I Is Free Will a Foundational Assumption in Quantum Theory?

[Lynch101]

Yes, that's a nice example of two mutually correlated phenomena.

My apologies! I know it probably makes things even more frustrating when someone doesn't even realize they understand certain basics. I've kind of gotten into a habit of presuming there must be a more complicated meaning to most terms I meet

 

[Lynch101]

You're missing the point. Even if the universe is completely deterministic, there is no correlation between certain data.

For example, suppose you and I in separate rooms wrote down a sequence of numbers.

Determinism might suggest that both sequences were inevitable from the big bang. But not that they are correlated.

If we find that the sequences are always the same, then that requires a different explanation. Determinism alone cannot achieve that.

Why would you and I always write the same numbers in a sequence? it doesn't matter that both sequences were determined at the big bang. Why are they the same?

Superdeterminism goes further - and further than Bell hints in what he says. In order to explain QM through superdeterminism you have the equivalent of a god who is playing tricks on us.

Thank you Perok, this explanation has helped to clarify the question a little further, particularly the question "why are they the same?"

Are they the same every time, or just the same when a particular question is asked? Say, if we are both asked to write a sequence of prime numbers, we will always write the same?

I have seen that there are 4 possible answers to this question, namely that they involve giving up either:
1) Realism
2) Locality
3) Locality and Realism
4) Free Will

It's the 4th option I'm trying to get a handle on. If it isn't Free Will in the sense that it is commonly understood, what is a more precise interpretation of it? Is it "simply" indeterminism or the notion that the future is open and not predetermined? If we look backward in time, would such a universe appear to be deterministic?

 

[PeroK]

Thank you Perok, this explanation has helped to clarify the question a little further, particularly the question "why are they the same?"

Are they the same every time, or just the same when a particular question is asked? Say, if we are both asked to write a sequence of prime numbers, we will always write the same?

I have seen that there are 4 possible answers to this question, namely that they involve giving up either:
1) Realism
2) Locality
3) Locality and Realism
4) Free Will

It's the 4th option I'm trying to get a handle on. If it isn't Free Will in the sense that it is commonly understood, what is a more precise interpretation of it? Is it "simply" indeterminism or the notion that the future is open and not predetermined? If we look backward in time, would such a universe appear to be deterministic?

Let's assume that the numbers are always all the same. So, we decide we do not have "free will". Then we decide to let some outside agency decide for us. We'll count the cars going past our labs in a specified minute, say.

Every day, at 12 noon, we do this. We both agree, by the way, that we had no choice: that this decision was inevitable from the big bang. No free will in any of this.

Now, what if the numbers are still the same? Why does you and I having no free will mean that the number of cars passing our respective laboratories is correlated?

Getting rid of free will does not help in the case of QM and Bell's theorem, because the experimenters can decide to use an outside agency to decide on a measurement angle.

It's not enough that we had no choice to use these data sources. That doesn't explain why the data sources we did choose are correlated in any way that is meaningful to our experiment.

To explain QM you must, in this case, employ some superdeterministic theory that correlates data that have no good reason to be correlated.

 

[PeroK]

To add to my post above. Let's simplify things and have us roll dice instead. You can if you wish check that:

You get 1-6 with equal frequency ( I.e probability) and I get 1-6 also with equal probability.

You can also check that our dice rolls are independent and uncorrelated. That means the equation posted earlier by @Demystifier is satisfied.

This is the basis of applying probability theory, as it is applied in Bell's theorem.

If we use this data (our dice rolls) to make decisions in a QM experiment that leads to an "unexpected" correlation in the results of that experiment. Then either we accept the correlation is inherent in the experiment. Or, we reject the lack of correlation in the dice rolling. This latter idea is not the loss of free will, but superdeterminism: somehow everything in the universe conspires to produce data that looks uncorrelated on one level, but at some other level is deeply correlated.

It's nothing to do with free will, per se.

 

[Quantum Alchemy]

Summary: Is "free will", as it is usually interpreted, a foundational assumption of QM?

Summary: Is "free will", as it is usually interpreted, a foundational assumption of QM?

I've done a search using the term "free will" and have done a ctrl+f "free will" to go through those threads but I feel that the best way to find definitive clarification on my question is to ask specific, targeted questions in a separate thread. The specific questions I have are:

1) Is "free will" a foundational assumption in Quantum Theory?
I've read a few different things about the notion of Free Will in Bell's Theorem and have read a few articles about "closing the free will loophole". In this video the author suggests that Bell's Theorem implies that we must give up our notions of either Realism, Locality, Local and Realism, or Free Will. Is it fair to say then that [the generally understood notion of] Free Will is a foundational assumption in QT?

2) Is Free Will a foundational assumption of the scientific method?
In reading up on Free Will in Quantum Theory, I have come across the notion that Free Will is a foundational assumption in the practice of sicence itself. Is this the case?

2) If there is no "free will", does that mean that the universe must be superdeterministic?
I'm not particularly interested in the implications of superdeterminism, or what it necessitates, I'm just interested in the the necessity of it as a conclusion, if Free Will does not exist.

I think Free Will has to be a foundational assumption in Quantum Theory for a couple of reasons.

1. The Experimenter's choice has to be a free choice or there would be some hidden variable that determines what measurement can or can't occur prior to an experiment taking place. This is essentially the Free Will Theorem and the Strong Free Will Theorem. If, as the Experimenter, my choice is predetermined, then this information has to be relayed to the quantum system prior to any measurement occurring.

2. We have a free choice but that choice is limited by what outcomes can occur. So I can roll a pair of dice a gazillion times and at the end of the day I can only roll a 2-12. So the question is, how restrained are the outcomes that can occur that are allowed by the initial conditions of the universe.

We see a universe filled with planets, galaxies, stars, black holes, comets and more but these things occur again and again. NASA was saying when it comes to exoplanets, the universe favors smaller Earth sized planets. The question is, how fine tuned or how random are the initial conditions that determine what outcomes can or can't occur. Are we looking at an infinity of universes that's similar to ours which would suggest the outcomes that can occur are very restrained or are we looking at 10^500 false vacua that would allow for an almost infinite set of initial conditions that can occur. The probabilities that can occur in QM seem to be restrained as to the frequency of there occurrence just like a 7 has the probability of occurring more frequently than a 2 as you keep rolling the dice or a 3 of a kind has the probability of occurring more frequently than a full house as you play more games of Poker.

 

[Stephen Tashi]

1. The Experimenter's choice has to be a free choice or there would be some hidden variable that determines what measurement can or can't occur prior to an experiment taking place.

Post #2 addresses that point.

We don't require actual human beings selecting what to measure do we? Visualizing human beings as selecting the measurements is merely a compelling way of describing situations - e.g. the "Bob and Alice" stories. Is there an example where the human beings must make decisions by conscious deliberation? Or is the role of the human beings in the story merely to choose what to do in a probablistic manner? The common notion of "free will", as applied to myself, doesn't say I make random decisions according to certain probabilities - although a person observing my behavior might model it as stochastic! If I had to make a sequence of decisions in a truly stochastic way, I'd make a decision about what random number generator to use or what apparently random phenomenon to use and then let that process make the individual decisons. Otherwise, I suspect my own habits and biases would violate whatever proabilities I was trying to implement.

The common notion of free will as involving conscious deliberation may have nothing to do with QM, but since the original poster is asking about "free will" in a broad sense, we should clarify what aspects of "free will" in the broad sense are needed in various interpretations of QM - as opposed to what aspects of free will are useful in illustrating QM with stories.

 

[WWGD]

I hope I am not too far off but how could someone argue for determinism in a situation such as the three-pendulum experiment? Are outcomes predetermined to be essentially unpredictable/random?

 

[PeterDonis]

how could someone argue for determinism in a situation such as the three-pendulum experiment?

Determinism is not the same thing as predictability. Nonlinear deterministic systems can exhibit chaos, which means that even though they are deterministic, they have such a sensitive dependence on initial conditions that their behavior is unpredictable in practice.

 

[WWGD]

Determinism is not the same thing as predictability. Nonlinear deterministic systems can exhibit chaos, which means that even though they are deterministic, they have such a sensitive dependence on initial conditions that their behavior is unpredictable in practice.

Edit: So I guess we may just not have a precise-enough calibration of measurements to pinpoint the initial conditions closely-enough.

 

[PeterDonis]

I guess we may just not have a precise-enough calibration of measurements to pinpoint the initial conditions closely-enough.

Yes.

 

[WWGD]

Yes.

So is this view of superdeterminism somehow "orthogonal " to that of MWI? If the measurement is pre-determined by the initial tuning then there is only one possible outcome?

 

[PeterDonis]

is this view of superdeterminism somehow "orthogonal " to that of MWI?

I wasn't describing superdeterminism, I was just describing determinism. Determinism does not necessarily imply superdeterminism.

As far as the MWI is concerned, the unitary dynamics of QM, which is what the MWI claims governs everything, is deterministic, but it is not nonlinear; the Schrodinger Equation is linear. So there is no chaos--no sensitive dependence of the initial conditions--in the unitary dynamics of QM. The issue is that the unitary dynamics of QM is for the wave function, which is not something we can measure or observe directly, and it is dynamics in an abstract configuration space, not the spacetime we actually observe.

If the measurement is pre-determined by the initial tuning

It isn't. That's the issue. What is determined by the initial conditions is the wave function, but the wave function does not include any single unique measurement result.

 

[Lynch101]

To add to my post above. Let's simplify things and have us roll dice instead. You can if you wish check that:

You get 1-6 with equal frequency ( I.e probability) and I get 1-6 also with equal probability.

You can also check that our dice rolls are independent and uncorrelated.

Thanks Perok, I was having trouble with the first example you gave, this one I understand better. My understanding of probability stretches this far :)

It might not be necessary, but just in case, I do want to stress that I am not advocating in favor of superdeterminism. I would question the common sense notion of free will which has led me to try and get a better understanding of statements I've heard in relation to Free Will in the context of the foundations of Quanutm Mechanics.

This is the basis of applying probability theory, as it is applied in Bell's theorem.

If we use this data (our dice rolls) to make decisions in a QM experiment that leads to an "unexpected" correlation in the results of that experiment. Then either we accept the correlation is inherent in the experiment. Or, we reject the lack of correlation in the dice rolling. This latter idea is not the loss of free will, but superdeterminism: somehow everything in the universe conspires to produce data that looks uncorrelated on one level, but at some other level is deeply correlated.

It's nothing to do with free will, per se.

I've heard the argument that the act of choosing to use dice itself involves free will, or the freedom of choice of the experimenter. I'm wondering why we would need to use dice in the first place though? Is the purpose of using dice to eliminate [or close the loophole of] Free Will in the first place? If so, would this imply that the commone sense notion of Free Will is a foundational assumption?

I guess, I'm not necessarily interested in the specifics of superdeterminism (SD), rather I'm just wondering if SD is a necessary consequence in the absence of Free Will.

As you allude to above, I have heard the idea that it is not necessarily Free Will as it is commonly thought of, but then I see suggestions - such as the use of dice - as a means to eliminate the common notion of Free Will.

 

[Lynch101]

Post #2 addresses that point.

We don't require actual human beings selecting what to measure do we? Visualizing human beings as selecting the measurements is merely a compelling way of describing situations - e.g. the "Bob and Alice" stories. Is there an example where the human beings must make decisions by conscious deliberation? Or is the role of the human beings in the story merely to choose what to do in a probablistic manner? The common notion of "free will", as applied to myself, doesn't say I make random decisions according to certain probabilities - although a person observing my behavior might model it as stochastic! If I had to make a sequence of decisions in a truly stochastic way, I'd make a decision about what random number generator to use or what apparently random phenomenon to use and then let that process make the individual decisons. Otherwise, I suspect my own habits and biases would violate whatever proabilities I was trying to implement.

The common notion of free will as involving conscious deliberation may have nothing to do with QM, but since the original poster is asking about "free will" in a broad sense, we should clarify what aspects of "free will" in the broad sense are needed in various interpretations of QM - as opposed to what aspects of free will are useful in illustrating QM with stories.

Thank you Stephen!

I have heard the argument made that the simple act of choosing the random number generator involves Free Will. Does Quantum Alchemy's point apply here, about hidden variables that determine what measurement can or can't occur prior to an experiment taking place?

 

[DarMM]

Take for example what is done in some actual Bell Tests. Here we have a pair of entangled photons. A device can measure one of two observables on one of the photons and another device can measure one of two observables on the second.

In each round we get a pair of distant quasars to select which of the observables each device will measure, this is based on the wavelength of light received from the quasars. Bell proved that local causal single valued hidden variables being responsible for the outcomes puts a bound on the correlations in such an experiment. This bound is broken, verifying QM and rejecting such hidden variables.

However it assumes that the distant quasars are uncorrelated with the photons, i.e. that the wavelength of the light from the quasars has nothing to do with the photons created in our lab.

Superdeterminism rejects this. It says that the photons are described by such hidden variables, but that the initial state (or at least a suitably early one) of the universe was such that the state of photons in our lab happen to be in sync with the quasar emission wavelength in such a way as to make it look like QM is true.

The analogue for General Relativity would be that Newtonian Mechanics is correct even for Mercury's orbit, but our telescopes happen to warp or distort images of Mercury due to flaws that emerge thanks to initial conditions in their construction in just such a way as to make it look like General Relativity is true.

 

[Lynch101]

Take for example what is done in some actual Bell Tests. Here we have a pair of entangled photons. A device can measure one of two observables on one of the photons and another device can measure one of two observables on the second.

In each round we get a pair of distant quasars to select which of the observables each device will measure, this is based on the wavelength of light received from the quasars. Bell proved that local causal single valued hidden variables being responsible for the outcomes puts a bound on the correlations in such an experiment. This bound is broken, verifying QM and rejecting such hidden variables.

However it assumes that the distant quasars are uncorrelated with the photons, i.e. that the wavelength of the light from the quasars has nothing to do with the photons created in our lab.

Superdeterminism rejects this. It says that the photons are described by such hidden variables, but that the initial state (or at least a suitably early one) of the universe was such that the state of photons in our lab happen to be in sync with the quasar emission wavelength in such a way as to make it look like QM is true.

The analogue for General Relativity would be that Newtonian Mechanics is correct even for Mercury's orbit, but our telescopes happen to warp or distort images of Mercury due to flaws that emerge thanks to initial conditions in their construction in just such a way as to make it look like General Relativity is true.

Thanks DarMM. I haven't had a chance to try to wrap my head around SD and it certainly sounds like it will take quite a bit of wrapping. I also gather that the consensus is seriously against SD. I'm not particularly interested in it at the moment, and so I'm not trying to defend it. I might be misinterpreting the purpose of your reply, but when I see a critique of SD in this manner it reads like a defense of Free Will by attempting to demolish the alternative. Is that how it can or should be taken?

 

[DarMM]

I might be misinterpreting the purpose of your reply, but when I see a critique of SD in this manner it reads like a defense of Free Will by attempting to demolish the alternative. Is that how it can or should be taken?

It's just a description of Superdeterminism. "Free Will" in the sense used in quantum foundations theorems basically means telescopes don't distort in just the right way when we go to look at Mercury and so on. That the means of observation used to analyse remote systems are not correlated strongly with those remote systems in a way that prevents correct analysis of them.

 

[Elias1960]

John Conway [of the Conway-Kochen-Specker theorem] talks unequivocally about "Free Will" in the common sense form of the idea.
...
Is there any sense in which the common sense notion is related to the usage in QM foundations?

To make common sense free will compatible with classical determinism is not easy, but one can at least try. I would not see any chance to make it compatible with superdeterminism. So, I think common sense free will is something stronger than the rejection of superdeterminism.

 

[Lynch101]

To make common sense free will compatible with classical determinism is not easy, but one can at least try. I would not see any chance to make it compatible with superdeterminism. So, I think common sense free will is something stronger than the rejection of superdeterminism.

I guess the question is, is it necessary to make Free Will compatible with QM?

 

[Demystifier]

I guess the question is, is it necessary to make Free Will compatible with QM?

As long as free will exists, it's necessary to make it compatible with QM. But whether free will exists or not depends on what exactly one means by "free will".

 

[Lynch101]

As long as free will exists, it's necessary to make it compatible with QM. But whether free will exists or not depends on what exactly one means by "free will".

Is there currently an interpretation of it in use in QM?

 

[Demystifier]

Is there currently an interpretation of it in use in QM?

Interpretation of what?

 

[Lord Jestocost]

As long as free will exists, it's necessary to make it compatible with QM. But whether free will exists or not depends on what exactly one means by "free will".

"Despite their claim that they are better equipped than scientists to make conceptual distinctions and evaluate the cogency of arguments, professional philosophers have mistakenly conflated the concepts of "free" and "will." They (con)fuse them with the muddled term "free will," despite clear warnings from John Locke that this would lead to confusion.

Locke said very clearly, as had some ancients like Lucretius, it is not the will that is free (in the sense of undetermined), it is the mind." [bold by LJ]

From: https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/free_will.html

 

[Lynch101]

Interpretation of what?

You said that if Free Will exists then it needs to be accounted for in QM. I'm wondering if there is an interpretation of Free Will in use in QM?

 

[Lynch101]

"Despite their claim that they are better equipped than scientists to make conceptual distinctions and evaluate the cogency of arguments, professional philosophers have mistakenly conflated the concepts of "free" and "will." They (con)fuse them with the muddled term "free will," despite clear warnings from John Locke that this would lead to confusion.

Locke said very clearly, as had some ancients like Lucretius, it is not the will that is free (in the sense of undetermined), it is the mind." [bold by LJ]

From: https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/free_will.html

Is the freedom of the mind the fundamental assumption in QM then and in what sense would you say that "the mind" is free?

EDIT: At the risk of devolving into unrelated philosophical territory, I'm wondering how these issues relate to QM or the foundational questions of QM.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Is the freedom of the mind the fundamental assumption in QM...

Is there a fundamental assumption in QM?
As Aage Bohr, Ben R. Mottelson and Ole Ulfbeck put it in "The Principle Underlying Quantum Mechanics":
"In fact, the quantum mechanical formalism was discovered by ingenious guesswork which was given an interpretation in terms of probabilities for the results of measurements."

 

[Demystifier]

You said that if Free Will exists then it needs to be accounted for in QM. I'm wondering if there is an interpretation of Free Will in use in QM?

See e.g. my http://de.arxiv.org/abs/1006.0338

 

[Lynch101]

See e.g. my http://de.arxiv.org/abs/1006.0338

Thanks Demystifier, the abstract sounds very intersting. I'll give a run through it

 

[Lynch101]

Is there a fundamental assumption in QM?

I guess that's partially what I'm trying to find out. I've heard from various sources that Bell's Theorem implies that one of either realism, locality, local realism, or free will must be given up because they are fundamental assumptions of Bell's theorem and the violation of the inequalities implies one or more of the 4 must be jettisoned.

The notion of free will that gets cited by various sources, including Bell and Conway (of the free will theorem) appears to be the common sense notion of free will.

 

[Demystifier]

Neither deterministic nor probabilistic fundamental laws are compatible with a true free will. If the behavior is deterministic that it's not free, if the behavior is probabilistic then it's not controlled by a will.