More Documentation
The 1987 Stock Market crash
While the 1987 stock market crash had a relatively mild after affect, it is one of the early examples of the risk of the new unregulated leveraged markets that took off in the 1980's Here are two articles that discuss it, one by a contributor to Forbes Magazine, the other a Federal Reserve Discussion Paper.
http://www.thebubblebubble.com/1987-crash/
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200713/200713pap.pdf
Both of these papers discuss how leveraged trading strategies - in particular Portfolio Insurance and Index Arbitrage - catalyzed the largest one day drop ever in the market.
They also indicate how the stock market - during the vaunted Reagan recovery - was bolstered by low interest rates, leveraged buyouts, IPO's, mergers, hostile takeovers, and a general investment euphoria. These were the days of junk bonds, Michael Millikan's $500 million dollar a year bonus, soaring P/E ratios and the advent of computerized trading of equities.
I have included a page of financial data history such as market prices, bond yields. P/E ratios etc for reference.
http://www.sniper.at/stock-market-crash-of-1987.htm
The crash seems to be attributed to panic that ensued after several things happened. Here is the description in the Fedeal Reserve Paper.
First, news organizations reported that the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives had filed legislation to eliminate tax benefits associated with financing mergers (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Report 1988,p.3-10). Stocks’values were reassessed as investors reduced the odds that certain companies would be take-over targets. Second, the Commerce Department’s announcement of the trade deficit for August was notably above expectations. On this news, the dollar declined and expectations that the Federal Reserve would tighten policy increased (Wall Street Journal 1987b). Interest rates rose, putting further downward pressure on equity prices (see Figure 2).
On Thursday, equity markets continued to decline. Some of this decrease was attributed to anxiety among institutions, especially pension funds, and among individual investors, which led to a movement of funds from stocks into the relative safety of bonds (Wall Street Journal 1987c). There was also heavy selling during the last half hour of the day amid heavier-than-usual activity by portfolio insurers (Brady Report 1988, p. 21).
Markets continued to decline on Friday, as ongoing anxiety was augmented by some technical factors. A variety of stock index options expired on Friday; price movements during the previous two days had eliminated many at-the-money options so that investors could not easily roll their positions into new contracts for hedging purposes. These developments pushed more investors into the futures markets, where they sold futures contracts as a hedge against falling stocks. Increased sales of futures contracts created a price discrepancy between the value of the stock index in the futures market and the value of the stocks on the NYSE. Index arbitrage traders reportedly took advantage of this price discrepancy to buy futures and sell stocks, which transmitted the downward pressures to the NYSE (Brady Report 1988, Study III, p. 12).
By the end of the day on Friday, markets had fallen considerably, with the S&P 500 down over nine percent for the week. This decrease was one of the largest one-week declines of the preceeding couple of decades, and it helped set the stage for the turmoil the following week (Wall Street Journal 1987d). Portfolio insurers were left with an “overhang” as their models suggested that they should sell more stocks or futures contracts (SEC Report 1988, p. 2-10). Mutual funds experienced redemptions and needed to sell shares (Brady Report 1988, p. 29). Further, some aggressive institutions anticipated the portfolio insurance sales and mutual fund redemptions and wanted to pre-empt the sales by selling first (Brady Report 1988, p. 29; SEC Report 1988, p. 3- 12). ..."
This is an interesting account and the entire event deserves careful study because it exhibits the dangers of an unregulated leveraged market. It shows how a price bubble driven by euphoria and leveraged speculation can be rapidly burst when the factors driving the bubble go away. This can be a change in tax law, a rise in interest rates, a bad economic report, and so on. It also shows how the use of financial derivatives - in this case futures contracts and portfolio insurance (which is a "replicated" put option on the stock market) - can magnify a decline into a crash.
An important thing to note is that with such a huge decline in stock prices, the stock exchange itself was at risk of breaking down . This is because stock specialists financed their positions in stock on bank borrowing using the stock as collateral The banks became reluctant to finance these positions because the stocks had lost significant value and there was huge risk still remaining. BTW: This sort of financing is common in securities markets. In Government bonds, the market for this type of short term - usually overnight - borrowing is called the Repo market.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portfolio_insurance