

Note Bohr and Heisenberg were debating this very point too. Heisenberg imagined particle behavior with sudden jumps. Bohr argued that "wave" and "particle" were distinct complementary descriptions. They cannot be distinct descriptions of the same reality if they are (or one of them is) direct representations of reality. They are rather distinct operational descriptions of system behavior. Later Heisenberg accepted complementarity and this is the final component of CI. --see http://www.aip.org/history/heisenberg/p09.htm

CI = complementarity + HUP + statistical interpretation of Schrodinger's wave equation (*and implicitly the interpretation of the wave-function itself as a statistical object, not a physical one...)

I think my (*) is clear in the discussions between Bohr, Heisenberg, and Einstein. The distinct reified wave function view grew from Schrodinger's original wave mechanics which was only natural given its similarity in form to prior classical wave mechanics. It was CI's distinct departure from this view which made it significant and allow the full formulation of QM as not only a new theory but a distinct type of theory from classical mechanics.

If you or anyone has a reference to Bohr, or Heisenberg post 1927 implying in any way that the wave function was to be interpreted as a direct representation of reality, please make it known to me.
 
  • #66
jambaugh said:
This characterizes Bohr's view and I generally mean Bohr CI when I speak of CI. This may be improper. The view of a unified CI is something of a myth.

I think that is one of the problems. You do a search on Copenhagen and all sorts of ideas pop up including what I always believed about it - namely it asserts wave-function collapse is a real thing that occurs out there. You find guys like Ballentine in his critique makes reference to its problems in that area. Now if guys like that who are experts in Quantum interpretation do that - well it really does make it hard for the rest of us.

Ballentine in his paper in the Ensemble Interpretation sates it outright - wave function collapse is part of 'orthodox' theory (and he seems to lump Copenhagen in with that) and is a problem for any interpretation that that has it - he doesn't seem to believe Copenhagen says it's merely something that occurs in physicists calculations
http://www.kevinaylward.co.uk/qm/ballentine_ensemble_interpretation_1970.pdf

He readily admits though his objections to not apply to what he calls 'subjective' interpretations favoured by for example Heisenberg where the collapse is like the above. Could that perhaps be the root of his confusion (if indeed it is confusion) - because there is no doubt Heisenberg ascribed to a version of Copenhagen?

Thanks
Bill
 
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  • #67
bhobba said:
I think that is one of the problems. You do a search on Copenhagen and all sorts of ideas pop up including what I always believed about it - namely it asserts wave-function collapse is a real thing that occurs out there. You find guys like Ballentine in his critique makes reference to its problems in that area. Now if guys like that who are experts in Quantum interpretation do that - well it really does make it hard for the rest of us.
I'm still reading Ballentine's paper you referenced. I note that in his introduction he states his principle objection to CI is its assertion that the "the state variable description is the most complete description of an individual quantum system".
Ballentine in his paper in the Ensemble Interpretation sates it outright - wave function collapse is part of 'orthodox' theory (and he seems to lump Copenhagen in with that) ...
Yes, Copenhagen invokes collapse...
...and is a problem for any interpretation that that has it - he doesn't seem to believe Copenhagen says it's merely something that occurs in physicists calculations
http://www.kevinaylward.co.uk/qm/ballentine_ensemble_interpretation_1970.pdf

He readily admits though his objections to not apply to what he calls 'subjective' interpretations favoured by for example Heisenberg where the collapse is like the above. Could that perhaps be the root of his confusion (if indeed it is confusion) - because there is no doubt Heisenberg ascribed to a version of Copenhagen?

Thanks
Bill
I could read what you cite differently. His objection to collapse is that it is invoking the maximal description assertion which he finds unnecessary. But I'll have to finish reading to see. His reference to Heisenberg and 'subjective' interps. would seem to mean he understood CI as I do. Heisenberg got this view from Bohr and was the one to coin the phrase Copenhagen Interpretation.

... reading further. Ah!, Ballentine is a realist! He wants to preserve reality ... near the end of p361 "...in contract the statistical interpretation considers the a particle to always be at some position in space, each position being realized with relative frequency |\psi(r)|^2 in an ensemble of similarly prepared experiments."[/color]

I think he is still in essence invoking collapse in the same way as CI (as I describe it) in that should one, using his interpretation, wish to describe the part of an ensemble that has been measured with a given position, they will of course need to use a "collapsed" wave function. I see nothing qualitatively distinct between asserting "that last electron came from an ensemble with state vector \psi" and saying "that last electron has mode vector \psi". The difference for Ballentine is his religious belief in the position of a particle between acts of measurement. (I say religious, not improper (nor proper) because it is a belief which cannot be empirically checked...by definition.)

I do see what may be a misunderstanding in his characterization of Heisenberg's "intermediate kind of reality," collapsing via measurement "from the possible to the actual." Note this is not saying "collapsing from an unobserved actuality(reality) to another observed actuality(reality)". But it might be read as such leading one to think Heisenberg is speaking of "collapse in actuality". But then the context of his '58 reference may be that this latter is a correct characterization of Heisenberg's view. I'd like to see that reference in context.

I found http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/heisenberg.htm from that same reference which may clarify. (still reading it)

I'll digest it and Ballentine's paper and get back to you.
 
  • #68
Len M said:
But what if the patterns are subject to “rules” that exist within the construct that is our reality?
You said it yourself, "exist within the construct." That makes it quite clear where the "existence" lies, that's what I'm saying about all forms of information. As soon as we see what nature is doing as being some kind of information processor, then immediately the information processor is our brains, not nature. We must see nature as a kind of "mini me", because that is all we understand-- that is the point of physics, to be able to see our thought processes in nature, thereby claiming some understanding. What other form of understanding is there?

By a construct I mean a reality that is not produced from the hardware of a dualistic brain, rather mind emerges from “something” that gives us empirical reality.
And that's the paradox of mind-- we want to imagine that our minds "emerge" from nature, but everything we think we understand about nature comes from our minds. Hence, the "emergence" scenario is one where a mind emerges from itself, like a tiger chasing its tail. It's hard to say what other options we have available, so we get as far as we can, but we should not be surprised when faced with certain difficulties if we choose to ignore the self-referential character of the situation.

Within that reality brains are the same stuff as external objects, everything is a dualist construct from “something”.
Exactly, everything is a construct, including what is purported to be responsible for the construct. Our minds are constructs that are trying to construct themselves. This is the situation, we don't need to imagine otherwise-- everything we can say about our minds, including the definition of what a mind is, and any attempt to understand a mind, ends up being the object of that understanding, not the subject of it. The subject of the understanding is not what we mean by a mind, not in physics anyway.
But within that “whole” surely we can then say that “rules” exist without thought.
That is just the thinking that I reject. To me, the words "rules" and "without thought" are having a little fight in that sentence. If there was any evidence that reality actually obeyed rules, rather than just can be effectively analyzed using the construct of rules (a product of a human mind), then there might be some authority to that claim, but a "rule" is something we make up (it's an anthropomorphism), and how does reality "obey" things anyway? These anthropormorphisms are not just conveniences of language, they are the language. If we could really make the point that our minds were not involved using language that is not anthropomorphic, then maybe we could be making a consistent argument, but there's a reason we never seem able to do that. The goal of understanding is to see ourselves in what we are studying, so anthropomorphism is inescapable, and that's fine, but we should not claim in the same sentence that includes anthropomorphisms that we are not involved.

Imagine a scenario where by nature outside of the “whole” consists of random irreducible elements not “existing” in space or time. We cannot logically think of an exception to this scenario that involves a brain sitting in a corner taking in all of these elements from “something” and creating “rules” – the brain can only be part of a dualistic construct that emerges from this “something”.
Sure, but even so, those "rules" exist in that brain, all the same. This also explains why rules are pretty much made to be broken, in physics, and why the ontologies of physics theories vary radically from century to century with no evidence of any convergence on the horizon.
The molecules do not care about their differences, but those differences involve “rules” that are part of our reality and are used in the emergence of the hardware that is us. Those “rules” will be there whether we discern patterns or not.
The rules are the patterns we discern, I don't think reality has the least idea what a rule is, precisely because reality does not have a mind. Or, if we take the view that reality is itself some kind of great mind, then the point still holds that the rules are a product of the mind, not the other way around. Both the rules, and what we mean in physics by reality itself, are inescapably intertwined with the mind that notices them, constructs them, and evaluates them. One can invoke the phrase "mind independent reality", but one cannot say anything else about it, so physics immediately leaves that notion to philosophy, as that notion has no place in the concept of reality that physics uses.

I believe Bohr hit the nail on the head when he pointed out that physics is not about reality, it is about what we can say about reality. Many people interpret that as Bohr's claim that the wave function is epistemic rather than ontic, but I think he was saying something much deeper that goes way beyond quantum mechanics-- he was saying that physics is a mind trying to see itself in what is around it, and meeting with both substantial success as well as unavoidable limitations.
I just don’t think that you can easily use the dualism of our reality to imply that cognitive thought gives rise to that dualism (unless one considers that dualisms exists as such within mind independent reality).
I don't think you have any choice in the matter-- the dualism does arise from itself, just like the mind does. There isn't any dualism that is "inherent" in some mind independent reality, dualism is just what you get when a mind tries to draw a line and say "in here is me, out there is other." It's pure mental construct, fundamental to the very definition of mind but meaningless without that definition. The tiger is chasing its tail, and that is part of the point of dualism.

It is the construct (the “whole”) that comes first and the cognitive thoughts second – existence comes before knowledge.
That is certainly the common view, but I regard it as untenable when applied to what physics means by "knowledge" and "existence" because there are two flavors of existence. There is what "really exists," which we can say nothing about, but we want to say something about it, so we invent physics and knowledge, and then, only then, can we start to talk about what exists. But then the existence we are talking about is immediately resultant from the knowledge and comes after that knowledge, and is strongly conditioned by the kinds of knowledge we are capable of manipulating. This is not a bug, it's exactly how physics is supposed to work-- physics is supposed to give us a means to talk about existence, and everything we get from physics comes as a result of our minds. There is no physics without physicists, and more, there was never supposed to be. That latter is what I believe Bohr meant by "there is no quantum world" and "physics concerns what we can say about nature."
None of this implies that our senses and brain do not have an effect on what we perceive, but that effect takes place within the construct that is the “whole” and within that “whole” there are rules that manifest themselves in terms of mechanisms that are purposeful and independent of cognitive thoughts.
The problem is when you try to get past the words "the whole", which are suitably vague to be talking about some pre-physics idea (what can be more basic than everything, the "whole"?), and try to get into specifics like talking about "rules." At that point you have left the realm of what we cannot talk about and entered the realm of what we can talk about (rules), which is exactly where you cross over from mind-independent thinking to mind-dependent thinking, and that brings us into contact with useful notions of our minds like rules and information. And if you want to start talking about what our minds are, you have the exact same issue-- you can start with words that don't say anything, like "a mind is whatever it is that connects with our ability to think", but the instant you take the next step, and give that definition some teeth by attributing elements to the mind, you have crossed over into what a mind can say about itself, and the tail chase is on.

Within our reality, (our “whole”) there seems to be purposeful things going on according to “rules”.
Again look at the inescapable anthropomorphisms. "Seems to be"-- seems to whom? To a rock? All we can say is that the "rules" concept is a good one to have in our minds, a useful notion, what more can we say, what more is there any need to say?

It is those “rules” that constitutes physics and we assign lots of interpretations to those “rules” (and thus I see physics as exploring the rules of our reality but not those of mind independent reality). But fundamentally, those “rules” are surely independent of the interpretations or of any cognitive process that fits the “rules” to our perception of things.
Why must the rules be independent of those interpretations? Consider the following "dense" student:
Professor: "gravity is a force that is inversely proportional to the distance to the center of the Earth."
Dense student: "Is that what it is exactly?"
Professor: "No, it's just a useful idealization, we have to make idealizations to do physics."
Dense student: "So what is gravity exactly?"
Professor: "Physics doesn't tell us that."
Dense student: "I don't understand, isn't physics where we get the notion of gravity? Experiment, hypothesis, theory, that whole scientific method business? So why can't it tell us what gravity is exactly, if it is responsible for the word?"
Professor: "Physics can tell us exactly what our approximate models are."
Dense student: "So gravity is a collection of approximate models, that physics tells us exactly what each particular model is?"
Professor: "Yes."
Dense student: "So gravity is a construct of our minds?"
Professor: "Um, well, er..."

There are “rules” that mean if we throw a ball, that same ball will come down.
Take that above dialog, and replace "gravity" with "ball", or with "come down." It's the same issue. "Reality obeys rules" is a statement of our minds that is gibberish without our minds. The ball, that we say is going up and coming down, has no idea what we are talking about.
 
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  • #69
jambaugh said:
... reading further. Ah!, Ballentine is a realist! He wants to preserve reality ... near the end of p361 "...in contract the statistical interpretation considers the a particle to always be at some position in space, each position being realized with relative frequency |\psi(r)|^2 in an ensemble of similarly prepared experiments."[/color]

I'll digest it and Ballentine's paper and get back to you.

Very perceptive. Yes indeed he is a realist, as am I. The ensemble interpretation is not a realist interpretation - it is strictly silent on it - you simply consider any observation as consisting of a preparation procedure then an observation with a very large number of preparations having the different possible observations associated with a preparation. You use the law of large numbers to ensure it is large enough so the proportion has reached a stable limit and what you observe is simply considered as selecting one of them. I hasten to add this does not make it a physical interpretation as someone tried to assert on philosophical grounds - that ensemble resides in one place only - the head of the theorist - the very large number you would need to guarantee the law of large numbers can not be replicated out there in reality.

The thing though with this interpretation is it whispers in your ear - there is more to this - there is some other factors at work that causes a particular element of that ensemble to be chosen and that would be a realist interpretation. Personally I believe some sub-quantum process does that (one candidate would be Primary State Diffusion advocated by Ian Percival although I don't think that's it - QM's secrets are probably not that easily won) but there are issues with the KS theorem that means that process is a theory that has QM as a limit but can't be QM. IMHO that's the reason Einstein liked it because he did not believe QM was fundamental - but Bohr did.

Anyway when you have finished it I would be really interested in what you think.

Oh - one thing I want to mention is I do not agree with Ballentine that other interpretations as bad as he makes out. I know Consistent Histories pretty well and a smattering of others - IMHO they all suck (including the Ensemble interpretation) in their own way and leave you dissatisfied - its just the way they suck is different for each interpretation. The way the Ensemble interpretation sucks is how does it chose the element from the ensemble - the way consistent histories sucks is it looks like you are defining you way out of the problem by saying you can't ask certain types of questions.

Thanks
Bill
 
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  • #70
Ken G said:
Dense student: "So what is gravity exactly?"
Professor: "Physics doesn't tell us that."
Dense student: "I don't understand, isn't physics where we get the notion of gravity? Experiment, hypothesis, theory, that whole scientific method business? So why can't it tell us what gravity is exactly, if it is responsible for the word?"
Professor: "Physics can tell us exactly what our approximate models are."
Dense student: "So gravity is a collection of approximate models, that physics tells us exactly what each particular model is?"
Professor: "Yes."
Dense student: "So gravity is a construct of our minds?"
Professor: "Um, well, er..."

I sort of follow this and yet I don't understand it. I mean there's a difference between unicorns and gravity. Unlike the former, "gravity" (the stuff/something that our model is referring to) affects rocks, humans, squirrels, planets, stars, galaxies, etc. I understand that our present model/theory of gravity is likely not final as we cannot foresee what a future theory of quantum gravity, etc. will be like, but our model is talking about some aspect of an observer independent reality; that is, the mathematical structure of the theory refers to or represents something that there is in the world independently of our theories.
 
  • #71
bohm2 said:
I sort of follow this and yet I don't understand it. I mean there's a difference between unicorns and gravity. Unlike the former, "gravity" (the stuff/something that our model is referring to) affects rocks, humans, squirrels, planets, stars, galaxies, etc. I understand that our present model/theory of gravity is likely not final as we cannot foresee what a future theory of quantum gravity, etc. will be like, but our model is talking about some aspect of an observer independent reality; that is, the mathematical structure of the theory refers to or represents something that there is in the world independently of our theories.

I would say that Ken G considers the mind to be the fundamental framework that encompasses our reality and provides a logical limit to what we can know through science (how can we step outside of the mind to examine its scientific place in “something”?)

So theories do not tell us anything scientific about mind independent reality, rather they can only tell us about consistencies within mind dependent reality. But I believe Ken takes this further – that even the elementary observation that excludes any kind of cognitive analysis of a rock falling to the ground is a product of the mind, the event has no scientific place within mind independent reality only a philosophical one.

I agree with all of that, but I stop short of what seems to me to be a stance of radical idealism. I’m not at all sure that this is a philosophically satisfactory stance; certainly Bernard d’Espagnat (his book “Veiled Reality”) puts forward philosophical arguments that suggest there is an external “something” to phenomena than just constructs of the mind. In this sense I find intersubjective agreement to be perplexing in terms of radical idealism along with the notion that within this stance knowledge comes before existence.

But the basic statement of Ken that says, the only thing we will ever have in our reality in which to establish “knowledge” is the mind, is quite stark and surely true. There appears no means, even in principle, of stepping outside of our minds, ever.
 
  • #72
bohm2 said:
I sort of follow this and yet I don't understand it. I mean there's a difference between unicorns and gravity. Unlike the former, "gravity" (the stuff/something that our model is referring to) affects rocks, humans, squirrels, planets, stars, galaxies, etc. I understand that our present model/theory of gravity is likely not final as we cannot foresee what a future theory of quantum gravity, etc. will be like, but our model is talking about some aspect of an observer independent reality; that is, the mathematical structure of the theory refers to or represents something that there is in the world independently of our theories.
It sounds like your definition of gravity would be something like "whatever it is that exists independently of our theories that makes our theories work." I'm fine with that, but note that this is not the way gravity gets used in physics. Gravity, in physics, is not whatever makes the theories work, it's just the theories, period. This is demonstrable-- we never test what makes the theories work, we test the theories.
 
  • #73
Len M said:
So theories do not tell us anything scientific about mind independent reality, rather they can only tell us about consistencies within mind dependent reality.
Yes, I couldn't have said it better.
But I believe Ken takes this further – that even the elementary observation that excludes any kind of cognitive analysis of a rock falling to the ground is a product of the mind, the event has no scientific place within mind independent reality only a philosophical one.
Yes, the "scientific place" is just what mind-dependent reality is, because the purpose of science is to replace (or represent) a mind-independent reality (if it is believed to exist) with a mind-dependent one (which is not a matter of belief, it is demonstrable).
I agree with all of that, but I stop short of what seems to me to be a stance of radical idealism. I’m not at all sure that this is a philosophically satisfactory stance; certainly Bernard d’Espagnat (his book “Veiled Reality”) puts forward philosophical arguments that suggest there is an external “something” to phenomena than just constructs of the mind.
I actually have no issue with the philosophical stance that there is some reality "out there" that we are interacting with when we form the scientific image of mind-dependent reality. I just don't think it matters to science whether or not such a thing exists, and none of the language of science refers to it. The confusion that comes up is that invariably people ask, "so you think there was no universe out there before humans came along?", but to that I simply say "you cannot make any sense of the phrase 'before humans came along' until you think like a human. So yes, I do think there was a universe out there before humans came along, and the reason I think that is because I think like a human, and so clearly everything I am talking about is the universe that humans think about, not some mind-independent version for which I cannot even define the words I'm using."

In this sense I find intersubjective agreement to be perplexing in terms of radical idealism along with the notion that within this stance knowledge comes before existence.
Yes, physics always leaves us with the question "why does this work at all?", including "why is there any such thing as objectivity or intersubjective agreement?" We don't know the answers to these, they might not even be questions that physics is capable of answering (just as no mathematical structure can be used to understand why its axioms are held to be true). I would say that all we can really say is that we know it does work, for what it works at, and we have no idea why, and even if we ever did get some idea why, it would not be a glimpse into mind-independent reality-- it would just be a deeper glimpse into mind-dependent reality, we would get some insight into how our minds work such that physics works, but we never escape the fact that all we get to know about reality is always the mind-dependent version. This is virtually tautologically true.
But the basic statement of Ken that says, the only thing we will ever have in our reality in which to establish “knowledge” is the mind, is quite stark and surely true. There appears no means, even in principle, of stepping outside of our minds, ever.
Exactly the issue. So instead of bemoaning that we cannot step outside our minds, or pretend that we can, we should simply embrace this truth, stop claiming physics is something it never was, and start accepting what it really is-- as Bohr said, it is what we can say about nature (using our minds).
 
  • #74
I think what you both (Ken G and Len M) are saying is obvious, as I said in other thread about this.

But the thing is that many people don't understand what you are saying at all. I have seen here people criticizing Ken G but showing that they did not understand what he is saying at all.
 
  • #75
Ken G said:
Exactly the issue. So instead of bemoaning that we cannot step outside our minds, or pretend that we can, we should simply embrace this truth, stop claiming physics is something it never was, and start accepting what it really is-- as Bohr said, it is what we can say about nature (using our minds).
I don't think a scientific realist will deny that our cognitive structures puts a limit on how we interpret the world and they do not deny the limitations of our mathematical models available to us to describe the world but I think there is disagreement with respect to this point below:
However, it is important to recognise that there is a very obvious difficulty with the thought that what can be said provides a constitutive contribution to what can be real and that physics correspondingly concerns what we can say about nature. Simply reflect that some explanation needs to be given of where the relevant constraints on what can be said come from. Surely there could be no other source for these constraints than the way the world actually is-it can't merely be a matter of language. It is because of the unbending nature of the world that we find the need to move, for example, from classical to quantum physics; that we find the need to revise our theories in the face of recalcitrant experience. Zeilinger and Bohr (in the quotation above) would thus seem to be putting the cart before the horse, to at least some degree. Schematically, it's the way the world is (independently of our attempted description or systematisation of it) that determines what can usefully be said about it, and that ultimately determines what sets of concepts will prove most appropriate in our scientific theorising. It is failure to recognise this simple truth that accounts, I suggest, for the otherwise glaring nonsequitur in the proposed answer to `Why the quantum?'...Of course, what statements can be made depends on what concepts we possess; and, trivially, in order to succeed in making a statement, one needs to obey the appropriate linguistic rules. But the point at issue is what can make one set of concepts more fit for our scientific theorising than another? For example, why do we have to replace commuting classical physical quantities with non-commuting quantum observables?
Information, Immaterialism, Instrumentalism: Old and New in Quantum Information
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~bras2317/iii_2.pdf
 
  • #76
mattt said:
I think what you both (Ken G and Len M) are saying is obvious, as I said in other thread about this.

But the thing is that many people don't understand what you are saying at all. I have seen here people criticizing Ken G but showing that they did not understand what he is saying at all.
Yes, I think that's all true. The point itself is obvious, but its ramifications are not. Some complain about the point because they reject the ramifications, but it is often because they leap too far into thinking what it implies. Two examples are, the common claims that if all physics language is mind-dependent, then we shouldn't be able to talk about the universe before there were minds (we are only now making sense of what came before), or that we could not all agree on the laws if they weren't independent of us (we are all quite similar, so why wouldn't we agree on laws that come from how we look at things?). So it is the objections based on false ramifications that fall through, not the claims themselves.
 
  • #77
bohm2 said:
I don't think a scientific realist will deny that our cognitive structures puts a limit on how we interpret the world and they do not deny the limitations of our mathematical models available to us to describe the world but I think there is disagreement with respect to this point below:
That argument is a classic example of what I am talking about. They claim to be refuting the idea that physics is entirely 100% what we can say about nature and nothing more, even though it is, by saying that if physics wasn't about something else, it couldn't work. There is no basis for that argument at all. We have no idea why physics works, and hence we also have no idea when it wouldn't work.
 
  • #78
Vectronix said:
Hi :)

I recently read a book that states that most scientists believe the wave function represents a real field (i.e., one that possesses energy and momentum). I think this is part of the transactional interpretation of QM but not sure... can anyone confirm whether the book I read is right about this or not?
Afaik, the conventional/mainstream interpretation of QM is that it's a probabilty calculus. That is, it's a mathematical system designed to calculate the probabilities of instrumental results. It's not a description of reality. And doesn't necessarily inform wrt what's going on wrt the behavior in realms that aren't amenable to our normal sensory apprehension.
 
  • #79
ThomasT said:
Afaik, the conventional/mainstream interpretation of QM is that it's a probabilty calculus. That is, it's a mathematical system designed to calculate the probabilities of instrumental results. It's not a description of reality. And doesn't necessarily inform wrt what's going on wrt the behavior in realms that aren't amenable to our normal sensory apprehension.
What's more, the same statement can be made about all of physics-- there's nothing about quantum mechanics that makes it more true than it always was. Quantum mechanics is simply the place where we are forced to part with our illusions to the contrary. What gets me is, I simply don't see any reason why anyone would hesitate to see physics for exactly what it is, what it does, and what is demonstrable about it. From where comes the need for pretense it is something else? Do the equations work differently if we pretend they correspond to some reality that physics is probing, other than the reality that emerges when we use our minds and senses? What is mind-independent, or sensory-independent, about that interaction? What is mind-independent, or sensory-independent, about anything in physics at all?

What's more, I don't see it as some kind of "bitter pill" to recognize that physics is something we humans participate in. Indeed, quite the contrary-- I think it is quite freeing to recognize that, and I suspect it will be more and more important, going forward into future theories, to continue to bear this in mind. The naivete of the "fly on the wall" physicist is gone forever from our most fundamental theories, vive la difference.
 
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  • #80
Ken G said:
What's more, the same statement can be made about all of physics-- there's nothing about quantum mechanics that makes it more true than it always was. Quantum mechanics is simply the place where we are forced to part with our illusions to the contrary. What gets me is, I simply don't see any reason why anyone would hesitate to see physics for exactly what it is, what it does, and what is demonstrable about it. From where comes the need for pretense it is something else? Do the equations work differently if we pretend they correspond to some reality that physics is probing, other than the reality that emerges when we use our minds and senses? What is mind-independent, or sensory-independent, about that interaction? What is mind-independent, or sensory-independent, about anything in physics at all?

What's more, I don't see it as some kind of "bitter pill" to recognize that physics is something we humans participate in. Indeed, quite the contrary-- I think it is quite freeing to recognize that, and I suspect it will be more and more important, going forward into future theories, to continue to bear this in mind. The naivete of the "fly on the wall" physicist is gone forever from our most fundamental theories, vive la difference.

One (social) concern is to clearly make this point in a way that it cannot be confused by persons not appreciating the issues of the question, who would highjack the authority of science to rationalize their wish-fulfilling mystical beliefs. In short we don't want the magicians saying "See this proves ESP and 'mind over matter' "!

Of course this is an absurd misinterpretation but there are no limits to human absurdity, e.g. http://www.churchofquantumconsciousness.com
 
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  • #81
apeiron said:
What's more, the same statement can be made about all of physics-- there's nothing about quantum mechanics that makes it more true than it always was. Quantum mechanics is simply the place where we are forced to part with our illusions to the contrary.
I hadn't ever thought of it like that. But it makes sense. Ie., due to QM we're forced to face the apparent fact that the mathematical theories aren't precisely corresponding to the qualitative characteristics of an underlying reality. And this goes for classical as well as quantum physics.

apeiron said:
What gets me is, I simply don't see any reason why anyone would hesitate to see physics for exactly what it is, what it does, and what is demonstrable about it. From where comes the need for pretense it is something else?
I suppose that's attributable to some scale/regime specific stuff that QM isn't designed to deal with. That is, human nature.
 
  • #82
jambaugh said:
One (social) concern is to clearly make this point in a way that it cannot be confused by persons not appreciating the issues of the question, who would highjack the authority of science to rationalize their wish-fulfilling mystical beliefs. In short we don't want the magicians saying "See this proves ESP and 'mind over matter' "!

Of course this is an absurd misinterpretation but there are no limits to human absurdity, e.g. http://www.churchofquantumconsciousness.com
This is a good point also, imho. Because people do sometimes, quite incorrectly, misinterpret and adopt stuff from quantum theory to support their social agendas.
 
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  • #83
ThomasT said:
I hadn't ever thought of it like that. But it makes sense. Ie., due to QM we're forced to face the apparent fact that the mathematical theories aren't precisely corresponding to the qualitative characteristics of an underlying reality. And this goes for classical as well as quantum physics.

By qualitative, I'm guessing here you mean intrinsic? If you are, I think I agree but was it any different in classical physics? I think an argument can be given that we were always ignorant of the intrinsic properties of matter. I think this is the point that Russell, Eddington and Stoljar, more recently, has argued; that is, physics can tell us only about the dispositional or relational properties of matter, but since dispositions ultimately require categorical properties as bases, and relations ultimately require intrinsic properties as relata, there must also be categorical or intrinsic properties about which physics is silent. Or so goes the argument. As Van Fraassen points out:
If all the ‘observable’ (in the physicist’s sense) properties of an object can be represented in structural terms, then what is the nature of the ontological residuum?...If there is something to nature besides its structure, but structure is all that science describes or can describe, then what is that something, that undescribed and indescribable something...? But what sense does it make to try and conceive of structure that is not structure of something? Structure of nothing is nothing, isn’t that so?
Structuralism(s) about science: some common problems.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2007.00150.x/pdf

So our model of "electrons" presumably is not be based on any sort of direct access to the particle’s intrinsic nature, but rather must be based on information about the particle’s behavior, reflected in the overall configuration of the particles (Jeremy Butterfield). But I still don't think this necessitates an anti-realist view (e.g. that the world does not exist independently of the human mind). For example, chemical facts that were not necessitated by physical facts in the past turned out later to be frustrated by then unknown physical facts (e.g. unification of chemistry with physics didn`t happen until the physics changed via quantum mechanics and then everything made more sense).
 
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  • #84
jambaugh said:
... reading further. Ah!, Ballentine is a realist! He wants to preserve reality ... near the end of p361 "...in contract the statistical interpretation considers the a particle to always be at some position in space, each position being realized with relative frequency |\psi(r)|^2 in an ensemble of similarly prepared experiments."[/color]

Well, it seems to me that one of the points of Bell's analysis of the twin-particle version of the EPR experiment is that a realistic interpretation of that kind is not so easy to make coherent. In the case of position, you can consistently believe that a particle has a position at every moment, but you just don't know what it is. But in the case of spin, is it consistent to believe that the particle simultaneously has a spin in the x-direction, the y-direction and the z-direction, but you just don't know what it is? It seems to me that Bell's argument shows that it's not consistent to believe that (and also believe in locality).
 
  • #85
bohm2 said:
By qualitative, I'm guessing here you mean intrinsic?
By qualitative I mean an apprehension of what's happening wrt our sensory capabilities (this is what understanding refers to). I'm not sure what intrinsic means.

bohm2 said:
If you are, I think I agree but was it any different in classical physics?
No, but it was the disparity between quantum experimental phenomena and the visualizability of the mathematics that accounted for it that made us realize that we really don't, and perhaps can't, maybe ever, have an accurate qualitative apprehension of the reality underlying instrumental behavior.

bohm2 said:
I think an argument can be given that we were always ignorant of the intrinsic properties of matter.
I don't think in terms of intrinsic properties of matter.

bohm2 said:
I think this is the point that Russell, Eddington and Stoljar, more recently, has argued; that is, physics can tell us only about the dispositional or relational properties of matter, but since dispositions ultimately require categorical properties as bases, and relations ultimately require intrinsic properties as relata, there must also be categorical or intrinsic properties about which physics is silent. Or so goes the argument. As Van Fraassen points out:

Structuralism(s) about science: some common problems.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2007.00150.x/pdf

So our model of "electrons" presumably is not be based on any sort of direct access to the particle’s intrinsic nature, but rather must be based on information about the particle’s behavior, reflected in the overall configuration of the particles (Jeremy Butterfield). But I still don't think this necessitates an anti-realist view (e.g. that the world does not exist independently of the human mind). For example, chemical facts that were not necessitated by physical facts in the past turned out later to be frustrated by then unknown physical facts (e.g. unification of chemistry with physics didn`t happen until the physics changed via quantum mechanics and then everything made more sense).
I wouldn't say that thinking that the world exists independently of the human mind characterizes the realist view. It seems to me that all physical sciences, including quantum physics, assume that the world exists independently of the human mind. But standard quantum theory is certainly not realistic. Is it?
 
  • #86
ThomasT said:
I'm not sure what intrinsic means.

A simple and obvious example is subjectivity/inner experience/qualia. We all seem to have special "access" to it that we have to nothing else. No matter how detailed the physics/molecular biology/neuroscience gets, even if we knew all the neural correlates of consciousness, a scientist will never be able to see/feel/experience/know your thoughts/inner experience/phenomenology. So it's argued that a brain (as presently understood) is not a mind, although the former seems to provide the structure/mechanisms for the latter. The same argument goes with other "material" objects in physics. Russell writes:
Physics is mathematical, not because we know so much about the 'physical world’ (and here he means the non-mental, non-experiential world) but because we know so little: it is only its mathematical properties that we can discover. For the rest, our knowledge is negative...The physical world is only known as regards certain abstract features of its space-time structure — features which, because of their abstractness, do not suffice to show whether the physical world is, or is not, different in intrinsic character from the world of mind.
 
  • #87
I can not even prove there are other "minds" out there besides my own "mind".

I know I can think/feel/perceive and have to suppose other "things" I perceive as "people" can think/feel/perceive as well, that "they" have a "mind" too.

So if I can not prove that there are other minds out there, neither I can prove there are "anything independent of my mind" (whatever it may mean).

But be it whatever it may be, the thing is that I have perception/sensory inputs, and all Science do is to organize rationally all that "sensory/experimental data" avoiding innecesary dogmas.

Be aware that all that perception/sensory data that I know I have, could be made by some kind of Matrix (you know, the film). In that case, all Science do again is to organize rationally all that "sensory/experimental data" avoiding innecesay dogmas, so that I can have the only one rational and consistent organization of all that data, even if the "world" that data "produce" is the one Matrix show me (and could have nothing to do with "the other world outside Matrix").

So ALL I could ever say about "this world" is "mind-dependent" in exactly that sense.

If all these galaxies, planets, physics, all I can perceive and think of, is "the world Matrix shows me" or just any other thing altogether, is a metaphysical question that Science can not treat.

But again, be it whatever ("trascendentally or mind-independent") it may be, Science is the only rational and consistent way of organizing all the perception/sensory data that constitute my "mind-dependent world" (the only one I will ever have access to).

EDIT: I am just learning English, so probably I didn't use the proper words to express what I wanted.
 
  • #88
jambaugh said:
One (social) concern is to clearly make this point in a way that it cannot be confused by persons not appreciating the issues of the question, who would highjack the authority of science to rationalize their wish-fulfilling mystical beliefs. In short we don't want the magicians saying "See this proves ESP and 'mind over matter' "!

Of course this is an absurd misinterpretation but there are no limits to human absurdity, e.g. http://www.churchofquantumconsciousness.com
Yes, that is a difficult distinction to make for people who are used to black-and-white thinking (either empirical science is the final truth or truth can be anything I want it to be, so any cool person in the armor of the first is an excuse for the second!). Frankly, I don't really care what anyone chooses to believe if it jazzes them to do so, but I do feel sorry for people looking for guidance about where to put their faith such that it will generate empirical returns! To them I just say, if you want empirically meaningful outcomes, stick to empirically established evidence. If you just think something is "cool" to believe, it's a free country.
 
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  • #89
ThomasT said:
I hadn't ever thought of it like that. But it makes sense. Ie., due to QM we're forced to face the apparent fact that the mathematical theories aren't precisely corresponding to the qualitative characteristics of an underlying reality. And this goes for classical as well as quantum physics.
I think that was actually me you quoted, and I agree with you-- the relationship between mathematics and reality is even harder to understand than the relationship between physics and reality! Physics is fairly straightforward-- we make observations and build mathematical models that make sense of how we interact with what we are observing. But what then is the meaning of a mathematical proof, and why do we care what can be proven rather than what can be tested? It's a place to get into the Godel theorems.
 
  • #90
Ken G said:
[...] Frankly, I don't really care what anyone chooses to believe if it jazzes them to do so, but I do feel sorry for people looking for guidance about where to put their faith such that it will generate empirical returns! To them I just say, if you want empirically meaningful outcomes, stick to empirically established evidence. If you just think something is "cool" to believe, it's a free country.

Yea, freedom is necessarily freedom to make mistakes. And I'm just as ambivalent about what others choose to believe privately. What gets my goat is public misrepresentations about what science says. I've cringed and yelled too many times when Sci. Fi. show X has the line "Quantum theory predicts __[insert nonsense here]__". Yes I know its a plot device and its just TV. BUT the same people who hear this nonsense and buys it, vote for representatives who control e.g. research appropriations, and education funding, and curriculum policy in public schools. When people either believe the nonsense, or knowing its nonsense believe that legitimate scientists believe the nonsense, then this will affect their social and political behavior. There's a growing movement away from the trust in science that we had in the 40's 50's and into the 60's. A rise in belief in mystic nonsense and confusion about what science actually is. I see a "proper" interpretation of QM as the culmination of true science (and what I consider "silly nonsense interpretations" as total anti-scientific mysticism). But the lesson is lost in the drone of nonsense.

Well I'm ranting and I'll cease. It's the teacher in me, both the desire to lecture and the lament at a lost opportunity for people to understand.
 
  • #91
I see what you mean, though I don't think the biggest problem comes from quantum mysticism. If people even know the word "quantum" in relation to science, even if only science fiction, they are well ahead of a lot of the people who are doing that voting. Is the problem with people who want their own religious beliefs in schools that they think physics is too mystical, or not mystical enough?
 
  • #92
Ken G said:
I see what you mean, though I don't think the biggest problem comes from quantum mysticism. If people even know the word "quantum" in relation to science, even if only science fiction, they are well ahead of a lot of the people who are doing that voting.
Ahead? as in "lost but I'm making good time!"? I don't know. I'm just venting my spleen. Bad science in popular culture is to me worse than rising mystic fantasy.

Is the problem with people who want their own religious beliefs in schools that they think physics is too mystical, or not mystical enough?
I think they can't appreciate the distinction between mysticism and science. They take either on authority and they (by my ranting reckoning) don't get a valid picture of scientific authority with which to compare to the televangelists and colonic irrigation quacks. You have people dying who might not because they put their trust in the wrong authority (e.g. Steve Jobs). You have government healthcare paying for pseudo-scientific crap-for-treatments. You have... [nipping rant in the bud...] other stuff I don't need to get my blood pressure up about. Anyway, it gets my dander up and I can go on and on. But that's another thread.
 
  • #93
jambaugh said:
Ahead? as in "lost but I'm making good time!"? I don't know. I'm just venting my spleen. Bad science in popular culture is to me worse than rising mystic fantasy.
I hear you. And I agree that recognizing the human role in physics is not the same thing as saying every person can have their own physics. The problem is in the term "subjective"-- it has two very different possible meanings. One is "up to each person, with no requirement to agree", and that is what most people mean. But that isn't subjectivity in physics, the latter is more like "depending in some way on the subject rather than just the object". Since all humans are more or less the same, in regard to physics observation anyway, subjectivity does not imply we all have our own physics, in the way that we all have our own subjective beliefs.
I think they can't appreciate the distinction between mysticism and science. They take either on authority and they (by my ranting reckoning) don't get a valid picture of scientific authority with which to compare to the televangelists and colonic irrigation quacks. You have people dying who might not because they put their trust in the wrong authority (e.g. Steve Jobs). You have government healthcare paying for pseudo-scientific crap-for-treatments. You have... [nipping rant in the bud...] other stuff I don't need to get my blood pressure up about.
Yes, I think there are two very separate issues here-- one is alternative medicine, and there the "mystical" elements of science are most problematic, and the other is education around things like evolution, which is more about whether people pay any attention to science in the first place. Science needs to distinguish itself from both of those, which forces science to sometimes mischaracterize itself as "an exact science." Then on the other hand you have people like Feynman who understand science much better and define it as maintaining a constant state of skepticism and higher regard for evidence than authority. So what do we do, be honest about what science is, and risk people misappropriating it, or lie about what science is, and violate one of the most central principles of science itself? It's clear what Feynman thought-- always say what's true, and to heck with the consequences! But he could get away with that, having a reputation as a bit of an eccentric...
 
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